THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROSCEPTICS IN THE NEW TERM OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FIRST MONTHS SINCE THE ELECTIONS

Transcription

1 RESEARCH REPORTS RECOMMENDATIONS AGNIESZKA ŁADA THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROSCEPTICS IN THE NEW TERM OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FIRST MONTHS SINCE THE ELECTIONS

2 INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS The European Programme Project co-funded by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Warsaw Project implemented with the financial support from the European Commission. The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. Translation: Anna Dzięgiel Proofreading: Hayden Berry Copyright by Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw 2014 Publisher: Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych Warszawa, ul. Szpitalna 5 lok. 22 tel. (22) , faks (22) isp@isp.org.pl,

3 Table of contents Eurosceptics in numbers First decisions Impact on debates in the member states Eurosceptics what to expect?

4

5 The success of the Eurosceptics in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 has not translated into their influence on decisions taken by this institution. They have not taken any important positions nor have they had an impact on the results of the first votes. This does not mean, however, that they have not left their imprint or that they will not leave their imprint on European debates. Their strength derived from support from the public that they enjoy in individual member states affects the subject matter and the style of political discussions in more than just one country, and influences the actions of national governments during EU negotiations. Eurosceptics in numbers The Eurosceptics in the European Parliament are a very diverse group. Eurosceptic groups do not consist solely of typically anti-system parties, which are usually radically right wing and reject European integration, such as the German National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), the British United Kingdom Independence Party, (UKIP) and the Polish Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP). This type of Euroscepticism may be called hard if an attempt were to be made at some classification of the phenomenon. Soft Euroscepticism, unlike the hard one, includes groups that do not explicitly advocate the dissolution of the European Union or oppose any form of integration, but their attitude towards a number of community elements is full of reserve or clearly critical. This group includes the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in Poland and Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in Germany. However, some very critical opinions related to the EU may also be heard, for instance, in the German Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU), a member of the pro-european Christian-Democracy, which naturally has its effect on discussions within this political group, as the other members of the group must address their partners who hold more radical views. In addition, some parts of the left wing of the political scene are also Eurosceptic, such as for instance the German party The Left (Die Linke). The European Parliament elections in May 2014 have been declared a triumph of the Eurosceptic parties. Indeed, if one looked at the number of votes won by them in individual member states, it may be stated that in a number of those states, politicians representing this option have become a significant political power. In France, the National Front (Front National) won 25% of the votes, in the United Kingdom, the (UK Independence Party) won almost 27% of the votes, the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) won 9.4% of the votes, and in Greece, the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) won the support of 9.4% of voters, whereas the Congress of the New Right was supported by 7.15% of voting Poles. However, in several states, in spite of earlier expectations, the Eurosceptics have not triumphed or have won The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 5

6 The Eurosceptic parties have altogether taken approximately 11% of seats in the European Parliament a lower percentage of votes than in previous elections. For instance, in the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) won the support of 13.3% of the voters, whereas expectations had been much higher. The Eurosceptic parties have altogether taken approximately 11% of seats in the European Parliament (80 out of 751), in the previous Parliament this percentage had been around 8%. Thus, the scale of the change is not huge and it is difficult to talk on the basis of the election results about a great success of the Eurosceptics. However, to the above mentioned 11%, the moderate Eurosceptics should be added, who have also fared quite well: the Polish Law and Justice party (31.78%), the UK Conservative Party (23.31%), and the German Alternative for Germany (7.1%), which has appeared in the European Parliament for the first time. Forming of political groups The very process of forming political groups in the Parliament has shown that the Eurosceptics are strongly divided and that it will be difficult for them to speak with one voice. What they have in common is criticism of the current condition of the EU, and what splits them apart is the lack of any common proposals. In some cases, in terms of image, such cooperation would be bad for these groups, as it might lead to losses on the national scene. The rivalry between the leaders of individual parties should not be underestimated either each of them wants to stand out and be regarded as the only leader of the whole group. The French National Front, which increased the number of its seats from 3 to 24, competed for allies with the British UKIP 1 (an increase in the number of seats from 13 to 24). Eventually it was the latter party that managed to group others around it, forming the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group, EFDD. The remaining Eurosceptics have not been able to collect the required number of 25 members of parliament representing at least seven EU member states. Thus, a significant number of politicians have been marginalised as non-attached members. Table 1. Parties members of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group by the number of members Source: European Parliament. Name of party Number of members United Kingdom Independence Party (United Kingdom) 24 Five Star Movement (Italy) 17 Order and Justice (Lithuania) 2 Swedish Democrats (Sweden) 2 Free Citizens Party (Czech Republic) 1 Congress of the New Right (Poland) 1 Member of European Parliament with no party allegiance (France) 1 1 Later in the text we will use the original abbreviations of the names of political parties and parliamentary political groups. 6 Agnieszka Łada

7 The parties forming EFDD differ on a number of issues, and the individual parties are often mixed groups of politicians holding diverse views. This is very well reflected in the results of votes to the European Parliament. From an organisational point of view, the group has experienced some instability much earlier than expected, when, in October 2014, as a result of one MEP leaving the group, it lost the required number of members from at least seven member states and disappeared. Its reinstatement was only possible after a Polish MEP, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz from the Congress of the New Right joined it. In the current term of the European Parliament, a qualitative change has also taken place in the group of European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR, grouping the soft Eurosceptics, as it has opened up to the parties that were once marginalised as too anti-system or controversial, such as the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) and the Danish People s Party (Dansk Folkeparti). As a result, it has become the third largest political group in the European Parliament, leaving behind the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Greens, but at the same time becoming much less uniform in its views than in the previous term. Name of party Number of members Conservative Party (United Kingdom) 20 Law and Justice (Poland) 19 Alternative for Germany (Germany) 7 Danish People s Party (Denmark) 4 New Flemish Alliance (Belgium) 4 Finns Party (Finland) 2 Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic) 2 Dutch Reformed Party (the Netherlands) 1 Christian Union (the Netherlands) 1 Finns Party (Finland) 1 Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević (Croatia) 1 Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lithuania) 1 Independent Greeks (Greece) 1 Bulgaria Without Censorship (Bulgaria) 1 Bulgarian National Movement - IMRO (Bulgaria) 1 Republican Party (Ireland) 1 Family Party of Germany (Germany) 1 For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK TB/LNNK (Latvia) 1 Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Slovakia) 1 Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia) 1 Conservative Democrats of Slovakia /Civic Conservative Party 1 (Slovakia) Table 2. Parties members of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group ranked by the number of members Source: European Parliament. The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 7

8 Table 3. Size of political groups in the current and in the previous terms of the European Parliament Source: European Parliament. Name of political group Number of MEPs at the end of the 7th term Group of the European People s Party (EPP) Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFFD) Non-attached 52 Number of MEPs at the beginning of the 8th term Positions (not) held The large number of non-attached members of parliament (52) has been one of the reasons why the radical Eurosceptics have failed to secure any positions in the European Parliament, because the number of positions allocated to members of a political group depends on the size of the group. Thus, the nonattached members have no chance for such positions. Theoretically, MEPs from the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group could The radical Eurosceptics have hope to secure some positions. However, their candidates lost failed to secure any positions votes, even though the unofficial rule observed so far indicated in the European Parliament, that they should get the support of other political groups in and the moderate accordance with the proportionality principle. Despite all this, Eurosceptics have obtained MEPs from the other political groups have been unwilling to statistically few of them support EFFD candidates. For similar reasons, the adoption of a more Eurosceptic stance by the ECR group has resulted in granting them rather few offices with respect to the third largest political group in the Parliament one vice-president of the European Parliament, one questor, and two chairs of parliamentary committees, whereas the smaller ALDE group has two vice-presidents, one questor, and three chairmanships of parliamentary committees. 8 Agnieszka Łada

9 Name of political group Number of positions: President and Vice- Presidents/Questors Number of Committee Chairmanships Group of the European People s Party 6/2 9 (EPP) Group of the Progressive Alliance of 4/1 6 Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) European Conservatives and Reformists 1/1 2 Group (ECR) Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 2/1 3 Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Confederal Group of the European United 1/0 1 Left Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) Group of the Greens/European Free 1/0 1 Alliance (Greens/EFA) Europe of Freedom and Direct 0/0 0 Democracy Group (EFFD) Non-attached 0/0 0 Table 4. The number of positions in the European Parliament obtained by individual political groups Source: Own calculations on the basis of the data from the European Parliament website ( europa.eu). The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 9

10 10 Agnieszka Łada

11 First decisions The statistically small number of hard Eurosceptics among MEPs has been the reason why they have not influenced the course of any vote in the European Parliament, as they have not been able to gain a majority during the votes. There have also been too few of them to become a blocking minority. This weakness is exacerbated by the lack of coordination The hard Eurosceptics between the non-attached MEPs and the other members of have so far not influenced parliament, with all of them voting differently as a result. decisions taken by the Ideological divisions within the EFDD group have been the European Parliament during reason why, in many cases, the members of the group also the current term voted in different ways, for instance during the vote on the positions of the European Parliament concerning the Ukrainian-Russian and the Palestinian-Israeli crises. The ECR group has not been uniform in their vote, either, of which the best example has been the election of the new European Commission, where the cohesion rate of voting by all members of the group was 30%. 2 An analysis of all the data currently available on the VoteWatch site, concerning the roll-call votes (140) in the current term 3 of the European Parliament shows that the EFDD group, in particular, has not voted in a very uniform manner their average cohesion rate was 54.7%. A rather significant decrease in cohesion compared to the previous term (from 86% to 74%) is also visible in the case of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. 4 The increased number of member parties has made it much more difficult to maintain a united front during votes. When analysing the 34 final votes (out of the above mentioned 140 roll-call votes), one can notice that in the case of the EFDD and ECR groups, the cohesion rate has usually been only 30-49%, and not infrequently in a quarter of the votes this rate for the EFDD group has even fallen below 30%. As far as the other political groups voting cohesion rate is concerned, no big changes have taken place in comparison to the previous term of the European Parliament. The main political groups have a high cohesion rate (EPP The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group, has, in most cases, not voted uniformly. In the current term, compared to the pervious term, the voting cohesion rate has also decreased in the European Conservatives and Reformists Group 2 In the study, we refer to the methodology and calculation of the voting cohesion rate created by VoteWatch: 100% cohesion rate means that all members of a given group have voted in the same way, 0% that the number of the group MEPs voting Yes and No and abstaining from vote has been the same. For more on this, see: [accessed: 28 October 2014]. 3 Not all votes to the European Parliament are roll-call votes; only such voting, however, makes it possible to analyse the distribution of votes. The VoteWatch web portal collects appropriate data and makes it possible to sort them depending on the category. This paper is based on data collected until the end of October See: [accessed: 30 October 2014]. The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 11

12 94.9%, ALDE 90.2%), which means that their members usually represent the same position when voting. Table 5. Number of votes according to the voting cohesion rate in political groups concerning the 34 fi nal roll-call votes (July-October 2014) Source: Own calculations based on the VoteWatch data. Name of political group Group of the European People s Party (EPP) Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) Group of the Greens/ European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFFD) Cohesion rate % Cohesion rate 70 89% Cohesion rate 50 69% Cohesion rate 30 49% Cohesion rate 29% and less However, the presence of the more numerous group of Eurosceptics mobilises the remaining political groups in the European Parliament towards closer cooperation. The Christian Democrats and the socialists realise that their cooperation and working together with the liberals or the Greens is now even more necessary than before, in order to jointly build up resistance against anti-eu ideas. It has already become a tradition as none of the political groups has the majority that decisions of the European Parliament are typically a result of agreement among the biggest political groups; usually the grand coalition of the centre right and the centre left. In the term, such a coalition was formed by almost 70% of votes, when the EPP and S&D groups held 61% of seats in the European Parliament; this coalition would be joined by the liberals. On other issues, a more centre-left (GUE-NGL, the Greens, S&D, 12 Agnieszka Łada

13 sometimes supported by the liberals) or more centre-right (EPP, ALDE, ECR) 5 coalition would be formed. Coalition Total number of seats EPP, S&D, ALDE 479 EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens 529 EPP, S&D, ECR, ALDE 549 EPP, S&D, ECR, ALDE, Greens, 599 EPP, S&D, ECR, ALDE, Greens, GUE-NGL 651 EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens, GUE-NGL 581 EPP, S&D, ECR EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens, EFDD Table 6. The highest possible size of selected coalitions in the current term of the European Parliament Source: Own calculations on the basis of the European Parliament data. It seems that the adoption of a more Eurosceptic line by ECR will make this group a less likely partner for the centre-right compared to previous years. However, the voting results have so far not entirely confirmed this supposition. At the beginning of this term of the European Parliament, the grand coalition is even more stable than it was in the previous term in 118 out of the 140 roll-call votes, members from the EPP and S&D groups have voted in the same way. This accounts for 84% of all the votes carried out The grand coalition has been so far. The two most numerous groups are almost always joined very stable during this term by the liberals this has been the case in 113 votes so far (out of the European Parliament of the 118, in which the EPP and S&D groups voted the same). MEPs from the EPP and The conservatives usually also join them (in 70 out of the 118 S&D groups have voted in the votes), as do a little more rarely the Greens (in 58 out of the same way in 84% of the votes 118 votes). This shows that the ECR group in spite of its more Eurosceptic character supports most of the decisions promoted by the grand coalition. The hard Eurosceptics and radical left MEPs form a determined opposition in the European Parliament both groups have voted differently from the grand coalition in 93 out of the 118 votes so far. An almost perfect unity of views can be seen between EPP and the liberals these groups have voted in the same way in 130 out of the 140 roll-call votes. The conservatives from ECR have held the same positions as the ones presented by the centre-right in 85 votes, whereas in 65 votes they have voted in exactly the same way as EFDD, and in 72 as the socialists, which does not account for even half of the votes and shows that the alliances of the hard and soft Eurosceptics are neither frequent nor obvious. The presence of the hard Eurosceptics could, however, be seen outside the voting itself, as they have been willing to demonstrate their anti-eu views with their behaviour. An example of this may be a situation when they have 5 See M. Szczepanik, 17 key votes in the European Parliament Conclusions from analysis of voting behaviour of Polish MEPs, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 13

14 turned their backs or remained seated when the official EU anthem was played during the first plenary session of the newly elected European Parliament. Symbolic gestures or harsh words by MEPs representing this political trend already attracted media attention in previous terms of the Parliament. It is mainly for this reason that these politicians, even though they do not make any contribution to European policies, are relatively well known to citizens of the whole of the EU. 14 Agnieszka Łada

15 Impact on debates in the member states However, a claim that Eurosceptics have no significant influence on European debates would be untrue. Their visible presence on the political scene both the European and national one leaves its imprint on the themes and course of the debate. The other parties, even though they do not admit it in public and sometimes even avoid confrontation with the Eurosceptics (for instance, in a television studio, as CDU politicians refuse to appear together with representatives of AfD), do react to the existence and particularly in some states the strong public support that the Eurosceptics enjoy. This is evident in the approach to certain topics raised in the public debate. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, such topics include immigration, the willingness to close the labour market to citizens from other EU member states, and the introduction of restrictions into social policy regulations so that they do not apply to Eurosceptic parties have an foreigners. In Germany, the CSU, from time to time puts forward adverse impact on the course a proposal for more frequent checks on the internal borders of of debates in member the Schengen zone. In Poland, the best example of the impact of states and the EU arena the Eurosceptic politicians on the public debate is the practical removal from the debate of the issue concerning the introduction of the euro in Poland. As PiS opposes Polish accession to the common currency area support for it is also low among the public, in spite of society s generally pro- European attitude the ruling coalition avoids this topic altogether in order not to provide the opposition with an opportunity to dominate the discussion or for PiS to gain increased support in the opinion polls. The influence of the Eurosceptics can also be seen in the actions of the national governments on the European scene. The cabinet of Prime Minister David Cameron demands changes in the EU internal migration policy and some general structural reforms in the community. This is expected to help him win over British voters who are more and more Eurosceptically inclined. While this example is specific as the coalition in the UK is formed by a party of moderately Eurosceptic character, it is the division within this party with its radically Eurosceptic wing that makes David Cameron adopt a harder line towards the EU. The influence exerted by the Eurosceptics on European decisions and debates is also visible in the group of Christian Democrats, of which the Hungarian Fidesz is a member. Therefore, the members of this group refrain from public criticism of the situation in Hungary and consent to certain decisions taken by their Hungarian colleagues in order to keep them within the group, for example, to the appointment of a controversial candidate for EU commissioner. The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 15

16 16 Agnieszka Łada

17 Eurosceptics what to expect? The Eurosceptics actions so far confirm the expectations and follow the patterns known from previous terms of the Parliament: significant ideological differences, lack of a positive programme, focusing on rhetorical and imageoriented actions, and lack of impact on the functioning of the European Parliament. It should, however, be remembered that their impact may become more visible in the coming months and years. Although in such a case, two scenarios are possible. According to one scenario, the voice of the Eurosceptics will be stronger when the new European Commission starts working when they begin to send legislative proposals and enter into discussions with the European Parliament. However, it will most probably mainly consist of a loud expression of opinions and unconventional ways of attracting attention to their proposals with the use of special rhetorical devices or controversial behaviour. Such activities may sometimes only provide good material for the media, while at other times it may be a real obstacle to the work of the European Parliament. In the other scenario, the more likely one, it is possible to suppose that the novelty of rhetorical battles will wear off for the Eurosceptics, the media will gradually get used to them and will no longer pay them so much attention. A lack of expertise and genuine proposals for change will result in more frequent absence of those MEPs from the work of the European Parliament, as they will focus more on domestic activities, which have traditionally been more important for them. Thus, however, they will have an even stronger influence on the positions of national governments and on the arguments used in the debates in their countries. The question remains open also among experts as to what steps should be taken in the face of the actions and behaviour of the Eurosceptics. Ignoring them, refusing to invite them to discussions, lack of cooperation, and lack of support in their strive for official posts, are all solutions that may reduce their influence on the decision-making process or their presence in the public debate. However, they may also provide the proof for voters that their representatives thus, also their voices as citizens are discriminated against, which may make those citizens even more disappointed with politics and strengthen the position of the Eurosceptics. So far, marginalising the Eurosceptic political groups through the joint action of the political mainstream in the European Parliament has effectively curbed their harmful impact on the work of this institution. The significance of Eurosceptics in the new term of the European Parliament... 17