Reverse engineering Internet banking
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1 Reverse engineering Internet banking Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Digital Security 24 June 2013 Nijmegen (The Netherlands) Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 1 / 17
2 Outline Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 2 / 17
3 1 Handheld smartcard readers: USB-connected & unconnected 2 ABN-AMRO & ING Direct 3 E.dentifier2 : Attack to e.dentifier2 (2012) 4 Try the attack in the new readers 5 Additional funcionalities: Mode1 & Mode2 Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 3 / 17
4 EMV-CAP Based on EMV Reverse engineered EMV-CAP handheld smartcard readers Login & Signing using challenge-response e.dentifier2 ABN-AMRO EMV-CAP reader Reverse engineered by Digital Security Versions : Old (2007) & new (2012) Modes: USB-connected & unconnected Operations: Login & Signing of transactions Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 4 / 17
5 Challenge-response 2 Application Cryptograms (AC) are created as proof of authorization from smartcard ARQC (Authorization Request Cryptogram). Response against the challenge sent AAC (Application Authentication Cryptogram). Verification DigiPass 850 ING Direct EMV-CAP reader Modes: USB-connected & unconnected Operations: Login & Signing of transactions Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 5 / 17
6 SWYS aka What You Sign Is What You See (WYSIWYS) Pretend to avoid Man-in-the-browser attacks PIN code has been entered in the reader Cardholder can accept/deny operations messages Cardholder can understand messages But: Bad designed ( Attack by Digital Security ) Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 6 / 17
7 Vunerability in the old e.dentifier2 Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 7 / 17
8 Attack in the old e.dentifier2 Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 8 / 17
9 Patch in the new e.dentifier2 Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 9 / 17
10 Possible correct SWYS protocol Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 10 / 17
11 1 Wireshark & USBTrace 2 RebelSim & RealTerm 3 Fake bankcard with Javacards 4 Own webpage 5 Python code using PyUSB library 6 Firebug Add-on Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 11 / 17
12 Big picture Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 12 / 17
13 Mode1 GetMode1Response (Challenge, Currency, Amount) JavaScript functions in ABN-AMRO website. File :BECON.js Reverse engineered Signing using challenge-response Unconnected mode has this mode Challenge 8 numeric digits Currency 4 digits for EMV code (0978 e) (0826 ) (0840 $) Amount 12 numeric digits between [ , ,99] Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 13 / 17
14 Protocol of GetMode1Response Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 14 / 17
15 Reverse engineering Mode1 Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 15 / 17
16 Mode2 GetMode2Response() JavaScript functions in ABN-AMRO website. File :BECON.js Reverse engineered Login Generate a right response Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 16 / 17
17 Protocol of GetMode2Response Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 17 / 17
18 if (SWYS) safe++; else problems=true; Mode1 & Mode2 are more secure Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Bachelor thesis Reverse engineering Internet banking 18 / 17
Reverse engineering Internet Banking
Reverse engineering Internet Banking Eduardo Pablo Novella Lorente Institute for Computing and Information Science Digital Security Group Radboud University Nijmegen The Netherlands A thesis supervised
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