# Cryptography CS 555. Topic 3: One-time Pad and Perfect Secrecy. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 1

Save this PDF as:

Size: px
Start display at page:

## Transcription

1 Cryptography CS 555 Topic 3: One-time Pad and Perfect Secrecy CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 1

2 Outline and Readings Outline One-time pad Perfect secrecy Limitation of perfect secrecy Usages of one-time pad Readings: Katz and Lindell: Chapter 2 CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 2

3 One-Time Pad Fix the vulnerability of the Vigenere cipher by using very long keys Key is a random string that is at least as long as the plaintext Encryption is similar to shift cipher Invented by Vernam in the 1920s CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 3

4 One-Time Pad Let Z m ={0,1,,m-1} be the alphabet. Plaintext space = Ciphtertext space = Key space = (Z m ) n The key is chosen uniformly randomly Plaintext X = (x 1 x 2 x n ) Key K = (k 1 k 2 k n ) Ciphertext Y = (y 1 y 2 y n ) e k (X) = (x 1 +k 1 x 2 +k 2 x n +k n ) mod m d k (Y) = (y 1 -k 1 y 2 -k 2 y n -k n ) mod m CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 4

5 The Binary Version of One-Time Pad Plaintext space = Ciphtertext space = Keyspace = {0,1} n Key is chosen randomly For example: Plaintext is Key is Then ciphertext is CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 5

6 Bit Operators Bit AND 0 0 = = = = 1 Bit OR 0 0 = = = = 1 Addition mod 2 (also known as Bit XOR) 0 0 = = = = 0 Can we use operators other than Bit XOR for binary version of One-Time Pad? CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 6

7 How Good is One-Time Pad? Intuitively, it is secure The key is random, so the ciphertext is completely random How to formalize the confidentiality requirement? Want to say certain thing is not learnable by the adversary (who sees the ciphertext). But what is the certain thing? Which (if any) of the following is the correct answer? The key. The plaintext. Any bit of the plaintext. Any information about the plaintext. E.g., the first bit is 1, the parity is 0, or that the plaintext is not aaaa, and so on CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 7

8 Perfect Secrecy: Shannon (Information-Theoretic) Security Basic Idea: Ciphertext should provide no information about Plaintext Have several equivalent formulations: The two random variables M and C are independent Observing what values C takes does not change what one believes the distribution M is Knowing what is value of M does not change the distribution of C Encrypting two different messages m 0 and m 1 results in exactly the same distribution. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 8

9 Perfect Secrecy Definition 1 Definition 2.1 (From textbook). (Gen,Enc,Dec) over a message space M is perfectly secure if We have probability distribution over M message m M ciphertext c C for which Pr[C=c] > 0 Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m]. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 9

10 Perfect Secrecy Definition 0 Definition. (Gen,Enc,Dec) over a message space M is perfectly secure if probability distribution over M The random variables M and C are independent. That is, message m M ciphertext c C Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m] Pr [C = c] CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 10

11 Definition 0 equiv. Definition 1 Definition 0 implies Definition 1 Idea: Given Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m] Pr [C = c], for any c such that Pr [C = c] > 0, divide both sides of the above with Pr [C = c], we have Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m]. Definition 1 implies Definition 0 Idea: c C s.t. Pr[C=c] > 0 Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m], multiple both side by Pr[C=c], obtain Pr [M=m C=c] = Pr [M = m] Pr [C = c] c C s.t. Pr[C=c] = 0 we have Pr [M=m C=c] = 0 = Pr [M=m] Pr[C=c] CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 11

12 Perfect Secrecy. Definition 2. Definition in Lemma 2.2. (Gen,Enc,Dec) over a message space M is perfectly secure if We have probability distribution over M message m M (assuming Pr[M=m]>0) ciphertext c C Pr [C=c M=m] = Pr [C = c]. Equivalence with Definition 0 straightforward. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 12

13 Perfect Indistinguishability Definition in Lemma 2.3. (Gen,Enc,Dec) over a message space M is perfectly secure if We have probability distribution over M messages m 0,m 1 M ciphertext c C Pr [C=c M=m 0 ] = Pr [C=c M=m 1 ] To prove that this definition implies Definition 0, consider Pr [C=c]. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 13

14 Adversarial Indistinguishability Define an experiment called PrivK eav : Involving an Adversary and a Challenger Instantiated with an Adv algorithm A, and an encryption scheme = (Gen, Enc, Dec) Challenger k Gen() b R {0,1} m 0, m 1 C=E k [m b ] b {0,1} Adversary chooses m 0, m 1 M PrivK eav = 1 if b=b, and PrivK eav = 0 if b b CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 14

15 Adversarial Indistinguishability (con d) Definition 2.4. (Gen,Enc,Dec) over a message space M is perfectly secure if adversary A it holds that Pr[PrivK eav A, =1] = ½ Proposition 2.5. Definition 2.1 is equivalent to Definition 2.4. CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 15

16 Perfect Secrecy Fact: When keys are uniformly chosen in a cipher, a deterministic cipher has Shannon security iff. the number of keys encrypting m to c is the same for any pair of (m,c) One-time pad has perfect secrecy (Proof?) In textbook CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 16

17 The Bad News Theorem for Perfect Secrecy Question: OTP requires key as long as messages, is this an inherent requirement for achieving perfect secrecy? Answer. Yes. Perfect secrecy implies that key-length msg-length Proof: Plaintext space Cipherttext space Implication: Perfect secrecy difficult to achieve in practice CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 17

18 Key Randomness in One-Time Pad One-Time Pad uses a very long key, what if the key is not chosen randomly, instead, texts from, e.g., a book are used as keys. this is not One-Time Pad anymore this does not have perfect secrecy this can be broken How? The key in One-Time Pad should never be reused. If it is reused, it is Two-Time Pad, and is insecure! Why? CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 18

19 Usage of One-Time Pad To use one-time pad, one must have keys as long as the messages. To send messages totaling certain size, sender and receiver must agree on a shared secret key of that size. typically by sending the key over a secure channel This is difficult to do in practice. Can t one use the channel for send the key to send the messages instead? Why is OTP still useful, even though difficult to use? CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 19

20 Usage of One-Time Pad The channel for distributing keys may exist at a different time from when one has messages to send. The channel for distributing keys may have the property that keys can be leaked, but such leakage will be detected Such as in Quantum cryptography CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 20

21 Coming Attractions Cryptography: Block ciphers, encryption modes, cryptographic functions CS555 Spring 2012/Topic 3 21

### 1 Message Authentication

Theoretical Foundations of Cryptography Lecture Georgia Tech, Spring 200 Message Authentication Message Authentication Instructor: Chris Peikert Scribe: Daniel Dadush We start with some simple questions

### Post-Quantum Cryptography #4

Post-Quantum Cryptography #4 Prof. Claude Crépeau McGill University http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~crepeau/waterloo 185 ( 186 Attack scenarios Ciphertext-only attack: This is the most basic type of attack

### SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION. Mihir Bellare UCSD 1

SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION Mihir Bellare UCSD 1 Syntax A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K,E,D) consists of three algorithms: K and E may be randomized, but D must be deterministic. Mihir Bellare UCSD 2 Correct

### Talk announcement please consider attending!

Talk announcement please consider attending! Where: Maurer School of Law, Room 335 When: Thursday, Feb 5, 12PM 1:30PM Speaker: Rafael Pass, Associate Professor, Cornell University, Topic: Reasoning Cryptographically

### Authentication and Encryption: How to order them? Motivation

Authentication and Encryption: How to order them? Debdeep Muhopadhyay IIT Kharagpur Motivation Wide spread use of internet requires establishment of a secure channel. Typical implementations operate in

### Lecture 10: CPA Encryption, MACs, Hash Functions. 2 Recap of last lecture - PRGs for one time pads

CS 7880 Graduate Cryptography October 15, 2015 Lecture 10: CPA Encryption, MACs, Hash Functions Lecturer: Daniel Wichs Scribe: Matthew Dippel 1 Topic Covered Chosen plaintext attack model of security MACs

### Message Authentication Code

Message Authentication Code Ali El Kaafarani Mathematical Institute Oxford University 1 of 44 Outline 1 CBC-MAC 2 Authenticated Encryption 3 Padding Oracle Attacks 4 Information Theoretic MACs 2 of 44

### Lecture 5 - Cryptography

CSE497b Introduction to Computer and Network Security - Spring 2007 - Professors Jaeger Lecture 5 - Cryptography CSE497b - Spring 2007 Introduction Computer and Network Security Professor Jaeger www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse497b-s07/

### Message Authentication Codes 133

Message Authentication Codes 133 CLAIM 4.8 Pr[Mac-forge A,Π (n) = 1 NewBlock] is negligible. We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who attacks the fixed-length MAC Π and succeeds in

### Overview of Symmetric Encryption

CS 361S Overview of Symmetric Encryption Vitaly Shmatikov Reading Assignment Read Kaufman 2.1-4 and 4.2 slide 2 Basic Problem ----- ----- -----? Given: both parties already know the same secret Goal: send

### 1 Construction of CCA-secure encryption

CSCI 5440: Cryptography Lecture 5 The Chinese University of Hong Kong 10 October 2012 1 Construction of -secure encryption We now show how the MAC can be applied to obtain a -secure encryption scheme.

### Cryptography. Jonathan Katz, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

Cryptography Jonathan Katz, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. 1 Introduction Cryptography is a vast subject, addressing problems as diverse as e-cash, remote authentication, fault-tolerant

### Dr. Jinyuan (Stella) Sun Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Tennessee Fall 2010

CS 494/594 Computer and Network Security Dr. Jinyuan (Stella) Sun Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Tennessee Fall 2010 1 Introduction to Cryptography What is cryptography?

### The Order of Encryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (Or: How Secure is SSL?)

The Order of Encryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (Or: How Secure is SSL?) Hugo Krawczyk Abstract. We study the question of how to generically compose symmetric encryption and authentication

### Lecture 3: One-Way Encryption, RSA Example

ICS 180: Introduction to Cryptography April 13, 2004 Lecturer: Stanislaw Jarecki Lecture 3: One-Way Encryption, RSA Example 1 LECTURE SUMMARY We look at a different security property one might require

### Proofs in Cryptography

Proofs in Cryptography Ananth Raghunathan Abstract We give a brief overview of proofs in cryptography at a beginners level. We briefly cover a general way to look at proofs in cryptography and briefly

MACs Message authentication and integrity Foundations of Cryptography Computer Science Department Wellesley College Table of contents Introduction MACs Constructing Secure MACs Secure communication and

### a Course in Cryptography

a Course in Cryptography rafael pass abhi shelat c 2010 Pass/shelat All rights reserved Printed online 11 11 11 11 11 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 First edition: June 2007 Second edition: September 2008 Third edition:

### Thinking of a (block) cipher as a permutation (depending on the key) on strings of a certain size, we would not want such a permutation to have many

Fixed points of permutations Let f : S S be a permutation of a set S. An element s S is a fixed point of f if f(s) = s. That is, the fixed points of a permutation are the points not moved by the permutation.

### 159.334 Computer Networks. Network Security 1. Professor Richard Harris School of Engineering and Advanced Technology

Network Security 1 Professor Richard Harris School of Engineering and Advanced Technology Presentation Outline Overview of Identification and Authentication The importance of identification and Authentication

### Message Authentication Codes. Lecture Outline

Message Authentication Codes Murat Kantarcioglu Based on Prof. Ninghui Li s Slides Message Authentication Code Lecture Outline 1 Limitation of Using Hash Functions for Authentication Require an authentic

### CSC474/574 - Information Systems Security: Homework1 Solutions Sketch

CSC474/574 - Information Systems Security: Homework1 Solutions Sketch February 20, 2005 1. Consider slide 12 in the handout for topic 2.2. Prove that the decryption process of a one-round Feistel cipher

### Provable-Security Analysis of Authenticated Encryption in Kerberos

Provable-Security Analysis of Authenticated Encryption in Kerberos Alexandra Boldyreva Virendra Kumar Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Computer Science 266 Ferst Drive, Atlanta, GA 30332-0765

### Cryptography and Network Security, PART IV: Reviews, Patches, and11.2012 Theory 1 / 53

Cryptography and Network Security, PART IV: Reviews, Patches, and Theory Timo Karvi 11.2012 Cryptography and Network Security, PART IV: Reviews, Patches, and11.2012 Theory 1 / 53 Key Lengths I The old

### Cryptography and Network Security Block Cipher

Cryptography and Network Security Block Cipher Xiang-Yang Li Modern Private Key Ciphers Stream ciphers The most famous: Vernam cipher Invented by Vernam, ( AT&T, in 1917) Process the message bit by bit

### Discrete Mathematics, Chapter 4: Number Theory and Cryptography

Discrete Mathematics, Chapter 4: Number Theory and Cryptography Richard Mayr University of Edinburgh, UK Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh, UK) Discrete Mathematics. Chapter 4 1 / 35 Outline 1 Divisibility

### Chair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München Prof. Carle. Network Security. Chapter 13

Chair for Network Architectures and Services Department of Informatics TU München Prof. Carle Network Security Chapter 13 Some More Secure Channel Issues Outline In the course we have yet only seen catastrophic

### Cryptography and Network Security

Cryptography and Network Security Xiang-Yang Li Introduction The art of war teaches us not on the likelihood of the enemy s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his

### CIS433/533 - Computer and Network Security Cryptography

CIS433/533 - Computer and Network Security Cryptography Professor Kevin Butler Winter 2011 Computer and Information Science A historical moment Mary Queen of Scots is being held by Queen Elizabeth and

Family Name:... First Name:... Section:... Advanced Cryptography Final Exam July 18 th, 2006 Start at 9:15, End at 12:00 This document consists of 12 pages. Instructions Electronic devices are not allowed.

### 1 Domain Extension for MACs

CS 127/CSCI E-127: Introduction to Cryptography Prof. Salil Vadhan Fall 2013 Reading. Lecture Notes 17: MAC Domain Extension & Digital Signatures Katz-Lindell Ÿ4.34.4 (2nd ed) and Ÿ12.0-12.3 (1st ed).

### Cryptography: Motivation. Data Structures and Algorithms Cryptography. Secret Writing Methods. Many areas have sensitive information, e.g.

Cryptography: Motivation Many areas have sensitive information, e.g. Data Structures and Algorithms Cryptography Goodrich & Tamassia Sections 3.1.3 & 3.1.4 Introduction Simple Methods Asymmetric methods:

### Lecture 9 - Message Authentication Codes

Lecture 9 - Message Authentication Codes Boaz Barak March 1, 2010 Reading: Boneh-Shoup chapter 6, Sections 9.1 9.3. Data integrity Until now we ve only been interested in protecting secrecy of data. However,

### Overview of Public-Key Cryptography

CS 361S Overview of Public-Key Cryptography Vitaly Shmatikov slide 1 Reading Assignment Kaufman 6.1-6 slide 2 Public-Key Cryptography public key public key? private key Alice Bob Given: Everybody knows

### Ch.9 Cryptography. The Graduate Center, CUNY.! CSc 75010 Theoretical Computer Science Konstantinos Vamvourellis

Ch.9 Cryptography The Graduate Center, CUNY! CSc 75010 Theoretical Computer Science Konstantinos Vamvourellis Why is Modern Cryptography part of a Complexity course? Short answer:! Because Modern Cryptography

### Developing and Investigation of a New Technique Combining Message Authentication and Encryption

Developing and Investigation of a New Technique Combining Message Authentication and Encryption Eyas El-Qawasmeh and Saleem Masadeh Computer Science Dept. Jordan University for Science and Technology P.O.

### Cryptographic Hash Functions Message Authentication Digital Signatures

Cryptographic Hash Functions Message Authentication Digital Signatures Abstract We will discuss Cryptographic hash functions Message authentication codes HMAC and CBC-MAC Digital signatures 2 Encryption/Decryption

### Effective Secure Encryption Scheme [One Time Pad] Using Complement Approach Sharad Patil 1 Ajay Kumar 2

Effective Secure Encryption Scheme [One Time Pad] Using Complement Approach Sharad Patil 1 Ajay Kumar 2 Research Student, Bharti Vidyapeeth, Pune, India sd_patil057@rediffmail.com Modern College of Engineering,

### SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF FORMAL LOGICS OF SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION. Gergely Bana A DISSERTATION. Mathematics

SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF FORMAL LOGICS OF SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION Gergely Bana A DISSERTATION in Mathematics Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the

### Authenticated encryption

Authenticated encryption Dr. Enigma Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science University of Central Florida wocjan@eecs.ucf.edu October 16th, 2013 Active attacks on CPA-secure encryption

### The application of prime numbers to RSA encryption

The application of prime numbers to RSA encryption Prime number definition: Let us begin with the definition of a prime number p The number p, which is a member of the set of natural numbers N, is considered

### encryption Presented by NTU Singapore

A survey on identity based encryption Presented by Qi Saiyu NTU Singapore Outline Introduction of public key encryption Identitybased encryption (IBE) Hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) Before

### CIS 6930 Emerging Topics in Network Security. Topic 2. Network Security Primitives

CIS 6930 Emerging Topics in Network Security Topic 2. Network Security Primitives 1 Outline Absolute basics Encryption/Decryption; Digital signatures; D-H key exchange; Hash functions; Application of hash

### Lecture 5 - CPA security, Pseudorandom functions

Lecture 5 - CPA security, Pseudorandom functions Boaz Barak October 2, 2007 Reading Pages 82 93 and 221 225 of KL (sections 3.5, 3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 6.5). See also Goldreich (Vol I) for proof of PRF construction.

### Network Security CS 5490/6490 Fall 2015 Lecture Notes 8/26/2015

Network Security CS 5490/6490 Fall 2015 Lecture Notes 8/26/2015 Chapter 2: Introduction to Cryptography What is cryptography? It is a process/art of mangling information in such a way so as to make it

### Introduction To Security and Privacy Einführung in die IT-Sicherheit I

Introduction To Security and Privacy Einführung in die IT-Sicherheit I Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Doğan Kesdoğan Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik kesdogan@fb5.uni-siegen.de http://www.uni-siegen.de/fb5/itsec/

### Security Aspects of. Database Outsourcing. Vahid Khodabakhshi Hadi Halvachi. Dec, 2012

Security Aspects of Database Outsourcing Dec, 2012 Vahid Khodabakhshi Hadi Halvachi Security Aspects of Database Outsourcing Security Aspects of Database Outsourcing 2 Outline Introduction to Database

### Introduction to Hill cipher

Introduction to Hill cipher We have explored three simple substitution ciphers that generated ciphertext C from plaintext p by means of an arithmetic operation modulo 26. Caesar cipher: The Caesar cipher

### Computer and Network Security. Alberto Marchetti Spaccamela

Computer and Network Security Alberto Marchetti Spaccamela Slides are strongly based on material by Amos Fiat Good crypto courses on the Web with interesting material on web site of: Ron Rivest, MIT Dan

### VoteID 2011 Internet Voting System with Cast as Intended Verification

VoteID 2011 Internet Voting System with Cast as Intended Verification September 2011 VP R&D Jordi Puiggali@scytl.com Index Introduction Proposal Security Conclusions 2. Introduction Client computers could

### Jigsaw-based Secure Data Transfer over Computer Networks

Jigsaw-based Secure Data Transfer over Computer Networks Rangarajan A. Vasudevan Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Chennai 600036 India ranga@cs.iitm.ernet.in Ajith

### Cryptographic hash functions and MACs Solved Exercises for Cryptographic Hash Functions and MACs

Cryptographic hash functions and MACs Solved Exercises for Cryptographic Hash Functions and MACs Enes Pasalic University of Primorska Koper, 2014 Contents 1 Preface 3 2 Problems 4 2 1 Preface This is a

### Sample or Random Security A Security Model for Segment-Based Visual Cryptography

Sample or Random Security A Security Model for Segment-Based Visual Cryptography Sebastian Pape Dortmund Technical University March 5th, 2014 Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2014 Sebastian Pape

6.857 Computer and Network Security Fall Term, 1997 Lecture 4 : 16 September 1997 Lecturer: Ron Rivest Scribe: Michelle Goldberg 1 Conditionally Secure Cryptography Conditionally (or computationally) secure

### Fundamentals of Computer Security

Fundamentals of Computer Security Spring 2015 Radu Sion Intro Encryption Hash Functions A Message From Our Sponsors Fundamentals System/Network Security, crypto How do things work Why How to design secure

### Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security. Murat Kantarcioglu

UT DALLAS Erik Jonsson School of Engineering & Computer Science Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security Murat Kantarcioglu Pag. 1 Purdue University Cryptographic Primitives We will discuss the

### Modified One Time Pad Data Security Scheme: Random Key Generation Approach

Modified One Time Pad Data Security Scheme: Random Key Generation Approach Sharad Patil Research Student, Bharti Vidyapeeth, Pune, India Manoj Devare Vidya Pratishthan s Institute of Information Technology,

### 1 Signatures vs. MACs

CS 120/ E-177: Introduction to Cryptography Salil Vadhan and Alon Rosen Nov. 22, 2006 Lecture Notes 17: Digital Signatures Recommended Reading. Katz-Lindell 10 1 Signatures vs. MACs Digital signatures

### Computational and Information-Theoretic Soundness and Completeness of Formal Encryption

Computational and Information-Theoretic Soundness and Completeness of Formal Encryption Pedro Adão Center for Logic and Computation IST, Lisbon, Portugal pad@math.ist.utl.pt Gergei Bana Department of Mathematics

### SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS MODULE EE5552 NETWORK SECURITY AND ENCRYPTION ECE, SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND DESIGN BRUNEL UNIVERSITY UXBRIDGE MIDDLESEX, UK

SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS MODULE EE5552 NETWORK SECURITY AND ENCRYPTION September 2010 (reviewed September 2014) ECE, SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND DESIGN BRUNEL UNIVERSITY UXBRIDGE MIDDLESEX, UK NETWORK SECURITY

### Chapter 11 Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Basic Cryptography

Chapter 11 Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Basic Cryptography What Is Steganography? Steganography Process of hiding the existence of the data within another file Example:

### Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 12

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 12 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (with edits by RHB) Chapter 12 Message Authentication Codes At cats' green on the Sunday he

### Introduction to Cryptography CS 355

Introduction to Cryptography CS 355 Lecture 30 Digital Signatures CS 355 Fall 2005 / Lecture 30 1 Announcements Wednesday s lecture cancelled Friday will be guest lecture by Prof. Cristina Nita- Rotaru

### Cryptography & Network Security

Cryptography & Network Security Lecture 1: Introduction & Overview 2002. 3. 27 chlim@sejong.ac.kr Common Terms(1) Cryptography: The study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security

### Cyber Security Workshop Encryption Reference Manual

Cyber Security Workshop Encryption Reference Manual May 2015 Basic Concepts in Encoding and Encryption Binary Encoding Examples Encryption Cipher Examples 1 P a g e Encoding Concepts Binary Encoding Basics

### Elliptic Curve Cryptography Methods Debbie Roser Math\CS 4890

Elliptic Curve Cryptography Methods Debbie Roser Math\CS 4890 Why are Elliptic Curves used in Cryptography? The answer to this question is the following: 1) Elliptic Curves provide security equivalent

### Common Pitfalls in Cryptography for Software Developers. OWASP AppSec Israel July 2006. The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org/

Common Pitfalls in Cryptography for Software Developers OWASP AppSec Israel July 2006 Shay Zalalichin, CISSP AppSec Division Manager, Comsec Consulting shayz@comsecglobal.com Copyright 2006 - The OWASP

### Introduction to Encryption

Computers and Society Introduction to Encryption Chris Brooks Department of Computer Science University of San Francisco Department of Computer Science University of San Francisco p.1/35 3-0: Terminology

### Network Security. Computer Networking Lecture 08. March 19, 2012. HKU SPACE Community College. HKU SPACE CC CN Lecture 08 1/23

Network Security Computer Networking Lecture 08 HKU SPACE Community College March 19, 2012 HKU SPACE CC CN Lecture 08 1/23 Outline Introduction Cryptography Algorithms Secret Key Algorithm Message Digest

### Network Security - ISA 656 Introduction to Cryptography

Network Security - ISA 656 Angelos Stavrou September 18, 2007 Codes vs. K = {0, 1} l P = {0, 1} m C = {0, 1} n, C C E : P K C D : C K P p P, k K : D(E(p, k), k) = p It is infeasible to find F : P C K Let

### One Time Pad Encryption The unbreakable encryption method

One Time Pad Encryption The unbreakable encryption method One Time Pad The unbreakable encryption method One Time Pad encryption is a very simple, yet completely unbreakable cipher method. It has been

### 9 Modular Exponentiation and Cryptography

9 Modular Exponentiation and Cryptography 9.1 Modular Exponentiation Modular arithmetic is used in cryptography. In particular, modular exponentiation is the cornerstone of what is called the RSA system.

### Identity-based Encryption with Post-Challenge Auxiliary Inputs for Secure Cloud Applications and Sensor Networks

Identity-based Encryption with Post-Challenge Auxiliary Inputs for Secure Cloud Applications and Sensor Networks Tsz Hon Yuen - Huawei, Singapore Ye Zhang - Pennsylvania State University, USA Siu Ming

### Hash Functions. Integrity checks

Hash Functions EJ Jung slide 1 Integrity checks Integrity vs. Confidentiality! Integrity: attacker cannot tamper with message! Encryption may not guarantee integrity! Intuition: attacker may able to modify

### IT Networks & Security CERT Luncheon Series: Cryptography

IT Networks & Security CERT Luncheon Series: Cryptography Presented by Addam Schroll, IT Security & Privacy Analyst 1 Outline History Terms & Definitions Symmetric and Asymmetric Algorithms Hashing PKI

### Lecture 1: Introduction. CS 6903: Modern Cryptography Spring 2009. Nitesh Saxena Polytechnic University

Lecture 1: Introduction CS 6903: Modern Cryptography Spring 2009 Nitesh Saxena Polytechnic University Outline Administrative Stuff Introductory Technical Stuff Some Pointers Course Web Page http://isis.poly.edu/courses/cs6903-s10

### Jigsaw-based Secure Data Transfer over Computer Networks

Jigsaw-based Secure Data Transfer over Computer Networks Rangarajan A. Vasudevan Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Chennai 600036 India Email: ranga@cs.iitm.ernet.in

### Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 9

Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 9 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (with edits by RHB) Chapter 9 Public Key Cryptography and RSA Every Egyptian received two names,

### CIS 5371 Cryptography. 8. Encryption --

CIS 5371 Cryptography p y 8. Encryption -- Asymmetric Techniques Textbook encryption algorithms In this chapter, security (confidentiality) is considered in the following sense: All-or-nothing secrecy.

### The New Approach of Quantum Cryptography in Network Security

The New Approach of Quantum Cryptography in Network Security Avanindra Kumar Lal 1, Anju Rani 2, Dr. Shalini Sharma 3 (Avanindra kumar) Abstract There are multiple encryption techniques at present time

### SECURITY IMPROVMENTS TO THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN SCHEMES

www.arpapress.com/volumes/vol8issue1/ijrras_8_1_10.pdf SECURITY IMPROVMENTS TO THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN SCHEMES Malek Jakob Kakish Amman Arab University, Department of Computer Information Systems, P.O.Box 2234,

### Leakage-Resilient Authentication and Encryption from Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives

Leakage-Resilient Authentication and Encryption from Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives Olivier Pereira Université catholique de Louvain ICTEAM Crypto Group B-1348, Belgium olivier.pereira@uclouvain.be

### Implementation of One-Time Pad over Web

International Journal of Engineering and Technical Research (IJETR) ISSN: 2321-0869, Volume-2, Issue-2, February 2014 Implementation of One-Time Pad over Web Sagar Chandrakar, Bhagya Shree Jain, Shrikant

### Cryptography and Network Security Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur

Cryptography and Network Security Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur Module No. # 01 Lecture No. # 05 Classic Cryptosystems (Refer Slide Time: 00:42)

### Network Security. HIT Shimrit Tzur-David

Network Security HIT Shimrit Tzur-David 1 Goals: 2 Network Security Understand principles of network security: cryptography and its many uses beyond confidentiality authentication message integrity key

### Evaluation of the RC4 Algorithm for Data Encryption

Evaluation of the RC4 Algorithm for Data Encryption Allam Mousa (1) and Ahmad Hamad (2) (1) Electrical Engineering Department An-Najah University, Nablus, Palestine (2) Systems Engineer PalTel Company,

### Symmetric Crypto MAC. Pierre-Alain Fouque

Symmetric Crypto MAC Pierre-Alain Fouque Birthday Paradox In a set of D elements, by picking at random D elements, we have with high probability a collision two elements are equal D=365, about 23 people

### CS 161 Computer Security Spring 2010 Paxson/Wagner MT2

CS 161 Computer Security Spring 2010 Paxson/Wagner MT2 PRINT your name:, (last) SIGN your name: (first) PRINT your class account login: cs161- Your T s name: Your section time: Name of the person sitting

### CS 758: Cryptography / Network Security

CS 758: Cryptography / Network Security offered in the Fall Semester, 2003, by Doug Stinson my office: DC 3122 my email address: dstinson@uwaterloo.ca my web page: http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~dstinson/index.html

### Cryptography and Network Security

Cryptography and Network Security Spring 2012 http://users.abo.fi/ipetre/crypto/ Lecture 3: Block ciphers and DES Ion Petre Department of IT, Åbo Akademi University January 17, 2012 1 Data Encryption Standard

### Secure Network Communication Part II II Public Key Cryptography. Public Key Cryptography

Kommunikationssysteme (KSy) - Block 8 Secure Network Communication Part II II Public Key Cryptography Dr. Andreas Steffen 2000-2001 A. Steffen, 28.03.2001, KSy_RSA.ppt 1 Secure Key Distribution Problem

### Cryptography Exercises

Cryptography Exercises 1 Contents 1 source coding 3 2 Caesar Cipher 4 3 Ciphertext-only Attack 5 4 Classification of Cryptosystems-Network Nodes 6 5 Properties of modulo Operation 10 6 Vernam Cipher 11

### Solutions to Problem Set 1

YALE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Handout #8 Zheng Ma February 21, 2005 Solutions to Problem Set 1 Problem 1: Cracking the Hill cipher Suppose

### Chap 2. Basic Encryption and Decryption

Chap 2. Basic Encryption and Decryption H. Lee Kwang Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, KAIST Objectives Concepts of encryption Cryptanalysis: how encryption systems are broken 2.1

### One-Way Encryption and Message Authentication

One-Way Encryption and Message Authentication Cryptographic Hash Functions Johannes Mittmann mittmann@in.tum.de Zentrum Mathematik Technische Universität München (TUM) 3 rd Joint Advanced Student School

### Computer Security CS 426. CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 40 1

Computer Security CS 426 Review for Final Exam CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 40 1 Basic Concepts Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authenticity Integrity (in communications) Non-repudiation Privacy (general

### CSCE 465 Computer & Network Security

CSCE 465 Computer & Network Security Instructor: Dr. Guofei Gu http://courses.cse.tamu.edu/guofei/csce465/ Public Key Cryptogrophy 1 Roadmap Introduction RSA Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Public key and

### Threshold Identity Based Encryption Scheme without Random Oracles

WCAN 2006 Threshold Identity Based Encryption Scheme without Random Oracles Jin Li School of Mathematics and Computational Science Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou, P.R. China Yanming Wang Lingnan College