IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO grandstanding IPO. Teho et al Aharony et al IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO. Ritter 1991 IPO

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1 * IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO 2002 grandstanding IPO Teho et al Aharony et al IPO 2009 IPO IPO IPO 2011 IPO Ritter 1991 IPO Teoh et al DuCharme et al IPO IPO IPO venture capital IPO value - added IPO Hellmann and Puri IPO *

2 Gompers and Lerner IPO Pre - IPO IPO 2011 IPO IPO Mosfield and Tan 2006 IPO value - added IPO Lee and Wahal 2004 IPO Gompers 1996 grandstanding IPO IPO IPO 1 Gompers

3 H1 IPO 809 H2 IPO 2012 IPO % H1 H2 H3 - H5 DA 0 = α 0 + α 1 VCIPO + α 2 Size + α 3 Lever + α 4 MB + IPO α 5 TopUnderwriter + α 6 TopCPA + α 7 SOE + Year + Industry 1 Nahata 2008 DA t = α 0 + α 1 TEST + α 2 Size + α 3 Lever + α 4 MB + α 5 SEO + Year + Industry 2 IPO DA 0 = α 0 + α 1 VCCharacter + α 2 Size + α 3 Lever + α 4 MB + α 5 TopUnderwriter + α 6 TopCPA + α 7 SOE + Year + Industry 3 1. DA 0 IPO Jones DA t IPO IPO Jones IPO 2. 1 VCIPO IPO 1 0 IPO 2 TEST VC VC_ SALE VC 1 0 VC_ SALE VCCharacter VC- Control _ Shares VCControl _ Dir VCReputation VCPoli- IPO Conn VCControl_ Shares IPO VCControl_ Dir H3 IPO IPO VCReputation H4. 1 IPO IPO VCPoli- Conn IPO H4. 2 IPO 1 H5 0 IPO 3. Size Lever / MB TopUnderwriter IPO CSMAR TopCPA

4 1 0 SOE VC VC t = SEO VC IPO VC IPO 1 IPO DA 1 IPO DA DA - 3 DA - 2 DA - 1 DA 0 DA 1 DA 2 DA *** *** *** *** *** VC ** ** *** *** *** ** VC ** *** *** *** *** t ** t *** ** * VCIPO VCControl_ Shares VCControl_ Dir VCReputation VCPoliConn Size Lever MB TopUnderwriter TopCPA SOE VC VC_ SALE SEO

5 1. IPO 3 IPO IPO DA Jones Model VCIPO ** ** ** ** ** ** Size ** ** * ** * * Lever MB Top Underwriter Top CPA SOE * * Constant * * * * Year Dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Industry Dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Wald chi Number z ** * Lee and Wahal Morsfield and Tan IPO 1 Jones DA VCIPO DA Kothari et al IPO IPO Kothari et al IPO 3 Jones IPO IPO IPO

6 ROA ROA Jones VCPoliConn 3-6 IPO DA 1 2 H3 H4. 2 H5 H1 IPO 5 IPO IPO DA 2. IPO VC * VCControl_ Shares IPO VC_ SALE ** VCControl_ Dir ** VCReputation IPO ** VCPoliConn H IPO Size IPO DA Lever *** VC MB ** VC_ SALE TopUnderwriter *** *** Size TopCPA *** *** Lever SOE MB Constant *** *** SEO Year Dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Constant Year Dummy Controlled Controlled Industry Dummy Controlled Controlled Adj - R Number t *** ** * Industry Dummy Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Adj - R Number t *** ** * IPO IPO 3. IPO Teoh et al Morsfield and Tan IPO 48 IPO VCControl_ Shares IPO IPO VCControl IPO _ Dir BHAR IPO VCReputation IPO t = 1 t = 1 BHAR i 1 T = T 1 + r it - T 1 + r mt 25

7 BHAR i 1 T i 1 T 6 VC IPO r it IPO r m t BHAR IPO Chen et al VC = IPO VC = Brav and Gompers 1997 Morsfield and Tan 2006 T ** * ** ** 2 VC IPO 2011 IPO IPO DA BHAR 4 7 DA BM IPO BHAR VC = 1 VC = 0 VC = 1 VC = ** * ** UnderPricing * * * Age Capital HighTech * Constant Adj - R Number t ** * BM IPO UnderPricing Age ln Capital IPO HighTech 1 0

8 7 IPO DA ~ 106 BHAR IPO IPO IPO ~ 119 DA BHAR Aharony J. C. J. Lee and T. H. Wong DA BHAR Financial Packing of IPO Firm in China. Journal of Accounting DA BHAR Research ~ 126 Brav A. and P. A. Gompers Myth or Reality The Long - run Underperformance of IPO Evidence from IPO Venture and Nonventure Capital - backed Companies. The Journal of Finance ~ 1821 IPO Chen L. J. Wang and K. C. Wei Underpricing and Long - term Performance of IPOs in China. Journal of Corporate Finance ~ 430 DuCharme L. L. P. H. Malatesta and S. E. Sefcik Earnings Management Stock Issues and Shareholder Lawsuit. Journal of Financial Economics ~ IPO Gompers P Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry. Journal of Financial Economics ~ 156 Gompers P. and J. Lerner Venture Capital Distributions Short - run and Long - run Reaction. The Journal of Finance ~ 2183 Hellmann T. and M. Puri Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start - up Firms Empirical Evidence. The Journal of Finance ~ 197. Kothari S. P. A. J. Leone and C. E. Wasley Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures. Journal of Accounting and Economic ~ Lee P. M. and S. Wahal Grandstanding Certification and the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPO. Journal of Financial Economics ~ Morsfield S. G. and C. Tan Do Venture Capitalists Influence the Decision to Manage Earnings in Initial Public Offerings The Accounting Review ~ 1150 Nahata R VentureCapital Reputation and Investment Performance. Journal of Finance Economics ~ 151 Ritter J. R The Long - run Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Finance ~ Teoh S. H. I. Welch and T. J. Wong ~ 85 Earnings Management and the Long - run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Finance ~

9 Abstracts of Main Papers The Substitution Effect between Managerial Judgment and Accounting Conservatism Zhou Wei & Wu Liansheng This paper investigates the relationship between managerial judgment and accounting conservatism based on accounting standards changed in China. A substantial decrease in accounting conservatism is found after increasing the scope of managerial judgment in accounting standards and this effect is more pronounced in non - state - owned enterprises than in state - owned enterprises. The result shows that the decrease of market information asymmetry caused by the increase in managerial judgment of the new accounting in China leads to the decrease in investor's demand for accounting conservatism. The result has implications to improving the accounting standard reform in China. The Achievement of Good Governance and Governance Effect of Government Accounting Chen Zhibin & Li Jingtao The paper deconstructs the connotation of good governance analyzes the action mechanism and realization paths of governance effect of government accounting on each connotation level. The paper suggests that government accounting can insure government governance normal legitimacy by perfecting institutional system strengthening audit constraints normalizing power operation and promoting incorrupt government. Can promote governance interaction and restriction through improving internal communication and checks & balances mechanism and building a government - led multiple governance mode. Can help government governance realize scientific and efficient through perfecting information disclosure optimizing governance methods scientifically evaluating governance performance and ensuring accountability be efficiently performed. Can insure stability and sustainability of government governance by perfecting crisis response and promoting green governance. Based on the effects above government accounting promotes achievement of good governance. Grandstanding and Earnings Management Evidence from Venture Capital Industry in China Cai Ning This paper investigates the impact of VC's incentive to build reputation grandstanding on the earnings equity and long - term performance after IPO. Firstly in IPO the earnings management of companies backed by VC is more aggressive than companies not backed by VC. The control of VC reputation and political connection of VC are all positively correlated with the earnings management in IPO Secondly after IPO the earnings management in following years of companies backed by VC is more aggressive than companies not backed by VC. The main purpose is to facilitate the withdrawal through selling shares Thirdly the long - run performance of companies backed by VC underperform that not backed by VC. The more earnings management in IPO the worse the long - run performance is. Ownership Type Government Intervention and Resolutions of Financial Distress Case Studies of China COSCO Holdings Co. Ltd Suntech Power Holdings Co. Ltd and Li Ning Co. Ltd Zhu Jigao et al. This paper discusses different resolutions of financially distressed firms and explains the differences of the resolutions by analyzing their ownership types and government interventions on them using three Chinese companies China COSCO Holdings Co. Ltd Suntech Power Holdings Co. Ltd and Li Ning Co. Ltd. The paper shows that for resolving the financial distress problem firms have to make basic changes by taking multiple measures including corporate governance restructuring strategic and operational restructuring assets restructuring and financial restructuring. State - owned companies prefer to use non - market - orientated resolutions such as related transactions whilenon - state - owned firms focus on the restructure of corporate strategy and improvement of operation efficiency. The cost of financial distress for state - owned company is less than non - state - owned company. Government intervenes financially distressed companies by offering help. The government intervention can help state - owned companies which is called the soft - budget problem and it can also help non - state - owned companies. But investors of non - state - owned companies don't show their positive response to the resolutions which are affected by government intervention. Enterprise Group Management Control and Risk Management of Finance Companies Yuan Lin & Zhang Weihua As a financial institution within enterprise group finance companies has played an important role in enterprise group management and risk control. Based case study on ten enterprises that have finance companies this paper examines how the effect management control of finance company effects its risk management. We found that the risk evaluation of finance companies is not perfect and some companies did not establish information platform of risk management to cover the whole group. Some groups affect the finance company credit decisions and other issues to get private benefits. We give some corresponding suggestions about risk management of finance companies from the perspective of management control. Stock Pledge and Expropriations of Controlling Shareholders Motivating by Market Capitalization Management Li Ni & Zheng Guojian Market capitalization management becomes increasingly important in corporate and capital market governance. This paper discusses the financing behavior of controlling shareholder motivated by market capitalization management and the governance role of market capitalization management. Based on the sample of Chinese listed firms over the period of 2006 to 2011 this paper finds that market capitalization management improves the efficiency of the financing behavior of controlling shareholder and reduces their expropriations which indicates the governance effect of market value management. Further analysis shows that equity held by controlling shareholders can enhance the governance effect of market capitalization management. 94