Conceptualizing Simulation Theory

Transcription

1 University Press Scholarship Online You are looking at 1-10 of 18 items for: keywords : mental simulation Conceptualizing Simulation Theory Alvin I. Goldman in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading Published in print: 2006 Published Online: September 2006 ISBN: eisbn: This chapter clarifies the notion of simulation and explores the relationship between simulating and theorizing. Generic simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one thing by another, so mental simulation is the resemblance or imitation of one mental process by another. For example, visual imagery may simulate vision by using much of the same neural machinery that vision uses. The main empirical question here is whether third-person mindreading is substantially based on attempts to simulate selected processes and states in the head of a target. The possibility of limited compatibility between simulation and theorizing undercuts arguments that mental simulation inevitably collapses into theorizing, and the prospects for simulation-theory hybrids are explored. Envisioning the Future and Self-Regulation Shelley E. Taylor in Predictions in the Brain: Using Our Past to Generate a Future September 2011 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter reviews research on mental simulations. Mental simulations can help people manage potential problems and reach goals that might otherwise be more difficult. Such activities as health behavior change, achievement of personal goals, and consumer decision making can all benefit from mental simulations. Although imagining either the outcome one wishes to achieve or the process required to achieve it can be helpful, on the whole, the evidence supporting the value of process Page 1 of 7

2 simulations, namely envisioning the steps needed to achieve a goal, is more consistent. Process simulations appear to aid performance primarily by helping people come up with specific plans and steps that they can take to solve problems or further their goals, and by helping people manage their emotions effectively. As such, the range of behaviors to which process simulations might profitably be directed could be enlarged. Putting Blinkers on a Blind Man : Providing Cognitive Support for Creative Processes with Environmental Cues Bo T. Christensen and Christian D. Schunn in Tools for Innovation Published in print: 2009 Published Online: September 2009 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Random cues may be both beneficial and harmful to creativity. Theories of analogical transfer and association assume that cues are helpful in generating new ideas. However, theories of path-of-least-resistance, fixation, and unconscious plagiarism say that cues can lead you into traps. Empirical research partly supports both theories. So what is a practitioner to do in selecting random cues for enhancing creativity? It is suggested that the answer is found in looking at the relationship between cues and the creative cognitive processes and their functions, and how this leads to creative outcome originality and usefulness. Two processes are examined: analogical transfer and mental simulation. It is recommended that random between-domain cues be used to increase between domain analogizing primarily with instruction to make connections, leading to product originality. Random withindomain cues should be used to increase within-domain analogizing. Due to property transfer, close analogies may have a negative impact on the originality of the outcome in problem-solving instances, but a positive impact on usefulness in problem-identifying and problem-solving instances. Random end-user cues will lead to greater amounts of enduser simulations of usability and user preferences, and thus to higher levels of product usefulness. Page 2 of 7

3 Engaging the World Ronald W. Langacker in Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction Published in print: 2008 Published Online: May 2008 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Because it unfolds through time, conceptualization (and hence linguistic meaning) is inherently dynamic. There are numerous natural paths that it tends to follow, and which tend to coalign in linguistic structure. In one kind of path, a salient reference point provides mental access to a target. Certain basic grammatical phenomena are analyzed in terms of reference point relationships, including possessives, pronominal anaphora, topic constructions, and trajector/ landmark organization (subject and object). A subject differs from a discourse topic by being structurally internal to a clause and conceptually intrinsic to the clausal process. Trajector and landmark are characterized dynamically as the first and second reference points evoked in building up to the full conception of a profiled relationship. This explains their general grammatical accessibility as well as their role in certain specific constructions. The mental world we construct is grounded in our experience as creatures with bodies who engage in motor and sensory interactions (embodiment). In constructing it, we transcend direct experience through abstraction, conceptual integration, and subjectification: the application of mental operations immanent in certain conceptions to situations for which their occurrence is extrinsic. Examples include fictive motion, fictive change, and the covert invocation of imagined scenarios. Mental simulation is a fundamental aspect of conception and linguistic meaning. Subjectification is an important factor in grammaticization (the evolution of grammatical elements from lexical sources). Many grammatical notions are subjective counterparts of basic aspects of everyday experience. Grammar reflects the means of disengagement through which we transcend immediate experience and construct our mental world. It is thus a key to conceptual analysis. Recreative Minds Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft Published in print: 2002 Published Online: October 2011 ISBN: eisbn: Item type: book acprof:oso/ Page 3 of 7

4 This book develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon recent theories and results in psychology. Ideas about how we read the minds of others have put the concept of imagination firmly back on the agenda for philosophy and psychology. The authors present a theory of what they call imaginative projection; they show how it fits into a philosophically-motivated picture of the mind and of mental states, and how it illuminates and is illuminated by recent developments in cognitive psychology. They argue that we need to recognize a category of desirein-imagination, and that supposition and fantasy should be classed as forms of imagination. They accommodate some of the peculiarities of perceptual forms of imagining such as visual and motor imagery, and suggest that they are important for mind-reading. They argue for a novel view about the relations between imagination and pretence, and suggest that imagining can be, but need not be, the cause of pretending. They show how the theory accommodates but goes beyond the idea of mental simulation, and argue that the contrast between simulation and theory is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They argue that we can understand certain developmental and psychiatric disorders as arising from faulty imagination. Throughout, they link their discussion to the uses of imagination in our encounters with art, and they conclude with a chapter on responses to tragedy. The final chapter also offers a theory of emotions that suggests that these states have much in common with perceptual states. Mental Simulation and the Nexus of Causal and Counterfactual Explanation David R. Mandel in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology January 2012 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter examines the role of mental simulation in causal and counterfactual explanations of outcomes of past cases. Following the Introduction, Part 2 outlines the author s reasons for his emphasis on explanation as opposed to thinking or reasoning. Part 3 traces the development of the mental simulation construct, expands on previous notions, and critically examines how psychologists have used the mental simulation construct to make claims about the nature of causal explanation. Part 4 summarizes an alternative functional account of the relationship between causal and counterfactual explanation called Judgment Dissociation Theory (JDT). In JDT, mental simulations are Page 4 of 7

5 posited to play a role in both causal and counterfactual explanations, but the focus of each type of explanation is different. Specifically, causal explanations tend to focus on antecedents that were sufficient under the circumstances to yield the actual event, whereas counterfactual explanations tend to focus on (the mutation of) antecedents that would have been sufficient to prevent the actual outcome and others like it from occurring. These different foci lead to predictable dissociations in explanatory content, which have been confirmed in recent experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the compatibility of JDT with an interventionist account of causal thinking. Visual Mental Imagery: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Research S. M. Kosslyn in Interdisciplinary Research: Case Studies from Health and Social Science Published in print: 2008 Published Online: September 2008 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter begins with a discussion of how visual mental imagery has progressed from a time of introspective analysis alone to the examination of the brain circuitry that underlies it. This sets the stage for a discussion of the possible relevance of imagery research for health. Topics covered include mental simulation of aversive events, imagery and cognitive restructuring, and imagery and mind-body interactions. Causal thinking David Lagnado in Causality in the Sciences September 2011 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ How do people acquire and use causal knowledge? This chapter argues that causal learning and reasoning are intertwined, and recruit similar representations and inferential procedures. In contrast to covariationbased approaches to learning, this chapter maintains that people use multiple sources of evidence to discover causal relations, and that the causal representation itself is separate from these informational sources. The key roles of prior knowledge and interventions in learning are also discussed. Finally, this chapter speculates about the role of mental Page 5 of 7

6 simulation in causal inference. Drawing on parallels with work in the psychology of mechanical reasoning, the notion of a causal mental model is proposed as a viable alternative to reasoning systems based in logic or probability theory alone. The central idea is that when people reason about causal systems they utilize mental models that represent objects, events or states of affairs, and reasoning and inference is carried out by mental simulation of these models. Suppositions, Conditionals, and Causal Claims Aidan Feeney and Simon J. Handley in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology January 2012 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ Causal conditional statements such as if I work hard then I will get a first class degree are comprised of an effect described in the consequent clause of the conditional (getting a first class degree) and a putative cause described in the antecedent clause (working hard). According to the suppositional theory (Evans, Over, & Handley (2005)), people evaluate causal conditional claims by supposing the cause and running a mental simulation in order to see whether the effect follows. In two experiments, using methods that have been employed to test this account, we examine the extent to which simulations of cause-present and cause-absent cases underlie evaluations of causal conditionals, concessive (even-if) conditionals and the strength of the causal relationship expressed by conditional claims. Whereas simulation of cause-present cases was positively associated with all three types of evaluation, simulation of cause-absent cases was negatively related to evaluations of the strength of the causal relationship expressed by a conditional claim, positively related to evaluations of even-if conditionals, and only weakly related to evaluations of causal conditionals. These results suggest that evaluating explicit causal claims, or conditional constructions used to deny such claims, cues a process of simulation that involves imagining that the antecedent event is undone. This is akin to the undoing associated with the generation of counterfactual possibilities and results in a belief that contributes to causal judgements in line with covariation and counterfactual accounts of causality. These findings suggest a mechanism through which people get a sense of the strength of causal relations in the world. Page 6 of 7

7 Functionalism Redux:: How Adaptive Action Constrains Perception, Simulation, and Evolved Intuitions Ezequiel Morsella, Merrit A. Hoover,, and John A. Bargh in People Watching: Social, Perceptual, and Neurophysiological Studies of Body Perception Published in print: 2012 Published Online: January 2013 ISBN: eisbn: acprof:oso/ This chapter considers body perception from a functionalist perspective in which mental phenomena (representations and subjective states) guide an organism s behavior. From this perspective, body perception is constrained by adaptive considerations of actions, influences of physical and social environments, and high-level cognitive processes. Page 7 of 7