AUTOSAR Security Modules

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1 AUTOSAR Security Modules Current Status V

2 Agenda 1. AUTOSAR 2. CAL & CSM 3. SecOC 2/40

3 AUTOSAR Introduction Automotive Open System Architecture Software for electronic control units (ECU) Software architecture SWC/Application RTE SYS COM LIB MCAL CDD Microcontroller 3/40

4 AUTOSAR Introduction Software component (SWC) / Application Implementation of functionality of ECU Runs on microcontroller Sends & receives data to and from other ECUs (in network) SWC/Application Microcontroller 4/40

5 AUTOSAR Introduction Run time environment (RTE) Provides interface to basic software (BSW) SWC/Application RTE Microcontroller 5/40

6 AUTOSAR Introduction System services (SYS) and libraries (LIB) Cryptographic modules Operating system (OS) Complex device drivers (CDD) SWC/Application RTE SYS LIB CDD Microcontroller 6/40

7 AUTOSAR Introduction Communication modules (COM) send & receive data on automotive bus systems > Controller Area Network (CAN) > Local Interconnect Network (LIN) > FlexRay > Ethernet >... SWC/Application RTE SYS COM LIB CDD Microcontroller 7/40

8 AUTOSAR Introduction Microcontroller abstraction layer (MCAL) BSW & SWC independent of microcontroller SWC/Application RTE SYS COM LIB MCAL CDD Microcontroller 8/40

9 AUTOSAR Motivation for security modules in AUTOSAR New security challenges Automotive software plays central role in car innovations Car connectivity will provide an essential part for value-added features Car security strict and secure access control to the car and its parts (ECU) sensitive car data (odometer, motor characteristic) passenger s data (GPS) intellectual property of the OEM 9/40

10 AUTOSAR AUTOSAR security modules CAL & CSM Basic cryptographic primitives for BSW and application SecOC Authenticated communication seamlessly integrated into the AUTOSAR communication stack 10/40

11 Agenda 1. AUTOSAR 2. CAL & CSM 3. SecOC 11/40

12 CAL & CSM Introduction Crypto Abstraction Library CAL BSW, CDD or SWC use CAL by inclusion Memory allocated by caller Enables re-entrance Crypto Primitive Library CPL SW implementation of cryptographic primitives Crypto Service Manager CSM CAL CPL SWC/Application RTE CSM SYS CRY CRY COM SWC use CSM through RTE LIB MCAL SHEDRV CDD BSW/CDD use CSM by inclusion Microcontroller SHE Asynchronous operation possible Callback indicates application Crypto library module CRY Implementation of cryptographic primitives Usage of SW or crypto HW possible 12/40

13 CAL & CSM Supported Cryptographic Services Abstract definition of cryptographic services No definition for a concrete cryptographic algorithm Basic Cryptography Hash Message authentication code () Generation Verification Random number generation Encryption/ Decryption Symmetric Asymmetric Signatures Key Management Key derivation function (KDF) Key generation, update*, export, import Key exchange protocols *Csm only Miscellaneous Compression/ Decompression Checksum 13/40

14 CAL & CSM Cryptographic Service Configuration AsymEncryptService AsymEncrypt_1 RSA2048 AsymEncrypt_2 RSA4096 SymEncryptService SymEncrypt_1 AES SymEncrypt_2 TwoFish HashService Individual configuration of each required service Set of distinct configurations Specific implementation for each service configuration 14/40

15 CAL & CSM Cryptographic Service Configuration AsymEncryptService AsymEncrypt_1 RSA2048 AsymEncrypt_2 RSA4096 SymEncryptService SymEncrypt_1 AES SymEncrypt_2 Serpent HashService Individual configuration of each required service Set of distinct configurations Specific implementation for each service configuration Implementations may change in future 15/40

16 CAL & CSM Cryptographic Service Configuration AsymEncryptService AsymEncrypt_1 RSA2048 ECC256 AsymEncrypt_2 RSA4096 ECC512 SymEncryptService SymEncrypt_1 AES SymEncrypt_2 Serpent HashService Individual configuration of each required service Set of distinct configurations Specific implementation for each service configuration Implementations may change in future API compatibility not ensured 16/40

17 CAL & CSM General Usage Streaming services Start Update Indefinite long data stream... Update Update... Update Finish Result Initialization with Start function (e.g. Csm_SymEncryptStart) Update function (e.g. Csm_SymEncryptUpdate) Finish function (e.g. Csm_SymEncryptFinish) Non-streaming services Example: Csm_GenerateRandom 17/40

18 CAL & CSM Hardware-based Security SWC/Application RTE CSM SYS CRY CRY LIB MCAL SHEDRV CDD Microcontroller SHE CSM services use cryptographic hardware or software implementation 18/40

19 CAL & CSM Hardware-based Security Controller Secure Zone SHE Secure Hardware Extension CPU Control Logic AES RAM + Flash + ROM Peripherals (CAN, UART,...) Secure Hardware Extension (SHE) On-chip extension to microcontroller Memory for secure storage of (cryptographic) data Hardware extension for cryptographic primitives Specified by Hersteller Initiative Software (HIS) 19/40

20 CAL & CSM SHE - Performance AES ECB Encryption: SHE vs. Software library Block 3 Blocks 6 Blocks µs SHE 64 Mhz SW 64 Mhz SHE 120 Mhz SW 120 Mhz Measured on a Freescale MPC5646C (w/ CSE), MICROSAR Stack with CSM and SHE driver with the Vector AUTOSAR Measurement and Debugging (AMD) Runtime Measurement (Rtm) Tool. 1 Block = 16 bytes 20/40

21 Agenda 1. AUTOSAR 2. CAL & CSM 3. SecOC 21/40

22 SecOC Introduction SecOC is parallel to PDUR PDUR routes PDUs PDU is a message on a bus SWC/Application RTE SecOC PDUR SYS COM LIB MCAL CDD Microcontroller 22/40

23 SecOC Introduction SecOC is parallel to PDUR PDUs are routed through SecOC PDU & authentication sent & received through IF or TP modules COM module combines data into PDUs SWC/Application RTE IF modules send & receive atomic messages TP modules manage messages longer than atomic messages SYS SecOC COM PDUR COM IF/TP LIB MCAL CDD Microcontroller 23/40

24 SecOC Introduction SecOC is parallel to PDUR PDUs are routed through SecOC PDU & authentication sent & received through IF or TP modules SecOC uses Cal or Csm RTE-interface Authentication: or signature CAL CSM SWC/Application RTE SecOC PDUR COM SYS COM IF/TP LIB MCAL CDD Microcontroller 24/40

25 SecOC Functionality ECU 1 ECU 3 Secured PDU BUS 25/40 SecOC sends & receives secured PDUs Secured PDUs are protected against Manipulation Random errors Replays

26 SecOC Sending a secured PDU ECU 1 DataID 1 Secured PDU DataID assigned to secured PDU Authentic PDU 26/40

27 SecOC Sending a secured PDU ECU 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Secured PDU Freshness value Monotonic counter to prevent replay attacks Implementation Timestamp Counter 27/40

28 SecOC Sending a secured PDU ECU 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Generator Secured PDU DataID, PDU, freshness value form input to generator Symmetric key required for generation SecOC may use C to benefit from SHE 28/40

29 SecOC Sending a secured PDU ECU 1 DataID 1 LSBs Fresh. Value Generator Fresh. Value Secured PDU MSBs PDU, truncated freshness value, truncated form secured PDU 29/40

30 SecOC Sending a secured PDU ECU 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Generator Fresh. Value Secured PDU MSBs NIST Special Publication B (C) Truncated length 64 bits Truncated length must be thoroughly chosen dependent on network attributes and security requirements 30/40

31 SecOC Reception of a secured PDU DataID 1 ECU 1 Fresh. Value Generator replace LSBs Fresh. Value Secured PDU ECU 3 DataID 1 Ver. Fresh. Authentic PDU is parsed DataID must be identical for sender and receiver Truncated freshness value is synchronized to form verification freshness value 31/40

32 SecOC Reception of a secured PDU Ver. Fresh = Ver. Fresh. Fresh. Value Secured PDU ECU 3 DataID 1 Ver. Fresh. Verification freshness value stored freshness value (replay attacks) If not: Increment MSBs of verification freshness value Synchronization between sender and receiver 32/40

33 SecOC Reception of a secured PDU DataID 1 ECU 1 Fresh. Value Generator Fresh. Value Secured PDU compare DataID 1 ECU 3 Fresh. Value Generator DataID, PDU, verification freshness form input to generator Symmetric key must be identical for sender and receiver MSBs of calculated are compared to truncated If successful, PDU is forwarded If not, PDU is dropped 33/40

34 SecOC System Configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 PDU 2 PDU 2 PDU 3 PDU 3 BUS 34/40

35 SecOC System Configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 PDU 2 PDU 2 PDU 3 PDU 3 BUS 35/40

36 SecOC System Configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 DataID 1 DataID 1 DataID 1 DataID 2 DataID 2 PDU 2 PDU 2 PDU 3 PDU 3 BUS Assignment of DataIDs to the to-be-secured PDUs 36/40

37 SecOC System Configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 DataID 1 DataID 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Fresh. Value Fresh. Value DataID 2 DataID 2 PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 3 PDU 3 BUS Specification of the layout of the secured PDU 37/40

38 SecOC System configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 DataID 1 DataID 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Fresh. Value Fresh. Value DataID 2 DataID 2 PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 3 PDU 3 BUS Assignment of keys to the secured PDUs Initial keying Re-keying 38/40

39 SecOC System configuration ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 DataID 1 DataID 1 DataID 1 Fresh. Value Fresh. Value Fresh. Value DataID 2 DataID 2 PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 2 Fresh. Value PDU 3 PDU 3 ECU1_Extract ECU2_Extract ECU3_Extract 39/40

40 For more information about Vector and our products please visit Author: Philipp Werner, Armin Happel, Ralf Fritz, Steffen Keul Vector Informatik GmbH Vector Informatik GmbH. All rights reserved. Any distribution or copying is subject to prior written approval by Vector. V

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