# 1 Safe Drivers versus Reckless Drunk Drivers

Save this PDF as:

Size: px
Start display at page:

## Transcription

2 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 2 Safe Road 0 Figure 1: Preference for Money & Safe Road Peron B 0 1 Peron A 1 Income Note the light difference in the orientation of the axi, where for afe road, A prefer the maller value, while B prefer the larger value Suppoe initially both individual (or group of individual) have an equal hare of income that i available a repreented by the dotted line The final equilibrium i dependent on who ha the legal right to afe road If the right are veted in A, then the initial endowment would be point E A, while if the legal right are veted in B, the initial endowment would be point E B It i clear then that the legal ytem determine the endowment In general, there i no reaon to believe that the initial endowment i Pareto efficient, that i it i poible that A i willing to trade ome of the afety in return for income, and the ame i true for B You can now ee that depending on whoe ide the Judicial Sytem take will determine who ha the greater level of utility at the final equilibrium How can uch trading be achieved, you could imagine an auctioneer calling the price for afe road, and income In that ene, it i almot equivalent to B bribing A

3 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 3 to drive on the road drunk Thi eem like a imple enough analogy, where the pricing mechanim i like a fine levied on drunk driving hould B be caught Problem arie however when Property Right are not well defined The analyi thu highlight the often heard cry for clearer definition of Law 2 Quailinear Preference and the Coae Theorem Although it i true in general that Property Right determine the ultimate level of externalitie that exit in an economy There are ituation when it doe not Thi occur when the utility function of agent are of the Quailinear Form a illutrated in figure 2 Notice that each individual indifference curve are horizontal tranlation of the other In that cae, the optimal level of externality i independent of which ever initial allocation i choen or determined by Property Right, and thi i typically known a Coae Theorem, credited to Ronald Coae of the Univerity of Chicago The numeraire good here i income However, thi interpretation ha been conteted with ome economit aerting that Coae Theorem only aert that when bargaining between agent are cotle over externalitie Pareto Efficiency i derived, and not that it i independent of property right

4 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 4 Figure 2: Quailinear Preference & Coae Theorem Safe Road Income Peron A Peron B U A U B Pareto Set Production Externalitie We will now conider production externalitie but with the aid of a little calculu Conider two firm, one a fihing village owned by a ingle clan, F, the other an off hore natural ga firm, G, that extract and pipe natural ga to the mainland of thi economy The tory i uch that the extraction will inevitably involve ome eepage that would harm the indigenou fih population the F harvet Let denote thi eepage a x, the externality Denote the output of the fihing village a f, and the ga company, g, with repective price, p F and p G Their repective cot function are c F (f, x) and c G (g, x) The more eepage, the more cotly would the production proce for the fihing village be, and we can denote imply thi a c F > 0 On the other hand, the more care in reducing the eepage, the greater the cot of the ga company, o that c G 0

5 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 5 The objective of each firm can be written a; max g,x p Gg c G (g, x) for the ga company, while for the fihing village, max p F f c F (f, x) f which i nothing but you tandard profit function, and the problem i one of profit maximization Note that it i only the natural ga company that get to chooe the level of externality, x, and that in maximizing it profit, it will not be concerned with the externality which it impoe on the fihing village The firt order condition for the natural ga firm are then, For the fihing village, it i jut, p G = c G(g, x ) g 0 = c G(g, x ) (1) (2) p F = c F (f, x ) f (3) where g, f and x are the optimal value of natural ga, fih output, and eepage in uch a program where each firm maximize their own profit independently What i clear from the above i that in maximizing their profit, the natural ga company G diregard it choice effect may have on the fihing village In producing natural ga and fihe, both produce up to the point where marginal revenue equate with marginal cot However, eepage from natural ga extraction increae the fihing village cot of producing fihe, and yet in chooing the optimal level of externality, firm G will produce x up to the point where the marginal cot of producing the next unit of externality i zero, and given the cot of production i decreaing in the level of externality, thi likely mean that G would produce more than they hould (We do not know yet We have to prove it) Thi cot impoed on the village i the ocial cot of natural ga extraction How can we examine what would be the Pareto efficient level of externality? If the firm performing the extraction, were alo the ame firm fihing the ame water, it would be in their interet to moderate the level of eepage Given thi level, we could

6 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 6 then examine if in the prior independent etup, whether there i an over production of externality Thi collective firm would maximize the following objective function; The firt order condition are now; max p Gg + g F f c G (g, x) c F (f, x) g,f,x p G = c G(ĝ, x) g (4) p F = c F ( f, x) f 0 = c F ( f, x) + c G(ĝ, x) (6) The firt two condition are a before, but evaluated at the new level of production and externalitie, ince ĝ g, f f, and x x The key condition i the lat, which can be rewritten a, c F ( f, x) = c G(ĝ, x) > 0 Since we know that both ide of the equality i poitive, thi term imply ay that in equilibrium, marginal cot of the externalitie mut be the ame in both type of production What i the ignificance of thi? Combining what we have here, with what we found before under independent production, c G (ĝ, x) < c G(g, x ) Since cot increae a externalitie fall (negative), thi then mean that the abolute value of the marginal cot i greater in the new etup than the old, which mean either g i higher, or x lower, or both are true Conequently, the new firm exercie a greater level of care, in other word, internalize the ocial cot the independent natural ga firm impoe on the fihing village Diagrammatically, thi i repreented below, = 0 (5) 4 Interpretation of the Condition 1 We can think of thi Pareto efficient level of eepage production a the point up to which the natural ga company price that they are willing to pay for permiion

7 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 7 Figure 3: Social & Private Cot p G, p F MC F = MC G MC G MC F x x x to pollute i jut equal to the actual ocial cot The inefficiency arie in the original ituation becaue firm G faced the wrong price Thi can be rectified by impoing a tax on the pollution of the water Suppoe the tax rate impoed i t per unit of pollution, o that for any amount of eepage x, the tax firm G ha to pay i xt The new profit maximization problem now i intead, max p Gg c G (g, x) tx g,x Thi then give the following firt order condition, p G = c G(g, x) g (7) t = c G(g, x) (8) Comparing equation (8) with (6), we ee that the olution i nothing but etting t = c F (g, x)

8 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 8 thereby giving rie to the Pareto Efficient outcome, or level of externality Thi kind of tax i known a Pigouvian Tax The problem with uch a cheme i that we need to know the optimal level of pollution to impoe the right level of tax, and yet if we did know, we needn t even alter the tax cheme, ince we can imply init that firm G produce the correct level of externality 2 We could alternately think of the problem a one of miing market for pollutant intead of facing the wrong price Conider the property right a being veted with the fihing village, who could ell the right to pollute to firm G, at the price of q The problem for firm G and fihing village F i a follow, and max p Gg c G (g, x) qx g,x max f,x p F + qx c F (f, x) repectively It i clear that thi program involve the tranfer between the natural ga company and the fihing village In thi manner, the fihing village now wretle away the deciion of pollutant in their water, ince optimally, the price they are willing to accept mut be equal to the price firm G i willing to pay Show yourelf that thi mut be true 3 We could ue a imilar program a the lat, but now give the property right to firm G We already know that if firm G doe not internalize the externality it impoe it will produce x level of externality Since the property right are veted with G, the fihing village could intead pay G not to pollute their water In which cae, the profit maximizing problem of G become, max g,x p Gg + q(x x) c G (g, x) while the fihing village problem i intead, max f,x p F f q(x x) c F (f, x) Show that in equilibrium, the ame equilibrium condition i derived a before, and conequently yield the ame level of Pareto Efficient level of externality Although the ame level of externalitie i obtained, note that the wherea in the former the tranfer i from G to F, while in the current, the tranfer i from F to G

9 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 9 4 Market Signal: We have found that if the firm could merge a one, it would then have to internalize any externalitie, thereby achieving higher profit The idea i that a long a the joint profit of the merged entity i greater than if the firm remain eparate, there i alway an impetu to merge That i the market itelf hould have provided the ignal for firm to merge if it i viable A claic example i that of an apiary and apple orchard haring the ame ownerhip 5 The Tragedy of Common: The Cae of Overfihing in International Water We have noted that a long a Property Right are well defined, the Pareto Efficient level allocation will be produced But when exactly i Property Right ambiguou? One of the claic example i from Overfihing Who own the ocean of the world? No one in truth, and everyone alo in truth Can we ue what we have learned about General Equilibrium and Externalitie to undertand the problem? Let the fih production in the Ocean of thi planet be F (), where i the ize of the fihing fleet where each fleet can catch a fixed maximum capacity Let the cot of fihing by each country (which you can think of a individual for implicity) be C() Now imagine there i a central world authority exit and can decide how much to fih through determining the number of hip in the water in any period What would that choice be? The firt order condition i imply, max F () C() F () = C() Which i nothing but the marginal product of the additional boat being equal to the marginal cot of obtaining that boat on the open ea Note that I have effectively normalized the price of the output at 1 for implicity Now what i occurring when an individual country or individual chooe to the optimal ize of the fleet? A country would continue to add to their fleet a long a the per unit haul per boat yield more in value than the cot of adding an additional boat Taken on the

10 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 10 aggregate, it i equivalent to the following: The former meaure i nothing but the average haul which i F (), while the latter i C() Taken together thi mean that; F () = C() F () C() = 0 That i the countrie will keep fihing with more boat until they earn zero profit You can think of thi a each country acting like a perfectly competitive firm o that they believe their choice will have no effect on the output of the world Thi equilibrium i nothing but equating the average product to average cot a in perfect competition Since the production function will uffer from diminihing marginal rate of production, ie downward loping, the marginal product i alway lower than the average product, thu, the deciion made by the authority would yield a lower level of hip, than when every country act on their own intinct Thi i commonly referred to a the Tragedy of Common, due to common ownerhip of a reource, ie property right i ambiguou Diagrammatically, thi i repreented below where for implicity, the cot per hip i fixed at c,

11 ECON 301: General Equilibrium IV (Externalitie) 11 Figure 4: The Tragedy of Common AP, MP MC c AP Efficient Output Equilibrium Output

### A Note on Profit Maximization and Monotonicity for Inbound Call Centers

OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 59, No. 5, September October 2011, pp. 1304 1308 in 0030-364X ein 1526-5463 11 5905 1304 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0990 2011 INFORMS TECHNICAL NOTE INFORMS hold copyright

### A note on profit maximization and monotonicity for inbound call centers

A note on profit maximization and monotonicity for inbound call center Ger Koole & Aue Pot Department of Mathematic, Vrije Univeriteit Amterdam, The Netherland 23rd December 2005 Abtract We conider an

### Solution of the Heat Equation for transient conduction by LaPlace Transform

Solution of the Heat Equation for tranient conduction by LaPlace Tranform Thi notebook ha been written in Mathematica by Mark J. McCready Profeor and Chair of Chemical Engineering Univerity of Notre Dame

### FEDERATION OF ARAB SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH COUNCILS

Aignment Report RP/98-983/5/0./03 Etablihment of cientific and technological information ervice for economic and ocial development FOR INTERNAL UE NOT FOR GENERAL DITRIBUTION FEDERATION OF ARAB CIENTIFIC

### Senior Thesis. Horse Play. Optimal Wagers and the Kelly Criterion. Author: Courtney Kempton. Supervisor: Professor Jim Morrow

Senior Thei Hore Play Optimal Wager and the Kelly Criterion Author: Courtney Kempton Supervior: Profeor Jim Morrow June 7, 20 Introduction The fundamental problem in gambling i to find betting opportunitie

### Chapter 32. OPTICAL IMAGES 32.1 Mirrors

Chapter 32 OPTICAL IMAGES 32.1 Mirror The point P i called the image or the virtual image of P (light doe not emanate from it) The left-right reveral in the mirror i alo called the depth inverion (the

### MSc Financial Economics: International Finance. Bubbles in the Foreign Exchange Market. Anne Sibert. Revised Spring 2013. Contents

MSc Financial Economic: International Finance Bubble in the Foreign Exchange Market Anne Sibert Revied Spring 203 Content Introduction................................................. 2 The Mone Market.............................................

### Chapter 10 Stocks and Their Valuation ANSWERS TO END-OF-CHAPTER QUESTIONS

Chapter Stoc and Their Valuation ANSWERS TO EN-OF-CHAPTER QUESTIONS - a. A proxy i a document giving one peron the authority to act for another, typically the power to vote hare of common toc. If earning

### Growth and Sustainability of Managed Security Services Networks: An Economic Perspective

Growth and Sutainability of Managed Security Service etwork: An Economic Perpective Alok Gupta Dmitry Zhdanov Department of Information and Deciion Science Univerity of Minneota Minneapoli, M 55455 (agupta,

### Queueing systems with scheduled arrivals, i.e., appointment systems, are typical for frontal service systems,

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 54, No. 3, March 28, pp. 565 572 in 25-199 ein 1526-551 8 543 565 inform doi 1.1287/mnc.17.82 28 INFORMS Scheduling Arrival to Queue: A Single-Server Model with No-Show INFORMS

### Growth and Sustainability of Managed Security Services Networks: An Economic Perspective

Growth and Sutainability of Managed Security Service etwork: An Economic Perpective Alok Gupta Dmitry Zhdanov Department of Information and Deciion Science Univerity of Minneota Minneapoli, M 55455 (agupta,

### A technical guide to 2014 key stage 2 to key stage 4 value added measures

A technical guide to 2014 key tage 2 to key tage 4 value added meaure CONTENTS Introduction: PAGE NO. What i value added? 2 Change to value added methodology in 2014 4 Interpretation: Interpreting chool

### ECON 301: General Equilibrium I (Exchange) 1. Intermediate Microeconomics II, ECON 301. General Equilibrium I: Exchange

ECON 301: General Equilibrium I (Exchange) 1 Intermediate Microeconomics II, ECON 301 General Equilibrium I: Exchange The equilibrium concepts you have used till now in your Introduction to Economics,

### Unit 11 Using Linear Regression to Describe Relationships

Unit 11 Uing Linear Regreion to Decribe Relationhip Objective: To obtain and interpret the lope and intercept of the leat quare line for predicting a quantitative repone variable from a quantitative explanatory

### v = x t = x 2 x 1 t 2 t 1 The average speed of the particle is absolute value of the average velocity and is given Distance travelled t

Chapter 2 Motion in One Dimenion 2.1 The Important Stuff 2.1.1 Poition, Time and Diplacement We begin our tudy of motion by conidering object which are very mall in comparion to the ize of their movement

### Mixed Method of Model Reduction for Uncertain Systems

SERBIAN JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING Vol 4 No June Mixed Method of Model Reduction for Uncertain Sytem N Selvaganean Abtract: A mixed method for reducing a higher order uncertain ytem to a table reduced

### TRADING rules are widely used in financial market as

Complex Stock Trading Strategy Baed on Particle Swarm Optimization Fei Wang, Philip L.H. Yu and David W. Cheung Abtract Trading rule have been utilized in the tock market to make profit for more than a

### Office of Tax Analysis U.S. Department of the Treasury. A Dynamic Analysis of Permanent Extension of the President s Tax Relief

Office of Tax Analyi U.S. Department of the Treaury A Dynamic Analyi of Permanent Extenion of the Preident Tax Relief July 25, 2006 Executive Summary Thi Report preent a detailed decription of Treaury

### Is Mark-to-Market Accounting Destabilizing? Analysis and Implications for Policy

Firt draft: 4/12/2008 I Mark-to-Market Accounting Detabilizing? Analyi and Implication for Policy John Heaton 1, Deborah Luca 2 Robert McDonald 3 Prepared for the Carnegie Rocheter Conference on Public

### The Arms Race on American Roads: The Effect of SUV s and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety

The Arm Race on American Road: The Effect of SUV and Pickup Truck on Traffic Safety Michelle J. White Univerity of California, San Diego, and NBER Abtract Driver have been running an arm race on American

### CHARACTERISTICS OF WAITING LINE MODELS THE INDICATORS OF THE CUSTOMER FLOW MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EFFICIENCY

Annale Univeritati Apuleni Serie Oeconomica, 2(2), 200 CHARACTERISTICS OF WAITING LINE MODELS THE INDICATORS OF THE CUSTOMER FLOW MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EFFICIENCY Sidonia Otilia Cernea Mihaela Jaradat 2 Mohammad

### 6. Friction, Experiment and Theory

6. Friction, Experiment and Theory The lab thi wee invetigate the rictional orce and the phyical interpretation o the coeicient o riction. We will mae ue o the concept o the orce o gravity, the normal

### Newton s Laws. A force is simply a push or a pull. Forces are vectors; they have both size and direction.

Newton Law Newton firt law: An object will tay at ret or in a tate of uniform motion with contant velocity, in a traight line, unle acted upon by an external force. In other word, the bodie reit any change

### Name: SID: Instructions

CS168 Fall 2014 Homework 1 Aigned: Wedneday, 10 September 2014 Due: Monday, 22 September 2014 Name: SID: Dicuion Section (Day/Time): Intruction - Submit thi homework uing Pandagrader/GradeScope(http://www.gradecope.com/

### Socially Optimal Pricing of Cloud Computing Resources

Socially Optimal Pricing of Cloud Computing Reource Ihai Menache Microoft Reearch New England Cambridge, MA 02142 t-imena@microoft.com Auman Ozdaglar Laboratory for Information and Deciion Sytem Maachuett

### Health Insurance and Social Welfare. Run Liang. China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China,

Health Inurance and Social Welfare Run Liang China Center for Economic Reearch, Peking Univerity, Beijing 100871, China, Email: rliang@ccer.edu.cn and Hao Wang China Center for Economic Reearch, Peking

### Politicians, Taxes and Debt

Review of Economic Studie 00) 77, 806 840 0034-657/0/0040\$0.00 doi: 0./j.467-937X.009.00584.x Politician, Taxe and Debt PIERRE YARED Columbia Univerity Firt verion received January 008; final verion accepted

### NETWORK TRAFFIC ENGINEERING WITH VARIED LEVELS OF PROTECTION IN THE NEXT GENERATION INTERNET

Chapter 1 NETWORK TRAFFIC ENGINEERING WITH VARIED LEVELS OF PROTECTION IN THE NEXT GENERATION INTERNET S. Srivatava Univerity of Miouri Kana City, USA hekhar@conrel.ice.umkc.edu S. R. Thirumalaetty now

### Utility-Based Flow Control for Sequential Imagery over Wireless Networks

Utility-Baed Flow Control for Sequential Imagery over Wirele Networ Tomer Kihoni, Sara Callaway, and Mar Byer Abtract Wirele enor networ provide a unique et of characteritic that mae them uitable for building

### January 21, 2015. Abstract

T S U I I E P : T R M -C S J. R January 21, 2015 Abtract Thi paper evaluate the trategic behavior of a monopolit to influence environmental policy, either with taxe or with tandard, comparing two alternative

### Project Management Basics

Project Management Baic A Guide to undertanding the baic component of effective project management and the key to ucce 1 Content 1.0 Who hould read thi Guide... 3 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Project Management

### Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy

Nov 008: Revied April 0 Illiquid Bank, Financial tability, and Interet Rate Policy Dougla W. Diamond Raghuram G. Rajan Univerity of Chicago and NBER Do low interet rate alleviate banking fragility? Bank

### Group Mutual Exclusion Based on Priorities

Group Mutual Excluion Baed on Prioritie Karina M. Cenci Laboratorio de Invetigación en Sitema Ditribuido Univeridad Nacional del Sur Bahía Blanca, Argentina kmc@c.un.edu.ar and Jorge R. Ardenghi Laboratorio

### MBA 570x Homework 1 Due 9/24/2014 Solution

MA 570x Homework 1 Due 9/24/2014 olution Individual work: 1. Quetion related to Chapter 11, T Why do you think i a fund of fund market for hedge fund, but not for mutual fund? Anwer: Invetor can inexpenively

### Introduction to the article Degrees of Freedom.

Introduction to the article Degree of Freedom. The article by Walker, H. W. Degree of Freedom. Journal of Educational Pychology. 3(4) (940) 53-69, wa trancribed from the original by Chri Olen, George Wahington

### Control of Wireless Networks with Flow Level Dynamics under Constant Time Scheduling

Control of Wirele Network with Flow Level Dynamic under Contant Time Scheduling Long Le and Ravi R. Mazumdar Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Univerity of Waterloo,Waterloo, ON, Canada

### Assessing the Discriminatory Power of Credit Scores

Aeing the Dicriminatory Power of Credit Score Holger Kraft 1, Gerald Kroiandt 1, Marlene Müller 1,2 1 Fraunhofer Intitut für Techno- und Wirtchaftmathematik (ITWM) Gottlieb-Daimler-Str. 49, 67663 Kaierlautern,

### Efficient Pricing and Insurance Coverage in Pharmaceutical Industry when the Ability to Pay Matters

ömmföäfläafaäflaflafla fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff Dicuion Paper Efficient Pricing and Inurance Coverage in Pharmaceutical Indutry when the Ability to Pay Matter Vea Kanniainen Univerity of Helinki,

### Support Vector Machine Based Electricity Price Forecasting For Electricity Markets utilising Projected Assessment of System Adequacy Data.

The Sixth International Power Engineering Conference (IPEC23, 27-29 November 23, Singapore Support Vector Machine Baed Electricity Price Forecating For Electricity Maret utiliing Projected Aement of Sytem

### Global Imbalances or Bad Accounting? The Missing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nations. Ricardo Hausmann and Federico Sturzenegger

Global Imbalance or Bad Accounting? The Miing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nation Ricardo Haumann and Federico Sturzenegger CID Working Paper No. 124 January 2006 Copyright 2006 Ricardo Haumann, Federico

### Mobile Network Configuration for Large-scale Multimedia Delivery on a Single WLAN

Mobile Network Configuration for Large-cale Multimedia Delivery on a Single WLAN Huigwang Je, Dongwoo Kwon, Hyeonwoo Kim, and Hongtaek Ju Dept. of Computer Engineering Keimyung Univerity Daegu, Republic

### A Life Contingency Approach for Physical Assets: Create Volatility to Create Value

A Life Contingency Approach for Phyical Aet: Create Volatility to Create Value homa Emil Wendling 2011 Enterprie Rik Management Sympoium Society of Actuarie March 14-16, 2011 Copyright 2011 by the Society

SCM- integration: organiational, managerial and technological iue M. Caridi 1 and A. Sianei 2 Dipartimento di Economia e Produzione, Politecnico di Milano, Italy E-mail: maria.caridi@polimi.it Itituto

### Morningstar Fixed Income Style Box TM Methodology

Morningtar Fixed Income Style Box TM Methodology Morningtar Methodology Paper Augut 3, 00 00 Morningtar, Inc. All right reerved. The information in thi document i the property of Morningtar, Inc. Reproduction

### Research in Economics

Reearch in Economic 64 (2010) 137 145 Content lit available at ScienceDirect Reearch in Economic journal homepage: www.elevier.com/locate/rie Health inurance: Medical treatment v diability payment Geir

### Lab 4: Motor Control

2.017 Deign of Electromechanical Robotic Sytem, Fall 2009 Lab 4: Motor Control Aigned: 10/5/09 1 Overview So far we have learnt how to ue the Arduino to acquire variou type of ignal from enor uch a the

### Buying High and Selling Low: Stock Repurchases and Persistent Asymmetric Information

RFS Advance Acce publihed February 9, 06 Buying High and Selling Low: Stock Repurchae and Peritent Aymmetric Information Philip Bond Univerity of Wahington Hongda Zhong London School of Economic Share

### Review of Multiple Regression Richard Williams, University of Notre Dame, http://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/ Last revised January 13, 2015

Review of Multiple Regreion Richard William, Univerity of Notre Dame, http://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/ Lat revied January 13, 015 Aumption about prior nowledge. Thi handout attempt to ummarize and yntheize

### The Cash Flow Statement: Problems with the Current Rules

A C C O U N T I N G & A U D I T I N G accounting The Cah Flow Statement: Problem with the Current Rule By Neii S. Wei and Jame G.S. Yang In recent year, the tatement of cah flow ha received increaing attention

### Finite Automata. a) Reading a symbol, b) Transferring to a new instruction, and c) Advancing the tape head one square to the right.

Finite Automata Let u begin by removing almot all of the Turing machine' power! Maybe then we hall have olvable deciion problem and till be able to accomplih ome computational tak. Alo, we might be able

### 12.4 Problems. Excerpt from "Introduction to Geometry" 2014 AoPS Inc. Copyrighted Material CHAPTER 12. CIRCLES AND ANGLES

HTER 1. IRLES N NGLES Excerpt from "Introduction to Geometry" 014 os Inc. onider the circle with diameter O. all thi circle. Why mut hit O in at leat two di erent point? (b) Why i it impoible for to hit

### Two Dimensional FEM Simulation of Ultrasonic Wave Propagation in Isotropic Solid Media using COMSOL

Excerpt from the Proceeding of the COMSO Conference 0 India Two Dimenional FEM Simulation of Ultraonic Wave Propagation in Iotropic Solid Media uing COMSO Bikah Ghoe *, Krihnan Balaubramaniam *, C V Krihnamurthy

### Thus far. Inferences When Comparing Two Means. Testing differences between two means or proportions

Inference When Comparing Two Mean Dr. Tom Ilvento FREC 48 Thu far We have made an inference from a ingle ample mean and proportion to a population, uing The ample mean (or proportion) The ample tandard

### A Duality Model of TCP and Queue Management Algorithms

A Duality Model of TCP and Queue Management Algorithm Steven H. Low CS and EE Department California Intitute of Technology Paadena, CA 95 low@caltech.edu May 4, Abtract We propoe a duality model of end-to-end

### Profitability of Loyalty Programs in the Presence of Uncertainty in Customers Valuations

Proceeding of the 0 Indutrial Engineering Reearch Conference T. Doolen and E. Van Aken, ed. Profitability of Loyalty Program in the Preence of Uncertainty in Cutomer Valuation Amir Gandomi and Saeed Zolfaghari

### Short-term allocation of gas networks and gas-electricity input foreclosure

Short-term allocation of ga network and ga-electricity input forecloure Miguel Vazquez a,, Michelle Hallack b a Economic Intitute (IE), Federal Univerity of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) b Economic Department,

### Performance of Multiple TFRC in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

Performance of Multiple TFRC in Heterogeneou Wirele Network 1 Hyeon-Jin Jeong, 2 Seong-Sik Choi 1, Firt Author Computer Engineering Department, Incheon National Univerity, oaihjj@incheon.ac.kr *2,Correponding

### Scheduling of Jobs and Maintenance Activities on Parallel Machines

Scheduling of Job and Maintenance Activitie on Parallel Machine Chung-Yee Lee* Department of Indutrial Engineering Texa A&M Univerity College Station, TX 77843-3131 cylee@ac.tamu.edu Zhi-Long Chen** Department

### A Spam Message Filtering Method: focus on run time

, pp.29-33 http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/atl.2014.76.08 A Spam Meage Filtering Method: focu on run time Sin-Eon Kim 1, Jung-Tae Jo 2, Sang-Hyun Choi 3 1 Department of Information Security Management 2 Department

### Optical Illusion. Sara Bolouki, Roger Grosse, Honglak Lee, Andrew Ng

Optical Illuion Sara Bolouki, Roger Groe, Honglak Lee, Andrew Ng. Introduction The goal of thi proect i to explain ome of the illuory phenomena uing pare coding and whitening model. Intead of the pare

### 1 Introduction. Reza Shokri* Privacy Games: Optimal User-Centric Data Obfuscation

Proceeding on Privacy Enhancing Technologie 2015; 2015 (2):1 17 Reza Shokri* Privacy Game: Optimal Uer-Centric Data Obfucation Abtract: Conider uer who hare their data (e.g., location) with an untruted

### Research Article An (s, S) Production Inventory Controlled Self-Service Queuing System

Probability and Statitic Volume 5, Article ID 558, 8 page http://dxdoiorg/55/5/558 Reearch Article An (, S) Production Inventory Controlled Self-Service Queuing Sytem Anoop N Nair and M J Jacob Department

### Four Ways Companies Can Use Open Source Social Publishing Tools to Enhance Their Business Operations

Four Way Companie Can Ue Open Source Social Publihing Tool to Enhance Their Buine Operation acquia.com 888.922.7842 1.781.238.8600 25 Corporate Drive, Burlington, MA 01803 Four Way Companie Can Ue Open

### Capital Investment. Decisions: An Overview Appendix. Introduction. Analyzing Cash Flows for Present Value Analysis

f. Capital Invetment Deciion: An Overview Appendix Introduction Capital invetment deciion are the reponibility of manager of invetment center (ee Chapter 12). The analyi of capital invetment deciion i

### Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising

Bidding for Repreentative Allocation for Diplay Advertiing Arpita Ghoh, Preton McAfee, Kihore Papineni, and Sergei Vailvitkii Yahoo! Reearch. {arpita, mcafee, kpapi, ergei}@yahoo-inc.com Abtract. Diplay

### T-test for dependent Samples. Difference Scores. The t Test for Dependent Samples. The t Test for Dependent Samples. s D

The t Tet for ependent Sample T-tet for dependent Sample (ak.a., Paired ample t-tet, Correlated Group eign, Within- Subject eign, Repeated Meaure,.. Repeated-Meaure eign When you have two et of core from

### TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND TRENDS BY USING SPSS PROGRAMME

TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND TRENDS BY USING SPSS PROGRAMME RADMILA KOCURKOVÁ Sileian Univerity in Opava School of Buine Adminitration in Karviná Department of Mathematical Method in Economic Czech Republic

### Continuous-Time (CT) Analog Filters are used for : 1. Interface Applications

Continuou-Time CT Analog Filter are ued for :. Interface Application Anti-Aliaing or Preconditioning, and, Smoothing or Recontruction function. The real ignal proceing i performed in the Digital domain..

### A Resolution Approach to a Hierarchical Multiobjective Routing Model for MPLS Networks

A Reolution Approach to a Hierarchical Multiobjective Routing Model for MPLS Networ Joé Craveirinha a,c, Rita Girão-Silva a,c, João Clímaco b,c, Lúcia Martin a,c a b c DEEC-FCTUC FEUC INESC-Coimbra International

### Free Enterprise, the Economy and Monetary Policy

Free Enterprie, the Economy and Monetary Policy free (fre) adj. not cont Free enterprie i the freedom of individual and buinee to power of another; at regulation. It enable individual and buinee to create,

### Chapter 5. Externalities, Environmental Policy, and Public Goods

Chapter 5. Externalities, Environmental Policy, and Public Goods Instructor: JINKOOK LEE Department of Economics / Texas A&M University ECON 202 504 Principles of Microeconomics Externalities Externality:

### A Communication Model with Limited Information-Processing Capacity of Recipients. Oleg V. Pavlov WPI. Robert K. Plice San Diego State University

A Communication Model with Limited Information-Proceing Capacity of Recipient Oleg V. Pavlov WPI Robert K. Plice San Diego State Univerity Nigel Melville Univerity of Michigan, Ann Arbor Keyword pam, email,

### REDUCTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY CHAIN CYCLE TIME IN INTERNAL BUSINESS PROCESS OF REAMER USING DOE AND TAGUCHI METHODOLOGY. Abstract. 1.

International Journal of Advanced Technology & Engineering Reearch (IJATER) REDUCTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY CHAIN CYCLE TIME IN INTERNAL BUSINESS PROCESS OF REAMER USING DOE AND Abtract TAGUCHI METHODOLOGY Mr.

### Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns

rokerage Commiion and Intitutional Trading Pattern Michael Goldtein abon College Paul Irvine Emory Univerity Eugene Kandel Hebrew Univerity and Zvi Wiener Hebrew Univerity June 00 btract Why do broker

### Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and the Role of Debt

Corporate Tax Aggreivene and the Role of Debt Akankha Jalan, Jayant R. Kale, and Cotanza Meneghetti Abtract We examine the effect of leverage on corporate tax aggreivene. We derive the optimal level of

### Distributed Monitoring and Aggregation in Wireless Sensor Networks

Ditributed Monitoring and Aggregation in Wirele Senor Network Changlei Liu and Guohong Cao Department of Computer Science & Engineering The Pennylvania State Univerity E-mail: {chaliu, gcao}@ce.pu.edu

### Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

aachuett Intitute of Technology Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 6.685 Electric achinery Cla Note 10: Induction achine Control and Simulation c 2003 Jame L. Kirtley Jr. 1 Introduction

### IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society Conference Proceedings. Copyright IEEE.

Title Trancription factor activity etimation baed on particle warm optimization and fat networ component analyi Author() Chen, W; Chang, C; Hung, YS Citation 00 Annual International Conference Of The Ieee

### Auction Theory. Jonathan Levin. October 2004

Auction Theory Jonathan Levin October 2004 Our next topic i auction. Our objective will be to cover a few of the main idea and highlight. Auction theory can be approached from different angle from the

### 13 Externalities. Microeconomics I - Lecture #13, May 12, 2009

Microeconomics I - Lecture #13, May 12, 2009 13 Externalities Up until now we have implicitly assumed that each agent could make consumption or production decisions without worrying about what other agents

### Distributed, Secure Load Balancing with Skew, Heterogeneity, and Churn

Ditributed, Secure Load Balancing with Skew, Heterogeneity, and Churn Jonathan Ledlie and Margo Seltzer Diviion of Engineering and Applied Science Harvard Univerity Abtract Numerou propoal exit for load

### CASE STUDY BRIDGE. www.future-processing.com

CASE STUDY BRIDGE TABLE OF CONTENTS #1 ABOUT THE CLIENT 3 #2 ABOUT THE PROJECT 4 #3 OUR ROLE 5 #4 RESULT OF OUR COLLABORATION 6-7 #5 THE BUSINESS PROBLEM THAT WE SOLVED 8 #6 CHALLENGES 9 #7 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION

### Morningstar Fixed-Income Style Box TM Methodology

Morningtar Fixed-Income Style Box TM Methodology Morningtar Methodology Paper April 30, 01 01 Morningtar, Inc. All right reerved. The information in thi document i the property of Morningtar, Inc. Reproduction

### CASE STUDY ALLOCATE SOFTWARE

CASE STUDY ALLOCATE SOFTWARE allocate caetud y TABLE OF CONTENTS #1 ABOUT THE CLIENT #2 OUR ROLE #3 EFFECTS OF OUR COOPERATION #4 BUSINESS PROBLEM THAT WE SOLVED #5 CHALLENGES #6 WORKING IN SCRUM #7 WHAT

### LECTURE 2. TURÁN S THEOREM : BIPARTITE GRAPHS

LECTURE 2. TURÁN S THEOREM : BIPARTITE GRAPHS. Complete bipartite graph.. Kövari-Só-Turán theorem. When H i a bipartite graph, i.e., when χ(h) = 2, Erdő and Stone theorem aert that π H = 0. In other word,

### Apigee Edge: Apigee Cloud vs. Private Cloud. Evaluating deployment models for API management

Apigee Edge: Apigee Cloud v. Private Cloud Evaluating deployment model for API management Table of Content Introduction 1 Time to ucce 2 Total cot of ownerhip 2 Performance 3 Security 4 Data privacy 4

### DISTRIBUTED DATA PARALLEL TECHNIQUES FOR CONTENT-MATCHING INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

DISTRIBUTED DATA PARALLEL TECHNIQUES FOR CONTENT-MATCHING INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS Chritopher V. Kopek Department of Computer Science Wake Foret Univerity Winton-Salem, NC, 2709 Email: kopekcv@gmail.com

### A model for the relationship between tropical precipitation and column water vapor

Click Here for Full Article GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS, VOL. 36, L16804, doi:10.1029/2009gl039667, 2009 A model for the relationhip between tropical precipitation and column water vapor Caroline J. Muller,

### Bob York. Simple FET DC Bias Circuits

Bob York Simple FET DC Bia Circuit Loa-Line an Q-point Conier the effect of a rain reitor in the comnon-ource configuration: Smaller + g D out KL: Thi i the equation of a line that can be uperimpoe on

### Towards Control-Relevant Forecasting in Supply Chain Management

25 American Control Conference June 8-1, 25. Portland, OR, USA WeA7.1 Toward Control-Relevant Forecating in Supply Chain Management Jay D. Schwartz, Daniel E. Rivera 1, and Karl G. Kempf Control Sytem

### (that is to say it takes place in a way other than through changing prices).

McPeak Lecture 12 PPA 723 Externalities. An externality occurs when an economic agent s consumption or production activities confer a benefit or impose a cost on other actors, and this benefit is conferred

### INFORMATION Technology (IT) infrastructure management

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING, VOL. 2, NO. 1, MAY 214 1 Buine-Driven Long-term Capacity Planning for SaaS Application David Candeia, Ricardo Araújo Santo and Raquel Lope Abtract Capacity Planning

### Three Phase Theory - Professor J R Lucas

Three Phae Theory - Profeor J Luca A you are aware, to tranit power with ingle phae alternating current, we need two wire live wire and neutral. However you would have een that ditribution line uually

### THE IMPACT OF MULTIFACTORIAL GENETIC DISORDERS ON CRITICAL ILLNESS INSURANCE: A SIMULATION STUDY BASED ON UK BIOBANK ABSTRACT KEYWORDS

THE IMPACT OF MULTIFACTORIAL GENETIC DISORDERS ON CRITICAL ILLNESS INSURANCE: A SIMULATION STUDY BASED ON UK BIOBANK BY ANGUS MACDONALD, DELME PRITCHARD AND PRADIP TAPADAR ABSTRACT The UK Biobank project

### In this paper, we investigate toll setting as a policy tool to regulate the use of roads for dangerous goods

Vol. 43, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 228 243 in 0041-1655 ein 1526-5447 09 4302 0228 inform doi 10.1287/trc.1080.0236 2009 INFORMS Toll Policie for Mitigating Hazardou Material Tranport Rik Patrice Marcotte,

### Original Article: TOWARDS FLUID DYNAMICS EQUATIONS

Peer Reviewed, Open Acce, Free Online Journal Publihed monthly : ISSN: 8-8X Iue 4(5); April 15 Original Article: TOWARDS FLUID DYNAMICS EQUATIONS Citation Zaytev M.L., Akkerman V.B., Toward Fluid Dynamic

### Public Transportation Systems: Basic Principles of System Design, Operations Planning and Real-Time Control

INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORTATION STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY Public Tranportation Sytem: Baic Principle of Sytem Deign, Operation Planning and Real-Time Control Carlo F. Daganzo Coure Note UCB-ITS-CN-00-

### HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE FUTURE OF TRANSITION ECONOMIES * Michael Spagat Royal Holloway, University of London, CEPR and Davidson Institute.

HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE FUTURE OF TRANSITION ECONOMIES * By Michael Spagat Royal Holloway, Univerity of London, CEPR and Davidon Intitute Abtract Tranition economie have an initial condition of high human