DRIVER LICENSE AGREEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES MANUAL

Transcription

1 DRIVER LICENSE AGREEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES MANUAL Table of Contents CHAPTER ONE: PREFACE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND... 4 Acknowledgements...4 CHAPTER TWO: ANTICIPATED BENEFITS FROM THE D L A... 5 Benefits for Drivers Benefits for Law Enforcement Benefits for Courts Benefits for Licensing Officials CHAPTER THREE: GENERAL INFORMATION... 7 Purpose of the DLA...7 Purpose of the Procedures Manual...7 What is the DLA Code?...7 What is the Driver Control Record (DCR)?...8 What is the Jurisdiction of Record (JOR)?...8 CHAPTER FOUR: IDENTITY VERIFICATION & CARD ISSUANCE One Identity-One Driver License-One Driver Control Record...10 Employee Training...10 Application...11 USING THE ACCEPTABLE VERIFIABLE RESOURCE LISTS...14 How to Verify the Documents...17 Social Security Number Verification...18 Collecting a Full Legal Name and Name History...20 Page 1 of 119

2 Verification of Address...21 Third Party Verification of Customer Identification Information...23 Verification of Driver License Status and PDPS, CDLIS Checks...24 Issuing Identification Cards...25 CHAPTER FIVE: THE DRIVER CONTROL RECORD Content...26 JOR s Responsibility to Maintain The DCR...27 Notification and Exchange of Driver Control Records...27 Exchange of Other Information and Reporting...28 CHAPTER SIX: WHETHER OR NOT TO ISSUE: HOW TO PROCEED Five-Year Rule, Medical Withdrawals and Failures to Comply...29 FIGURE 1. NEW DRIVER LICENSE ISSUED AFTER FIVE YEARS...30 FIGURE 2. DLA CODE CONVICTION AND WITHDRAWAL IN NON-JOR...30 FIGURE 3. WITHDRAWAL IN JOR FOR NON-DLA CODE REASON...31 FIGURE 4. NON-DLA CODE WITHDRAWAL IN JOR; LATER CONVICTION IN NON-JOR...31 Specific Requirements for Failures to Comply...32 FIGURE 5. FAILURE TO COMPLY...34 Out-of-State Withdrawals and Substantially Similar Conduct...34 Admissibility of Records...35 Reinstatement Requirements...35 Valid-In-One-State-Only Licenses...35 Card Design Specifications...36 Frequently Asked Questions...36 CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNAL CONTROLS What are Internal Controls?...42 Human Resources:...44 Auditing and Information Technology...45 Framework for Audit Plan...48 CHART: Driver Licensing and Identification Business Processes - Risk Areas and Control Assessment...52 Page 2 of 119

3 Privacy...57 CHAPTER EIGHT: DLA ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS Effective Date of DLA...58 Entry and Withdrawal Requirements...58 FIGURE 6. JOINING AND WITHDRAWING FROM THE DLA...59 Administration of the DLA...59 The Dispute Resolution Process...61 FIGURE 7. FORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS...61 Amendments to the DLA...61 FIGURE 8. AMENDMENTS TO THE DLA...62 Transitional Provisions...62 CHAPTER NINE: APPENDICES A THROUGH M Appendix A- DLA Code List...65 Appendix B - U.S. Acceptable Verifiable Resources List...67 Appendix C - Canadian Acceptable Verifiable Resources List...69 Appendix D - Verification Matrix...71 Appendix E Model Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)...75 Appendix F Considerations: Online vs. Batch SSN Verification...80 Appendix G - Considerations for Electronic Address Verification...82 Appendix H - Considerations for Third Party Verification...84 Appendix I White Paper On Over-The-Counter, Central And Hybrid Issuing Systems...86 Appendix J - Notice of Joinder...93 Appendix K - Failure to Comply Notice...95 Appendix L - Compliance Notice...96 Appendix M - Acronyms and Abbreviations...97 Appendix N DLA State Compliance Indicator...98 Page 3 of 119

4 CHAPTER ONE: Preface and Historical Background The Driver License Agreement (DLA) is the product of over nine years of analysis conducted on input received from jurisdictions. It combines and improves essential elements of the Driver License Compact (DLC) and the Non-Resident Violator Compact (NRVC). In August 2000, the Joint Board submitted a proposed final draft of the DLA to the Jurisdiction Chief Administrators, where applicable, for a vote of acceptance. The final vote was 49-2 to proceed with the DLA. Finally in October 2000, the DLA was presented as a final document at the Annual Membership Meeting. This process provided every jurisdiction a voice, a vote and direct input into the final product. The events of September 2001 were the cause of a sudden change of direction for the Driver License Agreement. Increased attention was focused on the challenges of assuring the identity of applicants for driver licenses and identification cards issued by jurisdictions. Following concerns raised by Congress, the AAMVA Executive Committee asked the Joint Compact Executive Board to revise the DLA to include requirements and procedures for jurisdictions to follow which would greatly reduce the opportunity for identity fraud in the licensing process. This revision was endorsed by the jurisdictions in Sept by a vote of 48 to 3. A Uniform Identification Subcommittee was formed within the AAMVA Driver License & Control Committee. This group of experts from Canada and the United States compiled and promulgated thirteen (13) requirements and eight (8) recommendations for standards, procedures and training which jurisdictions should implement to make the identification of individuals uniform and identity fraud much more difficult to perpetrate. Many of these have been incorporated into the Driver License Agreement. Acknowledgements The Joint DLC/NRVC Executive Board wishes to express its appreciation to the various individuals, jurisdictions and organizations which participated in developing the DLA. It especially wishes to thank the AAMVA Legal Services Committee and the DLA Legal Services Working Group for its expertise and effort in drafting this DLA and related documents. In addition, the Board wishes to acknowledge the vital contributions of the AAMVA Uniform Identification Subcommittee, which are the basis for enhancements to this Agreement. Contributions from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA,) the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) were essential to the realization of the new DLA. Page 4 of 119

5 CHAPTER TWO: Anticipated Benefits From The D L A Benefits for Drivers... One Identity - One License - One Driver Control Record : Ineligible drivers will find it more difficult to obtain a driver license among member jurisdictions. This is because the one identity one driver license - one driver control record concept of the DLA makes it more difficult to hide a bad driver history. This concept also makes it easier for good drivers to receive reciprocal services in member jurisdictions. Drivers may not necessarily be turned down for a driver license because they have non-safety-related convictions or withdrawal actions elsewhere. Also, drivers will find it easier to clear issues in other jurisdictions, due to only one DCR and better record keeping. Jurisdictional cooperation: Drivers proceed through other jurisdictions like residents, without fear of arrest or the requirement to post collateral or bond for most traffic offenses. Jurisdictions agree to communicate and reciprocate with one another on driver issues. The customer s personal information is more secure and protected thereby increasing individual privacy. There is enhanced fraud and identification theft protection. There will be uniform application of procedures. There will be better customer service and enhanced reciprocity between jurisdictions. Benefits for Law Enforcement... Better record keeping reduces inefficiency and time spent at traffic stops. Failure to comply provisions of the DLA allow an officer to treat non-resident motorists the same as residents when making traffic stops. New standards and procedures to reduce identity fraud at licensing offices provide security and comfort in knowing the individual driver is actually the person represented on that driver license. Driver licenses and ID cards issued using verifiable resources will provide accurate information when presented to law enforcement. Driver license and ID card records will contain all name information associated with the customer, including the legal name. Better training will be available to identify legitimate and fraudulent driver licenses and identification products issued. Unsafe drivers will be prevented from obtaining another driver license document. Provides for uniformity through minimum standards, card layout and design, security techniques employed and common machine readable technology provided. Page 5 of 119

6 Benefits for Courts... Compliance with citations should increase along with collection of fines. The potential for reduced driver license related litigation exists due to improved DMV processes, greater consistency, standard rules of evidence, and better record keeping under the DLA. Greater assurance that the decisions rendered against drivers will be applied to the appropriate record. Benefits for Licensing Officials... Improved record sharing and record keeping procedures promote efficiency and results in better licensing decisions. Cooperation among members fosters expedient problem resolution. All acceptable, verifiable resources listed are easily identified and understood, streamlining the process for front-line staff. A minimum level of knowledge through fraudulent document recognition training will be available for all employees. The same resources and data elements are used to verify the customer s identity. The conditions under which exceptions are handled are clarified and reduced. There will be accelerated detection and deterrence of identification fraud from both external and internal sources. There will be a reduction of identification errors such as choosing or updating the incorrect record. There will be heightened integrity of documents issued and motor vehicle records created and maintained. By increasing compliance with jurisdictional laws through effective record keeping and licensing, states and provinces realize improved highway safety for citizens. The DLA guidelines protect the integrity of the driver license document by promoting the exchange of driver record information, by safeguarding identification of individuals and by reducing fraudulent identification practices. The resource lists, data elements required, and common security levels establish a minimum identification standard for all jurisdictions. By utilizing standard processes and administrative procedures identification reciprocity between jurisdictions will be facilitated. The procedures provide jurisdictions options, guidelines and processes to verify the accuracy of the data presented and to control the systems that communicate the information. There will be enhanced authentication of genuine driver licenses and identification cards and better recognition of fraudulent documents. Page 6 of 119

7 CHAPTER THREE: General Information Purpose of the DLA The DLA is a voluntary, reciprocal agreement among member jurisdictions to promote the one identity, one driver license - one driver control record concept and to provide for the fair and impartial treatment of all drivers operating within their borders with respect to offenses and failures to comply. The DLA provides a more efficient means for assuring uniformity and cooperation among jurisdictions in performing driver licensing procedures, maintaining and sharing driver records, protecting against identity fraud, and promoting reciprocity in the treatment of non-resident violators. The DLA provides the mechanism of assuring the concept of one identity, one driver license, and one driver control record. Purpose of the Procedures Manual Information presented in this manual is intended to enable jurisdictions to perform the functions required or recommended of members of the DLA. This information will also enable jurisdictions to effectively utilize the various resource documents included in the DLA and accompanying Rules, and should facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the DLA on an operational, day-to-day basis. What is the DLA Code? The DLA Code is The list of convictions and administrative actions approved by the Board to be reported to the Jurisdiction of Record under the DLA. The DLA Code identifies the types of convictions and administrative actions, as well as failures to comply, relating to highway safety matters and federal mandates that reflect conduct that is to be reported under the DLA. Only DLA codes will be transmitted between states, by electronic or other means in a manner that is secure, intelligible, complete, and accurate, as specified in the rules. (See Appendix A - DLA Code List) The DLA Code is approved and adopted by the Board responsible for the administration of the DLA. Note that the DLA Board doesn t control the ACD, which is used by all jurisdictions to comply with federal mandates for commercial drivers. However, since all jurisdictions use these codes, the DLA Board has the option to make its codes agree with the ACD. In practice, the two code sets will be the same, and the jurisdictions will not notice any difference in their procedures. The ACD equivalency table maps each jurisdiction s laws to the corresponding ACD. Thus, jurisdictions do not need to maintain separate tables to map their laws to the laws of other Page 7 of 119

8 jurisdictions. The equivalency table will be revised as part of a separate initiative to only include codes relating to safety, fraudulent use of a driver license or ID card and federal mandates. All other codes will be removed from the table and ACD code set. This data may still be maintained on a jurisdiction s own system, and driver control action may still be taken based on these codes. However, they will no longer be transmitted interstate as part of the DLA Code (and ACD Code set). In addition, as part of the forthcoming ACD revision, a new status code will be developed to distinguish between an ACD code withdrawal and a withdrawal based on a non-acd code. A non-acd code withdrawal will be defined as a withdrawal issue" by a jurisdiction for a single conviction which is neither traffic safety related, driver related or federally mandated. The creation of a generic comprehensive non-acd code withdrawal within the revised ACD set will ensure that non-acd related withdrawal information is passed in the history response during a change state of record. Having the DLA Board adopt a set of DLA codes that are equal to the ACD codes may seem redundant, because jurisdictions have been using the ACD code set for some time. However, because the DLA Board represents all the jurisdictions in the DLA, the Board's adoption of its own code set buttresses the argument that out-of-jurisdiction convictions can be counted when taking action against a driver. Challenges to another jurisdiction s conviction are primarily based upon the similarity or equivalency language argument. Specific language in the DLA (see Articles VIII and X) emphasizes conduct rather than substantially similar language. The pre-determination upon joinder into the DLA by the Board of substantially similar conduct along with a statute of limitations argument should be given great weight in subsequent judicial challenges. While the process may seem cumbersome, the drafters believe this will be more cost effective in the long haul given the expenses of litigation. What is the Driver Control Record (DCR)? The DCR consists of information on the status of a driver including the list of convictions and administrative actions set forth in the DLA Code, as well as failures to comply, which must be reported to the JOR. The DLA identifies the types of convictions and administrative actions relating to highway safety matters, identity fraud and federal mandates that reflect conduct required to be reported under the DLA. The DCR is the only official record for the driver that is recognized by all member jurisdictions and the only record providing a basis for withdrawal of driving privileges in all member jurisdictions. What is the Jurisdiction of Record (JOR)? The JOR is the jurisdiction that issues the most current driver license, or if there has never been a driver license issued, the JOR is the jurisdiction of address listed on a citation or report. The Page 8 of 119

9 JOR controls and maintains the DCR, implements appropriate driver license sanctions based upon driver actions and failures to comply. The JOR must forward the DCR to another member jurisdiction when it issues a driver license and requests the DCR to be sent. Under present system constraints, it is possible for there to be more than one JOR only in the instance where the driver has never been issued a driver license. Such drivers, when cited in multiple jurisdictions, may give different jurisdictional addresses resulting in each of these jurisdictions creating a DCR skeleton or ghost record for the driver. In these cases, the JOR(s) have not issued a driver license, however, it is possible that the unlicensed driver s offense resulted in the JOR taking a driver license withdrawal action and reporting it to NDR/PDPS and/or CDLIS. In the future, new database information sharing systems may alleviate this confusion. Page 9 of 119

10 CHAPTER FOUR: Identity Verification & Card Issuance One Identity-One Driver License-One Driver Control Record The concept of drivers having One Identity, One Driver License, One Driver Control Record that is recognized by all jurisdictions is essential to all the provisions in the DLA. When a person applies for a driver license in a jurisdiction, the jurisdiction s licensing authority, as the potential new JOR, must verify the identify of the person and determine if this person has ever held or is the holder of a license issued by any other jurisdiction. Employee Training The DLA requires every member jurisdiction to implement and use the AAMVA Fraudulent Document Recognition (FDR) Model Training Program in employee training programs for document fraud. Standard training materials and training methods will then be a part of all member motor vehicle agencies (MVA s) and law enforcement organizations. Employees must receive the required training prior to assignment to the review and acceptance of identification documents. The FDR Training Program encompasses the following elements: Manual document review Fraudulent document recognition Customer service Interview techniques Fraud intervention Document examiner ethics The key to an effective identification fraud detection and deterrence program is the employees of the MVA s and law enforcement agencies. Providing them the appropriate knowledge and tools to equip them to perform their jobs well is the purpose of employee training. The FDR Training Program will provide a standardized, comprehensive approach to ensure all staff are receiving the same up-to-date information and are performing the human identification function in the same way. A Working Group of MVA and law enforcement identification training experts from many North American jurisdictions developed the FDR Training Program. It was then validated for content by the United States Secret Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in consultation with an independent training consultant for format and delivery techniques. The Program is comprised of: Instructor s Guide, which provides unit lesson plans and instructor s visuals for teaching the core subject matter. Lesson plans include content outlines, objectives, and topics, teaching points, student activities, quizzes, end-of-course evaluation and visuals. Level I Training is designed as both initial and refresher training for MVA and law Page 10 of 119

11 enforcement staff and delivers a four-step fraud detection model evaluation process. Lesson plans include visual and tactile review of documents, interview techniques and document and document holder verification. The course teaches the ability to evaluate and authenticate documents in a short time period. The number of hours required will be determined by AAMVA. Level II Training is designed as advanced training for supervisors, expert document examiners and fraud investigators and Level I is a prerequisite. Lesson plans include mid- to high-level security feature analysis and tools such as ultraviolet light and magnification techniques. The training is premised on having a longer time period to more thoroughly evaluate and authenticate documents referred by Level I Examiners. The number of hours required will be determined by AAMVA. FDR Instructor Preparation Workshop is designed to teach how to establish and instruct an MVA s fraud recognition training program. Lesson plans include teaching assignments and end-of-course knowledge and practical evaluation. An accumulated score of 80 percent or higher is needed to receive a certificate of completion. The number of hours required will be determined by AAMVA. Each member jurisdiction shall provide FDR Level 1 training to all employees who review applicant documents for the issuance of driver licenses and identification cards. FDR Level II training is intended for designated employees to provide more advanced document review and assist Level I trained employees. FDR Instructor Preparation should be provided to the jurisdiction s trainers. Annual/periodic refresher training must be provided to all employees. The same FDR training must be provided by all employers, agents or contractors of the licensing authority or the member jurisdiction in order to train their employees who are engaged in the issuance of driver licenses and identification cards. Application An application form is required of every person who requests the issuance of a driver license in order to create a record for that individual. In order to prevent licensure by more than one jurisdiction, the application form should contain the following questions: Have you ever been issued a driver license or identification card in this or any other jurisdiction? Note: Jurisdictions may allow holders of foreign driver licenses to retain them. However, a check of PDPS and CDLIS is still required see below. If yes, do you have it/them in your possession or under your control If you don t have it in your possession, where was it issued? Under what name was it issued? Date of expiration? Type or class of driver license? Driver License Number? Page 11 of 119

12 Have you had a driver license, permit, identification card or privilege to operate a motor vehicle suspended, revoked or canceled or an application for a driver license or identification card denied in this jurisdiction or elsewhere? If yes, has your driver license, permit, identification card or privilege been restored? Once the MVA has determined whether the driver has ever been licensed or issued an identification card by another jurisdiction, the following processes should be completed: Determine whether the applicant has been subjected to the required identity verification processes by this or a previous member jurisdiction. The identity verification process is specified in the DLA Rules and requires the applicant to provide acceptable verifiable documents which provide the data elements being collected by the MVA. (See Appendices B & C U.S. and Canadian Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists). If the MVA is certain the applicant has completed this process previously and there are no changes to the data, the MVA may waive further proof of identity if it is completely satisfied the applicant is who he represents himself to be. Alternatively, MVAs are free to require any additional proof of identity, at any time they deem appropriate. Exception processing is discussed further in the Using the Acceptable Resource Lists section of this manual. Visually and electronically verify proof of identity documents whenever possible, as specified in the Rules. (See Appendix D - Verification Matrix) Capture the complete legal name and full name history as specified in the Rules. Perform electronic checks on each applicant to determine whether the applicant has his driving privilege withdrawn in another jurisdiction and take appropriate action. If the applicant driver license is withdrawn, notify the applicant of the information and how he must resolve the issue. If the applicant will be issued a driver license by the MVA he shall be required to surrender any and all driver licenses issued to the applicant by any other jurisdiction. The issuing agency should note the surrender on the DCR. Some foreign reciprocity/bilateral agreements will allow an applicant to retain a foreign license. This provision would not apply to a driver license from another jurisdiction. An applicant who has a foreign driver license must surrender any and all driver licenses issued to the applicant by any other jurisdiction. If an applicant has no driver license to surrender or states that he/she has never held a driver license or does not now have a driver license in his/her possession or under his/her control, that applicant shall certify that he/she has never been licensed in any jurisdiction, or otherwise does not have a driver license to surrender. This certification should contain the following information: Jurisdiction Issuing the Driver License Prior JOR from which Applicant Has Moved Applicant s Signature Examiner s Signature Attesting to the Applicant s Statement Page 12 of 119

13 Statement of Warning Concerning Penalties for False Statements It is the responsibility of the new JOR to conduct any further inquiry or investigation prior to the issuance of a driver license or identification card. The licensing authority may deny the applicant a driver license or identification card based upon its investigation. Surrendered cards should either be returned in a secure manner to the issuing jurisdiction (if requested) or destroyed. Request the former JOR (if any) to forward the DCR to the MVA (who now becomes the JOR). If an identification card (but not a driver license) is being issued to an applicant from another member JOR, notify that jurisdiction of the issuance including the following information: a. full legal name and name history; b. birth date; c. gender; d. address; e. Social Security number, if any; f. any other unique identifier; g. the jurisdiction that issued the identification card; h. the date of card issuance and expiration; i. the card number if any; and j. the date of cancellation, if any. The JOR should indicate the existence of the identification card on their DCR. Complete screening, testing, and issuance as required by jurisdictional laws and procedures. If the applicant is a non-citizen, jurisdictions are urged to tie card expiration dates to end of stay dates. An AAMVA Model Law dealing with this topic is available to jurisdictions. Only documents contained in the Acceptable, Verifiable Resource Lists for U.S. and Canadian jurisdictions may be accepted by MVAs for proof of identity. (See Appendix B and Appendix C of this manual, as well as Rule for Articles II and III (1)) U.S. applicants must provide documents only from the U.S. Jurisdictions list. Canadian applicants must provide documents only from the Canadian Jurisdictions list. Each document listed may be used only for the data elements defined in the list. No foreign documents other than a passport shall be used. Page 13 of 119

14 USING THE ACCEPTABLE VERIFIABLE RESOURCE LISTS Applicant Categories Applicants for driver licenses and identification cards fall into one of five categories based on age and risk factors associated with the use of the DL/ID. These risk factors take into consideration what resources the applicant can deliver and the validity of the resources provided. In addition, the categories promote uniform issuance processes within all jurisdictions, for like applicants. In general, applicants within category number 5 are liable to present documents that are the most difficult to verify. Consequently, the resources presented by these applicants require more scrutiny. 1. Legal Minor (those applicants under age 18) This group historically has fewer resource documents than other age groups and will often complete the issuance process with a parent/guardian already in the jurisdiction s files. 2. U.S. Citizen Any person born in the United States, naturalized or born abroad to U.S. citizens. A U.S. citizen is not required to carry proof of citizenship. 3. Canadian Citizen Any person born in Canada, naturalized as a Canadian or granted citizenship. A Canadian citizen is not required to carry proof of citizenship. 4. Out of Jurisdiction Transfer Any person surrendering a jurisdiction s driver license or ID card when applying for a driver license or ID card in another jurisdiction. 5. Non-Citizen Any person not a citizen or national of the United States or Canada. Non Immigrant Aliens Non U.S. or Canadian citizens granted temporary entry into the U.S. or Canada. Resident Aliens U.S. Aliens admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Permanent residents are also commonly referred to as immigrants; however, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) broadly defines an immigrant as any alien in the United States, except one legally admitted under specific nonimmigrant categories. Canada Permanent Resident admitted to Canada as a lawful resident. Refugee Any person who is outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Parolee U.S. - A parolee is an alien, appearing to be inadmissible to the inspecting officer, allowed into the United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or when that alien s entry is determined to be for significant public benefit. Parole does not constitute a Page 14 of 119

15 formal admission to the United States and confers temporary status only, requiring parolees to leave when the conditions supporting their parole cease to exist. There are 6 types of parolees. Canada Permit (Minister s or Temporary Resident) holder is a foreign national that is legally inadmissible to Canada but has been granted conditional entry as a temporary resident. This category has several categories as it encompasses minor to serious criminality as well as refugees seeking resettlement on an urgent basis, or a medically. Asylee U.S. - An alien in the United States or at a port of entry who is found to be unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality, or to seek the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Asylees are eligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident status after one year of continuous presence in the United States. Canada Refugee claimant is an asylum seeker in Canada. This class of migrants is considered temporary residents until claim is reviewed. If positive, the claimant becomes a Permanent Resident. Data Elements Not all information on any given resource item is equally reliable. For example, the name shown on the Social Security Card may not be the name as shown on the birth certificate. In order to research the information on any resource item, each item was dissected into the following data elements: Legal name Date of Birth Signature Social Security Number Address Legal Presence Photo For every resource item, each data element was researched with the issuing government agency. Based on this research, the bullets in the matrix indicate data elements that are reliable and verifiable. Although additional data elements may appear on a listed resource, only those that are indicated in the Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists above can be used to validate that particular data element. For instance, the data element legal name is not indicated for the Social Security Card, because the Social Security Card does not have to show the legal name. Page 15 of 119

16 Resource Items All jurisdictions must require a resource or resources that provide the data elements from column A (name) and column B (date of birth) from Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists above. Jurisdictions that require proof of additional data elements must require a resource that provides the indicated data elements from the appropriate columns on the list. Jurisdictions may require additional resources from the list, as the number of resources indicated only establishes minimum requirements. Additional resources should be requested if the documentation submitted is questionable or if the issuing agency has reason to believe the person is not who he/she claims to be. All resource items accepted must be the original or a certified copy from the issuing agency. Hospital-issued birth certificates are not acceptable as a resource item. Jurisdictions should publish information, which contains the identification procedures and lists the acceptable resources. Jurisdictions should educate the public to ensure customers are aware of any new requirements. Each identification resource must be government issued and verifiable. Address must be verifiable and a minimum of two resources must be provided. Exception Processing Because of the universal acceptance of the driver license and ID card as a primary form of identification, to be issued a driver license or ID card means having the required identification resources available. On occasion applicants may be placed under exceptional circumstances where resources from the list are not available to them because of the applicants age or situation, thereby eliminating them from driver license or ID card eligibility and, in effect, limiting their ability to function in society. Exception processing should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Exception processing does not mean that the applicant forgot to bring an approved resource document to the issuing office or that they claim they have lost one (if a duplicate is available). Personnel, authorized by the licensing agency, may accept alternative resources to verify an applicant s identity provided the jurisdiction follows defined procedures. The record must be marked when an alternate identification resource is accepted. Any driver license or ID card issued using exception processing requires a complete record of the transaction including the reason for the exception and the resources accepted for identification. In addition the jurisdiction shall retain the documents accepted or copies thereof. Specific procedures should be in place for jurisdictions to verify the resources used in the exception process. At the jurisdiction s discretion, additional resources may be requested, Page 16 of 119

17 particularly if the resources submitted are questionable or if the licensing agency has reason to believe the person is not who he/she claims to be. Exception Situation Examples The following are examples of possible exceptions. Mentally disabled applicants Abandoned children Wards of the court Homeless applicant Legal Minor Suggested Exception Processing Resource List 1. Parent/legal guardian affidavit must include the child s legal name, date of birth and Social Security Number parent/legal guardian must already hold a driver license or ID card in the jurisdiction where application is made parent/legal guardian must be present with the child 2. Canadian SIN (Social Insurance Number Card) 3. Affidavit of identification from your jurisdiction s correction/parole/probation agency (prison release document) jurisdictions that accept release documents must have in place a signed Memo Of Understanding with specific responsibility for verification of identity falling to the correction/parole/probation agency. 4. Minor ID card issued by law enforcement (used to locate missing children) must follow criteria from parent/legal guardian (#1 above) 5. Certified Letter of Identification For a Ward of the Court must include name and date of birth additional support resources required 6. INS Employment Authorization Card (I-688b) must provide local jurisdiction-issued employment card (when available) 7. INS Resident Alien Card (I-151) withdrawn from circulation approximately 6 years ago and can not be confirmed. 1. must provide local jurisdiction-issued employment card (when available) How to Verify the Documents The DLA Rules specify that MVAs must verify documents provided to it for purposes of identification (See Rules for Article II & III). For some documents such as Social Security information, electronic verification of the documents is possible along with visual inspection. Page 17 of 119

18 Whenever electronic verification is possible, MVAs should utilize that method of verification. It is likely that electronic verification of other documents will be possible over time, and as these become available, jurisdictions should make use of them to the fullest extent possible. The Verification Matrix (See Appendix D) will assist the document reviewer in determining the best methods for verifying authenticity of the documents. All documents presented as proof of identity must be either the original document or a copy certified as authentic by the issuing party. Social Security Number Verification While manual verification must be done by scrutinizing the Social Security Number (SSN) card or any of the SSN verification documents specified in the Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists, the opportunity for fraud is high whenever paper documents are utilized as the only method for verification. SSN card fraud is one of the most common forms of identification fraud. If the counterfeit, forgery or deception is clever enough, a manual examination alone may not discover the alteration or simulation. Also, replicas of SSN cards such as metal, plastic or laminated cards should never be accepted. These facsimiles of SSN cards can be easily obtained from commercial suppliers who do not check the authenticity of the information provided by their customers. For U.S. jurisdictions, the DLA requires the collection of SSN from all driver license and identification card customers and it is mandatory to electronically check the validity of the SSN with the Social Security Administration (SSA) to ensure it is genuine and accurate. The SSA provides for on-line and batch mode electronic verification (Social Security On-Line Verification or SSOLV). Depending upon whether the MVA is an over-the-counter or central issue agency, one of these two methods must be used in every case. The SSA requires jurisdictions to complete a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in order to implement this process. A sample MOA is included in Appendix E, however the MVA should contact the SSA or AAMVA to obtain the most recent version of the MOA. Both the batch and the on-line verification process verify data input from the inquiring state. States must submit the SSN, last name, and first name. They may also submit a middle name or initial, date of birth (DOB), and sex. SSA then compares that data using their Enumeration Verification System (EVS). There are matching tolerances in the program logic for names and DOB. SSA compares the information furnished with information in their Master Files of SSN Holders and SSN Applications system of records. SSA will respond, using one of the following responses. (Note: the response codes for on-line and batch mode are different.) 1 = Both name and DOB match 2 = Invalid SSN On-Line Mode: Page 18 of 119

19 3 = Name does not match, DOB matches 4 = DOB does not match, name matches 5 = Both name and DOB do not match 6 =We are unable to process the information for the SSN provided. Please review your information or have your customer visit a Social Security Administration office. 9 = System error, unable to process at this time. Batch Mode: 0 = SSN verified by SSA as correctly assigned 1 = SSN not in file (impossible SSN/never issued/ or no SSN found) 2 = Name and DOB match, sex code does not 3 = Name and sex code match, DOB does not 4 = Name matches, sex code and DOB do not 5 = Name does not match, DOB and sex code not checked Once verification is accomplished, the DCR should be marked so that the customer does not have to verify the number each time a transaction is completed. A list of considerations for the use of batch and on-line verification of SSN is included in Appendix F. Memorandum of Agreement Regardless of which process is used, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) must be established between the state MVA and the SSA. In some cases, the batch process will require an additional Memorandum with a government agency within the state that will serve as the conduit for the electronic transmission of batch verifications. Memorandums should be specific and should contain: Purpose of Agreement Period of Agreement Modification or Cancellation Provision Authority to Perform the Function Functions to be Performed Consent Language to Collect the SSN Referral of Individuals to SSA Reimbursement See example in Appendix E Page 19 of 119

20 Collecting a Full Legal Name and Name History A person s name is a very important data element or piece of identification information about the individual. Along with name, other data elements such as date-of-birth, gender and SSN (in the U.S.) help surround the individual s identity. It makes up the person s unique identifiers or unique characteristics. The DLA requires every member jurisdiction to capture a full legal name and name history. The legal name is the name as presented by the customer on the documents in the U.S. and Canadian Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists (provided in this manual). The legal name is a data element consisting of three parts: 1) Family name(s) full last name(s), 2) Given name(s) full first and middle name(s), and 3) Suffix information i.e., junior, senior, first, second. A prefix such as Father, Sister, Reverend and any non-birth suffixes such as MD and PhD are not included. Jurisdictions should collect the customer s name(s) from the resource documents exactly as they appear on them. The base name is the most complete version of the applicant s name found on the resource documents presented. Jurisdictions must collect as much of an individual s name as available to form a base (foundation) computer file record, the base name record. All alternative configurations of the name, and alternative names, found on different resource documents presented should also be recorded and linked to the base name record to form a name history. Any future name changes of the individual (i.e., marriage, divorce, court ordered name change) should be linked to the names in the history. All linked name history records (names) for an individual are to be retained. It is necessary to collect all name information presented and keep a record of changes because if an individual attempts to use a previous name in the same or another jurisdiction, without a complete record of all of the names used the JOR may not be able to determine if the individual is the same person identifying themselves with a previous name or a new applicant seeking to obtain a document for the first time. All name records should be a variable length field of up to 125 characters (40 for Family name(s), 80 for Given name(s), and 5 for the Suffix). No special characters, other than a space or a hyphen should appear in the name. Jurisdictions will use the AAMVA Driver Message Data Dictionary to define name collection and truncation procedures. Truncation should be used very minimally for the data record, the face of the driver license and identification card, and in the bar code (i.e., if the name exceeds 125 characters in length). In all cases, if truncation is used on the DL/ID document, the name data element must be the same on the front of the card (human readable portion) and in the two dimensional bar code (machine readable portion). If the name is truncated, an indicator (flag) must be placed on both the human readable and machine readable portions, and on the base name record, to alert users that the name is not the full legal name. One exception to this rule is for magnetic stripe encoding. Because of the limited storage capacity of this media, the name field will remain 35 characters as described by the Personal Identification AAMVA International Specification DL/ID Card Design. Jurisdictions should share all names (name history) for an individual with all other jurisdictions Page 20 of 119

21 MVA, law enforcement agencies, and all others authorized to receive the data under the DPPA (Driver Privacy Protection Act) and similar jurisdictional privacy laws. Jurisdictions should design and use name matching and search programs that are robust and flexible. Verification of Address Jurisdictions are required by the DLA Rules to manually verify the applicant s address by utilizing at least two documents from either the U.S. or Canadian Acceptable Verifiable Resource Lists, which are valid for address verification. A customer s address is an essential data element and one that is frequently used in combination with other erroneous items in the perpetration of identity theft and fraud. Therefore, in addition to the manual verification of resource documents, a jurisdiction should consider the further verification of address by electronic methods. Background Whether a jurisdiction issues DL/ID cards over-the-counter or from a central location, assuring that the address that has been given by the applicant is correct and, in fact, exists is very important to the customer and to the MVA for many reasons. The most obvious reason is that we want to be sure that the customer receives the card. We also maintain the address on the data base for any future mailings such as renewal notices or notifications of actions taken against the customer s driving privilege. Law enforcement and the courts also rely on these addresses in the course of their business. Most jurisdictions have laws requiring that DL/ID cardholders submit changes of address in a timely manner. New cards are not necessarily issued, but the new address is maintained on the driver record for future use by the MVA. Not maintaining accurate and current address information can have a serious impact on the customer. For example, if an action is taken against a driving privilege and the action notification is sent to an incorrect address, the subject of record may not be able to request due process in the form of a hearing or administrative review in a timely manner, and can also be held liable for additional legal action for driving on a suspended or cancelled driver license. In some cases, the subject s vehicle can be impounded if driving on a suspended driver license that he or she isn t aware is suspended, cancelled or revoked. Not verifying the accuracy of an address can also have serious consequences for the MVA and the general public. Using fictitious addresses is a common factor in fraudulently obtaining a DL/ID card or stealing another person s identity, which has far reaching economic impacts on the community and particularly for the individual whose identity is stolen. MVA s could be held liable for issuing cards that were obtained fraudulently, causing someone s identity to be stolen. The cost and personal impact of identity fraud impacts the public in general and is growing nationally. Page 21 of 119

22 When DL/ID cards are issued from a central location, it is likely that a valid address will be given so that the applicant can receive the card. This does not mean that the address is actually the applicant s. A common address is sometimes used by one or more persons as a drop for fraudulently obtaining a DL/ID cards. For MVA s that issue cards over the counter, it is much easier for a customer to submit a bad address since he or she will walk out of the office with the card in hand. Verification As in all data element verification, using both a manual and an electronic method is preferable. There are public and private business methods available to assist with electronic verification. United States Postal Service (USPS) has several address verification processes that can assist jurisdictions. One is the National Change of Address process. Addresses, including the subject s name, can be electronically checked against the NCOA master file, and mail can be forwarded to any newer address NCOA may have for that person. Another USPS process is Delivery Point Validation that can confirm validity of an address down to the apartment or suite number. However, the address may not belong to the individual s name appearing on the DL/ID card. Private Industry Service Providers offer products and services that can accomplish some form of address verification. Some of these utilize the USPS products and some utilize other database resources containing names and addresses. Aside from the issue of fraud as it relates to address verification, there is also the issue of maintaining database integrity, particularly as jurisdictions begin to share more information with each other and with other stakeholders. For example, the USPS reports 3% of the total mail volume is undeliverable. While there are costs associated with contracting for address verification services, in the long run they may be offset by the savings realized in current mail costs associated with undeliverable mail, in addition to other costly business ramifications. A list of considerations for selecting an electronic verification provider for address verification is provided in Appendix G. Page 22 of 119

23 Third Party Verification of Customer Identification Information The American Association of Motor Vehicles received funding from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to propose other electronic means of verifying identity and data elements. Active pilots are being conducted to study the feasibility of and facilitate the automated exchange of status checks with public and private partners, exchanging digital images between jurisdictions, and exchanging birth certification information between vital statistics and motor vehicle administration offices. The potential results of these pilots are a major step in accomplishing reliable documents, better ensuring identity security, and reducing fraud. Your jurisdiction may already or soon be using these systems. While most of these electronic verification processes involve government or quasi-government organizations, other products are available through the private sector to assists jurisdictions in the difficult task of verifying information by some more reliable method than using paper documentation alone. Basically, there are two types of products. The first are verification products that can be used to verify the identification data provided by the applicant by comparing it with information collected about the applicant by other entities. The second type are pattern matching products that compare the information presented by the applicant to information submitted by other applicants and files of known fraudulent information to detect instances of possible fraudulent activity. Verification Products There are at least two main variations of the verification type of products, but they share the common feature of using databases of information collected from a variety of sources. While some vendors limit their sources to only government entities, most of the vendors collect data from a very large group of commercial, financial, and government sources. The two main variations of these verification products were based on how the applicant s data was to be evaluated. In the simplest version, whatever information the vendor found by searching its databases was returned to the inquirer, who would then review it and make a determination. This information could normally include a greater level of personal detail about the applicant than is now collected by most driver licensing authorities. The other main variation of this service provides a series of questions about the applicant s personal history that asked for information that an impostor would not likely know. These systems usually return a score that indicates the likelihood that the applicant is indeed who he or she claims to be. Page 23 of 119 Pattern Matching Products In the pattern matching type of system, the applicant s data is not matched against files of personal information collected from other sources. Instead the pattern matching system