AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM. Charles Town, West Virginia. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the. requirements for the degree of

Transcription

1 AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM Charles Town, West Virginia IMPROVING AIR BASE DEFENSE BY MOVING THE UAV OPERATOR INTO THE BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER: A Historical Perspective of Air Base Defense; How Air Base Defense has Developed at Joint Base Balad, Iraq; A Brief Overview of the Air Operations Center; How Ground Forces and the Joint Intelligence Support Element will Benefit. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES by Matthew A. Harmon Department Approval Date: April 27, 2010 The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes. The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author s creation or in the public domain.

2 Copyright 2010 by Matthew A. Harmon All rights reserved.

3 DEDICATION I dedicate this thesis to my wife Mary, my son Christian and my daughter Madison. Through this endeavor all three of these family members have sacrificed while I dedicated the time necessary to complete this project. I would especially like to thank my wife, whom without her loving support of my children and I this project would not have been possible.

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my former Commander Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Donley for serving as a stalwart example of higher education. I benefited greatly from his strict enforcement of academic perfection in all projects that he assigned to me. I would also like to thank Colonel John Decknick. During my deployment as a Battle Captain at Joint Base Balad he offered his valuable time and insight, and I am a better officer for it. Additionally, I wish to thank my current commander Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Walker for his full support in the completion of this work. Finally, I thank my thesis professor Dr. Ronald Mangum for his direction and flexibility during the writing process. His detailed critical analysis not only served to make me a better writer, but assisted in bolstering the credibility of this thesis.

5 ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS IMPROVING BASE DEFENSE BY MOVING THE UAV OPERATOR INTO THE BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER: A Historical Perspective of Air Base Defense; How Air Base Defense has Developed at Joint Base Balad, Iraq; A Brief Overview of the Air Operations Center; How Ground Forces and the Joint Intelligence Support Element will Benefit. by Matthew A. Harmon American Public University System, April 27, 2010 Charles Town, West Virginia Professor Ronald S. Mangum, Thesis Professor The defense of air bases in Iraq could be greatly improved by moving the United States Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator into the Joint Defense Operations Center. Joint Base Balad has existed as an ongoing experiment in the improvement of air base defense operations. Security Forces leadership at this location have successfully synchronized Army defense assets, personnel and outside the wire patrol operations. The component that air base defense operations lack is a dedicated and locally controlled air power asset to act in support of ground forces and intelligence analysts within the Joint Defense Operations Center. The research in this thesis is qualitative in nature, and uses a case study approach to analyze and discuss the application of this thesis.

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION Purpose..7 Methodology.11 II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Air Base Defense: A Historical Perspective. 13 How Air Base Defense has Developed at Joint Base Balad..21 A Brief Overview of the Air Operations Center III. DISCUSSION The Dedication of Locally Controlled UAV Assets: The Benefit to Ground Forces Locally Controlled UAV Assets and the Joint Intelligence Support Element Summary 41 Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY.51

7 I. INTRODUCTION Purpose The defense of air bases in Iraq could be greatly improved by moving USAF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators into the base defense operations center, and dedicating precision strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capable USAF UAVs to the mission of air base defense. Lieutenant General Ronald E. Keys, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations in 2004 stated that Air base defense remains a riddle in the U.S. Air Force, and is one of five critical problems facing the Air Force today. 1 Historical analysis of air base defense reveals that the Air Force has exhibited a short attention span when it comes to the importance it places on the protection of air bases against ground threats. 2 The focus of this thesis is to effectively argue that dedicated USAF UAV operators who are located within the Base Defense Operations Center are critical to the success of defending air bases against level I and II threats within Iraq. The thesis will support this argument through a case study of current base defense operations on Joint Base Balad, Iraq, and will discuss the dedication of this recommended air power to air base defense operations at this installation. Air Force Basic Doctrine and Air Force Instruction have historically responded slowly to base defense needs. This statement holds true when it comes to the problem of air base defense in the 21 st century. This is not necessarily a criticism of the Department of the Air Force, as any educated student understands that government bureaucracies traditionally respond slowly to new 1 Gilles Van Nederveen, "A Book Review of Air Base Defense in Vietnam, ," Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 2006): (accessed April 4, 2010): Michael D. Bean, "United States Air Force Security Forces in an Era of Terrorist Threats." Master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University. (accessed April 2, 2010). 7

8 threats. In current operations within Iraq the existence of the air base located on the frontlines of the fight against insurgencies has blurred the traditional doctrinal definition of air bases located in the rear area of operations. Current Air Force doctrine addresses the type of air base that first existed in the rear area. Air bases in the European theaters of war existed as one of two types of air bases during World War I and II. During these wars, the locations of air bases in the European Theater were designed to keep air power, which was especially susceptible while on the ground, far out of the reach of the traditional enemy army forces of the time. The first of these types of European air bases were known as main operating bases, and they were located at least 250 nautical miles behind the forward edge of the battle area. This type of air base was designed to support a second type of air base known as the forward fighting base. The forward fighting base was located within 250 miles of the forward edge of the battle area. Air bases in Iraq are now known as Forward Operating Bases, and although their name is similar to that of the forward fighting bases during the World Wars forward operating bases are located on the front lines of the fight against insurgencies. Air Force doctrine addressing the defense of air bases has not properly accounted for the existence of an air base among population centers during an irregular war. In this type of war occurring within Iraq the enemy uses guerilla style tactics, and they exist in and among population centers that surround air bases. These population centers that surround air bases have redefined the front lines of war, and it is these front lines that harbor level I and II threats, where combatants account for not only the greatest number of attacks on the air base, but also represent the types of attacks that can cause the most catastrophic damage to the base. The combatants residing inside these front lines use tactics that include vehicle borne explosive devices, rocket, mortar and small arms fires. In Iraq U.S. air bases no longer face the threats of traditional 8

9 armies. The enemy now exists just beyond the air base perimeter, and they blend in with the existing population. No sizable forces exist in these theaters of war that can successfully penetrate air bases on a mass scale. The absence of a traditional opposing army in Iraq has allowed air bases to encroach on the front lines of the fight. As the location of the base in relation to the fight has changed, so too must the doctrine strategy and tactics developed to defend it. To some extent the Air Force has seen changes in base defense below the doctrinal level. These changes have included reforming the ideals that air base defense should be conducted from within the perimeter. Traditionally, outside of an air base perimeter the Army has owned the mission of defense and key terrain denial. While the perimeter fence line of an air base represents the demarcation and representation of the two distinct missions between the Army ground forces and Air Force ground forces that perimeter fence does not mark an area where threats to that air base stop. For the Air Force, the fence line of the air base has acted as that physical representation of the location where missions change, and air base defense forces are constrained to defend the base from a static position. As will be later discussed, this concept of air base defense has been redefined at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. Much has been written on how to improve the defense of air bases existing within these new insurgency environments, but none of these literary works has addressed further decentralizing the control of USAF UAV aircraft by integrating UAV operators within an air base defense operations center, or assigning these USAF air assets to specifically support air base defense. Most air base defense literature addresses improvements at the ground level, and advocates for improving on such things as ground tactics, joint operations and changes to unit posture, training or manning. 9

10 Currently, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) develops priorities and missions for all sorties flown over Iraq. Very rarely are sorties assigned directly to the defense of the air base. In some cases, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft are assigned missions that entail intelligence collection during a very brief window of time, and sometimes these aircraft are scheduled on a daily basis to conduct these missions, but these missions last merely a few hours per day. Other USAF aircraft such as fighter assets are available for very brief periods of time as they fly out of and into Joint Base Balad air space, but these aircraft cannot be diverted to support ground forces unless the request is approved by the CAOC. The MQ-1 Predator is one of several UAV platforms that would meet the precision strike and ISR requirements advocated herein for the improvement of air base defense. This thesis will illustrate how assigning dedicated and locally controlled USAF UAV assets with capabilities similar to the MQ-1 Predator will improve air base defense by better synchronizing UAV operations with ground force command and control, and intelligence analysis within the Base Defense Operations Center. Specifically, this argument will be reinforced through the application of the thesis to the Joint Defense Operations Center on Joint Base Balad, and will show how these changes will improve support to Security Forces outside the wire, and analysts working within the Joint Intelligence Support Element. This thesis intends to reveal that U.S. Air Bases in Iraq require a change in Air Force doctrine to allow for dedicated UAV air support for the base defense mission. The defined need of the air base in the realm of air power assets should include the capability of 24/7 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as the precision strike capability of weapons systems that can support the protection of the base and ground forces against level I and II threats. Among the questions that will be explored are: 10

11 1. How will dedicated air support improve the overall security and defense of current air bases in Iraq? 2. In what ways will base defense ground forces benefit from a 24/7 dedicated UAV air support mission? 3. How will dedicated UAV air support benefit the developing joint defense operations centers in theater? 4. How will dedicated air support benefit the joint intelligence support elements now attached to these joint defense operations centers? 5. In what ways can dedicated UAV air assets defend terrain, and survey battle space that is currently being viewed by base defense static sensor systems, and how could this effect the overall safety of ground forces? Methodology This thesis will conduct qualitative research, which is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem, and is a process of research involving the development of emerging questions and procedures. 3 This paper will offer a basic set of beliefs that guide the researcher s actions early in the study. This paper will utilize the author as the key instrument for gathering the data interpreted for or against the thesis. Throughout this research the paper will abide by the participant s meanings when presenting data to the audience and the thesis will inherently include an emergent design. This emergent design will be the key to honing and focusing on the essential problem or issue behind 3 J.W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications),

12 the subject that this thesis addresses. As data is analyzed and collected the reader should keep in mind that the research conducted for this thesis is a form of interpretive inquiry. This means that the audience may draw upon different conclusions regarding the data collected and presented, and the reader s interpretations are part of what makes up this qualitative research design. This paper will present a historical perspective of air base defense to enlighten readers who may be unfamiliar with this subject. In addition, the historical perspective will reveal how and when significant changes to air base defense have occurred. Understanding at what levels most recent air base defense changes have occurred is important in understanding why the changes supported in this thesis will require a change in Air Force doctrine. Data collection procedures will involve the review of Air Force Doctrine, Air Force Instruction and Joint Defense publications on record utilizing Air Force Electronic Publications websites. The American Military University online library will be exploited in the review of journal articles, theses, and research reports on this subject area. Additionally, the Air Force s Air University online library will examine previous literature in the area of base defense in order to support the focus of the thesis. Finally, the study will be buttressed by the author s personal experience as a Battle Captain in the Joint Defense Operations Center while assigned to the 332 nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. 12

13 II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Air Base Defense: A Historical Perspective During World War I, and prior to the establishment of the Department of the Air Force, air bases were largely immune to attack because air bases were located in the rear area of operations, and they were protected by a huge structure of trench lines that delineated the forward fighting area from the rear. This protection probably helped breed the apathy towards air base defense within the Army Air Corp. The operation and protection of airbases during World War II was very similar to the events of World War I. There became some growing appreciation for air power during World War I, and then during and after World War II as air power was seen as being decisive to attaining victory. Still, during World War II attacks on air bases were minimal. The German Luftwaffe had some success, and of course the Japanese had one great success during the attack on the surrounding Army airfields of Pearl Harbor, but overall aerial bombing was focused on population centers and the destruction of the war making capability of the nation, and the threats to air bases were much different then as compared to now. World War II ultimately brought the realization to the world that air power was a very decisive tool for victory. Germany clearly realized this fact, and incorporated this strategy of air power into the Blitzkrieg strategy. The Nazi regime developed a tactic of dropping paratroopers and airborne forces behind enemy lines in order to seize or destroy enemy air bases in the rear area. According to one author the decisive episode in the loss of the island of Crete to the 13

14 Germans was their capture of the British Air Base at Maleme. 4 It was this very event that led England s Prime Minister Winston Churchill to announce that he would no longer tolerate half a million air force personnel without a combat role. 5 Churchill drove senior military leaders to commit to training Royal Air Force Airmen to defend and be willing to die for the airfield. The United States followed England s lead in this area when in 1942 George C. Marshall approved the allotment of approximately 53,000 black soldiers to the Army Air Forces with the direction that these forces be organized expressly for the defense of a ground force invasion of an air base. Fortunately, threats to air bases located in the European Theater during World War II diminished early on as allies began gaining more and more control of surrounding land areas. In World War II within the Pacific theater the need to capture and defend airfields drove both American and Japanese Campaign planning. 6 The critical struggle for Henderson Field on Guadalcanal is one of the best examples of this fact. 7 After the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, the Army Air Core eliminated ground defense forces by closing all air base security battalions. The primary threat to air bases at the end of World War II was the enemy capture of the base, and played the primary role in how air base defense developed during this time. In 1947, the Department of the Air Force was established and became a separate service apart from the Army. Along with this establishment came the responsibility for the Air Force to provide for its own air base defense. Under the doctrine of the Army Air Corp the Army ground forces were previously tasked with this responsibility. The documents that established this new base defense responsibility were the National Defense Act of 1947, the Army-Air Force 4 Roger P Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), 12 5 Ibid., 16 6 David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, Check Six Begins on the Ground: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases. (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995), 23 7 The defense of Henderson field was of immeasurable importance to the success of the United States Armed Forces in establishing a foothold in the Solomon Islands during the summer of 1942, and continuing a successful offensive campaign against the Japanese. 14

15 Agreement of 1947 and the Key West Agreement of While these documents implied that the Air Force would now be responsible for its own defense there was no clear instruction on how the Air Force s air base defense mission would tie into the Army s area security mission just outside the air base. The Key West Agreement of 1948 provided the clearest message to this time regarding each service s responsibilities. Specifically, the Key West Agreement directed each service to develop, garrison, supply, equip and maintain bases. 9 Still, the air base defense mission of the Air Force was vague at best. The USAF air base defense commander relied heavily on relationships with surrounding Army commanders in order to secure the ground force commitments necessary for the protection of the base. With the onset of the Korean War, and soon after the establishment of the Department of the Air Force, this new department would realize its first war time challenge involving the defense of air bases. In World War II war planners realized the escalating value of air power, and this fact led to a revised focus on air base defense during the Korean War. During the Korean War the Air Force responded by expanding its Air Police from 10,000 in 1950, to 39,000 in However, at the time of the Korean War the Air Force still remained without official policy or tactical doctrine for air base ground defense. 10 The Air Force would continue for a full two years before producing Air Force Regulation 355-4, which officially established local ground defense doctrine for the first time. An Air Provost Marshall was the newly assigned position responsible for the mission of air base defense. The Provost Marshall had two categories of base defense forces. The base defense task forces organized and equipped themselves like infantry. The Airmen who made up this defense force were not directly linked to flight operations, and were 8 David T Young, "Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense: A New Doctrinal Framework" (master's thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2005), GetTRDoc?AD=ADA439510&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed February 27, 2010). 9 Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam pp Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam

16 merely part time base defense personnel to be called upon by the Air Police in times of need. The second group of defense forces was the Air Police, and they acted as cadre for the base defense task forces, and operated directly under the command of the Air Provost Marshall. However, Air Force Regulation was again vague in nature, and it wasn t until Strategic Air Command published SAC Manual that the Air Force seriously addressed the conflicts between the Army and the Air Force regarding the air base defense mission. This doctrine published in 1952 recognized that the Army could not be expected to defend Air Force installations that were not vital to the accomplishment of the Army s own mission objectives. 11 In fact, the Army s limited and temporary defense role might very well run counter to air base defense priorities. Hence, the Army could not realistically be expected to restrict its operations to the defense of Air Force constituents not vital to its own mission. The lack of focused concern by the Army regarding air base defense potentially left the Air Force vulnerable to surprise attack. Prior to this doctrine the Air Force relied heavily on the Army to fill planning gaps in base defense outside of the perimeter, but SAC Manual officially recognized the need for the Air Force to fully accept this responsibility. This did not change the fact that the Air Force still relied on the Army to participate in fulfilling the air base defense mission outside the base perimeter. The doctrine put the responsibility of planning for defenses outside the perimeter on the Air Force, but required the Army s participation to carry out the plan on the ground. While attention to air base defense grew during the 130 attacks against air bases during World War II, the attacks on air bases during the Korean War would see a major downward trend, and would ultimately contribute to the lack of attention given to the subject of air base defense after 11 Raymond E. Bell, "To Protect an Air Base." Air Power Journal (Fall 1989). (accessed March 12, 2010). 16

17 that war. 12 In the Korean War air bases would see only three attacks, and these attacks constituted less than 1% of all attacks on air bases up until Unfortunately for air base defense, the Air Force would continue to exhibit a lack of affliction on the subject. With the onset of the Vietnam War, air base defense practices were carried forward from ongoing security requirements for aircraft as practiced on Air Force bases located inside the continental United States. These practices were internally focused on physical security measures that were dedicated to preventing acts such as sabotage, and favored standardization of practice over intelligence. The Cold War era contributed to this air base defense practice as top brass felt that sabotage by communist spies was the biggest threat. 14 These practices focuses on physical security were very effective in preventing sabotage or sapper attacks, but during the Vietnam War these tactics would prove very ineffective in combating standoff mortar and rocket attacks instigated by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army. Additionally, an expert on the subject points out in his book that the organizational structure left security police without ground intelligence, vehicles, weapons procurement, training, maintenance, effective communications, and strong engineering support. 15 The Vietnam War provided air base defense challenges that were never experienced to this extent before. During the Vietnam War air bases were attacked a total of 493 times, which accounts for 76% of all attacks against air bases up until During World War II attacks against air bases mainly comprised tactics used to seize an airfield, or prevent the use of the air field. The goals and guerilla tactics of the Vietcong during the Vietnam War were completely 12 Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle's Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases. (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1995), Ibid., Young, A Book Review of Air Base Defense in Vietnam, Ibid. 16 Vick, Snakes in the Eagle's Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases,

18 different. Most attacks on air bases during the Vietnam War could be classified as harassment attacks that intended to injure and kill personnel, or damage and destroy equipment. Another factor that contributed to the ill preparedness of the Air Force in the realm of base defense was the fact that AFR had outlined the threat of ground attack as a much more serious problem than what the Korean War would demonstrate, which led senior Air Force leaders to dismiss the importance of the publication, and eroded the credibility of the document. 17 At the end of the Vietnam War another factor emerged that deterred the perceived need of establishing improved air base defense doctrine. During the Cold War the national security strategy of the time was revised to include a strategy that sought to remain out of small regionally limited wars such as the Korea and Vietnam Wars. This new Cold War national security strategy was focused on the threat of nuclear war, and dismissed the idea that a future need would develop to emplace air bases near the front lines of the fight. Little did national security strategists of the time know that air bases operating on the front lines would become the standard for conflicts in the Middle East. As one analyzes the history of air base defense it becomes clear that the majority of attacks on air bases were of a stand-off nature designed to harass through death and destruction in limited quantities, and were performed by personnel who were operating using guerilla tactics. These types of attacks also represent the majority of attacks and destruction caused to air bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. As in the Vietnam War, the enemy insurgents use tactics similar to guerilla 17 AFR was the first publication to make an effort to establish air base defense doctrine for the Air Force. In so doing it reviewed attacks during World War II, and established that based on the upward trend seen during this war the threat to air bases should be addressed more seriously. It was simply the North Korean s disinterest in attacking air bases that helped to erode the validity of the threat that AFR355-4 outlined. The lack of confidence in AFR directly contributed to the lack of concern by the Air Force to develop a serious ground defense force further. The lack of interest was not only exhibited by senior Air Force leaders, but by Congress as well whose decision to fund the increased manning was necessary in order to develop the proposed ground defense force. 18

19 forces in Vietnam. The nature of a reactive and static air base defense strategy favors the hit and run tactics used against U.S. air bases in the Middle East. Just as in Vietnam the Army is currently responsible for carrying out the base defense mission outside of the base perimeter. As will be discussed later in this paper wing commanders are held responsible for the defense of their air base, but have little influence on how the off base terrain is protected by the Army. Air base defense forces of today known as Air Force Security Forces are in most cases restrained to internal base duties by order of U.S. Air Force Central Command, with a few exceptions that include Joint Base Balad. The Air Force s continued stance of defending air bases from within the perimeter has proved problematic in Iraq just as it was in Vietnam. As in most cases the Air Force relies on the Army to establish a secure area outside of the air base perimeter, but competing Army missions as well as frustrations resulting from the constant threat of ambush and improvised explosive devices have disrupted the Air Force s base defense mission, and resulted in relative freedom of attack by insurgents using stand-off weapons. 18 The most current guidance that describes how the armed forces operate in Iraq and Afghanistan in an expeditionary environment and conduct air base defense is found in Joint Publication , Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense, published in The Joint Rear Area concept is applicable across the range of military operations in Iraq. 18 Joint Base Balad, formerly known as LSA Anaconda, was for several years referred to as Mortoritaville due to the high number of indirect fire attacks and the relative freedom of attack that insurgents enjoyed around the base. 19 Ron Gray, "Integrated Swarming Operations for Base Defense: Applications in Irregular Warfare." Master's thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, (accessed February 27, 2010). 19

20 Joint Publication sets forth the legal definitions of responsibility of air base defense, and places those responsibilities on the air base commander. 20 Joint Publication is the most current and authoritative document providing for the guidance of air base defense in a joint environment, but at the same time it is still out of date by defining the air base in the rear area of operations. Figure 1 below clearly represents the out of date concepts within Joint Publication Notice that in the illustration below Figure 1 shows the air base in the left portion of the map, while indicating that the combat zone is located to the right. This is no longer true because air bases in Iraq are located on the front lines of the insurgent war, and are surrounded by level I and II threats. Figure 1: Example of out of date geographical organization of the rear area of operations. Source: Department of Defense. Joint Publication (JP) , Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense 20 Department of Defense. Joint Publication (JP) pp. I-1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense, 23 July 1996, IV-12. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense,

21 How Air Base Defense has Developed at Joint Base Balad The responsibility of the United States Air Force for the defense of Joint Base Balad (JBB) officially started on midnight June 15, 2008 to coincide with the transfer of base support functions from the Army to the Air Force under the Base Operating Support Integration initiative, known as BOS-I. 21 This changeover in responsibility directed the Air Force to take full responsibility for base support functions to include food service, lodging, vehicle operations, base upkeep, construction projects and base defense. Leading up to this significant change the installation commander was an Army Brigadier General. While this date marked the official change in responsibility for the base defense mission the Army would continue to conduct Balad s base defense until October, 2008, when Security Forces Airmen were able to arrive and fully assume the mission inside the wire. The 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group stood up to assume responsibility for the defense of Joint Base Balad on July 24 th, The Base Defense Operations Center is the Air Force command and control structure for air base defense. At JBB the BDOC is a joint environment, and so is therefore known as the Joint Defense Operations Center. (JDOC) Upon stand up of the 332 nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group leadership quickly began working to improve the existing JDOC in order to better integrate both Army and Air Force assets and personnel for base defense. 22 The JDOC s mission was to bring together Army and Air Force command and control of ground forces in and around the air base in order to better integrate personnel actions and existing technologies. The JDOC, under the command of the 332 nd 21 Lisa Spilinek, "New Name for Balad Reflects Joint Status," 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs (Joint Base Balad), June 17, 2008, (accessed March 5, 2010). 22 While Air Force and Army command and control elements were collocated within the JDOC, the Air Force Security Force s authority would stop just beyond the base perimeter. 21

22 Expeditionary Security Forces Group also more fully integrated a Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) in order to begin the improvement of integrating air assets into the base defense mission. 23 The JTAC personnel provided a critical link of communication and aircraft video feed to the JDOC, which could be used to better support Army and Air Force ground forces outside the wire. The integration of these air assets would be sporadic at best though, as every aircraft in JBB s air space was centrally controlled through the Combined Air Operations Center. The integration of the air asset would mostly occur while aircraft passed in and out of JBB s airspace, and offered support during this approximate 10 minute window of passage. Although these aircraft could provide support during this flight transition in or out of JBB airspace, any requests to support a base defense need (i.e. provide air strike or remain on target longer for surveillance) required coordination and approval through the CAOC. This coordination was often a lengthy process, and therefore could not effectively provide the immediate support or response that ground forces needed. The success of air integration of such aircraft as the F-15 had been proven in the past at JBB. In March of 2006 during a mortar attack the JDOC utilized available technology to quickly calculate the point of origin of the mortar launch, and then immediately relayed the coordinates to the F-15 commander who was in communication with the JTAC during their brief transition through JBB airspace. The F-15 was able to immediately visually acquire the location and utilized the aircraft s electro-optical and infrared sensor capability to quickly locate three individuals in a fleeing vehicle near the area of the point of origin of the mortar launch. The F-15 aircraft tracked the vehicle to a local house where the 23 Although the JTAC worked within the JDOC and could coordinate air assets with Air Force ground forces outside the wire, the JTAC fell under the command of the Army, and could not request air to ground engagement without the approval of the Army. 22

23 JDOC then directed members of U.S. Army Task force 3-29 to investigate this location. 24 The JDOC personnel remained visually tied to the F-15 camera feed through remotely operated video enhanced receiver technology, allowing the radio transmission operator in the JDOC to walk the responding ground forces right up to the front door of the home. 25 Outside of this sporadic support of transitioning aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles were tasked by the CAOC for very short periods of time to directly support base defense through surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 26 Included in the defense strategy of JBB was an Air Force Security Forces presence outside the wire in coordination with the Army. While the Air Force projected a presence outside the wire in the interest of base defense the Army would remain the battle space owner, and at times would have overriding interests that weren t necessarily in line with air base defense. 27 Meanwhile, the Air Force wing commander is considered a battle space owner within the confines of the air base. In situations such as these there exist side by side two battle space owners whose mission priorities are not in aligned. The Security Forces Airmen, who maintain a daily presence within an 8km area outside of Joint Base Balad in order to provide support for base defense, are at the same time not under the operational control of the wing commander who is directly responsible for the defense of the air base. During these outside the wire patrols Air 24 "Fighter Aircraft Help Apprehend Insurgents." US Fed News Service, Including US State News, March 20, 2006, (accessed March 5, 2010). 25 Remotely operated video enhanced receiver, known as ROVER, is able to receive camera images from nearby aircraft and UAVs. As long as the operator has acquired the aircraft s ROVER frequency, the video feed can allow for greater assistance to ground forces, and will help senior commanders put eyes on a situation and make better decisions to allow offensive operations to occur. 26 The MQ-1 Predator UAV was regularly scheduled for short missions of approximately 2 hours per day in support of defense operations at Joint Base Balad. During this time frame the Joint Tactical Air Controller working within the JDOC would direct UAV operations based on the inputs of the Joint Intelligence Support element within the JDOC. 27 Battle Space is a term used to signify a unified military strategy to integrate and combine armed forces for the military theater of operations, including air, information, land, sea and space to achieve military goals. 23

24 Force Security Forces movements are tracked by the JDOC, and their patrol missions are submitted to the Army for approval prior to execution. 28 During 2009 the JDOC had fully achieved expertise in melding available air support into the ground mission being performed outside the wire by Air Force Security Forces Airmen. During every rocket or mortar attack, any aircraft within JBB airspace was immediately contacted and given the coordinates of the point of origin of the attack. 29 During events where air support was available, the JDOC was able to achieve a visual of the point of origin through use of ROVER technologies in as little as 45 seconds after enemy launch. The JDOC has perfected integration of air assets into many other base defense scenarios. Every distinguished visitor who toured the JDOC in 2009 was shown video footage of an operation where the JDOC had been monitoring MQ-1 Predator feed from a surveillance mission which came upon a suspicious individual walking in a remote location that had been previously used for indirect fire attacks on Joint Base Balad. The JDOC successfully walked in a team of Security Forces Airmen in the dark of night onto the individual s position, even as he was securely hidden in surrounding terrain. Successes such as these would push the 332 nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group to contract its own assigned air support, since the Air Force up to this point had not given them this capability. In late 2009 the 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group began successful integration of contracted air assets that were solely dedicated to the air base defense mission at JBB. This unmanned aerial vehicle manufactured by Boeing and known as the Scan Eagle, would serve to provide the JDOC with constant aerial surveillance that could be integrated and coordinated with 28 Security Forces teams patrolling outside the wire maintained communication with two command and control elements. The patrols were required to maintain contact with the JDOC as well as the Army. While their mission was to directly support base defense, they were forced to gain all approval for movements through the Army chain of command, delaying their ability to respond to mortar attack points of origin provided through JDOC technologies. 29 While JDOC Airmen became masters at this procedure, aircraft were only available in the local airspace for ground support approximately 25% of the time. This fact is based on the author s own experience as the Battle Captain in charge of the Joint Defense Operations Center during

25 Security Forces ground movements. The Scan Eagle is a lightweight portable surveillance system outfitted with a high resolution day and night camera as well as a thermal imager. 30 The aircraft can stay airborne for up to 20 hours at a time, and provides remote video feed back to the JDOC. This was not the first venture for Boeing providing Scan Eagle support to the military. The success of the small unmanned aircraft had been proven in past operations during the fulfillment of a 14.5 million dollar contract with the Navy providing support for Navy Expeditionary Strike Groups. 31 While these changes in air base defense are occurring on such installations as Joint Base Balad they don t necessarily represent the rule among all air bases in the Iraq and Afghanistan Theaters of War. There have been two major factors hindering the change in base defense ground strategy. First, Army doctrine does not conform with handing over land ownership outside of air bases to Air Force Security Forces. Second, the Air Force does not have the ability to maintain Security Forces manning requirements supporting this expanded expeditionary base defense mission among all air bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. In essence, the base defense operation on Joint Base Balad is in reality experimental, but these changes on Joint Base Balad are quickly redefining Air Force ground tactics and thinking among officers in the Security Forces career field. Lagging behind the change in air base defense strategy is Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, and Joint Publication , Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense. Both of these publications, although the most up to date doctrine in the area, are clearly based on a conventional warfare model. The mention of the word rear 30 "Fact Sheet: Scan Eagle." The Official Website of the U.S. Air Force. factsheet.asp?id=10468 (accessed March 6, 2010). 31 "Scan Eagle: Overview." Boeing. scaneagle/index.html (accessed March 20, 2010). 25

26 area suggests an inference to a linear and contiguous battlefield. As such, the words rear area used in any conversation alongside the word forward operating base is out of place when used in reference to the War in Iraq. Joint Base Balad now lies in what is termed an insurgent battlefield. The U.S. experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan should have removed this perception of the old term rear area, as the insurgent battlefield is one that has no flanks, no rear, or, to put it otherwise, it is front all around. 32 Joint Publication has made some strides in updating air base defense doctrine. The publication advocates patrolling beyond the base perimeter. The publication is problematic though in that it provides no method of coordinating areas of responsibility and operations with the elements doctrinally given the responsibility for the external security of the rear area bases. 33 The Department of the Air Force has continued the trend of neglecting to appropriately update air base defense doctrine. While below the doctrinal level senior Air Force Security Forces officers are making huge strides in conducting air base defense the top echelon of Air Force leadership has not adapted air support operations in order to better fit this changing base defense strategy. The increase in success of unmanned aerial vehicles such as the MQ-1 Predator offers the perfect low cost platform to assign to the defense of each major air base in Iraq. 32 Davis P. Briar, "Sharpening the Eagle's Talons: Assesing Air Base Defense," Air and Space Power Journal Fall 2004 (September 2004): page #s, (accessed January 29, 2010). 33 Ibid. 26

27 A Brief Overview of the Air Operations Center To better appreciate the argument of this thesis, the reader should understand the basics of how air power is assigned and managed in the United States Air Force. This understanding will later lend an appreciation of how air power could be better managed for the needs of air base defense. An Air Operations Center (AOC) is a command and control center that plans, executes and assesses aerospace operations during a contingency or conflict. 34 General Ronald E. Keys is the Commander, Air Combat Command, and was the Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command, and in the past the General has said that "the AOC is fundamental to what makes us great as an Air Force," and "if you have a group of airplanes but you don't have an AOC, you don't really have an air force.you have a flying club." 35 These statements are simple and to the point in illustrating the importance of the AOC to the Air Force. The AOC is the sole authority in developing a target priority list known as the Air Tasking Order (ATO), and managing aircraft assignments to carry out missions in relation to these targets. The AOC was designed to be the nerve center for command and control for the air component of a war. Operational planners develop and assess, in real time, various courses of actions that are based upon the Commander s intent and the Aerospace Component Picture. 36 The challenges of managing an air war has been in one sense overcoming the information overload factor, and making decisions to engage targets within a theater of war in the shortest possible time. The problem of time management comes into play when discussing what has been termed 34 "Air Force Rethinks Air Operations Centers." The Official Website of the U.S. Air Force. (accessed March 20, 2010). 35 Ibid. 36 Paul Phister, Igor Planisch and Todd Humiston, The Combined Aerospace Operations Center of the Future. Tracks/Papers/Track7/062_tr7.pdf (accessed April 23, 2001). 27

28 as time sensitive targets that are not addressed by the Air Tasking Order planning cycle. The likelihood of an AOC successfully engaging these types of targets has been summed up as less than 60 minutes must be good; 0-30 minutes must be lucky and good; less than 10 minutes must be crazy. 37 The Air Force has been trying to get this decision making process down to single digit minutes, and has had some success in the development of a Time-Sensitive Targeting Cell within the Combined Air Operations Center responsible for the Iraq Theater of War. While the AOC was developed to fight air wars that the United States would be engaged in alone, the Combined Air Operations Center is responsible for the Iraq Theater of War and takes into account that the Air Force of today does not fight the battle alone, but instead fights the battles alongside coalition partners committed to the cause. The CAOC operates under the principles of the aforementioned AOC, but goes a step further in taking into account this coalition aspect, and merges together all aspects of warfare to include air, space and cyberspace in order for the Air Force to achieve full spectrum dominance within any engagement. 38 The Time-Sensitive Targeting Cell was developed to handle time sensitive targets that are cultivated through troop contact on the ground. The Time-Sensitive Targeting Cell is the structure that has been designed to respond to Air Force Security Forces requests for support while conducting terrain denial missions outside the wire at JBB. The Iraq CAOC s Time-Sensitive Targeting Cell consists of about 25 members, and handles thousands of pieces of information per day. In the most successful of cases the Cell is able to coordinate ground support to Special Operations Forces within two to three minutes. Nonetheless, there are checks and balances built into the decision making process that tend to slow down the execution time. The cell works with other 37 Jonathan Lee Jackson, "Solving the Problem of Time-Sensitive Targeting." Master's thesis, Naval War College, GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415574&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010). 38 Phister, The Combined Aerospace Operations Center of the Future. 28

29 military planners within the CAOC before any time sensitive target is given the green light. 39 Once the cell is given the green light, the air asset is assigned to the battle space owner (i.e. Army owning a land area outside of an air base) where the battle space owner makes the final decision on whether or not to strike the target. Consequently, Air Force Security Forces who operate outside of Joint Base Balad in support of air base defense and operationally attached to the Army, have yet one additional level of command and control to go through before getting air support. The concepts of the Air Operations Center and the Combined Air Operations Center are built around doctrine that guides the management of the air component of a traditional war around the concepts of centralized control, and decentralized execution. 40 The concept was designed to best manage air assets over a very large land mass in order to obtain better effects based success. This construct worked perfectly during the invasion of Iraq, but current operations against insurgencies rooted in land areas that surround the air bases requires a more decentralized control of air power that can better support the immediate needs of the air base and its defense. Further decentralizing the control of air assets assigned to air base defense would reduce the workload of the Time-Sensitive Targeting Cell within the CAOC. With an air asset permanently assigned to support an air base defense mission the CAOC no longer needs to handle management of those assets, and thus the decentralized control of those aircraft is handed over to the air base commander. 41 Further decentralization of air assets, and moving UAV operators into the base defense operations center could reduce response time to ground forces from minutes to seconds. 39 Brian Orban, "Time-Sensitive Targeting Adds Combat Flexibility." Air Force Link News. (accessed March 20, 2010). 40 Jackson, "Solving the Problem of Time-Sensitive Targeting." 41 This proposed model assumes that the Air Force and Army could develop doctrine that gives battle space owner rights to the air base commander within a set area outside of his perimeter fence. For the purposes of this argument, the air base Commander should be given a minimum of eight square kilometers of land area to control outside of the air base in order to dominate terrain used for stand-off weapons attacks. 29