STRATEGIC PROGRAMME DOCUMENT. DRC-DDG in IRAQ

Transcription

1 STRATEGIC PROGRAMME DOCUMENT DRC-DDG in IRAQ

2 Contents 1.0 Summary... I 2.0. Situational analysis... II 2.4. Activities by and plans of other assistance actors... VI 2.5. Critical conditions for provision of assistance... VII 3.0. DRC-DDG s programme objectives and priorities... VII 3.1. Vision and contextual exit criteria... VII 3.2. Objectives and target groups... VIII 3.3. Application of critical operational principles... IX 4.0. Enabling factors... X 4.1. Relations with key stakeholders and partners... X 4.2. DRC s capacity... X Organisation and logistics... X Staff capacity... X Handling safety... XI 4.3. Funding... XI Annexes... XI A Map... XI B Results Contract XI

3 1.0 Summary Over the course of 2014 the political and humanitarian context in Iraq deteriorated significantly. An increase in sectarian violence and the rise of armed opposition groups (AOG) has resulted in massive displacement in several governorates, placing additional strain on local authorities already struggling under the weight of old IDP case loads and growing numbers of refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. In August the UN declared Iraq a level three emergency, placing the crisis on a par with events in Syria, CAR and South Sudan. In order to address the needs of those affected by the conflict humanitarian actors have been obliged to re-focus their programming, moving away from recovery and returning to emergency response activities. UNOCHA estimates that a total of 5.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Iraq, of whom 1.8 million are those displaced by conflict and 1.5 million are affected host communities. A further 1.7 million people are not directly affected by the displacement, but are living in areas controlled by armed groups and are therefore largely beyond the reach of humanitarian actors. These numbers are supplemented by the estimated 200,000 (and increasing) Syrian refugees currently living in Iraq. Kurdistan region: The surge in violence linked to AOG has resulted in the displacement of 1.8 million people, 47% of whom are now hosted by the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The majority of the displaced have, to date, settled in informal locations such as municipal buildings or have been taken in by host families. However, in November 2014 the KRI government announced its intention to move the IDP population into camps, many of which are currently under construction. Many of these IDPs have expressed a reluctance to move into camps. In addition to the internally displaced, the KRI also hosts more than 215,000 Syrian refugees who have fled the conflict in their home country. As of 31 st August 2014 the KRI was hosting refugees in 10 camps located throughout its three governorates. However, some 60 percent of refugees in KRI do not live in camps but with host communities throughout the region. Those living outside formal camps have little or no access to basic services. According to UNHCR refugees and IDPs now make up 20% of the total population of KRI. South and Central Iraq: Armed opposition groups comprised of, amongst others, tribal militias, members of the former regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have taken control of much of Central Iraq. Large parts of the governorates of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-din and Diyala are now under their control, prompting an exodus of civilians fleeing the conflict. It is thought that 13 percent of all those displaced remain in areas controlled by ISIL or other groups, putting them largely beyond the reach of humanitarian actors. Central Iraq is also host to Syrian refugees, albeit in far smaller numbers than seen in KRI. The deterioration in Iraq s political and security environment during 2014 has resulted in a large displacement crisis which has prompted a significant re-focusing of DRC-DDG s strategy for With the situation in Iraq now declared a level three emergency, and an estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian aid, DRC-DDG has rapidly expanded its operations in order to respond. The organisation remains active in seven governorates in Iraq, with offices in Erbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Baghdad and Kerbala. In order to respond to the crisis, DRC-DDG s programming has moved from capacity development to focusing on the provision of life-saving emergency assistance. It will conduct activities in the following sectors: protection, livelihoods, WASH, shelter and CCCM. It will also work to build the capacity of duty

4 bearers to take on greater responsibility for the provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations. DRC-DDG will focus its intervention in 2015 on conflict-affected populations, in the understanding that this encompasses refugees, IDPs, returnees, host communities, and those who experienced conflict but remained in situ. It will focus on ensuring that it is able to continue to respond to the present caseload, is prepared to respond to any new caseloads as they occur, and is in a position to support the identification and implementation of realistic durable solutions for those affected by the crisis. All interventions will be in line with agreed humanitarian priorities as specified in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the Iraq-specific Strategic Planning Document (SPD) and the more recent Fast Track Priorities for Iraq document endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). In addition to the many difficulties already faced by the displaced and the broad range of assistance provided by DRC-DDG the situation in Iraq and in particular Kurdistan is worsened by the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW). With this in mind DDG plans on initiating a small programme to run parallel with that of DRC providing risk education and technical support Situational analysis 2.1. Root causes of conflict and displacement Iraq has suffered from decades of insecurity and instability. It has long been plagued by sectarian tension, as the Sunni and Shia communities have vied for political and economic control. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni minority have felt marginalised from both political and economic processes. The progression of the Syrian conflict saw the emergence and expansion of radical Islamist groups, with the most notable being the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL s objective is to establish a Sunni caliphate, and is extremely hostile to both Shia and non-muslims. As it pushed eastward into Iraq, it rapidly overtook several large towns and came close to overrunning Baghdad. The ISIL advance has been marked by extreme brutality. Shia, non-muslims and those who have resisted the ISIL domination have been subject to massive human rights violations, including acts which constitute war crimes. 1 It is within this context that 2014 has seen three major waves of internal displacement resulting from the activities of ISIL and other AOGs. The first wave occurred in December 2013/January 2014 following extensive military operations in and around the town of Fallujah. The second wave took place in June when Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, came under attack from ISIL and affiliated groups. The third wave came in August, when ISIL attacks on Tel Afar district, resulting in the highly publicized displacement of the Yazidi community from Sinjar. This displacement is in addition to the previously mentioned populations of Syrian refugees. It is possible that this number will grow in coming months as the conflict intensifies in northern regions of Syria. Kurdistan region 1 Amnesty International, Ethnic Cleansing on a Historic Scale: Islamic State s Targeting of Minorities in Northern Iraq, 2014

5 Until the fall of Mosul in June 2014 the bulk of persons seeking protection in the KRI constituted refugees from Syria. When questioned in September 2013 the majority of refugees stated that they left their homes as a direct result of armed conflict. However, the same people also reported economic motives for choosing KRI as destination. 2 In the final months of 2014 the number of Syrian refugees arriving KRI increased as people tried to escape the ISIL advance towards Kobane and the surrounding areas. To date, approximately 25,000 refugees from Kobane have arrived in the KRI, of which some 85 percent are in Erbil governorate. There is every indication that this flow of refugees will continue into 2015 and may even increase, should the international community intensify its campaign against ISIL in Syria. The advance of ISIL and its affiliated groups into eastern areas of Iraq over the course of 2014 prompted much of the internal migration into the KRI. The fall of Mosul in June 2014 resulted in an initial influx of approximately 450,000 IDPs. Further ISIL advances have continued to provoke additional displacement, adding to the numbers of IDPs arriving in the KRI, many of whom are from religious and ethnic minority groups. Should Iraqi government forces attempt to drive ISIL out of Mosul and surrounding areas, as is expected, it is likely that another wave of IDPs will try to seek protection in KRI. South and Central Iraq Those fleeing the ISIL advance have also fled into parts of Central Iraq, the majority of who remain in those parts of Anbar and Ninewa governorates not under control of ISIL or affiliated groups. Smaller, but still significant, numbers of IDPs can also be found in Salah al-din, Diyala, Kirkuk governorates. The Iraqi armed forces are already encroaching into ISIL-held territory, and it is likely that there will be further waves of IDPs in Central Iraq. The current wave of displacement forms the most recent chapter in Iraq s long history of violence, and significant numbers of people remain displaced from former outbreaks of violence. Reliable figures are hard to come by, but UNHCR estimates that there remain 1.1 million individuals associated with the old caseload of displacement following the outbreak of sectarian violence in Given Iraq s history of conflict, there is also large population of Iraqi refugees living outside the country. Following an improvement in security in 2008 attempts were made to support their voluntary return. This process continued at a fairly slow pace until 2013, when the deteriorating security situation once again put a halt to the returns process. It is unlikely that the security situation will stabilise far enough to encourage voluntary return in 2015, but there should be continued awareness of the existence of Iraqis refugees outside their country of origin Humanitarian situation needs and gaps Kurdistan region There are currently believed to be some 850,000 displaced people in KRI, of whom approximately 60 percent are being hosted by friends or family, or have arranged their own rented accommodation. The remaining IDPs are staying either in collective shelters (24%), in tents (3%) or in the open (11%). The 2 REACH Situational Report, 5 th September 2013

6 majority of the IDPs originate from Sinjar and Mosul districts, in Ninewa Governorate, and approximately 86 percent report leaving their homes in June and August 2014, indicating that the caseload is newly arrived and closely linked to recent ISIL incursions. OCHA reports that over half of all the IDPs in the current caseload are children. It is estimated that the prevalence of female-headed households is around five percent. The KRI government has recently announced its intention to move all IDPs who are currently living in informal settlements into 26 camps, some of which are inhabited and others which are still under construction. The majority of the IDPs assessed in August 2014 (64%) cited a permanent end to the conflict as an essential pre-condition for their return to their areas of origin. As that is unlikely in the near future, it can be expected that the IDPs will remain displaced well into 2015, if not beyond. The 2014/2015 Strategic Response Plan states that its overarching objective is the protection of civilians. Women, children and members of minority communities are considered to be particularly in need. In addition to protection activities there is a need for effective camp management, in addition to a scale-up of shelter and basic service provision activities. Host communities also require support to cope with the rapid influx of displaced people, which is essential both for humanitarian reasons and to ensure continued social cohesion between displaced and host groups. As with the IDP population, the majority of Syrian refugees currently residing in KRI do not live in camps. As a result they have reduced access to community services, and may not have their needs adequately addressed. In the most recent Regional Response and Resilience Plan (3RP) UNHCR has identified the need for providing life-saving emergency assistance, including food, WASH, health care, shelter and NFIs. It also places an emphasis on the need for protection assistance, including legal advice and counselling, and for community-based protection mechanisms. Finally, there is a push to focus on building the resilience of communities and institutions, to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis and to encourage recovery and transformation. South and Central Iraq As of November 2014, approximately 700,000 people were displaced in the central region, with the overwhelming majority living in the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al-din. Large parts of these districts are currently under the control of ISIL or associated armed groups, and therefore are beyond the reach of humanitarian partners. Efforts have been made to conduct needs assessments remotely, and the emerging picture is bleak. Fewer than ten percent of health facilities are functional, due largely to the lack of power and medicine. The majority of the IDPs are living in rented accommodation, using their savings to support themselves and thereby reducing their ability to cope with further shocks. In many areas fuel shortages are common, and rapid inflation is increasing the price of food and suppressing household purchasing power. Although limited data are available, it can be assumed that the IDP populations also require significant protection support. The conflict and subsequent displacement has disrupted both food production and distribution; as a result 2.8 million people are now classed as food insecure. In addition, public service provision has deteriorated dramatically over the course of the year. Health and education facilities have been damaged in the fighting and the flight of health and education professionals has severely reduced the ability to deliver services.

7 The humanitarian community is increasingly concerned about levels of food insecurity within the country given the disruption caused to the government-run Public Distribution System (PDS), which provides food rations to millions of at-risk families The World Food Programme forecasts that 2 million people will be without food support from January In the medium to long-term, ongoing conflict in Ninewa and Salah al-din governorates could have a severe impact on the country s ability to feed itself, given that these two governorates are responsible for producing nearly a third of the country s wheat. ERW Contamination Iraq has played host to numerous conflicts over the last century, from WWI, through revolution in 1920 to WWII, the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980 s, the first and second Gulf wars and the numerous rounds of internecine fighting that have often followed international events. Currently the country finds itself embroiled in a vicious struggle with ISIL. All of these engagements have contributed to an ERW contamination problem that is amongst the worst in the world posing serious and life threatening risks to the population and a severe blockage to economic development. Whilst contamination remains across large swathes of the country much of it is historical, well known, marked and presents a limited threat to the population. The defensive minefields laid during the Iran-Iraq war to protect the border with Iran through the Shat Al-Arab district of Basra Governance are a good example of high density mine and ERW contamination that presents little immediate threat whilst requiring hundreds of millions of dollars to properly eradicate. In contrast the regions of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulemaniyah (along with Basra the most heavily contaminated regions in Iraq as identified by the LIS) contain a deadly legacy not known to the approximately 1,000,000 displaced people who now find themselves seeking refuge there. This coupled with growing reports of ISIL laying mines and placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) within their homes and villages means a very real and immediate threat is now faced by significant numbers. DDG believes that some of this can be alleviated by the provision of relatively inexpensive risk education and intends to create a small programme to run in synch with that of DRC-DDG to provide this and other services Identification of key duty-bearers National, Regional and Local Government Kurdistan region The government of KRI is extremely active in the humanitarian response, which it manages through several bodies and Government Emergency Cells, each operating at governorate level. The individual bodies manage the humanitarian response, and are motivated and extremely active. They manage the coordination of humanitarian action. Their capacity is somewhat good, but further support is required to ensure that their technical skills continue to improve. KRG financial resources to respond are presently limited, with reduced transfers from Central Government coupled with the lack of a legal framework to

8 directly sell oil from KRI in international markets. Mine Action activities are overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA). South and Central Iraq In South and Central Iraq DRC interacts with duty-bearers at national and governorate level. The Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) are the key line ministries. Both have competent technical staff and operate within a policy framework, although implementation and coordination are weak. Both ministries have had sufficient resources (this may change with recent reductions in prices on the global oil market). They are cooperative, and supportive of DRC s work in South Central Iraq. At the governorate level, DRC-DDG engages with provincial councils and Governorate Emergency Cells, with whom DRC also has a good relationship. These organisations have authority at a governorate level, and require support to increase their capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Mine Action is overseen by the Department of Mine Action (DMA) who are assisted in the South by the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) in Basra. United Nations The UN maintains a large and active presence in the north and south-central areas, with large-scale humanitarian programming by key agencies including UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, with coordination through OCHA. UN agency funding and technical support to refugees, IDPs and other conflict-affected populations is largely sectorial according to standard cluster lines, with overall leadership provided by the Humanitarian Coordinator supported by HCT that comprises UN heads of agencies, INGO representatives and several key donors. DRC engages actively in relevant cluster and IDP coordination forums and is presently an elected INGO representative on the HCT Activities by and plans of other assistance actors Iraq has been the recipient of donor funds for many years. Until recently these funds were provided by traditional humanitarian donors: the UN, the European Union, the governments of the US, the UK, Denmark, Sweden etc. However, in mid-2014 the government of Saudi Arabia provided the UN with 500 million USD in additional funding to address the growing humanitarian crisis. This influx of cash substantially increased the ability of the humanitarian community to respond to the emergency, and by the end of 2014 there were 36 international relief actors present in the country. In addition, there are approximately 70 national NGOs registered and active throughout the country. As Iraq is now a level three emergency, the various emergency funding mechanisms that had been dismantled have now been re-established. As a result, the UN agencies and humanitarian partners in Iraq produced a Strategic Response Plan which will be used as an advocacy and fundraising tool in South and Central Iraq The Iraqi government remains a key interlocutor with regards to issues of displacement and humanitarian assistance. The key line ministries are the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). These line ministries operate according to a legal framework

9 and have strong technical capacity. However, the scale of the crisis has largely exhausted their capacity, and additional support is required. UN OCHA is responsible for coordinating the IDP response through the cluster system. Kurdistan region The differing legal status of IDPs and refugees has resulted in a division of responsibility between two lead UN agencies. As per its mandate, UNHCR leads the Syrian refugee response, coordinating humanitarian activities and supporting the government to fulfil its legal obligations to the refugee population. As part of its regional plan to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, UNHCR has produced the 3RP. This plan forms the basis of the integrated refugee response, and will guide UNHCR programming in As in the central Iraq region, UN OCHA is the responsible for coordinating IDP response activities. The KRI authorities, as mentioned above, are extremely active in the humanitarian response, and coordinate closely with humanitarian actors. They take a leading role in the management, administration and coordination of the camps, with a stronger involvement relating to IDPs than refugees. Coordination is devolved to governorate level, and is overseen by Governorate Emergency Cells Critical conditions for provision of assistance Three key factors have been identified as critical to DRC-DDG s ability to provide assistance. The first necessary condition is access, both to the beneficiary populations and to key humanitarian and government partners. In order for this condition to be met, the security situation must remain relatively stable. Should the security situation deteriorate to the extent that field access is compromised, and government/un offices are placed off limits, DRC-DDG s ability to provide effective assistance will be compromised. The second factor critical for success is the capacity of national and international staff. In 2014 DRC in Iraq experienced rapid growth, and as a result now has substantially more national and international staff than it has ever before. In order to deliver high quality and effective programming, DRC must recruit and retain staff with high levels of technical and managerial capacity. The continued availability of funds is the third critical condition for the provision of assistance. The scale of the crisis unfolding in Iraq will require extensive investment over the immediate and long term. Current funding levels are sufficient for the immediate response only, but must be sustained in order to enable programming aimed at promoting resilience and durable solutions DRC-DDG s programme objectives and priorities 3.1. Vision and contextual exit criteria Vision: National and sub-national (Iraq & KRI) governments, as capacitated prime duty bearers, assume full responsibility for providing for the needs of conflict-affected communities, including the identification and implementation of appropriate durable solutions to both long and short-term displacement crises.

10 Phase-Out Strategy: The current crisis notwithstanding, as a middle-income country Iraq has the financial potential to provide its citizens with a comfortable standard of living. However, it is currently a long way from being able to realise this potential, and it is unlikely that it will be able to do so for several years. Therefore, within the scope of this SPD, DRC s strategy is to increasingly support government duty bearers to take effective responsibility for providing for the needs of conflict-affected populations communities and individuals. As government capacities increase, DRC would begin to phase out its operations. Program Exit: DRC does not foresee that this vision will be realised within the near future, but will continue to develop its programming to contribute to this long-term goal Objectives and target groups 3-year programme objectives: Emergency: To provide emergency assistance and improve the protection environment of vulnerable displacement affected individuals and communities in Iraq. Protracted Displacement: To develop and support integrated livelihood capacities of displacement affected populations with a focus on women and youth. Resilience & Stabilization: To support the identification and implementation of durable solutions for conflict-affected populations, including safe return and/or sustainable integration. 3-year capability objectives: Support functions (HR, Finance, Procurement & logs) capacities in all DRC Iraq offices meet or exceed (providing surge capacity) programme requirements and DRC policies and procedures are fully applied. Development of national staff capabilities leading to the placement of national staff in management positions. DRC Iraq has expertise and credibility with key stakeholders to effectively engage with and inform national and regional level policy. Programme Objectives for 2015: Emergency: DRC Iraq will meet the Immediate and short term needs of new displacees through a combination of food, NFI, cash and protection assistance. Protracted Displacement: Displaced populations are supported through camp management, WASH, livelihoods, protection and community acceptance activities and services. Resilience and Stabilisation: Depending on possibilities of safe return of IDPs, CDRD/S and livelihoods restoration projects are established in return communities in currently contested areas. Capability objectives for 2015: Support functions (HR, Finance, Procurement & logs, Security) capacities in all DRC Iraq offices are better able to meet current programme requirements and DRC policies and procedures are fully applied. Improved retention of key programme, management and support staff.

11 Target Groups: One of the features of the crisis to date has been the use of broadly assigned beneficiary categories to determine the nature of the response provided to each. This has resulted in some groups benefiting at the expense of others, with little reference to each group s relative needs. In order to address this issue DRC will target populations affected by conflict throughout the country; this term encompasses both new and old caseloads of IDPs, Syrian refugees, returnees, and host communities. Within the broader context of these communities, individuals and/or households and groups categorised as being exposed to higher protection risks and having specific needs will be prioritised for service provision. DRC-DDG will place an emphasis on working in camps and collective centres but will also ensure that, where necessary, measures are put in place to address the needs of the conflict-affected in urban contexts. This includes ensuring that host families and communities receive the support they need to mitigate the additional burden placed on them by large-scale displacement Application of critical operational principles Rights and Community-based approach: Whenever possible, DRC will ensure people of concern are actively involved and participate in all phases of the project cycle, thus promoting self-protection, resilience and empowerment of people of concern and build on these to deliver protection and solutions. Integrated Programming: Wherever suitable, multiple activities are implemented in the same area/community to increase their total impact and address the needs of the displaced populations and reduce the burden on the host community. DRC believes that providing multiple services through integrated programming is vital to ensure access and to meet the expectations of different groups affected by displacement. Adopting this comprehensive approach as opposed to focusing on one set of needs improves DRC s image with the local community and other stakeholders including government authorities and increases the sustainability of the interventions. Building capacities of local stakeholders: DRC has adopted a flexible approach to coordination and capacity building of national stakeholders by focusing on the persons, organisations, and/or authorities who show interest and ability. The difficult working environment in Iraq makes it even more important to strengthen local resources, thereby making capacity building initiatives a priority for DRC. Transparency, accountability and complementarities: DRC is an independent NGO operating in a transparent manner towards donors, authorities, and beneficiaries. DRC-DDG is committed to accountability towards beneficiaries and therefore, DRC-DDG involves the beneficiary population in the development and implementation of all activities whenever possible. Furthermore, in order to maximise impact by ensuring that programmes complement each other, DRC coordinates closely with all relevant stakeholders to avoid overlaps and use resources wisely. Gender sensitivity: DRC is committed to identify the particular needs of and risks faced by women, girls, men and boys in all phases of project management and to formulate strategies and guidelines for how to address these. Iraq is in a transition period of increasing influence from conservative religious groups, making the needs of women especially important to address. When appropriate, DRC takes appropriate action to address gender-specific challenges.

12 Strengthening accountability: Due to the additional challenges posed by the volatile security environment in Iraq, the need to strengthen accountability towards the beneficiary population is very strong. DRC has been certified by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and strives to implement the requirements under the HAP benchmarks whenever possible Enabling factors 4.1. Relations with key stakeholders and partners DRC engages fully in international, regional, national and sub-national coordination activities. It is an elected member of the Humanitarian Country Team and a founding and board member of the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq, and attends all of the relevant sectorial clusters and working groups. DRC also coordinates regularly with central authorities such as the MoLSA and the MoDM, and the NGO Directorate. At the sub-national level, DRC-DDG meets and coordinates with governorate authorities, provincial councils, local councils, and the regional branches of line ministries such as DoWS, MoSLA and MoDM. In addition, DRC places great emphasis on consulting and coordinating with communities and beneficiary populations at all stages of the project cycle, from development to close out, to ensure that activities continue to meet the needs and expectations of all stakeholders DRC s capacity Organisation and logistics The Country Director is responsible for overall management of the DRC Iraq country programme, and works from the country coordination office in Erbil. The CD reports to the Director of the Middle East & North Africa region, based in Amman. DRC international programme staff is based in three programme offices, in Baghdad, Erbil and Dohuk. Sub-offices in Zakho (Dohuk governorate) and Kerbala are managed by national staff. The DDG country director also sits in Erbil and separately manages mine action activities and associate country/local representation, but using DRC logistic and other support functions Staff capacity Throughout 2014 DRC grew rapidly in order to respond to the emergency needs of both IDPs and refugees. As of December 2014 it has 31 international and over 150 national staff, with offices in four governorates (This excludes DDG staff in Basra, as DDG is closing operations there December 2014.) As a result, DRC has extremely wide reach within Iraq and a broad understanding of both the dynamics in-country, and the scale of need. The stretching of management and administrative capacities by the 2014 scale-up is currently being addressed with enhanced finance, procurement, logistics and HR functions at field and country office levels. An important focus in 2015 will be on further consolidating this expansion and developing some excess capacity to meet new emergencies. An emphasis will be also placed on developing national staff to fill some of the key operational and project management functions currently held by short-term expatriate staff.

13 Handling safety Iraq is a highly insecure country, although there are significant variations across the various locations. Security remains of great concern when planning and implementing programming. Although security has not yet deteriorated to the levels seen during , it does remain a key issue for consideration. Baghdad, which is currently rated at security level 5 (of 6), experiences regular IED bombings and other incidents aimed at provoking sectarian tensions, and as a result staff are subjected to extensive security restrictions. Much of South and Central Iraq is inaccessible to both international and national staff, greatly restricting DRC s ability to implement programming. Where direct access is not possible, activities are implemented through national partners, using remote management practices, but even these activities are subject to rigorous and regular security analysis. To date the security situation in KRI has been more stable than that in South and Central Iraq. However, the final months of 2014 have seen an increasing level of threat, and the detonation of a vehicle-borne IED at the governor s office in Erbil. It remains to be seen whether this event was a one-off, or is the start of deterioration in the security situation. New developments will be monitored closely, and new regulations will be put in place as necessary Funding DRC s funding in 2014 was provided by a number of donors including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, SIDA, DANIDA, OFDA, BPRM, ECHO and DFID. Many grants during 2014 were short-term, six months or less. In order to meet the objective set out above, DRC-DDG will seek longer-term funding which allows integrated programming. It will also seek to further develop integrated activities which address conflict-affected populations as a whole, rather than running parallel projects which cater separately to the needs of IDPS/refugees/host communities. Annexes A Map B Results Contract 2015

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