NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CIENTIFIC UARTERLY QUARTERLY (93)

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2 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CIENTIFIC UARTERLY QUARTERLY no 4(9 (93) WARSAW 2013

3 SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE Associate Professor Andrzej Glen, Ph.D. chairman, Professor Stanisław Zajas, Ph.D. deputy-chairman, Professor Waldemar Kaczmarek, Ph.D. Management and Command Faculty, Professor Waldemar Kitler, Ph.D. National Security Faculty, Dr James Corum Baltic defence College, Col. Miroslaw Dimitrov, Associate Professor National Defence Academy in Sofia, Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. National Defence University in Bucharest, Doc. Ing. Mariana Kuffova, Associate Professor Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Professor Pavel Necas Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Col. Dimitar Tashkov, Associate Professor, Ph.D. National Defence Academy in Sofia, M.A. Adam Szynal Thematic editor: Assoc. Prof. Ryszard Chrobak, PhD The list of reviewers: Colonel Instructor Stan ANTON, Ph.D.; Commander Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel BUČKA, Ph.D.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D.; Colonel Miroslav Stefan DIMITROV, Assoc. Prof.; Colonel Instructor Pascu FURNICĂ, Ph.D.; Doc. Ing. Peter LIPTAK, Cs.C.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Dimitar NEDYLKOV; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Constantin POPESCU, Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, Ph.D.; Researcher Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Peter SPILÝ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Andrzej Glen, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KACZMAREK, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Stanisław KOZIEJ, Ph.D.; Prof.Marian KOZUB, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Zdzisław KURASIŃSKI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Józef MARCZAK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.; Maj.Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Jacek PAWŁOWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Piotr SIENKIEWICZ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Stanisław SIRKO, Ph.D.; Prof. Zenon STACHOWIAK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Jeremiasz ŚLIPIEC, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Jarosław WOŁEJSZO, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Marek WRZOSEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Stanisław ZAJAS, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Janusz ZUZIAK, Ph.D. Editorial committee: Anna Doraczyńska, M.A. chief editor (tel. 6/ ), Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters, M.A. editing of papers in English Address: Warszawa 72 al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela 103, bl. 4 tel./fax: (6) zn@aon.edu.pl All articles are available in Polish in Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej National Defence University Scientific Quarterly has been indexed in the international database Index Copernicus Master List. The papers published in the NDU Scientific Quarterly are reviewed by experts. They express individual opinions of the authors; they are also verified by an anti-plagiarism system. National Defence University Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University, order no 668/2014, edition of 150 copies

4 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D. Irmina DENYSIUK, MA Components of stabilisation and reconstruction processes in contemporary crisis response operations... 5 Assoc. Prof. Andrzej CIUPIŃSKI, Ph.D. Treaty principles of the EU s Common Foreign and Security Policy Stanisław MAKSIMIEC, Ph.D. Fathers of Europe uniting ideas in integration practice Assoc.Prof. Agnieszka LEGUCKA, Ph.D. Conflict management in the EU-Russia shared neighbourhood. Between soft and hard power Jerzy Tomasz LIMANOWSKI, Ph.D. BRICS - a security's creator in the international environment - the role of the Russian Federation against the background of the Crimea Crisis Lt. Col. Sławomir IWANOWSKI, PH.D. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, April 29, NATIONAL SECURITY AND STATE DEFENCE Marian KULICZKOWSKI, Ph.D. Eng. State defence preparations in the national security system of the Republic of Poland classification and description of defence tasks Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D. Organisation of the National Security in Poland in the Context of a Country s Internal Order Protection Assoc. Prof. Ryszard CHROBAK, Ph.D. Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek KUBIŃSKI, Ph.D. State Security Threats Col (ret.) Eugeniusz JENDRASZCZAK, Ph.D. Development of Contemporary Security Tools Bogdan MICHAILIUK, Ph.D. Eng. Rescue and Civil Protection Subsystem Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. Eng. Chemical contamination typology of threats

5 Robert MARCJAN Marek ŁAKOMY Michał WYSOKIŃSKI Kamil PIĘTAK Marek KISIEL-DOROHINICKI Criminal intelligence supported with spatial analysis tools in LINK application EDUCATION FOR SECURITY Marcin MAZUREK, Ph.D. Civic determinants of security education Ilona URYCH, Ph.D. New challenges for safety education - physical activity cure for selected peacetime threats in the XXI century Cdre Assoc. Prof. Ryszard SZYNOWSKI, Ph.D. Military Administration Personnel

6 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES ISSN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES IN CONTEMPORARY CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Irmina DENYSIUK, MA National Security Faculty NDU Abstract Stabilization and reconstruction of countries, although are often considered as distinct actions, usually are an integral part of many activities undertaken in the scope of crisis response operations, including mainly peace support operations. Therefore the statement that stabilization and reconstruction is a set of actions and tasks taken within the confines and background of crisis response operations, which is acknowledged as a main assumption of this consideration, needs to be emphasized. Taking into consideration the need of comprehensive approach to crisis response that is stressed nowadays, such a perception of the processes outlined above seems to be fully justified and desired, both by the political and military decision-makers. It also needs to be pointed out, that wide object scope that includes stabilization and reconstruction, requires knowledge systematization and its distribution among all subjects involved in these specific, but extremely necessary actions. Military success is just a prelude to further actions aimed to achieve a stable situation in a country, and only then the reconstruction of its governmental structures and security forces can be carried out. At the end of the process we should be able to pass on complete responsibility for a proper country's functioning to the local authorities. Key words failed states, failing states, crisis response operations, stabilization and reconstruction, PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), SSR (Security Sector Reform) Introduction Stabilisation and reconstruction of countries, although they are often considered as distinct actions, are usually an integral part of the many activities undertaken in the area of crisis response operations, which mainly include peace support operations. These activities are often seen as distinct operations; however, such a singling out seems to be an attempt at exposing their importance and 5

7 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK character. Therefore, the statement that stabilisation and reconstruction are a set of actions and tasks taken within the confines and background of crisis response operations, which is acknowledged as the main assumption of this consideration, needs to be emphasised. Thus, it should be emphasised that the set of these ventures is not accidental. On the contrary, it is consciously directed at achieving an established purpose and, therefore, it can be considered as a process. It means that the process of stabilisation and rebuilding should be understood as a sequence of changes (actions, tasks) undertaken in the framework of crisis response operations, occurring one after the other or overlapping, according to the guidelines included in operational plans. Source: Own elaboration based on: J. K. Wither, Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), Materials from the scientific conference Misje stabilizacyjne dla odbudowy państw, organized on May 2009 at the National Defence University, also in: M. Marszałek (ed), Koncepcja użycia sił zbrojnych w wojnach nieregularnych, research work no. III.5.1.0, AON, Warsaw 2011, p Figure 1: Location of stabilisation and reconstruction activities in crisis response operations Taking into consideration the need for a comprehensive approach to crisis response that is stressed nowadays, such a perception of the processes outlined above seems to be fully justified and desired, both by political and military decision-makers. Increased interest in this subject was also recently triggered in the context of the continuing operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Afghanistan. Considerations are focused, in particular, on their effectiveness and actual capacity for creating a safe and stable environment. The multidimensionality of these activities and the multitude of subjects' involved also needs emphasis. Therefore, a lot of attention in the context of stabilisation and reconstruction is given to multi-agency cooperation in their realisation. Operational lessons learned so far show that cooperation is not at the expected level yet. However, it can be

8 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES assumed that the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the United Nations are all noticing a growing need for joint use of diverse object abilities. Only such an approach can guarantee success in future operations that will certainly include stabilisation and reconstruction activities. It also needs to be pointed out that the wide objective, which includes stabilisation and reconstruction, requires knowledge systematisation and its distribution among all subjects involved in these specific, but extremely necessary actions. Achieving the desired end state defined by political decision-makers requires not only effective stabilisation activities, but also a myriad of activities aimed at state reconstruction. Whereas military success is just a prelude to further actions aimed at achieving a stable situation in a country, and only then the reconstruction of its governmental structures and security forces can be carried out. At the end of the process we should be able to pass on complete responsibility for a country's proper functioning to the local authorities. The stabilisation and reconstruction process considerations featured in this article have been broken down into general research questions and specific ones. The general problem is: How do the elements used by third party forces in the stabilisation and reconstruction process support failed or failing countries?. Taking into consideration the complexity of the problem, it seemed advisable to identify the following specific research questions: What is the essence of stabilisation and reconstruction operations? Which elements supporting them can be singled out and what is their role in the countries' stabilisation and reconstruction? How was the practical use of these elements organized in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? This article describes the results of research conducted in frames of statutory research activity by the National Security Department of National Defence Academy. The output is, therefore, presented in the form of a cohesive and synthetic explanation of devices and methods used in the supporting of the reconstruction process and the rebuilding of countries. The present-day vision and mission of the stabilisation and reconstruction of states The stabilisation and initial reconstruction operations, as Richard Nelson calls them, can be seen in a traditional way, which is usually preferred by the military. This approach outlines the aims, roles, missions, tasks, operational concepts and desired results. Therefore, it is important that planned military operations must be made to fit properly into the existing political conditions. Hence, one of the definitions of stabilisation and reconstruction operations, given by R. Nelson, explains these activities as a process that enables lasting peace to be achieved in an 7

9 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK unfriendly operating environment 1. Avoiding any merits-related and methodological correctness of this definition, it can be stated that its contents stress the meaning of the final political state, which is more important than any previously achieved military success. This approach, in the opinion of the quoted author, seems to be consistent with an approach worked out by the North Atlantic Alliance that refers to the majority of operations from an array of non-article 5 crisis response operations which include actions connected with stabilisation and reconstruction. In the opinion of the authors of the study Improving Capacity for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, the efforts identified as stabilisation and reconstruction activities involve many overlapping missions, which themselves, considering the diverse objective we are discussing, are the components of strategies (approaches) and actions. In their opinion, stabilisation refers to all the efforts aimed at termination of the conflict and the social, economical and political turbulence it causes 2. Achieving stabilisation in each of enumerated areas is essential before reconstruction activities begin. One can agree with the authors assessment the mentioned study that without achieving and maintaining the stability and security associated with this, any other venture usually only leads to a short-term effect. Following this line of reasoning, it can be assumed that stabilisation is one of the fundamental elements of activities (components) undertaken during an operation. Stabilisation, as already mentioned, can be a part of crisis response operations. In this case, its aim is to terminate the conflict. Stabilisation is also essential after combat operations end, which can knowingly or unknowingly lead to the outbreak of another (additional) conflict. Furthermore, stabilisation is recognised as an extremely important part of actions allowing the suppression of insurgency, once it has been estimated as a threat by the international community. In these specific operations, which are extremely difficult for the armed forces, great importance is ascribed to the results of stabilisation. Thus, the need for receiving strong support from the local community arises, which is correctly treated as the centre of gravity 3. Obtaining this support mostly depends on ensuring the security of the civilian population, and thus bringing the armed violence to an end and eliminating any situations that bear signs of threats for the local community. The elements of stabilization can also include antiterrorist operations (Counterterrorism Operations CT) or counterinsurgency (Counterinsurgency operations COIN), which were classified in the set of crisis response operations 4. If these operations are conducted 1 R. Nelson, How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington D.C. 2006, pa N. Bensahel, O. Oliver, H. Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, RAND, Santa Monica 2009, pa The centre of gravity is the attribute, opportunities or places, from which the country (nation), the Alliance, the armed forces or other groups derive latitude of action, physical strength or will. See: Słownik pojęć sojuszniczej obrony powietrznej, AON, Warsaw 2003, pa See: AJP-3.4, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, Brussels 2010; M. Marszałek, Operacje reagowania kryzysowego NATO. Istota, uwarunkowania, planowanie, Difin, Warsaw

10 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES in an uncertain environment, stabilisation may be crucial for obtaining intelligence information. Stabilisation may be also considered as a part of activities to be run after the conflict ends, which are necessary efforts aimed at achieving country reconstruction. Moreover, reconstruction concerns the building and rebuilding process of the state structures, which ensure effective handling, social and economic development and national security. Reconstruction becomes possible only when a proper level of stabilisation is achieved in each of the previously described sectors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that stabilisation is a sine qua non condition of reconstruction. Without stabilisation, all the efforts made in the field of reconstruction will not bring the desired, and equally important, long-term effects. When considering armed conflicts, two groups of tasks were outlined. Originally, stabilisation was considered among experts as the key to the cessation of the use of violence. Reconstruction, for a change, was seen as a component which played a role in preventing the re-escalation of violence. Although there is a clear difference between stabilisation and reconstruction, these activities are interrelated, and what is more, dependent on each other. Taking into consideration the varied environment (conditions) for conducting stabilisation and reconstruction operations, it must be pointed out that the range of tasks carried out by the armed forces can be on the one hand wide, but on the other limited 5. However, tasks connected with security should be primarily aimed at ensuring it is available to all personnel and subjects involved in the operation. Such details must be obligatorily a matter of negotiations at the early stage of operation planning and the developing of its appropriate mandate 6. These are the main mission areas that include: forcing the agreement on cease fire, disarming warring parties, collecting and destroying weapons and armaments, controlling demilitarised zones and establishing proper relations with local civilians. It is widely known that creating a safe environment first of all requires the concentration of security forces. It is also worth mentioning that according to American experts, the term security forces embraces not only the armed forces, but also police, border guards and other subjects responsible for ensuring national security in the country. Protection of combat measures and ammunitions' storehouses should be treated as a priority by military components designated for stabilisation and reconstruction. The North Atlantic Alliance's experiences in this field, gathered from operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as conclusions collected from a number of the United Nations peacekeeping operations 7, confirm the thesis that the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers 5 The Armed Forces, e.g. the North Atlantic Alliance, may only be an element of supporting stabilisation and reconstruction operations, as in the case of the NATO training mission in Iraq. 6 R. Nelson, op. cit., pa Widely: M. Marszałek, T. Limanowski, Operacje pokojowe Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Geneza struktura planowanie, AON, Warsaw

11 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK can be extremely difficult, but rightly considered as a key factor in the long-term stabilisation of a post-conflict area. It is also important to inform public opinion about the conducted operations. The NATO armed forces must communicate with the local community. Forces pursuing stabilisation and reconstruction operations should use public organisations and mass media to pass on actual information, exercise control and prevent social unrest, as well as display important announcements in the local language. Armed forces must also ensure the security of the territory where stabilisation and reconstruction are being conducted. The range of activities connected with this includes peacekeeping by establishing an effective controlling system over the country s borders. Such a system should also consist of border checkpoints that will be able to stop the smuggling of weapons and illegal goods, prevent insurgents from infiltrating the area of operation, and the uncontrolled movement of organised criminal groups and terrorists, and at the same time ensure the security of returning refugees. The last item usually requires special attention from intervening forces, which in a natural way causes the allocation of necessary forces and measures aimed at their protection. Moreover, one can agree with R. Nelson's claim that allied forces carrying out stabilisation and reconstruction activities can also be involved in establishing and maintaining people's freedom of movement within the country. This seems to be a necessary undertaking for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. These forces then aim at making trade and movement of people legitimate, controlled, and hence more secure. Furthermore, a separate group of stabilisation tasks refers to forcing and keeping security and public order. The main effort, in the opinion of the quoted author, should focus on protection of civilians, ensuring free access for humanitarian organisations carrying assistance for victims, as well as temporary fulfilment of typical police tasks and demining the area where the operation is conducted. R. Nelson's idea that including the high risk of grounded ethnic struggles, which can happen in the envitonment of post-armed-conflicts, in the main effort for stabilisation and reconstruction that should be directed at ensuring long-term public order, seems relevant. The conclusions from the operations carried out in Afghanistan and Kosovo prove that organised crime and groups involved in drug production and trafficking can pose a serious obstacle for the implementation of any projects related to stabilisation and reconstruction. There should be reflection on the application of the rules of the use of force adequate to the situation and the tasks carried out 8. These rules, as emphasised by, inter alia, R. Nelson, should be extremely clear and, also importantly, regularly monitored and modified if needed. NATO s armed forces, and also those of other countries involved in stabilisation and reconstruction, must shield and ensure the security of the critical infrastructure. The most important political leaders, governmental institutions and previously deployed military installations must also be under protection. Ensuring 10 8 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are also called rules of use the armed violence in the right order.

12 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES efficient protection of listed subjects and objects is considered essential in creating a safe environment. Coordination of activities in the security field is of great importance in such operations. Throughout the time in which stabilisation and reconstruction are running, the coordination of NATO's armed forces activities becomes crucial, with efforts directed towards the security of other subjects, such as: armed forces of non-nato countries participating in an operation, local armed forces (providing that they are going to be formed), civilian police and other institutions responsible for security in a country. Coordination must be led in a transparent manner, guided by clear rules of force engagement and conception of the operation. NATO's armed forces can have appropriate input in initial reconstruction that aims at bringing basic help to meet the most urgent needs of the local people. The logic behind this is that if local or other sources essential for rebuilding are unavailable, it is the foreign armed forces, either in coalition or alliance, that must begin the rebuilding of critical infrastructure. During the initial phase, reconstruction activities should focus first of all on bringing back the damaged infrastructure, to allow the influx of humanitarian aid and to guarantee the supply of electricity, water, food, medical assistance and transport services. Another component vital to operational success is ensuring the continuity of the stabilisation and reconstruction. One can agree with the thesis that it is a big challenge due to the high frequency of rotation of personnel involved in the operations and, usually, the long-term nature of the problems that need solving. It seems that these problems can be solved by extending the operations' duration, especially in the area of the engagement of senior staff. Also, the standardisation of policy conducted and procedures employed might be beneficial. Elements of stabilisation and reconstruction support The unity of efforts undertaken in the framework of operations is not only the basic premise, and thus a fundamental principle of crisis response operations, but also a certain minimum necessary for coordinating the activities. Their uniform perception and application in practice is of particular importance in the context of efforts to achieve stability in a difficult and dangerous operating environment, both in failed or failing states. In the light of the first lessons learned (Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans), a need for comprehensive action to make homogeneous and uniform use of procedures was pointed out. 9 The elements, which in this way are to 9 The key, however, is to state that standardisation which aims at having more uniform support elements such as PRTs, reduce their ability to respond flexibly and rapidly to dynamic and changing circumstances typical to post-conflict zones. Flexibility of the activities undertaken in modern conflict environments plays an important role and is identified with the types of activities undertaken, the way they are undertaken, involvement of the individual force components for their performance and the possibility of a modular use of these forces. 11

13 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK support the stabilisation and reconstruction process, are: the idea of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the strategy of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other aid programs founded from governmental or nongovernmental funds by the host country and third party countries. The concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams was a response to the growing threat of a resurgence of conflict, which paradoxically occurred in the initial stages of the stabilisation process. PRTs are to focus their attention primarily on aspects of the implementation of civil-military tasks in a difficult environment: urbanised and populated by the local community, where support is indispensable to create and maintain a level of relative stability and local security. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are generally multinational. Their structure is built by the components of forces from different countries (usually two or three), but clear differences are emerging and not only within individual Teams. These internal differences can be minimised by the principle of voluntary association and, thus, the possibility of cooperation with national groups that are close to us culturally. Especially noticeable differences are, however, those between the Teams stationed and performing their tasks in different provinces. It seems that one can point to at least two sources for these structural differences. First of all the different levels of risk and (de)stabilisation of regions. The adaptation of both the structure of the Teams and the nature of their undertakings to the conditions prevailing in the regions of their responsibility is obvious. Secondly, far-reaching differences in terms of tasks being carried out, and thus the structure of the teams, point to their inability to make rigid standardisation. However, regardless of how diverse PRTs function in reality, they have one fundamental thing in common they serve the local society to improve its living conditions. The adoption of such a general purpose as the core curriculum of the functioning of PRTs makes each of the countries responsible for a given province aim at achieving the goal by different ways and using different means. In contrast, the individual aspirations of the countries involved may lead to different results of the stabilisation and transformation process, such as the empowerment of local business tycoons at the expense of, for example, weakening the position and authority of the host-state government. 10 Despite the numerous differences in the functioning of the Teams, a certain immutable framework indicating the fundamental imperatives that should dominate and define the core of each PTRs was set. This should include 11 : a strong link between civil and military aspects; orientation of the tasks primarily aimed at stabilising the region and creating the necessary conditions for achieving stabilisation; 10 M. Marszałek (ed), Obszary działań i zadań sił zaangażowanych w odbudowę i utrzymanie bezpieczeństwa w środowisku miejskim, research work no I , AON, Warsaw 2012, pa PRT Playbook. Tactic, Technic and Procedures, Center of Army Lessons Learned, No 07-34, September 2007, pa

14 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES multinational, multifunctional and multi-institutional nature; functioning in accordance with the idea of support towards the host state government and at its explicit request; operating in the provinces, away from the capital and the main centre of power; functioning of all PRTs on the principles of command appropriate for the leading nation; significant reduction of the possibility to use resources, personnel, operations, rules of engagement and armaments; significant dependence on the logistical and military support of other entities, high level of support obtained from the population; principles of operation and implementation of security and development solutions of the province are often created ad hoc and adapted to the circumstances; long-term ultimate goal has a political character and the criterion for success of the PRTs is to create stability and a reliable local authority. Moreover, it was assumed that the military components in the composition of the PRTs are responsible primarily for maintaining stability and, to a lesser extent, for taking immediate defensive or offensive action. Each Team requires the participation of diverse forces so that they are able to respond to the full spectrum of events adequately to each situation, both of a military and non-military nature. The armed forces should, therefore, be ready to take action simultaneously in two different directions against the enemy, as well as in support of the local community. In shaping their local security environment, PRTs can benefit from the help of international non-governmental agencies and organisations which are able to use their competences in order to work out the joint success of the operation. The foundation of the civil-military nature of the PRTs was thus based on the ineffectiveness of responding in a complex environment with operations in only one dimension military or civilian. It was pointed out that the military component is able to effectively realise the military task, while lacking skills in political, social or economic challenges. The civil component, on the contrary, needs relative stability in order to pursue its diplomatic and social tasks, because it only uses the traditional mechanisms and means of action and cannot overcome the unstable conditions of the environment. Tasks performed by the PRTs are mainly intended to have a static and not kinetic character 12, while simultaneously assuming the possibility of their use to strengthen military activities. Depending on the situation in which they have to function, PRTs can take responsibility for the main effort of the operation. More often, however, they complement the leading emergency response operations, in which they care about gaining the favour of the public carrying out the tasks of rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged regions and restoring basic public services and the rule of law. On the other hand, the work of PRTs can be seen as a 12 PRT Playbook, op. cit., pa

15 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK way to provide a stable environment for its own forces stationed in the area of operation. However, regardless of the options considered, it should be noted that the purpose of the PRTs is to reduce the number of situations that generate conflict and, thus, the motivation for the use of violence in solving existing and emerging problems. The PRTs primary task is to improve stability and security, while the second is to build the capacity of the host state to govern, to strengthen the economic mechanisms, and to provide basic public services, such as the provision of law and order, public access to justice, health care and education. These requirements are aimed primarily at ensuring the relative level of stability that is needed to start the rebuilding process. Source: Own study based on: PRT Playbook, op. cit., p Figure. 2. Major tasks of PRTs The simultaneous contribution of PRTs to the reconstruction and development of local institutions ensures responsibility for overall security gradually passes to the local self-governing structures (the so-called Transition phase). Therefore, the analysis of objectives and targets achieved and the success of the conducted operation depends not only on the efforts of the Teams, but also on the authorities of the host country, the entire nation, mutual relationship, and the degree of

16 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES interdependence of the actors and their cooperation. The factors that are jointly responsible for the smooth and effective functioning of the PRTs include the opinion of the international community responsive to dynamic media reports from the battlefield. Therefore, the success of the actions realised by the PRTs can be seen as the result of the following elements: the degree of support from the local and international community for the authorities of the host country; the degree of involvement of local communities in the activities of (local) government and pro-government behavior; the degree of visible improvement of material and non-material conditions of life and development, reliability of the PRTs work. 13 It is worth stressing that the PRTs function as units of a temporary nature, despite the fact that their commitment is long-term, which was repeatedly verified in Afghanistan. In such a long-term performance of their tasks, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should take into account the possibility of a re-escalation of crises due to human activities. Therefore, the success of the operation cannot be declared prematurely and international security forces must not be withdrawn from the province. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams can also be considered in an instrumental perspective, as tools of improvement. Such an approach is a consequence of the search for new, effective methods of stabilisation and post-conflict normalisation after direct combat operations such as, among others, the one in Afghanistan. Difficulties in the stabilisation and reconstruction process somehow forced the international security forces to take a civil action and the apparent increase in the percentage of these activities in relation to conventional military action led to an open debate on the possible scope of cooperation at the civil-military level. No less important was the need to pursue the strategy developed by Lakhdar Brahimi, according to which everything must be done by the soldiers involved in the operation so that they are not perceived by the Afghan people as occupiers. 14 The PRTs are, therefore, the effect of a consensus between expectations and the actual capacity for achieving the formulated objectives; with an awareness of the necessity to possess not only light arms, but also the right to use violence beyond cases of self-defence. The key assumption of PRTs is also their range of influence reaching far beyond the capital city of Afghanistan Kabul, including the distant regions of the country, and gradually all its provinces. This is a consequence of the implementation of measures to extend the influence of the Afghan government and 13 PRT Playbook, op. cit., pa M. Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An innovative instrument of international crisis management being put to the test, Occasional Paper Series, European Center for Security Studies, No 16, January 2008, pa

17 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK to promote the value of order, law and justice. It is worth noting that the nature of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), stationed in Afghanistan since 2001, did not meet such formulated assumptions. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as part of the task force of ISAF, have, however, a potential ranging from 50 to 500 civilian and military experts deployed in the all provinces of the country. 15 Teams thus became an instrument used to create the foundation for a national administration, also contributing to accelerating the pace of the self-reliance and selfsufficiency of Afghanistan. Therefore, the PRTs coordinate projects in three main areas of stabilisation and reconstruction. These are the tasks of : direct provision and maintenance of security; enabling the development of state institutions throughout the country; creating conditions and facilitating reconstruction. 16 It is, however, indicated that these tasks and the political end-goal of operation require a long-term effort, as opposed to the rapid achievement of military objectives, to which we all have become accustomed (eg. operation Allied Force in Kosovo 78 days). The PRTs effort, however, is measured in years rather than months. Therefore, upon experience and an analysis carried out after five years of PRT operations in Afghanistan, the authors indicate the need for the continuous presence of PRTs in their structures and locations for at least years. The civilian population is also favourable to such an assumption and recognises the PRTs as a centre of the province s life providing direct assistance and a job. 17 The authors also recognise that such an outlined long-term effort is often contrary to the desire of a quick political success. Undoubtedly, the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is a forwardlooking way of implementating the S/R tasks (Stabilization and Reconstruction), but one should pay attention to the need for regularity and consistency in the quest to achieve a satisfactory level of their readiness. Presently, the PRTs have a great potential and ability to implement innovative solutions in accordance with the concept of think globally, act locally. However, this is only one of many elements that should be undertaken in long-term and multi-faceted commitment to the reconstruction and development of fragile post-conflict states. Security Sector Reform is another undertaking implemented in the stabilisation phase. SSR is a concept of reform of the state in the area of security, which is particularly justified in the post-conflict phase, when some dysfunctions in its functioning are visible, or political institutions are not able to provide public safety. This reform can also be understood as a reconstruction of the security sector (including not only military forces but also the state paramilitary forces such as the 15 Ibidem. 16 Ibidem. 17 Projects that modernise roads, builds schools, or implement vocational training for the Afghan population. See more: Projekty Polska pomoc dla mieszkańców prowincji Ghazni w 2012 roku, ( ), and others, ibidem. 16

18 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES police). It also aims at increasing operational efficiency and the effectiveness of these forces. After conflict settlement, SSR may include activities such as disarmament of former combatants (often including women and children), strengthening the rule of law, judicial reform and training of forces responsible for security in the country, carried out under the supervision of the local legitimate and democratic government. Therefore, SSR can have a significant impact on the improvement of security conditions and permanent prevention from renewal of conflict. 18 However, it is important to keep in mind that SSR is a long process focused primarily on solving the structural causes of insecurity and, therefore, does not cover all levels of necessary involvement in the state-building post-conflict phase. 19 In practice, the SSR is a component implemented by the Allied forces in the performance of their tasks in the PRT area. The first symptoms of the need for security sector reform in Afghanistan became a subject of discussion at the G8 Summit in Tokyo in January 2002, where a preliminary draft was outlined and the responsibilities of the countries participating in the reform of the various security fields were defined. Germany had to deal with reform of the police, Italy justice, and the United Kingdom with the fight against drugs. Another lasting program of reform in Afghanistan was signed in January 2006 in London between representatives of the Afghan government and the international community and was called the Afghanistan Compact agreement, which highlighted the need to rebuild the state, including the security sector, and conduct a reform of the judiciary, law and police. 20 The security environment of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein s regime was correctly assessed as unstable. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were in a state of decay, unable to stand up to crime and violence in a society that did not trust the coalition forces and where a formal state authority did not exist, which was effectively used by insurgent groups and terrorists. The coalition involvement in Iraq had, therefore, to include many reforms, starting with the elimination of rebel forces, rebuilding structures and the capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces so it could take responsibility for overseeing the situation in the country, and to make a thorough security sector reform. 21 The SSR in Iraq was to provide a safe 18 A. Bryden, H. Hanggi, Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector, [in:] A. Bryden, H. Hanggi, Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF), LIT 2005, pa M. Sedra, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and Iraq: Exposing a Concept in Crisis, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pa The author also approaches the issue of the assessment and effectiveness of SSR and enumerates seven conditions that must exist in order for the Security Sector Reform to be considered effective. 20 F. Ayub, S. Kouvo, R. Wareham, Security Sector Reform In Afghanistan, Initiative for Peacebuilding, April 2009, pa A. Rathmell, O. Oliker, T.K. Kelly, D. Brannan, K. Crane, Developing Iraq`s Security Sector, The Coalition Provinsional Authority`s Experience, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005, pa

19 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK environment for political reforms and initiate the rebuilding of state structures from the authoritarian regime to those of a democracy. 22 Reforms included the following sectors of national security: the security of state institutions, the defence sector, the ministry of internal affairs, the justice system, the security of the infrastructure, the intelligence services, along with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the forces. 23 Aid programs are projects financed and realised by the individual states, creating and co-creating PRTs. The U.S. Department of Defense s CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) provide support for the smooth functioning of their national PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The funds provided are to enable the commanders of the local Teams to conduct rapid response in emergencies, provide urgent humanitarian assistance and to implement programs in the field of reconstruction, which contribute to improving the living conditions of the local population. The CERP, according to the principles of the Financial Management Plan , can be implemented in the following nineteen areas: construction/repair/ treatment of water sources, wells and drains; irrigation; production and distribution of food; agriculture; electricity; health care; education; telecommunications; economic development; transport; justice; development of civil society; support for services of security and public order; renovation of cultural facilities and public facilities; implementation of financial compensation for damages resulting from the military activities under the leadership of the United States; providing compensation to civilians and their families for death, bodily injury or damage to property caused by the activities of the coalition of states under the leadership of the United States; providing compensation for interned people; other projects in the field of small state infrastructure, including street lighting; other short-term relief projects Ibidem, pa Ibidem, pa Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27, September 2005.

20 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES The CERP projects are implemented on a smaller scale than the whole of the PRTs. It should be emphasised that they are subject to constant monitoring by the DoD. It is also important to indicate that other countries, including, inter alia, the Republic of Poland, within the framework of their own and joint US-Polish responsibility for the province, conduct separate aid projects. The Polish contingent, supporting Ghazni province, has been implementing projects in the energy, road and bridge infrastructure, education, health, justice and law sectors since Moreover, the contingent directs its activities towards building appropriate relations with the civilian population, seeking, in the long term, to develop a sense of social belonging to the province and responsibility for it. Polish aid projects are implemented and funded by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the entire team of the US-Polish PRT in Ghazni has two budgets: from the operational fund of the CERP and from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual fund. The activity of the CIMIC specialists, both Polish and American, is not only dictated by the availability of financial resources, but is also adjustable to the project cycle. Each of the projects submitted for execution is subject to its own national legal regulations, yet since it contains similar requirements, according to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is a legal proposal of regulations. A sample model of the project cycle is shown in Figure 3. Source: Structure of PRT functioning, Ghazni, PKW Afganistan, ( ). Figure 3. Five-phases project cycle of a PRT task according to legal regulations of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19

21 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK The first phase is usually initiated by those who need it (a government, a local representative of the authority of the host-state), and rarely by non-governmental organisations operating in the province. Aid projects, which require intensive manpower and resources, often have to get positive feedback from other stakeholders. In Afghanistan, the consultative body on issues important to the development of the province is the Provincial Development Council (PDC), which makes sure that projects are implemented in accordance with the established order of priority. The Council also analyses and evaluates the submitted project applications. Afterwards, the submitted application is reviewed in terms of its feasibility and advisability by the Reconstruction Team, who submit it to the funding body (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DoD). The preparation of documents and the launching of a tender procedure, which reveals the executive agent, make up the next phase. All the implemented actions are controlled at both formal and executive level. Acceptance of the executed work is carried out by a commission composed of experts in the field, who then decide to transfer the realised project to the representatives of the province. In 2012, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to devote PLN 23 m (EUR 5,5 m) to the development of the Ghazni province. 25 By June 2012, the submitted projects amounted to EUR 19 m in total. This contributed to 21 aid projects 26 that encompassed modernisation of roads, construction of schools, other public buildings and the critical infrastructure of the province, including the construction of a dam, vocational training (weaving and sewing, and specialising in the field of electrical engineering) and equipping schools with the necessary educational aids. The practical dimension of stabilisation and reconstruction In Afghanistan, the operational environment was shaped by two key elements of the allied forces, who carry out their duties as part of operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF. Operation OEF and the forces of CFC (Command Force) were commanded by the United States Central Command in Kabul. Currently the ISAF mission constitutes the foundation of the S/R operation (stabilisation and reconstruction), and provides the second pillar of the common efforts of Western Countries in Afghanistan. ISAF forces contain about soldiers from 37 countries (including eleven non-nato) 27 and they fulfil their 25 In 2011 it was PLN 22,9m ($7,5m), in 2010 PLN 16m ($5,2m), in 2009 $4,2m, in 2008 $1 m. 26 Polska Pomoc dla mieszkańców prowincji Ghazni w 2012 roku, PKW Afganistan, wp.mil.pl/pl/127.html ( ). 27 The number of ISAF forces has changed over the years. In November 2006 they amounted to 32.8 thousand, while in January 2009 there were already 55.1 thousand soldiers from 39 countries, most of them from the U.S. (23.2 thou.) and the UK (8.9 thousand). See: Słownik pojęć i organizacji międzynarodowych, ( ). 20

22 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES duties under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and NATO operational plan NATO OPLAN 10302ISAF(2006). ISAF forces are functioning in the structure of 28 Provincional Reconstruction Teams and they are subordinate to five regional commands: the Capital command, command North, East, South and West. Each team consists of military and civilian personnel numbering between 50 and 500 people, representing governmental and international agencies, carrying out duties in the area of security, stabilisation and reconstruction. The first Reconstruction Team was set up in Gardez city in Pakita province on 1 February Thus, in a real post-conflict environment, mission, tasks and PRT's operation domain, were defined. Seven others were located in the provinces of Kunduz, Bamiyan, Mazar-i-Shafif, Parwan, Herat, Nangarhar and Kandahar to the end of that year. Next, in 2004, the potential of the forces was expanded to eleven PRTs. It was the American component that was mostly involved in creating PRT structures, commanding twelve of twenty-eight Teams. Others were under the command of other ISAF countries 29. It needs to be noted that the beginning of the operation in Afghanistan was carried out in the conditions of a failed state, in which government institutions and administration were not functioning. There was no electricity, running water, schools, hospitals or roads. The reasons for this were undoubtedly the long-term civil war in the country and the Taliban regime that destroyed the country. PRTs in Afghanistan are functioning in the wide spectrum of the involvement of civil-military forces, fulfilling duties which can generally be divided into own and outsourced. Own tasks are closely related to the mandate of fulfillment and implementation of aid projects (the American CERP and others). Their main financing sources are governments of countries involved in ISAF. We must, however, bear in mind that not all of the submitted projects receive approval and, thereby, financial help for finalising them. Outsourced tasks are based, first of all, on PRT cooperation (commanders, civilian representatives) with the Afghan community and its leaders (usually these are local level officials province, district, religious and clan leaders). Due to numerous cultural differences, daily cooperation is a current problem for the province. Therefore, PRTs are helping local authority representatives in solving tribal disputes, as well as forming regional development processes by promoting the rule of law, good governance and democracy, establishing organisations and coordinating their activities 30. However, the primary aim of the presence of forces in Afghanistan is to provide security. It is also one of the three main goals assigned to the PRT, next to stabilisation and reconstruction; nevertheless,their mutual interdependence must also be taken into consideration. Creating a safe environment must be based on the 28 M. Marszałek (ed.), Koncepcja użycia, op. cit., pa C. Malkasian, G. Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009, pa Ibidem, pa

23 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK realisation of smaller sectorial tasks in social, cultural, political economic and other areas, such as reducing insurgent activity, ensuring the (alternative for illegal) source of family income or the country s economic development. Together they are the foundations of security which, properly managed, can contribute in the longterm perspective to excluding violence as an essential means for the existence of the state and the nation. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, being a part of crisis response operations, are therefore responsible for supporting the development of effective security management by legally chosen state structures 31. General indications, ideas, mission and aims, set as a compulsory part of PRTs activities, are leading the scope of their activities. However, looking towards an analysis of areas of the functioning of the fulfillment of tasks by PRTs in Afghanistan, the impossibility of their unequivocal specification must be pointed out. This difficulty is, first of all, caused by the great diversity of each of Afghanistan's provinces, their individual needs and challenges. This diversity is also a consequence of multinationality in crisis response operations and acquiescence of the use of national management models, realised in the frames of PRTs. Detailed discussion of the areas of engagement and activity of PRT components would need all specific Rebuild Teams; however, research efforts are focused only on characterisation a group of tasks functioning within one province. It is also crucial to point out that changes in both political and economic aspects and, most of all, mental aspects must be assessed. The last one is most significant as it represents the attitude and assessment made by local people. The authors of the report Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work? made such an assessment, taking as its criterion three factors: the level of community participation in governance, their involvement in functioning political institutions at the local government level and the level of assurance by the government bodies of key services for the public and the corruption level. For the purposes of this study it was decided to analyse the area and activities of PRT forces in Ghazni province. Involvement of PRT forces in Ghazni Ghazni province is inhabited by approximately 931 thousand people. This province is considered as one of the most dangerous ones in the country insurgent activity, despite numerous efforts to restrict it, remains high. The issue of the ethnic division of the province is also significant in creating the security landscape. The percentage of the Pashto people is higher, representing about 42 percent of the province population, although the Hazara constitutes a strong minority group Ibidem, pa Ibidem, pa. 21.

24 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES However, it was proven that violence and insurgent activity were not the only problem, since the low legitimacy and efficiency of local governing structures was indicated, with the corruption level estimated as the 9 th highest of all the 19 districts. The PRT started its activity in Ghazni in 2006, primarily dealing with the improvement of the security management process in the area. Specific tasks that were undertaken in this area were: direct, daily support to officials and government bodies (Provincial Council, Ghazni Provincial Development Committee) by American PRT officers; combating corruption by controlling the tendering process; implementation of plans to improve public services in the province, including health care by regular meetings with representatives of health care institutions (directors of clinics, hospitals), and cooperation in this regard with representatives of NGOs; arrangement of training courses, seminars, workshops and lectures on health care for the Afghan people and health professionals, including distant districts; building of a "social network monitoring the activity of the insurgents; realisation of large building projects, 55% of the overall spending package has been dedicated to improving the quality of roads or their building, linking distant areas of the province with the capital, which allowed, among other things, transport of agricultural products from small farms to a collection point and increased public participation in the political and social life of the province; establishing cooperation with tribal elders and inciting them to participate in the political life of the province; pursuing policies of informing about ongoing projects as well as their own, such as the government s, particularly the consultation proposals both with the provincial authorities and also with the local assemblies in each district. 33 The engagement outlined above has confirmed that the political participation of the community can contribute to the improvement of stabilisation and security in the area of responsibility. It needs to emphasised that, similarly to other provinces, increased insurgent activity occurred there as well. Therefore, it has been stressed that measures aimed at minimising the activity of the Taliban cannot be taken solely by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It should be noted that all PRT aid projects were also funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Poland, CERP, USAID, or the Afghan government programs (NSP - National Solidarity Program) supported by the World Bank and the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD). 33 Ibidem, pa

25 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK Source: Historia PRT Ghazni, ( ). Figure 4. Financing aid projects implemented by the Polish team of PRT Ghazni This Ministry is coordinating implementation of economic aid projects, thereby initiating the cooperation of the local assembly of the elders, management districts and provinces of the central government in Kabul 34. PRT in Iraq Arrangement of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq was taken by the U.S. administration from the idea of their use in Afghanistan as an effective tool for stabilisation and reconstruction in post-conflict countries, and was successfully transplanted there in Ten initial PRTs have been established, and for the next two years their activity was supported by subsequent teams. In total, a PRT was functioning at the centre of each province 35. Moreover, at the lower stage (local government administration), their tasks were fulfilled by the so-called e-prts (13) 36, which were supporting development of economic, administration, business, rules of law and the idea of a civil society 37. Despite the adaptation of PRT solutions from Afghanistan, the organisation and forces structure of Iraq Reconstruction Teams included a significantly smaller share of the military component. The first three of the ten PRTs (in Mosul, Kirkuk and Hilla) were functioning relying on representatives of the U.S. State 34 Ibidem, pa In 15 of the 18 provinces of Iraq, under the assumption that one team in Erbil impacts with its range comprising three northern provinces of Iraq. See: U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, ( ). 36 For example in Baghdad, the capital city, their tasks are performing one PRT and 6 eprts. 37 PRT Playbook, op. cit., pa

26 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES Department, the Department of Justice and Agriculture and USAID. Their main aim was ensuring safety for developing aid programs realised by Americans, outside Baghdad. The extension of the PRT's involvement occurred in 2007, when President Bush presented the project for supporting Iraq on its way to independence under the name "New Way Forward" 38. This assumed a strengthening of reconciliation, supporting counterinsurgency operations, support aimed at accelerating the development of Iraq and building the capacity of the authorities to perform their duties. Nevertheless, the activity of the PRTs was focused on shaping the political environment rather than rebuilding the infrastructure. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), were called up as a support for the carrying out of new ventures. Newly created PRTs in Baghdad, Anbar Province and Babylon were to be functioning within the framework. Along with these intentions, the PRTs created by the BCT were supposed to be small groups of forty states representatives, supporting the process of the planning of future operations. Experts from agriculture, firm management or business fields were employed as well. In the BCT and PRT unit created to function together, firstly their division competences were specified. BCTs were to be responsible for security and PRTs for protection and ensuring operational support. Following the changes, the PRTs in Iraq were focused on the areas of their involvement, gradually expanding on activities related to reconstruction and state-building. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq were civilian-military diplomatic outposts, whose missions and tasks expanded greatly. They served as an assistance to local governments in developing and maintaining the capacity for governance and justice, economic development, education, culture and public health care 39. The long-term aim (strategic goal) of PRTs in Iraq was to achieve stability and the security and independence of the country. Therefore, a decision to expand the areas of engagement was made, creating partnerships with local people. This cooperation was bearing fruit, as solutions to everyday problems were found more easily, enhancing the implementation of development projects relevant to the citizens quality of life. In the field of justice, PRTs worked with local courts, assisting them in the development of investment and economic growth through an overview of property rights and enforcement of commercial law. They also provided protection for Iraq's legislative system, verified the preservation of human rights, oversaw the functioning of the prison system, supported the fight against corruption, and improved the position of women in the country as well 40. In promoting economic development, PRTs used relationships and contacts established with the provincial government. Representatives of the U.S. Ministry of Treasury and Agriculture, through cooperation with local experts, organised 38 R. M. Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report, United State Institute of Peace, PRT_IRAQ.pdf. 39 U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, ( ). 40 Governance & Rule of Law, ( ). 25

27 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK conferences, fairs, summits, seminars and discussions on a wide range of topics such as banking, finance, agriculture, transport, energy, energy resources, irrigation systems, sewerage and access to water. These were the key services delivered by the state, including the protection of the critical infrastructure of the country. They proved essential to its proper functioning and growth of the level of development of society 41. PRTs were also involved in improving the functioning of educational institutions at all administrative levels in Iraq, in order to expand learning opportunities for children, youth and adults, and to increase their capacity to put the skills and acquired knowledge into practice. An important part of the educational process has been dedicated to learning English, so that a long-term perspective international cooperation in Iraq could be established. It also enabled the creation of partnerships between universities and schools, through student exchanges and international scholarships, such as the Fulbright program 42. Tasks for promoting the development of culture and general national improvement in the field were fulfilled by PRTs through supporting the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage. Measures taken in this direction aimed at promoting the protection of monuments and creating and supporting state institutions responsible for the protection of cultural heritage 43. PRTs were also involved in improving the capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of Health and its delegations in the provinces in order to improve public services in the field of caring for the life and health of citizens. First of all, necessary technical assistance was delivered, so that health services and equipment could be operated by qualified medical personnel. In a wider aspect, PRT professionals contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole stabilisation and security process of Iraq, by improving the quality of essential services, which undoubtedly are the conditions for a dignified life and health 44. Conclusions Contemporary armed conflicts are characterised by a high probability of reescalation. Many suitable measures will be taken to prevent them. In the case of Afghanistan, one of the organisations actively participating in stabilising the conflict and the reconstruction of the destroyed state is the North Atlantic Organisation, which, apart from the ongoing operations, has to deal with the entire spectrum of other global threats. As part of these endeavours, NATO's involvement in activities related to the stabilisation and reconstruction in countries with a fragile Economic Development, ( ). 42 Education & Culture, ( ). 43 Ibidem. 44 Public Health, ( ).

28 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES power structure is necessary. NATO has many resources to conduct these types of activities. However, while engaging in crisis response operations, the alliance must be prepared to take action targeted firstly at stabilising the situation, then reconstructing the state with all its military and non-military potential, and rebuilding its personal and material resources. Efforts in this field are based on the concept of the use of the support elements of the process. Among these measures, the idea of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the concept of Security Sector Reform and the implementation of any kind of assistance, the idea of functioning in an operational environment seems crucial. It's clear that NATO's involvement in the stabilisation and reconstruction processes around the globe will be based on the lessons learned in Afghanistan. ISAF forces were operating within the structure of 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams subordinated to the five regional commands. Their structure was integrating civilian and military forces, which proved an optimal solution. Their role was to help local government solve tribal disputes, promote the process of development of the region through the rule of law and democracy, institution building and the coordination of their activities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as an element of crisis response operations, should therefore be responsible for supporting the development of effective security management by the local legal authorities of the country. In conclusion, it is vital for us to answer the question: how do the elements used by the allied forces in the stabilisation and reconstruction operations support failed or failing states? In the context of post-conflict stabilisation in the country, allied forces used different means and methods. For example, the state responsible for the operation of the PRT in the province strove to achieve the projected end state of operation by different ways and means; nevertheless, the main assumptions of operations remain unchanged. To the elements used by the alliance force in the stabilisation and reconstruction process we must also include all kinds of assistance programs that are implemented and funded by individual states, which form the PRTs. For example, the CERP program of the U.S. Department of Defense provided sufficient support for the better functioning of their national PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The financial resources allowed PRT commanders rapid response in emergencies, to provide urgent humanitarian assistance and the implementation of its programs in the field of reconstruction. This all affected the improvement of living conditions for the local population. In addition, other countries, including the Republic of Poland, carried on their own assistance programs. The Polish contingent, which has been supporting Ghazni province since 2008, put the projects for the energy sector into effect, including infrastructure (such as roads and bridges), education, health, justice and the law. Moreover, the PRT directed its activities towards building appropriate relations with the civilian population. 27

29 MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK In conclusion, it should be emphasised that successful completion of the stabilisation operation should not only result from PRT commitment, but also from the host country s efforts, the ability to build relationships with other parties engaged, the degree of interdependence between actors and the effectiveness of their cooperation. To the factors contributing to the successful execution of its activities we should also include the opinion and attitude of the international community, the role of the media and their direct relation to the "battlefield". The interaction of all these components enhances the stabilisation of post-conflict situation in a given region and then the country, boosts proper economic development and creates good living conditions for its citizens. Bibliography Ayub F., Kouvo S., Wareham R., Security Sector Reform In Afghanistan, Initiative for Peacebuilding, April Bensahel N., Oliver O., Peterson H., Improving Capacity for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, RAND, Santa Monica Bryden A., Hanggi H., Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF), LIT Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27, September Gauster M., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An innovative instrument of international crisis management being put to the test, Occasional Paper Series, European Center for Security Studies, No 16, January Malkasian C., Meyerle G., Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?, Strategic Studies Institute, March Marszałek M. (ed), Koncepcja użycia sił zbrojnych w wojnach nieregularnych, research work no III.5.1.0, AON, Warsaw Marszałek M (ed.), Obszary działań i zadań sił zaangażowanych w odbudowę i umacnianie bezpieczeństwa w środowisku miejskim, research work no I , AON, Warsaw Marszałek M., Limanowski T., Operacje pokojowe Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Geneza struktura planowanie, AON, Warsaw Materials of scientific conference Misje stabilizacyjne dla odbudowy państw, organized on May 2009 in AON. Nelson R., How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington D.C Perito R. M., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report, United State Institute of Peace, PRT_IRAQ.pdf. PRT Playbook. Tactic, Technic and Procedures, Center of Army Lessons Learned, No 07-34, September Rathmell A., Oliker O., Kelly T.K., Brannan D., Crane K., Developing Iraq`s Security Sector, The Coalition Provinsional Authority`s Experience, RAND National Defense Research Institute,

30 COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES Sedra M., Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and Iraq: Exposing a Concept in Crisis, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, Economic Development, Education & Culture, Governance & Rule of Law, Historia PRT Ghazni, PKW Afganistan, wp.mil.pl/pl/127.html PKW Afganistan, Public Health, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, 29

31 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 4(93) ISSN ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Assoc. Prof. Andrzej CIUPINSKI, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The aim of this article is to analyse the long political and military process of forming the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the beginning it was the separate pillar of the European. For the European security issues was responsible the NATO and the Western European Union. After almost twenty years the Lisbon Treaty on European Union, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, changed the competence of the European Union in the security sphere. Treaty of Lisbon created the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and for the first time put so much attention to European Union s international activity. Responsible for this is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. For this function was appointed Catherine Ashton. She is assisted by the European External Action Service. HR is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council, especially in the security matters. Lisbon compromise also led the termination of the Western European Union in Several prominent leadershave voiced support for a common defence for the Union. This possibility, requiring unanimous support among the member states, was formally laid down in Article 42 the Treaty of Lisbon extended the enhanced co-operation provision to become available for application in the area of defence. This mechanism enables a minimum number of member states to deepen integration within the EUs institutional framework, without the necessity of participation for reluctant member states. Key words Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). European External Action Service (EEAS). 30 From Maastricht to Lisbon Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign and security policy issues had fallen within the scope of the EU s second pillar. In the Treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 1992, in Maastricht, Title V was introduced, it contained provisions regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (or

32 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY CFSP). Articles J.1 - J.11 stated the general objectives, which effected positively the notion of introducing any restrictions, concerning activity in areas of foreign security. Article J.4 constituted, that: The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the security of the European Union, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence 1. The targets of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were presented in five points: 1) the protection of the common values, essential interests and independency, 2) strengthening the security of the EU and Member States, in all ways, 3) peace preservation and strengthening international security by following the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (or UN), Helsinki Final Act and the targets of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe; 4) support of the international collaboration; 5) development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of the world, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Defence abilities, including military ones, were also developed prior to the Maastricht Treaty introduced some restrictions, which limited such development. Namely, the issue of security was distinguished from the activities in defence areas. Aspects such as, disarmament, assets and weapon rotation were in the scope of security issues. All actions leading to the use of armed forces are classified as defence issues and such actions were ascribed to the Western European Union (or WEU). The defence issues were explicitly excluded from the CFSP s area of activity 2. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced also a provision, concerning Member States protection, in the scope of their sovereign rights regarding security, diplomacy and defence. First of all, Member States received an assurance, that the EU s policy did not violate their obligations, resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty. Secondly, the provisions of the Treaty on European Union could not hinder the closer cooperation of the countries, in the area of defence and military, within NATO and the Western European Union. The accurate specification of the security and defence areas resulted in the verification of the Treaty, which took place after the Inter-Governmental Conference. Consequently, a new Treaty on European Union was accepted and signed in Amsterdam on 2 October The new Treaty expressed wider support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy by introducing a number of elements, which enabled the enhancement of the competencies in the area of crisis response. 1 Treaty on European Union [w:] W. Czapliński, R. Ostrahinsky, A. Wyrozumska (ed.), Prawo Wspólnot Europejskich. Dokumenty. Orzecznictwo. Scholar, Warszawa 1994, p. 134; J. Barcz, Wprowadzenie i przekład [w:] Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version, Warszawa 2000, p W.M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja systemu decyzyjnego Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej [w:] Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych, edited by S. Parzymiesa, Scholar, Warszawa 2009, p. 57. A. Ciupiński, Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej. Geneza. Rozwój. Funkcjonowanie. Difin Warszawa

33 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI The CFSP became the EU s domain, but previously it belonged to the competencies of the European Union and Member States. These modifications resulted in the expansion of the union bodies rights in the decision-making process, concerning the domestic relations and security policy 3. A substantial change to the Treaty was the introduction of the EU s integrity provisions duty and the strengthening of its security, in all ways. The European Council and the Council of the European Union reinforced their competencies. The most significant action was the introduction of a new post, the High Representative for the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty specified the relations between the European Union and the Western European Union. Based on art. 17 par. 1, the Western European Union is obliged to support the EU in determining defence aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The subordination was strongly expressed in the statement: The Western European Union will serve an instrument to elaborate and implement the decisions and actions of the EU, which influences the defence issues 4. The Petersburg tasks had serious consequences on the development of crisis response abilities. Art. 17 par. 2 stated that: the matters defined in this article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping missions and military mission, which serves in crisis management, including peace-making process. The instruments presented in the Amsterdam Treaty are, as follows: 1. the specification of general principles and guidelines for CFSP, 2. the specification of common strategies, 3. joint actions, 4. common positions, 5. systematic cooperation between Member States, 6. constructive abstention 5. The implementation institutions were strengthened by assigning the High Representative for the CFSP, whose post was merged with that of the Secretary- General of the Council (Art. 18, AT). The European Parliament and the European Commission also joined the CFSP 6. The Amsterdam Treaty enabled defence and security policy introduction and military capacities development within Helsinki Headline Goal. Almost immediately after the treaty conclusion, but before its entry into force, it was necessary to make amendments to the treaty of the European 3 Ibidem, s Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version [w:] J. Barcz, Traktat o Unii Europejskiej. Wprowadzenie i przekład, Warszawa 2002, pp ; J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, J. Z. Pietraś, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa po Traktacie Amsterdamskim [w:] M. Chorośnicki, E. Cziomer (ed.), Unia Europejska i integracja w Europie, Kraków A. Legucka, Podstawy normatywne reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej [w:] J. Gryz (red. nauk.), System reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, pp W.M. Góralski, Rozwój, op. cit., p

34 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Union. The next Inter-Governmental Conference was convened in order to resolve a problem of the, so called, Amsterdam leftovers. Some issues were specified in the Nice Treaty, nevertheless records concerning the WEU were excluded. The European Union's preparation for significant enlargement took place in Nicaea, whereas the contribution towards the area of European Security and Defence Policy (or ESDP) was small. Rafał Trzaskowski was right by assuming that this very conclusion of the agreement was already a success 7. With difficulties and limitations a formula of enhanced cooperation within CFSP was forced through (art. 27A-e), being determined to serve a common values and interests protection of the European Union, and confirming its identity on the international scene. It was a significant limitation to exclude from this cooperation the issues having military or defence implications 8. The issue of the EU s reform, including the domestic and foreign security complex, was postponed until the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty abridged the EU institutional reform, thus was rejected by the French and the Dutch. Consequently, a new and shorter version was introduced the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty. Common Security and Defence Policy within the Treaty of Lisbon After many political incidents the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, and introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (or CSDP) 9. The CSDP was incorporated within the complex of EU external actions, which consist of: Common Foreign and Security Policy, common economic, development and humanitarian policy, and foreign policies aspects (e.g. cultural policy) 10. Common Security and Defence Policy was defined in Title V, in Articles It was concluded that it constitutes an integral element of the CFSP, and it should serve to assure operational capacities, which rely on civil and military supplies. 7 R. Trzaskawski, Dynamika reformy systemu podejmowania decyzji w Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa p J. Barcz, Trakat z Nicei. Zagadnienia prawne i instytucjonalne, Warszawa 2003, p ; R. Zięba, Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego, op. cit. p. 213; J. Czaputowicz, Polityka zagraniczna i dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej a Traktat Konstytucyjny, CSM Raporty i Analizy, nr 4,Warszawa It is worth noting, that the name of policy contains again the adjective common, which initially appeared in the Declaration adopted in Koeln in June 1999, whereas the adjective European was eliminated, as the European Union has not covered the whole continent. 10 c.f. J. Barcz, Zasadnicze reformy strukturalne ustroju Unii Europejskiej [w:] Traktat z Lizbony. Główne reformy ustrojowe Unii Europejskiej, (ed.) J. Barcz, Warszawa 2008, p Ewa Górnicz, Rola Unii Europejskiej na arenie międzynarodowej w kontekście zmian Traktatu z Lizbony, Unia Europejska na forum globalnym, Departament Analiz i Strategii,,Biuletyn Analiz, Nr 23, grudzień 2009, pp. 4 26, ( ). 33

35 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI These supplies are used to maintain peace and strengthen international security. However there were almost no far-reaching references to obtaining its own supplies by the EU. The Union, as of yet, will implement peace-making tasks using forces and assets, which will be offered by Member States. In the light of the new regulations, the European Union can lead the forces and assets to implement six mission types: 1. common disarmament actions, 2. humanitarian and rescue missions, 3. military counselling and support, 4. armed actions and service to ease the crisis, 5. peace-making, 6. conflict ending and stabilization. As in the case of previous treaties, the issue of a possible common defence was postponed for an indefinite time. It will be developed, if the European Council makes a unanimous decision. The treaty respects the security and defence policy of these Member States which want to implement the common defence policy within NATO (art. 42 par. 2 LT). The obligation clause, which Member States have towards each other in case of armed aggression aimed at one of them, sounds promising. Under the solidarity clause, Member States are obliged to come to the rescue of one another, when one of them is threatened by a terrorist attack or natural disaster, or else any catastrophe caused by a human. Structures and competencies of institutions responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Common Security and Defence Policy were defined in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. The role of the European Council in the development of security and defence policy The European Council is the most important political body of the European Union. The European Council meetings consists of the leaders of countries or heads of EU s Member States governments. Pursuant to the Treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice) the European Council had a right to coordinate the actions of three EU s pillars and had a great influence on the European integration development. On 26 June 2002, in Seville, the European Council made a decision on the meetings, which are to be held four times a year, and also arrange extraordinary meeting, if needed 11. Initially, referring to the development of security and defence policy and military capacities, its competencies had a limited and non-treaty character. Only the Amsterdam Treaty in accordance with the art. 13, entitled the European Council to make decisions on defence issues. Based on art. 17 par. 1, AT, the European Council was enabled to make decisions concerning the integration of the Western European Union into the European Union, which framed the formation of the process of creating EU s independent military capacities. p R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2007.

36 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Commencing as of June 1999, since meeting in Cologne, the European Council, each 6 months, made decisions which influenced the military capacities development. In Cologne decisions concerning independent military capacities were made. Next, on December 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goal was introduced in order to develop the European Union Rapid Reaction Force. In Santa Maria da Feira, under Portugal's presidency, The European Council made a decision on the formation of civil segments of the crisis response system. At the EU meeting in Nice, on 7-9 December 2000, the Helsinki Headline Goal Force Catalogue was accepted, as well as decisions concerning structures responsible for the EU military capacities development (the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, the European Union Military Staff). In December 2001 at a meeting in Laeken, the European Council introduced the European Capabilities Action Plan ECAP. The European Union interfered directly in the development of the military capacities creating new institutions and programs regarding force and assets, on numerous occasions. The European Council adopted a document entitled, A secure Europe in a better world, which was a crowning achievement of concept works in the European Security and Defence Policy. In 2004 the European Council determined the subsequent Helsinki Headline Goal The European Council makes periodic appraisals, both within the implementation of the program, as well as within the evaluation of the goals achievement progress, which were set by the European Security Strategy. Under art. 24 LT, the competencies of the European Council included: 1) defining EU strategic interests, 2) determining general guidelines and strategic objectives within the CFSP, 3) specifying common approach which constitutes an object of general interest and making necessary decisions 12. Based on art. I-22 LT, the European Council elects the representative of the European Council, who represents the European Union in international relations within the CFSP. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, Herman van Rompuy was elected to hold this position. The tenure of the European Council Representative runs for 2,5 years. The competencies of the European Council within the Common Security and Defence Policy The European Council, on the basis of its general directives, develops the CFSP and performs a crucial role in the decision-making process concerning the crisis response system. It determines and initiates the main objectives, and decides on the issues within the CFSP 13. Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe meet as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (fr. CAGRE Conseil Affaires générales et relations extérieures). Since the European Council meeting in 12 W.M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja, op. cit., p J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, p

37 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI Seville in June 2002 the CFSP problems got distinguished from the general affairs 14. The Council is a crucial decision-making body in the scope of planning, conducting crisis response operations, both in military area as well as in civil aspects. The decision-making areas underwent some changes. Under the Maastricht Treaty the decisions of the Council were made unanimously, excluding Denmark (pursuant to protocol no 5 enclosed to the Treaty on European Union). Qualified majority voting was allowed in the case of undertaking common activities and positions only if all Member States gave their approvals. The Amsterdam Treaty allowed for qualified majority voting if the EU Council decided on common activities and positions implemented within a common strategy, approved prior. Another condition was that the decisions referred to the common activities and positions 15. There were two cases indicated, which excluded qualified majority voting. Firstly, if one of the Council members declared that: for national policy reasons he opposes the application of majority voting procedure. Secondly, majority voting procedure cannot be applied in the case of military and defence implications. It was determined that the use of force shall be preceded by a unanimous decision. The Amsterdam Treaty gave a possibility of a flexible approach to the issue of security and defence policy by introducing so called constructive abstention (art. 23 par. 1). Then the European Council made unanimous decisions within the CFSP, however the abstention did not hinder the decision-making process. A country, or countries, which did not take part in the decision-making process, were not obligated to implement any resolution and did not incur any costs concerning this process. By the abstention, the country accepted that the decision is binding for the EU, and this being the case, the country cannot undertake any action which would hinder the EU proceedings. The decision on the application of the constructive abstention procedure cannot be followed, in the case that the absenting countries derive more than one third of the weighted votes 16. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty of 2005, caused numerous concessions to the benefit of the opponents to equip the EU s defence capacities. The position of Ireland was crucial concerning the above issues. This state was in strong opposition to the treaty's ratification in its modified and shorter version. Prior to the decisive referendum, the opponents of the ratification scared their fellow citizens with the idea hat the European Union will become a military power. The last negotiations, regarding the Lisbon Treaty, were held between Ireland and the British government. The agreement was reached before the EU s meeting. The document was in the form of a binding protocol (primary law) and a political 14 F. Tarpen, La politique de sécurirté et de défense de l Union Européene, Paris 2010, p J. Barcz (wprowadzenie i przekład), Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version, MSZ, Warszawa 2001, p J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, p

38 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY declaration of Irish government. The protocol concerns mainly the issue of the Irish position towards European Security and Defence Policy 17. In the Irish Protocol the objectives concerning the common defence decisions were repeated, confirming that such decisions must be made unanimously by the European Council. On November 13, the Czech government, as the last, deposited in Rome the Lisbon Treaty ratification documents. According to the arrangements, a new treaty came into force in December It was tremendous progress for the the EU s external activity; the European Union became a legal and international personality. Pursuant to art. 26 LT, the Council performs fundamental functions implemented in the area of the CFSP by making: 1) necessary decisions to fulfil the guidelines and strategic objectives approved by the European Council, 2) executive decisions in the form of activities and positions, which should be undertaken by the EU (art. 28 par. 1), 3) decisions determining the EU approach to a specific problem of a geographic or subject character. The Council is entitled to determine both the financing methods of CFSP and access to budgetary funds (art. 41 par. 3 LT). The Council cooperates with the High Representative in order to ensure the unanimity, coherency and effectiveness in EU activities within the CFSP (art. 26 par. 2 LT). The Council determines the principles of the organizing and functioning of the External Action Service of the European Union (art. 27 par. 3 TEU). The Spanish presidency initially showed its activity in enhancing the CFSP. On 25 February 2010, in Palm de Majorca another informal Defence Ministers meeting was held, on which the postulate of reshaping the meeting into a Council of a decisive character was examined. In his speech Carme Chacon highlighted that the Lisbon Treaty significantly strengthen defence policy. It is necessary to call a formal body on the European level, which could examine issues such as: effective conducting of military operations, defence capacities and conditions of clause implementation of mutual defence or the application of the solidarity clause, Catharine Ashton accepts the concept promoted by the French and the Spanish. Although she did not take part in the Mallorca meeting, she filed a letter to the Defence Ministers which favours the idea of a regular meeting of this this body. The French and the Spanish found allies in the European Parliament. In the 17 The Irish wished for the approval of two principles: first, the policy of defence and common security will not influence Irish national security policy and its obligations; second, the Lisbon Treaty will not influence the Irish traditional neutral military policy. Each country will decide on the aid forms they wish to provide to the EU Member States in case of terrorist attack or armed aggression. Likewise permanent structural cooperation and European Defence Agency, each country will decide whether to be involved in such activities. The protocol contains the assurance, that the Lisbon Treaty does not stipulate forming the European army, as well as military trainings. Additionally, Ireland and other countries determine the amount of military expenses Council of The European Union, Nr 11225/09, Brussels, 19 June 2009, pp

39 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI resolution, March 2010, it was noted that: in the light of the progress in CFSP area, which enables the Lisbon Treaty, it indicates the necessity and legitimacy of establishing the Defence Council within the Foreign Affairs Council which consist of Defence Ministers led by Vice-president / High Representative and which would play a crucial role in enhancing cooperation as well as adjusting and integrating military potential 18. A serious debate was initiated, which proved ineffective and was a meeting subject on numerous occasions. Presidency of the European Council The Presidency of the EU Council is of crucial importance regarding the elaboration and implementation of the EU foreign and security policy, especially in the scope of the coordination and mediation between the EU Member States. Holding this position for a period of 6 months, the country represents the EU on the international scene. The Presidency, on behalf of the EU Council, holds a dialogue with third world countries and presents its position on current international problems. In this area the presiding country is allowed to make declarations on behalf of the Council. Customarily, the Presidency undertakes actions, at least verbal, in the case of a crisis. After the approval of the Lisbon Treaty numerous Presidency competencies were transferred to the competencies of the High Representative and the External Action Service of the European Union. Amongst all Council formations only one is not subjected to the Presidency - the Foreign Affairs Council - presided by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty. Committee of Permanent Representatives The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is not focused on the security and defence policy, but it plays a crucial role in the elaboration constructive decisions. It consists of permanent representatives (ambassadors) of Member States. It is an institution where formulations and expertise are drafted in Council meeting with the presence of Foreign Ministers. Therefore, within the COREPER all EU issues are determined. This is the body which customarily performed the function of a coordinator. It is of great importance, because the EU crisis response operations can have a different character and cause financial 18 European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010 op. cit. punkt 16, szerzej; C. Caballero- Bourdot, Le suivi interparlementaire de la Pesc : possibilités pour le futur, Occasional Paper, nr 94, ISS, Paris, octobre

40 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY consequences or repercussions 19. In the case where the meeting of the permanent representatives refers to the CFSP problems, then they are treated as the COPEPER II UE. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy A few months after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 18 October 1999, the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was selected as the General Affairs Council Secretary General, simultaneously becoming the High Representative (or HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, de facto he was also made the highest diplomatic representative of the European Union. Moreover, on 25 November 1999, Solana was appointed the Western European Union Secretary General and enlarged his competencies in the military area. Besides this, he was treated as informal defence minister. The accumulation of so many functions performed by one person can be understood as the lack of institutional solutions and a need for foundations necessary to form some. Just after accepting the position of Western European Union Secretary General Solana assumed that The Western European Union is now in the last phase of its evolution. He clearly admitted that his function was to perform the liquidation of the organisation 20. Solana was in office as the High Representative for two terms, till the end of November Under the European Council decision the responsibilities of the High Representative were passed to Baroness Katherine Ashton. The tasks and responsibilities of the High Representative were described in detail. The HR particular attributes results from the fact that, one person got rights reserved for cooperation strategies, i.e. intergovernmental as well as community area, so called integration one. It stems from the abolition of the pillar structure. Consequently, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy gained both rights entitled to commissioners and the title of the Vice-President of the European Commission. Vice-President plays a crucial role in the establishment and implementation of EU foreign policy, by issuing proposals to the Council, as well as the European Council. As a deputy of two bodies, he is the main executor of their decisions in three policy areas: political, security and defence. Within the Council the VP ensure coherence and fluency of actions in the area of external relations and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. He also monitors the coherence of the EU's overall actions, concerning the targets and objectives of foreign and security policy. The High Representative is appointed by the European 19 G. Bértrand, La prise de déision dans L Union européenne, La Documentation française, Paris 2002, p A. Ciupiński (red.), Dyplomacja wielostronna, Warszawa 2003, pp

41 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI Council to this position, on the basis of qualified voting majority. He can be dismissed from this position in the same procedure. The approval of the European Commission President is required during the nomination proceedings. However, the approval of the European Parliament is required in the case of appointing the responsibilities of the Commission deputy President, likewise other Commission members. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in her former career did not have many occasions to get acquainted with the European security problems, especially with military aspects. It was a surprise when Katherine Ashton won the elections, in that the chosen candidate was nominated by Great Britain. This country was unwilling to enlarge the EU s supranational competencies in the area of foreign and defence policy. Additionally, Ashton s first public speeches proved that her knowledge of the areas of her responsibility needs to be enhanced. The provisions approved by the Lisbon Treaty has broadened the scope of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy competencies, regarding the issues within the Common Security and Defence Policy 21. The HR presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, where he can issue proposals. Moreover, he has the right to direct questions to other EU s bodies in the reference with CFSP s problems. Under art. 27 par. 1 Lisbon Treaty the High Representative ensures that the decision of the European Council and the Council are followed, as well as this the HR can represent EU within the CFSP and on its behalf cooperate with the third world countries (art. 27 par. TEU in LT version). It concerns both countries and international organizations towards which the EU position is presented. On the international conferences, the HR ensures the coordination of Member States actions in order to perform uniformly according to the EU position. The HR maintains contacts with the European Parliament, and consults regularly regarding the most significant problems of the CFSP and the CSDP. Furthermore, he has a crucial role in crisis management, since together with the Council they monitor the policy control and strategic management, performed by the Political and Defence Committee, regarding the military and civil operations. The Lisbon Treaty gave the High Representative the right of initiative concerning CSDP mission funding. Since then, it is possible to apply for creating a start-up fund out of the Member States' contributions 22. Till the initial period of High Representative actions, commentators had many objections regarding the structural cooperation and treaty mechanism enabling greater cooperation within the CSDP. The start-up fund, serving to finance the 21 J. Rehrl, H.B.Weisserth (forewords of Catherine Ashton), Handbook on CSDP, The Common Security and Defence Policy of The Eeuropean Union, Vienne 2010,p , W.M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja, op. cit., p The interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission regarding the budget discipline and approriate managemnt of finance, art. 42, 43;Official Journal of the European Union of , L

42 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY preparatory actions to EU foreign missions, did not come into force because the VP did not submit the project of its creation and financing to the Council. The reform on the financing principles of the European Defence Agency also failed 23. European Commission towards the EU foreign security The European Commission remains bound with the actions of the CFSP (art. 27 TEU). On account of its responsibility of budget implementation, but also its obligation of coordination assurance between the EU CSDP actions and its consequences, plus the application of instruments for assistance which remain at the disposal of EU. Under three treaties, preceding the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission performed strong foreign actions and had powerful instruments of influence which remained at its disposal, with the help of the trade policy. The research worker of the UE security issues indicates a gradual interest increase in the Commission foreign policy issues 24. In 1994 the Directorate-General for External Political Relations was established, however other structures also functioned alongside. In 1999 the structures were combined into Directorate-General for External Relations - DG RELEX chaired by Chris Patten. The foreign representatives, over one hundred till 2009, were subjected to the Directorate. When the Amsterdam Treaty came into effect and the post of High Representative for the CFSP was established, it became noticeable that the commissioner Chris Patten and Javier Solana were rivals 25. The European Commission protected rights, which concerns the civil aspects of human protection. The Commission contributed enormously to the crisis response system, by the activity of the conflict prevention unit, functioning within DG RELEX. It was responsible for the coordination of the European Commission's actions in the crisis zones. The conflict prevention unit cooperates with the EU's Secretariat, especially with bodies implementing European Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. It maintains contacts with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Commission and the organizations willing to support conflict prevention 26. The Doctorate for European Commission Development performs similar but wider-ranging actions, monitoring mainly aid programs' implementation for countries included in, so called ACP (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Africa Caribbean Pacific - 23 D. Liszczyk, Bilans pierwszego roku urzędowania wysokiej przedstawiciel UE,,,Biuletyn PISM Nr 16 (765) z dn. 16 lutego R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna I Bezpieczeństwa, op. cit., p In 2004 Patten was taken over by Benita Ferrero Waldner who perfomed this position till the Lisbon Treaty came into force. 26 M.M. Martinelli, L intégration des dimensions de paix et sécurité dans les actuelles politiques de coopération au développement de l Union européenne, GRAPAX Groupe de recherche en appui aux politiques de paix, Working Paper Nr 4, Bruxelles 2005 p

43 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI European Union; fr. Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique). The European Union was bound with Cotonou, by the arrangement of development aid for 77 countries 27. It is necessary to indicate the role of a few agencies, which cooperated with the European Commission, and strengthens security and promotes European values - ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission) and EuropeAid. ECHO performed the activity in the scope of humanitarian aid which cover over 60 countries at the beginning of XXI century. EuropeAid is an institution established in 2001 in order to promote democracy and human rights. EuropeAid has at its disposal funds from the EU budget, financing the actions which promote European values and election monitoring missions (inside and outside the EU), support non-profit organizations, bringing humanitarian aid. The contemporary structures of the CFSP, especially the External Action Service of the European Union, closely cooperate in the scope of programming, planning and implementing its actions with the Commission services. Due to the overlap of the competencies, the coordination in the management of instruments implemented in the area of CSDP is necessary. The most important instruments are: the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation, the European Development Fund, the Financing Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in the World, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Instrument for Stability, Cooperation with Non-EU Member Countries on Nuclear Safety, Financing Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized and other High-income Countries and Territories. The coordination of the above mentioned agendas is simplified because the High Representative is simultaneously the Vice-President of the European Commission. The Commission does not hold any competencies in the area of CSDP, however it has rights in multiple fields of security issues: pollution and illegal migration prevention, security of sea and air transport, along with issues connected with the peaceful use of outer space. Massive expenses contributed to the Development and Technology and concern also investments not covered by security, programs such as, Galileo and the GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security). Institutions subjected to the Commission have competencies in the scope of IT infrastructure prevention. This area is of great importance for the CSDP and is determined as the priority issue for NATO. It is worth indicating, that the Commission supports the establishment of a common market for the defence industry and has a great influence on legal regulations in this area 28. The atmosphere within the European Commission creates encouragement for the CSDP development, and its President, José-Manuel Barroso, himself 27 R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna I Bezpieczeństwa, op. cit., p M. Olejarz, Zamówienia w dziedzinie obronności i bezpieczeństwa, Wybór i opracowanie: J. Czarnecka A.Kowalski, Warszawa 2011, L. Łukaszuk, Współpraca i rywalizacja w przestrzeni kosmicznej. Prawo polityka gospodarka, Toruń 2012, pp

44 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY a supporter of the political union. On 12 September 2012, in the European Parliament presenting the topic of The Condition of the European Union he appealed for strengthening EU foreign policy, also in the military area. He suggested reviewing the Member States military capabilities and to plan for a common defence 29. External Action Service of the European Union The new institution which had direct and indirect influence on the functioning of the European External Action Service EEAS. It is an EU body established under the Lisbon Treaty. Under article 13a-III, the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU Article 27) states the following: In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission 30. Although the Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, the performance of external action officially began a year later - 1 December Till then the management staff and the EU Diplomatic Corps were simply complementing each other's work. The institutionalization of the EEAS was performed under the Council decision dated on 26 July In the light of this document the External Action Service of the European Union is an autonomous EU body, subjected exclusively to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, having legal abilities at its disposal, which allows it to represent the EU in international relations 32. It is located in Brussels. The functions and tasks of the EEAS are 29 N. Gros-Verheyde, Barroso plaide pour une «review» complète des capacités de defense, 30 Tytuł V. Rozdział 1 Postanowienia ogólne o działaniach zewnętrznych Unii. Treaty on European Union. Consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Union, (2008/C115/28), ( ), c.f. W. M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja systemu decyzyjnego Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej [w:] Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych, pod red. Stefana Parzymiesa, Scholar, Warszawa 2009, p The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 determining the organization and the functioning principles of the European External Action Service (2010/427/UE).,,,CSDP Newsletter no.11 winter 2010/ The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 determining the organization and the functioning principles of the European External Action Service (2010/427/UE). Official Journal of the European Union of , L 201/

45 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI directly bound with the obligations imposed by the High Representative, in the area of EU foreign policy, including the area of CSDP. Additionally, the EEAS is obliged to give assistance to all institutions which implement its tasks in the scope of the EU external relations, especially to the President of European Council, the President of European Commission and to the Commission (art.2 ust.2 of the Council Decision). The European Parliament made efforts in order not to be excluded in this action area 33. The External Action Service of the European Union structures consist of a central administration in Brussels and the EU delegacy established in third world countries and international organizations. At the forefront of the EEAS central level stands the Executive Secretary General (or the First Secretary), who is subjected directly to the High Representative. The main goal of the Executive Secretary General is to ensure an effective functioning of the EEAS. The First Secretary is responsible for the actions between the central administration and the EU s Diplomatic Corps. Its position requires also the management of the EEAS s budget. There are two deputies at its disposal 34. On 25 October 2010, a French diplomat, Pierre Vimont, was appointed Executive Secretary General 35. On 29 October the duties of First Secretary s deputies were transferred to Helga Schmidt, responsible for political issues and Maciej Popowski responsible for the inter-institutional issues. Within time, the highest structures of the security area were subjected to the First Secretary: the European Union Military Staff, Operational Centre, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorial and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 36. Six Geography General Directorates and Directors were appointed for the following regions: Managing Director of Global and Multilateral Issues - Maria Marinaki. Managing Director of Russia, Eastern Neighborhood and Western Balkans- Miroslav Lajcák. Managing Director of the Americas - Christian Leffler. Managing Director of Middle East and Southern Neighborhood - Hugues Mingarelli. Managing Director of Africa - Nicholas Westcott. Managing Director of Asia - Viorel Isticioaia Budura. 33 In her letter of 18 June 2010, Catherine Ashton the High Representative, committed herself to consult with the European Parliament regarding the most important issues of CSDP. The consultation with Parliament could be held a priori, The Parliament will be liable to monitor the nominations of directors delegacies D. Liszczyk, Bilans pierwszego roku urzędowania wysokiej przedstawiciel UE,,,Biuletyn, PISM Nr 16 (765) z dn. 16 lutego ,CSDP Newsletter no.11 winter 2010/2011 p H. Klavert, EU external action post-lisbon: what place is there for development policy?,,the Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2011, N. Gros-Verheyde, Le SEAE aménage son organisation politico-militaire, ( ). 44

46 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY David O Sullivan was appointed the Director-General of DG RELEX, former Secretary General of the European Commission. Agostino Miozzo became managing Director of the Crisis Response Department in the European External Action Service. Hansjörg Haber was assigned to be a Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. Lieutenant General A.G.D. (Ton) van Osch is currently the Director General of the European Union Military Staff. The External Action Service of the European Union consists of a few important institutions, where the management underwent some changes. The European Defence Agency earned a new Managing Director - Claude-France Arnould; Antonio Missiroli became the Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies and Ilkka Salmi was appointed the Director of the Situation Centre of the European Union. Outside the EU there are 136 embassies. The employment period can last up to 8 years, but on special occasions this term can be extended to 10 years. From the security policy point of view a significant role is assigned to the EU representatives to the UN. The External Action Service of the European Union was seated in New York City in the year It was enabled by the cooperation of the Spanish Presidency in the first half-year, and the Belgian Presidency in the term ranging from July till December. At the beginning of January 2010, the head of the delegation became the EU s ambassador Pedro Serrano, who represents the EU at Security Council meetings, informing them of EU actions concerned with peacekeeping and other undertakings. It can be freely assumed that besides the abolition of a 3-pillar structure in the EU, the achievements in the area of external activity constitute a long-lasting reform, which enhance the integration process. Nevertheless, it is necessary to declare that many of the treaty records (presented in the enclosed annex) have still not been applied. 45

47 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI Anex; Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 115/ 38-42, Volume 51, 9 May 2008, SECTION 2; PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU) 1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. 2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as the European Defence Agency ) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. 46

48 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. 5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. Article The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. 2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. 47

49 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI Article Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. 2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. Article The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to: (a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure. 2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary. 48

50 TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Article Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. 3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned. The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate. 6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only. 49

51 ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI Article The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-7- solidarity-clause/510-article-222.html 50

52 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE ISSN FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE Stanisław MAKSIMIEC, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The main role in the European integration process was played by prominent European politicians called the Fathers of Europe or Builders of European Unity. The federalists predominated among them. They dreamed of a common and strong European state similar to the United States. The prime minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill in his reference to the mutual tradition of European nations inspired the possibility of creating a United Europe in Zurich on 19th Sept This project was supported by Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli, and Alicide De Gasperi. Jean Monnet proposed a sector method when perceiving the ineffectiveness of the original project. For this reason he suggested the concept of small steps in constructing European structure oriented toward tightening interstate links. This way, the first stage of this concept was implemented through linking French and German sectors of coal and steel. This proposal was supported by French Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Schuman on 9 May 1951 and named after his surname. The creation of a federal structure of Europe was the ambition of the Fathers of Europe. However, strong the reluctance of some states and politicians meant that integration was mainly only in the area of the economy. The dynamic political and economic integration occurred after creating the European Union in 1992 based upon federalism. At present the European Union is neither a federation nor confederation, because each state possesses its own sovereignty and freedom in the sphere of international relations. In essence, the European Union has an institutionalized form of cooperation between states. Consequently, the European Union can be understood both as an international organization and a specific union of states. The success of the Fathers of Europe is the United Europe, which engulfs the majority of European states and tends to further enlargement. Although the progress in the integration of the European Union is significant, the process of limiting the role of national states in favour of a European Commonwealth is yet a distant project. Key words European integration, Fathers of Europe, European federation, European Union, European Community. 51

53 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC The Second World War brought an enormous drop in Europe s standing on the international arena. After the war Europe was in a state of extreme economic, political and mental poverty. Due to the total nature of the war, the continent suffered material losses, as well as loss of life. During the war Europe lost more than 15 million people and by 1945 its industrial production had dropped by over 50% in comparison with statistics from At the beginning of the twentieth century, Europe was in the lead in global politics, over 80% of world s total investments belonged to either Great Britain, France or Germany. After the end of the Second World War, Europe was dominated by the USA and the USSR. The Second World War changed the balance of power between the main states of the West. The European balance of power from the interwar years was replaced by bloc division and the growing balance of fear. It was influenced by the decisions of the Big Three, concerning the division of power in Europe and the arising postwar conflict between the USSR and the USA, which took the form of a cold war 1. The more farseeing politicians of the main states of Western Europe reached the conclusion that in such a difficult condition post-war Europe would be unable to retake the lost position on the international arena while acting separately. Through joint actions they hoped to improve conditions for the development of particular states, as well as the safe development of the continent. The prominent role in striving and initiating the process of European Integration was played by leading politicians of Western Europe called Fathers of Europe or builders of European unity. The great majority of them consisted of federals, who dreamed of a common and strong European country, the second United States not of America, but of Europe. On 19 th September 1946 in Zurich Winston Churchill called for this creation, referring to the common heritage of European nations. His thoughts were seconded by others, who supported and propagated the idea of unifying Europe: Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli and Alcide De Gasperi. The propagators of federalism blamed European states for the recent war. They believed that a Europe divided into sovereign states would be unable to make an impact on global politics as well as on its own economic development. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a federal state, based on the USA or Switzerland, from particular sovereign nation states. It was also necessary to divide powers, on the basis of the constitution (on internal law), between the European federation as a whole and its members, so that the former European countries would be divided into states, cantons or lands with autonomy limited by the constitution. The key issues of state entities, such as foreign policy, defence and 1 K. Łastawski, Od idei do integracji europejskiej. Od najdawniejszych idei do Unii 25 państw, II Ed, Wyd. Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej Towarzystwa Wiedzy Powszechnej, Warsaw 2004, ISBN X, p

54 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE security, economy, and finances would have be governed by a central supranational federal authority 2. According to supporters of the federal form of the future and new Europe, the limitation of sovereignty in favour of supranational authorities would have helped to avoid wars, international conflicts and economic issues. In their opinion integration would have meant the decentralization of functions at the federal government level and decentralization at regional, as well as at local level. The principal source for the federal concept was the belief that nation states had less and less power to solve the basic problems of a political, military and economic nature within the international structure which was formed after the war with two dominant superpowers. There was also the belief that the traditionally perceived role of a state as a sovereign state, was no longer able to guarantee its citizens security. In the situation when a state is unable to guarantee this security while acting independently, it should strive after international cooperation, making conditions for a more effective system of international security. In this case Western Europe would have become the third, equivalent power. Moreover, it was deemed that Western Europe, united in a supranational way, could eliminate conflicts arising between states 3. However, J. Monnet noticed the contrary phenomenon, namely: the functions of nation states were stronger with the post-war progress of the restoration process. The assumption, that the function of the nation state grew weaker resulting in the easy transferring of the fundamental powers of the nation state to supranational bodies, did not fit the post-war reality. Having been certain of the ineffectiveness of a total approach to the issue of the unity, J. Monnet proposed the method of sections in economy. Instead of pushing the traditional ideas to establish the European federation by the superiors, he had another concept of European unity: a gradual, step-by-step process, which would not raise so many doubts, but it would lead to the assumed aim towards the union state 4. He reached the conclusion that the strengthening states of Western Europe would not be likely to relinquish their common powers and the election of the European parliament would not immediately change their citizenship attitude into European. This is why in order to achieve this unity it was necessary to start building the integrated Europe by joining particular branches of government activity, but only to the degree necessary to solve specific problems, as well as this activity to be adopted by the interested states. He also deemed that European unity should be achieved by increasing the real, mainly economic links between states, 2 K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, Polityczna integracja Europy Zachodniej, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2002, ISBN , p J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, Unia Europejska. Proces integracji europejskiej i zarys problematyki instytucjonalno-prawnej, Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze IURIS, Warsaw Poznań n.d., ISBN , p A. Marszałek, Z historii europejskiej idei integracji międzynarodowej, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 1996, ISBN , p

55 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC but not by federation, European parliament or other institutions. In his opinion the economy had primacy over politics and determined its strength. Monnet also stated that European integration should proceed slowly, step by step. The economic cooperation between particular European states would result in the full integration of a supranational character 5. The specific results of taken actions and achievements would lead to the development of the integration on the political plane and lead to full integration, and then to the creation of a European federation after the cession of sovereignty by states. This model of integration was called functionalism. In this way there arose the idea to join the French and German coal and steel sector at that time the most important resources for the development of the economy. This proposal, supported by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, was called the Schuman Declaration. It was announced on 9 th May 1950 and was addressed to other states of Western Europe, which accepted it despite the initial surprise and disbelief. This led to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which was the beginning of European integration. At first it consisted of six states: France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. J. Monnet became the president of the High Authority, the supranational executive body of the ECSC, which would have become the main engine of the Community. The High Authority, despite having theoretically great powers given by the Treaty, in reality was not a fully autonomous and independent body in the decision making process. National interests of member states, protected by the international Council of Ministers, predominated over supranational interest. The Parliamentary Assembly comprised of representatives of parliaments of particular member states and had limited, mainly advisory, powers. The Treaty establishing the ECSC assumed the formation of a federal body in the future, even though it did not refer directly to the idea of federalism. However, an attempt to make this model real ended in failure. In the ECSC national interests predominated, which conflicted with J. Monnet s idea of integration, which assumed that particular states would cede their powers to supranational control. As a result, in 1954 Monnet resigned as President of the High Authority, but he actively supported the process of European integration. The sectoral integration of Western Europe would lay a foundation for military and political integration and would be a first step towards European federation. J. Monnet proposed not only the ECSC, but also the European Defence Community (EDC) which had been shaped in the Pleven Plan. Its full text was officially presented in October 1950 by the Prime Minister of France, René Pleven. The aim of this plan was to a create European defence system, which would also include West Germany with the intention of preventing Germany from re-militarising, so that Europe would not be in danger again. The EDC assumed the establishment of 5 Ibidem, p. 147; J. Łukaszewski, Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o budowniczych jedności europejskiej, Wyd. Nor sur Blanc, Warsaw 2002, ISBN , p

56 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE a pan-european military, composing inter alia of German military, which would guarantee control over it. The joint European army would have consisted of a common European political authority called the European Political Community. In practice it proved that within a few years after the Second World War those audacious ideas had met with doubts and the strong opposition of some political and social authorities, especially French. The establishment of the EDC would have meant the cession of partial sovereignty by its member states in such crucial fields as defence and foreign policy. Eventually the EDC collapsed along with the political integration 6. Under these circumstances they focused on developing economic integration, which would be less likely to be opposed. This concept was based on a conviction, that political and military integration was not possible without prior and complete economic integration. As a result, under the leadership of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Henri Spaak, committee experts issued a report, including a project to establish new communities: the European Economic Community (the EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The assumptions of this report constituted the base for negotiations, which ended with concluding on 25 th March 1957 the Treaty of Rome, establishing these two communities. It was another crucial step towards European unity, in line with the uniting ideas of the Fathers of Europe. The European Economic Community would play the leading role in economic integration. The main aims of the EEC were: the harmonious development of economic activity in the whole Community by way of the establishment of a common market and the gradual unification of member states economic policy; stable and regular development; strengthening stability; the rapid improvement of living standards as well as the improvement of relations between member states 7. Actions for the benefit of economic integrations resulted in the establishment of the custom union (since 1 st July 1968) and common commercial policy for third countries (since 1 st January 1970). In 1969 there began cooperation as a part of common agricultural policy. Common agreements were introduced as a part of industrial, regional, fiscal and monetary policy. Four Communities were established on the basis of the Rome Treaties: Parliamentary Assembly common for three Communities, which acted as an advisory body and control authority, but not a legislative body (since 1962 the European Parliament); the Council of Ministers (since 1967 common for three Communities) operating as a decisive body and vested with a right of legislative initiative; the Commission operating as a supranational executive and legislative body (since 1967 common for three Communities) and the Court of Justice. The Treaty stipulated the greater supranational role of the bodies a sign of the using 6 J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p Traktat w sprawie utworzenia Europejskiej Wspólnoty Gospodarczej, Zbiór Dokumentów 1957, no. 5, p

57 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC of the supermajority in the decision making process by the Council instead of unanimous and direct election to the Parliamentary Assembly. Initially in the EEC, intergovernmental cooperation prevailed over supranational, which was also visible in the leading role of international bodies. At the beginning of the 1960s, apart from stimulating and increasing the economic integration as a part of the EEC, as well as attempts to increase powers of supranational bodies, efforts were made to build a political union of member states. France took the initiative, however, the states of Benelux rejected two plans for a political union commonly called the Fouchet Plan. The name for this plan was derived from the name of its applicant French Foreign Minister, Christian Fouchet. In the first place the Plan covered issues of foreign policy as well as scientific and cultural cooperation. Their ideas referred to the concept of a Europe of Homelands presented by the French President, General Charles de Gaulle. These beliefs also expressed the idea of confederalism as a means for the further integration and the abandoning of the political union of a supranational character 8. The Commission chaired by Attilio Cattani from Italy presented a new plan for political union, which would have been an intermediate stage for the future European federation. Catani proposed enhancing the role of the supranational bodies: the European Commission and Parliament, as well as to create the office of Secretary General. France rejected these proposals 9. Under these circumstances the creation of the European political union was postponed until years later. Discrepancies in the form and course of integration led to the Empty Chair Crisis in It was connected, inter alia, with attempts at increasing the role of the Commission in the Community s institutional system. The President of the Commission from Germany, Walter Hallstein, was a true believer of the supranational and Atlantic character of Western European integration 10. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, since the beginning of the transitional period of the third stage on 1 st January 1966, most of the Council s decisions should have been adopted by way of supermajority or by a simple majority vote. The third stage of the transitional period would have given more authority to the Commission. The purpose of these changes was to increase the role of the Commission and enhance the supranational character of the Community and at the same time to limit the sovereignty of member states. France strongly opposed and withdrew its representative from the Council of Ministers, using the empty chair policy. The compromise agreement was reached as a result of the Luxembourg protocol. France agreed to resolve less important issues in the Council by supermajority, however, issues important for further integration issues had to be resolved unanimously. The primary role of the Council of Ministers was 8 Z.M. Doliwa-Klepacki, Integracja europejska (łącznie z uczestnictwem Polski w UE i Konstytucją dla Europy), Wyd. Temida 2, University of Business and Enterprise in Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, Białystok 2005, ISBN X, p K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p Z.M. Doliwa-Klepacki, op. cit., p

58 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE acknowledged in the decision making process of the Community, which constituted representatives of the governments of the member states. However, W. Hallstein s federal ambitions and aspirations to increase the role of the Commission were withheld 11. The principles of EEC Treaty were majorly revised while considering the French, i.e. the national concept of the Community 12. Achieving the goals of the Community very often entailed transferring a part of the decision making powers from the level of the sovereign member states to the supranational level. This issue caused (and still causes) many disagreements, controversies and disputes. The principle of leading community policy unified in terms of its formal, legal and objective scope required to subordinate separate national priorities to the priority of achieving common (community) goals. Many times member states were opposed to ceding a part of their sovereignty. One of the triumphs was the agreement of member states that the law of the community should prevail over internal law. It enabled states to proceed with integration in the EEC. A significant turnabout in the development of the EEC occurred at the end of 1960s. The Hague Summit (1 st -2 nd December 1969) took a decision to establish an economic and currency union and announced the intention to coordinate mutual policy instead of establishing political union. However, it was not possible to put economic and currency union into effect until the 1980s. Whereas, the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was a very important step. The scope of economic integration had been tightening and broadening since the 1970s. In 1973 three states: Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain joined the EEC. Greece joined the Community in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in Common policies were successfully implemented and the coordination of economic policies was facilitated. A crowning achievement was the implementation of the majority of common market principles, consisting of four freedoms: the free movement of goods, people, capital and services. Still, the EEC was predominated by intergovernmental cooperation, rather than supranational. Despite the fact that economic integration focused on economic issues as a part of the EEC, the solutions for political union were still sought. Apart from establishing economic and currency union the Hague Summit had also decided to continue its work on establishing political union. However, the proposals presented in 1970 by the so-called Davignon Committee, chaired by Étienne Davignon from Belgium, referred to the prior Fouchet plan and assumed the establishment of political union on the basis of the cooperation of sovereign states without supranational solutions. Following on from this, the Tindemans report (Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans), published in 1975, assumed the gradual 11 W. Nicole, T.C. Salmon, Understanding the European Union, Pluto Press, London 2001, p. 25; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p

59 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC establishment of the European Union based on closer political and economic cooperation on the basis of the existing structures and legal accomplishments of the three Communities. An important role in political cooperation was to be played by the highly advanced coordination of member states' foreign policy, which the basic directions should be determined in the meetings of the European Council (an institution comprising of the heads of states and governments, which at that time determined directions and strategies of the EEC). Regarding the institutional issue, the report postulated to increase the role of the EEC bodies, in particular the European Parliament, by giving them legislative authority and to change the vote in the Council to majority vote 13. On the basis of the said report the European Council decided to hold direct and general elections to the European Parliament, which for the first time took place in It initiated the process of evolution to enhance the role and importance of this body. The next stage of the concept of creating the European Union occurred in the 1980s. The so-called London report of 1981, written by a group under the leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter A. Carrington, presented a governmental stance on further political integration. It assumed the international cooperation between sovereign member states without the transfer of power to the supranational level. Carington also underlined that it was necessary for member states to better agree on common stances in important issues of foreign policy and security 14. At the European Council s request the Commission of the Communities prepared the so-called Thorn Report (a Luxembourg Gaston Thorn a president of the Commission), which was announced in June The report concerned the creation of the European Union and took into consideration, inter alia, the low efficiency of the institutional structure and decision making mechanism in the EEC. Above that it copied proposals of previous reports 15. On January 1981 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Western Germany and Italy: Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Emilio Colombo presented proposals for further political integration. They assumed that to create the European Union gradually it was necessary, inter alia, to limit the principle of unanimity in the Council, increasing the role of the European Parliament and the European Council, to develop a common foreign policy and improve the coordination of security policy 16. In November of that year, on the basis of the proposals of Genscher- Colombo, the following project was presented the European Act, however it did not arouse the interest of member states. A very important initiative of the European Parliament concerning the creation of the European Union was the establishment of the Standing Committee on 13 J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p Ibidem, p K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p D.W. Urwin, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman, London and New York 1995, p ; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p

60 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE Institutional Affairs, chaired by an Italian eurodeputy, Altiero Spinelli. The Committee presented a draft of a treaty on the European Union. It assumed significant changes in institutions, the division of powers between the Union and member states, enlarging the authority of the European Parliament and the Commission and limiting powers of member states. The draft would have been a contribution to a future European constitution. It was adopted in 1984 by the Parliament, but Great Britain, Denmark and Greece were opposed to its ratification, which led to discarding this project. In 1983 at the Stuttgart Summit the European Council passed The Solemn Declaration on European Union referring to the Genscher-Colombo Plan 17. At the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau (1984) the previously presented reports were discussed and it was decided to continue work in the direction of integration. The Council established two working committees in order to develop new projects: The Committee on Institutional Changes chaired by an Irish Senator, James Dooge, and the Committee for a People s Europe chaired by an Italian eurodeputy, Pietro Adonnino. It also passed a resolution on the introduction a European passport from 1985 and emphasizing the Communities symbols by adopting the European flag and anthem 18. At the European Council meeting in Milan (1985) reports of both Committees were discussed. It again exposed different stances on the model of integration between member states: those which supported federal solutions (West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) and those opposed to this model (Great Britain, France, Denmark, Greece). The reports were analyzed together with drafts of the Treaty on the European Union submitted by West Germany and France and an agreement on common foreign and security policy submitted by Great Britain. The European Council decided to call an intergovernmental conference in order to choose a way to create the European Union. The work during the conference exposed different stances on the extent of the transformation of the Community. Due to these discrepancies on 17 th February 1986 the negotiated treaty was not signed by Denmark, Greece and Italy. Only after further agreements did they sign the treaty on 28 th February. The Single European Act (SEA) introduced crucial legal and institutional modifications, inter alia, it approved the legal basis for the operations of the European Council and the European Political Cooperation. The act enhanced the authority of the European Parliament by vesting it with, inter alia, a procedure of co-decision with the Council of Ministers. Moreover, it also increased the Council s capacity to reach decisions by qualified majority, enhanced the executive powers of the Commission of the Communities and had an entry on creating the common market gradually by the end of Further more it emphasized the importance of the principle of subsidiarity, which assumed achieving the 17 J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p D.W. Urwin, op. cit., p. 226; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p

61 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC undertaken community aims based on decentralization of decisions and the use of financial funds granted at the level of member states and regions. In addition to that, for the first time the SEA referred to the European Political Cooperation, which enabled transforming it into the Common Foreign and Security Policy 19. A significant step towards the creation of common a European country was the process of the abolishment of borders in the Community, initiated by an agreement from Schengen on14 th June Without doubts, the process of creating a Europe without borders constituted one of the federal mechanisms in a European structure. The Single European Act became a stimulus to continue efforts into advancing the integration processes and works concerning the European political union. Despite a strong British opposition, a report was prepared concerning converting the EEC into a political union. At the end of 1990 there began parallel negotiations of economic, currency, as well as political unions. The most controversial were issues concerning the extent to which sovereign member states would cede their powers in favour of political union. The most prevailing problem was the stance that bodies of the future European Union should deal with the aspects of foreign and security policy which could not be solved by particular states. The final agreement on the Treaty on European Union was reached at the European Council summit in December 1991 in Maastricht 20. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed on 7 th February 1992, was regarded as the next stage in the creation of European federation. However, because of British opposition, it was finally accepted that it constitutes a stage in the creation of a closer union 21. By defining Union the Treaty gave the Community a new direction, leading towards a system based on federalism. In addition the Maastricht Treaty enhanced the Union's authority regarding foreign policy, justice and international affairs. The Treaty improved relations between member states and the process of European integration became more intensive despite the elements of federalism in the economy. The Treaty established the European Union based on three pillars: the economic pillar; the foreign and security policy pillar; Justice and Home Affairs. The economic pillar comprised of the so-called authority of the Community and reflected federal trends, while the other two pillars concerned the intergovernmental cooperation. The new pillar structure expressed the integration trends, beyond the cooperation prevailed economic issues as a part of the past activities of the Communities. On the basis of a Treaty on 1 st January 1999 a currency union was established as part of the economic and currency union and in July 2002 a common European currency was introduced the Euro. On 1 st June 1998 the European Central Bank was established, which had the authority to lead monetary policy, which de facto also meant implementing one of the elements of federalism. The past and neutral Ibidem, s ; J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p K. Łastawski, op. cit., p K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p. 179.

62 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE foreign policy was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Parliament received more powers based on the principle of co-decision, which increased its role in the legislative process. The Committee of the Regions was established, representing the interests of member states and regions at the level of the EU. European Citizenship was introduced together with the European Ombudsman. In order to provide the economically weaker states and regions with financial support, the Treaty established the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund in order to improve living standards and conditions of the labour force. The Council of the European Union decided on more issues by qualified majority. The implementation of the principle of subsidiarity meant that decisions at the central level should be reached only when it is beyond the power of specific states or local authorities. The principle of subsidiarity, inspired by a federal model, stipulated the limits of the powers of the Community and the limits of decision making process at supranational level 22. On this basis, the principle of subsidiarity meant progress towards the evolutionary federalization of Europe. The next Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 extended cooperation between member states in the field of eliminating unemployment, protecting the natural environment, consumer interest and public health. Additionally, the Treaty expanded such fields as visa, asylum, and immigration policy and the freedom of movement of workers. Since then the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters have been within the European Union's powers and under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Treaty enhanced the federal character of the Union, enhanced powers of the European Parliament, appointed the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and extended the scope of the decision making process by qualified majority in the Council of the EU. Moreover, the Treaty established the common security policy by introducing the so-called Petersberg tasks. They assumed humanitarian and rescue tasks and ways to overcome crises within the Community 23. The following Treaty, the Treaty of Nice (2001), once again extended the scope of the decision making process by a qualified majority instead of unanimity. Regarding issues of the internal market (pillar I) the Treaty abolished the use of the veto by one or more member states. Within the CFSP (pillar II) it allowed the closer cooperation of the member states of the EU, with the reservation that it had to serve the aims and interests of the EU as a whole. In the scope of police and judicial cooperation (pillar III) the right of veto was abolished and a new judicial institution was established Eurojust. Furthermore, it introduced a new weighted voting system after expanding the Union to the East 24. The European Union increased its territorial scope of integration. In 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. The historical enlargement to the East 22 J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p Ibidem, p Ibidem, p

63 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC occurred after the reforms introduced in 2001 in the EU by the Treaty of Nice. On 1 st May 2004 ten countries joined the EU: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. In 2007 the next states joined the EU: Bulgaria and Romania, followed by Croatia in The milestone in the creation of a common European state was the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The draft of the Constitution Treaty, presented by European Convention and comprising 105 parts, covered many federal solutions. The most essential were regulations concerning the legal personality of the Union, establishing the exclusive authority of the Union, shared powers between the Union and member states and supporting (competitive) competences, further expanding the scope to vote by qualified majority, regulations concerning the Union's powers in the scope of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the supremacy of EU law over the law of member states, resolutions concerning citizenship and the appointment of the President of the European Council who would represent the Union in matters relating to the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Moreover, it created the office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expanded the powers of the European Parliament, replaced the EU Council with the Council of Ministers and abolished the pillar structure of the EU. All projects expressed the evolution towards federal solutions. Emphasis should be put on the solidarity clause which in the event of the risk of the one of its member states the Union may use any means to prevent terrorist threat on the member states territory or to protect from any possible danger against the democratic institutions and civil population 25. Simultaneously the project of including the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Treaty enhanced axiologically the Union bases and brought it closer to federal solutions. After the rejection of the Constitution Treaty by French and Dutch society in 2005 it was decided to adopt a new treaty that had to include the majority of TCE resolutions as a part of former Union treaties the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). During the European Council summit in Brussels on rd June 2007 it was reached that the negotiating mandate for an intergovernmental conference would propose the final project of the treaty. The text, drawn up by the conference, was presented to member states on 18 th October 2007 during the EU summit in Lisbon. According to agreements, the Reform Treaty (RT or Treaty of Lisbon) was signed on 13 th December 2007 and entered into force on 1 st January 2009, i.e. before the next elections to the European Parliament and before the formation of the European Commission's composition. The states had a choice whether or not to ratify the Treaty in a national referendum or through parliamentary ratification. The exception to that was the Republic of Ireland in which there is a constitutional duty to hold a referendum. However, in a referendum in June 2008 the Irish electorate rejected the Treaty. One of the reasons was the financial crisis that significantly K. Łastawski, op. cit., p

64 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE affected Ireland 26. Euroscepticism became smaller among Irish society after the information campaign led by Irish politicians. In a second referendum of 2 nd October /3 of Irish voted for the ratification of the Treaty. The result was influenced by guarantees which Ireland received from the Union. In that situation the presidents of Czech Republic and Poland,who had resisted the most, signed the Treaty which finally entered into force on 1 st December Compromise solutions proposed by the Reform Treaty resulted in deviating from a big amending treaty (i.e. constitutional treaty bis, adopted instead of current treaties) and returning to a traditional amending treaty. In contrast with the Constitutional Treaty which originally repealed and replaced all prior treaties, the Reform Treaty solely amended Treaties that have entered into force, i.e. TEU and TEC. The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the powers of the European Parliament in the field of legislative procedure, budget and international agreements. Expanding the scope of applying co-decision procedures ensured the European Parliament an equal position with the EU Council to adopt Union acts. The Treaty increased the possibility for the national parliament to take part in EU activities, particularly by the new mechanism that the EU would take action only if they achieved better results (subsidiarity) by monitoring its activity. The increased role of the European Parliament and national parliaments would have an influence on the enhanced democracy and legitimization of the EU authority. Citizens have more influence on EU legislation. By introducing the Citizens Initiative citizens from member states have a right to call directly to the European Commission to propose a new legal act. The Treaty of Lisbon provided for the first time the ability for member states to leave the EU if they wanted to 27. The Lisbon Treaty simplified the structure of the Union, abolished the pillar system and granted the Union the status of international organization and vested the Union with legal personality. This put an end to the fear that the integration process was striving to a create pan-european state at the cost of member states' sovereignty. The Treaty enhanced its negotiable position and gained more power on the international arena. The establishment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and simultaneously the Vice- President of the European Commission supported by the newly appointed European External Action Service shall assure more influence, cohesion and effectiveness of the external activity of the Union. The Treaty underlined the role and special character of the member states' powers in the field of the Union's Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It introduced a new mechanism that had influence on the field of freedom, security and justice (fight against terrorism and 26 W. Bokajło, A. Pacześniak (scientific editors), Podstawy europeistyki. Podręcznik akademicki, Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław 2009, ISBN , p Traktat Reformujący Unię Europejską, ( ). 63

65 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC criminals) and in many other essential fields such as energy policy, public health, population protection, humanitarian aid or climate change. It shall provide the Union with more possibilities to react to the security threat of union citizens 28. An essential issue in the Lisbon Treaty is the enlargement of the field of the decision making process in the EU Council by a qualified majority in order to facilitate it. Since 2014 the qualified majority will be counted by double majority: member states and citizens which will increase the legitimization of the Union's power. The double majority will constitute at least 55% of member states represented by at least 65% of EU population. The establishment of a permanent President of the European Council, elected for a 2.5-year term, will create a stable and less complicated institutional framework. The Treaty introduced a sharing of competences between member states and the European Union. Its clear classification will enable the explicit specification the relation between member states and the EU. The new classification covers competences such as exclusive competence, shared (competitive) competence and supporting competence i.e. to support, coordinate, supplement member state actions in. According to the regulations, the competences not granted to the Union by the Treaties are obtained by member states. In the event of taking action in some field, the scope of the competence of the Union is specified by an objective act of the Union in the fact that it does not cover the whole field. A new thing is the statement that potential amendments to the Union's resolutions in the future can be designed not only to enhance competences, but also to limit them 29. The Lisbon Treaty lists and emphasizes values and objectives on which the European Union is based on, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights which underlines rights by which included rules and liberties have legally binding force. The Treaty protects and enhances the four freedoms as well as political, economic and society freedoms to which the Union's citizens are entitled. The Treaty enhances solidarity among member states. The Union and its member states act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. It underlined the meaning of solidarity in the field of energy 30. The Reform Treaty carried on enhancing the federal elements by regulations regarding the clear division of competences, transferring about forty fields from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting and sustaining the new formula i.e. double majority in the EU Council. Moreover, the enlargement of the fields in which will be applied a regular legislation procedure granting to the European Council the institutional status. Furthermore, the treaty establishes a new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; it also Ibidem. 29 W. Bokajło, A. Pacześniak (red.), op. cit., p Traktat Reformujący Unię Europejską, ( ).

66 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE includes the systematization of current regulation, e.g. by introducing the same objectives in preventing the effects of climate change under the environmental protection or energy policy of the solidarity clause, demonstrating the slow federalization of the European Union. It is important to mention such regulations as: transforming the Union into single international organization, enhancing democratic legitimacy by strengthening the role of national parliaments in the European decision making process, and forming an institutional basis for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy development 31. It is worth noticing changes in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, namely the new procedures of voting that provide the European Council with qualified majority voting in the AFSJ, excluding sensitive matters in which they decide unanimously. Moreover, the introducing of uniform legal instruments or new forms of enhancing cooperation or enhancing the status of Eurojust prove the union is getting closer to federal system. The Treaty does not mention Union symbols included in the Constitutional Treaty, i.e. flag and anthem. It also does not include any regulations concerning the supremacy of the EU law over the national law of member states. The European Union's ongoing crisis favours the strengthening of the integration, but at the same time the Union is losing the trust and support of citizens. Establishing the banking union or strengthening control over the budget policy of certain states (especially eurozone, sealed by the Fiscal Compact) means a greater cession of sovereignty than assumed in the Lisbon Treaty. The solution would be further strengthening institutions of the European Union, especially the European Parliament it is a mantra repeated by many eurodeputies as the only directly elected institution in the EU structure. However, while many of the eurodeputies rely on democracy and the priority of more Europe in enhancing the role of the European Parliament, their electors paradoxically significantly lose appetite for more Europe 32. The ongoing economic crisis, since 2008, has caused an increase in the eurosceptic mood among politicians and the societies of the many EU states. The British Prime Minister, David Cameron, has enacted a new law regulating a relation between Great Britain and the Union. It confirms the continuing sovereignty of the British Parliament in legislation that decides on the content of the sovereignty of British policy as well as in the scope of the EU activities. Currently, the Swedish, Fins and in some point French have a similar point of view. The British express their reluctance to the further strengthening of integration and threaten to leave the EU. On the other hand, France put forward a project of separating the eurozone from the remaining part of the EU which would mean 31 D. Matusik, Koncepcje federacji europejskiej a europejskie procesy integracji, PhD thesis UŚ, Katowice 2009, Biblioteka UŚ, p T. Bielecki, Czy ktoś nadal chce więcej Europy?, Czy_ktos_nadal_chce wiecej_europy.html#trrelsst#ixzz2xr9egycg ( ). 65

67 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC establishing a close Union in the frame of the current EU, consisting of 28 member states. According to some politicians the answer for the dangerous European crisis should be more Europe. During the Polish presidency of the EU Council, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, in his speech at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin in November 2011 proposed a way to facilitate the European Union and dampen the impasse in the integration process that reverberated in the whole Union. He suggested preparing a new treaty that would make the EU more effective, contracting the composition of the European Commission and introducing the rotation system of the commissioners and enhancing its effectiveness as spokesman of common European interests. Furthermore, he suggested transferring more responsibilities to European institutions that would enhance their legitimacy, and especially strengthen the role of the European Parliament the draconian powers to supervise national budgets should be wielded only by agreement of the EP. In the European Parliament election there should be created a European list from which 25 of the euro deputies would be elected by people entitled to vote from the whole Union and national lists as well as to create a seat in Parliament in a single location. The posts of the President of the European Council and that of the European Commission should be combined and a candidate should be elected by direct vote. He postulated to maintain coherence between the Euro zone and the EU as a whole by the openness of meetings and Euro summits for all EU states. Moreover, certain prerogatives should be guaranteed forever for Union member states: identity, religion, lifestyle, public morals, and rates of corporate and VAT taxes 33. The German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, supported Minister R. Sikorski and stated that the cause of dispute to develop integration is a lack of a genuine European constitution. In his opinion the binding Lisbon Treaty has many disadvantages, the decision making mechanism is too complicated and there is a lack of transparency. It is necessary to create a common constitution decided by citizens in a referendum. He postulated the President of the European Council should be elected by direct vote and the European Parliament should be transformed into a two-house legislature in the second house there would be the leaders of the EU states, included in composition of the European Council 34. In March 2012, Guido Westerwelle, initiated a discussion concerning the future of the EU, to which were invited chiefs of diplomacy from Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France and Austria as well as R. Sikorski within the so-called reflection group. Their proposals and ideas did not have any 33 R. Sikorski, Schyłek Unii nie jest przesądzony, Gazeta Wyborcza from 30 November 2011, No M. Magierowski, Europa umiera ze strachu, PlusMinus Tygodnik Rzeczpospolitej from March 2012, No

68 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE formal character, but they were an impulse for discussion about future of the EU which during the economic crisis is found at a crossroads according to Minister G. Westerwelle and the EU is threatened due to national resentment and prejudices that have been revived in some states. Deeper economic and financial integration in the EU, the European Monetary Fund, the common ministry of finance or the direct election of the EC chief these are some ideas of the chiefs of diplomacy to reform and enhance the Community. In their opinion the coordination and control mechanism over fiscal and economic policy should be enhanced as well as the transferring of some of the sovereign powers of the state to the Union's structure. A permanent firewall for the eurozone (The European Stability Mechanism ESM) could be transformed into the European Monetary Fund in the future. They underlined the necessity of streamlining the European institutions and improving the decision process's efficiency, which driving force should stay the European Commission although smaller than at present. On the other hand, the EU Council could more often reach decisions by qualified majority instead of unanimity and to a greater extent use the possibility of enhancing the cooperation of some countries e.g. in such spheres as border protection or the coordination of economic policy. The more additional tasks and competences given to the EU, the more democratic legitimacy European institutions need to have. It would be possible if for example the European Parliament became more visible to the public in the EU states; electing a pan-european leading candidate by political party to the EP election could help it. In the long-term perspective the EU could introduce the direct election of the President of the European Commission, appoint a European Finance Minister and create a two-house parliamentary system. According to minister s opinion the EU should build up a European army and a have common representation in international organizations, including the United Nations Security Council 35. The German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeduble commented in the same vein. In the interview for German weekly Der Spiegel in June 2012 he stated that there is a need for clear institutional redevelopment of the EU and better democratic legitimacy of the decision process. He underlined that union bodies should have more powers in important fields of policy, because nowadays, nine times out of ten, member states have the final say. The European Commission should become a real government of the EU and union states' citizens should elect the President of the EU by direct vote. He also supported enhancing of the European Parliament position and creating a fiscal union which means transferring budget competences from national countries to Brussels. The optimal solution would be the appointing of a union finance minister who would have the power of veto over national budgets as well as a power to approve the size of debt. 35 A. Widzyk, Kilku szefów dyplomacji proponuje reformy w UE, ,title,Kilku-szefow-dyplomacji-proponuje-reformy-w-UE,wid, ,wiadomosc.html? ticaid=1ea8c ( ). 67

69 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC According to his view, the future Europe would not be a federal state similar to the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, but it would create its own political system 36. At the current stage of development the EU has a specific functioning, but still developing structure. Progressive integration, the constant rotation of rights and enhancing competences at a supranational level mean that the EU exceeded the field of its rights as an international organization in its traditional meaning. As a consequence of the multidimensional function of the EU and complicated character of the processes that led to its establishing, the Union has both federal and confederal features. In the process of the gradual integration the federal factors include: supremacy of the community's law over the national law; pan-national institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament established by general and direct election since 1979, Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice EU and the Court similar to a federal system within its competence there is arbitration between European institutions and member states and a statement of the community law is made and controlled to obey it); abolishment of boundaries (free movement of goods, capital services and people); common policies of the Union, inter alia: agricultural, transport, trade, regional, structural, monetary, research and development and still developing energy policy; creation of the European National Bank and common euro currency; own recognition and representing member states outside; systematically increasing the scope of voting by majority vote instead of unanimity; transparent division of competences between member states and European Union; introduction of the EU citizenship and the European Ombudsman; existence of the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee to carry out federal principle of participation; common Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Union has federal features, although it is neither federation nor a confederation. It exists next to member states not instead of them and each member state has sovereignty and freedom of creating international relations (it is not a component part of the Union). The internal structure of the EU neither works on the basis of national constitution nor any internal law. In this context euro currency and the institution of citizenship have political and symbolic features rather than legal. 36 Minister finansów Schaeuble za dalszą integracją w UE, search/info/ ,minister-finansow-niemiec-schaeuble-za-dalsza-integracja-w-ue ( ). 68

70 FATHERS OF EUROPE UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE On the other hand, inside the Union there are national countries with their own constitutions, their own public authority bodies, independent diplomacy, army, police and distinct symbols. Apart from that, member states maintain the basic competences in foreign policy and defence affairs. In this context it should be noted that the legitimization of power in the EU has a completely different character than in a democratic country. The Union, based on the agreement of each sovereign state, derives its legitimization from each state not directly from society. In fact, the EU constitutes an institutionalized form of state cooperation that works in broad spectrum of traditional international organization and specific union state. Jean Monet laid the foundation of the European institutions system and current institutional system of the European Union. The Fathers of Europe had an ambition to create a European construction of a federal character, but in a time of crisis and increased euroscepticism among politicians and societies, especially in the so-called old Union, it is not a good time in Europe now. At the current stage the attachment to national states is too strong and the distinction of constitutional and systematic tradition is too wide to transform the EU into a federation. Apart from that, the local interests of member states are still prevailing over pan-national policy. However, it does not exclude the possibility to extend the scope of federal elements inside European construction which can lead to the creation of a new form of transnational organization 37. In fact, it is an unrealistic idea to establish the European state of a federal character according to the Fathers of Europe intention and desire. The union of countries within the European Union as far as it is a union, it would carry out subsequent federal elements, however, the full federalization would not happen for the next generation of Europeans. There are too strong and expressive cultural distinctions: the views on national identity and sovereignty of the countries that created the Union and still noticeable local and political interests. There is a greater chance to achieve the idea of the Fathers of Europe to integrate the whole European continent than establishing a European federal state. A united Europe in the form of the European Union covers the majority of European states and there are real conditions for its expansion to the East Europe (Ukraine, Moldova) and the South (Balkan countries and Turkey) during the next few years. The digression concerning the potential federal future of the Union should consider globalization that blurs the concept of sovereignty. Moreover, the mechanisms toward the coordinating and transferring of rights at the supranational level and towards regionalism, that work at European integration processes, weakens the sovereignty of member states. Economic, social challenges and especially defence matters mean that the Union would develop in a federal direction, because none of the current European states is able to meet those challenges independently. 37 D. Matusik, op. cit. 69

71 STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC Bibliography Documents Traktat Reformujący Unię Europejską, Traktat w sprawie utworzenia Europejskiej Wspólnoty Gospodarczej, Zbiór Dokumentów 1957, No. 5. Monographs Bokajło Wiesław, Pacześniak Anna (red. nauk.), Podstawy europeistyki. Podręcznik akademicki, Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław Doliwa-Klepacki Zbigniew M., Integracja europejska (łącznie z uczestnictwem Polski w UE i Konstytucją dla Europy), Wyd. Temida 2, Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu i Przedsiębiorczości w Ostrowcu Świętokrzyskim, Białystok Kowalski Jerzy, Ślusarczyk Zenon, Unia Europejska. Proces integracji europejskiej i zarys problematyki instytucjonalno-prawnej, Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze IURIS, Warsaw Poznań n.d. Łastawski Kazimierz, Od idei do integracji europejskiej. Od najdawniejszych idei do Unii 25 państw, II Edition, Wyd. Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej Towarzystwa Wiedzy Powszechnej, Warsaw Łukaszewski Jerzy, Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o budowniczych jedności europejskiej, Wyd. Nor sur Blanc, Warsaw Marszałek Antoni, Z historii europejskiej idei integracji międzynarodowej, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź Nicole William, Salmon Trevor C., Understanding the European Union, Pluto Press, London Urwin Derek W., The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman, London and New York Wiaderny-Bidzińska Krystyna, Polityczna integracja Europy Zachodniej, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń Unpublished works Matusik Daria, Koncepcje federacji europejskiej a europejskie procesy integracji, PhD thesis UŚ, Katowice 2009, Biblioteka UŚ. Articles Magierowski Marek, Europa umiera ze strachu, PlusMinus Tygodnik Rzeczpospolitej from March 2012, No. 11. Sikorski Radosław, Schyłek Unii nie jest przesądzony, Gazeta Wyborcza from 30 November 2011, No Internet sources Bielecki Tomasz, Czy ktoś nadal chce więcej Europy?, 1,75477, ,Czy_ktos_nadal_chce wiecej_europy.html#trrelsst#ixzz2xr 9eGYcG Minister finansów Schaeuble za dalszą integracją w UE, news/search/info/ ,minister-finansow-niemiec-schaeuble-za-dalsza-integracja-w-ue Widzyk Anna, Kilku szefów dyplomacji proponuje reformy w UE, pl/kat,102634,title,kilku-szefow-dyplomacji-proponuje-reformy-w-ue,wid, , wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1ea8c 70

72 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD ISSN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD. BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD POWER Assoc. Prof. Agnieszka LEGUCKA, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The goal of this study is to analyse the involvement of the EU and Russia in conflict management in their shared neighbourhood, i.e. the six East European and South Caucasus countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Due to the broad understanding of conflict management, which may relate to political, economic, ethnic and armed conflicts, this analysis will focus on managing only the latter. In the case of the discussed region, this means the conflicts in: Transnistria, Nagorno- Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. The comparison of the EU and Russian armed conflict managing actions allows for determining the efficiency of soft and hard power used by these two international actors. The European Union received the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for having contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights. Therefore, it seems important to answer the following question: Can its experience benefit the EU in managing the post-soviet region? Key words conflict management, armed conflict, soft power, hard power The shared neighbourhood of the European Union and the Russian Federation covers an area of over 1,031,114 km 2, made up of European countries: Ukraine (603,628 km 2 ), Belarus (207,600 km 2 ), Moldova (33,843 km 2 ), and Caucasus countries: Georgia (69,700 km 2 ) 1, Armenia (29,743 km 2 ) and Azerbaijan (86,600 km 2 ) 2. Identification of the six countries in the shared neighbourhood is based on several notions. Firstly, these countries are covered by the Eastern Partnership, i.e. a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), which is conducted by the EU and dedicated to special relations with the eastern region. In European Union documentation, these countries are treated as a group, and specific 1 Because of Russia s takeover of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia has actual control over 57,250 km 2 of its territory. See more A. Legucka, Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje konfliktów zbrojnych na obszarze poradzieckim, Difin, Warszawa 2013, s World Fact Book, [ ]. 71

73 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA standards of conduct towards them and mechanisms for cooperation are accepted. Secondly, these countries will not join the EU in the near future, which means that they will constitute the external area surrounding the EU and Russia and this, in turn, will make the external security of both the EU and Russia dependent upon their internal situation, and political and economic stability. Thirdly, these countries are characterised by low stability and they generate problems and threats, which underly the calls necessitating the need for cooperation between the EU and Russia in the shared neighbourhood in order to eliminate dangers, among others those related to solving frozen conflicts in the post-soviet area. We can make a hypothesis that the European Union has a policy based on values and attraction, or soft power. The Russian Federation leans more heavily towards post-soviet hard power, where it manages international relations by threats and payments for governing relations between states using, amongst others, frozen conflicts in the region. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the foreign and security policies of both entities and their operating strategies in the post-soviet countries in armed conflict management. Conflict management Russia and EU approach According to a general definition, a conflict is a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party 3. Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action, involving two or more actors with the expression of differences often accompanied by intense hostilities. Most significantly, protracted conflict arises from a failure to manage the antagonistic relationship 4. A special kind of conflict involves force being used by both parties to the conflict. Armed conflicts in the shared neighbourhood of Russia and the EU emerged during the disintegration of the USSR, when parts of former Soviet republics began to claim independence. This is when Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria decided to form independent states, thus infringing on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - all states with international recognition. The parties on both sides of these conflicts (all with both an ethnic and political nature) were trying to solve these situations by themselves, but the management process was joined by third parties : Russia, Iran, Turkey, 3 J.A. Wall, Jr. R.R. Callister, Conflict and Its Management, Journal of Management 1995, Vol. 21, No. 3, s. 517; Ho-Won Jeong, Conflict Management and Resolution. Introduction, Routledge, New York 2010, s L. Kriesberg, B.W. Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, Rowman & Littlefield, Plymouth 2011, s. 428; B. Balcerowicz i in., Wydanie drugie, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2002, p ; J.S. Nye, Konflikty międzynarodowe. Wprowadzenie do teorii i historii, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2009, s Ho-Won Jeong, op. cit., s

74 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD CIS and other international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and recently also the EU. The questions that arise from this concerns the reasons for Russia to allow the EU to participate in managing these conflicts and the opportunities and limitations faced by a Europe which aspires to lead the security policy in its nearest neighbourhood. The discussed subject shall require the analysis of the conflict management approaches adopted by Russia and the EU and their implemented strategy for the counties - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - which have directly experienced armed conflicts. Among many approaches towards conflict management, there are also actions undertaken by third parties, in this case by Russia and the EU 5. Such actions basically mean the involvement, at every possible stage of an armed conflict, of an external actor who works to ensure early warning, preventive diplomacy, the limitation of military actions until the armed conflict ends, and to prevent a renewed outbreak, which is referred to as post-conflict peace building. Only towards the end of the 1990s did the EU accept the responsibility for managing armed conflicts institutionally and legally under its European Security and Defence Policy ESDP (since the Lisbon Treaty the Common Security and Defence Policy CSDP). However, European countries have participated much earlier in promoting peace through diplomacy and spreading values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights; and providing development assistance and humanitarian aid; and supporting local governments and NGOs 6. The support of the EU in managing armed conflicts usually takes an official and transparent form and, which is very important, it is in line with the international peacekeeping requirements that assume neutrality and the favouring of neither of the conflicting parties. The European Union has extensive experience in conducting peace operations and building post-conflict stabilization, which can be somewhat ironically referred to as the Americans making the mess, the Europeans cleaning it up. But in the majority of the UN, WEU, OSCE and NATO missions, the postconflict peace building was indeed done by soldiers, police officers, officials and observers from Europe. In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for having contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, which was supposed to be an incentive for further work in this field. The goal of the EU in managing armed conflicts in the post-soviet area is the creation of widely 5 K. Barseghyan, Z. Karaev, Playing Cat-and-Mouse: Conflict and Third-Party Mediation in Post-Soviet Space, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2004, No (6.1), s ; L. Jonson, Keeping the Peace in the CIS. The evolution of Russian Policy, Discussion Paper RIIA 1999, No. 81, s. 13; D. Sagramoso, Russian peacekeeping policies [w:] J. Mackinlay, P. Cross (red.), Regional peacekeepers: the paradox of Russian peacekeeping, United Nations University Press, Tokyo New York Paris 2003, s N. Singh, Governance Mechanisms in Divided Societies: Learning From and Using Global Experience [w:] C.H. Grant, R.M. Kirton (red.), Governance conflict analysis and conflict resolution, Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston 2007, s

75 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA understood stabilization in the neighbourhood in order to eliminate the dangers associated with the prolonging of the frozen conflicts : socio-economic degradation, growth in organized crime, refugees, illegal migration, contraband, trafficking in arms and humans, poverty and diseases. The document concerning the strengthening of the ENP in 2006 reads as follows: These are not only our neighbours problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism and confirms that the EU is being more active in addressing frozen conflicts ( ). The EU needs to be more active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or peacekeeping efforts 7. This is augmented by the economic interests of Europe, securing its foreign investments and tapping into the energy potential of the Caspian Sea. During the Soviet era the Russians did not gain the necessary experience in the conducting of UN peace operations 8. After the collapse of the USSR a new area of armed conflict management in the form of peace-keeping missions has been called mirotworciestvo, or the creation of peace. It covers a wide range of activities from political mediation to military operations undertaken in order to achieve peace by force. The most characteristic features of Russian peace missions are: the ability to enter into the conflict zone before the cessation of hostilities, and the inclusion of peacekeeping troops of both conflicting parties or the CIS countries, ensuring Russia obtains greater legitimacy as a promoter of peace and avoiding allegations of interfering in the internal affairs of post-soviet states 9. What distinguishes the Russian conflict management concept of using peace missions from the European one is a lack of neutrality towards the conflicting parties. The Russians often supported the weaker - the separatists - against stronger countries in the region: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Thanks to the frozen conflicts, Russia can influence the post-soviet geopolitics of the region. Because of their limited efficiency in promoting peace, the goal of Russian operations have become not so much a solution to the armed conflicts as rather maintaining the status quo. Russia uses both official and unofficial channels to influence the development of the situation, making its actions less transparent. It should also be noted that in Russia the decisions relating to conflict management have been made at various political, administrative and military levels, which sometimes makes it difficult to determine the clear position of Russia 10. As a result, the Russian Federation has 7 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (2006), Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006)726 final, [ ]. 8 A. Sokolov, Russian Peace-keeping Forces in the Post-Soviet Area, [w:] M. Kaldor, B. Vashee (red.), Reconstructing the Global Military Sector, PINTER, London-Washington 1997, chapter 8. 9 K. Malak, Czynnik wojskowy w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej ( ). Rozprawa habilitacyjna, Zeszyty Naukowe AON 2001, Dodatek specjalny, s L. Jonson, op. cit., s. 3.; A. Legucka, Geopolityczne, op. cit., s

76 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD become the most important stabilizing factor inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities in post-soviet countries, having at the same time its own political, military and economic interests in the region - so it becomes a party to the conflict. Russia conflict management There have been several armed conflicts in the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s conflicts arose in Nagorno- Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Transnistria. They all underwent similar phases: eruption, and then a freezing in the form of a truce and the creation of quasi-states that are not recognized by the international community. Then, two of these conflicts were unfrozen : in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which, in August 2008, were transformed into the Georgian-Russian war. According to some, there is a considerable possibility of the conflict in Nagorno- Karabakh escalating into another international conflict. A renewed outbreak of hostilities is indeed highly probable, especially when you look at the arms race in the South Caucasus 11. Russia had an impact on the course of each of these conflicts in the CIS area. In the first phase of the conflict, when the military action took place, the Russians supplied weapons and soldiers (sometimes mercenaries) and offered military advice and support military and diplomatic activities were conducted in parallel. It must be stressed that, during the intensive armed operations in the early 1990s, the decision-making process in Russia was highly distributed. Government agencies, the president, the parliament, the ministries of foreign affairs and of defence, the army, including officers and soldiers in units distributed throughout the former USSR territories, all had a say in the process. Mainly owing to the support of the latter, the separatists obtained the necessary military provisions for conducting military operations. In Transnistria, the separatists success was determined by the 14th Soviet Army; in Abkhazia and South Ossetia weapons were obtained from local military units; and in Nagorno-Karabakh the separatists were supported by Armenia, itself probably being armed by Russia. At the same time Russia sought international partners to have them recognize the CIS as an organization ensuring regional security and building peace and stabilization. Lena Jonson claims that, in the first phase, Russia attempted to present itself as a coorganizer of regional security. The country was ready not only to participate in peace operations all over the world, but also to transfer the responsibility for the security of the southern frontier of the former USSR to the UN and the CSCE 12. An 11 A. Legucka, Wyścig zbrojeń na Kaukazie Południowym [w:] A. Bryc, A. Legucka, A. Włodkowska-Bagan (red.), Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci prof. Kazimierza Malaka, Difin, Warszawa 2011, s L. Jonson, op. cit., s

77 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA important motive was to secure the financial support necessary for conducting peace operations in the near abroad. But the UN and the CSCE (later OSCE) limited themselves to supporting Russian operations, not wanting to send peacekeeping missions into regions of conflict, but merely monitoring Russian operations. In Abkhazia, an observer mission was undertaken by the UN (UNOMIG), in South Ossetia and Transnistria by the CSCE/OSCE, and in Nagorno-Karabakh the peace process was coordinated by the CSCE/OSCE Minsk Group 13. The goal laid down in the mandates of these missions that of conducting negotiations aimed at solving the conflicts - with the parties interests decidedly at odds - has not yet been achieved. In the second phase, after the cessation of military operations, Russia took the role of the main mediator and guarantor of the truce agreements and had success in forcing both parties to the negotiating table. In June 1992, an agreement was signed in Dagomys to end the South Ossetia conflict. The agreement set forth the formation of a peacekeeping force that included the South Ossetian, North Ossetian, Russian and Georgian battalions. In July 1992, the Transnistrian conflict was brought to an end. As a result, a security zone was established and a Joint Control Commission composing of three parties: Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria. Russia was named the trust guarantor 14. In 1994, Russia proposed an initiative to send CIS peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia (in reality these were predominantly Russian forces) to secure the truce agreed in December of the previous year. Also, in May 1994 a truce was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, owing to the lack of proper agreement between the two parties, no peace forces were sent into the region of the conflict. After the ending of hostilities in the border region of the former Soviet Union, Russia s position as a regional leader was much in demand and it could shape a required regional order promoting Russia s soft power. However, it became clear that Russia may gain more by using hard power, or a position of strength, by maintaining quasi-states and not ending any conflict with a peace treaty. Between the end of 1992 and 1996 Russia changed into an intervening military power that maintains no guidelines or standards set forth in the UN s system of peace operations. Russian peace-building activity developed outside of the UN s system and norms. Russia was deeply involved in solving conflicts, although an international audience highly doubted its solely peaceful intentions and questioned the impartiality of its actions 15. In the third phase, when the conflict freezing occurred, Russia was still using diplomatic means and its military presence in order to guarantee the status quo of relative stability. Simultaneously, the constant monitoring of the situation by the 13 В.Н. Казимиров, Мир Карабаху. Посредничество Росcии в урегулировании нагорнокарабахского конфликта, Международные отношения, Москва 2009, s L. Jonson, op. cit., s D. Sagramoso, op. cit., s. 13.

78 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD Russian Federation prevented a final solution to any given conflict. As a result, the separatists in the CIS countries, counting on Russia s help, hardened their negotiating position. For many years Russia, anxious about its own areas with separatist tendencies (Chechnya) gaining strength, had not recognized any of these quasi-states. The frozen conflicts provided a natural guarantee of Russia s influence over the situation in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia committed to withdraw its forces and military equipment from Georgian and Moldovan territories. From 2005 to the end of 2007, it withdrew its forces from military bases in Georgia, but most of them were simply transferred to Armenia. However, the commitments concerning the separatist Transnistria Republic were not kept. The fourth phase was to unfreeze the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus, which was influenced by the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003, the bold demands of the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, on the recovery of territorial integrity, in what was supposed to help support the modernization of the Georgian army by the Americans, and the growing military budgets of countries in the region (mainly Azerbaijan, which proclaimed the desire to reclaim the Nagorno-Karabakh). The support of the West, in the form of including the South Caucasus countries in the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and the announcement to invite Georgia to NATO in April 2008, was treated as a threat towards the regional position and political, military and economic interests of Russia. After a series of incidents and provocations, Russia (1) conducted direct attacks on military targets in Georgia - a helicopter attack on Georgian facilities in Kodoria and a missile strike on a radar station in 2007, involving numerous provocations of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict area; (2) established a communication and economic blockade of Georgia from 2006, (3) attempted to play off the internal conflicts in Georgia in 2007/2008; there has been an outbreak of a new armed conflict 16. After the attacks of the Georgian forces on the South Ossetia capital - Tskhinvali - on 7/8th August 2008, Russia stepped in to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia and, then, in Abkhazia, and the Russian army marched into Georgia, occupying strategic points and dividing this rebellious republic from the main country. On 26th August 2008, Russia officially recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thus confirming it is able to unfreeze a situation of armed conflict in the Commonwealth of Independent States region when not in its favour. However, by using force, Russia has weakened its soft power. No CIS member has recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is contrasted with the recognition given by the West to Kosovo s independence in February K. Strachota, Gruzja na wojnie z Rosją, Tydzień na Wschodzie OSW,

79 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA European Union conflict management The Russian involvement in the east neighbourhood area contrasts vividly with the approach adopted by the European Union, reluctant to openly act against Russia and internally divided. For years the EU has not been paying much attention to solving conflicts in the area, partly because some European countries feared the reaction of Russia and accept its special position as the peace guarantor in the region. The importance of external security became a relevant factor only after the enlargement of the European Union. The European Security Strategy of 13th December 2003 reads: The post-cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked (...). The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations 17. The European Union did not participate in any armed conflict in the eastern neighbouring countries but it did, on several occasions, act as a mediator or advisor. It has involved itself relatively late with managing conflicts in the CIS region. Its role was fulfilled by Russia, Ukraine, the UN and the OSCE. This situation changed with the enlargement of the European Union and the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy 18. In the documents of the EU there is defined the neighbourhood of its interests, including the announcements of the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution 19. The authors of these documents have especially studied the recommendations of Professor Joseph Nye, who claimed that a precisely defined national interest may be a factor attracting others through the promise of economic help or work for peace. In order to build a contact platform with the new ring of friends in the neighbourhood, the EU claimed that the privileged relationship with neighbours will build on a mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development (European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, 2004). But at the same time it must be noted that, although the political values may be a strong source of attraction, it is not enough to believe in them (Nye, 2007, p. 89). What is important is the third 17 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, /uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf, [ ]. 18 Based on the Lisbon Treaty that came into force in December 2009, the European Security and Defence Policy was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy. 19 European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, , COM(2004) 373 final, paper_en.pdf, [ ]. 78

80 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD element of soft power - that is, the conducted foreign policy. When the ideas and values are not transferred into practice, or when double standards are used, then the power based on values loses its attraction and becomes a subject of criticism. In the case of the European Union, a state of self-complacency is dangerous when concerning the setting of goals and strategies without reflecting on the efficiency of its policies. In 2003, the practical phase of the ESDP began. The first EU missions were sent to the Balkans, but the natural target area for stabilizing operations seemed to be the post-soviet territories 20. In September 2003, the European Union was officially invited to participate in the negotiations concerning the Transnistrian conflict. The frozen conflict in Transnistria was a problem for European security because of, amongst other things, the lack of international control over this small territory, sometimes earning the name black hole, creating perfect conditions for the illegal trade in cigarettes, alcohol, weapons, people and organs. At the request of the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova in June 2005, the European Union created a special training-control border assistance mission which was tasked with supporting the border and customs services of these countries 21. The goal of this mission was to combat smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud taking place on the border, especially its Transnistrian part, and to conduct training and provide support for customs. Experts from the EU provided support and advice in the organization of the border control. The final declaration stated that the EU hopes that the mission will contribute to wider efforts to find a viable and sustainable solution to the Transnistria conflict 22. Since 2001 the place of the EU s greater involvement was the South Caucasus. the EU has upgraded its political visibility in the South Caucasus. On 7 July 2003 the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) was appointed. This role was given to Heikki Talvitie (2003/496/CFSP), whose tasks were, among other things, to contribute to the prevention of conflicts, and to prepare the return of peace to the region and assist in conflict resolution with the OSCE and UN. Initially, the EU supported Georgia s efforts towards solving the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, but only through the OSCE and the UN 23. The Rose 20 A. Ciupiński, Realizacja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE na obszarze poradzieckim [in:] Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci prof. Kazimierza Malaka, op. cit., s ; D. Lynch, Russia faces Europe, Challiot Paper 2003, May 2003, No 60, s ; N. Popescu, A. Wilson, Polityka Unii Europejskiej i Rosji wobec wspólnych sąsiadów, Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa The inauguration ceremony took place in Odessa on 30th November 2005, but the actual start of the operation was delayed until the 1st December European Union s Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine - Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union - Odessa, Ukraine, 30 November 2005, Brussels, 30 November /05 (Presse 334), [ ]; org/en/, [ ]. 23 Still, in the EU supplied over EUR half-a-million worth of equipment for the Georgian border guards. This help was aimed at protecting unarmed OSCE observers by the 79

81 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, and the inclusion of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia into the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and Black Sea Synergy (2007), enforced a special sensitivity towards this region 24. The EU confirmed its willingness to play a more active political role in the South Caucasus 25. Under ESDP, the EU independently conducted a mission based on the joint action of the Council of the European Union of 28th June 2004 (2003/496/CFSP). A Rule of Law Mission, EUJUST-THEMIS, began operating on 15th July 2004 and lasted one year. It aimed at reforming the existing Soviet-type judicial system that was generating corruption and a lack of horizontal coordination of authorities. On 20th February 2006, the Council of the European Union extended the work of the EU Special Representative in the South Caucasus region. His mandate included, amongst other things, contributing to conflict prevention, helping in conflict solution, and intensifying dialogue between the EU and the main stakeholders in the region (2006/121/CFSP). It was Peter Semneby who served as EUSR for the South Caucasus until 28 February 2011, then it was Pierre Morel who served as EUSR during the crisis in Georgia until 31 August 2011 and then Philippe Lefort who served until 30 June The greatest challenge in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU was the Georgian-Russian war in August The EU realized the importance of pulling countries out of their traditional sphere of influence and into the orbit of the West for the continent s security. The Georgian-Russian war became a catalyst for cooperation with the East, speeding up the discussion on the Eastern dimension of the ENP (Eastern Partnership). Simultaneously, the reaction to the Georgian- Russian war showed some discrepancies in the interpretation of the Georgian events, while the unequivocal expression of support for Georgia's territorial integrity from all European countries, in particular by Germany, made Moscow abandon its previous practice of playing on the pro- and contra-russian feelings Georgians, who monitored the border between Georgia, Chechnya and the Russian Federation. The EU s contribution to the OSCE mission in Georgia successfully supported the functioning of Permanent Secretariats on the Georgian and South Ossetian sides under the emblem of the OSCE and facilitated meetings under the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which is the most important forum in the conflict-solving process. In June 2006, the EU extended its financial support for the OSCE mission. This support was supposed to finance the JCC meetings and conferences under the JCC name, and to partly cover the costs of running two Secretariats for one year. The financial reference amount was EUR 140,000. R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, s On 11th April 2007, the European Commission adopted the communication titled Black Sea Synergy a new regional cooperation initiative. This was aimed at creating a political framework for various practical operations. The Commission set an ambitious goal to contribute to solving conflicts in the South Caucasus, and to ensure additional means for solving problems underlying the frozen conflicts. 25 D. Helly, EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitions bet on rule of law [w:] Nowak Agnieszka (red.), Civilian Crisis Management The EU Way, Challiot Paper June 2006, No 90, EUISS, Paris, s

82 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD among the European Union members 26. The differences among the Europeans did not concern the political support for Georgia, which was expressed in solidarity, but their response to the Russian action. Representing the then EU presidency, President Nicolas Sarkozy travelled to Moscow on 12th August He was able to negotiate a peace plan with the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, under which the parties: (1) committed to the non-use of force, (2) would permanently end all military actions, (3) would ensure free access to humanitarian aid, (4) would allow Georgian forces to return to their permanent points of deployment; further more (5) Russian forces were to withdraw to the lines prior to the start of military operations but they would be entitled to introduce additional security measures, (6) international talks would commence concerning security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The agreement negotiated by Nicolas Sarkozy was brought to Tbilisi by the then American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and was accepted by Mikheil Saakashvili on 15th August, and on the day after that by the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev 27. The obligations resulting from the agreement were only partly fulfilled by the Russians; the fighting was stopped but the Russian forces were not withdrawn from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the following days saw more military action on the territory of Georgia proper. There were rumours of cleansing Ossetia of Georgian families. By this, Russia infringed on the first, second (until 2009) and fifth point of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement. Also, the access of international humanitarian aid was hampered. South Ossetia only received aid from Russia, and for the Georgian refugees it was available only in Georgia (Germany increased its aid to EUR 2 million) 28. The fourth point concerned Georgia and was implemented. Also, the last sub-point has not been completed as it assumed the start of international negotiations on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although international talks did begin later in Geneva, on 26th August 2008 Russia officially recognized the independence of the two small states, announcing their support, including military support. On 3rd September 2008, the European Parliament issued a resolution stating that the European Neighbourhood Policy should be developed further and better adapted to the needs of the EU s eastern partners 29. The EU then decided to independently send ca. 300 observers who were to control the security zones proposed in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement. On 1st October 2008, the European Union Monitoring Mission began operations, its goal being to monitor the borders of the security zone in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia region. Unarmed observers in light armoured vehicles labelled EUMM were to patrol their identified areas. 26 S. Żerko, Niemcy wobec konfliktu w Gruzji (sierpnień 2008), Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego 2008, nr 1, s R.D. Asmus, Mała wojna, która wstrząsnęła światem. Gruzja, Rosja i przeszłość Zachodu, Res Publica Nova, Warszawa 2010, s S. Żerko, op. cit., s L. Alieva, EU and South Cauasus, CAP Discussion Paper December 2006, s

83 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA The EU s observers were deployed in four locations: the capital of Georgia - Tbilisi, in Gori near South Ossetia, Zugdidi near the Abkhazian border and the Black Sea port of Poti. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission was EUR 31 million (2008/736/CFSP) 30. The basic limitation on the fulfilment of the mission s task was the blockade of the EU observers entrance into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also, in June 2009, Russia blocked the extension of the UN mission s mandate in Abkhazia, and of the OSCE s in South Ossetia. In this way, the European Union became the only international organization supervising the situation in Georgia and an important financial aid donor for the country s redevelopment. For this, another EUR 500 million were allocated to Georgia, which nearly equalled the sum received by Georgia under various EU programmes from 1992 to 2005 (EUR 505 million) 31. According to the World Bank, Georgia has received much more assistance in the years around USD billion under the Official Development Assistance. These data do not cover all categories of aid, as well as a large part of the post-war aid package amounting to USD 4.5 billion 32. Through the conflict in Georgia Russia has achieved the main goal of its foreign policy. It helped to withdraw NATO and the Americans from this country replacing Western obligations in Georgia with EU stabilization. It has accelerated work on the Polish-Swedish proposal to strengthen the EU s relations with the countries of that region 33. The proposal of eastern specialization in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy was eventually adopted as the Eastern Partnership project (EaP), officially established in May Evaluation of the conflict management of Russia and the EU According to Dmitry Trenin the Russians perceive the EU in opposition to NATO: good West is Europe and the EU, evil West is America and NATO 34. This model might not fully reflect Russia s attitude towards the EU, but after many 30 COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248/26, , :EN:PDF, [ ]. 31 K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Integracja czy imitacja? UE wobec wschodnich sąsiadów, Prace OSW 2011, s. 47, Georgia Strategy Paper, , s M. Matusiak, Gruzińskie wybory. Między silnym państwem a demokracją, Punkt Widzenia OSW 2012, s J. Cieślińska, Partnerstwo Wschodnie miejsce wymiaru wschodniego w Europejskiej Polityce Sąsiedztwa, Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej 2009, nr 3, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań, s ; T. Kapuśniak Tomasz, Wymiar Wschodni Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej. Inkuzja bez członkostwa, Zeszyty Natolin 2010, Centrum Natolińskie, Warszawa. 34 D. Trenin, Russia EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps, Russia on Russia, Issue 1, Moscow School of Political Studies and Social Market Foundation, Moscow 2000, s. 106.

84 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD years of distrust Russia has learnt to deal with this organization and, especially, to act on issues that it finds important by antagonizing individual European Union member states. The support received by Moscow during the rule of German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and simultaneous anti-russian statements by politicians from Poland and the Baltics helped Russia successfully utilize this strategy. The European Union can be efficient against Russia only when full solidarity of European interests is ensured, which was exemplified by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the August war in Georgia. At the same time, the case of Georgia makes one ponder Russian motives to join the EU peace process. For many years Georgia has been drawing nearer and nearer to Russia s greatest rival, the USA. The growing position of the USA worried Moscow, especially in the context of the proposed expansion of NATO to include the Ukraine and Georgia 35. By including the European Union in the peace talks and allowing its observers to enter into Georgia proper, Russia managed to remove the USA from the Georgian issue. Although the USA supported Georgia s territorial integrity and sharply opposed Russia, it is the European Union who took over the responsibility for Georgia s redevelopment and stabilization. However, the policy of fait accompli - epitomized by Russia s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia s independence and the failure to keep all points of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement - showed the lack of instruments in Europe able to force compliance on Russia. Examples of the EU s involvement in conflict management in the shared neighbourhood show that Georgia has become the priority country, but, as the experts stress, the idea of an ESDP missions in the former Soviet space should not lead to increasing tensions with Russia 36. This is confirmed by the case of Moldova, which for several years has been following the road of European integration but, due to the Transnistrian conflict, cannot secure enough support in the European countries which want to avoid the deterioration of their own relations with Russia. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU has even less instruments at its disposal to influence the situation. There is no full EC delegation in the Azerbaijan capital, Baku, only a Europa House information centre with one envoy. The EU has no presence in Karabakh or the surrounding occupied territories. Nevertheless, the EU has founded a wide range of economic and infrastructure tools in the regions. It can be partly explained by the unwillingness of the key parties the government of Azerbaijan and Armenia to seek EU assistance. The peace negotiations held by the OSCE Minsk Group are fragile and the opening of a new forum for discussion about the conflict could undermine this 35 This is reflected in the statement by W. Putin in the conference in Munich on 11th February D. Helly, op. cit., s

85 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA process. Unfortunately, the status quo is preferable to most actors than settlement of the dispute 37. What strengths does the European Union have? The biggest positive element of attraction and attractiveness of the European Union is its experience of integration, which stopped conflicts between Germany and France, improved the quality of life for inhabitants and secured them against totalitarianism, authoritarianism and extremism. The European Union is building its soft power on the values of respect, but, as Nye warns, (2007, p. 89) the political values like democracy and human rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim them (...) Perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values 38. European values strongly influence the consciousness of the societies of Eastern Europe but this element may be wasted, however, if the European Union does not open itself to the societies of the Eastern Partnership countries. This includes a clear and attractive strategic communication referring not to the concept of neighbourhood but a united Europe, in which these countries do not necessarily have to be invited to join the EU, but which should offer certain European perspectives for the countries that are most advanced with their internal reforms 39. Europe, facing demographic problems, will have to open itself to an inexpensive labour force from the East, which seems less problematic in terms of cultural differences. On-going negotiations on visa simplification are the first step in this direction. Moreover, the EU is the biggest donor of development assistance and humanitarian aid in the world, which increases its soft power with regard to the Eastern neighbourhood. The global economic crisis and recession which threatens many developed countries, traditionally generous donors of development aid, naturally stimulates the discussion concerning the quality and efficiency of development aid. In March 2011, a document entitled A New Responses to the Changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy was adopted, showing the EU s will to strengthen democracy, good administration and human rights in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, and enhance the transfer of aid through civic society organizations 40. It is expected that EUR 96.2 billion, constituting 6.8% of the total budget of the European Union, will be allocated for external actions, including development ones, in EUR 23.3 billion shall be allocated to the Developmental Cooperation Instrument (of key importance for global development), and EUR 18.2 billion for the new European Neighbourhood 37 E.J. Steward, EU Conflict Management in the South Caucasus: A Preliminary Analysis, University of Nottingham, November 2007, s. 8, shared_icmcr/ Docs/stewart.pdf, [ ]. 38 J.S. Nye Jr., op. cit., s K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, op. cit., s A New Responses to the Changing Neighbougrhood. A Review of the European Neighborhood Policy, Brussels, 25 May 2011, en.pdf, [ ]. 84

86 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD Instrument. The European Development Fund continues to remain outside the general budget of the European Union, and will amount to EUR 34.2 billion in However, experts point out that it is not just about money but also about the opening up of society and the emphasis on grassroots democracy (Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, 2011, p. 6). It should also be noted that development assistance and humanitarian aid is the European alibi that allows the authorities to avoid deeper involvement in linking Eastern countries with Europe, which may take the form only of supporting their reforms even at the cost of deteriorating relations with Russia. It is essential, therefore, to create favourable conditions for foreign investment of European companies in Eastern markets. Summary Armed conflicts determine the security policy of the countries in the region that seek more powerful external allies in order to balance the threat posed by their neighbours. This is why Armenia expects Russia s support, whereas Georgia relies on the USA (NATO) and the European Union. For several years, Moldova has been counting on European integration to balance the Russian position and solve the conflict in Transnistria. In the EU, there was an increase in awareness of the challenges and threats existing in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, resulting in a demand to prove the EU s capability to prevent and manage armed conflicts. The security of the shared neighbourhood of the EU and Russia is determined by many factors, including the influence of these two strategic partners, with the first one - the EU - adopting the role of stabilizer, and the second one - the Russian Federation - striving to maintain a state of controlled destabilization in order to have a stronger influence on the six countries in the region. For the European Union, the values such as democracy, the rule of law and civic society development are important. This, in the long run, is to ensure the economic and social development of these countries which in the future will eliminate negative phenomena such as illegal migration, organized crime, terrorism, and trafficking in arms and humans. For Russia, the priority is to maintain the countries in its sphere of influence and frozen conflicts remain an important tool in achieving this goal. In the latter case, Russia maintains its military presence in six of the region s countries, determining the unfreezing of armed conflicts, and has an impact on the security policy of each of its neighbours. As an economic means, Russia uses differentiating prices of energy resources, embargoes on oil and natural gas, and trade sanctions (bans on imports of wine, vegetables and meat). This is 41 Raport. Polska pomoc rozwojowa, Grupa Zagranica, Warszawa 2011, s. 12, org.pl/images/stories/publikacjegz/monitoring/raport_polska_wspolpraca_rozwojowa_2011_grupa _Zagranica.pdf, [ ]. 85

87 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA accompanied by political pressure, which works with increased strength given the availability of Russian TV channels and newspapers in neighbouring countries. Russia strongly affects the area of the neighbourhood which it shares with the European Union. The EU is internally divided and not yet ready for a coherent policy towards the East. In a situation of economic crisis, and with European attention focused on other regions of the world, the European Union does not want to, and has not the means to, effectively work towards the security of the shared neighbourhood. The stabilization of the region will, therefore, be the result of internal factors in these countries and the influence of Russia. This region may become a challenge for twenty-first century Europe as we can repeat, after Joseph Nye, that perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values 42. Bibliography A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, /uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf, [ ]. Asmus Ronald D., Mała wojna, która wstrząsnęła światem. Gruzja, Rosja i przeszłość Zachodu, Res Publica Nova, Warszawa Alieva Leila, EU and South Cauasus, CAP Discussion Paper December Barseghyan Kristine, Karaev Zainiddin, Playing Cat-and-Mouse: Conflict and Third-Party Mediation in Post-Soviet Space, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2004, No (6.1). Borkowski Paweł J., Polityka sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej, Difin, Warszawa Cieślińska Joanna, Partnerstwo Wschodnie miejsce wymiaru wschodniego w Europejskiej Polityce Sąsiedztwa, Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej 2009, nr 3, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań Ciupiński Andrzej, Realizacja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE na obszarze poradzieckim, [w:] Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci prof. Kazimierza Malaka, Bryc A., Legucka A., Włodkowska-Bagan A. (ed.), Difin, Warszawa Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (2006), Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006)726 final, [ ]. COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/121/CFSP, /cmsupload/l_ en pdf COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248/26, , uri=oj:l:2008:248:0026:0031:en:pdf, [ ]. European Neighborhood Policy STRATEGY PAPER, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Brussels, , COM(2004) 373 final, (źródło, URL < strategy_paper_en.pdf>, wrzesień 2007) J.S. Nye Jr., op. cit., s. 89.

88 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD European Union s Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine - Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union - Odessa, Ukraine, 30 November 2005, Brussels, 30 November /05 (Presse 334), [ ]; [ ]. Falkowski Maciej, Problemy bezpieczeństwa na Kaukazie Południowym, [w:] Legucka Agnieszka, Malak Kazimierz (red.), Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa na obszarze WNP, Rytm, Warszawa 2008, s Helly Damien, EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitions bet on rule of law, in: Nowak Agnieszka (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management The EU Way, Challiot Paper June 2006, No 90, EUISS, Paris, p Jeong Ho-Won, Conflict Management and Resolution. Introduction, Routledge, New York Jonson Lena, Keeping the Peace in the CIS. The evolution of Russian Policy, Discussion Paper 1999, No 81, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Kapuśniak Tomasz, Wymiar Wschodni Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej. Inkuzja bez członkostwa, Zeszyty Natolin 2010, Centrum Natolińskie, Warszawa. Казимиров В. Н., Мир Карабаху. Посредничество Росcии в урегулировании нагорнокарабахского конфликта, Международные отношения, Москва Konończuk Wojciech, Rodkiewicz Witold, Czy Naddniestrze zablokuje integrację europejską Mołdawii, Komentarze OSW, Kriesberg Louis, Dayton Bruce W., Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, Rowman & Littlefield, Plymouth Legucka Agnieszka, Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje konfliktów zbrojnych na obszarze poradzieckim, Difin, Warszawa Legucka Agnieszka, Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej, AON, Warszawa Legucka Agnieszka, Wyścig zbrojeń na Kaukazie Południowym [w:] Bryc A., Legucka A., Włodkowska-Bagan A. (red.), Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci prof. Kazimierza Malaka, Difin, Warszawa Lynch Dov, Russia faces Europe, Challiot Paper May 2003, No 60. Malak Kazimierz, Czynnik wojskowy w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej ( ). Rozprawa habilitacyjna, Zeszyty Naukowe AON 2001, Dodatek specjalny. Matusiak Marek, Gruzińskie wybory. Między silnym państwem a demokracją, Punkt Widzenia OSW Popescu Nicu, Wilson Andrew, Polityka Unii Europejskiej i Rosji wobec wspólnych sąsiadów, Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa Raport. Polska pomoc rozwojowa (2011), Grupa Zagranica, Warszawa, aca_rozwojowa_2011_grupa_zagranica.pdf, [ ]. Sagramoso D., Russian peacekeeping policies, [w:] J. Mackinlay, P. Cross (red.), Russian peacekeepers: The paradox of Russian peacekeeping, United Nations University Press, Tokyo-New York-Paris Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Balcerowicz Bolesław i inni Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa Sokolov Alexander, Russian Peace-keeping Forces in the Post-Soviet Area, [w:] Kaldor Mary, Vashee Basker (red.), Reconstructing the Global Military Sector, PINTER, London-Washington

89 AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA Steward J. Emma, EU Conflict Management in the South Caucasus: A Premilinary Analysis, University of Nottingham, November 2007, uk/shared/shared_icmcr/ Docs/stewart.pdf, [ ]. Strachota Krzysztof, Gruzja na wojnie z Rosją, Tydzień na Wschodzie OSW, Trenin Dmitrij, Russia EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps, Russia on Russia, Issue 1, Moscow School of Political Studies and Social Market Foundation, Moscow Wall J. A., Callister Jr. R. R., Conflict and Its Management, Journal of Management 1995, Vol. 21, No. 3. Włodkowska Agata, Polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej wobec obszaru Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw, Adam Marszałek, Toruń World Fact Book (źródło URL: marzec 2011). Żerko Stanisław, Niemcy wobec konfliktu w Gruzji (sierpnień 2008), Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego 2008, nr 1. Zięba Ryszard, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa

90 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ISSN BRICS A SECURITY'S CREATOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT - THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE CRIMEA CRISIS Jerzy Tomasz LIMANOWSKI, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract In November 2001, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, economist Jim O'Neill, created the acronym BRIC for the group of the four largest emerging markets with high economic potential. These markets belong to the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. In February 2011, the group was expanded to include South Africa, causing a change in the name of the group to BRICS. According to Goldman Sachs' forecasts, the world's economies, in particular, equity markets, will depend on the economic development of this group of countries in the near future. In addition, in 2050 the total value of the BRICS economies will exceed the value of the G-7 economies. Such predictions seem quite reasonable, taking into account the fact that the BRICS countries have a significant amount of resources. For example, China is a source of cheap labour, both Russia and South Africa have large stocks of natural resources, the agro-industry in Brazil is very highly developed, while India has cheap intellectual resources. So today it is not only the BRICS group of countries that have considerable economic potential, but also a number of general political interest, which allow members of the BRICS to conduct a coordinated policy and act as a strong player in the international arena. BRICS countries occupy 26 % of the territory of the world with almost 2.83 billion population representing almost half of the total population entourage (42% ), while the combined nominal GDP ( 15,434 trillion ) is 14.6 % of global GDP ratio. This study refers to the facts and development forecasts for this group of countries. In this paper, the author tries to define the directions of the economic development of the rising giants, their investment position in the world, the power supply of the engine of the global economy, their political views,and also the most important views on strengthening new economic and military alliances. Due to the ensuing new military- political situation in the region of Eastern Europe (Crimea), taking place at the time of writing, the author has tried to develop his words in a very marginal way to show how these events will affect the configuration of the world economy, and influence the military- economic situation of the world. Key words Crimea, Big Four, BRICS Nations, ethekwini Declaration, Goldman Sachs Reports 89

91 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI Creating a BRIC In recent years, many of the new economical-military alliances have been growing. One of them is the BRICS. But this acronym was not created to represent a fresh organisation, but has taken its background from the former economic alliance named BRIC.. The rise of a group of emerging economies is one of the most striking phenomena in recent economic history. The creation of diplomatic clubs 1 among States such as BRICS highlights current evolutions in the political arena. This group constitutes a forum of industrialised, large and fast-growing economies with significant influence on regional and global matters. They have assumed a proactive presence in several multilateral contexts aimed at promoting normative and operational changes 2. This effort has been primarily generated at their annual summit for the Heads of State. Source: WARDSAUTO. The Information Centre for and about the Global Auto Industry. Picture 1. BRIC nations The term BRICs was coined by the Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs in 2001, in a paper entitled Building Better Global Economic BRICs 3 and at the time it included Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa only joined the group in The concept of emergence was seen essentially as a market-driven phenomenon that reflected deep changes in the structure of the global economy, as well as making the right economic policy choices. It is considered a multidimensional phenomenon, the product of economic, socio-political and identity 1 Kowitt, Beth ( ). For Mr. BRIC, nations meeting a milestone. CNNMoney.com. Retrieved Global Economics Paper No. 99, Dreaming with BRICs and Global Economics Paper 134, How Solid Are the BRICs? 3 See note nr 1 and nr 2 above, and Economist's Another BRIC in the wall 2008 article. 90

92 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT elements. The grouping s pattern of resilience would have legitimated a posteriori their conceptual coherence In economics, BRIC is a grouping acronym that refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, which are all deemed to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development. It is typically rendered as the BRICs 4 or alternatively as the Big Four. Various sources refer to a purported original BRIC agreement that predates the Goldman Sachs thesis 5. Some of these sources claim that President Vladimir Putin of Russia was the driving force behind this original cooperative coalition of developing BRIC countries. However, thus far, no text has been made public of any formal agreement to which all four BRIC states are signatories. This does not mean, however, that they have not reached a multitude of bilateral or even quadrilateral agreements. Evidence of agreements of this type is abundant and is available on the foreign ministry websites of each of the four countries. Trilateral agreements and frameworks made among the BRICs include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 6 and the IBSA 7 Trilateral Forum, which brings together Brazil, India, and South Africa in annual dialogues. Important statistics of BRIC T a b l e 1 Country / Statistics Federal Republic of Brazil Russian Federation Republic of India People's Republic of China $ 11,316 billion Total 2011 % of Global GDP (PPP) $ 2,178 billion $ 2,230 $ 20,193 $ 4,469 billion billion billion 24 % GDP (nominal) $ 2,429 billion $ 1,850 $ 8,253 $ 1,676 billion $ 2,298 billion billion billion 18 % Area 8,514,877 km2 17,075,400 3,287,240 9,640,821 38,518,338 km2 km2 km2 km2 27 % Population 192,787, ,927,297 1,210,193,422 1,336,970,000 2,881,877, % Military expenditure $ 33 billion $ 91 billion $ 47 billion $ 166 billion $ 337 billion 20 % % of GDP 1,5 % 4.4% 2.5% 2,1 % Source: Personally developed. 4 alternatively are used the BRIC countries or the BRIC economies. 5 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is an American multinational investment banking firm that engages in global investment banking, securities, investment management, and other financial services primarily with institutional clients. 6 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and military organisation which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the members renamed the organisation. India is an observer. 7 The IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) is an international tripartite grouping for promoting international cooperation among these countries. 91

93 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI Also important to note is the G-20 8 coalition of developing states, which includes all the BRICs. Furthermore, because of the popularity of the Goldman Sachs thesis BRIC, this term has sometimes been extended whereby BRICK 9 (K for South Korea), BRIMC 10 (M for Mexico), BRICA (GCC Arab countries Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) 11 and BRICET (including Eastern Europe and Turkey) ]12 have become more generic marketing terms to refer to these emerging markets 13. In August 2010, Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs argued that Africa could be considered the next BRIC. Analysts from rival banks have sought to move beyond the BRIC concept, by introducing their own groupings of emerging markets. Proposals include CIVETs 14, the EAGLES 15 and the 7 per cent Club (which includes those countries which have averaged economic growth of at least 7 per cent a year). 16 Projections on the future power of the BRIC economies vary widely. Some sources suggest that they might overtake the G7 economies by The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (also known as the G-20, G20, and Group of Twenty) is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 major economies. The members, shown highlighted on the map at the right include 19 individual countries Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union (EU), with Spain participating as a permanent guest, and further short-term guests named annually by the group's rotating chairperson. The EU is represented by the President of the European Council and by the European Central Bank. 9 The Australian Business - Emerging markets put China, India in the shade. Theaustralian.news.com.au. Retrieved , IBM Targets Russian Developers: Could overtake India, China in number of developers, says senior executive, OutSourcing World, February 11, sses.html. 11 Study: Energy-rich Arab countries are next emerging market. Thestar.com.my Retrieved An emerging market is a country that has some characteristics of a developed market but is not a developed market. This includes countries that may be developed markets in the future or were in the past. 14 CIVET Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa. 15 EAGLES Emerging and Growth-Leading Economies. 16 Acronym alert: the Eagles rock, beyond brics blog. Blogs.ft.com Retrieved Rana Foroohar ( ). BRICs Overtake G7 By The Daily Beast. Retrieved

94 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Gross Domestic Product in 2006 US$ billions 18 T a b l e 2 Grups Countries Brazil BRIC Russia India 5,637 8,640 13,653 20,226 28,925 40,278 55,090 74,483 98, ,324 China Canada France Germany G 7 Italy Japan, United Kingdom USA 28,005 30,437 33,414 36,781 39,858 43,745 48,281 53,617 59,475 66,039 Source: Personally developed. More modestly, Goldman Sachs has argued that, although the four BRIC countries are developing rapidly, it will only be by 2050 that their combined economies can eclipse the combined economies of the current richest countries of the world 19 In 2010, however, while the four BRIC countries accounted for over a quarter of the world's land area and more than 40% of the world's population 20,21, they accounted for only one quarter of the world s gross national income. 22 According to a paper published in 2005, Mexico and South Korea were the only other countries comparable to the BRICs, but their economies were excluded initially because they were considered already more developed, as they were already members of the OECD. The same creator of the term BRIC coined the term MIKT that includes Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey; more recently, in 2013, he endorsed the term MINT, which replaces South Korea (now regarded as already developed) with the growing economy of Nigeria BRICS AND BEYOND - Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and N11 nations, November 23, Brazil, Russia, India And China (BRIC). Investopedia. Archived from the original on 21 May Retrieved bricnation.com. bricnation.com. Retrieved F182C 22 How Solid are the BRICs? (PDF). Global Economics. Retrieved BOESLER, MATTHEW (NOV. 13, 2013). The Economist Who Invented The BRICs Just Invented A Whole New Group Of Countries: The MINTs. Business Insider. Retrieved 7 January 2014., Magalhaes, Luciana (Dec 9, 2013). O Neill, Man Who Coined BRICs, Still Likes BRICs, But Likes MINTs, Too. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 7 January

95 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI List of Economies by Incremental Nominal GDP from 2006 to T a b l e 3 Countries GDP from 2006 GDP from 2020 GDP from 2035 Rank Rank to 2020 to 2035 to 2050 Rank China 9,448 billion 1 21,718 billion 1 36,362 billion 1 USA 4,733 billion 2 8,119 billion 2 12,417 billion 3 India 1,999 billion 3 7,666 billion 3 27,154 billion 2 Russia 1,572 billion 4 2,711 billion 5 3,319 billion 8 Brazil 1,130 billion 5 2,769 billion 4 6,103 billion 4 Source: Personally developed. Several of the more developed of the N countries, in particular Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea, were seen as the most likely contenders to the BRICs. Some other developing countries that have not yet reached the N-11 economic level, such as South Africa, aspired to BRIC status. T a b l e 4 Statistics on some categories inside the BRIC (ciphers bolded shown place) Categories Brazil Russia India China Area Population Population growth rate Labour force GDP (nominal) GDP (PPP) GDP (nominal) per capita GDP (PPP) per capita GDP (real) growth rate Human Development Index Exports Imports Current account balance Received FDI Foreign exchange reserves External debt Public dept Electrosity consumtpion Renevable electrosity source Number of mobile phones See note nr 19 above, page N - 11 The Next Eleven (known also by the numeronym N-11) are the eleven countries Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank and economist Jim O'Neill in a research paper as having a high potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, the world's largest economies in the 21st century 94

96 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Categories Brazil Russia India China Number of internet users Motor vehicle prodaction Military expenditures Active troops Rail network Road network Source: Personally developed Goldman Sachs did not argue that the BRICs would organise themselves into an economic bloc, or a formal trading association, as the European Union has done. 27 However, there are some indications that the four BRIC countries have been seeking to form a 'political club' or 'alliance', and thereby converting their growing economic power into greater geopolitical clout. 28 On 16 June 2009, the leaders of the BRIC countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, and issued a declaration calling for the establishment of an equitable, democratic and multipolar world order. Since then they have met in Brasília in 2010, met in Sanya in 2011 and in New Delhi, India in In recent years, the BRICs have received increasing scholarly attention. Brazilian political economist, Marcos Troyjo, and French investment banker, Christian Déséglise, founded the BRICLab at Columbia University, a Forum examining the strategic, political and economic consequences of the rise of BRIC countries, especially by analysing their projects for power, prosperity and prestige through graduate courses, special sessions with guest speakers, Executive Education programmes and annual conferences for policymakers, business and academic leaders, and students Brazil, Russia, India And China (BRIC). Investopedia. Archived from the original on 21 May Retrieved BRICs helped by Western finance crisis: Goldman. Reuters , Mortished, Carl ( ). Russia shows its political clout by hosting BRIC summit. The Times (London). Retrieved Halpin, Tony ( ). Brazil, Russia, India and China form bloc to challenge US dominance. The Times, 17 June Retrieved from us_and_americas/article ece

97 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI The ten largest economies in the world in 2050, measured in GDP T a b l e 5 Source: Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and N11 nations, 23 November In 2003 the BRIC thesis recognizes that Brazil, Russia, India and China 31 have changed their political systems to embrace global capitalism. Goldman Sachs predicts that China and India, respectively, will become the dominant global suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. Of the four countries, Brazil remains the only polity that has the capacity to continue all elements, meaning manufacturing, services, and resource supplying simultaneously. Cooperation is thus hypothesised to be a logical next step among the BRICs because Brazil and Russia together form the logical commodity suppliers. The Goldman Sachs global economics team released a follow-up report to its initial BRIC study in The report states that in BRIC nations, the number of people with an annual income over a threshold of $3,000 will double in number within three years and reach 800 million people within a decade. This predicts a massive rise in the size of the middle class in these nations. In 2025, it is calculated that the number of people in BRIC nations earning over $15,000 may reach over 200 million. This indicates that a huge pickup in demand will not be restricted to basic goods but impact higher-priced goods as well. According to the report, first China and then a decade later India will begin to dominate the world economy. A report from 2007 reveals updated projection figures attributed to the rising growth trends in India over the last four years. Goldman Sachs assert that India's influence on the world economy will be bigger and quicker than implied in our 31 Five Years of China's WTO Membership. EU and US Perspectives on China's Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Kluwer Law International, Volume 33, Number 3, pp , by Paolo Farah. 32 BRICs - Goldman Sachs Research Report

98 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT previously published BRICs research. India has 10 of the 30 fastest-growing urban areas in the world and, based on current trends, we estimate a massive 700 million people will move to cities by This will have significant implications for demand for urban infrastructure, real estate, and services. In the revised 2007 figures, based on increased and sustaining growth and more inflows into foreign direct investment, Goldman Sachs predicts that from 2007 to 2020, India's GDP per capita in US$ terms will quadruple, and that the Indian economy will surpass the United States (in US$) by At the same time, the report indicated that Russia, while continuing its dominance of the European energy market, would continue to struggle economically, as its population declines. Source: Personally developed. Picture nr 2.Gross Domestic Product per capita at 2012 According to a 2010 report from Goldman Sachs, China might surpass the US in equity market capitalisation terms by 2030 and become the single largest equity market in the world. 34 By 2020, America's GDP might be only slightly larger than China's GDP. Together, the four BRICs may account for 41% of the world's market capitalisation by 2030, the report said. 35 In late 2010, China surpassed Japan's GDP 33 Microsoft Word - Draft of Global Econ Paper No 152.doc (PDF). Retrieved _Final.pdf. 35 Goldman predicts: onwards and upwards for emerging markets, beyondbrics blog. Blogs.ft.com Retrieved

99 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI for the first time, with China's GDP standing at $5.88 trillion compared to Japan's $5.47 trillion. China thus became the world's second-largest economy after the United States. 36 Global domestic product in 2006 US% billions T a b l e 6 Rank % Country increase 1 China % 2 USA % 3 India % 4 Brazil % 5 Mexico % 6 Russia % Source: Develop their own. Based on a Forbes 37 report released in March 2011, the BRIC countries numbered 301 billionaires among their combined populations, exceeding the number of billionaires in Europe, which stood at 300 in According to The National Institute of Economic and Social Research 39 (NIESR) based on International Monetary Fund 40 figures, in 2012 Brazil became the sixth-biggest economy in the world by overtaking the UK with $2.52 trillion and $2.48 trillion, respectively. In 2010, the Brazilian economy was worth $2.09 trillion and the UK $2.25 trillion. This significant increase was caused by a Brazilian economic boom on high food and oil prices. 41 After Standard & Poor's (S&P) 42 cited that India's growth outlook could deteriorate if policymaking and governance don't improve, in June 2012 Fitch Ratings 43 cut its credit outlook to negative from stable and maintained its BBB- 36 Japan's Gross Domestic Product Fell 0.3% at Year's End /02/14/business/global/14yen.html?partner=rss&emc=rss. 37 Forbes is an American business magazine owned by Forbes, Inc. Published biweekly, it features original articles on finance, industry, investing, and marketing topics. Forbes also reports on related subjects such as technology, communications, science, and law. 38 BRICs becoming billionaire factory feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1GCKIXd3V. 39 The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) is an independent [1] research organisation located in the City of Westminster, London, England. 40 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that was initiated in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference and formally created in 1945 by 29 member countries. The IMF's stated goal was to assist in the reconstruction of the world's international payment system post World War II. 41 Brazil 'overtakes UK's economy'. BBC News. 6 March, Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC (S&P) is an American financial services company. It is a division of McGraw Hill Financial that publishes financial research and analysis on stocks and bonds. 43 Fitch Ratings Inc. is a jointly owned subsidiary of Hearst Corporation and FIMALAC SA. 98

100 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT rating, the lowest investment grade rating. A week before Fitch released the rating, S&P said India could become the first of the BRIC countries, to lose investmentgrade status. 44 Since the global recession started, in Q the economy of Brazil contracted by 0.5 percent from the previous quarter, representing the first contraction since Q For the year 2013, China surpassed $4 trillion of world trade for the first time and became the world's largest trading country, consisting of: export $2.21 trillion and import $1.95 trillion. While the U.S. for 11 months of 2013 had a world trade figure totalling $3.5 trillion and seemingly cannot beat China. China s world trade balance had a surplus of almost $260 billion in 2013, a 12.8 percent increase from last year. 46 Gross domestic product per capita (real) US% billions T a b l e 7 Rank 2050 Country % increase 12 China % 1 USA % 17 India % 11 Brazil % 7 Mexico % 4 Russia % Source: Personally developed. The economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India and China is such that they could become among the four most dominant economies by the year The thesis was proposed by Jim O'Neill, global economist at Goldman Sachs. 47 These countries encompass over 25% of the world's land mass and 40% of the world's population and hold a combined GDP (PPP) of 20 trillion dollars. On almost every scale, they would be the largest entity on the global stage. These four countries are among the biggest and fastest growing emerging markets.(incal 2011) 48 These countries have taken steps to increase political cooperation, mainly as a way of influencing the United States position on major trade accords, or, through the implicit threat of political cooperation, as a way of extracting political concessions from the United States, such as the proposed nuclear cooperation with India. 44 Fitch cuts India rating outlook to negative. Reuters. 18 June Brazil's economy experiences first contraction since December Angela Monaghan (10 January 2014). China surpasses US as world's largest trading nation. 47 Ask the expert: BRICs and investor strategy from the Financial Times, Monday : th International Conference on Aluminium - INCAL 2011 Held on 6th to 8 th December 2011 at Hyderabad 99

101 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI Creating a BRICS South Africa sought BRIC membership from 2009 and the process for formal admission began as early as August South Africa was officially admitted as a BRIC nation on 24 December 2010 after being invited by China and the other BRIC countries to join the group. 50 The capital S in BRICS stands for South Africa. President Jacob Zuma attended the BRICS summit in Sanya in April 2011 as a full member. South Africa stands in a unique position to influence African economic growth and investment. According to Jim O Neill of Goldman Sachs, who originally coined the term, states that Africa's combined current gross domestic product is reasonably similar to that of Brazil and Russia, and slightly above that of India 51. South Africa is a gateway to Southern Africa and Africa in general as the most developed African country. ]52 China is South Africa s largest trading partner, and India wants to increase commercial ties to Africa. South Africa is also Africa s largest economy, but as number 31 in global GDP economies it is far behind its new partners 53. Source: Reuters follow IMF, CIA, Factbook, Governments. Picture nr 3. BRICS map and nations comparison 49 BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard Foreign Policy Journal 2. Foreign Policy Journal. Retrieved See note nr 48 above, page By Jim O Neill ( ). How Africa can become the next Bric. FT.com. Retrieved South Africa Economy BRIC. Globalpost.com Retrieved See note nr 10 above, page

102 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT African credentials are important geopolitically, giving BRICS a four-continent breadth, influence and trade opportunities. 54 South Africa's addition is a deft political move that further enhances BRICS power and status. 55 In the original essay that coined the term, Goldman Sachs did not argue that the BRICs would organize themselves into an economic bloc or a formal trading association, which this move signifies. Source: Photo nr 1. The Fifth Summit of BRICS. Photo of Heads of States and Governments South Africa was subsequently successful in joining the bloc. This was despite economists at the Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, held on 6 7 December 2010, dismissing the prospects of South African success. 56] Jim O'Neill, for example, told the summit that South Africa, with a population of under 50 million people, was just too small an economy to join the BRIC ranks. 57 However, after the BRIC countries formed a political organisation among themselves, they later expanded to include South Africa, becoming the BRICS. 58 The Fifth BRICS Summit was held on 26,27 March 2013 in Durban, South Africa. The Summit, which brought together the heads of the emerging States of 54 BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard Foreign Policy Journal 2. Foreign Policy Journal. Retrieved See note nr 53 above, page Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, London and New York, 6-7 December Live.reuters.com. Retrieved Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, London and New York, 6 7 December New era as South Africa joins BRICS. SouthAfrica.info. Retrieved

103 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, took place for the first time on African soil. The leaders expressed their opinion on the theme of BRICS and Africa Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation. The objectives on the agenda were ambitious: promoting development and reforming multilateral institutions. The ethekwini Declaration 59 reaffirmed the group s commitment to promoting international law and multilateralism, as well as global stability, development and co-operation, based on an inclusive approach. The Summit brought together the leaders of countries that, together, account for more than 40 per cent of the global population, nearly 30 per cent of the land mass, and a share in world GDP (PPP) that has increased from 16 per cent in 2000 to nearly 25 per cent in Basic statistics data of BRICS T a b l e 8 Country / Statistics 102 Federal Republic of Brazil $ billion $ billion Russian Federation Republic of India People's Republic of China $ 11,316 Republic of South Africa Total 2012 GDP (PPP) $ $ $ $ billion billion billion billion GDP $ 1,850 $ 1,676 $ $ $ (nominal) billion billion billion billion billion Area km 2 km 2 km 2 km 2 km , Population , Military 33,143 90, ,107 47,735 billion expenditures billion billion billion 4,60 billion 342,34 billion % of GDP 1,5 % 4.4% 2.5% 2,1 % 1,3% Source: Personally developed. One of the main discussions during the Summit concerned the formal launch of the negotiations for the creation of a development bank, in order to finance infrastructures and industrialisation in BRICS and other developing countries, particularly on the African continent 61. This bank would serve as a financial institution aligned with the way emerging countries view development, but not really as a counterweight to the World Bank and the IMF. The leaders also decided to constitute a financial safety net by creating a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) 62 among BRICS countries, intended to anticipate short-term liquidity 59 Declaration which was taken during Fifth BRICS Summit 60 BRICS a force for world peace, says China. Business Day. 8 August Retrieved 9 November Mariam, Isa. BRICS Summit expected to establish development bank. Business Day. 22 March A Working Group was established to explore the feasibility of constituting a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) among BRICS members. At the Durban Summit, Leaders declared that they were of the view that the establishment of the CRA, with an initial size of US$ 100 billion is feasible and desirable; although, it would be subject to internal legal frameworks and appropriate safeguards.

104 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT pressures and strengthen financial stability. This contingency fund, with an initial size of 100 billion USD, as agreed by the member States, was not elaborated on further. Moreover, they signed co-operation agreements, including the Multilateral Agreement on Co-operation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development and the Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa 63. Economic data of BRICS T a b l e 9 Country Population GDP (nominal) HFCE Governme nt spending Exports Imports GDP per capita Literacy rate Life expectancy HDI Brazil Russia India 201,046,886 $ 2,695.9 billion 143,451,702 $ 2, ,210,193,422 billion $ 1,824.8 billion China 1,354,040,000 $ 8,227.0 billion South Africa 51,770,560 $ billion $ 1,266.3 billion $ billion $ billion $ 1,835.3 billion $ billion $ billion $ billion $ billion $ 2,031.0 billion $ billion $ billion $ billion $ billion $ 2,021.0 billion $ billion $ $ billion 13,623 $ $ billion 17, % (high) 99.6% (high) $ $ 3, % 64.2 billion $ 1,780.0 billion $ billion $ 9, % (medium).699 (medium).629 $ 11, % 51.2 (medium) Source: Economic data is sourced from the most recent IMF figures and given in US dollars. 64 The new Chinese President, Mr Xi Jinping, took part in the BRICS Summit which was his first major multilateral meeting, and which marked the beginning of a long African tour. Other African countries were also present, especially during the dialogue between the leaders of the BRICS and African countries on the 27 March. Among the Dialogue guests were the Presidents of the African Union (AU), the AU Commission and NEPAD 65, as well as various leaders representing 63 The BRICS Multilateral Cooperation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable Development sets out to explore the establishment of bilateral agreements aimed at establishing cooperation and co-financing arrangements, specifically around sustainable development and green economy elements. 64 World Economic Outlook. IMF. April 2013 data. Retrieved 17 April NEPAD -The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an African Union strategic framework for pan-african socio-economic development, is both a vision and a policy framework for Africa in the twenty-first century. NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded by African leaders, to address critical challenges facing the continent: poverty, development and Africa's marginalisation internationally. 103

105 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI regional economic communities. The Dialogue helped to open discussions between the BRICS members and other developing States and regional organisations. These discussions were preceded by business and academic forums able to create conditions for co-operation and business, according to Brazilian diplomacy. Concrete results stemmed from these discussions, such as the creation of the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Business Council. The forums, with the academic one in particular, aimed at formulating recommendations and a long term vision for the Summit of the Heads of States and Governments. The BRICS Academic Forum hosted by the Durban University of Technology (DUT), the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO), and Higher Education South Africa (HESA), contemplated increasing interactions in research circles and formulating recommendations to be presented to the leaders during the Summit of March Most participants were grouped into think tanks linked to the governments of the five countries and involved in formulating public policies. A smaller number of civil society organisations and other research institutions integrated the non-official delegations of these countries 66 The debates were organised into plenary sessions followed by parallel discussions on five themes: the role of the BRICS in the Global Economy, the Reform of Institutions of Global Governance, Co-operation in Africa, Education, Research and Skills Development for Building Industrialising Economies as well as the Peace and Security theme. The recommendations also representing the adopted themes include: 1. BRICS AND GLOBAL ECONOMY: The BRICS should facilitate better co-operation in the trade field, particularly goods and services. They should undertake discussions on the feasibility of setting up privileged commercial agreements among themselves, as well as reinforcing financial and development co-operation by establishing a BRICS development bank, and by creating mechanisms to manage the volatility of the global money market. 2. REFORM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS: The objectives of the group are to reform global multilateral institutions by making them more democratic, representative and accountable. As such, the BRICS should endeavour to make their voices heard and to promote the representation of emerging economies and developing countries in multilateral forums. The BRICS should actively explore innovative and complementary partnerships for an equitable and sustainable development. The creation of a parliamentarian forum could intensify political interaction. 3. CO-OPERATION with AFRICA: The BRICS should acknowledge the value of diversity and experience found in the separate and joint histories of their own countries and those of African countries. This should include looking for deep

106 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT co-operation with the African Union and taking into account African priorities, with regional integration in particular. 4. TRAINING, CARRYING OUT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPING SKILLS TO ELABORATE INDUSTRIALISED ECONOMIES: The BRICS should intensify their support for academic collaboration. This includes enhancing the status of local languages and cultural practices. The BRICS should consider creating an independent agency to rate schools and universities in their countries. Moreover, the Forum proposes the establishment of a primary data bank on the five countries, as well as a digital platform including detailed information on the researchers and institutions working on BRICS-related issues. Source: BRICS to mull development bank, forex reserve pool China Daily. Picture nr 3. 11BRICS Growth and GDP 5. PEACE AND SECURITY: The BRICS should continue to promote the importance of the United Nations, and be more active in promoting peaceful solutions in the case of conflicts. Shared safety preoccupations such as water, diet, the environment, health and preparedness to disasters must continue to be a focal point. The BRICS should also promote the peaceful use of space and use their relative power in post-conflict situations, under the aegis of the United Nations. 105

107 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI However, participants did not mention once any issues concerning, for example, the situation in Syria. Concretely, the meeting of the Think Tanks, which was held on the 8th and 9th of March 2013, decided to establish a BRICS Think Tanks Council with the intention of enhancing co-operation in research, knowledge-sharing, capacitybuilding and policy advice. This Council, made up of institutions leading the delegations, will be in charge of organising the next academic forums. All additional co-operation functions and methods were due to be elaborated on during a meeting held in October Conclusion The emerging countries that have gained coherence as a result of their increasing economic role in the global economy, particularly in terms of marketdriven changes, assume likewise a historical identity of being on the periphery of the Western world and are faced with problems of poverty, inequality and vulnerability. These countries demand status, recognition and the means to impact the international system by working through groups or alliances and/or through multilateral institutions. BRICS grouping is a result of this logic, having become a group of power rather than only an economic grouping, intending to influence and reform international architecture. Within the framework of its interaction with Africa, this power bloc is beginning to yield results, the most recent being the election of Brazilian national, Roberto Azevêdo, as the head of the World Trade Organisation (even though Azevêdo was not the candidate of the bloc at the beginning of the negotiations). Yet, unlike IBSA 67, which represents a slightly more homogeneous group, and which was already able to implement a greater number of concrete initiatives, the BRICS somewhat agree on a few guidelines for South-South co-operation 68 and for contributing to the African regional integration process. Besides, it adds major powers like China and Russia upon the configuration of the international system. This could be moved forward by implementing the development bank project, which is considered a means of advancing BRICS institutionalisation under a functional logic, although the negotiation process is on-going and vague. For the moment, efforts are focused on increasing interactions and knowledge on the different countries making up the BRICS. The Academic Forum initiated its closing session with a declaration from the head of the Russian delegation, Dr 67 See note nr 6 above, page South South Cooperation is a term historically used by policymakers and academics to describe the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries, also known as countries of the global South. 106

108 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Vyacheslay Nikonov, who summarised the status of the group: BRICS is now a reality, not a virtuality. We have become more and more real 69. The political and economic co-ordination prospects are under construction and, to date, advocate the flexibility and autonomy of each country, only advancing the issues under a functional basis and on which there is agreement. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the BRICS-members share the same views concerning several key aspects of the functioning of the present political and business systems and ways for their reformation: these countries unanimously confirm their devotion to the United Nations and support the idea of the restoration of the UN taking up a regulating role in the world; furthermore, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa propose to change the international financial system through different mechanisms, including diversification of the world basket of reserve currencies, revision of the basic principles of world trade and through finding solutions to the problem of food safety; besides this, the BRICS-members also continue to adhere to the policy of the minimum intervention in internal affairs of other states, and also express their concerns about the problems of energy security and the deterioration of the environment. As of now, the BRICS-members have achieved the greatest success in the sphere of the reformation of international financial and economic systems. It goes to show that such cooperation is very effective. In 2010, the consolidated GDP of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa accounted for almost a quarter of the world s GDP. More importantly, about 50 % of the world s GDP increased accounts for this group of countries, even in this difficult postcrisis period. It is estimated that the cooperation of the BRICS-members will assist in overcoming the global financial crisis and its consequences. With regard to political and economic spheres, it is important to notice that BRICS-members are active participants in the work of G-20, which promotes the establishment of a more democratic system of supervision of the global economy and the finance system. In particular, due to the joint efforts of these countries at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh (September 2009), in Toronto (June 2010) and in Seoul (November 2010) it became possible to take the decision on the redistribution of the 5% voices at the International Monetary Fund and 3% voices at the World Bank in favour of the developing states. As a result, the share of the emerging markets, along with the developing countries in the World Bank, has increased from % to %, whereas their share in the IMF has grown from 39.5 % to %. Moreover, China, Russia, Brazil and India turned out to be among the top-ten shareholders of the IMF. Another important fact about the BRICS-members is their valuable contribution to the strengthening of world security. The countries in this group are convinced that the formations of the multipolar, just and democratic world order are a necessity. States-participants of BRICS also share a commitment to the

109 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic methods, instead of use of military force. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa showed strong signs of cooperation during the sessions of the United Nations, in particular, in the work of the Security Council, where all the BRICSmembers are present this year. Such cooperation can be illustrated by an eloquent testimony: the countries took a common stand in the Security Council when the events in Cote d Ivoire, Sudan and Libya were submitted for consideration; the coauthorship of the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the nondeployment of any kind of weapon in space, the use of force or threat of the use of force in relation to space objects; and general approaches to many questions of the agenda of the UN Human Rights Council and ECOSOC 70. As a whole, it is possible to claim that BRICS is a reflection of the network multi-vector diplomacy when the countries interact and cooperate in order to reach their specified aims. Today, the main stimulus for the BRICS- members to cooperate is their mutual interest in achievement of their purposes that are defined by themselves as being vital. Their common purpose is to gain more weight in the world community in accordance with the emerging alignment of forces, and then to get access to the political and economic dividends. Crimea Crises, In Sanctions Aftermath Russia and China will move towards closer economic cooperation with Asia as a result of the West's sanctions and other anti-russian actions, according to a Reuters' analysis 71. Russia Today also reported on 21 March that Russia will look to other members of the BRICS group to which Russia and China belong, such as India and Brazil, for increased trade, energy, and military cooperation. Brazil's beef and agricultural exports to Russia could be increased to make up for reduced agricultural exports to Russia from Western Europe resulting from sanctions 72. The worse Russia's relations are with the West, the closer Russia will want to be to China. If China supports you, no one can say you're isolated, said Vasily Kashin, a China expert at the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) think thank. Reuters sees it likely that the huge natural gas deal between Russia and China that has been under discussion for a number of years will be signed during President Putin's May trip to Beijing The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) constitutes one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It is responsible for coordinating the economic, social and related work of 14 UN specialised agencies, their functional commissions and five regional commissions. 71 Reuters 22 March :56PM. 72 Russia Today 21 March Reuters 24 March :15 PM. 108

110 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT State-owned Russian gas firm GAZPROM hopes to pump 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year to China beginning in 2018, via the first pipeline between the world's largest producer of conventional gas to the largest consumer. The EU and Turkey took 182 bcm of gas from Russia last year. This year China overtook Germany as Russia's biggest buyer of crude oil, thanks to ROSNIEFT, Russia's biggest oil company, securing deals to boost eastward oil supplies via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline and another crossing Kazakhstan. Reuters also points out that Igor Sechin, the head of ROSNIEFT, was in Tokyo when he said that If Europe and the United States isolate Russia, Moscow will look East for new business, energy deals, military contracts and political alliances 74. Japan, which has supported the West verbally over the Crimea, but has refrained from sanctions, is dependent on Russian gas to replace energy lost from the closing of the Japanese nuclear sector. Sechin also included India, Vietnam, and South Korea on his Asia trip. Russian relations with India are also good. In a speech earlier this week, Putin took time to thank one other country for its understanding over Ukraine and Crimea, saying India had shown restraint and objectivity 75 On 19 March, he called Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss the crisis, suggesting there is room for Russia's ties to flourish with traditionally non-aligned India. Putin's moves to assert Russian control over Crimea were seen very favourably in the Indian establishment, N. Ram, publisher of The Hindu 76 newspaper, told Reuters. Russia has legitimate interests, he added. Bibliography Soule-Kohndou, F Le role des Forums IBAS et BRICS dans la diplomatie d émergent de l Inde. 12ème Congrès Association Française de Sciences Politiques. 9 Juillet Paris. Hirst, M Emerging powers and global governance. DF. Access 01/06/2013 Soule-Kohndou, F Le role des Forums IBAS et BRICS dans la diplomatie d émergent de l Inde. 12ème Congrès Association Française de Sciences Politiques. 9 Juillet Paris. Fourcade, M., The material and symbolic construction of the BRICs: Reflections inspired by the RIPE Special Issue. Review of International Political Economy 20, Rosnieft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin has told to the media after attending the Japan- Russia investment forum in Tokyo 19 March (Reuters / Toru Hanai) 75 Vladimir Radyuhin 26 March 2014 Warn of painful sanctions on economy if Moscow escalates situation. 76 The Hindu, U.S., allies ask Russia to change course 26 March

111 JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI BRICS, 2012, The BRICS Report: a study of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with special focus on synergies and complementarities, OUP India, 21 June Jayan, P.A., BRICS: Advancing Cooperation and Strengthening Regionalism. India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 68, ethekwini Declaration, 20/05/2013 RFI, 2013, Sommet des BRICS: une nouvelle «ruée vers l Afrique»?, 20/05/2013 Le Monde, 2013, Chinafrique, les questions qui dérangent, 20/05/2013 Boillot Jean-Joseph, La montée de la Chindiafrique and le pionnier du développement A. O. Hirschman, Revue Tiers Monde, 2011/4 n 208, p DOI : /rtm Lafargue François, L Afrique du Sud et la Chine. Un mariage de raison?, Afrique contemporaine, 2012/2 n 242, p Eyben, R., Savage, L., Emerging and Submerging Powers: Imagined Geographies in the New Development Partnership at the Busan Fourth High Level Forum. Journal of Development Studies 49, Elder, Miriam, and Leahy, Joe, et al., Who's who: Bric leaders take their place at the top table, Financial Times, London, September 25, 2008 Firzli, M. Nicolas, Forecasting the Future: The BRICs and the China Model, JTW/ USAK Research Center, Mar Kateb, Alexandre, Les nouvelles puissances mondiales. Pourquoi les BRIC changent le monde (The new global powers. Why the BRIC change the world) (in French), Paris : Ellipses, 2011, 272 p. ISBN O'Neill, Jim, BRICs could point the way out of the Economic Mire, Financial Times, London, September 23, 2008, p. 28. Mark Kobayashi-Hillary, 'Building a Future with BRICs: The Next Decade for Offshoring' (Nov 2007). ISBN James D. Sidaway (2012) 'Geographies of Development: New Maps, New Visions?', The Professional Geographer, 64:1, J. Vercueil, Les pays émergents. Brésil-Russie-Inde-Chine... Mutations économiques et nouveaux défis (Emerging Countries. Brazil - Russia - India - China... Economic Transformations and new Challenges) (in French), Paris : Bréal, 2010, 207 p. ISBN Paulo Borba Casella, BRIC : Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud - A l'heure d'un nouvel ordre juridique international, éd. A.Pedone, Paris, Sept. 2011, EAN ISBN : SAFPI, 2013, BRICS Academic Forum: speech by SA Foreign Minister, 20/05/2013 Hurrel, 2012, Récits d émergence : la fin du Tiers Monde?, Critique internationale 2012/3 (N 56) 110

112 BRICS A SECURITY S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Lafargue François, L Afrique du Sud et la Chine. Un mariage de raison?, Afrique contemporaine, 2012/2 n 242, p Laïdi Zaki, Les BRICS : un cartel d ambitions souverainistes, Le Débat, 2011/5 n 167, p Vieira de Jesus, 2013, Os principais pontos na agenda da Cúpula de Durban, BRICS Policy Center, 20/05/2013. Other sources The BRICS Post News website with a focus on the BRICS. BRICS Information Centre. University of Toronto. Retrieved 29 June BRIC(S) nations have become growth markets for the world economy and are no longer emerging markets. China Daily. 13 April Retrieved 17 June BRICS flame continues to shine. Indrus.in. 29 February Retrieved 17 June Goldman's O'Neill: Time to move beyond BRICs. MarketWatch.com. 21 November Retrieved 17 June United States should learn from emerging powers such as India and Brazil in the economic arena. Reuters. 14 October Retrieved 17 June BRICS Multi-format Cooperation. Russian Business Council for Cooperation with India Retrieved 17 June James D. Sidaway (2012) 'Geographies of Development: New Maps, New Visions?', The Professional Geographer, 64:1, Retrieved 8 August

113 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 4(93) ISSN SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, APRIL 29, 2013 Lt. Col. Sławomir IWANOWSKI, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract On 29th April, 2013, was published a new French White Paper on Defence and National Security 1. This numbering 160 pages document assumes, among others, further modernization of the country s defence and security (with the sustainable adaptation of measures for appointed tasks), development of the national defence industry within the framework set by France; the goal is to return to sustainable public finances and it indicates the course that French armed forces should take over the next twelve years, this is until the year Furthermore, it serves as the basis for preparing the Act on Programming Spending on Defence (the name in original, French language - LPM Loi de programmation militaire means the Law of Military Programming ) for years In addition to determining financial frames, the currant White Paper (as the previous ones) serves one more, very important function, namely, it is a tool allowing familiarizing citizens with the strategy for defence and national security as well as gaining their support 4. Key words: France, white paper, strategy Currently, the publishing of the White Paper is also a consequence of updating the challenges, threads and priorities of France, adjusted to the dynamism of the globalising world and a revision of the policy objectives on security and defence in the regular (in connection to the Act on Planning Spending on Defence), five-year intervals. On the other hand, it takes a long-time fifteen-yearperspective of time - with the task of defining priorities and operational frameworks and measures that will permanently ensure the safety of France 5. 1 See the French White Paper on Defence and National Security, [in:] seetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf (accessed: 21 October, 2013). 2 (accessed: 25October, 2013). 3 J-Y Le Drian, 2013, France Will Maintain the Best Army of Europe, the interview led by. A. Barluet, V. Guillermard, the Le Figaro, 26 November. 4 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the French White Paper on Defence and Security 2013: a State of Outskirts of Europe as One of the Poles of the World Order, the National Security, a Quarterly of the National Security Bureau, Issue 27, III , page 72, [in:] (accessed: 22December, 2013). 5 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit. Page

114 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY Thus, together with the Act on Planning Spending on Defence, it appoints the strategy for defence and national security of France for the coming years 6. The previous edition of the White Paper on Defence and National Security 7 was published in It referred mainly to challenges and threads of the then contemporary security environment and most importantly, unlike previous such type of documents (the White Paper on Defence of 1994 and the first White Paper of 1972), it was embracing the national security in a comprehensive manner (going for the first time outside military defence as the topic), and therefore one in which it is shaped by a number of entities (and not only by the armed forces). However, the previous White Papers either adjusted the strategy for the security of France to the security environment at the end of the last century (the document from 1994 created an adoption of French strategy for changes, that had occurred in the nineteen nineties, after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Pact and included entirely issues on defence without the national security 8 ), or they included the strategy for the security of that State, after it had left, in 1966, the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance in a situation of dividing the world into opposing military and political blocks, underlining the meaning of the nuclear deterrence (the document of 1972) 9. According to the White Paper of 2008, the main factor influencing the security of France was globalization and the rapidly progressing exchange of information, and the possibility for people s fast allocation as well as economical and political conditions 10. The event which meant that the new document had begun to be thought of (besides the presidential election) was the financial crisis, which highlighted the kind of economic dimension of the national security, highlighting the fact that keeping the balance of public finances has a direct impact on the State s independence, because it can cause a limitation of freedom for the benefit of creditors 11. In 2012, Mr. François Hollande, when starting his 6 In the long term perspective, a fifteen year period is taken into consideration, but announced periodically, every five year revision has, as a task, to fit the strategy to the changing international situation, see B. Marcinkowska, the White Paper on Defense and National Security of 2013, an Announcement of Changes in the Strategy for Security of France?, the Bulletin of the Analytical Centre for International Initiatives, Issue No 2/2013, pages 15-25, [in:] (accessed: 27October, 2013). 7 The White Paper on Defence and National Security, [in:] defenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index. html (accessed: 20August, 2011). 8 J. Gryz, the French White Paper Defence and National Security, [in:] The International Security Yearbook 2009/2010, the College of International Relations and Social Communication in Chełm, Poland, page 1, [in:] upload/wydawnictwo/rbm/rbm_artykuly/2010_7.pdf (accessed: 28 October, 2013). 9 W. Kozicki, the Reforms of Armed Forces of France [in:] The National Security, a Quarterly of the National Security Bureau, Issue No 19, III , page 242, [in:] (accessed: 20 October, 2013). 10 Therein. 11 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit. page

115 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI presidential term, announced that the new international situation requires a redefinition of the policy for the security and defence of France, so that is why actions were taken in order to publish the new White Paper. The edition of 2013 indicates that in the world, in which there are still existing old threats, but also all sorts of new challenges and threats, the strategic autonomy in the area of defence and security is necessary for national independence; it ensures the protection of French citizens, also enabling (with fulfilling international obligations) a collective security of Europe and the Allies of France. According to French politicians Europe can fulfil its obligations only on the condition that it will achieve a strategic autonomy. The point is not in agreeing on weakening the Atlantic Alliance by a so-called drift of continents, but to make the EU a fully law-obedient partner for the United States in constructing the security on our continent 12. The conception assumes, among other things, to possess - at the national or European level - a full range of equipment suited to satisfying all the needs of the entire range, stemming out of the most likely scenarios of response to any types of threads. Therefore, it excludes any deficiencies in this regard, which literally would mean dependence, for instance on the USA 13. So possessing (at the national and European level) a wide range of equipment (among others things: autonomous measures of assessing the situation, both satellite and by intelligence), which would satisfy all needs coming out of the most likely scenarios of responding to threads, France and other countries will become lawful owners, and not only users of the measures serving for constructing of European security. The strategic autonomy itself is based on maintaining the potential of the modern defensive industry, which would be capable of integrating within the high-tech string at a time when none of the European states is able on its own to provide for itself a full range of defence capabilities. Cooperation in the implementation of the Projects of Tomorrow among European states equipped with tools such as the European Defence Agency and the Joint Organization for Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), allows optimizing costs through sustainable technological partnerships, giving also a guarantee for being their rightful owners. That is why what is so important is, in this context, is the consolidation of the industrial base and technology, in order to preserve the potential of Europe s defence industry and the possessing of advanced technological knowledge as well as a large network of entities of different sizes 14. The main objective of the White Paper of 2013 is the consistency of effort for the security and defence with the priority of the reconstruction of the sustainability of public finances 15. In the preface, the French President stressed that the challenges and risk phrases, which were identified in the last White Paper, are currently not sufficient, as a result of significant events that have occurred since 12 P. Buhler, 2013, We Count on Ourselves (Counting on Each Other), the interview led by J. Dudek, the Wyborcza Gazette, 7 November, page Therein. 14 Therein. 15 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit. page

116 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 2008, both in Europe and in the world 16. The most important ones can include, for example, the financial crisis (2007) and the progressive economic and financial integration of the European Union, a review of strategic priorities of the United States, and the so-called the Asian Option of the USA, being a direct consequence of the need for reductions in spending on defence, changing the balance of power in the world (in this context, attention on growing power of China is drawn), the conflict in Georgia (2008), the Arab Spring of Nations (2010) and the uncertainty as to which way the development of the political situation in the region is going to go. The earlier White Paper did not recognize the situation in the world as being more dangerous, but as less predictable or stable. The main dangers to the security of France, but also to the whole European Union arose, among others, from regions and countries covered by the conflict (Middle East, Asia), and the greatest threats were: terrorism, ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, cyber attacks and threats to health (pandemic) and environmental ecology, exacerbated by the degradation of the biosphere 17. In both publications, fears can be found that France does not exclude a possibility that its territory may be attacked, so it takes into account the participation in a war of a wider range in cooperation with European countries and (or) other Allies 18. Nevertheless, current threats showed that the formation of the ring of stable and friendly countries around the borders of the European Union (which was the main objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy) is difficult to achieve. Therefore, it has become a necessity to define new threats in a globalizing world and setting targets for security and defence policy as well as to identify military capabilities. Thus, the need has been revealed for a redefinition (adapting to the new situation) of the security strategy, which would be an answer to these significant changes that have occurred within the five years since the publication of the previous White Paper. The White Paper of 29 th April, 2013, like its predecessor from 2008, was prepared by a team of experts, which was appointed by the President of France by decree. Nevertheless, in contrast to the earlier one, the new document is the result of discussions conducted by a commission composed of both parliamentarians and members of government, and for the first time, with European partners, that is independent foreign experts from the UK and Germany 19. This was to ensure a more European, common look at the issue of safety The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013, Preface by the President of the Republic, page 7, [in:] (accessed: 29 October, 2013). 17 W. Kozicki, the Reform, op. cit., page W. Kozicki, the Reform of Armed Forces of France, [in:] The National Security No.19, III , page 242 [in:] ; The French White Paper on Defence and the National Security, gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf (accessed: 21 October, 2013). 19 The Commission started its work in the summer of 2012, and finished it after almost six months. 20 The French White Paper on Defence and National Security , [in:] sgdsn.gouv.fr/site_article130.html, (accessed: 21 October, 2013). 115

117 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI The current edition of the White Paper contains an introduction, preceded by a foreword by the President, seven chapters, summarizing conclusions and annexes 21. The foreword highlights three priorities for the security strategy of France, being somewhat a keynote of the White Paper : protection, deterrence and intervention 22. Together with the introduction, it contains explanations of motives behind the creation of the new strategy in terms of marking changes in the closer and more distant surroundings of France 23. In the first chapter France in the New Strategic Landscape, the role and position of France in the international arena is highlighted. At the beginning, there is a provision that in the current geo-political situation, France is not threatened by a conventional, direct attack on its territory, and thanks to, among others, its unique location (the centre of the European Union) and the current situation (peace and stability) on the European continent, rather far from a threat of the outbreak crises and conflicts known in the recent past. The French Republic is defined as a European power of global reach. Attention is drawn to the fact that, although the French population is less than 1% of the remaining population of the world, the French economy is the fifth largest among the largest economies in the world 24. In addition, it is stressed that despite the increase in the number of developing countries, France remains the fifth largest global exporter of goods 25. Emphasis is placed on the position and the importance of France as a member of international organizations (the UN, NATO, EU), increasing both its safety and imposing responsibility for the security of others (it should continue to play an active role in preventing or alleviating crisis, as in the past during interventions in Lebanon, Libya, Mali and Côte d'ivoire/ivory Coast) 26. In the second chapter, entitled the Foundations of the Strategy for Defence and National Security, fundamentals of the French strategy are presented. These are the State s sovereignty and legitimacy of its actions (a requirement for the legal basis of conduct in the international arena, as well as national). It was stressed that the State s sovereignty is based on independence (autonomy) in decision making and action 27. It is also noted that, in the international environment, the decisions and actions of the State must comply with the law 28. Maintaining its self-reliance and independence, and by ensuring the safe impact on a wider, international scale 21 The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. pages The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page Other remaining strategic functions, i.e. knowledge and foreseeing (anticipatory), and prevention have also got their reflection in the White Paper of 2013, and will be presented in the later section. 24 Taking into account the nominal Gross Domestic Product, (GDP). 25 The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page B. Marcinkowska, the White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013 an Announcement, op. cit., page The White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page J. Pawełek-Mendez, The White Paper..., op. cit., page

118 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY is for France, in this context, extremely important 29. Thus, France is actively involved in ensuring international security, by taking action legitimized internationally and at the national level. Though the priority should be understood as the involvement of France in missions conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance and by the European Union, which contributes to improving the level of safety in the world (Mali, Afghanistan, Ivory Coast and Libya) 30. Similarly, in the preface we can read that France has decided to maintain its defence capabilities at a level enabling independent initiatives to a danger 31. Thus, it retains its sovereignty by providing the means to enable action and impact on the development of the international situation. In that chapter, there were also present references to the impact that the economic and financial situations have on the State s sovereignty. In this context, it is also referred to a guarantee for the security of information systems. There is also a statement that the state of sovereignty is not given for ever, so France has been working for ages on its construction and maintenance, also through participation in many regional and international organizations. In contrast, the nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of the State s sovereignty 32. So, a necessity to posses the full independence is stressed, which must ensure certain abilities to assess a situation (among others: by means of the aforementioned autonomous measures of assessing the situation, especially intelligence), taking decision and commencing any action. France, in accordance with the concept of strategic autonomy, is ready to share, with their partners from the European Union, these capabilities, because better coordination in their acquisition at the European level, will allow to avoid the duplicating of efforts and preventing the formation of capability gaps. Some records included in this chapter indicate also that France is looking for a balance between maintaining its full sovereignty and deepening cooperation with its closest partners and developing the European Culture of Defence 33. That is why the European Union, which is crucial in terms of political and economic future of the country, is the cornerstone of the security of France (though, the UN and NATO are the main guarantors of its security and defence) 34. The third chapter of the White Paper of 2013 contains an analysis of the strategic environment, and the main threat to the security of the State (Table 1) B. Marcinkowska, the White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013 an Announcement, op. cit., page B. Marcinkowska, the White Paper of 2013 Redefinition of Security Strategy of France, [in:] (accessed: 28 December, 2013). 31 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page See also. M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, the Minister of Defece, the Speech to Commanders of the Military School, Monday, 29 April 2013, page 7, [in:] / /file/DISCOURS%20DU%20MINISTRE%20AUX%20COMMANDEURS%20LE %20LUNDI%2029%20AVRIL%202013%20A%20L-ECOLE%20MILITAIRE.pdf (access: 20 November 2013). 117

119 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI As in the previous White Paper, globalization is mentioned here as the main factor causing changes in the strategic environment of France. The new document confirms its importance, while pointing to the violent and unexpected changes in the situation and enhancing a sense of uncertainty of the changes that have occurred since then 36. Threads resulting from globalization 37 Threads related to the use of force Risks, dangers and challenges to the security of France T a b l e 1 economic and financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe; so-called the Arab Awakening, increase instability in the Middle East (a civil war in Syria, the lack of progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict); reorientation of the strategic priorities of the United States ( U.S. Asian Option ); crises in the European Union (crisis in the euro zone, negligible economic growth, the aging of the population); vague rules, unsuitable for the contemporary threats, constituting the basis of the international order. the threat of an outbreak of a conventional conflict on areas politically unstable (source: the radicalization of national feeling that, as a result of frustration or a sense of historical injustice, can lead to the escalation of patriotism into nationalism, especially in politically unstable countries, i.e. areas of the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China Seas, Kashmir and Afghanistan); increase the economic power of Asian countries (with the absence of stability in the region); increase in military spending in some regions of the world (Asia, Russia); increase in the military power of the Russian Federation (return to a policy of force); threat to the energy security of Europe (Russia's ambitions towards establishing a monopoly in the supply of energy resources); the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Middle East countries, North Korea and Iran); nuclear programs of some countries; strengthening the nuclear-missile capacity of certain countries; threat of the usage of chemical and biological weapons in the future; development of offensive cyber capabilities by some countries. Weaknesses emerging threads Weak States (unstable, failed, unable to maintaining their own security) the Sahel countries 38, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan; organized crime; smuggling; terrorism; civil wars (the Sahel countries). 36 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page Being a major factor of changes in the strategic environment of France. 38 The geographic region in Africa covering an area along southern edges of the Sahara and northern margins of the Sudan (that is, from Senegal to Somalia, through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, the Sudan and Eritrea). 118

120 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY Threads of the strength of the impact intensified by globalization economic (the result of a deepening in international economic dependence, and fighting for the economic precedence/leadership); cell phone (which can be used, for example, to initiate an explosive or to purchase armaments); arms trade; media coverage of terrorist activities - the mass media; Internet - recruitment to terrorist organizations; geographical spread of terrorism, particularly to the territories of weak states (countries of the Sahel and the Sahara, North of Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the area of Afghanistan and Pakistan); cyber terrorism; threat of aggression in space; natural disasters, pandemic/health and technology; environmental hazards. Source: Own calculations on the basis of the French White Paper on Defence and National Security, April 29, The hazard analysis contained in the third chapter of the White Paper, is reflected in the presentation of the five main strategic priorities of France (referring to these threats), shown in the next chapter (the fourth one) 39. Priorities are ranked hierarchically in terms of the importance of the essential security interests of the State. Their presentation, with the reference to the reflecting, potential risks, is presented in Table 2. Strategic priorities of France. T a b l e 2 No. Priorities Threads 1. Protecting the territory possibility of the attack on French territory as a result of the of the State and citizens of France and guaranteeing the continuity of basic functions of the State rapid deterioration of the international situation; main threat to security - terrorism (potential use of nuclear weapons, biological, chemical or radioactive materials); cyber attacks that could cripple the functioning of the State (and thus constitute an act of war); organized crime; theft of intellectual property, scientific and technical one; natural disasters, sanitary, technological, industrial or accidental cases; related to the protection of the French overseas territories (3 million citizens, rich deposits of natural resources, the spaceport in French Guiana), and their interests on the Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia), on the Indian Ocean (the islands of La Reunion and Mayetta); attacks on French citizens residing abroad (sudden evacuation of people from areas at risk). 2. Common (with partners and allies): ensuring the security of Europe and the North-Atlantic space risks that relate to France, mostly, they also apply to its allies in the EU and NATO. They are such as previously mentioned 39 The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. pages

121 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI No. Priorities Threads 3. Common (with partners and allies): stabilization of Asia; Europe s closer surroundings Participation in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf 5. Contributing to ensuring peace in the world the EU's eastern neighbourhood: political instability, Europe's dependence on energy from Russia, the Caucasus and Central Mediterranean area: political instability in countries belonging to the Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Turkey), the risk to strategic security of supplies of energy sources, terrorism, smuggling, security for French citizens holding dual citizenship, French investments in the region; areas of priority concern for the safety of France (countries of the Sahel, Mauritania, Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) - the loss of this space can be a strategic threat of the first order for Europe (example - Mali): the instability of regions, the lack of the capacity of the authorities to control their own territory may result in a collapsed state, the development of criminal and terrorist groups, illegal arms flows and drugs, conflicts, terrorism, security of French citizens holding dual citizenship. conflict in the region with global repercussions ( Iran to pursue nuclear weapons); instability in the region; threat to energy security (the transit of oil from the Persian Gulf). area of the Indian Ocean and Asia: the instability of countries and regions (tensions), high probability of a conflict arising, terrorism; piracy; proliferation of nuclear weapons; energy security; natural disasters. Source: Own calculations on the basis of the French White Paper on Defence and National Security, April 29, The fifth chapter, concerning the involvement of France in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union (benefits and liabilities), tells of the fact that the security policy of France is embedded into the framework of these organizations. It is the result of three dimensions: the sovereignty of the decision, full involvement in NATO and an ambitious approach to the European Union 41. After France s returning in 2009 to NATO's integrated command structure, the organizationaccording to the French people - should ensure them collective defence, secondlybe an instrument of the transatlantic strategic partnership and thirdly- provide a framework for military action in the event of a common response to security threats. France wants to strengthen the Alliance; the priority for that in the coming 40 The priority for France in this range, according to the White Paper is the security of all the neighbouring countries, see the French White Paper on Defenceand National Security, [in:] page 53, (accessed: 21 October, 2013). 41 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper..., op. cit., page

122 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY years will be to adapt attempts to reform NATO's command structure to potential operations, and actions to improve the management of common funds targeted for projects that will bring benefit to all allies (in the industrial field, a task of the Smart Defence has to be the promotion of programs proposed by the European Union s military industry) 42. On the other hand, it is emphasized that the European Union is not a competition for the North Atlantic Alliance. Subsequent chapters of the White Paper - the sixth one: ( Implementing the Strategy - the Main Vectors of its Implementation ), and the seventh one: ( The Resources Required to Implement the Strategy - the means of achieving the strategy for security and defence of France) focus on the practical aspect of the implementation of the security and defence strategies. The chapter on the implementation of the security and defence strategies of France, like the earlier document (of 2008), in addition to strategic risk analysis presents also the doctrine of French defence policy, basing it on the five main strategic functions: knowledge and prediction (anticipatory), nuclear deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention. Some of them due to changes in the security environment that have occurred since publication of the previous White Paper are detailed, but nevertheless, the main assumptions of this policy remained unchanged. In the White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2008, it is clearly shown that a departure from understanding the security only through the lens of the military aspect. There is a blurring of the boundary between concepts of defence and security which was, among other things, a change in the nature of the international security environment, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, The publication was kind of a response to the challenges of globalization, especially in the situation of increasing the importance of non-state actors in the international arena 43. This new approach to the evaluation of the security policy resulting from changes in the security environment, created a redefinition of the main strategic functions 44. The national security task was to adopt a holistic approach in the identification of threats and answering them, using five strategic functions: knowledge and foreseeing (anticipation), prevention, nuclear deterrence, safety and intervention 45. According to the White Paper of 2008, the objective of the first function - knowledge and prediction - was to adapt the ability of the security and defence system to the contemporary challenges. The unpredictability of more and more 42 Therein, page The White Paper, 2008: the Context, the Minister of Defence, [in:] gouv.fr/portail-defense/enjeux2/politique-de-defense/livre-blanc-2008/contexte, (accessed: 02 October, 2013). 44 D. Jankowski, the Note on the White Paper on Defence and National Security of the Republic of France, the National Security Bureau, Department of Strategic Analyses, Warsaw, 27 January 2011, [in:] (accessed: 27October, 2013). 45 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page

123 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI emerging crisis meant that the concept of national sovereignty, in the case of asymmetric threats, such as terrorism, has taken on a completely different meaning 46. Therefore, according to the experts appointed to work on the White Paper, the shape of French defence and national security must be a function of the estimated needs in this area, and not the result of habits or preconceptions estimated in advance 47. This pillar, by the fact that, in reality, it limited the role of the national policy of nuclear deterrence (the sole purpose of nuclear deterrence is to prevent aggression originating from a state against the vital interests of the French Republic) was a major innovation of the White Paper. Its efficiency affects five factors: the special services, the chain of command at all levels, diplomacy, the analysis of changes in the international environment (perspective forecasting), and information management. Similarly, in the current White Paper the function knowledge and predicting (anticipatory), relating primarily to the actions of intelligence services and strategic forecasting, stems from a need for an ability to self-assess a situation as a condition of taking independent decisions, both political and operational or economic 48. The second strategic function (according to the White Paper of 2008), - prevention - results from the belief that one of the best ways to ensure security of the state, in the face of the risk of conflict or crisis, is to prevent their occurrence by early response to their symptoms. So it embraces the other tools, not included in the first pillar, necessary to prevent crises. The national security based on the preventive strategy, besides diplomatic measures, included also the economic, financial, military, and legal ones 49. In the present White Paper, it is emphasized that this function includes activities both on the territory of the State as well as beyond it. Its practical implementation is to take control of sensitive technologies, among other things, through the development of national (and international) standards in the field of natural (and technological) hazards, counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in the fight against smuggling and demilitarization and the strengthening of peace 50. In practice, the function of prevention should include measures to prevent the deepening of internal conflicts (strategy of strengthening peace) in unstable regions of the world, aiming to restore order in countries in crisis situations. Therefore, the primary task in this area is focusing efforts on the restraint of the fully-fledged authority of a certain state (e.g. conducting elections) and supporting it in controlling its own territory. Preventive actions, according to the authors of the White Paper, must be conducted in a spirit of a global approach and coordinated within the framework of international organizations (the UN, D. Jankowski, the Note on the White Paper,op. cit. page J. Gryz, the French White Paper - Defence, op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. page J. Gryz, the French White Paper - Defence, op. cit., page J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page 93.

124 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY EU). This should include development aid, as well as military, police, judicial and administrative ones. To have the actual ability in the implementation of this function, it is assumed that forces dedicated to France are distributed in one (or two) sea areas, at the base in the United Arab Emirates and at several bases in Africa, where they are equipped with a flexible rapid response capability. They will be cooperating with African forces, so that they can, in a higher degree, take responsibility for their own safety 51. According to the White Paper of 2008, the third strategic function - nuclear deterrence although it created an essential part of the strategy of France (having a purely defensive character and being one ensuring the strategic autonomy of the State) lost its importance in comparison with the previous White Paper. This stemmed from the conviction that the new challenges and threats in the field of security require a more flexible approach to security policy, where diplomacy should play a major role 52. On the other hand, although the French atomic weapons were to in future remain under the exclusive control of the State (as well as an industrial and technological base), it was regarded to be possible for the inclusion of the French nuclear arsenal in the deterrence system of NATO and the EU 53. Also, the present White Paper defines the nuclear deterrence as a strictly defensive means (the final guarantee of the safety, security and independence of the French nation), which could be used only for the purpose of necessary selfdefence and then in a situation of critical danger. The document stresses that the French nuclear deterrence, held at the level of strict sufficiency is a contribution to the security of NATO 54. The fourth strategic function (according to the White Paper of 2008) - protection is related to the ability of revitalization (restoration of forces and means) structures of the State (the public authority and society) and restoring their normal functioning (despite the state of emergency), after the intended aggression (an attack) on the territory of France or in the event of crisis on a large scale. This feature was another key change in the White Paper as that based on a flexible approach to the issue of security and defence, it assumed the combined use and coordination of civilian and military resources in strengthening the ability to recreate, which was in fact one of the fundamental principles of the new strategy 55. The protective function, according to the White Paper of 2013, is to give a guarantee for the integrity of the territory and the defence (and security) of French citizens (including those living in other countries) against all types of threats, and similarly, as it was outlined in the document from 2003, it is realized 51 Therein, page D. Jankowski, the Note on the White Paper, op. cit., page J. Gryz, the French White Paper - Defence, op. cit., page J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page D. Jankowski, the Note on the White Paper,op. cit., page 2; J. Gryz, the French White Paper - Defence, op. cit., page

125 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI both by civilian resources, and military, including the territorial administration 56. The new document states that in relation to the Treaty Clause of Solidarity, its implementation can also include the territories of the European Union 57. The implementation of this function enforces the continuous monitoring of the security situation both in the closer environment (proximity of Europe), as well as the further one (security of citizens residing outside of France). Therefore, it has a direct relationship both with the function to know and predict (anticipate) and intervene, its practical dimension is to prepare for a possible intervention in emergency situations (preparation of action plans), as well as providing the means to carry out the operation to protect the territory or citizens 58. Lastly, the fifth function - intervention - described by the White Paper of 2008 resulted from the ability of France to prevent conflicts and it assumed a possibility to conduct operations outside the Country. This document defined a set of rules of intervention of the French forces abroad, noting that the decisive factor to intervene (regardless of whether it is a national or collective assessment), will be the risk assessment of peace and national security (or international), and the assurance that it will be applied in accordance with the letter of international law 59. The White Paper of 2013 confirms the possibility of the intervention of the French armed forces (in operations conducted alone or in coalition - as the leading State or supporting) outside the Country s borders, in order to meet international obligations and to ensure the protection and safety of its citizens, as well as protecting the strategic interests of France (protecting the interests of allies is also mentioned) 60. The foundation of this kind of commitment is the principle of strategic autonomy, which gives the right to take a sovereign decision to initiate interventions, and by requiring that France has its own military capabilities, allows also its implementation. Seventh, the last chapter of the White Paper of 2013, presents the ways and means (from the practical and financial dimension) of implementing the strategy for security and defence of France. As mentioned at the beginning, on the basis of assumptions set out in the White Paper, a perennial Act on Military Programs is being developed (the current one covers the years ) 61. And although the previous White Paper assumed to stabilize the defence spending, as a result of the economic crisis, in order to restore the sustainability of public finances, the future spending in this area has been reduced. Therefore, it has been determined, that in 56 The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. Page J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper, op. cit., page Therein. 59 D. Jankowski, the Note on the White Paper, op. cit., page 2; J. Gryz, the French White Paper - Defence, op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit. pages

126 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY the years , it will amount to 364 billion euros, in the period covered by the Act on Military Programs ( ) billion 62. In connection with such financial constraints, in the White Paper inline with the four principles, there was presented a new approach to the implementation of the military involvement strategy. The first principle concerns the previously described strategic autonomy. The second principle refers to the consistency of the model of the armed forces with potential scenarios to commit the forces. The third principle relates to the behaviour of various types of forces capable of carrying out strategic functions at a level enabling them to take part in the operations of various types. Finally, the fourth principle implies the need to look for opportunities to share placed at the disposal capacities (and the solidarity of their use) and the means of defence, also with European partners (pooling and sharing) 63. The White Paper also specifies the future format of the armed forces and the so-called the Operating Contract, i.e. a set of their tasks to be performed, resulting from the strategic functions of the defence policy and the security of France 64. And so, under the protective function, it could be possible for the involvement of up to 10 thousand soldiers of the land forces and the appropriate means of sea and air forces, supplemented by cyber defence capabilities. The preventive function would be performed by the forces deployed in military bases and at sea, in the United Arab Emirates and Africa. The feature know and predict (anticipate) will be filled by ensuring by the 5 thousand soldiers on standby, and appropriate measures (including unmanned aircrafts) capable within 7 days of deploying up to 3 thousand km from the French territory, or a base located outside its borders (until the time that an immediate action is to be carried out by the Air Force) 65. If there is a need to participate in the long-term operations (France has the opportunity to engage in a maximum of three such ongoing operations at the same time); it will be possible to use for this forces creating an equivalent of a common army brigade (6-7 thousand soldiers), supplemented by special forces troops, naval forces and to select about 12 combat aircraft 66. If there would occur a need to separate the military potential to participate in a larger operation with a high intensity using special forces, then it was predicted the selection of about 15 thousand soldiers (two common military brigades of land forces), up to 45 combat aircrafts (in the naval aviation) and an impingement of marine clusters (consisting of an aircraft carrier or universal amphibious onshore landing ships, 62 The Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence, the White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013 [in:] 20blanc%20-Dossier%20th%C3%A9matique.pdf, page 41 (accessed: 25October, 2013). 63 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper..., op. cit., page Therein. 65 The Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence..., op. cit., page The French White Paper on Defence..., op. cit., page

127 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI together with associated vessels, such as frigates, a pulsed nuclear submarine and maritime patrol aircrafts 67. The new model of the army presented in the time horizon up until 2025 in the White Paper gives a priority to the development of reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities (including analysis of information and its dissemination) 68. Equally with a priority, a development of cyber capabilities (defensive and offensive) will be treated. A quantitative strengthening and retrofitting in the most modern measures for Special Forces commanding is also announced. The number of ground forces is to be formed at a level of 66 thousand soldiers (7 common military brigades). They may be equipped with 200 heavy tanks, 250 medium tanks, 2.7 thousand multi-role armoured vehicles, 140 reconnaissance and assault helicopters, 115 multi-role helicopters and about 30 tactical unmanned aerial vehicles 69. Naval forces as one of the two (apart from the Air Force) components equipped with a means dedicated to nuclear deterrence (4 submarines equipped with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads) will also have: an aircraft carrier, six hunting submarines (nuclear powered), 3 universal onshore landing ships, 21 frigates, 15 patrol ships, 6 light frigates and marine patrol aviation, as well as measures to combat mines 70. The potential of the Air Force, the third kind of the armed forces of France, is to be in the future: 225 combat aircrafts (including the marine aviation), about 50 transporting planes, 7 planes for early detection and warning, 12 multi-role aircrafts for air-to-air refuelling, 12 reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft for the operational level, as well as light reconnaissance aircrafts and 8 air-defence systems and anti medium-range missiles systems 71. Regarding the gendarmerie, in the future, it has to have abilities maintained at the current level. The White Paper also mentions the military health service, which will have to undergo a reform in order to use the possibility of complementing the public service 72. The White Paper foresees a future reduction, in the years , in the number of military and civilian personnel, of 24 thousand (there is still neededadded to that- 10 thousand of the planned reduction, by 54 thousand in the years ) The Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence..., op. cit., pages J. Pawełek-Mendez, the White Paper..., op. cit., page The French Army in the Perspective of 2020, [in:] infographie/2013/04/29/l-armee-francaise-a-l-horizon-2020_ _ html (accessed: 27 October, 2013). 70 J. Pawełek-Mendez, the Wite Paper..., op. cit., page The Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence..., op. cit., page Therein. 73 L.Watanabe, the France s New Strategy: The 2013 White Paper, CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 139, September 2013, page 3, [in:] Analysis-139-EN2.pdf (accessed: 29October, 2013). 126

128 THE FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY The French White Paper on Defence and Security is a document which, on one hand presents the main strategic directions and assumptions of the State s defence policy (including the protective and preventive potential, as well as the condition of the armed forces), on the other hand- through specific provisions on the armaments or the number of military personnel- it very precisely defines measures that are intended to defend the country, and the amount of the budget. This is an excellent example of an overall approach to the issue of the policy for defence and security and the combining of the strategy with measures for its implementation in a coherent context of the State s policy, also in the budgetary dimension. The records contained therein, as already mentioned, are the starting point to develop a multi-year bill for military programs. In view of the fact that, as it is repeatedly emphasized in the White Paper, France is a country with ambitions not only regional but also global (resulting, among other things, from its status in the United Nations and its participation and position in the structures of the European Union and NATO), it focuses its activities not only on the immediate neighbourhood, but also on other regions of the world, relevant to its interests. This is, however, due to its geographical conditions: having overseas territories and departments, as well as several million citizens living around the world, France feels also responsible for those distant neighbourhoods. The intervention in Mali is somewhat a confirmation of its traditional ambition to play a role as one of the leaders in global security policy, as well as of a willingness to be militarily involved in the regions where it has its vital interests 74. The document also strongly emphasizes the importance which France assigns to the European cooperation including, among other things, defining strategic priorities, developing interoperability, and the emergency management and retrieval of joint technological capabilities (and industrial) 75. Therefore, seeing the strategic opportunity to strengthen Europe against other rising powers (including military ones), it declares the active participation in constructing the European dimension of policy for security and defence. On the other hand, it seems that the effects of the crisis, that affected the announced reduction of defence capabilities, while a desire to maintain strategic ambitions, means that France is becoming more and more pragmatic in its cooperation, seeking more tangible military benefits (for example, selecting initiatives that will help to fill in the gaps in its military potential, or give benefits to the defence industry) rather than strictly political initiatives P. Elman, M. Terlikowski, the Ambitions to Measure the Crisis? The Security Policy of France in the Coming Years, the Bulletin of the Institute of International Affairs (PISM), No. 8 (984), 25January, 2013, page 1, [in:] 75 Therein, page P.Elman, M.Terlikowski, the Ambitions, op. cit., page

129 SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI In the new White Paper, the key threats are set out (both for the State and for the region). There is no doubt that the political context is different than the one in But the threats and challenges are mostly not new (the document refers mainly to those defined in 2008). Thus, it appears that the level of changes in the current document is not as significant as in the way of redefining the strategy in previous years. Therefore, the present White Paper is rather fitting the priorities of the foreign policy and the State s security to the conditions currently prevailing in the international arena than their significant redefinition. 128

130 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM ISSN NATIONAL SECURITY AND STATE DEFENCE STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF DEFENCE TASKS Marian KULICZKOWSKI, Ph.D., Eng. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The global security environment is characterised by the long-lasting situation of low the probability of the outbreak of an armed conflict on a large scale and the simultaneously observed increased possibility of local conflicts. Also there have been noticed significant changes in a typical course of an armed conflict. The dynamic phase of combat activities is shorter and the post-conflict stage of stabilisation and rebuilding activities becomes longer. Tasks connected with the state s defences and the preparation of the population and public property for war are the responsibility of all the public authorities and administration bodies as well as business leaders; social organisations and citizens (individuals) - in the scope defined in the laws. The basis for the state s defence preparations in the national security system in the course of integration are the defence needs and the defence tasks arising from them. In the current legal circumstances, defence tasks are considered equivalent with tasks connected with the general defence obligation or with the tasks performed as part of the state s defence preparations, carried out in times of peace; in the case of an external threat to the state s security and in times of war. The objective scope of these tasks, fulfilled by all subjects of the state defence system, is extremely extensive. This study aims to systematize the subject matter of the state defence preparations in the national security system from the point of view of the classification of defence task types and their description. Key words national security system, state defence system, state defence preparations, defence planning, defence tasks 129

131 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI Introduction the notion and nature of defence tasks The basis of state defence preparations in the national security system in the course of integration are the defence needs and the defence tasks arising from them. The scope of these tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations, by all subjects of the state defence system, is extremely extensive. It is based on many sources of law, as well as the administrative decisions of the authorised public administration bodies. In order to properly understand the state defence preparations, from the point of view of defence tasks, it is important to define the notion of defence tasks, determine their nature and provide their classification. The term defence tasks, used in applicable laws, regulations and planning documents, is defined differently, depending on the scope of a legal act or a planning document, which leads to ambiguity concerning its understanding. The analysis of professional literature and legal acts in force connected with this issue shows distinct contradictions in this respect. It seems very difficult or even impossible to find an unambiguous definition of defence tasks, used both in theory and in practice. In some legal acts the term defence tasks is equated with tasks connected with the general defence obligation, and in others with the tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations 1. An appropriate definition of defence tasks, taking into consideration the fact that they constitute a part of tasks from the scope of national security, can be found in the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland in the following wording: Defence tasks, as a part of tasks from the scope of national security, cover activities carried out by the executive branch of the government and other state authorities and institutions, entrepreneurs and citizens connected with: the preparation of the state for efficient functioning and survival in the case of an external threat, crisis or war, carrying out particular operational undertakings in these conditions, as well as the elimination of the effects of the obviated threat in order to restore the normal functioning of the state 2. The objective and subjective scope of defence tasks is a part of the field of state defence preparations described in the regulations of the Act on General Defence Obligations of the Republic of Poland of 21 November The scope of defence tasks, contained in the mentioned field, carried out by the state defence system 1 Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, Wyd. AON no AON 6181/13, Warsaw 2013, p Cf. Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Sector strategy of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 23 December 2009, point Cf. The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 1967 (JoL of 2012, item 461 with subsequent amendments). Article 6(1) of the Act lists the tasks of the Council of Ministers, performed in order to ensure the external security of the state and general management in the field of state defence. The relevant regulation can be found in executory orders to Article 6 (2). 130

132 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM bodies, covers in particular 4 : defence planning, including operational planning and programming; preparing the national security management system, including the state defence; maintaining constant state defence readiness and creating conditions to improve it, including the organisation of the fixed duties system; the economy mobilization; creating and maintaining strategic reserves; preparing transport and national transport infrastructure for the defence needs; preparing and using medical units for the state defence needs; preparing and using communications systems for the state defence needs; preparing for military use the organisational units performing defence tasks; preparing for the special protection of buildings; tasks performed for the Polish Armed Forces and the allied troops, as well as organising defence training and controlling the fulfilment of defence tasks. In order to systemize and define the types of defence tasks it is necessary to classify them, which is of significant importance for the description of these tasks. Classification of defence tasks by type and the accomplishment stage 5 After the analysis of the professional literature and having conducted research concerning the nature and scope of defence tasks, they have been classified with regard to the type, aim and accomplishment stage. The classification by type is a basic division of defence tasks. The classification, presented in the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, concerning the defence tasks performed by the state defence structures, in accordance with this criterion, differentiates their following types: tasks in the scope of state defence management; military tasks and non-military defence tasks. The classification of the defence tasks of the state defence system in accordance with the criterion of type is presented in figure 1. The above mentioned defence tasks include undertakings carried out by all subjects of the state defence system by the Polish Armed Forces as well as by the executive branch of the government, other state bodies and institutions, business leaders and citizens. Defence tasks in the sphere of the state defence management these concern ensuring optimal conditions for efficient decision making as well as the constant and long-lasting coordination of activities by the public authority and administration bodies of all levels, as well as the commanding bodies of the Polish Armed Forces, during peace and especially in times of war. 4 Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce, Wyd. AON no AON 6181/13, Warsaw 2013, p The presented classification of defence tasks was based on the author's study contained in the scientific research study. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Klasyfikacja zadań obronnych oraz ich charakterystyka [in:] Przygotowania ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów administracji publicznej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, scientific research study under the scientific supervision of J. Wojnarowski, Wyd. AON, Code: II , no S/8349,Warsaw 2012, p

133 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI DEFENCE TASKS OF THE STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM Defence tasks in the sphere of state defence management Military defence tasks Protection of the state independence and ensuring the security and inviolability of its borders Participation in the international stabilisation process as well as the crisis response and humanitarian operations Non-military defence tasks Supporting internal security and providing assistance for the society (przeciwstawienie się agresji) General tasks of preparatory character Diplomatic Information Economic and defence Protective Source: Own work on the basis of the Defence Strategy the Republic of Poland, op. cit., chapter III and IV. Figure 1. Classification of defence tasks of the state defence system by type Military defence tasks - are performed by the Polish Armed Forces in order to maintain readiness to conduct three types of missions: 1) guaranteeing the state s defence and opposing aggression - the Polish Armed Forces maintain readiness to carry out tasks connected with: the defence and protection of the inviolability of the Polish borders; participation in anti-terrorist activity in the country and outside Poland s borders; participation in solving local or regional military conflicts on or outside the territory of NATO responsibility as well as participation in defence operations outside the country according to obligations of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and also conducting strategic defence operations on the territory of the Republic of Poland. 2) participating in the process of stabilising the international situation as well as crisis response and humanitarian operations this requires the Polish Armed Forces maintaining the power and capability to realise tasks connected with: participation in peace and crisis response operations conducted by NATO, the EU, and the UN, as well as other operations resulting from international agreements; participation in humanitarian operations conducted by international, nongovernmental and other organisations, and also military cooperation in the field of the development and usage of means of building trust and security. 132

134 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 3) supporting internal security and providing assistance for society - the Polish Armed Forces maintain the capability to perform tasks consisting of: monitoring and protecting the air space as well as supporting the protection of the land border and territorial waters; conducting reconnaissance and intelligence activity; monitoring radioactive, chemical and biological contamination on the territory of the state; clearing the land from explosive materials and dangerous objects of a military origin; conducting search and rescue activities; assisting the state authorities, public administration and the society in responding to threats. It needs to be emphasised that military defence tasks have been thoroughly analysed and subject to multifaceted research. On this basis, the needs of the Polish Armed Forces have been defined, including the mobilization needs of military units connected with personnel and material reserves. They are prepared by non-military subjects of the state defence system, as part of defence tasks carried out for the Polish Armed Forces. Defence tasks performed by the non-military structures of the state defence system include the above discussed defence tasks accomplished in the area of the state defence management, and also 6 : General tasks of a preparatory character allowing to create organisational conditions for the functioning of the non-military structures in particular cases of state defence readiness and in the case of alerts. Diplomatic tasks aiming at minimising the risk of a threat to basic national interests and principles of foreign and security policy, and also at providing diplomatic support in times of armed conflict and in the course of containing such conflict. Information tasks helping to protect and promote Polish interests, limiting the enemy's access to information, reinforcing the willpower, morale, defence determination and perseverance of the society. Economic and defence tasks aim to ensure a material basis for the accomplishment of defence tasks, such as: maintaining the production and renovation capacity to carry out tasks resulting from the Economy Mobilization Program; preparing for production and services, as well as the accomplishment of tasks included in the Economy Mobilization Program; creating and maintaining the reserves; preparing transport for the needs of the state defence; preparing for activity in the situation of limited supplies; using personal and material benefits; maintaining the strategic reserves; accelerating the realization of investments of strategic importance; introducing limitations in communications; reconstructing destroyed infrastructure; ensuring supplies of equipment, materials and protective means for civil defence; monitoring the economic potential in the field of industry, agriculture, communications, transportation, power industry and forestry. Protective tasks aim at ensuring the efficient functioning of the state as well as the meeting and protecting the population's basic existential needs. They constitute 6 Cf.: Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, point

135 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI a very important part of defence tasks performed by all subjects of the state defence system and include protective tasks connected with the efficient functioning of the state as well as tasks connected with the meeting and protecting of the population's existential needs 7. Classification of defence tasks by aim and accomplishment stage The classification of defence tasks by aim and accomplishment stage covers the following tasks: preparatory; intervention (operational, response) and rebuilding (restoring peace) 8. The classification of the defence tasks of the state defence system by this criterion is presented in figure 2. DEFENCE TASKS OF THE STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM ] Preparatory Intervention (operational, response) Rebuilding (restoring peace) Source: Own work on the basis of W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych [in:] M. Kuliczkowski (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne, op. cit., p. 18. Figure 2. Classification of defence tasks of the state defence systems by aim and accomplishment stage Preparatory tasks, understood as a part of defence tasks performed in times of normal functioning of the state (the lack of real threats) which aim to prepare the state, public authority bodies, armed forces, fire service, services, inspection and other state institutions, the national economy, material and cultural goods and the whole society to function and (or) survive in the case of an external threat to the state security, crisis or war 9, constitute a detailed specification of general tasks of a preparatory character discussed earlier among defence tasks classified by type. 7 The analysis of defence tasks in the subjective and objective scope as well as the types and description of defence tasks have been presented in the research work. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania ochronno-obronne państwa w kontekście zadań obronnych, [in:] Przygotowania ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, p Cf. W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych [in:] M. Kuliczkowski (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne, p Ibidem, p

136 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM Whereas, new types of defence tasks, in accordance with the criterion of the aim and accomplishment stage are operational and rebuilding (restoring peace) tasks: Operational tasks are a part of defence tasks performed in the case of an external threat to the state security and in times of war 10. It needs to be noticed that in the face of the lack of a uniform (universal) definition of defence tasks the presented definition of operational tasks may cause some interpretation problems. Due to that reason, operational tasks are understood as distinguished, in accordance with a particular aim of an activity and expressed as operational plans, part of defence tasks carried out by particular subjects of the state's law, in the scope of their statutory competence, in the case of an external threat to the state's security (and its symptoms), crisis and war, aiming at: preventing the existing threat or its symptoms, preparing to remove it in accordance with the assessment of the situation, and providing the necessary response 11. The presented notion, without changing the essence of the legal definition, specifies this part of defence tasks more precisely. The character of operational tasks has been defined in the prescriptive documents which establish the rules of operational planning. They can be divided into: general tasks performed in the government administration offices and other state organisational units; technical tasks carried out in particular departments of the government administration by ministers and the subordinate central government administration bodies; technical tasks carried out by central offices supervised by the Prime Minister and tasks performed in provinces 12. Operational tasks accomplished by the state administration and entrepreneurs are of a confidential character and due to formal reasons cannot be the subject of a detailed analysis in this study. Rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) constitute the part of defence tasks which are performed by particular subjects of the state's law, in the scope of their statutory competence, after a threat has been removed, aiming at eliminating its consequences and restoring the normal functioning of the state. Taking the above into consideration, it should be noticed that the field which integrates the state defence preparations system, including the determination of defence tasks, is defence planning, understood as the entirety of undertakings aiming at ensuring the framework for the activity which enables the harmonisation of allied planning with national planning with reference to particular planning fields/disciplines 13. Defence planning (operational planning and defence programming) 14 constitutes the basic tool for carrying out the state defence policy 10 Cf. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning, 2, point Cf. W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań..., p Cf. The defence standard. State defence system, defence plans, classification (NO-02-A060). 13 Cf. Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Wyd. AON, 2008, p Defence planning - deals with the ways of performing defence tasks by the government administration and local government bodies as well as the use for that purpose of necessary powers 135

137 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI in the scope of the preparation, maintenance and development of its defence potential and the preparation of the Polish Armed Forces, government administration and local government bodies to act in the case of an external threat and in times of war. Its essence is to determine the defence tasks and the ways the government administration bodies performing them, including local government bodies and business leaders as well as the use for that purpose of necessary powers and measures. Within the framework of defence planning there are defined preparatory defence tasks and intervention tasks (operational, response). There are not, however, any rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) envisages aiming at restoring the state of the normal functioning of the state 15 after a political and military crisis has been dealt with. 136 Description of preparatory, intervention and rebuilding tasks Preparatory tasks are realised in times of peace, as part of defence preparations, by all subjects of the state defence system in order to ensure the efficient functioning of the state in the case of political and military threats 16. It needs to be emphasised that state defence preparations are conducted in two interdependent fields (spheres): the creative area and the completion area. The creative sphere is manifested, on the one hand, in the development of the rules, assumptions and aims of the defence policy (security policy), and on the other hand, in carrying out the defence policy in the form of defence programmes. The sphere of completion is mainly manifested in translating defence programmes into executive defence plans 17. This is why, it is crucial for the defence preparation process and the tasks and measures, including operational planning and defence programming; Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of planning and financing of tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations by government administration and local government bodies (JoL of 2004 no 152, item 1599, with subsequent amendments), 2 point 6. Operational planning - deals with establishing the activities connected with the preparation and activity of the government administration and local government bodies in the case of an external threat to the state security and in times of war, presented in the form of operational task sets and also the determination of powers and measures necessary to perform them. Ibidem, 2 point 7. Defence programming deals with establishing defence tasks performed in times of peace, for a ten-year planning period which starts in an odd year, presented in the form of material and financial undertakings, in order to maintain and develop the state defence potential and prepare the Polish Armed Forces, government administration and local government bodies to act in the case of an external threat to the state security and in times of war, and also designing budgetary resources destined for that goal. Ibidem, 2 point Normal state the state of peacetime when there are no significant threats to the state's external security author's footnote. 16 The objective and subjective scope of the state defence preparations and the fundamental areas of these preparations are defined in the monograph. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce, p Cf. M. Sułek, Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, BELLONA, Warsaw 2008, p. 5.

138 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM undertaken in this respect by the state to be sufficiently planned and sent to appropriate entities participating in its completion. The objective scope of preparatory tasks includes mainly: defence planning; defence budgeting 18 ; defence education, including patriotic and defence education; teaching in the framework of the education system and teaching in universities; defence training; scientific research and the widely understood fulfilment of the general defence obligation 19. Whereas, the objective scope of preparatory tasks defined in the defence programming documents concerns material and financial undertakings, such as 20 : the maintenance and improvement of the non-military state structures, concerning in particular: the preparation of the management system, including investments or constructions, reconstructions, renovation and equipping management stations; programming economic mobilization; fulfilling the needs of the Polish Armed Forces and allied troops; militarisation, including the preparation for militarisation of organisational units performing tasks especially important for the state defence or security; the preparation of the defence of buildings especially important for the state security and defence, as well as the organisation of defence training and control over the performance of defence tasks; the improvement of the civil defence, concerning: managing the civil defence; stocking and maintaining equipment destined for the needs of the civil defence and the maintenance of the civil defence equipment warehouses; the organisation of the collective and individual protection of the population, including the maintenance of protective buildings, the construction and maintenance of emergency drinking water intakes; the evacuation of people and securing logistic and medical resources for the injured; information and education activity in the scope of population self-defence as well as training in the field of civil defence 18 Within the framework of defence programming and budgeting there are undertaken, among other things, material and financial enterprises listed in: the Programme of Non-military Defence Preparations of the Republic of Poland and the Economy Mobilization Programme which concern, among other things, the maintenance and improvement of the non-military structures of the state defence system as well as supplies and renovation of weaponry and military equipment for: the Polish Armed Forces and allied troops, performing joint defence tasks on the territory of the Republic of Poland, the organisational units of the Internal Security Agency, and also the organisational units supervised by and subordinate to the minister competent in the internal affairs and the Minister of Justice. Ibidem, In accordance with the general defence obligation, Polish citizens are obliged to: do military service, perform obligations resulting from crisis and mobilization assignments, perform work in accordance with employee mobilization assignments, serve in the civil defence, be educated in the field of security, participate in the population self-defence, participate in exercises in the units destined for militarisation and serve in militarized units, render services for defence purposes - on the basis of and in the scope defined by law. Cf. the Act of the General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland., Article 4(a) (1). 20 Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of planning and financing of tasks, op. cit.,

139 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI with the participation of the civil defence formations in national and international exercises; the creating, storing and maintenance of strategic reserves in case of a threat to the state's security and defence, to the public security, order and health and in case of a natural disaster or a crisis situation, in order to support the completion of tasks connected with the state's security and defence, reconstructing the critical infrastructure, reducing the disruptions in the continuity of supplies which ensure the functioning of the economy and the fulfilment of citizens' basic needs, rescuing their life and health and also meeting the international obligations of the Republic of Poland 21. It needs to be emphasised that what is of key importance for the existence of the whole state defence system are preparatory tasks connected with the broadly defined state mobilization. Mobilization preparations of the elements of the state defence system are the sine qua non condition of the purposefulness of existence of the whole defence system 22. It concerns also tasks performed as part of economic and defence preparations which aim to create conditions for the efficient adjustment of the economy to fulfil the material defence needs of the state, and in particular to: ensure optimal conditions to maintain and train the armed forces in times of peace and the preparation of the base for the army to carry out its tasks in the case of a threat to the state's security and in times of war, and also to create the conditions for the population's survival in extreme circumstances 23. Taking the above into consideration, in times of peace, when there are no significant external threats to the state security, the objective scope of preparatory defence tasks consists of undertaking of two types of strategic activities: maintaining efficiency and improving SOPs, integrated with the ally security system and shaping the international environment so as to strengthen the state's defence 24. In order to maintain efficiency and improve SOPs tasks are performed connected with the state defence preparations which include in particular: making analyses and assessments of challenges and threats to international and national security; uncovering and neutralising intelligence activity against the state's defence and security; defence planning which includes operational planning and defence programming; improving joint (national and ally) procedures of conduct in crisis situations and in times of war; increasing the Polish Armed Forces capability to react fast to a direct threat to the state's security, including increasing their ability to conduct independent activities; maintaining and improving the integrated system of national security management, including the state's defence; maintaining the capability to introduce, in accordance with the scale and character 21 Cf. the Strategic Reserves Act of 29 October 2010 (JoL of 2010 no 229, item 1496 with subsequent amendments), Article Cf. M. Sułek, Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, p Ibidem, p Cf. Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, chapter

140 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM of a threat, the state defence readiness alert; ensuring conditions to welcome on its territory the Allied Augmentation Forces by performing tasks resulting from the obligations of the host nation (HNS); maintaining the readiness to perform production and service tasks defined in the Economy Mobilization Programme (EMP); maintaining the necessary level of strategic and personnel reserves for the needs of state defence and security; and the expansion and maintenance of the defence infrastructure, as well as education in the field of defence and the patriotic education of the society. In order to shape the international environment with the purpose of strengthening the state's defence there are tasks performed that aim at: ensuring the strong international position of Poland and the possibility of the effective promotion of Polish interests on the international arena; strengthening the control mechanisms in the field of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dual use materials and technologies, and in the area of arms control; participating in activities for the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights as well as for the allotment and maintenance of powers and resources to participate in allied crisis response operations, humanitarian operations and search and rescue operations, and also in possible coalition and national operations, as well as active influence on potential sources of threats connected with global terrorism by way of conducting preventive foreign missions as well as engaging in social and economic policy, including the readiness to participate in anti-terrorist activities. Intervention, response tasks (executive tasks of an operational character) constitute a part of defence tasks which are carried out in the situation of an external threat to the state security and in times of war 25. It needs to be emphasised that they are performed by public administration and business leaders, are of a confidential character and due to formal reasons cannot be the object of a detailed analysis in this study. On the basis of the conducted research and available sources of law, it can be established what these operational tasks apply to. They are the tasks defined in the operational task sets 26 for: ministers; central government administration bodies and organisational units subordinate to and supervised by the Prime Minister and provincial governors (wojewoda) - on the basis of the operational tasks accomplishment tables which constitute a fundamental part of the extract from the 25 Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning, 2, point Operational task set should be understood as systematized operational tasks to be performed by a particular minister at the head of a department of the government administration, a central government administration body, provincial governors, managers of organisational units subordinate to or supervised by the Prime Minister or a minister, or a defined group of these entities, assisted by subordinate and supervised organisational units, and in the case of provincial governors also with the assistance of province marshals, starosts, presidents, commune heads and mayors as well as organisational units created by local government units Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning, op. cit., 2, point

141 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland 27 and are sent to these institutions by the Minister of National Defence. These tables include: the general task sets dealing with the preparation of public administration bodies, state organisational units' managers and business leaders to perform particular operational tasks connected with the high-defence readiness of the state; the task sets for the government administration departments, the task sets for central offices supervised by the Prime Minister, and also the task sets carried out in provinces (województwo) 28. Rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) constitute the part of defence tasks which is performed by particular subjects of the state's law, in the scope of their statutory competence, after a threat (a political or military crisis) has been obviated, aiming at eliminating its effects and restoring the normal functioning of the state. In professional literature, the period of restoring the normal functioning of the state after a crisis has been obviated is called demilitarization, understood as all the enterprises connected with the transition of the state and armed forces from the state of war to the state of peace; the opposite of mobilization. In the military understanding, demobilization consists of dissolving units which are not useful during peace; the sale or destruction of redundant war materials and arms and the transition to the peace-time recruitment and training of troops 29. The issue of the demilitarization of the state, including rebuilding tasks, has not so far been a subject of dedicated research and studies. Few existing studies concern solely the demobilization of the armed forces 30. The author of this study has tried to establish the objective and subjective scope of the rebuilding tasks and their description in the research study, financed from the funds of the National Centre for Research and Development 31. The description of rebuilding tasks presented below is a part of the research conducted by the author in the scope of the above mentioned project Ibidem, 2, point Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce, p Cf. Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, p Cf. Study of the General Staff of the Republic of Poland, Przejście Sił Zbrojnych ze struktury organizacyjnej czasu W na strukturę organizacyjną czasu P (Demobilizacja), J. Małolepszy (scientific editing), Scientific and research studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II item 2.10; J. Krzemiński, Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych. Doctoral thesis, AON, Warsaw 2001 and Z. Piątek (scientific editing), Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych. Scientific and research study, AON, Warsaw The project concerned The National Security System of the Republic of Poland, project reg. no: O ROB/0076/03/001 Project manager: Prof. Waldemar KITLER, PhD, Eng. The contractor of the project is the scientific and industrial consortium: National Security Faculty of the National Defence University; Asseco Poland S.A.; Police Academy in Szczytno; Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities and the Main School of Fire Service. 32 Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Charakterystyka zadań obronnych (zapobiegawcze, interwencyjne i odbudowy) realizowanych przez podmioty systemu obronnego państwa [in:] Ocena (diagnoza) formalno-prawnych podstaw i stanu organizacji bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP w aspekcie spełniania funkcji jednolitego i zintegrowanego systemu organizacyjnego i funkcjonalnego. 140

142 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM Rebuilding tasks, in their objective scope, cover all the enterprises connected with the transition of the state and armed forces from the state of war to peacetime, performed as part of demilitarization. Being the opposite of state mobilization, demobilization is based on two fundamental pillars: the demobilization of the Armed Forces and economic demilitarization. The demobilization of the Armed Forces, is understood as disarmament, that is: bringing the army from a state of war to the state of peace; the dissolution and abolition of strictly military formations and consequent discharges (moving to the reserve) of some soldiers on active duty, as well as the return of equipment (machines, vehicles) taken from the national economy, and also the transition to the peace-time system of the recruitment and training of troops 33. Economic demilitarization deals with restoring the relations created by war to the peacetime norms, and in particular: cancelling military supply contracts, readjusting production to the needs of the civil economy and also ensuring work places for discharged soldiers. In this period, what is a great challenge is the need to meet the existential needs of the population and its spiritual disarmament by calming down hostile moods created during the war 34. The demilitarization of the national economy is connected with a fundamental change of the structure of production and methods of managing the economic life. In the social and psychological meaning, demilitarization consists of the changing of moods caused by war and adjusting the society's psyche to peaceful work. From the point of view of legal relations, demilitarization means the cessation of military courts' competence in the field of common offences committed by soldiers on duty and offences not connected with the military service 35. In the process of demilitarization, that is restoring the normal functioning of the state after a political and military crisis has been obviated, what needs to be taken into consideration are the needs of the national economy in the scope of securing its functioning in respect of professional personnel, transportation and material means. At the same time, what needs to be taken into consideration is the problem concerning the fact that the demobilization of the armed forces will be inseparably connected with the demilitarization of the national economy. Due to that reason the following enterprises will have to be undertaken: developing necessary programme documents and a legal basis; introducing peaceful social and economic relations; changing the state's life governing methods; abolishing the war time legal and organisational restrictions; terminating contracts for war supplies and readjusting the industry to the peacetime needs, and also ensuring work places also for discharged soldiers. The fundamental objective scope of the enterprises undertaken as part of state demilitarization is presented in figure 3. Podzadanie badawcze System obronny państwa. Code: SBN RP Team manager Jan Wojnarowski, AON 2013, p Encyklopedia Powszechna, Wydawnictwa Gutenberga, Warsaw 1994, p Ibidem, p Cf.: Leksykon wiedzy wojskowej, Wyd. MON, Warsaw 1978, p

143 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI The result of the presented list of the main problems which require solving after the end of a political and military crisis are particular reconstruction tasks performed as part of the process of restoring the state's normal functioning. This process needs to take place on the basis of a decision of the state authorities and public administration and with their participation, in accordance with the current legal situation. It should define the objective scope of the rebuilding tasks (restring the normal state functioning) for those bodies, taking into consideration the conclusions resulting from the activities connected with repelling military aggression. The objective scope of rebuilding tasks, completed by the public authority and administration bodies, includes in particular: medical, psychological and social assistance for victims of military aggression; restoring the functioning of public utility facilities and necessary critical infrastructure, as well as restoring the full efficiency of information circulation and the full efficiency of the rescue forces which have suffered losses as a result of military activity. S T A T E D E M O B I L I Z A T I O N - restoring normal state functioning after armed conflicts ARMED FORCES DEMOBILIZATION NATIONAL ECONOMY DEMILITARIZATION 1. Legal basis for the armed forces demobilization. 1. Legal basis for demilitarization. 2. Armed forces demobilization plan. 2. NE demilitarization plan. 3. Determining demobilization spots. 3. Eliminating war time legal and organisational restrictions. 4. Register of personnel subject to discharge. 4. Changing the state life governing methods. 5. Structural demobilization. 5. Introducing peacetime social relations. 6. Personnel demobilization. 6. Adjusting the war communications system to the peacetime needs. 7. Material demobilization. 7. Termination of war supply contracts. 8. Preparing soldiers to the life outside the army. 8. Readjusting the industry to the peacetime needs. 9. Establishing irretrievable losses and transferring the data to the 9. Reconstruction of war damage. Polish Red Cross. 10. Creating war cemeteries and 10. Ensuring work places for population, placing them under state including discharged soldiers supervision. Source: Own work on the basis of the study of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Scientific and research studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II item Figure 3. Principle enterprises undertaken as part of the state demilitarization 142

144 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM Reconstruction is an early state of rebuilding. Activities undertaken at this stage are limited to restoring the functioning of the critical infrastructure systems necessary for existence, however, only to an extent which provides the aggrieved with the minimal standards. These activities are sometimes undertaken simultaneously with rescue activities and are of a short-term character. Reconstruction includes: the estimation of losses; financial and material assistance; and ensuring basic conditions of survival for the aggrieved. In the rebuilding phase, there are performed the following tasks connected with: analysing the effects of an event, defining the needs and possibilities of removing them; supervising activities in the scope of ensuring living standards for the aggrieved population; initiating and giving an opinion on repair programmes, rebuilding, reconstruction and rebuilding of critical infrastructure, and also the assessment of the activity of the services, of population behaviour, as well as of the sufficiency and usefulness of the distribution of services, equipment and stores, and also preparing conclusions and the improvement proposals of the population's protection system. An important role in the process of rebuilding is to be played by powers and resources at the disposal of competent authorities, services and public administration bodies, within the crisis management system 36. It needs to be emphasised that at every level of public administration there have been developed crisis management plans including, among other things: the analysis of threats, balance of needs, own powers and resources as well as procedures of obtaining external assistance (including appropriate contracts, agreements and plans) 37. Whereas, the ways of responding to situations of the damage or disruption of the critical infrastructure functioning as well as reconstructing this critical infrastructure are defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Programme. The programme defines the national priorities, aims and standards aiming at ensuring the efficient functioning of critical infrastructure and indicates ministers at the head of government administration departments and managers of central offices responsible for critical infrastructure systems, as well as detailed criteria allowing the identification of buildings, installations, devices and services included in the critical infrastructure systems, taking into consideration their importance for the state's functioning and meeting the citizens' needs Crisis management is the activity of the public administration bodies, which constitutes an element of the national security management, consisting in preventing crisis situations, controlling them by way of planned actions, responding in the case of crisis situations and reconstructing infrastructure or restoring its original shape. The structure and functioning of the crisis management system is defined in the Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007 (JoL no 89, item 590, with subsequent amendments). 37 There is the National Crisis Management Plan as well as provincial, district and commune crisis management plans, Cf. Article 5 (1) of the Act. 38 Ibidem, Article 5(b). 143

145 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI In the current legal situation, there have not been indicated any common tasks for the state defence system and the crisis management system, and there have not been established any mechanisms for the transition from the state defence readiness in times of war to the constant state of defence readiness. The tasks mentioned concern the rebuilding tasks performed in the period of restoring the state's functioning after military aggression has been repelled. The appropriate planning and preparation as well as proper coordination of powers used included in the mentioned systems will be of significant importance for the rebuilding process. What results from the above presented list of the main problems which require to be solved after the end of a political and military conflict are particular rebuilding tasks carried out in the situation of a disrupted continuity of supplies which allows for the economy to function and meet citizens' basic needs, rescuing their life and health. In order to limit these disruptions, the minister responsible for the economy, by way of a decision, makes the strategic reserves immediately available in accordance with the rules and mode defined by the regulations 39. Powers and resources as well as information contained in the Economy Mobilization Programme are of significant importance in the process of restoring the normal functioning of the state after a political and military crisis has been obviated. The making use of the production and renovation capacity of business leaders, established in this programme, is of key importance for the rebuilding process. The potential of these business leaders should constitute the material basis for particular rebuilding tasks. In the process of restoring the normal state functioning, the tasks connected with meeting the basic existential needs of the population are of key importance. In the decision making process, what needs to be taken into consideration in the course of establishing tasks in this respect are both the production and service capabilities of selected sectors of the economy (the economy, agriculture, transport, environment, maritime economy and health) defined in the Economy Mobilization Programme, as well as balanced possibilities of the national economy to carry them out. It concerns in particular the supply of: food; medical products and medical devices; fuel and energy as well as fossil fuels, and also the provision of transport services 40. Conclusions In order to properly understand the tasks performed in the process of the state defence preparations it is important both to define the very notion as well as to provide the classification of defence tasks together with the description of the 39 Cf. The Act on Strategic Reserves of 29October 2010 (JoL no 229, item 1496, with subsequent amendments.). 40 The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland and a number of other laws, regulations and planning documents author's note. 144

146 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM nature and typology of defence needs. In this respect they are connected with human resources, material and financial resources as well as service capabilities necessary to achieve a particular level of readiness of the defence system in the condition of the state's constant defence readiness, defence readiness in times of crisis and defence readiness in times of war. It needs to be emphasised that defence needs and tasks connected with them constitute the basis of the state defence preparations. Defence tasks presented in this study are performed by all subjects of the state defence system, and their list is contained in the defence planning documents. The objective scope of defence tasks includes undertakings carried out by the Polish Armed Forces as well as the executive government bodies, other state bodies and institutions, businesses and citizens. They are connected with preparing the state for efficient functioning and survival in the case of an external threat to the state's security, crisis and war, and carrying out particular operational undertakings in these conditions, and also with removing the effects of a threat after it has been obviated, aiming to restore the normal state functioning. The leading role among the subjects carrying out the defence tasks within the state defence system is played by the public administration and business leaders. They are responsible for defence preparation in all its fields. It needs to be emphasised that the regulations of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022, and also the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland establish in a comprehensive way the state defence system with the activities for the national security system, and also emphasis the role of public administration and business leaders in the process of these preparations. On the basis of available professional literature and conducted research, it needs to be stated that the defence tasks defined in the binding legal acts and planning documents for the government administration and local government bodies, as well as business leaders and the Armed Forces, concern solely the tasks which are performed in the case of an external threat to the state security and in times of war. There have not been envisaged, however, any rebuilding tasks aiming to restore the normal functioning of the state after a political and military crisis has been obviated and during the demilitarization of the state. The description of rebuilding tasks presented in this study and carried out as part of state demilitarization should be treated as an introduction to and the basis for further research. The aim of this research should be both the systematic, legal and organisational regulating of the issue of state demilitarization after a military conflict as well as defining the objective and subjective scope of rebuilding tasks connected with restoring the normal functioning of the state. * * * Basing on the events from the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century as well as the ongoing military conflicts, it may be stated that it is true that 145

147 MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI we can deal much more efficiently 41 with the situations which we are prepared for, than with those that surprise us 42. One needs to be aware that threats and challenges of the 21st century are different from those which we grew up with during the Cold War. Then politics was frozen and the sphere of defence static. Threats to defence could be faced in a defensive way. Modern world does not function in this way. Political, economic and military activities must be integrated. Terrorists, falling regimes, weapons of mass destruction are both political as well as military challenges. The defence of the homeland begins abroad, and it is necessary to always start caring about security in one's heart and mind ( ) The borderlines between the internal and external security, police and army, preventing crises and solving them, combating crime and financial fraud, tracking terrorists and dealing with falling regimes become artificial and vague 43. Bibliography Literature Encyklopedia Powszechna Wydawnictwa Gutenberga, Warsaw Kitler W. (project manager) System Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP[National Security System of the Republic of Poland], Project registration number: O ROB/0076/03/001. Kitler W., Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych państwa w kontekście potrzeb i zadań obronnych. [in:] M. Kuliczkowski (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne w systemie obronnym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Zeszyt Problemowy TWO no 1(65) 2011 ISSN , Warsaw Kotarbiński T., Hasło dobrej roboty, 2nd edition, Warsaw Krzemiński J., Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych. [Demobilization of the Armed Forces after a military conflict.] Doctoral thesis, AON, Warsaw 2001 r. Kuliczkowski M., Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, Wyd. AON no AON 6181/13, Warsaw Kuliczkowski M. (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne państwa w systemie obronnym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Teoria i praktyka, Zeszyt Problemowy TWO no 1 (65) 2011, Warsaw Kuliczkowski M., Klasyfikacja zadań obronnych oraz ich charakterystyka [in:] Przygotowania ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów 41 According to T. Kotarbiński, efficiency consists in doing something which is a good means for a set target and not making mistakes in this respect. Cf. T. Kotarbiński, Hasło dobrej roboty, 2nd edition, Warsaw 1975, p The events in the Balkans of the 1990s after the fall of Yugoslavia, the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States and terrorist attacks in Madrid (11 March 2004), Beslan (1 September 2004) and London (7 July 2005), and also the development of the political and military situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Syria as well as in the states of North Africa cause particular concern for the security of the state and its citizens author's note. 43 Cf. J. Solana, Unia Europejska i NATO, strategiczne partnerstwo, [available on the Internet: 19 November 2002] 146

148 STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM administracji publicznej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronnoobronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, scientific research study under the scientific supervision of J. Wojnarowski, Wyd. AON, Code: II , no S/8349,Warsaw Małolepszy J. (scientific editing), Przejście Sił Zbrojnych ze struktury organizacyjnej czasu W na strukturę organizacyjną czasu P (Demobilizacja), Scientific and research studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II, item Leksykon wiedzy wojskowej, Wyd. MON, Warsaw 1978, Piątek Z. (scientific editing), Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych. Scientific research study, AON, Warsaw Solana J., Unia Europejska i NATO, strategiczne partnerstwo, [available on the Internet: 19 November 2002] Sułek M., Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, Bellona, Warsaw Wojnarowski J., Kuliczkowski M., Olszewski M., Przygotowania obronno-ochronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów administracji publicznej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (II ), AON no S/8349, Warsaw Zdrodowski B. (scientific editing), Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, wyd. 6, AON, Warsaw Legal acts The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 1967 (JoL of 2012 item 461 with subsequent amendments). The Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007 (JoL no 89, item 590, with subsequent amendments). The Strategic Reserves Act of 29 October 2010 (JoL of 2010 no 229, item 1496 with subsequent amendments). The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of planning and financing of tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations by government administration and local government bodies (JoL of 2004 no 152, item 1599, with subsequent amendments). Strategic documents The White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland issued on 24 May Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland adopted by the Resolution no 67 of the Council of Ministers of 9 April 2013 (OJ of 2013, item 377). National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 13 November Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 23 December 2009 Sector strategy of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. 147

149 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 4(93) ISSN WALDEMAR KITLER ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND IN THE CONTEXT OF A COUNTRY S INTERNAL ORDER PROTECTION 1 Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The issue of the organisation of national security of Poland, including its management, requires the analysis of problems related to the internal order protection in the country. This need, among others, results from a lack of clear formulated concepts and determination of the extent of internal security, public safety, constitutional security, security of citizens, as well as public order in the legitimate sphere and in the security theory. As a consequence, the stance concerning the scope of their application has not been stabilised yet. Additionally, in the title of this article, one more term internal order has been introduced. The conceptual categories mentioned above often have strong epistemological and ontological relations and, therefore, determining their identity and distinctiveness requires the adoption of a certain questioning attitude on the basis of the existing concepts in Polish legal order and in the theory of the problem. Key words internal order, national security, internal security, public safety, public order, national security management The concept, nature and scope of the internal order in a country Let us start our considerations from an understanding of the terminology and by specifying the concept of internal order; beginning, however, with the internal security. 1 The article includes selected content from the study titled The Process of Security Management (organisational rules and the ways of functioning of the management system) in three states of security [Proces kierowania bezpieczeństwem (organizacyjne zasady i sposoby funkcjonowania systemu kierowania) w trzech stanach bezpieczeństwa] W. Kitler, a research project on National Security System of the Republic of Poland, founded by NCBiR contract No DOBR/0076/R/ID1/2012/03 of r., the registration number of the project: O ROB/0076/03/001, Project Manager: prof. dr hab. inż. Waldemar KITLER. 148

150 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND Internal security is not a substantive concept; all the more reason the legislator himself has distinguished between internal security and public order 2. It is difficult to find an interpretation of internal security in Polish law, including administrative law. The theory of security contains various opinions. According to one of them narrow, internal security is treated as a category covering constitutional security (protection of the country and its constitutional order), public safety and general security. Another one the broad one relates internal security to the issues taking place in the territory of a country; thus, to everything that is happening in a country and is connected to domestic goods protected by the law. Also, the scope of the internal affairs department of the government administration does not cover all the issues mentioned above, neither in the narrow interpretation, 3 nor the broad one. If there are no big differences in the theory for understanding external security, there is no such a unity as far as the internal security is concerned. And this is due to the following two reasons: historical events and a misunderstood, simplified association of internal security with the internal affairs department of the government administration, and (or) the issue of ensuring internal order in the country. Some views expand the issue of internal security slightly, subsuming within its frame not only the matter of repressive nature 4, and therefore constitutional order and public safety, but also general security 5. In this perspective, public safety is a condition manifested in the protection of the legal order, life and health of the citizens as well as the national wealth against illegal activities 6. General security, in turn, is a condition manifested in the protection of the life and health of the citizens as well as the national wealth against the effects of natural and technological disasters 7. Constitutional order, according to the authors of the referenced report, is, thus, the condition of the order and functioning of the country in accordance with the standards set out in the basic law 8. A narrow understanding of internal security will still be working in the theory and practice of the issue for a long time 9, mainly because of determining its scope 2 See B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, edition 2, C. H. BECK, Warszawa 2012, s. 220 i Constitutional security, for obvious reasons, does not and should not belong to this chapter. 4 Among other things, Jerzy Muszyński distinguishes, within the internal function of a country, a detailed repressive function, whose essence is to ensure safety and public order as well as counteracting any social pathologies. See J. Muszyński, Podstawy nauki o polityce, państwie i prawie,. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007, p B. Wiśniewski, S. Zalewski, D. Podleś, K. Kozłowska, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, AON, Warszawa 2004, p Ibidem, p Ibidem. 8 Ibidem, p. 29. As for the issue of constitutional order, adducing only the basic Law is not enough - Constitutional Law covers many more regulations of a statutory nature. Without doubt, the Constitution if the state has one is the basic act in this respect. 9 In National Security Strategy of Poland of 2007 (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP z 2007 r.) a narrow understanding of internal security was adopted The ultimate goal of the state in the field of internal security is to maintain the ability to react appropriately to a certain situation- in 149

151 WALDEMAR KITLER in the regulations of constitutional law. This is due both to the traditional approach to the subject and to the fact that internal security is, in my opinion, treated incorrectly, as a field of national security 10. Such an approach, however, can be acceptable in practice but, in theory, contradicts the essence of the definition and scientific interpretation of certain phenomena. For the first time in Polish law (in 2002), the legislator split state of emergency in the field of internal security into two separate states: state of emergency and state of emergency due to natural disasters. This means that if we take the nature of internal security into account, we should provide for matters of constitutional security, security of citizens and public safety as well as general security (with which the state of emergency due to natural disaster is associated). In the traditional approach, order is related to discipline, obedience, submissiveness, regime, notches, compliance, respect, arranging something according to some pattern. Order also means codification, segregation, organisation, normalisation, standardisation and unification. It is implied from the above, that bringing in order is associated with the arrangement, organisation and the restoration of normalisation and regulation. The constitution has a significant role in this respect and is an act of the highest legal force, superior to all laws, regulating the basis of a country s system, the basic principles of organisation and the method of appointment of the highest authorities of the state, the fundamental rights, freedoms as well as the duties of a man and a citizen. If one unified stance in the terminology issues mentioned above is absent, we assume that internal order is a set of rules and a state of things according to which the country, its public authorities and society, including the matter of the constitutional system of the country (constitutional security, constitutional order) as well as public safety covering public order and security of citizens operate. Political system security will be associated with the issues of the state s system of constitutional security, that is with the protection of standards establishing: the political system of the Republic of Poland; the principles of political pluralism; the socio-economic system; the legal status of an individual, the freedom and duties of citizens; the legal system and the legislative process in the country as well as legal system protection. This is related to constitutional order, which means a combination of the authorities, government institutions and their activities, as well as the system of legal rules underwriting the continuity of the constitutional system case of threats to public and general safety related to the protection of legal order, life and health of the citizens as well as the national wealth from illegal activities and the consequences of natural disasters and technical failures. 10 It is difficult to accept the recognition of (according to the subjective criterion) the following types of national security in one group: political, economic, military,, social, internal, ecological, cultural, information and others (emphasis W.K.). See System bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, tom IV, Koncepcja systemu bezpieczeństwa RP, Project Manager. R. Kulczycki, AON, Warszawa 1983, p

152 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND of the country, including the protection of the country as a legal and political organisation, the protection of classified information, the protection of people, facilities and equipment essential for the national security, and also the protection of the freedom, rights and duties of citizens. A clear manifestation of the prevailing constitutional order in the Republic of Poland includes the main rules formed on the basis of the Constitution of 2 April 1997, which point directly to the protected welfares in this regard, which are: 1) related to the political system: sovereignty (Article 4); the republican form of a state of law (Article 1); democratic state of law (article 2); separation of powers and balance of powers (Article 10); political representation; bicameral parliament (Article 10.2); political pluralism (Article 11); the principle of decentralisation of public authority (Article 15); the establishment of local self-government (Article 16); mutual independence and cooperation of the state and churches and religious associations (Article 25); freedom and the rights of citizens (Chapter 2); parliamentary form of governance; the separateness of jurisdiction and the independence of the courts and tribunals (Article 173); 2) Unrelated to the political system but of key importance in Polish constitutionalism: the social market economy (Article 20); private property (Article 21) and economic freedom (Article 22). Public safety is, in turn, a process covering various activities (means) whose principal purpose is the protection of legal order in the country against prohibited actions and actions offending public institutions 11 and public equipment 12, the life and health of people as well as social standards and customs and, what is most important, the interests of the state protected by law. This involves ensuring the smooth functioning of the institutions of the state and its citizens through the prism of threats against the normality of their functioning, according to the socioadministrative system and law and order. Public safety is often associated with public order, bringing them under an umbrella term security and public order 13. In the Act of 6 April 1990 on the 11 The public institutions include the whole social infrastructure, that is: hospitals, emergency services, sanatoria, nursing homes, schools, kindergartens, cultural and sport facilities, courts, prisons and public administration buildings. 12 Public devices include: public roads, railway networks, water networks, airports, ports, electrical installations, water, gas and steam transmission facilities, water intakes, sewage works, cemeteries, communication and information technologies, (telecommunication, post offices, Internet, radio, TV); media utilities (electricity, water, sewage, heating, gas, trash removal). In this case, the term economic infrastructure is used interchangeably. 13 See respectively: the Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police (Journal of Laws of 1990 No. 30, item. 179, as amended.), Art. 1, paragraph 1, Law of 4 September 1997 on government administration (Journal of Laws of 1999 No. 82, item. 928, as amended.), Art. 29. Paragraph 1 point 1 to the Act of 6 June 1997, the Penal Code (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 88, item. 553, as amended.), Chapter XXXII; the most interesting matter is in the act of 5 June 1998 on the county government (Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 142, item. 1592, as amended.), where there are terms such as public order (Article 4, paragraph 1, point 15), security and public order (Article 7) and security and order in the name of the Security and Order Commission. 151

153 WALDEMAR KITLER Police, in Article 1, paragraph 1 it is specified that this is a formation dedicated to maintaining security and public order, among other things, without distinguishing between the two terms. Moreover, the Act mentions separately the category of human security referring to the task related to the protection of people s security. The first case regards: the protection of public safety and order, including ensuring peace in public places and means of public transport, on roads and waterways dedicated to public use (Article 2, paragraph 2); initialisation and organisation of activities aimed at the prevention of crime and offences, as well as crime-related phenomena, and cooperation in this field with state and local agencies and social organisations (Article 2, paragraph 3); crime and offence detection and prosecution of the perpetrators (Article 2, paragraph 4); control over abiding order and administrative regulations related to public activities or existing in public places (Article 2, paragraph 6) as well as collecting, processing and passing on criminal information (Article 2, paragraph 8). The issue of the protection of human security covers matters relating to people s lives and health security, as well as their property against unlawful attacks violating goods (Article 2, paragraph 1, Act on the Police). Further, the Act on government administration activities combines security and public order with the and conjunction, in which the issue of security and public order protection is included in the internal affairs section in Article 29, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1. However, we have to be careful here, as security and public order protection does not reflect the full range of security and public order, or in short public safety. Probably, only the penal code refers separately to public order, listing the offences against public order. Undoubtedly, public safety and public order are still separate categories, although there would be nothing wrong if they were determined by one term public safety. The issue still requires in-depth research and analysis and, although raised by many specialists, it has not been completely organised yet, and neither in the legal system. In a lesser article it was assumed that public safety is superior to public order. This results from the essence of public order, which is related to observing the norms as well as maintaining the efficiency of public institutions, that is e.g. from: human behaviour in accordance to existing regulations; observing registration regulations 14 ; regulations on meetings, public gatherings and mass events; building, hunting, fishing, fiscal offences regulations and water resources law; civil law acts and people s behaviour in public places. There are various interpretations of public safety, ranging from a very broad one, through its various modifications, to a narrow one. The broad interpretation leads to the covering of the entire space of national security, treating it as 14 The Act on Government Administration Activities, excluded the issues of registration of population, ID cards and passports from the public safety and order area. 152

154 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND a protection against all threats, regardless of their sources 15. It can be especially found among law theorists, who distinguish the terms public and private. A slightly narrower approach to public safety associates it with social relations, regulated by law and moral standards as well as principles of community life, ensuring the protection of society, individuals and property against perils related to the violent actions of people as well as the forces of nature. In this case, almost the entire space of narrowly understood internal security is occupied, combining the issues of threats caused by the forces of nature and by human actions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to translate it into the right organisation of the security system in practice as, in fact, the matter of counteraction against the forces of nature is different from the one against the unlawful activities of people. The narrower approach to the issue limits its content on the protection of legal order, internal order, and public safety, and also against all prohibited actions which threaten people s lives and health, their property, environment, norms and social customs. Without denying the validity of broader interpretations, especially in isolation from the superior national security, the narrower approach, whose main reason is to determine the identity of the issue among other areas (types) of national security, has been adopted in this article. The mutual relations of public safety with other areas of security are quite complex, as they relate to political, military, economic, social, ecological, ideological and cultural areas. In all these cases we deal with prohibited actions, both socially harmful and reprehensive. Consequently, the duty of the state, local authorities, businesses, social organisations and individual citizens is to protect the institutions activities, legal order, customs, to ensure public morality follows existing legal, moral and customary norms, to protect certain goods (material and spiritual), and to pursue the perpetrators and use certain sanctions. At the core of such an approach lies the existence of an immense number of activities, actions, behaviours and human attitudes, or lack of them, from which emerges the regulation of certain legal norms or standards established in the development of social norms of behaviour by law. Therefore, what kind of threats or dangerous states are the basis for rational thinking and acting in the public safety sector? There are a lot of approaches, broad and narrow ones; however, in this article the following division will be suggested: prohibited actions (by state law) or reprehensible actions under social evaluation (by social norms) related, among other things, to: human life threat and health risk; road safety; security of environment; personal freedom; freedom of conscience and religion; tradition; honour and bodily integrity; activities of state institutions (administration, justice department); public order (e.g. active participation in gatherings with sudden 15 See: E. Ura, Pojęcie ochrony bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego, Państwo i Prawo 1974, No 2, p. 76. A. Pakuła, Bezpieczeństwo publiczne jako dobro wspólne (kilka uwag i refleksji), [in:] Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w działaniach terenowej administracji publicznej, red. A. Chajbowicz, T. Kocowski, Editorial House Kolonia Limited, Wrocław 2009, p

155 WALDEMAR KITLER assault to a person or property; public incitement to crime, offence or misdemeanour; taking and holding a hostage); desecration of corpses and burial sites; public promotion of prohibited ideologies; protection of information; property; trading; fiscal regulations; credibility of documents; labour law and safety regulations. Activities not included in these types of threats are war crimes, crimes against peace, humanity, the foundations of the state political system, constitutional order political crimes and crimes against defence. These belong to the area of political or military security. Public safety in the national law has its rightful place in the contents of constitutional law, including the Constitution of the Polish Republic; electoral regulations for the Polish Parliament and Senate; the Act on the Election of the President of Poland; the Act on the national referendum; electoral regulations for the European Parliament; the Act on the direct election of the Mayor; on the Council of Ministers; on the National Administrative Court; on the Supreme Chamber of Control; on the Ombudsman; on the radio and television; on the activities of government administration; acts on states of emergency; the act on access to public information; the law on public meetings; the act on trade unions; on public fundraisers; on guarantees of freedom, conscience and religion; and press law. The regulations of administrative law play an important role in the issue of public safety due to the regulations regarding, among other things,: a governor and government administration in a province; commune, district and provincial authorities; the Internal Security Office and the Intelligence Office; the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service; the State Sanitary Inspection; technical supervision; the National Fire Service; the Veterinary Inspection; crisis management 16 ; fire protection; the Police; the Military Police; and the military law enforcement authorities; the Border Guard; communal guard 17 ; hunting law 18 ; railway 19 ; the Environmental Protection Inspection; the State Labour Inspectorate 20 ; road transport 21, as well as the competence of the 16 We have in mind the issue of the protection of critical infrastructure, which is essentially related to public institutions and facilities. 17 The Act of 29 August 1997 on the Community Guards (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 123, item. 779, as amended.). The law in Article 1 paragraph 1 states that: For the protection of public order in the commune a self-government uniformed formation can be formed - a municipal guard, hereinafter referred to as guards. 18 The Act of 13 October 1995 Hunting Law ( Journal of Laws of 2002 No. 42, item 372, as amended). The act establishes the State Hunting Guards as a uniformed, armed and equipped in an off-road and marked means of transportation formation subordinate to the governor. See more: Chapter 7 Articles Under the Act, the Railway Guard was created, whose tasks involve: control of obeying the provisions of law and order and protection of life and health of people as well as property in the area of railways, in trains and other rail vehicles. 20 The Act of 13 April 2007 on the State Labour Inspectorate (Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 89 item. 589). 154

156 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND authorities and the regulations for the functioning of other public administration authorities and other entities with no such status (e.g. Government Protection Bureau). From a public safety point of view, an important role is also played by consumer protection law covering, among other things, the following issues: pursuing claims in group proceedings; counteracting unfair market practices; protection of some services supplied electronically, based on the conditional availability; protection of some consumer rights as well as responsibility for damage caused by dangerous products. The criminal and misdemeanours law, in turn, mainly consists of Polish national law acts, whose provisions are related to the following issues: - crime, according to the Penal Code, against: life and health (Chapter XIX, Art. 148 to 162 PC); common safety (Chapter XX. Art. 163 to 172); safety in traffic (Chapter XXI, Art. 173 to 180); environment (Chapter XXII, Art. 181 to 188); freedom 22 (Chapter XXIII, Art. 189 to 193); freedom of conscience and religion (Chapter XXIV, Art. 194 to 196); sexual and moral freedom (Chapter XXV, Art. 197 to 205); family and care (Chapter XXVI, Art. 206 to 211a); honour and bodily integrity (Chapter XXVII, Art. 212 to 217a); the rights of people performing paid work (Chapter XXVIII, Art. 218 to 221); the activities of national institutions and local government (Chapter XXIX, Art. 222 to 231a); justice (Chapter XXX, Art. 232 to 247a); elections and referendum (Chapter XXXI, Art. 248 to 251); public order (Chapter XXXII, Art. 252 to 264a); protection of information (Chapter XXXIII, Art. 265 to 269b); the credibility of documents (Chapter XXXIV, Art. 270 to 277); property (Chapter XXXV, Art. 278 to 295); trading (Chapter XXXVI, Art. 296 to 309); money and securities trading (Chapter XXXVII, Art. 310 to 316); - fiscal offences, according to the Penal and Fiscal Code which lists a total of fiscal offences against: tax obligations and expenses on grants and subventions; customs duties and the regulations on foreign trade in goods and services; foreign exchange and organisation of lotteries and pari-mutuel betting 23 ; 21 Act of 6 September 2001 on road transport (Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 125, item. 1371). As a consequence of the introduction of the Act, the Road Transport Inspectorate was created to monitor compliance with the provisions of road transport and non-commercial national and international road transport of motor vehicles, with the exception of vehicles referred to in art. 3 of the Act. See Articles and Article 3 of the Act Here, it is about crimes against freedom within the understanding of the Penal Code : unlawful imprisonment, threatening another person with committing an offence to make harm to this person or an immediate person, if the threat causes a well-founded fear that it will be fulfilled, violence against a person or an unlawful threat to coerce another person to a particular action, nonfeasance or abrogating, performing medical treatment without the patient s permission, encroaching into someone s house, flat, room or fenced area, or staying in such a place against the request of the entitled person. See Kodeks karny, Articles See Kodeks karny skarbowy, Articles: 54; 55; 85; 86; 97; 107 i 107a. 155

157 WALDEMAR KITLER - misdemeanours: fiscal (see above) and, according to the Petty Offence Code, 24 against: public peace and order; national, local and communal institutions; security of people and property; security and order in communication; person; health; property; consumer interests; public decency; facilities for public use; registry obligation, and also in the area of forest, field and garden damage 25. Among other regulations related to public safety, it is worth paying attention to the issues on personal data protection; protection of people and property; building law; water law; aviation law 26 ; public roads; traffic regulations; transport / carriage law; international shipments of wastes, and forests. Behind the main tasks carried out in the framework of public safety (and order) are crime fighting: organised crime; criminal offences; cross-border criminal offences; drugs; economic crime; cybercrime; terrorism and extremism; corruption; offences against trading and credibility of documents; offences against the interests of the European Union; and also prevention of counterfeit, mass disruption of public order and safety, disruption of mass events security as well as threats to traffic 27. The tasks of public authorities in the field of public safety (and order) are set out in relevant law acts. These are mainly: the Act of 4 September 1997 on government administration 28 ; the Act of 23 January 2009 on provincial governor and government administration in provinces 29 ; the Act of 5 June 1998 on provincial government 30 ; the Act of 5 June 1998 on district government 31 ; the Act of 8 March 1990 on commune government 32 as well as the Act of 26 April 2007 on crisis management 33. The tasks of special services in the field of public safety and order are, in turn, determined in: the Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police 34 ; the Act of 12 October 1990 on the protection on the national border 35 ; the Act of 12 October 1990 on the 24 The Act of 20 May 1971 on the Code offenses (Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 109, item. 757, as amended) 25 See ibid, respectively: chapters VIII-XIX. 26 In chapter 3 of the Act on Rescue and Fire protection of airports, the tasks of an airport manager were determined. They mainly deal with organising and maintaining rescue system and fire protection of the airport within the frames of national emergency system. The tasks of the Civil Aviation Authority include creating conditions aimed at increasing the safety of air transport; providing protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference within the respect of its properties. 27 See Raport o stanie bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w 2010 roku, MSWiA, Warszawa Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 141, item. 943, as amended, edited. 29 Journal of Laws of 2009 No. 31, item. 206, as amended, edited. 30 Journal of Laws of 1998 No. 91, item. 576, as amended, edited. 31 Journal of Laws of 1998 No. 91, item. 578, as amended, edited. 32 Journal of Laws of 1990 No. 16, item. 95, as amended, edited. 33 Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 89, item. 590, as amended, edited. 34 Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 43, item. 277, as amended, edited. 35 Journal of Laws of 2005 No. 226, item. 1944, as amended, edited. 156

158 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND Border Guard 36 ; the Act of 24 August 1991 on the National Fire Service 37 ; the Act of 27 August 2009 on Customs Service 38 ; the Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Office and the Intelligence Service 39 ; the Act of 9 June 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau 40, the Act of 16 March 2001 on the Government Security Bureau 41. Moreover, there are local consolidated and non-consolidated administrative authorities of an inspection and control character involved in ensuring public safety and order 42, dealing with various aspects of public safety and order as well as communal and city guards 43, persons and property protection agencies 44 as well as non-governmental organisations 45. It is assumed that they are a part of a broadly understood system of law-abiding authorities. It is worth pointing to the fact that the acts regulating this issue both constitutional and jurisdiction come from various periods during the construction of our country, have been repeatedly changed, either directly or through the provisions in other acts, and do not always fulfil the legislative requirements of correctness. To sum up the issues of public safety, covering public order and the safety of citizens, we have assumed what was agreed. The nature of public order can be explained as being about the manner of people s (individuals or groups of people) behaviour in public places, and maybe better in public than non-public space. Although the Penal Code regulates the criminal liability of citizens of a certain country, we will probably find the best hints for distinguishing the content of the concept of public order in its provisions. It results from these that public order is related to the following issues: 36 Journal of Laws of 2002 No. 171, item. 1399, as amended, edited. 37 Journal of Laws of 1991 No. 88, item. 400, as amended, edited. 38 Journal of Laws of 2009 No. 168, item. 1323, as amended. edited. 39 Journal of Laws of 2002 No. 74, item. 676, as amended. edited. 40 Journal of Laws of 2006 No. 104, item. 708, as amended. edited. 41 Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 27, item. 298, as amended. edited. 42 These are the complex local administration authorities, the school superintendent, Provincial Inspector of Road Transport, Regional Pharmaceutical Inspector, Provincial Inspector of Plant Health and Seed Inspection, Provincial Inspector of Construction Supervision, Provincial Inspector of Geodesy and Cartography, Provincial Inspector of Environment Protection, Provincial Inspector of Trade Inspection, Provincial Inspector of Agricultural and Food Quality, Provincial Sanitary Inspector, Provincial Veterinary Officer. These are also non-complex local administration authorities - art. 56 of the Act of 23 January 2009 on the palatine and government in the province (Journal of Laws of 2009 No. 31, item. 206, as amended). 43 The Act of 29 August 1997 on the Community Guards (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 123, item. 779, as amended) 44 The Act of 22 August 1997 on the protection of persons and property, (Journal of Laws of 2005 No. 145, item. 1221, as amended) 45 The Act of 24 April 2003 on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 96, item. 873), the Act of April 7, 1989, the Law on Associations (Journal of Laws of 1989, No. 20 item. 104, as amended) 157

159 WALDEMAR KITLER - taking or holding a hostage in order to force a government or local government, an institution agency, an organisation, an individual, a legal person or a group of people to behave in a certain way; - taking an active part in a mass meeting, knowing that its participants will commit a violent assault on a person or property; - taking, damaging or making components of the following systems unusable: water supply, heating, sewage, electricity, gas, telecommunications or railway, tramway, trolleybus or underground, thereby causing disruptions to the operation of the whole or a part of a network or line; - public provocation to committing a fiscal misdemeanour or offence, a crime or approve of an offence; - distributing or presenting publically information likely to facilitate commission of a terrorist offence, intending such an offence to be committed; - public promotion of fascist or other totalitarian system of a state or exhorting to hatred based on various differences national, ethnic, racial, religious or due to a lack of religious beliefs; - public insulting of a group of people or particular individuals due to their nationality, ethnic, racial or religious affiliations, or due to their lack of religious beliefs, or if for such reasons, the bodily integrity of a person is violated; - participation in an organised group or association (as well as of an armed character) aiming at committing a crime or a fiscal offence; - using force or an unlawful threat which foils holding a lawful meeting, gathering or procession, or scattering such a meeting, gathering or procession; - insulting a monument or another public place commemorating a historical event or a person; - profaning and fleecing human remains or burial places; - crossing the border of the Republic of Poland with the use of force, threat, deception or in cooperation with other persons. For the safety of citizens everything that is related to the reality of being a citizen of a certain country guaranteeing their legal protection, should be taken under consideration. Guided by the provisions of the Penal Code, 46 we can come to the conclusion that it is about protection against people s activities which threaten: people s life and health; general safety; security in communications; environment; freedom; freedom of conscience and religion; sexual freedom and customs; family and care; honour and bodily integrity; the rights of people performing paid work as well as election and referendum, among other things. The matters of internal order in a country, on an entity basis, are related to two specific subjects: a country as a political institution (legal, sovereign) and a citizen. Hence, the rule, according to which there is a confrontation between the necessity to ensure the fulfilment of the country s interests (read: the interests of the state 46 The issues of civil security were also taken in Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP z 2007 r., however, in the opinion of the author they were presented cursorily. 158

160 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND authorities) and the interests of the citizens, is confirmed. It is natural that they are not always compatible, even when the country acts to protect public safety, and what is more the safety of its citizens. Management process in the area of counteraction to threats of internal order in the country An attribute of management and, what is more, public administration management is having power, whose source is the right to use the resources that determine the functioning of an organisation. Government is connected with the relationship of the subjection of the management entity to the manager. The competence of management is closely associated, and not without reason, with dominative and non-dominative eligibility and forms of administrative activities. The manager incessantly faces problems, which require continuous and recurrent solving, and this requires having competent governmental authority, manifested in the form of normative and administrative acts. Also, non-dominative forms of administrative activities are worth mentioning, when at least between two entities there is no relation of managing and managed type, and, according to Jerzy Paśnik, these are: administrative settlement, administrative agreements, civil-law transactions and factual actions 47. Management is often associated with directing, which from a formal point of view, is ill conceived. Direction is mainly based on the right to provoke a particular behaviour from the directed. Direction is the totality of a director s activities involving the impact on directed entities, aimed at making them behave (operate, function) in accordance with his will to achieve a goal and realise a certain task. Management is a form of direction, distinguished due to the competences of the manager to use resources (human, material, financial), which consists in undertaking entire planning, organisational, motivational and monitoring activities by the management in order to achieve the goal and realise the task. In public administration, we deal both with directing and managing. However, directing, according to Zbigniew Leoński, is related to two aspects: the dominative impact of the superior authority on its subsidiaries in the public administration hierarchy, as well as directing the activities of a certain group of people in a given organisational unit 48. Generally, therefore, the directing person is the one who has the formal right to influence the behaviour of others, and indeed, the one who sets the rules of people s behaviour. Management, on the other hand, is when one has at 47 More: J. Paśnik, Prawne formy działania administracji publicznej, [in:] Administracja publiczna i prawo administracyjne w zarysie, edited by M. Karpiuk, J. Kowalski, PWP Iuris, Warszawa-Poznań 2013, p See Z. Leoński, Nauka administracji, edition 6, Publishing House C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2010, p

161 WALDEMAR KITLER one s disposal and wields the human, material, service, information and financial resources in order to achieve the targeted goal, and also while performing a certain task. Taking the complexity of the issue of internal order in the country into account, as well as the non-equivalence of three of its components in formal, objective and subjective terms, it is difficult to characterise and evaluate the process of management in this area unambiguously. Thus, it is not that easy when ensuring security under the circumstances of threats to the state and during a war. Firstly, this is due to the fact that an armed aggression 49 has its detailed interpretation in international law, and secondly, because the subject responsible for the initiation and coordination of all actions in the area of management is the supreme government administration authority (Minister, Council of Ministers) or in certain cases, the President of the Republic of Poland. The whole management process is, therefore without doubt, centralised and hierarchical. For the protection of internal order in a country the situation is different. Protection of internal order can take place under two formal states of country state functioning, a normal state and a state of emergency. Due to the weakness of Polish legislation of states of emergency, it could appear that it is only about the state of emergency, but such an approach could be some kind of misunderstanding. Both protected items in the area of internal order and insulting them will be taken into consideration during each state of emergency, and the state of emergency will be, of course, a special case of action in the area. What is more, the legislator, as opposed to the external threats and the period of war, divided the tasks in the area of the protection of internal order among a number of entities, including the decentralisation of responsibility. This results in a need to process the issues of internal order protection through the prism of many protected items and objectively separated tasks, as well as many separate contractors. This means that there is no a single, centrally coordinated management system in this regard. The protected items in the area of internal order protection taken into account, excluding the divisions made so far, can be divided into the ones which are and will be protected in a centralised and systemic way, and into the ones which will still be subjected to a certain dissipation. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that some of the specific protected items could be the basis for the introduction of a state of emergency. Thus, any actions for organising the sphere of the management of internal order protection in a country could be realised according to a certain scheme whose essence joins the answers to the following questions: What items are protected, and what conditions and degree (scale) of threat as well as who and what and to what extent should take actions (including the justification of the 49 In the Polish law of the war state, an armed aggression means an external threat to the country and an armed attack on the territory of Poland. 160

162 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND state of emergency) to make the process of internal order protection management bring the desired results? Where: - protected items are these elements of the constitutional system of a state and public safety, which in the legal area are considered as constitutive elements of protected items; - the condition and degree (scale of a threat) are measured in the value of the protected item, and not in the extent of the situation of a specific threat it is, in other words, the seriousness of threats to valuable goods, having impact on the survival of the entire nation (it can be measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where number 5 means the highest degree); - the scale of operation it is a measure of the involved resources, costs and participation of entities of public authorities (it can be measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where number 5 means the highest degree). In the context of the above question, a thesis should be established that if there is no doubt as to the significance of the introduction of a state of emergency by the President of the Republic of Poland at the request of the Council of Ministers, in a situation of a specific threat to the constitutional system of the country, there is great doubt as to whether such a situation of a specific threat to the safety of citizens and public order is possible to constitute the basis for the introduction of such a state, in the mode above. The diagram below can be helpful (table 1). It can be seen from that brief and subjective calculation that among the vast number of elements influencing the protected good, which is internal order in a country, only a few of them, being the key part of the constitutional system of the country, should be subordinated to one management (coordination) in the areas of planning, organising, motivating and controlling, and consequently, also in such cases, the belief in the need to introduce a state of emergency could appear. The author is not convinced, as far as such behaviour is concerned, in other cases from the constitutional system area. Due to the fact that the most important constituent elements of the constitutional system of a country are (should be) protected in centralised and hierarchical systems, the answer to the question whether appropriate authorities take actions coordinating the whole spectrum of operations should be negative, and this means there is still no systemic approach to the issues in the area, and the data available to the author does not show that there are some planning and organisational activities undertaken for the inference of the introduction, proclamation and execution of the state of emergency resolutions. I think it is still so that only a presumptive state of war has careful planning and organisational frames Even a possible state of emergency, due to the fact that everything in the area of people s life protection, protection of property in a considerable range and the environment was exposed to crisis management, is an orphaned state in its own way. 161

163 WALDEMAR KITLER The protection of constituent elements of public safety (safety of citizens or security of public order) is, in turn, decentralised, and is implemented to various degrees and at various levels of public administration. Consequently, for this state of affairs, the process of public safety management is carried out at all levels of public administration in general, as well as in particular services, inspections and guards as far as their properties specified by law, basic acts and internal edicts are concerned. Due to the fact that inference and proclamation of a state of emergency is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic of Poland, and during the state, the coordination of the activities aimed at reestablishing the normal state belongs to the Prime Minister or a governor, the answer to the question whether these authorities undertake planning and organisational activities can be only negative. In the present state of affairs, the author does not know about any activities in this area. T a b l e 1 A table of assessment of the value of protected goods for determining the basis for the management process and the need of the introduction of the state of emergency Value protected by law constitutional political system Value protected by law public safety, including public order and safety of citizens Elements of value protected by law Degree/ scale of a threat of the value protected by law Responsible subject Actions /whether it requires a state of emergency in the situation of a specific threat Elements of value protected by law Degree/ scale of a threat of the value protected by law Responsible subject Actions /whether it requires a state of emergency in the situation of a specific threat The sovereignty of the nation Republican state under the rule of law Democratic state under the rule of law The division and balance of powers Political representation Bicameral parliament Pr RP; RM Pr RP; OKPiOP RM Pr RP; OKPiOP RM Pr RP; RM Pr RP; RM 5 Public institutions 5 Public facilities People s life and health Norms and social mores 5 Environment 2 2? 2 General security RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR; RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR; RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR

164 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND Value protected by law constitutional political system Value protected by law public safety, including public order and safety of citizens Elements of value protected by law Degree/ scale of a threat of the value protected by law Responsible subject Actions /whether it requires a state of emergency in the situation of a specific threat Elements of value protected by law Degree/ scale of a threat of the value protected by law Responsible subject Actions /whether it requires a state of emergency in the situation of a specific threat Political pluralism Decentralisation of powers 4 3 Self-government 3 Separation of state and church Rights and freedoms of man and citizen Parliamentary form of government Severability and independence of the judiciary and tribunals Social economy market Property protection Pr RP; RM Pr RP; RM Pr RP; RM Pr RP; RM Pr RP; OKPiOP RM Pr RP; RM Pr RP; RM 4 Safety in communications 3 Freedom Freedom of conscience and religion Sexual freedoms and customs 5 Family and care ?? 4?? Honour and bodily integrity Rights of people performing paid work Election and referendum National and religious symbols RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR OKPiOP;RM; M; COAR; Wa; S; W; TOAR Economic freedoms 3?? others? - - Others Agenda: Pr RP the President RP; OKPiOP national control and protection of law authorities; RM the Council of Ministers; M minister; COAR central government administration authority; Wa governor ; TOAR local government administration authority; S district governor; W - commune head, mayor, city mayor

165 WALDEMAR KITLER Bibliography Banaszak B., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, 2. wydanie, Wydawnictwo C. H. BECK, Warszawa Leoński Z., Nauka administracji, wydanie 6, Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa Muszyński J., Podstawy nauki o polityce, państwie i prawie, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń Pakuła A., Bezpieczeństwo publiczne jako dobro wspólne (kilka uwag i refleksji), [w:] Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w działaniach terenowej administracji publicznej, red. A. Chajbowicz, T. Kocowski, Wyd. Kolonia Limited, Wrocław Paśnik J., Prawne formy działania administracji publicznej, [w:] Administracja publiczna i prawo administracyjne w zarysie, red. M. Karpiuk, J. Kowalski, PWP Iuris, Warszawa-Poznań Raport o stanie bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w 2010 roku, MSWiA, Warszawa System bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, tom IV, Koncepcja systemu bezpieczeństwa RP, kier. nauk. R. Kulczycki, AON, Warszawa Ura E., Pojęcie ochrony bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego, Państwo i Prawo 1974, Nr 2. Ustawa z 24 sierpnia 1991 roku o Państwowej Straży Pożarnej (DzU z 1991 r., Nr 88, poz. 400, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 12 października 1990 r. o ochronie granicy państwowej (DzU z 2005 r., Nr 226, poz. 1944, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 12 października 1990 r. o Straży Granicznej (DzU z 2002 r., Nr 171, poz. 1399, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 13 kwietnia 2007 r. o Państwowej Inspekcji Pracy (DzU z 2007 r., Nr 89. poz. 589). Ustawa z dnia 13 października 1995 r. Prawo łowieckie (DzU z 2002 r., Nr 42, poz. 372, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 16 marca 2001 r. o Biurze Ochrony Rządu (DzU z 2001 r., Nr 27, poz. 298, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 20 maja 1971 r. Kodeks wykroczeń (DzU z 2007 r., Nr 109, poz. 757, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie osób i mienia, (DzU z 2005 r. Nr 145, poz. 1221, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2009 r. o wojewodzie i administracji rządowej w województwie (DzU z 2009 r., Nr 31, poz. 206, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 24 kwietnia 2003 r. o działalności pożytku publicznego i o wolontariacie (DzU z 2003 r., Nr 96, poz. 873). Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu (DzU z 2002 r., Nr 74, poz. 676, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym (DzU z 2007 r., Nr 89, poz. 590, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 27 sierpnia 2009 r. o Służbie Celnej (DzU z 2009 r., Nr 168, poz. 1323, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o strażach gminnych (DzU z 1997 r., Nr 123, poz. 779, ze zm.). 164

166 ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND Ustawa z dnia 4 września 1997 r. o działach administracji rządowej (DzU z 1999 r., Nr 82, poz. 928, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie powiatowym (DzU z 1998 r., Nr 91, poz. 578, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie powiatowym (DzU z 2001 r., Nr 142, poz. 1592, ze. zm.). Ustawa z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji (DzU z 1990 r., Nr 30, poz. 179, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji (DzU z 2007 r., Nr 43, poz. 277, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. Prawo o stowarzyszeniach, (DzU z 1989 r., Nr 20, poz. 104, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym (DzU z 1990 r., Nr 16, poz. 95, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 9 czerwca 2006 r. o Centralnym Biurze Antykorupcyjnym (DzU z 2006 r., Nr 104, poz. 708, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 r. o samorządzie województwa (DzU z 1998 r., Nr 91, poz. 576, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny (DzU 1997, Nr 88, poz. 553, ze zm.). Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o transporcie drogowym (DzU z 2001 r., Nr 125, poz. 1371). Wiśniewski B., Zalewski S., Podleś D., Kozłowska K., Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, AON, Warszawa

167 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 4(93) ISSN ISSN RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI STATE SECURITY THREATS Assoc. Prof. Ryszard CHROBAK, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek KUBIŃSKI, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract Due to its geopolitical situation, Poland functions in a particular environment implying constraints which can be more or less accurately forecasted. The responsibility of those who have the state security at heart must aim at building mechanisms able to detect the changes and mechanisms limiting threats in the future. As in any system, the state s most important element is its people, that is society. In this context, in order to prepare society, in the best possible way for new situations, it seems appropriate to forecast most accurately the challenges and threats it possibly faces. The hostile elements existing in the environment, with their new destructive capabilities, and in the virtual reality too, force us to analyse the motives and strategies of their activity attentively in order not to allow situations threatening our national interests. Key words challenges, threats, national security, internal security, terrorism, cyberterrorism, military threats, media, security education, transnational organised crime The factors determining change in the national and international security environment in the modern world indicate that it is, in fact, becoming freer from an outbreak of a global conflict. The reduced level of risk of global conflict triggers, to some extent, other threats, which in the bipolar world were treated as minor problems. Nowadays, as well as in the foreseeable future, the level of state security is not only measured by the probability of a military threat. Hence, it is considered legitimate to address the problems of own security in different conditions of the state functioning. The legitimacy of the above thesis results not only from the changes in the contemporary world, but mainly from the state legal obligations in the scope of ensuring the conditions for its survival and development in the international arena in any circumstances. The notion of security contains the designata connected with all spheres of social, human and state life. Threats are an imminent part of life and cannot be eliminated. They can only be brought to a socially accepted level or to a level of readiness allowing them to be neutralised 166

168 STATE SECURITY THREATS or eradicated or their negative effects opposed in an organised way. Therefore, the state security system must be an efficient instrument of the state policy enabling it to ensure its independence and territorial integrity, which should maintain its readiness to oppose any threats irrespective of the estimated probability of their occurrence. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in Poland, a process started which aimed to redefine the way threats were perceived in many areas of state security. The political changes, known by many politicians as the revolution of the Central- and East European states, were one of the most significant factors contributing to the demise of powers in the world which lead to the disappearance of its bipolarity. It did not mean, however, that the problem of state security became less important. On the contrary, it needs to be approached in a different way, that is to take into consideration the new geopolitical situation of Poland. Moreover, being a NATO member, Poland should aim to be an attractive ally and contribute to the reconstruction of the existing all-european security system. Security can be considered as a multidimensional category. It can be discussed as the relation of the state to its citizens and their community; in the network of the correlation between the states; in the framework of international life factors and in view of the overriding norms of morality and international law. As in any system which is a state, and also in this most complex one, the most important element is the people, that is society. In this context, in order to prepare this society in the best possible way for new, often difficult and surprising situations, it is necessary to verify some areas of the citizens' current state of mind. The main areas of human activity, such as commerce, communication, culture and finances, not to mention social plagues, such as drug addiction, crime, epidemics and terrorism, more and more often cross national borders and national sovereignty. Hence, what takes place in these fields is the constant globalisation of institutions and threats. If reviving nationalism, a mighty and ruthless power, is added to these phenomena, the challenges faced currently by security guarding organisations can easily be perceived. With reference to the objectives of general education, contemporary citizenship education faces tasks consisting in equipping the society with the appropriate knowledge and abilities allowing it to organise efficient individual and collective protection and defence against the effects of various threats, as well as to conduct effective rescue operations and bring help to people in danger. When in ancient Greece, Thucydides of Athens was asked, when will there be justice in Athens? he said that there will be justice in Athens when those who are not injured are as outraged as those who are. This sentence has survived a few thousand years and nowadays is still relevant, although the notion of security changed within the space of a few centuries. In different political systems and historical periods it was understood in various ways. There was also an additional 167

169 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI question asked, how to act in order to ensure security for oneself and one's loved ones. What is worth emphasising is the fact that these questions are valid today 1. Security is not a static phenomenon, but one that evolves and changes with the development of civilisation. The analysis of objectives and the course of many post- WW II military conflicts allow us to notice a certain regularity, which can be summarised in the statement that threats that precede them, as a rule, have more than one cause. Their sources are rather a coincidence of many unregulated issues of, for example, economic, territorial, psychological ethnic, religious, political, ecological or military character. What emerges from the above mentioned causes is a wide range of unresolved problems which accompanied the international community when it entered the 21st century. These are the factors that will destabilise the international situation, turn into threats and constitute the embers of conflicts. Deepening developmental disproportions lead to differences. On a global scale, an emerging difference between the rich North and the poor South can be observed; and on a regional scale - in Europe, between the rich West and the poor East. The growth of these disproportions may become the source of military conflicts. Moreover, such conflicts may have different scopes and be connected with the use of different ways of military achievement of assumed objectives. The causes of these conflicts require attentive analysis and and the symptoms threatening national interests need to be forecast. Hence, one of the fundamental changes in the scope of citizenship education is new challenges and threats. It is a frequent practice to use these terms interchangeably, which leads to certain inaccuracies 2. This problem is also indicated by B. Balcerowicz 3, who explains that a challenge is a new and difficult situation which requires determining a response and taking appropriate action. A challenge may be dangerous or may contain a certain type of risk, but does not have to be one. Whereas, a threat is a situation in which there is a high probability of the development of the state which is dangerous for a given environment 4. Threats may appear in the military and non-military fields. A particular category of new threats is terrorist activity which requires multiple undertakings, carried out more and more often with the participation of non-militant people (the civilian population). The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 5 of 2007 indicates that it is organised international terrorism that is the threat for Europe, and consequently for Poland. Due to that reason, Poland must take into account the possibility of activity aimed against its security in connection with participation in the antiterrorist campaign. Retaliatory actions are also not impossible as Cf. A. Urban, Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych, Warsaw 2009, p Cf. B. Szulc, Wpływ zagrożeń na teorię walki, p.k. Zagrożenia, AON, Warsaw 2003, p B. Balcerowicz, Pokój i nie-pokój na progu XXI wieku, Warsaw 2002, p Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, BPiI MON, Warsaw 1966, p The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, November 2007.

170 STATE SECURITY THREATS a consequence of antiterrorist activities undertaken by NATO, the United States or the EU. What is a particular threat to the Polish entities that perform tasks outside the country's borders are the military activities carried out by terrorist groups in the area of responsibility of the Polish Military Contingents. Despite quite general agreement concerning the character of contemporary threats, it is not easy to find consensus in military and political circles concerning the classification of these threats. Apart from the increasingly common division into: peacetime threats, crisis threats and wartime threats, the analysis of professional literature allow us to distinguish two: the military and non-military ones 6. Military threats most often include: war and military aggression, local crises and conflicts, excessive concentration of military potential, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; while non-military threats cover: international terrorism, organised crime, natural and ecological disasters, and illegal migration. Due to the geopolitical situation of Poland and the economic problems of the post-soviet countries, the territory of Poland is the place through which runs the main channels of the activity of international organised crime, including especially the smuggling of goods of illicit origin and, for instance, drugs. Recently uncontrolled movement of nuclear technology and fissile materials has also become a significant threat. It is even more dangerous as they may be reached by states connected with terrorist organisations. According to CBOS (Centre for Public Opinion Research) Polish citizens believe that among miseries brought to the world by the 21st century the prime ones include terrorism, organised crime and unemployment (figure 1). A consequence of Polish accession to the European Union is the freedom of movement of citizens of different nationality on EU territory. Poland has already become the seat of international institutions and agencies/posts which, in turn, may become objects of terrorist attacks. Also, Polish diplomatic posts and citizens abroad can be threatened by this type of activity. Although there are specially trained and equipped police units of particular countries destined to undertake activities preventing such threats, the increasing number of such phenomena may lead to the necessity to reinforce these forces with military troops in rescue operations (evacuation of Polish citizens), or the protection and defence ones (e.g. against terrorist attacks on Polish diplomatic posts). In international relations, terrorism 7 seems to be highly attractive from the point of view of the organisers of such activities, as the method of achieving objectives contradictory to the vital interests of other states. Terrorism is becoming an instrument of international confrontation and an effective weapon of the weaker against the stronger. 6 B. Szulc, Wpływ zagrożeń, op. cit., p It is worth quoting the definition of terrorism developed by the United States Department of Defence which says that terrorism is: the unlawful usage - the threat of using - force or violence against a person or property in order to threaten the government or society, often to achieve political, religious or ideological goals. 169

171 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI terrorism crime unemployment disease war environmental devastation nuclear weapon genocide Source: own work on the basis of a CBOS opinion poll of a representative group of 2089 adult Poles, published in Figure 1. Sources of threats to Poles' security It needs to be emphasised that over half of victims of all terrorist attacks carried out in recent years were civilians, and most often accidental ones. Mass media has undoubtedly given a favourable spin to terrorist activity. Thanks to the press, radio and above all television, an isolated act of violence becomes a public issue 8. Generalising multiple definitions of terrorism in the most concise way, it may be said that terrorism is an act of violence planned in such a way so as to attract attention and by way of this publicity convey an appropriate message 9. The strategy of terrorism is a strategy based on communication; however, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that the platform for this communication is not only the official mass media but also the multiple methods available on the Internet which can offer a worldwide range with minimal expenditure. The rapid development of the global network, the increasingly higher bandwidth and falling 8 What often happens is the phenomenon called by Americans CNNisation of the world, that is acting by politicians in the sphere of media facts and not the real ones. H. and A. Toffler emphasised the media importance even stronger when they wrote that (...) some of the most important battles of today will be fought in the field of the media. 9 Cf. T.R. Aleksandrowicz, Terroryzm międzynarodowy, Warsaw 2008, p. 21.

172 STATE SECURITY THREATS costs, have gradually made the Internet one of the main tools of communication for terrorists. Thanks to the Internet, the possibility of conveying propaganda messages and influencing society is simply unlimited. The Internet cannot be censored and, due to the power of its message and the possibility of influencing social attitudes, has much greater potential than television; where journalist self-censorship remains and top-down legal regulations make it impossible to present the full scale of a given dramatic event. Television stations often refrain from showing the most violent events, but this is not so in the case of the Internet. Without much effort, anybody who has access to the Internet can connect with the right portal and watch the most drastic scenes, e.g. the execution of hostages. Other terrorist film productions can also be found on the Internet, e.g. recordings of attacks and suicide bombings. Many of these films are long (even up to a dozen or so minutes) productions, with background music and propaganda or religious slogans visible to a reader, and they remind one in their format of video clips familiar in the West. Taking into consideration the wide range of the Internet, its widespread access and uncontrolled content, it is clear that the possibilities it gives in the scope of propaganda activity and the gathering of financial resources are immeasurable. It can be assumed that the Internet is becoming a dominant form for conveying information. 10 The RFE/RL's research The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus focused on the relations between the media connected with Al Qaeda and armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. Daniel Kimmage, the research founder, claims that the Internet has become a fundamental tool, used by this supranational organisation to promote its message. In 2007, this author collected material from the net being a media bond of al Qaeda. It turns out that this organisation forbids its followers to create the content on their own, in order not to lose control over it and not to allow internal differences and disputes to be uncovered. Uploaded messages have a template: at the top of the page the logo of the group that prepared the material appears, and at the bottom the logo of the group that produced the video. The Internet, thanks to its flexibility and universality, has become a great world network allowing fanatics a free discussion on an international scale. 11 When analysing the internal and external environment of the state in the context of potential threats to the state security, the authors could not omit cyberterrorism, since any state which uses virtual space may become its victim, and undoubtedly Poland also. It seems appropriate to present the notion of cyberterrorism with a background of a fairly common classification of terrorist phenomena, that is: classical terrorism; superterrorism (nuclear, biological and chemical); cyberterrorism. 10 Tomasz Goban-Klas. Media i terroryści. Kraków 2009, pp Ibidem, p

173 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI The third category - cyberterrorism- can be divided into subcategories, according to researchers, allowing the placing of events connected with violence and attack in the information dimension. These include activism, hacktivism and cyberterrorism. In order to avoid ambiguity, it has been assumed that there are three equal problems which are a threat to the state information security and do not possess the qualities of an international conflict due to the fact that the notion of cyberterrorism is contained in itself: aktyvism: activities aiming at communicating and coordinating actions undertaken by activist organisations. These include such subgroups as collecting information, publication, dialogue, coordination of activities, and lobbying; haktivsm: the combination of criminal activity and activism, consists in civil disobedience referring to the Net. It includes virtual occupation, blockades, bombs, hacking into websites and computers, computer viruses and bugs; cyberterrorism: the notion at the junction of cyberspace and terrorism. It is different from haktivism as the aim of its activity is to inflict the largest possible damage on the enemy, including human victims. The most important types of cyberterrorist attacks are: logical bombs, Trojans, chipping, spoofing, hijacking, sniffing, DOS, Van Eck phreaking, flooding, and spamming. 12 As mentioned above, the computer network is nowadays doubtlessly a blood circulation system for any modern state. It is actually the foundation of the undisturbed activity of all spheres of state functioning, but mainly of its security. On the basis of the above, it can be assumed, after Glenn Buchan, that there are various reasons which might induce terrorists to carry out attacks in cyberspace: regular armed activity costs are incomparably higher than the costs of activity via the Internet. Currently, most members of society have their own computers; hence to launch a cyber-attack it is enough to have access to the Internet and some skills; an attack can be carried out from any place on the planet which has access to the Internet. The barriers between what is state, private, commercial and military have become blurred. It is not known where the attack comes from and who is behind it; actions are sudden and unpredictable, victims do not expect it, are unaware of danger and unprepared to repulse the attack; anonymity undoubtedly allows information to be manipulated, causes impediments connected with repulsing the attack by the state and the building of the coalition; there is a minimal risk of uncovering the ready attack; the intentions of the attacker are also unknown; 12 Krzysztof Liedel, Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dobie terrorystycznych i innych zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Toruń pp

174 STATE SECURITY THREATS greater propaganda effects and acknowledgement of public opinion are gained by paralysing the system of the enemy state than by aggression towards innocent people. 13 Intensively evolving criminal cyberterrorism is directed against banks and business; for example, during the attack on the ICT network in 1995 in Frankfurt, the functioning of stock exchange servers was blocked. Experience shows that nowadays it is not a problem to train an appropriate number of hackers whose aim may be to launch a mass attack on servers supporting such areas as: finance, transport, communication, medicine, energetics or national defence 14. The issue strictly connected with cyberterrorism is Internet wars. This notion refers to (...) actions aiming to damage, destroy or disrupt the operation of software, computers or information networks of a state or organisation, carried out by non-public actors, as a response to a similar attack launched by other non-public actors. Internet wars mean transferring real conflict or tension to cyberspace where a virtual clash takes place with the participation of more or less organised groups of hackers, but also cyberterrorists. 15 In practice, the objects of their interest are: software, computer networks of the government, public utility organisations, army and companies, which is why these tasks may in a decisive way contribute to a lowering of the national security level. To conclude, the phenomenon of cyberterrorism may always be a very dangerous, politically inspired act of aggression towards computers, networks or IT systems of any state aiming either to destroy its infrastructure or to terrorise the government and extort from it the decisions or activities complying with a terrorist organisation's wish. Another, extremely dangerous threat, which the state needs to defy firmly and effectively, is transnational organised crime. International criminal groups, fighting for areas of influence and smuggling channels, especially including mafia gangs from the East, clash precisely on the territory of Poland which has become a transit country, and more and more often, the destination of refugees, mainly from Asia. One of the requirements of the European Union towards Poland is sealing the Eastern border against uncontrolled movement of people and goods. In practice, the implementation of these requirements is manifested in the increased number of Border Guard posts and the introduction of the visa obligation for the neighbouring countries from the East. These efforts should significantly limit transnational organised crime, not only on the territory of Poland, but also in the whole of the European Union. Organised crime is difficult to easily define and does not submit to simple schemata, which is why it often generates problems and controversies in the research environment. 13 A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M. Gawrycki, Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie, Warsaw 2003, pp Ibidem, pp A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M. Gawrycki, op.cit., p

175 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI This is because it is a complex and diverse phenomenon changeable in form, which covers many spheres of public life, constantly evolves and is of dynamic character. To put it in the most concise way, transnational crime can be defined as a criminal phenomenon occurring on an international scale which cannot be strictly limited to an actual crime. It includes a set of particular offences, a complex form of anti-social behaviour. It is not a phenomenon previously unknown, as it was present in many countries, in different forms, and the objects of its interest were various spheres of social and economic life 16. International organised crime is defined in professional literature as one of the new risks or non-traditional risks which pose a threat to the security of citizens as well as whole states and the international order. Threats posed by this phenomenon are not direct and easily noticed, on the contrary, it is very difficult to recognise its activity and evaluate the scale of its influence on the state and international security system. 17 B. Hołyst counts organised crime among the factors which introduce chaos in a society by disturbing the balance of social systems and their cohesion, which contributes to destabilisation. They act against the social order in respect of the economy, law and morals 18. The source of threat caused by criminal groups comes from the very fact of undertaking illegal activity, and consequently infringing, on a large scale, rights protected by law. Whereas, what is even more dangerous for the state security system are the long-term effects of organised crime cross-border activity, whose sources should be sought in the so called secondary influence of criminal groups. Taking into consideration the fact that, as a result of illegal activity, organised criminal groups gain particular financial benefits, it should also be assumed that the resources obtained are used to influence the situation of particular states, their economies, and also, consequently, their security. So the financial resources obtained may also be used by criminal groups, not only to enhance the efficiency of their activity (buying better weapons and other technical equipment, paying specialised advisors), or to create a protective umbrella (corruption of officials and officers of law enforcement units), but also even if these types of effects are not intended by the criminals to lead to the destabilisation of the economic situation (growth of consumption and inflation caused by the inflow of illegal financial resources) as well as the political situation of the state (the decline in the trust of citizens towards politicians and state bodies caused by corruption and a lack of effectiveness in combating crime) 19. Cross-border organised crime also takes various forms in Poland. Its manifestation and range of activity in particular time spans also vary. To generalise, one can assume a thesis that this form of crime is a very dynamic phenomenon and at the same time impossible to describe in highly general terms Cf., of 30 January Cf. Zięba R., (ed.): Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, Warsaw 2008, p Cf. Hołyst B.: Kryminologia, 9th extended edition, Warsaw 2007, p of 30 January 2012.

176 STATE SECURITY THREATS Treating the above discussed threats as real and characterised with an extremely high probability of occurring, it cannot be ruled out that some of them, in the presence of appropriate situational factors in the state external environment, may turn into military threats. That is why, it seems appropriate to say that in order to assess potential threats to the state security it is necessary to explain the causes of military threats in Poland's external environment. The analysis of professional literature in this respect indicates that these causes include: unequal economic development; territorial claims and ethnic issues; international organised crime; religious fundamentalism. Special attention should be drawn, in the authors' opinion, to religious fundamentalism 20 as a source of threats, and, in particular, to the spreading in a number of forms, so called militant Islam, which leads to liberation conflicts, where membership of a religious community increases the morale of fighting sides. The manifestation of militant Islam may be terrorism in unstable states, such as Afghanistan or Pakistan. Also, others among those causes presented above contribute to the existence of military as well as terrorist 21 threats which lead to armed conflicts. Military threats, as an effect of the coincidence of different causes, may lead to armed violence 22. Professional literature offers different classifications of military threats. However, the majority of military theorists agree that armed forces may be used in an indirect and direct way. Due to that fact, it seems appropriate to divide them into: the threat of indirect and direct use of armed forces 23. Threats of indirect use of armed forces include 24 : military presence; military demonstration; armed blackmail; provocation (incidents); blockades; military assistance or support in the case of internal destabilisation. Threats to the indirect use of armed forces deepen the crisis in a given region, which may, or may not, require the military response of the international community. 20 Religious fundamentalism is an aspiration to subordinate all spheres of human life and the life of the society to religious rules and hedge them with law enforced by state institutions, [author's note.]. 21 The notion of a military and terrorist threat quoted after S. Dworecki, T. Kęsoń, M. Kulisz, Współczesne konflikty zbrojne (aspekt prognostyczny), Warsaw 1998, p P. Sienkiewicz, Wystarczalność obronna, Warsaw, 1996, pp B. Balcerowicz, Obronność państwa średniego, Warsaw 1997, p S. Dworecki, Prognoza obronności Polski do 2010, p.k. Gamma, Warsaw,

177 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI Direct use of armed forces may assume the following forms: armed intervention; armed border clash; sabotage attack; armed conflict on a limited scale; regular offensive military operation. Examples of direct use of armed forces are connected with two types of armed conflicts 25 : local conflicts of low or medium intensity 26 ; wars on a large scale. As a result of the location of Poland, and mainly the fact of being the border state of NATO, the most probable armed conflict in the closest environment may be a local conflict of low and medium intensity whose aim might be the annexation of a part of a disputed territory. The analysis of this problem to date shows that such a conflict is the most probable both on the territory of Poland as well as in the other areas of NATO defensive responsibility. There are many indications that show that in a local conflict of low and medium intensity the prerequisite of an aggressor's success is achieving the aim before the attacked party and its allies manage to implement effective countermeasures. It may happen when the aggressor obtains the effect of surprise by the selection of time, direction and strength of attack, where the aim of aggression 27 determines the way of using powers and resources 28. Moreover, the capability of firing assets at the disposal of the post-ussr states, especially Russia in the Kaliningrad region, have allowed the estimated ranges of their influence on the territory of Poland to be defined. Their analysis leads to another conclusion: that these states are able to launch an air rocket attack on the territory of Poland without a physical violation of the state border. The determination of the aim of an armed attack, the quantitative description of powers and resources, as well as their range, allows us to sketch a probable route for the potential aggressor's activity, which may proceed in accordance with the following stages: 1. Causing armed military incidents Attack and taking control of a disputed territory. 25 Ocena i prognoza zagrożeń polityczno militarnych RP oraz właściwości przyszłych działań wojennych [Evaluation and forecast of political and military threats of the Republic of Poland and the characteristics of future war activities], Warsaw 1992, pp , In western literature defined as: a low-intensity conflict. 27 Armed aggression armed force used by a state against sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of another country or otherwise contradictory to the United Nations Charter, J. Marczak, J. Pawłowski, O obronie militarnej Polski przełomu XX i XXI wieku, Warsaw 1995, p W. Lidwa, Współdziałanie w walce lądowej, Toruń 2000, p Armed incident intentional violation of state sovereignty (violation of borders). Cf. R. Wróblewski, Elementy teoretyczne planowania strategicznego obrony narodowej, Warsaw 1992, p

178 STATE SECURITY THREATS 3. Holding the disputed territory. 4. Making the dispute international and crawling into long-lasting negotiations. The analysis of historical experiences and military theorists opinions indicates that the development of a threat may take a few years. In this period, armed border incidents may happen and criminal (robbing) groups may come into play to attack the population of the borderland. Using the activity of sabotage groups, an aggressor aims at penetrating deep into a disputed territory in order to cause confusion and wreak havoc in the functioning of infrastructure and paralyse the administrative system of a given region. The above, as well as an aggressor s other activities, are of a provocative or sabotage character. Provocative activity aims at drawing the state into an armed conflict or burdening it with the responsibility for causing it. These goals may be achieved by: terrorist attacks; armed uprising; attacks on border posts, military and administrative facilities; purposeful violation of the state border. Another group of activities includes sabotage actions aimed at spreading panic, destabilising social life and weakening the morale of the population. In order to achieve this special actions, contracted criminal activities, smuggling, mugging or robberies might be carried out. Also the activity of terrorist groups, special forces, armed underworld groups or common criminal groups is possible 30. So far, the discussion has concerned possible military threats referring in general to Poland's closest environment, that is Polish relations with its neighbours not being NATO members. Moreover, Polish military units, mainly those marked out for NATO response forces, may at any time be summoned to act in the defence area of responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance, outside the territory of the country. Using these forces within the framework of allied intervention, may have different, often unfavourable consequences for the user, and require appropriate efforts in order to avoid or minimise them. Firstly, the situation should be systematically assessed and its development forecast, irrespective of whether it is the territory of Poland or another NATO area of responsibility. Secondly, an allied intervention may cause different reactions on the part of states (societies) of the territories where it takes place or on the part of the states supporting them. Simultaneously, the possibility of political pressure towards Poland cannot be ruled out completely, just as any attempts at retaliatory actions, mainly by bringing into play terrorist groups to launch attacks on the territory of 30 From the point of view of the state self-defence in the face of such activity, it is important to notice that the activity of irregular units, armed groups, gangs which carry out armed attacks against another state, in accordance with Article 3 of the definition of aggression (Resolution no 3314/XXIX of 14 December 1974 on Definition of Aggression), is considered as an act of aggression against which any state has the right of self-defence. 177

179 RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI Poland, which consequently may lead to an international crisis, and even to a local armed conflict. Thirdly, it might be necessary to use Polish response units to participate in actions against the states that may be considered as sponsors of potential terrorists. The selected threats and causes of conflicts presented in this article, arising from the closer and further environment of Poland, confirm the complexity and changeability of the problem. Both the adopted assumption that contemporary threats do not eliminate military threats and the ones that might appear in the future should be considered in the context of a conflict of low and medium intensity. The picture of threats presented above constitutes the basis for defining the directions of changes in the field of citizenship education. It seems advisable to emphasise the significant redefining that has taken place in this respect. In the documents of the Ministry of National Education it is stated that the role of education is (...) not only to give society the appropriate knowledge and preparation for professional life on the free market, but also to change the mentality, habits and customs by educating for democracy and explaining the notion of integration (...). Hence, teaching should be in equal measure focused on equipping people with practical skills as on shaping their predisposition to live and serve in the community 31. The assumptions of national education speak clearly of openness to the cultural values of Europe and the world. If it is assumed that international rapprochements lead to the averting of the threat of wars and promote peaceful coexistence and cooperation between nations, it seems necessary to redefine the nature, aims, content and organisation of education. Although nowadays Poland is not facing any serious external threat and its membership in the NATO structures seems to push such a possibility to the background, what needs to be borne in mind are the significant dynamics of changes taking place in Europe and in the world. Bibliography Aleksandrowicz T.R., Terroryzm międzynarodowy, Warsaw Balcerowicz B., Obronność państwa średniego, Warsaw Dworecki S., Kęsoń T., Kulisz M., Współczesne konflikty zbrojne (aspekt prognostyczny), Warsaw Dworecki S., Prognoza obronności Polski do 2010, p.k. Gamma, Warsaw, Bógdał-Brzezińska A., Gawrycki M.. Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie. Warsaw Goban-Klas T., Media i terroryści. Kraków Hołyst B.: Kryminologia, 9th extended edition, Warsaw F. Ułasiuk, Wychowanie pro obronne młodzieży, Wojsko i Wychowanie,1997, no 4, p. 24.

180 STATE SECURITY THREATS Liedel K., Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dobie terrorystycznych i innych zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Toruń Leksykon wiedzy wojskowej, MON, Warsaw Lidwa W., Współdziałanie w walce lądowej, Toruń Mały słownik języka polskiego, PWN, Warsaw Marczak J., Pawłowski J., O obronie militarnej Polski przełomu XX i XXI wieku, Warsaw Ocena i prognoza zagrożeń polityczno militarnych RP oraz właściwości przyszłych działań wojennych [Evaluation and forecast of political and military threats of the Republic of Poland and the characteristics of future war activities], Warsaw Sienkiewicz P., Wystarczalność obronna, Warsaw, Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, BPiI MON, Warsaw The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, November Szulc B., Wpływ zagrożeń na teorię walki, p.k. Zagrożenia, AON, Warsaw Ułasiuk F., Wychowanie proobronne młodzieży, Wojsko i Wychowanie,1997, no 4. Urban A., Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych, Warsaw Wróblewski R., Elementy teoretyczne planowania strategicznego obrony narodowej, Warsaw Zięba R., (ed.).: Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, Warsaw

181 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 4(93) ISSN ISSN EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS Col. (ret.) Eugeniusz JENDRASZCZAK, Ph.D. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract The author pays attention to the current problems of development of collective security tools, particularly focusing on the structures of such mechanisms, which form the basis of the European states security. The article analyzes changes in perception of real threats in order to present current directions of building adequate defence tools and mechanisms. Dynamic and areas in which political, social and economic changes take place, bring new assessments of contemporary threats. When the Cold War ended, the European states based their vision of security on NATO an EU. They had a traditional approach to NATO as the safest and the most reliable political and military structure, which was supposed to become their refuge of safety. The European Union, on the other hand, guaranteed political and economic development of the countries. The author analyzed the changes which took place in this area. Key words The European Union, NATO, security tools The author s aim is to verify (analyse) the development of concepts concerning security when it comes to contemporary threats. At the turn of the 20th and 21st century, the Cold War period ended having lasted nearly half a century after World War II. While discussing the changes which took place at this time, one may talk about a wide opening of the states to the world. This is also connected with socalled globalisation, which became released on the remains of the former system, due to the changes of contemporary political solutions when it comes to maintaining peace order in the world. There are some factors which have contributed to these changes. Apart from technological progress (e.g. information technology), economic and social development of the states (in particular those which were a positive example of social and economic development in the free market system) determined the changes as well. On the other hand, it should be remembered that other factors were also important, especially those which generated new mechanisms in the face of social unrest caused by progressive 180

182 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS underdevelopment of the countries (e.g. countries living on drug production and trafficking), which survived in ineffective social and political structures. Another factor is the culture of political systems (mainly in countries dominated by Muslims), referring to the supremacy of religion over the values of a democratic system. It should be remembered that the system of economic interests in a globalised world changes the current comprehension of a state s (economic) security. This may be caused, for example, by the unfavourable economic dislocation of the state s essential economic elements outside the country. Providing security in the contemporary world is often subject to discussion. This is caused by the events which have disturbed it (e.g. war in the former Yugoslavia or military interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan). Moreover, in the past, the armed forces were used to carry out the tasks aimed at stabilisation of situations which could result in escalation of the number of victims and the spreading of conflicts outside their borders. Security, which has many definitions 1, is one of the fundamental dimensions on which the existence of individuals and entire societies is based 2. Most often it is defined both as the state (a subject s sense of security) and the process (providing a subject with a sense of security) 3. In talking about the subject of security, I mean the interests of particular people, social groups, nations, states, organizations etc, whose ambition is to pursue these interests. Thus, many fields of security, e.g. economic, social, military, public, ecological etc., may be identified. The term physical security is often used when we have in mind protection and defence against deliberately organised destructive actions, taken by means and resources created particularly for this purpose. This case concerns military security and civil security (non-military). Depending on the location of the threat and risk, we may distinguish internal and external security 4. External security is related to military security, while internal security is part of civil (non-military) security. The traditional perception of security as a lack of external threat still dominates; such understanding has its origins in history. This is obviously connected with having appropriate structures of the armed forces and focusing foreign policy on the allies guarantee of support in case of threat. Currently, changes in the traditional perception of security can be observed. According to PhD K. Winkler, the traditional approach to external security was of great 1 Przegląd definicji. Zob. np. J. Stańczyk: Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa. ISP PAN, Warszawa 1996; J. Czaputowicz: System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku. WNPWN, CSM, Warszawa 1998; Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. AON, Warszawa S. Koziej: Bezpieczeństwo: istota, podstawowe kategorie i historyczna ewolucja. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, Kwartalnik BBN, II-2011/18, Warszawa Ibidem, s W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System. Wyd.: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2011, s

183 EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK importance at the time when international connections were weaker than at the beginning of the 21st century. He also claims that a spectrum of current challenges is greater than in the previous century 5. In this aspect he agrees with the views of many scientists who work in the field of security. Paradoxically, the expected changes which took place in international relations (in particular the end of the Cold War) did not result in a smaller number of threats and a greater sense of security. Undoubtedly, technological progress, which also encompassed interpersonal contacts in the advancing globalization process, as well as new political actors (non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations etc.) significantly contributed to introducing the changes. At the same time, due to transformation in the international arena, new areas of threats appeared, such as various organised crimes and specialised combat training centres of organised terrorist groups. Collective security, which meant building the balance of power, has become a distant memory. Observation and analysis of contemporary threats in the field of collective security clearly prove that they concern a greater number of scientific and research disciplines than before. The most important ones include, inter alia: political sciences, law, sociology, ecology and, finally, in the group of social sciences security science discipline and defence science discipline 6. According to S. Koziej, contemporary threats to security are a result of: social changes; globalisation process; disintegration of bipolar security system; weakened mechanisms of functioning of states and international organisations; deepening polarisation of the level of development and standard of life between rich and poor countries, and, as a result, increasing frustration and social unrest 7. In a lecture delivered at the National Defence University, Prof. A.D. Rotfeld claimed that while at present a considerable decrease in the number of classical threats (armed invasions) can be noticed, there are more untypical, asymmetrical threats caused by difficult to define non-state actors 8. Thus, it is not easy to identify the enemy, his intentions and potential. Furthermore, in the new political order, proper assessment of the threat to security of particular subjects, resulting from events which are taking place in various geopolitical areas, will also prove difficult. 5 E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, Wyzwania dla bezpiecznej Europy XXI wieku. Wydanie Specjalne Kwartalnika Bellona, Warszawa A. Lykke Jr., Towar dan Understanding of Military Strategy [w:] Military Strategy: Theory and Application, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 1989 [za:] U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security and Strategy, red. J.B. Bartholomees, Jr., wyd. 2 popr. i uzup., AWC Department of National Security and Strategy, Carlisle 2006, s S. Koziej, Strategiczne problemy bezpieczeństwa globalnego i europejskiego. Warszawa A.D. Rotfeld, Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP w nowych warunkach międzynarodowych: nowe wyzwania, nowe zadania. Zeszyty Naukowe AON 2003 nr

184 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS Undoubtedly, the approach to an assessment of threats to world security changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, For most countries, including Poland, this date became a turning point in the creation of a new political order after the Cold War 9. Globally, collective security mechanisms, which had existed up to that time, were based on solutions implemented mainly by the United Nations. In cases of arguments and armed conflicts near one or many countries, special groups of experts (recognised authorities) appointed by the UN were sent to solve them. Other measures included deploying international military units to conduct peacekeeping missions ( Blue Helmets or Blue Berets ) in areas which required supervision of meeting the commitments of the parties to the conflict, up to the peaceful intention to end it. Together with the change of the bipolar security order, this mechanism lost its meaning and became less useful in new conflicts. This could be noticed, in particular, in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (1992), where the UNPROFOR mission conducted under UN resolution was not able to manage all the tasks. Then, actions aimed at verification of the UN mechanisms were taken and another international structure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was asked for help. In this way, the Alliance used military forces to carry out tasks outside its territory for the first time. Under the UN resolution of , for the first time NATO forces shot down four Serb aircraft in the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Since then there has been greater demand for the use of real military structures to settle the conflicts which became the subject of interest of international organisations other than the UN (OSCE, NATO, EU, and African Union AU). NATO s concept to engage the troops seemed the most effective, due to the real use of troops, as well as having appropriate structures and systems of command. In case of crises the UN could then slightly expand the mechanism of the involvement of troops. However, in the majority of contemporary crises, it is easier for the UN to apply to NATO for help than to solve them on their own. This highlights the significant weaknesses of this organisation. Many crises in this century concern the fighting of terrorism, humanitarian problems, fighting for natural resources, the domestic unrest of states on their way to democratic development, or sea piracy. In such a situation the Alliance more often has to undertake measures to counteract or liquidate trouble spots beyond the NATO Treaty area of responsibility. The character of the new challenges sometimes requires making fundamental changes aimed at adapting military structures and their capabilities to actions appropriate for the new environment of conducted operations. The need to make these changes rests on the member states, and the unpredictability of the development of potential threats does not make this task easier. In the structures of the military and law enforcement services both civil and military tendencies to 9 Ibidem. 10 Rezolucja Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 816 z 31 marca 1993 r. 183

185 EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK focus on expansion of special forces, capable of fighting with a new enemy can be noticed in many countries. In Poland, for example, the special forces were created as a new branch. At the same time, the Alliance deploys troops in the conflict areas beyond its area of responsibility and in this way develops structures and command systems which meet new needs resulting from participation in the so-called expeditionary missions. Simultaneously, the NATO states reduce their armed forces and implement new solutions (including e.g. Smart Defence). These mechanisms are to guarantee security within obligations under Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. During combat operations conducted beyond the NATO Treaty area the troops face the enemy using typical guerrilla tactics. The war, called asymmetrical, does not have to be fought by the state, but for example by an organised group (political, religious, criminal group etc.), which has precise objectives. The threats resulting from asymmetrical operations may be connected with 11 : 1. destabilisation or incapacitating the key elements of the enemy s civil or military infrastructure; 2. weakening political support which the enemy receives from the allies; 3. reduction of the rate of actions; 4. weakening the enemy s military effectiveness, in particular by impeding employment of equipment before and during combat operations. 5. increasing political costs of conducted operations and involvement of human and material resources; 6. thwarting interoperability to hinder the coalition operations; 7. preventing the enemy s intelligence supremacy and appropriate situation assessment. Development of security tools could be also noticed as the new concepts appeared concerning political and military cooperation in the structures of an expanding European Union. The NATO Prague summit (21 22 November 2002) revealed the convergent endeavours of the EU major states politicians to transform the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the European Security and Defence Union (ESDU). These changes were aimed at the development of cooperation of the EU states in the field of security as to 12 : a) creating international forces; b) development of defence industry; c) human resources management; d) development of joint defence doctrines; e) increased concentration and rationalisation of funding for the goals of security and defence due to majority voting; f) acceleration of the decision-making processes. 11 Por. J. Pawłowski, Zagrożenia asymetryczne. Warszawa 2003, s ; M. Madej, Globalizacja zagrożeń asymetrycznych. Sprawy Międzynarodowe 2003 nr E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, op. cit., s

186 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS Many EU states expected such a concept, in particular those which applied for the status of a full member. The discrepancies in attitudes of the representatives of some countries also appeared, e.g. France and Germany focused on building European defence. Great Britain headed those EU states which were oriented at the development of common security together with strengthening transatlantic ties. The EU politicians official statements prove that they perceived development of the ESDP, beside NATO, as an important tool providing Europe with common security. Security understood in this way is based on strong transatlantic ties. During the meeting in Brussels (17 18 June 2004) the European Council adopted new decisions concerning the development of the ESDP. Based on the document, Headline Goal 2010, the European Defence Agency and planning cells 13 were set up. As a consequence, due to the development of the EU security concept, decisions to create the European Rapid Reaction Forces were made on November The forces should be capable of starting operations within days, conducting them on their own for 30 day, and, after reinforcement, extending this to 120 days at a distance of up to 6,000 km from Brussels 14. The decision was made to establish 13 battlegroups with a strength of 1500 troops each. The Central European states, which had joined the EU, supported the decision to set up the battlegroups. Implementation of this decision was perceived as a chance for real engagement in the creation of EU operational forces. The effectiveness of using the EU battlegroups in crisis response operations results from the following factors 15 : 1. political factors which define the character of a mission, the number of troops, rules and structure of command, the way of funding and Rules of Engagement. 2. military factors, which define the rules of operations, area of responsibility, equipment of troops, the way of conducting kinetic counterterrorism operations; 3. non-kinetic operations which guarantee the success of activities aimed at providing security and winning the trust of the local population; 4. training and equipment of sub-units, which is the basis for defining capabilities and the level of effectiveness in the multinational environment; 5. logistical factors which, in turn, determine the possibilities of supplying troops, health care and all kinds of repairs. Due to the variety of places where EU battlegroups conduct their operations, it is necessary to define detailed tasks depending on changing conditions. Moreover, the appropriate structure of the battlegroup should be provided as well as efficient command. Apart from execution of these tasks, the EU systematically supported the UN and NATO initiatives aimed at stabilising the situation in the conflict areas in the 13 Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June European Union Battlegroup Concept. Brussels, 5 October 2006, s E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, op. cit.; D. Majchrzak, Przygotowanie grup bojowych Unii Europejskiej, s

187 EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK world. Initially, these tasks were of little significance when it comes to engaged forces. However, at the NATO summit in Istanbul (28 29 June 2004) the decision was made to hand over the mission of the Alliance under the UN mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council Resolution no (22 November 2004), the mandate for the EU Force (EUFOR) in operation Althea was defined. On 25 November, the European Union Council made a decision to take part a week later in the biggest military operation in the history of the European Union 16. This case demonstrates that new tools and mechanisms for building security were sought, such as real military cooperation of NATO and EU structures. The important thing is that the actions were taken under the UN resolution and mandate. This mission was, to a certain degree, a testing ground for the EU, in particular its organisational structures, which were gaining experience in the execution of such tasks. The circumstances which allowed for the conduct of this military operation cannot be underestimated. It was based on the support which NATO provided to EUFOR troops all the time they were carrying out their tasks. Due to the mechanism of EU NATO agreements, called the Berlin Plus, it was possible to prepare documents detailing the range and principles for support of the operation by NATO. On this basis all efforts to support the EU operation by the Alliance were subject to financial settlements between these organisations. Such experience allowed the EU not only to understand better the cost and funding of the military mission, but more importantly, in my opinion, to learn about issues related to the conducting of military operations by the multinational forces. The European Union not only engages in creating possibilities for military involvement to settle conflicts and crises, but also develops the mechanisms of political participation in this process. The regional cooperation between the EU and Russia should also be mentioned. However, agreeing on a uniform attitude towards cooperation in reaction to the conflicts faced problems. At the European Council summit in Seville, Russia did not accept most proposals for cooperation in response to conflicts in the common neighbourhood 17. The initiatives to cooperate as to the conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus were not successful either. The Russian authorities agreed to contribute to common operations with the EU on the condition that they would fully participate in the procedures for commanding the operations 18. It seems that appointing five Russian internal services officers to 16 EUFOR Fact Sheet Spotkanie Rady Europejskiej w Sewilli, czerwca 2002 r. Wnioski prezydencji. Żródło URL: oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/dokumenty/konkluzje/sewilla pdf.marzec 2011/. 18 Spotkanie Rady Europejskiej w Sewilli, czerwca 2002 r. Wnioski prezydencji. Żródło URL: oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/dokumenty/konkluzje/sewilla pdf.marzec 2011/. 186

188 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) was the only case of its active involvement 19. However, one should still expect progress in the relations between the EU and Russia stbefore the summit in Sochi, as announced by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council 20. One may add here that the project of the initiative undertaken at the NATO summit in Rome in 2002, concerning close cooperation in counteracting crises and settlement of conflicts, did not bring any noticeable results. At the meeting of the NATO Russia Council in Brussels (2013), the agreement on missile defence was not achieved. Only the mechanism of regular contacts, if it were to come to security at the level of ministries of defence between the USA and Russia, was initiated. These contacts concern practical cooperation between both countries. In spite of this, many experts see here a lot of unused potential, which gives hope for greater successes in the future. It should be expected that the meeting in Brussels this January, in which the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, and Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen participated, established a desire for future cooperation 21. This meeting resulted in discussion on undertaking common efforts to fight terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking, as well as cooperation as to Afghanistan. Moreover, other topics were raised, on which agreement had not been reached so far, including the American missile defence system. Conclusions Contemporary security needs an analysis of the changes and their results which emphasise further elements of the general definition of security. The determinants of today s security are: 1. Most democratic countries (including Poland) perceive security in a different way now, and focus more on providing internal security than external security At present, external security is perceived by many states as an active involvement in international structures and mechanisms (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE etc.) which are to guarantee it. The states intention is not to allow development of conflicts near their borders. 19 M. Menkiszak: Rosja wobec Unii Europejskiej: kryzys strategicznego partnerstwa. Prace OSW, Warszawa, styczeń 2006, s Głos Rosji, 29 stycznia UE i Rosja powinny osiągnąć postęp w stosunkach przed szczytem w Soczi. Źródło: 21 Głos Rosji, 28 stycznia NATO i Rosja opowiadają się za partnerstwem strategicznym. Źródło: i rosja/. 22 See: Z. Nowakowski, H. Szafran, R. Szafran, Bezpieczeństwo w XXI wieku, Rzeszów 2009, s

189 EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK 3. At present, Russia plays significant role in shaping security. In this regard, NATO and the EU will, if possible, strengthen mechanisms for maintaining good relations with the Russian Federation. As the successor of the former USSR (due to good knowledge of issues related to Asia) and a main supplier of energy resources to Europe, it is an important actor in settling potential crises. 4. NATO and the EU will focus on the command systems and reaction forces based on the most modern solutions. In a short time the reaction forces should be capable of operating independently or in cooperation with allied forces in remote areas of deployment. 5. NATO will base collective defence guarantees (Art. 5 of the Treaty) on development of a complementary allied defence system within the Smart Defence concept, at the same time reducing of the number of troops and command structures. 6. NATO and EU operations will be based on the mechanisms of the international law institutions (UN as the lead organization). 7. In the majority of countries (including Poland), elements of the military and law enforcement structures police systems will be expanded in order to improve security. The structures of the military forces will be reduced; moreover, they will be refocused on development and maintaining elements essential to conduct defence tasks under Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty which means special forces and expeditionary units according to the requirements of the EU and NATO. 188

190 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM ISSN RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM Bogdan MICHAILIIUK, Ph.D. Eng. National Security Faculty NDU A wise man expects the worst and experiences the best Abstract Chinese proverb Civil protection includes activities aimed at providing security to people, assets and the environment in case of threats caused by nature itself and the development of civilization, as well as warfare or terrorist activity. The rescue and civil protection subsystem plays an important role in the national security system of our country. Taking into account the specific area of activities, it is crucial for the subordinate services to be properly coordinated and their competences to be distributed appropriately. Rescue and civil protection services should properly understand the nature of threats their types and range, as well as the types and range of their negative effects concerning people, animals, the environment and material assets. Key words civil protection, rescue, civil defence Introduction Television screens and newspaper front pages nearly every day show images of different types of conflicts and disasters taking place in the world. Any coverage from a threatened place oscillates around one statement to bring help to the needy in the shortest possible time. Irrespective of whether a given event is the effect of human activity or the consequence of acts of nature, it is most important to ensure that the response is adequate, fast and effective. The human factor plays an important role here. Namely, the units which perform tasks connected with rescue and civil protection should be competent, composed and demonstrate the ability to cooperate fast and effectively in a team. The future of people and assets in 189

191 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK threatened places depends upon rescue services. In the face of these type of events, it is important to undertake every type of activity in order for our civil protection and rescue services not to fail when they are most needed. The rescue and civil protection subsystem plays an important role in the Polish national security system. Taking into account the specific area of their activities, it is crucial for subordinate services to be properly coordinated and their competences to be distributed appropriately so as to avoid duplication. In the changing world, the foundation of the management of any organism, mechanism, social structure, or enterprise is the updated, real, reliable knowledge of a given situation. Rescue and civil protection services should be equipped with the knowledge of threats their type and range along with the type and range of their consequences concerning people, animals, the environment and assets. Contemporary challenges and threats have never affected people, assets, the environment and infrastructure so much as they do these days. 1 Threats to contemporary societies caused by catastrophes and technical failures, natural disasters and environmental contamination are also the consequences of wars. Apart from military power, contemporary national security and national defence encompass, to an increasingly larger extent, the ability to protect and rescue people, assets and the environment against non-military threats. 2 The place of rescue and civil protection in the National Security System of the Republic of Poland (NSS) In order to ensure the national interests and strategic aims in the field of security, Poland has formulated and developed an integrated National Security System (NSS). 3 The National Security System of the Republic of Poland of 2007 does not present it as a uniform system, but as a collection of many different subsystems. 4 The White Paper on The National Security of Poland issued in 2013 by the National Security Bureau defines the national (state) security system as all the powers (entities), means, resources and reserves destined by the state to perform tasks in the field of security, which are organised properly (in subsystems and links) to fulfil these tasks, and are maintained and prepared. It consists of the subsystem (system) of management and a set of executory subsystems (systems), 1 A. Skrabacz, Ochrona ludności w Polsce w XXI wieku. Wyzwania, uwarunkowania, perspektywy, Agencja Marketingowo-Wydawnicza Merkeriusz Agmarkt s.c., volume. 1, Tarnów 2006, ISBN , p M. Renner, National security. The economic and environmental dimension, Worldwatch Paper 5/1989, Worldwatch Institute, Washington 1989, ISBN: , p W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System, Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2011, ISBN , p The National Security System is presented in point 4 of the National Defence Strategy of

192 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM connected in different ways, including operational subsystems (defence and protection) and support subsystems (social and economic). 5 The above model of the national security system is graphically presented in figure 1. ADVISORY BODY DECISION MAKER MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEMS STAFF BODY Operational subsystems Support subsystems defence protection social economic EXECUTORY SUBSYSTEMS Source: own work on the basis of the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland, National Security Bureau, Warsaw 2013, p. 36. Figure 1. Universal model of the national security system Currently the NSS constitutes the sum of separate subsystems which internally are not fully logically and strictly connected by the national security management subsystem. This is the result to a significant extent from the multiple inaccuracies of the legal grounds, manifested in the lack of responsible bodies, which, in extreme situations, causes a duplication of competences and the consequent wastefulness and inefficiency of the system. It needs to be stressed that the NSS has still not been optimally organised. In this respect, it is a challenge to appropriately integrate its particular elements. Where is the place of civil protection and rescue services? Well, it is the executory subsystems that should be indicated here, and in particular, the operational subsystems. The operational subsystems include the state defence 5 The White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland, National Security Bureau, Warsaw 2013, ISBN , p

193 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK subsystem (defences, national defence, military security) and the state and civil protection subsystems (civil, non-military security). Within the framework of the first group, the tasks performed aim at seizing the chances, taking up challenges, minimising risk and counteracting (preventing and opposing) external threats to security of a political and military character. Whereas, the state and civil protection subsystems aim at seizing the chances, taking up challenges, minimising risk and counteracting (preventing and opposing) external and internal threats to the security of non-military (civilian) character Civil protection and rescue notion, character and nature The term civil protection is included in the set of notions which, being intuitively understood, are commonly used in legal instruments. Civil protection is often treated equally with civil defence, which is a mistake. Over the last few decades, a significant evolution in this respect lead to significant differences between these terms. Civil protection is included in the scope of the responsibility of civil defence, although the scope of its activity significantly exceeds the field of civil defence, hence it is wrong to equate these two. Civil defence aims at: protecting people, work places, public utility facilities and cultural assets; rescuing people and providing help to the injured during war time; cooperation in combating natural disasters and environmental threats, and also in eliminating their effects. 7 The issues of civil defence, and hence also civil protection and rescue, are regulated in Poland by two key legal instruments: the Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland 8 and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers on Civil Defence 9. Civil protection consists in the protection of the civilian population and civilian people 10 and includes both public administration activity as well as individual activity aiming at ensuring the security of life and the health of people and their possessions. It strives for maintaining favourable environmental conditions for their survival, social and psychological help for the injured, legal protection and educational support as well as fitness preparation in order to be able to deal with 6 Ibidem, p Article 137 of the Act of 21 November 1967 on General Defence obligation of the Republic of Poland (JoL of 2013, item 852). 8 The Act of 21 November 1967 on General Defence obligation of the Republic of Poland (JoL of 2013, item 852) 9 The Regulation of the Council of Ministers on Civil Defence of 28 September 1993 (JoL of 1993, no 93, item 429 with subsequent amendments). 10 In accordance with Article 50 (2) of the Amendment Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) made in Geneva on 8 June 1977 (JoL no 41 of 1992, item 175) civilian population means all civilian people.

194 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM various situation in case of catastrophes, natural disasters and military conflicts, as well as directly after their cessation. 11 The Geneva Convention 12 defines civil protection as one of the civil defence tasks which includes activities enabling people's survival in case of a cataclysm or war. In accordance with the definition adopted by W. Kitler, civil protection encompasses the all activities of all the state legal subjects, depending on their legal status, aiming at ensuring the security of the society, property, national heritage assets and the environment in the face of natural calamities and disasters as well as the ones caused by human activity, including war. 13 Civil protection is therefore a sphere of security which, first of all, focuses its attention on ensuring human survival, irrespective of the type or cause of threat. The location of civil protection in the general context of threats is depicted in figure 2. MAIN SOURCES (CAUSES) OF THREATS CAUSATIVE THREATS CONDITIONING THE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND DYNAMICS OF THREATS natural threats accidents errors ELEMENTS -> RESPONSE Critical physical threats: biological, chemical, mechanical, geological, radiation, acoustic, magnetic, thermal... crisis inducing Disturbances of population existence environment Critical psychological threats: functional disturbances, impediments, overburdening, conflicts, demoralization... purposeful activity Critical infrastructure effectiveness: manufacturing infrastructure, including: services; protective infrastructure CIVIL PROTECTION Source: own work on the basis of the issue date: 14 January Figure. 2. Place of civil protection in the general context of threats 11 Ibidem, Article The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 13 W. Kitler, Powszechna ochrona ludności w świetle ustaleń międzynarodowych, Zeszyt Problemowy 1/2001, Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw 2001, p

195 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK The implementation of tasks aiming at ensuring security for people, assets and the environment in the case of threats caused both by forces of nature (natural disasters) and civilisational development (failures, catastrophes), as well as military and terrorist activity includes four types of activities: 1. prevention, that is activities aiming at minimising losses legislative works, planning, creating stores, building organisational structures, constructing protective buildings and systems (hiding places, shelters, flood banks), control (border and shipping, etc.), 2. achieving readiness constant examination, improvement of rescue services, and equipping them, educating the society, simulations and exercises, developing procedures; 3. responding to threats organising means of management and coordination, searching for the injured and providing help, eliminating the hotbeds of threats, mobilising rescue services and volunteers, transferring information between the services and the authorities, mass media and the society; 4. reconstruction, that is restoring the condition from the time before the event estimating losses, informing of rights and obligations, effective administering, initializing the reconstruction of the damage, analysing needs and fulfilling obligations, guaranteeing access to social aid, constructive conclusions and proposals. Civil protection tasks include, among other things, defining threats, preventing them and ensuring the protection of people in times of threats, including war, and also organising and ensuring the functioning of the crisis management system. Essential elements of civil protection, which performs both temporary activities, in the scope of response to threats as well as appropriate planning tasks, are: chief and central public administration organisations, that is competent ministers, Commandant of the State Fire Service, the Chief of State Civil Defence and chief inspectors. The implementation of tasks in the scope of civil protection is undertaken by local bodies of public administration governors [wojewoda], district councils, municipality heads [wójt] or mayors (city presidents). The scope of activity of the local civil protection bodies in districts [powiat] includes: defining threats and planning preventive measures in the administered area, monitoring and alerting people, coordinating rescue activities as well as order and protection activities, along with management in crisis situations with the help of a district crisis management centre. Whereas, as for the scope of the activity of local civil protection bodies in towns and cities, it is definitely worth indicating here that they are responsible for: defining particular locations of threats' sources, eliminating them and their consequences as well as monitoring and alerting people. What seems essential here is the coordination of rescue activities and rescue forces management, as well as the evacuation of people with the help of a city/town response team; mobilisation and preparation to spread the services in order to 194

196 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM perform tasks connected with civil protection in times of war; the organisation of a population's training in the field of general self-defence. To put the tasks of civil protection in order, the following areas should be listed: planning and organisational works in the necessary scope; warning and alerting; rescuing people, animals and assets; evacuation of the threatened areas; preparing and organising shelters; operating black out devices; organising medical and psychological help (also religious care); combating natural disasters (fire, flood); restoring and maintaining order in the disaster areas; ensuring temporary accommodation and supplies for the injured; restoring the activity of public utility services; liquidation of contamination and infections, decontamination and other protective activities; burials. 14 The activity in the scope of civil protection is conducted in any conditions and situations of the state's functioning 15. There can be listed three conditions of the implementation of the above mentioned tasks. The first one is vigil and immediate response, which means everyday routine activities connected with rescuing people and assets, and cleaning the environment and the elimination of their negative consequences, including activities aiming at preventing and counteracting threats. Another condition is the response in the face of a threat leading directly to a crisis and during a crisis. The last one is civil protection in times of war, in accordance with the international legal regulations. Civil protection is divided into collective and individual protection. At the collective level, it is provided by institutions and includes such activities as evacuation, creating places of shelter, detecting threats and alerting people about them. Whereas at the individual level, it consists of the following activities undertaken by citizens: obtaining the knowledge of evacuation rules, routes and places, obtaining the knowledge of alarm signals and rules of conduct after hearing them, possessing individual protective equipment and the ability to use it and the consequences of using it, 14 Article 61 Protocol I. 15 The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 September 2004 on the state defence readiness (JoL of 2004, no 219, item 2218) introduces 3 conditions of state defence readiness: condition of permanent state defence readiness, condition of state defence readiness in times of crisis, condition of state defence readiness in times of war. 195

197 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK obtaining the knowledge of rules concerning the preparation of flats, buildings, water intakes and food to be protected against the consequences of disasters and crises, obtaining the knowledge of rules of providing first aid, ensuring the ability to independently eliminate the sources of disasters, e.g. fires. As for the phenomenon of rescue, in the most general way it can be defined as the organised way of providing help in the case of accidents. Currently, it appears to be the first line of national protection and defence. Rescue capability and the efficiency of professional and volunteer rescue formations, led by the state and volunteer fire service, medical, chemical and sea rescue services, supported by the rescue forces of the army constitute an unusually significant link between contemporary national protection and defence. The Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa [Small Military Encyclopaedia] defines rescue as providing help in case of emergency, especially when threatening health and life of people; rescue operations are undertaken both in times of peace (great catastrophes, natural disasters) as well as in times of war. 16 Whereas, according to the Nowy słownik języka polskiego PWN [New Polish Language Dictionary] rescue is an activity which aim is to rescue people or things in danger, as well as people and means engaged in such activity. Rescue activity consists in averting a danger, (...) especially the threat of death or destruction. 17 It is also worth differentiating between the notion of rescue and rescue activity. Rescue is understood as activity conducted at all levels of the state organisation in its all conditions (in times of peace, crisis and war) with the use of different methods, powers and means, which aims at rescuing human life and material assets. Whereas, rescue activity means providing help in a difficult emergency situation which threatens the life of victims and rescuers and may lead to the contamination of the environment and the destruction of important elements of material and cultural assets. Having analysed the source and the way of financing of rescue activity, there may be differentiated: state rescue financed form the state budget and the territorial government resources; social rescue costs of organisation and maintenance are 100 percent covered from the resources of non-governmental organisations; commercial rescue which functions in the category of service, which means that the rescue activity is chargeable. There is a frequently used typology of rescue which divides the phenomenon with respect to the range of rescue activity. Namely, on this basis, there might be Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa, volume III, MON, Warsaw 1971, p Nowy słownik języka polskiego PWN, Wyd. PWN, Warsaw 2000, pp

198 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM differentiated: international, national, provincial [wojewódzki], district [powiatowy], municipal [gminny] and local rescue. The following categories may be differentiated within the state rescue: depending on types of rescue forces: - medical rescue; - military rescue; - mining rescue; - chemical rescue; - rail rescue; - veterinary rescue, etc. depending on types of events (natural disaster, natural, technical, technological catastrophe, etc.) among others: - sea rescue; - fire rescue; - radiation rescue; - aviation rescue; - flood rescue; - road rescue; - rail rescue. Rescue operations are organised and conducted in order to rescue and provide help to people injured as a result of military activity, natural disasters and other similar events, such as, for example, threats to the environment. 18 The obligation to organise and conduct rescue operations in times of war belongs to the heads of civil defence and managers (owners) of work places. They have at their disposal civil defence formations, appropriately prepared from the point of view of competence and equipment. The commandants of these formations lead rescue operations, and use all available powers and resources destined for that purpose. It is impossible within the scope of this article to describe the issues connected with the specificity of the organisation of rescue operations typical for different types of rescue services subordinate to different ministries. This is due to the fact that all services develop their own methodology of conduct, resulting each time from a specific situation. Due to the long experience of the author connected with the work in the chemical corps, the example of a chemical failure will be used to show the set of aims and tasks performed stage by stage in the failure zone. Additionally, the choice of this rescue operation background is justified by the fact that this activity is uniform for all services faced with this type of threat. Mainly, these tasks, rescue operation phases, include: identification of a substance, indication of contamination zones and the range of threats; activation of the contamination alarm, warning and alerting systems; 18 F.R. Krynojewski, Obrona cywilna Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2012, ISBN , p

199 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK evacuation of people from the threatened zone and providing first aid; elimination of emission sources as well as the destruction and neutralisation of a released toxic substance; decontamination of rescue services; rehabilitation of the environment in the failure zone. 19 The most important stage of the organisation of a rescue operation, apart from providing medical aid, is the destruction and neutralisation of toxic industrial chemicals 20 in the failure zone. The most important aims - stages in this field include the: indication of the destruction zone division of the failure zone; limitation of the source of gas emission, leak of a liquid substance, spill of a solid substance; limitation of the proliferation of the substance released: - to the air by placing water curtains or lowering the intensity of evaporating; - to surface waters by sealing the sewer system; - to the ground and ground waters by sectioning off foil covered ditches; 4. mechanical and sorbent cleanup of toxic substances and transporting them to the destruction zone; 5. neutralisation of a toxic substance in the failure zone or in a particular place; 6. cleanup and neutralisation of the failure zone from the remains of TIC. 21 The diagram of the organisation of a rescue operation in a failure zone is presented in figure 3. All rescue services in a different and characteristic way divide a rescue operation zone. In general, the division of a rescue operation zone into three zones could be assumed as justified: zone I destruction zone; zone II - support zone (in figure 3 marked as the distribution of rescue units zone); zone III clearance zone issue date: TIC toxic industrial chemicals; chemical compounds of poisonous properties, used in big amounts especially in transport and industry. They are characterised with the ability to be easily released to the air due to the destruction or failure of installations. They have varied properties whose specificity does not allow to classify them in accordance with the criteria of classical division of poisons and poisonous substances. The basis of classification is here the point of view of the Civil Defence and entities undertaking activities aiming at the protection against contamination of people and providing aid to the injured (cf.: issue date: 09 January

200 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM PPM EP S II R R S I Straż R katastrofa R R R R R PPM Sztab koord. Straż PI EW SK Pol. Amb. Kost. Pol. Pol. ZMM ZMM Hosp. Hosp. ZMS ZMS ZMS Legend: OE original evacuation, SE secondary evacuation, IP information point, MSP medical service point, R rescuer, MP management point, SI destruction zone, SII distribution of rescue units zone, SA substitute accommodation, SHP substitute hospital places. Source: own work on the basis of the J. Konieczny, Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w nagłych i nadzwyczajnych zagrożeniach środowiska: studium społeczno-ekologiczne w perspektywie zrównoważonego rozwoju, Wyd. Panoptikos, Poznań 1995, p Figure 3. Diagram of the organisation of a rescue operation in a failure zone 199

201 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK Rescue and civil protection services The fundamental task of the state is ensuring for its citizens the protection of life and assets at any time and in any circumstances, which is clearly stressed by the constitutional guarantee of protection against disastrous industrial threats, natural disasters and the consequences of military activities. Government and local administration bodies are obliged to fulfil these assurances both in times of peace as well as in time of war. The services destined for civil protection and the elimination of local threats in times of peace include the regular rescue forces [the State Fire Service (SFS), Police, medical services, sanitary and epidemiological, veterinary, environmental protection services and others] and designated sub-units of the armed forces, and also (in case of a large range of a threat) the civilian population. Their task is to provide necessary help in the case of road accidents, rail accidents, and power and gas supply failures. Rescue activities in times of peace are managed by a designated person from the SFS who coordinates its activity with a competent local government body (municipality head, mayor, council leader, or governor depending on the range of a threat). In times of war, extraordinary threats are dealt with by all powers and resources at disposal in a given area, under the leadership of a locally competent body for civil defence (commune head, mayor, district council, governor depending on the range of a threat). In case of the insufficient predispositions of these people, superior bodies may designate another, substantially competent person. Undoubtedly, it is the State Fire Service (SFS) that plays one of the most important roles among rescue and civil protection services. It is a professional, uniformed formation fitted with specialised equipment, destined for combating fires, natural disasters and other local threats. 22 The SFS plays a role of an intervention force in the case of disastrous events. In the rescue and civil protection subsystem, its activity is supported by other services, guards and state institutions as well as by the network of non-governmental organisations. 23 The ranks of the State Fire Service are composed of over 30 thousand officers, lead by the Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service, subordinate to the Minister of Interior. From the moment of its establishment, the scope of the SFS's tasks has been significantly expanded. It is not only associated any more with its original duty extinguishing fires, but also with organising and conducting rescue operations in emergency situations, including among other things, disasters and road accidents, construction accidents and those of a chemical background. The Sate Fire Service 22 Article of the Act of 24 August 1991 on the State Fire Service (JoL of 2013, item 1340 with subsequent amendments). 23 The White Paper on the National Security of the Republic of Poland, p

202 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM is also a work place of people supervising the observance of fire regulations, conducting scientific research on fire protection and civil protection. The author of this article had a chance to participate in the conference Civil protection past and present organised in 2012 by the Civil Protection and Civil Defence Bureau as well as the International Cooperation Bureau of the National Headquarters of the State Fire Service. Events of this type show that the issue presented in this article is very significant. Furthermore, thanks to the participation of representatives of the world of science, and determiners of legal and institutional conditions, as well as people performing tasks from the scope of civil protection and rescue, an exchange of opinions was able to take place, which results in the development of innovative solutions, supported with concrete proposals. The State Fire Service serves as a coordinator of rescue operations in a disaster zone, by synchronising the cooperation of its officers with the police and emergency service staff. The last decade has resulted in a wave of innovative changes in the scope of the distribution of vehicles as well as rescue and fire-fighting equipment. What is even more important, the internal procedures have been verified and modified so as to adjust them to the requirements of the contemporary reality. Enterprises within the scope of civil protection are conducted in accordance with strictly defined rules. The chief rule is based on the universality of the civil protection system. Another one is the three-step separation of powers, where the industry arrangement plays an auxiliary role. It is also important to ensure the response of powers and resources adequate to the character and range of a threat. Another rule concerns a one-person leadership and responsibility for maintaining the readiness to protect people by municipality heads and district leaders at a province level. An important role in civil protection is played by central government administration bodies and local administration bodies led by governors, district leaders and municipality heads. In Poland there are many organisations performing different tasks from the scope of rescue and civil protection, in accordance with the national legal regulations. Among them the following may be named: working in the emergency mode: the State Emergency Medical Services, sea rescue, mountain rescue, water rescue, mining rescue, gas rescue, energy rescue, the National Firefighting and Rescue System, working in the regular mode: 201

203 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK municipal services, welfare services, health service, sanitary and epidemiological services environmental protection services, and multiple non-governmental organisations. A basic difficulty, making it impossible to fully use the potential of the above mentioned institutions, is the lack of the systematic ordering of their mutual relations, which is a prerequisite of forming, on the basis of their experience, a formation able to provide protection on a mass scale. 24 In the face of such a state of affairs, what should be acknowledged are the efforts of the firefighting environment that at the beginning of the 1990s saw the need to standardize the rules of cooperation between different rescue operation participants. In recognition of the need to form an integrated system facilitating activities aiming at rescue and civil protection, rescue organisations cooperating in different ways, were concentrated in one point. And so, in 1995 the National Firefighting and Rescue System was founded (NFRS) and organised on the basis of the units of the State Fire Service. It needs to be emphasised at this point that rescue and civil protection in Poland in the context of the current obligations constitute a new field of activity for fire protection units. 25 Their tasks include activities aiming at the protection of life, health, assets or the environment by way of: fire, technical, chemical, ecological, medical, and water rescue as well as radiation rescue, rescue at heights, sea and harbour rescue. 26 NFRS constitutes an integral link in the internal security system and its activity is focused on the protection of life, health, assets and the environment against fires, natural disasters or other local threats. Its unquestionable asset is the simplicity and flexibility of the structure which enables the undertaking of activities adequate to threats and maintaining readiness to perform tasks in any circumstances. 27 Activities in the scope of civil protection are conducted in a direct way mainly by state rescue services (State Fire Service, professional fire service, national sea rescue, medical rescue, chemical rescue, radiation rescue and technical rescue), rescue organisations of a social character (Mountain Volunteer Rescue Service, Tatra Mountains Volunteer Rescue Service, Water Volunteer Rescue Service, Polish Red Cross), and also private rescue companies. Civil protection can also be found among the obligations of civil defence. Moreover, civil protection is dealt with by public order and safety services, such as the Police, Municipal/Commune Police, Railroad Guard or private security agencies. If the above entities cannot 24 issue date: 14 January R. Kalinowski, Ochrona ludności bezpieczeństwo nauka i edukacja, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach, Siedlce 2011, ISBN , p Ibidem, p K. Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, F.R. Krynojewski, Zarządzanie kryzysowe w administracji publicznej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2010, ISBN , p

204 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM manage a particular crisis situation, all activities connected with civil protection are taken over by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. 28 Civil protection includes also psychological activities. They are conducted by the Polish Psychological Society which creates Crisis Intervention Centres and provides help for rescuers during rescue activities. Civil protection has also a legal dimension, manifested in the ratification of international rules, which defend fundamental and universal citizens' interests (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights). Conclusions Preparing universal and effective civil protection in places of residence, work places and schools, as well as in public places seems to be one of the key needs of Polish national defence. It is a serious challenge due to the enormous differences between the organisation of civil protection in our country and the functioning of the civil protection system in other NATO and EU countries. It requires increased intellectual effort connected with the improvement of legislative works, the engagement on the part of individuals experienced in the field of the discussed issue, the ability to cooperate, and drawing on the achievements and solutions of other countries. It is connected with the necessity of adopting the attitude of the readiness to face on a daily basis non-military threats with consequences as dangerous as wars. The necessity of harmonious cooperation results from the character of new threats and the need to respond to non-military threats, as well as the need to undertake adequate rescue activities. 29 Nowadays, civil protection enterprises are included in a wider scope of civil defence. In this context, it is worth pointing out that civil defence constitutes a significant part of the enterprises connected with the so called civil planning, in the case of extraordinary situations, and with the tasks connected with maintaining public administration readiness to undertake appropriate activities. It also includes activities within the framework of NATO's established strategy of host nation support as well as civilian and military cooperation. Although in different countries, civil defence means different things, its fundamental undertakings, apart from civil protection, include: work places and infrastructure protection; cultural assets' protection; authority structure protection; ensuring the state's functioning in times of peace and war; 28 issue date: R. Kalinowski, Ochrona ludności, p

205 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK organisation of crisis management; physical protection (of people, assets and the natural environment); psychological protection; legal protection; education and training. Rescue means the activity conducted at all levels of the state organisation and in all conditions (in times of peace, crisis and war) by way of different methods, powers and resources, which aims at rescuing human life and assets. It is important for the Republic of Poland to have at its disposal the modern, thriving, coordinated civil protection and rescue subsystem. Existing or potential threats condition activities of specialised services which monitor the systems able to detect and identify threats, and then provide data necessary for warning and alerting the population and gauging the number of the people present in the forecasted danger zones. It is important for such units to be able to conduct their work and improve the achieved methods of conduct. The sustainable development of people engaged in the formation of the civil protection and rescue subsystem and verification of the adopted procedural solutions is manifested in multiple trainings and exercises. The Internet information service concerning the civil defence of our country 30 shows different undertakings which aim at improving the effectiveness of the functioning of rescue and civil protection services. There are steps undertaken which, in their authors' opinion, should influence the effectiveness of the civil protection and rescue system. The functioning of entities responsible for civil protection and rescue has become the subject of deliberations of competent ministers. One of their fruits is the initiative called the Rescue and Civil Protection Programme for the period The planned Rescue and Civil Protection Programme aims at: o developing the general legal framework regulating the activity of institutions and public services and also social organisations performing tasks in the scope of civil protection and rescue; o applying solutions adopted in the law on the emergency communication system after its adoption by the lower and higher chamber of the Parliament, thanks to which it will be possible to establish a comprehensive and compatible mechanism of cooperation between rescue services and the emergency communication system; 30 Available at: 31 Draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers on adopting the Rescue and Civil Protection Programme for the period This document results from the National Development Strategy2020 (objective I.3. Improvement of the conditions for satisfying the individual needs and activity of citizens, developmental priority, I.3.3. Enhancing citizen security) and the Efficient State Strategy 2020 (objective 7: Ensuring high level of security and public order). Rescue and Civil protection Programme is a specific fulfilment of declarations contained in a detailed objective Development of Rescue and Civil Protection Programmes. 204

206 RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM o applying organisational solutions, administrative and legal procedures, as well as financial mechanisms guaranteeing the appropriate functioning of civil protection and rescue. 32 The desired solutions are intended to support and develop the security potential of the state, with the executory subsystem functioning within its framework, and speaking more precisely the protection potential contained in the operational subsystems formed by, among others, the subjects performing tasks in the scope of civil protection and rescue. Bibliography Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warsaw 2013, ISBN Chęciński J., Ochrona ludności we współczesnej wojnie, Wyd. MON, Warsaw Chocha B., Obrona terytorium kraju, Wyd. 2., Wyd. MON, Warsaw Jakubczak R., Skrabacz A., Gąsiorek K. (ed.), Obrona narodowa w tworzeniu bezpieczeństwa Polski w XXI w., Wyd. Bellona, Warsaw Kalinowski R., Obrona cywilna w Polsce, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo- Humanistycznego w Siedlcach, Siedlce Kalinowski R., Monitorowanie zagrożeń, Wyd. Akademii Podlaskiej, Siedlce Kalinowski R., Ochrona ludności bezpieczeństwo nauka i edukacja, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach, Siedlce 2011, ISBN Kitler W., Skrabacz A., Bezpieczeństwo ludności cywilne. Pojęcie, organizacja i zadania w czasie pokoju, kryzysu i wojny, Wyd. Towarzystwa Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw 2010; Kitler W., Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System, Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2011, ISBN Kitler W., Powszechna ochrona ludności w świetle ustaleń międzynarodowych, Zeszyt Problemowy 1/2001, Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw Konieczny J., Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w nagłych i nadzwyczajnych zagrożeniach środowiska: studium społeczno-ekologiczne w perspektywie zrównoważonego rozwoju, Wyd. Panoptikos, Poznań Krynojewski F.R., Obrona cywilna Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2012, ISBN Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa, tom III, MON[MND], Warsaw Materials from the conference Civil Protection past and present, the National Headquarters of the State Fire Service, the Main School f Fire Service in Warsaw, 28 November Michailiuk B., Wątor W., Ratownictwo chemiczne, Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw Nowy słownik języka polskiego PWN, Wyd. PWN, Warsaw issue date: 09 January

207 BOGDAN MICHAILIUK Amendment Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), made in Geneva on 8 June 1977 (JoL no 41 of 1992, item 175). The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 September 2004 on state defence readiness (JoL of 2004, no 219, item 2218). The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 28 September 1993 on civil defence (JoL of 1993, no 93, item 429 with subsequent amendments). The Regulation of the Minister of Interior and Administration of 18 February 2011 on detailed rules of the organisation of the national firefighting and rescue system (JoL of 2011, no 46, item 239). Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek K., Krynojewski F.R., Zarządzanie kryzysowe w administracji publicznej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2010, ISBN Skrabacz A., Ochrona ludności w Polsce w XXI wieku. Wyzwania, uwarunkowania, perspektywy, Agencja Marketingowo-Wydawnicza Merkeriusz Agmarkt s.c., Wyd. 1, Tarnów 2006, ISBN Skrabacz A., Ratownictwo w III RP. Ogólna charakterystyka, Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw The Act of 24 August 1991 on the State Fire Service (JoL of 2013, item 1340 with subsequent amendments). The Act of 21 November 1967 on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland (JoL of 2013, item 852). Wolanin J., Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa obywateli. Ochrona ludności na czas pokoju, Fundacja Edukacji i Techniki Ratownictwa, Warsaw Internet sources ,DEAPARTAMENTRATOWNICTWAIOCHRONYLUDNOSCI.html

208 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS ISSN CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. Eng. National Security Faculty NDU Abstract Risk of contamination is a problem well known for many years. Its apogee coincided with the Cold War, in which weapons of mass destruction, which is the main source of potential contamination, remained constantly in the spotlight. Today, despite the threat of use of chemical weapons, nuclear or biological weapons is negligible, the problem of contamination still exists. This is particularly evident in the case of chemical agents, which in some cases can lead to major emergencies. In addition, due to the quite different characteristics of individual agents, the type of emerging risks, generated by the contamination may be very different. This means that for a correct assessment of possible contamination risks we have to get to know the type and nature of all agents, being a potential factor in the formation of contamination. This article is an attempt to present the essence and nature of the risks generated by chemical agents, both those warfare, as well as other commonly used in the national economy. For a better problem understanding, the most possible threats have been discussed, pointing to the real danger that pose. Additionally presented the essence of the contamination, identification of respective risks and their basic typologies. Key words Contamination, chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, chemical hazardous substances The dynamic and increasingly widespreadprogress of modern civilisation is undoubtedly a source of prosperity and development for each individual. From day to day we cross other barriers that allow us to achieve what, not so long ago, we could not even imagine. All this in the daily race for a better reason for living, to slowly forget about the darker side of our existence, in which, independently of our will, there remain a whole range of different threats and problems. Among them a prominent place is occupied by cases of environmental contamination which, 207

209 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ because of their size, diversity and character, have an increasing impact on the safety and comfort of our lives. In the literature, it is not difficult to find a definition of contamination, but not all of the definitions are equally reliable and unambiguous. Moreover, the term contamination is of little use, because its specific importance is achieved only when combined with the determination of its kind. In this way we can deal with environmental contamination, of soil, water, air, and man, or the contamination of biological, radioactive or chemical substances. The last example is usually treated as a pollution of air, water, soil, human body, objects, etc. by toxic substances. Its source can be either a deliberate action, for example through the use of chemical weapons, or a total coincidence, resulting from the failure of industrial facilities or accidents during the transport of hazardous substances. The problem of the risks posed by chemicals, both military and industrial, has led to numerous studies, reports and publications, which more or less reflect its essence and character. The multiplicity of expression, their imperfection and the weight of the problem means, however, that there is a need to create a coherent typology of risks generated by chemical contamination. The purpose of this article is to identify the possibilities for formation of chemical contamination, and to diagnose the level of risk posed by chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. For this reason, it presents the basic characteristics of these agents with a simultaneous analysis of the possibility of potential hazards related to this. To assess it the following questions were formulated: What is the nature of chemical contamination? Which agents pose a serious threat and why? Whether the destruction potential of respective agents is comparable? And finally - is there a clear, commonly accepted typology of these threats? The essence of contamination The creation of chemical contamination usually results from the accidental release or deliberate use of chemicals, which then, due to its nature and specific properties, can cause significant risks to human beings, animals or the environment. Due to the quite different characteristics of individual agents, the type of threats generated can be very different. This means that to correct their evaluation, it is necessary to know the exact type and nature of all chemical agents, which in some cases can be a potential source of contamination. The issue of risks implied by the contamination is not new. For many years, research centres have conducted studies to develop or improve better and better weapons, among these a prominent place is occupied by chemical weapons. Even ignoring other destruction outputs, the extent and dangerous nature of emerging 208

210 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS contaminants clearly qualifies chemical weapons for their military use. In general, however, such use refers almost exclusively to an armed conflict in which the use of chemical weapons is theoretically justified. Looking at it from this point of view it is easy to see that contamination as a result of attacks from weapons of mass destruction is very unlikely to arise during peacetime. Does this mean that the threat of contamination does not occur? Certainly not, because in addition to toxic warfare agents, there is a whole range of hazardous chemical substances, which in some cases can cause contamination. So, the question is what the essence of contamination is and what characteristics distinguish it? Contrary to appearances, the answer to this question is not clear, because, depending on the interpretation, the contamination can mean different states. First of all, it can be treated as an impurity, which, due to a particularly high concentration or intensity or exceptional activity may result in the short term sickness or death of human beings (and other organisms) 1. In other words, contamination could mean released into the environment... toxic or radioactive substances that pose a risk to the health and life of plants, animals and man... 2 In addition, it is common to find the opinion that contamination is synonymous with pollution, regardless of the types of contaminants. This has been said about oil contamination of water and soil contamination with heavy metals or industrial gases in air. Such contamination, although burdensome, is not always dangerous, and as such should not be understood in terms of contamination. As a result, it can be concluded that the essence of contamination is - the undesirable presence of chemical, biological or radioactive materials which, because of their harmful properties, could cause loss of human life or health (other organisms). At this point it should be emphasised that this must be the undesirable presence of these substances, not something normal, commonly found in a particular place or area. To speak about contamination this presence must occur in an unintended and unexpected manner, which in turn will create or increase the risk to life or health of human beings, plants or animals. When considering the problem of chemical contamination, in the first place a classification of chemical agents, both combat and industrial, needs to be set. It turns out, however, that it is not so simple, because in the literature there are a number of different classifications, depending on the kind of criteria. Consideration of all of them is far beyond the scope of the article; therefore, our considerations will be limited only to the most important ones. Due to the serious effects, first we will discuss the classification of warfare agents, and then will consider the issues of toxic industrial typology. 1 Słownik pojęć przyrodniczych Environmental contamination Encyklopedia biologiczna tom X, Agencja Publicystyczno- Wydawnicza Opres, Kraków 2000, p

211 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ Typology of chemical hazards - warfare chemical agents Warfare Chemical Agents are, as the name suggests, a group of toxic agents that have been used on the battlefield, mainly for the destruction of an opponent's manpower. Among them we can find both those that are definitely of a mortal nature and others that are less lethal. The basic typology of agents that are most common is presented in Table 1. This shows that the impact of various agents on the human body can cause choking, blistering, bleeding, irritation or effects on the nervous system. Another, more useful classification will arise when the division criterion accept their physical condition, namely the physical state and the vapour pressure. The issue of state of matter is so obvious that it needs no comment, but the vapour pressure and its associated volatility requires a brief explanation. Vapour pressure is the pressure of saturated steam which has a liquid on its surface. At constant temperature it has constant value and does not depend on the ratio of liquid and vapour. However, this depends on the type of substance and its characteristics 3. On the other hand, volatility is the ratio of a partial vapour pressure component coupled to its mole fraction in the liquid. Volatility is characterised by the ease of the evaporation of a substance and depends largely on the temperature 4. Classification of toxic agents due to the mode of action T a b l e 1 Agent Class Name Symbol Phosgene CG CHOKING AGENTS Diphosgene DP Chloropicrin PS Nerve Agents Tabun GA Sarin GB NERVE AGENTS Soman GD Cyclosarin GF Vx, VX Vx, VX Hydrogen Cyanide AC BLOOD AGENTS Cyanogen Chloride CK Arsine SA BLISTER AGENTS Distilled Mustard H/HD H/HD - VESICANTS Nitrogen Mustard HN-1, HN-2, HN-3 Mustard-T Mixture HT Lewisite L Mustard-Lewisite Mixture HL Phenyldichloroarsine PD Ethyldichloroarsine ED Leksykon naukowo-techniczny z suplementem, tom II, Wydawnictwa naukowo-techniczne, Warszawa 1989, p Ibidem, s. 448.

212 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Agent Class Name Symbol Methyldichloroarsine MD Phosgene Oxime CX INCAPACITATING 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate BZ AGENTS O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile CS RIOT CONTROL Dibenz(b,f)-1:4-oxazepine CR AGENTS Capsaicin OC Diphenylchloroarsine DA IRRITANTS Diphenylcyanoarsine DC VOMITING AGENTS Adamsite DM Source: Potential military chemical/biological agents and compounds, Fort Monroe, Quantico, Newport, Maxwell, 2005, p. F-1. Looking at it from the point of view of warfare agents, volatility is very crucial because it determines the manner and extent of their use. Highly volatile agents can be successfully used where our intention is to lead to air pollution, while those with a low volatility are perfectly suited for contaminating the site. But that's not all the features that interest us because, as it turns out, volatility has a direct impact on the persistence of toxic chemicals and, thus, their ability to cause long-term impacts on people and the environment. Interestingly, in the literature, the opinions about persistence of respective chemical agents differ quite significantly, because very often we have to deal with a situation in which, in one publication, the toxic agent is treated as a non persistent, while in the other its persistency is defined as large. Such a flagship example of non-compliance features two nerve agents - sarin and soman, which in publications are treated interchangeably, depending on the source 5. To avoid such a problem, it is was proposed that the persistency of warfare agents should be considered in the following way: persistent toxic agents: such agents, which after application are capable of inducing shock from 24 hours to several days, or even weeks. non-persistent toxic agents: such agents which, after use. lose their ability to cause shock after minutes 6. This division seems pretty unequivocal, but it lacks information on how to treat agents with persistency in the range of 15 minutes - 24 hours. Probably, it was considered that this range does not really matter, because the persistency of this same agent, depending on the meteorological and terrain conditions, can be very different. This ensures that accurate and constant classification of chemical agents persistency is not possible. The classifications presented above reflect the division warfare agents just because of one criterion. For the planning of combat operations it is neither 5 These disparities are particularly evident when comparing the Russian publications with the American. 6 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02, Department of Defense, Washington 2005, p. 369,

213 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ convenient, nor useful; therefore, a military division was created, with different qualities included, such as persistency, tactical purpose 7 and the mode of action of the toxic agent. A graphic image of this classification is shown in Figure 1. From the information presented in the figure it can be concluded that the usefulness of warfare agents is very different. Analysis of the reports concerning the possession of chemical weapons, however, indicates that the basis for combat use are toxic agents acting fatally, including organophosphorus agents, vesicant and toxins. Other chemical agents have far less application 8. LETHAL PERSISTENT BLISTER HD, HN-1, HN-2, HN-3, L, HT, HL, PD, ED, MD, CX TOKSIN XR VX HERBICIDES HERBICIDES DEFOLIANTS 2,4,5,-t, Picloram, 2,4,-D NON PERSISTENT NERVE AGENTS GA, GB, GD, GF CHOKING CG, DP BLOOD AGENTS AC, CK, SA IRRITATING VOMITING DA, DC, DM TRAINING RIOT AGENTS LACRIMATORY PS CN CS, CR INCAPACITATING PSYCHEDELICS BZ Source: J. Solarz, Prognozowanie skażeń chemicznych, AON, Warszawa 2007, p. 22. Figure 1. Military classification of warfare agents 7 Comp. M. Krauze, I. Nowak, Broń chemiczna, MON, Warszawa 1984, p In many countries, these agents are not considered as chemical warfare agents, so they can be used for other purposes, e.g. in agriculture. 212

214 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Typology of chemical hazards - toxic industrial chemicals Toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) is a term that has no single, universally accepted definition. In addition, the concept of toxic industrial chemicals are most often treated the same as the concepts of industrial contamination or hazardous substances. The consequence of this situation is a mess of terminology, which in hazardous conditions does not allow for the unambiguous identification of the problem. To overcome this inconvenience it is worth discussing specific expressions. The first of them - industrial pollution - a term that is rarely defined in the literature. Perhaps the reason for this, as is quite clear, embraces the full range of pollutants generated by industry, the public utilities sector and transport. Due to the fact that the concept includes a very broad group of chemical substances of any state of aggregation, different abilities to air passage, and different toxicity, we can find here potentially toxic hazardous substances such as chlorine, ammonia, phosgene and also many substances that are almost completely harmless. Another term that should be considered is - dangerous substances. Normally, we can assume that these are substances or mixtures which, because of one or more chemical, physical or toxic properties, can pose a potential threat 9. The generality of this definition implies that almost any substance can, in certain circumstances, pose a threat. To specify the type and level of risk an additional division was introduced, which was categorised according to the types of risks. At this point, the provisions of the two laws should be cited, i.e. on chemical substances and mixtures, and on the transport of dangerous goods 10. In the first Act we find the definitions and general classification of dangerous substances and mixtures. According to these, hazardous substances and mixtures are classified as substances and mixtures: with explosive properties; oxidation; extremely flammable; highly flammable; flammable; very toxic; toxic; harmful; corrosive; irritant; sensitisation; carcinogenic; mutagenic; toxic for reproduction and environmentally hazardous. The second Act - on the transport of dangerous goods - is based on the provisions of the relevant regulations and international agreements. We find there a definition of dangerous goods for which it is - a material or object which, according to ADR, RID or ADN 11 is not approved, 9 S. Wajda, J. Żurek, Zapobieganie nadzwyczajnym zagrożeniom środowiska, konwencje międzynarodowe i uchwały organizacji międzynarodowych, Instytut Ochrony Środowiska, Warszawa 1995, s Ustawa z dnia 25 lutego 2011 r. o substancjach chemicznych i ich mieszaninach (Acts. Laws 2011, No. 227, item. 1367), ustawa z dnia 19 sierpnia 2011 r. o przewozie towarów niebezpiecznych (Acts. Laws 2011, No. 63, item. 322). 11 ADR European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), done at Geneva on 30 September 1957 (Acts. Laws 2011 No. 110, item. 641), RID Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID), as Annex C to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), signed in Berne on 9 May 1980 (Acts. Laws 2007, No. 100, items. 674, 675, 2009 No. 167, item and 2011, No. 137, item

215 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ respectively, for road transport, transport by rail or inland waterway, and transport of either is allowed for such carriage under the conditions set down in these provisions 12. The appropriate classification of hazardous materials is shown in Figure 2. Class 1. Expolsives Class 2. Gases Class 3. Flammable liquids Class 4.1. Flammable solids, self-reactive substances and explosives, solid desensitized Class 4.2. Pyrophoric materials Class 4.3. Substances which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases Class 5.1. Oxidizing substances Class 5.2. Organic peroxides Class 6.1. Toxic materials Class 6.2. Infectious substances Class 7. Radioactive materials Class 8 Corrosive materials Class 9. Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles Source: Ustawa z dnia 25 lutego 2011 r. o substancjach chemicznych i ich mieszaninach (Acts. Laws 2011, No. 227, item. 1367). Figure 2. Classification of hazardous materials and 805), ADN European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterways of dangerous goods (ADN), concluded at Geneva on 26 May 2000 (Acts. Laws 2010 No. 235, item. 1537). 12 Ustawa z dnia 19 sierpnia 2011 r. o przewozie towarów niebezpiecznych, op. cit., art. 2, point. 1, para

216 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Even a cursory analysis of the data presented in the figure shows that many of the agents, although they are dangerous, will not cause contamination. In fact, the threat created has a completely different character. So the question is - which of them will pose a real danger of contamination? To understand this you need to clearly describe what really determines the contamination. To solve this problem it would be quite useful to elaborate on the National Defence Academy definition of toxic industrial. According to this, toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) shall be: chemical substances with toxic properties, manufactured and used in the national economy in large quantities and transported for use or processing in other plants, having the ability to be easily transferred into the atmosphere via release from tanks and installations, and causing paralysis of soldiers 13. It is easy to note that the classification of the agents to the category of TIC enforces on it the need to have specific properties, namely: strong toxicity, massive use in the economy, the ability to cause paralysis and, most importantly, easing the transition into the atmosphere. This latter property greatly reduces the number of hazardous materials, narrowing them only for gaseous substances. And these substances, assuming they are highly toxic, will constitute a real threat after their release over a wide area. Toxic industrial chemicals have very diverse toxic properties, which makes it difficult to classify them according to traditional criteria applicable to warfare agents. In the literature one can find such a division, the criterion used is the dominant syndrome that occurs during acute intoxication. It is shown in Figure 3. sulfur dioxide nitrogen oxides fluoride hydrogen sulfide Choking and blood agents Metabolic toxic agents oxide ethylene ammonia Choking and Neurotrophic agents Neurotrophic toxic agents carbon disulfide cyanide Agents with a predominance blood action Agents with a predominance choking action chlorine phosgene Source: Prepared on the basis Metodyka oceny sytuacji chemicznej po skażeniach toksycznymi środkami przemysłowymi., MON, Warszawa 1993, p Figure 3. Classification of toxic industrial chemicals due to the manner of impact 13 I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Toksyczne środki przemysłowe jako źródło zagrożeń dla wojsk prowadzących działania bojowe na obszarze kraju, AON, Warszawa 1998, p

217 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ Characteristics of chemical warfare agents The use of warfare agents and their typology can be very different. The manner of using them will determine their chemical, physical and toxic properties. The fundamental characteristics of the contaminants are depicted in Table 2 Characteristics of basic chemical warfare agents T a b l e 2 Nerve Type Symbol GA, GB, GD VX Persistency The method of penetration Speed Summer Winter of action Vapor / Liquid aerosol eyes, mouth, 10 min 24h 2h 3 days v. quickly eyes, lungs skin 2 dni 1 2 days - eyes, mouth, quickly eyes, lungs week weeks skin immediatel lungs eyes y Choking CG, DP 1 do 10 min 10 min 1h Blister HD, HN 3 dni 1 week weeks slowly L, HL 1 3 days weeks quickly eyes, skin, lungs eyes, skin, lungs Blood AC, CK 1 10 min 10 min 1h v. quickly eyes, lungs eyes, skin, eyes, mouth, skin eyes, mouth, injured skin NOTE: Abbreviations means: GA - tabun, GB - sarin, GD - soman, CG - phosgene, DP - diphosgene, HD - distilled mustard HN - nitrogen mustard, L - lewisite, HL - mustard - lewisite mixture, AC - hydrogen cyanide, Source: Health service support in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment, Department of the Army, Washington 1993, p Nerve agents are organophosphorus toxic agents, derivatives of phosphoric acid and alkylophosphonic. The standard adopted conventional division is made into two groups - G and V. The first one includes agents which in their basic form are relatively volatile, while the second agents meet with much greater persistency. In military applications persistency of warfare agents has a vital importance and, therefore, in order to increase the stability of group G all kinds of thickeners are used. The most important representatives of the nerve agents include: phosphoric acid derivatives - DFP, tabun; phosphonic acid derivatives - sarin, soman, and V. In addition, this group also includes many herbicides and insecticides that are commonly used in the civilian economy. These are: amiton, armin, dimefox, paraoksan, paratin, systoksy. All these substances are toxic, although much less than those found in military applications. Actually, only sarin, soman, Vx and their variations, such as cyklosarin (GF) and thickened soman (TGD), are of importance today. 216

218 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Blister agents (vesicants) are among the most well - known and the longest used warfare agents. Their flagship representative - sulfur mustard (HD) appeared on the battlefield on 12 July 1917, at Ypres. Thereafter follow: lewisite (L) and the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3). Apart from these, other blister agents were also used, for example phenyldichloroarsine (PD) or methyldichloroarsine (MD). Besides undoubtedly good toxic properties, mustard (both sulfuric and HN-3) has a major drawback, namely, a high freezing temperature. Below this temperature it is a solid, thereby losing many of its useful features. Therefore, there is a need to apply the product as a technical mustard, containing a variety of additives which have considerably reduced solidification point. It is also used in specially prepared mixes e.g. mustard with lewisite, where freezing temperatures can be as low as minus 42 o C. Lewisite, in turn, is the primary toxic agent from the group of arseniccontaining compounds. Currently, its military importance is low, mainly because with the high humidity lewisite hydrolyses so fast that it is difficult to obtain the appropriate concentration needed to cause burns. Choking agents are agents that next to mustard gas and chlorine were the most frequently used during the First World War. As with nerve and vesicant agents - they are a group of lethal agents. The main representatives of this category are: phosgene (CG), diphosgene (DP) and chloropicrin (PS) 14. Due to the state of matter - gas (phosgene) and volatile liquids (diphosgene, chloropicrin) are all nonpersistent and work through the respiratory system - the nose, throat and lungs. The relatively low toxicity of phosgene, diphosgene and chloropicrin, compared with the toxicity of nerve agents means that their usefulness in the modern battlefield is very slight. In addition they are disqualified because of too much volatility, which prevents the formation of dangerous concentrations that could lead to mass loses. Currently, a view exists that agents of this kind should be considered only in terms of toxic industrial chemicals that may pose a local threat to troops and civilians. Blood agents, also known as cyano compounds (cyanides), were often used on a massive scale during World War I 15. Their advantage was their high availability and fast performance, the downside - too great a volatility, which effectively depreciated them 16. Their general names do not accurately reflect their properties, as some of them do not have a cyano group, and others are not poisons of the blood. For these reasons they have been given the name - generally toxic agents in Poland. Among them are mainly (CK) and hydrogen cyanide (AC) and 14 Chloropicrin has no combat appliance, but can be used for gas masks testing. 15 During World War II, Germany used the hydrogen cyanide (in the form of Zyklon-B - calcium sulfate impregnated with 40% HCN) to the extermination of people in gas chambers. 16 Therefore, some attempts were performed to use various mixes, which should be then more efficient. An example would be French Vincennite agent, consisting of: 50% HCN, 30% AsCl 3, 15% and 5% SnCl 4 CCl 3 H (chloroform). 217

219 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ additionally cyanogen bromide, arsine (SA) and carbon monoxide. In fact, from these agents, only cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide have some military importance, although to a very limited extent. Hydrogen cyanide (prussic acid) is a colourless, mobile liquid with an odour of bitter almonds. A low boiling point ensures a high evaporation rate, and hence low persistence in the field. Typically, in open ground, this is 5 minutes and in wooded areas 10; in winter this does not exceed an hour. Therefore, liquid hydrogen cyanide is not designed for wide use in the field. Nevertheless, the ease of obtaining high levels of combat concentrations is a serious threat to human beings. This is confirmed by the use of this agent to carry out the death penalty. Acid vapours are well absorbed by fibres and porous materials, which poses a threat of poisoning in confined spaces due to desorption. It is very soluble in water and organic solvents. Cyanogen chloride is a colourless, mobile and very volatile liquid with a pungent odour. Sometimes the odour may be undetectable due to its strong irritant to the eyes, nose and respiratory system. Its volatility is several times greater than that of hydrogen cyanide, which reduces its persistency, yet allows easy production of very high concentrations. In contrast to hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride has very strong irritant and choking features. It is soluble in organic solvents, mustard gas and chloropicrin. Currently, these agents are not seen as potential chemical weapons. However, due to their mass occurrence in the industrial sectors of many countries they still may pose a serious threat as a significant part of toxic industrial chemicals. Characteristic of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) The individual characteristics of all hazardous substances are far beyond the scope of the article so you can simply mention that the Central Institute for Labour Protection (CILP) has been engaged in the indexing of these substances and the development of the so-called Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous substances for many years, carried out in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 17. These cards contain information on the properties of substances (chemical, physical and toxicity) and the principles of handling during production, transport and neutralisation. Currently, the CILP database contains 645 SDS. The characteristics of hazardous substances can also be found in the development of the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection under the title: 17 Regulation (EC) no 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, art

220 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS Principles of rescue operations 18, which is an implementation of the U.S. publication: Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG). As already mentioned, all the toxic industrial chemicals are gaseous under normal conditions and, therefore, pose a direct threat to troops and the population (with the exception of hydrogen cyanide). After release they may spread through the air for long distances, while maintaining a concentration lethal to human beings and animals. Other dangerous substances posing an indirect threat to troops are usually liquids or solids. Furthermore, they can contaminate ground and water reservoirs and rivers after escaping from containers, causing hard to reverse biological effects, both for the environment and the population. Also interesting is the fact that toxic industrial chemicals generally have a characteristic odour and a specific colour, which can be used for visual and olfactory identification. The boiling and solidification temperatures are varied, which in turn affects the stability of the agents in the environment. Similarly, the vapour density of respective TICs relative to air is also different. If the density is less than the density of air, the TIC will ascend to the upper layer of air; if it is the larger agent it will hold on to the surface of the earth, penetrating to the base and all kinds of depressions. Knowing the type of chemical agent and its vapour density relative to air, we can predict its behaviour in the environment and use this property to protect the population. When considering the problem of chemical contamination we must remember that the presence of harmful substances does not always mean immediate contamination. To contaminate, the amount of toxic substance must be sufficiently large to pose a threat. The point is that the concentration of the agent decides whether it is a threat or not. The basis for determining whether a chemical substance will pose a threat is Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 29 listopada 2002 r. w sprawie najwyższych dopuszczalnych stężeń i natężeń czynników szkodliwych dla zdrowia w środowisku pracy 19. The regulation describes the volume concentration limits for all hazardous substances. It specifies the maximum acceptable concentration (NDS) 20, the maximum threshold concentration 18 Zasady postępowania ratowniczego 2008, Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska, Warszawa See, Acts. Laws of 2002 No. 217, item NDS - weighted average of concentration for which the impact on the employee during the 8 - hour, daily and average weekly working time laid down in the Labour Code, by the period of its activity should not cause negative changes in his condition and the state of health of future generations. 219

221 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ (NDSP) 21 and the maximum acceptable concentration for instantaneous (NDSCh) 22. The values, specified for common TIC are shown in Table 3. Allowable concentrations of toxic industrial chemicals (mg/m 3 ) T a b l e 3 Name Threshold sensibility Maximum acceptable concentration (NDS) Maximum acceptable concentration for instantaneous (NDSCh) Lethal concentration Ammonia 0, Chlorine 0,06 1, Hydrogen 0,2 0,3-300 cyanide Carbon disulphide Sulfur dioxide 0, Hydrogen - 0, fluoride Phosgene 2 0,08 0, Hydrogen 0, sulfide Ethylene oxide 1, Nitrogen oxides 0, Source: Prepared on the basis Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 29 listopada 2002, op. cit. The presented data shows that the scale of the toxic effects of individual agents is not the same. What's more, as it turns out, their value does not only depend on the toxicity of the agent but also on the resistance of the organism, viewed as the sum of characteristics such as gender and age of the person, species sensitivity, racial and inter-individual, physiological state of the body, as well as current and past illnesses. When analysing the problem of threats posed by toxic industrial chemicals we should pay attention to yet another aspect, namely their prevalence in the country. It is quite obvious that the more of them there are, the more dangerous they become. However, if we look at the numbers alone, it would appear that the whole country is simply packed with objects in which toxic industrial agents are produced, stored or processed. In fact, only factories that include industrial plants 21 NDSP is concentration value, which due to the health hazard the worker may not exceed in the work environment in no time. 22 NDSCh - is the average concentration that should not cause negative changes in the health of the worker, if present in the work environment no longer than 15 minutes and not more than 2 times during a shift in an interval of not less than one hour. 220

222 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TYPOLOGY OF THREATS with increased risk or high risk of a major industrial accident 23 pose a real threat.according to the Major Command of the State Fire Service there are about 200/ In addition, a major danger is created by just two industrial toxic agents, namely ammonia and chlorine. Statistical data also confirms this relationship, according to which more than 75% of all industrial plants are plants with ammonia (although the vast majority of them contain small amounts of agent), and approximately 16% of chlorine. Other objects with TIC are found in much smaller numbers and the threat they pose is negligible. Conclusions The modern risk of contamination, treated as a source of major emergencies, can vary substantially, which is largely the result of the very essence of contamination. This essence, as stated, will manifest itself in the undesirable presence of chemical, biological or radioactive materials which, because of their harmful properties, could cause loss of human life or health (other organisms). In the case of chemical contamination a considerable variety of possible sources of contamination (chemical agents) were found, which depending on the destination can be deadly or just harmful. The first is, of course, chemical warfare, which in a sense ex officio is designed to cause mass losses on the battlefield. At this point, however, you can protest, noting that the production and use of chemical weapons is legally prohibited by the Convention of 13 January 1993 on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction 25. It turns out, however, that there are still cases of use of chemical weapons, and even their storage creates a real danger of contamination (intentional or accidental). The second type of threats is pollution generated by industrial toxic chemicals. Compared to warfare agents, this threat is of a different character, exhibiting a much lower hazard level for each substance and, for a great number of them, their prevalence and diversity. Therefore, in most cases, contamination resulting from toxic industrial chemicals is rarely the cause of emergencies, mainly because they are unstable and have limited range. As a result, it can be concluded that the risk of contamination caused by toxic industrial chemicals will not be large, mainly due to the limitations of the low 23 For a major accident within the meaning of art. 3 pkt 23 act of 27 April 2001 Prawo Ochrony Środowiska (Acts. Laws of 2008 No. 25, item. 150) we treat the event, in particular emission, fire or explosion, resulting in the industrial process, during storage or transport, in which there is one or more hazardous substances, leading to immediate of danger to life or health of human beings or the environment or the emergence of such a threat of delay. For major industrial accidents this is understood in accordance with Art. 3 point 24 of the above-mentioned major accident at the plant. 24 As of Year 25 see Laws. 1999, No. 63, item

223 JAROSŁAW SOLARZ toxicity of most of them or any toxicity at all. You also need to add that contamination arising after the release of toxic industrial chemicals is unstable and, as such, will not cause danger for a long time. This does not mean, however, that it can be taken lightly, since under certain conditions this can cause a real tragedy 26. Bibliography Zieliński S., Skażenia chemiczne środowiska, Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej, Wrocław 2007; Solarz J. Prognozowanie skażeń chemicznych, AON, Warszawa 2007; Marrs T. C., Maynard R. L., Sidell F. R., Chemical warfare agents, toxicology and treatment, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, New York, 1996; Nowak I., Solarz J., Wpływ skażeń toksycznymi środkami przemysłowymi na działania bojowe wojsk na obszarze RP, AON, Warszawa 1997; Metodyka oceny sytuacji chemicznej po skażeniach toksycznymi środkami przemysłowymi, MON, Warszawa 1993; 26 In 1984, in Bhopal (India) methyl isocyanate was released, which resulted in the death of several thousand people and many more losing their sight. 222

224 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013 ISSN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION ISSN Robert MARCJAN Marek ŁAKOMY Michał WYSOKIŃSKI AGH University AGH University AGH University of Science and Technology of Science and Technology of Science and Technology Kraków Kraków Kraków CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION 1 Kamil PIĘTAK AGH University of Science and Technology Kraków Marek KISIEL-DOROHINICKI AGH University of Science and Technology Kraków Abstract The aim of the paper is to present the possibilities of utilizing spatial (geographical) information in the criminal analysis and to introduce the LINK software, which is able to perform such analyses. LINK is a decision-support system dedicated for operational and investigational activities of homeland security services. The paper briefly discusses issues of criminal analysis in the Polish reality and focuses on crime mapping and spatial analyses. It also lists available analysis methods and software tools together with their pros and con. The description of LINK system functionality constitutes the main part of the paper. It covers the tasks of data acquisition, processing, analysis and visualization. In addition to that the paper also includes a description of the integration possibilities of LINK and ESRI s ArcGIS application stack and performing complex geospatial analyses. Key words decision support, criminal analysis, GIS geographical information system 1 Prace zostały sfinansowane z projektu: Zaawansowane technologie informatyczne wspierające procesy przetwarzania danych w obszarze analizy kryminalnej Projekt rozwojowy NCBiR nr O ROB

225 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI Introduction Criminal analysis is a complex process involving information gathered from different sources, such as phone billings, bank account transactions and eyewitness testimonies. Most of this data possesses a spatial (geographical) aspect, what means it can be presented and analysed on maps. Because of the massive character of this information, it is hardly possible for it to be processed without the help of sophisticated computer systems. On the other hand, because of the crucial role of a human expert in the process, the main role of such a system is to support dealing with such complex data. It means that all the information has to be transformed into a coherent and relatively simple visual form, in which key objects (suspects, events, etc.) and their interrelations can be easily spotted. The paper describes a system designed to facilitate complex analysis processes, in particular those related to the operational and investigation activities of homeland security services. It covers the most important tasks and typical analysis steps including: initial data transformation and filtering, data integration and structuring, graphical data representation, visualisation on maps and use of geospatial analysis functions. Criminal analysis Criminal analysis [4] has been recognised as a useful support tool for over twenty-five years and is now successfully used both within the international law enforcement community and private sector organisations. Nowadays, INTERPOL, Europol and the police forces of many countries have criminal analysts among their personnel. There are many definitions of criminal analysis in use throughout the world. The definition agreed in June 1992 by an international group of twelve European INTERPOL member countries and subsequently adopted by other countries is as follows: The identification of and provision of insight into the relationship between crime data and other potentially relevant data with a view to police and judicial practice. The central task of criminal analysis is to help officials (law enforcers, policy makers, and decision makers) to deal more effectively with uncertainty, so it plays only an auxiliary role in the whole investigation process. The analysis is usually requested by a police officer or a prosecutor who defines the detailed goal of the analysis and conveys all potentially useful materials (data) to the analyst. The analyst usually starts with importing all the data (e.g. files including telephone billings received from operators) to a database. Next, the analytical 224

226 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION process can be started. It usually contains the following steps, which can be repeated many times (they form a loop): operations on data; they can be performed both by the use of various analytical algorithms (e.g. filtering, removing duplicates, calculating statistics, joining or decomposing data sources) and by an analyst's operations (e.g. annotation of data in the diagram), putting forward a hypothesis (based on the results of the previous step), the hypothesis testing. In the above (iterative) process an analyst can request additional data at any time. The output from the analysis usually takes the form of a report (hard copy) which is next included in the documentation related to the investigation. LINK 2 analysis environment and its architecture overview LINK [3],[4] is a comprehensive data analysis platform aimed at aiding criminal analysis which, as described in previous sections, has some specific requirements. The basic version of the system provides a set of tools for integrating, processing and visualising data which may originate from various sources (e.g. phone billings, bank account statements, address books, etc.). LINK is an extensible platform, based on plug-in architecture [7]. It allows for integrating new tools for automatic or semi-automatic data analysis as well as enhancing existing ones. Such tools may be provided by third party vendors and combined with others in order to extract relevant information from a large volume of data. This approach allows for nearly unlimited ways of extending and adjusting the system to the requirements of a particular criminal analysis domain. Data acquisition The first step in the process of data analysis in LINK is importing the data into the system. Based on the experience of professional criminal investigators, it is safe to state that there is no standardised format of analysed data. Not only can it be in any file format (e.g. plain text, Rich Text Format, Comma Separated Values, Microsoft Excel or Word), but it can also be in paper form, which requires additional steps in order to digitalise it. LINK provides an advanced data import tool. The import wizard guides the user through the import process in an intuitive manner. During the import the data is validated against various rules, which may be specific for a particular data domain (Fig. 1). For example, this may include checking if a phone call record in a billing has both caller and receiver numbers or if bank account numbers in a bank statement are valid. The user can preview each step of the import process and

227 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI influence it by adjusting parameters like format of time, date, etc. or defining default values. All operations and user modifications are placed in an import log, which is presented to the user once the import is completed. Fig. 1. Data importer wizard The biggest advantage of the LINK import tool is its flexibility. It comes in two forms: a simplified version for importing data of a tabular nature (e.g. phone billings) which is similar to import tools used in spreadsheet applications a generic import tool which is based on parsing trees and may be used to import data in any form (e.g. bank statements) Both versions of the import tool allow the user to specify the format and the semantics of each portion of the data (e.g. appointing the phone call start time, caller and receiver numbers, etc.) Moreover, they support even more sophisticated scenarios. For example, some mobile network providers deliver billings in which the phone call direction is specified by the caller column and receiver column, whereas others provide two columns with numbers and an additional column with direction information. The LINK import tool is able to handle these cases, as well as others that are even more complicated. Due to the flexibility of the import tool and the variety of data formats, the whole import process is tedious and time-consuming. In order to aid this, it is possible to define an import template which can be later reused for loading data in the same or similar format (templates may be adjusted if needed). Templates are 226

228 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION stored as XML files and, therefore, they are easy to share with other users (via or centralised repository). Data processing and analysis The work of criminal analysts is a form of advanced, context aware, data mining. The goal of the analysis process is to find related objects in a network of data, which is achieved by applying a mixture of numerous algorithms which are formalised by graph clustering [9], social network analysis and other pattern recognition [11] fields of study. Most of these operations can be automated, at least to some extent, and LINK is designed to facilitate that. The basic version of LINK provides a set of essential data analysis operators which allow for extraction of vital information from a large volume of data. The most widely used operation is filtering, which may be based on a data type, string pattern, and value or time range (Fig. 2). Fig. 2 Tabular data view 227

229 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI This allows for quick removal of irrelevant data from the analysis picture. The user can always see the summary of analysed data in the form of basic statistics, which include the counts of all elements and their relationship occurrence as well as average or aggregated values of their attributes. Such a summary is very useful as it allows for quick recognition of data regularities and anomalies, such as frequent events or extraordinary values. In addition to the basic analysis operators, LINK provides more advanced ones. For example, in the phone billing analysis domain users can perform operations such as: detecting and removing phone number prefixes merging 2 or more billings into one data set detecting duplicate phone calls (even with time shift) Since the LINK platform is extensible, new, even more advanced analysis operators and tools can be provided in the future (e.g. for detecting paths in graphs or finding frequent event patterns). 228 Visualisation One of the most important features of LINK is its support for exploring and manipulating data in a visual manner, which is in conformance with the visual data mining [2] approach. This is done via editors which allow for the analysis of different aspects of the data. Editors allow the presented data to be modified as well as adding new artificial data; therefore, they can also be used as general purpose graphical notepads. The basic version of the system provides two graphical data editors: Scheme editor, which presents the data in the form of a graph Timeline editor, which presents the occurrence of events with emphasis on their chronology Data in the scheme editor is presented as a graph which consists of nodes and connections with properties. In order to display the graph in a readable form, various graph layout algorithms are provided, including: Circle layout - nodes are evenly spaced on the border of a circle Group layout - main nodes (with significantly more connections) are placed in a circle, remaining nodes are further outside Peacock [10] layout - main nodes are in the centre, remaining nodes are further outside (Fig. 3) Grid layout - nodes are evenly spaced on a grid Additional layout algorithms may be provided as extensions to the system. The scheme editor provides several operators, which allow for: detecting leaf nodes (nodes with only one connection) merging selected nodes into one merging all nodes with the same label

230 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION Fig. 3 Peacock layout of scheme diagram The timeline editor displays horizontal timelines (which may represent people or phone numbers) and events, which are presented as arrows between them. In addition, the timeline diagram displays a horizontal time axis. This form of data analysis is useful for investigating sequences of events between various objects, as well as event patterns. In addition to the above-mentioned editors, others may be provided as extensions for the LINK system. Operation tracking The process of data analysis may be complicated and it may take a lot of steps. Moreover, data may be merged, transformed or split for further analysis; therefore, it may be difficult to describe the analysis process that led to certain outcomes. In criminal investigation it is essential to thoroughly document the processing steps which started from the acquired source data and resulted in the final conclusion. LINK facilitates this process as it thoroughly tracks all the operations and modifications that were applied to the data. The system allows the deduction graph 229

231 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI for a certain data set, or even a single data element, to be displayed. This graph will contain information about all the operations that led from the imported data to the current one. LINK mapping module Evaluation of standard LINK software data visualization tools, scheme editor and timeline editor, has shown the need for special treatment of geographical data visualisation. Many cases processed by analysts involve evaluation of data strictly connected to geographical context. Mobile phone call billings, among other data, provide information about the location and range of BTS 3 stations utilised to establish a call. Also, bank statements provide information about the addresses of ATM machines and sales points, where the credit or debit cards were used. This information visualisation is often crucial for understanding the whole situation and proving analysed hypotheses. To achieve this goal, analysts often use specialised GIS software [5], [6]. Fig. 4. LINK Map Editor Base Transceiver Stadion.

232 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION To help continuing analysis flow and taking advantage of the LINK modular Eclipse Plugin Architecture [1], the new Map Editor plugin has been developed (Fig. 4). This Map Editor plugin is aimed at increasing the productivity of analyses based on geographical data. Most operations performed on geographical data during criminal analysis are often repeated and come down to a few simplified functions. As most day to day analyses wouldn t go beyond that functionality, simple tools for most common data analysis and visualisation have been implemented in the LINK Map Editor plugin. If that is not enough, plugin provides tools for integration and interoperation with specialised GIS software such as ESRI ArcGIS [5] (briefly described in the next section). The main advantage of this approach is it provides an easy way to export pre-prepared data for further and more sophisticated GIS analysis. The map data is also determined separately from the other program data. In the initial phase of Map Editor development, geographic data in LINK was continued through the same mechanism as all the other data, in the file based SQLite database. This solution, however, turned out to be unsatisfactorily slow and inefficient for performing operations on this type of data. To overcome this bottleneck a different approach was applied. In the current development version geographical data is serialised to JSON and continued in compressed text files. This solution has led to read/write operations on large datasets being more than twice as fast. Currently, research on utilising the GIS specialised database is being conducted, especially PostGIS DB. The use of this type of database would ease the integration of LINK with specialised GIS software. It would also allow an easier and more efficient implementation of operations for manipulating geographic data with its built-in set of standard functions accessed through SQL queries. One of the most important features of every map editor is to give support for raster basemaps. LINK software, by default, uses open access raster map data available through an OpenStreetMap 4 webservice. However, the user is not restricted to using the default solution. In order to provide the possibility of access to any type of basemap, LINK defines an extension point for new providers. By utilising certain interfaces external vendors or even users can independently develop providers of basemaps from external sources such as Eclipse Plugin Modules. Considering the real needs of Polish criminal analysts, and realising that they often work with internet disabled workstations, application by default comes not only with online OpenStreetMap basemaps, but also with a set of standard basemaps prepared on disk files. The current functionality of Map Editor comprises tools for: visualisation of previously gathered data, manual data preparation object filtering tools

233 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI Base data models available in map editor are points, tracks and ranges (such as BTS station ranges). Apart from these, it is possible to bind metadata objects with the map model. These can be distance measures, events order indicators, notes or a map legend describing object classes placed on the map. Dedicated RCP Views were created to manipulate the data domain and visual properties. It is also possible to manipulate objects directly in the editor. Apart from the possibility for importing basic geographical objects from heterogeneous sources, specialized visualisation methods were developed for mobile phone call billings and BTS station lists, e.g. for objects bound with BTS range data (including mobile phone call events) it is possible to switch the display of particular ranges visualisation according to the current analysis needs. There is also a tool for data transformation between the model of BTS stations with related call events and the model in every call event is mapped to a separate pin object (point). Data filtering is possible via two developed tools the timeline dialog and objects view. The timeline visible objects to be filtered by the occurrence time of connected events. It does not only allow the user to filter out events from the specified timeframe, but also to investigate the sequence of events. On the other hand, the objects view allows objects to be filtered by their domain properties values such as a phone number or BTS station address, including the full text search. It is worth to note, that originally map editor is more extensive and provides many features for performing all basic operations on the map data. Currently, maintaining these basic functions has been abandoned in favour of utilities actually being used by the analysts on a daily basis. It significantly simplifies the interface and shortens the learning curve for the average analyst. 232 Integration with ArcGIS 5 Even though some geo-processing can be done using LINK, it is often necessary to use more sophisticated analytical software, like ArcGIS. This is a set of software tools developed by ESRI for creating, processing and analysing maps and spatial data. The tools are available for desktop and server architecture, as well as for mobile devices. The main platform for ArcGIS is Windows; however, ESRI offers some limited functionality for Linux and OS X. In addition to simple analysis methods like data filtering, ArcGIS allows for chain processing, which connects individual geo-processing functions and creates very complex models like hot-spot analysis or the determination of meeting probability between two suspects (which is presented in the next section). ArcGIS is not the only product on the market that offers complex geo-processing capabilities. There are many alternatives in both the paid and free applications sectors. However, there are several features that distinguish it from its rivals: 5 5http://

234 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION supporting the entire chain of processing starting from creating and storing data in databases and finishing with displaying results, an unprecedented variety of geographic data processing functions, a thorough, well-structured and easy to use documentation, big community and professional support. The ArcGIS software is designed for end-users, as well as developers. It offers COM based ArcObjects APIs in Java and C#, which can be used for creating applications with geo-processing capabilities and extending the functionalities of those provided by ESRI. In addition to this, geo-processing functions can also be accessed via Python modules and put together in scripts or extensions. To provide interoperability between LINK and ArcGIS, an intermediate layer of data integration was developed. This layer consists of two modules, one on each side (LINK and ArcGis). In the first approach the LINK mapping module has been equipped with a simple export algorithm to a shapefile 6 data format. On the other hand, the ArcGIS custom Python extension was developed. It provides the tools to help data import and for conducting common analyses. It comes with its own graphical interface (Fig. 5). Unfortunately, this solution came out to be imperfect. Geographical data exported from LINK software into shapefile has to be simplified. Shapefiles have many limitations, they support only one shape associated with an entity, only one shape type per file, and do not provide a simple way to introduce relations between exported data. This implies many transformations on data exported from LINK, leading to its simplification and making it hard to import the data back after processing with ArcGIS. Fig. 5. The LINK data import dialog extension in ArcMap 6 Esri spatial data format: 233

235 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI To overcome these difficulties and provide tighter integration with ArcGIS, the current development is conducted towards data exchange through PostGIS spatial database extension. This would allow data to be interchanged both ways without loss of information. It would also exclude the necessity for manual invocation of import/export actions and allow for concurrent data access. Also, the ArcGIS plugin for the LINK platform is being developed with ArcObjects Java API. Its implementation, and therefore full integration of software in just one application window, would allow continuous analysis work without having to switch between two application contexts. Case study simple geographical criminal analysis To illustrate the use of the LINK and ArcGIS software applications in criminal analysis while considering the geographical data, let s walk through a simple case study. Let s assume that a series of three gas station robberies had taken place. CCTVs had captured the same registration number of the robbers car. The car owner has been arrested. Unluckily, he did not have the stolen money with him. He has also claimed that his car had been stolen and he had nothing to do with the robberies. In the meantime, another suspect with a large amount of money, matching the stolen amount, has been arrested in another part of Poland. The analyst has been asked to check whether one of the suspects could have been at the crime scene. The mobile network operator has provided billings with mobile phone calls of both suspects. The data was imported to LINK, and BTS data was automatically complemented with UKE 7 database contents. Next, a map diagram of BTS used for calls was created and augmented with the robbed stations positions (Fig. 6). The diagram showed that only the car owner s mobile phone made calls through BTS stations approximate to the crime scenes (BTS stations indicated by horizontal pin series). Furthermore, he is probably lying about the car theft, as he did not claim his phone has been stolen with it. On the other hand, a suspect arrested with money could not possibly have been with his phone at those places (BTS stations indicated by vertical pins series). However, to exclude all doubt about the car owner being able to rob the stations, the analyst had to prove that the suspect could manage to get, between phone calls, to the crime scene and have enough time to perform the robbery (Fig. 7). Unfortunately, this case is beyond the current LINK software capabilities. However, it is possible to export map data to external GIS applications,such as ArcGIS software, and continue the analysis (Fig. 8) Republic of Poland Office of Electronic Communications

236 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION Fig. 6. BTS logins diagram augmented with robbed gas stations' positions Fig. 7. BTS login times and distance from crime scene 235

237 R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI Fig. 8. LINK map diagram data exported to ArcGIS software; network-based analysis visualisation The ArcGIS allows for the network-based analysis, and for finding the route that could have been taken by the suspect and comparing driving time to the approximate BTS login time difference. The computed driving time is 1 hour 9 minutes (Fig. 9) and the actual login time difference (Fig. 7) is 1 hour 32 minutes. Therefore, the suspect could not only get to the crime scene, but also had a spare 23 minutes to perform the robbery. After proving it was possible for the car owner to have performed the series of robberies, the analyst had another hypothesis to consider: The person arrested with the money could have met with the car owner and picked up the plunder. The LINK application is equipped with an easy to use tool for potential meeting analysis. For the given case it has found two possible suspects meetings within a 60 minute timeframe (Fig. 10). Positions of BTS stations used for phone calls nearby to the possible meeting area can be shown on a map diagram (Fig. 11). However, to estimate the actual meeting place, one can again export map data to the external ArcGIS application. The network-based analysis can be performed to form a diagram of areas possible to be reached within the defined time intervals from BTS login (Fig. 12). In this case, intervals are set to 5 minutes 236

238 CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION Fig. 9. Driving time computation Fig. 10. Possible meeting finding tool 237