Staying Above the Waterline: The Cost and Impact of Climate Change in New York City

Transcription

1 Staying Above the Waterline: The Cost and Impact of Climate Change in New York City Prepared by: Jonathan Cavalieri, Associate Director of Outcomes Assessment & Community Partnerships Nicole Wiktor, Fordham University

2 Introduction New York City is at increased risk of more intense heat waves, longer and heavier downpours, and more frequent and extensive coastal flooding over the next fifty years as a result of climate change. 1 An expanded floodplain and more frequent extreme weather events threaten the city s infrastructure, particularly tunnel entrances in low-lying areas and several subway lines in Lower Manhattan, which jeopardizes the Nation s financial center. 2 The overwhelming amount of damage Superstorm Sandy inflicted on New York City s infrastructure serves to illustrate the enormous potential of climate change to devastate the city s economy and quality of life. While the current state of New York City s infrastructure alone argues for a steady stream of investment and overall stewardship, the expected increase in major weather events, like Superstorm Sandy will further stress an already burdened infrastructure network. This illustration substantiates the need for a dedicated fund to finance resiliency projects that prepare the city for the impacts of climate change. Superstorm Sandy s Impact on Infrastructure Superstorm Sandy hit the shores of New York City on October 29 th 2012 and left 43 dead, $19 billion in damages and over $11 billion in lost economic output in its wake. 3 Over 2 million New Yorkers - nearly a quarter of the city s population - lost power as Sandy flooded five major electric transmission substations, reduced one-third of the city s electric generating capacity, and knocked four of the city s six steam plants out of service. 4 Sandy completely shut down 6 hospitals and 26 residential care facilities causing the evacuation of more than 6,400 patients. In total, New York City hospitals incurred $1 billion in emergency response costs and an additional $1 billion in repair and mitigation costs. 5 Sandy s storm surge flooded major railroad, subway, and vehicular tunnels impairing the mobility of nearly 4.2 million drivers and 8.5 million public transit users. 6 Nearly 560 lane miles of roadway suffered minor or severe damage and the MTA suffered an estimated $4.8 billion worth of damage. 7 Three years later, New York is still experiencing the effects of Sandy s damage on the transportation system. The Hugh L. Cary Tunnel, formerly the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, was built in 1950 and carries an estimated 47,700 drivers and 3,100 buses daily between Brooklyn and Manhattan. 8 It took 21 days for the tunnel to fully reopen after 60 million gallons of brackish water compromised vital tunnel components, including the tunnel s safety systems. 9 The 1940 s era Queens Midtown Tunnel, which carries 81,000 daily vehicles and 1,100 buses was also heavily damaged as nearly 40% of the tunnel was submerged in 12 million gallons of corrosive salt water. 10 Although the tunnel fully reopened 10 days after the storm, it has since been operating with temporary repairs. In 2015, the MTA awarded a $236.5 million contract to bring the Queens Midtown Tunnel into a pre-storm state of good repair. 11 The Hugh L. Carey Tunnel is still undergoing a $285.5 million restoration to correct the storm damage. 12 Sandy s storm surge also exposed the vulnerability of New York s subway system and by extension, its economy, to the impacts of climate change. Completed for $530 million just 3 years before Superstorm Sandy, the new South Ferry station in lower Manhattan was entirely submerged from the platform level to mezzanine areas by a 14 foot storm surge that filled the station like an unwatched bathtub. 13 Nearly all of the station s components were damaged as 4,000 linear feet of the tube sat filled with salt water for a week after the storm. The station is currently undergoing a $345 million restoration, during which 2

3 customers are forced to the original, inadequate 1905 era South Ferry station that only accommodates five subway cars until repairs are completed in Subway damage was not limited to the southern tip of Manhattan as all NYCT s under river subway tunnels that connect Brooklyn to Manhattan, one that connects Queens and Manhattan, and another connecting Brooklyn and Queens were flooded by Sandy s storm surge. The 1920 s era Montague Tube, which carries the R train under the East River between Manhattan and Brooklyn, was closed between 2013 and 2014 for an extensive $259 million restoration after 20 feet of corrosive salt water sat stagnate for 10 days in a 4,025 foot portion of the tunnel. 14 Approximately 65,000 subway riders were affected each day of the 14 month closure. 15 The Greenpoint Tube which carries the G train under Newton Creek between Brooklyn and Queens was closed for twelve weekends to repair Sandy related damage in a $93 million project. These two under river tubes alone account for $352 million in restoration costs. NYCT s other subway tubes are still undergoing repair for an estimated $330 million, all the result of Sandy related damage. 16 Superstorm Sandy s Damage to New York City Subway Tunnels Under River Tube Subway Line(s) Total Daily Riders Total Days Closed Total Restoration Costs (millions)* 53 rd Street Tube E, M 275,000 7 $92.6 Steinway Tube 7 200,000 6 $29.0 Greenpoint Tube G 55, $93.0 Canarsie Tube L 200, N/A Rutgers Tube F 130,000 7 N/A Cranberry Tube A,C 230,000 7 $96.7 Clark Tube 2,3 145,000 6 N/A Montague Tube R 65, $259.0 Joralemon Tube 4,5 185,000 6 $113.8 Source: MTA River Crossings Damaged by Superstorm Sandy * MTA 2015 Recovery and Resiliency Data Sandy s storm surge also inundated Amtrak s 105 year old East River and North River tunnels with millions of gallons of highly corrosive sea water. The tunnels are primarily used by MTA s Long Island Railroad and New Jersey Transit, respectively and carry more than 600,000 passengers into Manhattan each weekday. 17 Although the water was pumped out of the tunnels in the days following the storm, a recent impact assessment revealed that the dewatering process did not remove the salts, chlorides and sulfates that infiltrated the tunnels and coated various tunnel components. 18 These corrosive elements have damaged and continue to damage numerous tunnel features including exposed steel, cracked concrete, embedded reinforcing steel, electrical, mechanical, and communication components, and perhaps most seriously, the concrete bench walls that provide emergency access to trains and house essential equipment. 19 Pieces of deteriorating bench walls that dislodge from their structure have the potential to cause significant service delays, as evident by a recent subway derailment caused by a 75 foot piece of bench wall that bowed onto the tracks of an oncoming train injuring three passengers. 20 Although the assessment affirmed that the tunnels are structurally sound, the number of service disruptions will continue to increase unless repairs are made to the damaged components. The current price tag to repair and restore the tunnels is $689 million. 21 3

4 The Current Condition of New York City s Infrastructure Public infrastructure undergirds New York City s economy, provides for public health, and the reliable movement of products, services and workers. However, it is the nature of infrastructure to age, wear out, and require regular maintenance to provide continued service and ensure quality of life for all users. With each passing year deferred maintenance on critical components increase the likelihood of failure. This is particularly true for New York City s underground utility infrastructure, most of which dates to the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Half of the city s 6,400 miles of sewers were installed before 1930 and 10.4% were installed before Moreover, nearly 60% of the 6,800 mile water main network was built before 1940 and approximately 1,000 miles of these pipes are over 100 years old. 23 To put these numbers in perspective, the general lifespan for water system pipes is 100 years for those installed before 1920 and 75 years for those installed after the Second World War. 24 The majority of these pipes are rapidly approaching the end of their lifespan. Furthermore, about 70% are unlined or concrete-lined cast iron pipes. 25 As these pipes continue to age they become more susceptible to corrosion and breakage. In 2013, a broken 98 year old water main flooded the 23 rd street subway station in Manhattan with 2 feet of water bringing a station that serves over 24,000 daily passengers to a complete standstill. 26 This example represents just one of the 406 water main breaks that year. 27 In 2015, the number of water main breaks surged to 562 and is predicted to increase further over the next five years. 28 Average Age of Utility Infrastructure Type of Distribution Line Miles of Pipe in Network Average Age in Years Sewer Mains 6, Water Mains 6, Gas Mains 6, Source: The Center for an Urban Future, Caution Ahead Unlike the city s utility infrastructure, New York s transportation network is highly visual and interactive. Every day residents, commuters, and tourists board subway cars, cross bridges, and drive over pavement without a thought toward the structural integrity of the steel, iron, and concrete that tie together the city. Despite increased visibility, the network remains in similar states of disrepair. Over 45% of New York City highways are in fair or poor condition and have clearly visible surface distress and suffer frequent and severe distress. 29 Nearly 30% of local roads and approximately 58% of all bridges maintained by the New York City Department of Transportation are in similar condition, including the famous Brooklyn Bridge. 30 Many of these structures have components that are well past their useful lives and require corrective maintenance and/or rehabilitation to remain functional. Compounding matters are the 47 bridges that are both structurally deficient and fracture critical. 31 Not only do these bridges require corrective maintenance, they lack structural redundancy and the failure of just one component could cause the entire bridge to collapse. Every day, 2.7 million people drive over fracture critical bridges. 32 The situation is equally as bad for New York s public transportation system. Each weekday 5.6 million people rely on New York City Transit (NYCT) subways. 33 In 2015, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), forecasted a 20-year, $68 billion dollar capital need to rehabilitate and modernize the 4

5 nearly 110 year old system. 34 Across the entire system, 27% of all structural components in the subway stations have structural defects. 35 A 2013 Inspector General audit affirmed that NYCT has not inspected some critical support structures, including steel supports at elevated stations, truss bridges, and abandoned sections of stations that serve as support structures for active portions of the station in a regular or timely basis; some for decades. 36 Although the absence of timely inspection increases the risk of serious structural failure, NYCT does not expect to repair structural defects to elements of line structures, including the 13 miles of under-river tubes and 123 miles of land-based tunnels by 2024 and all high priority structural defects in the 70 miles of elevated structures by The Cost of Resiliency New York City is among a growing number of municipalities across the United States that has begun planning and implementing long-term initiatives to adapt to climate change. The New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) advises the city on climate risks and resiliency, and informs the city s climate polices and citywide resiliency plan. The cornerstone resiliency plan, PlaNYC, was released in 2007 and outlined measures to address aging infrastructure, support parks, improve the quality of life and health for New Yorkers, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An updated edition was released in 2011 and, following the devastation of Superstorm Sandy, the city released PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York, which documented the lessons learned from Sandy, a redevelopment strategy, and recommendations for adapting the city to the impacts of climate change. The cost of this plan was an estimated $20 billion, although the price tag may have been understated. 38 Building on the strengths of PlaNYC, the city s current long-term strategic document, OneNYC, charts a course for a sustainable and resilient city for all its residents, and addresses social, economic, and environmental issues. 39 This new strategy represents a continued $20 billion capital commitment to invest in resiliency against climate change. 40 Specific examples of resiliency projects reveal the costs associated with preparing for climate change. In 2015, the city activated Croton Filtration Plant in the Bronx which broke ground in The $3.2 billion Croton Filtration Plant will now be able to provide up to 30% of the city s water demand, provide vital redundancy to water supply, and enhance resiliency against the impacts of climate change. 41 The city recently identified $315 million in protective measures to increase the resiliency of low-lying waterfront wastewater treatment plants as climate change threatens the city s capacity to efficiently discharge wastewater. 42 The largest of the city s plants, the Newtown Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant is in the midst of a $5 billion upgrade to improve water quality and increase the plant s treatment capacity during wet weather storms. 43 Additionally, the city is working with utility companies to ensure utility infrastructure upgrades and redundancy. Con Ed has spent $200 million to move miles of power lines underground, and spent $100 million to install isolation switches to mitigate the effects of power losses. 44 5

6 Challenges and Opportunities: Should there be a Dedicated Resiliency Fund? In Pursuit of PlaNYC s ambitious goals to build resiliency, the city committed the most money to capital projects since the 1970s only to achieve mixed results. 45 The city receives less than 25% of its capital funding from state and federal sources and the majority of the city s capital funding is fully financed from the sale of bonds. 46 However, with a high level of outstanding debt and restrictions limiting the city s ability to borrow money, New York will be hard pressed to finance existing capital needs, let alone build resiliency against the effects of climate change. When PlaNYC was first released, capital spending for agencies included in the plan represented only 47% of the adopted Capital Strategy. 47 The majority of capital spending was allocated for agencies not covered by the resiliency plan, which reflects the competing nature of capital investments. Rather than compete with capital projects that are not included in the resiliency plan, the city should consider creating a dedicated source of funding for capital projects that build resiliency against climate change. The New York City Council recently called for the creation of a rainy day fund to help with cyclical budget management and pay as you go capital spending to allow the city to slow the growth of outstanding debt. 48 Governments have traditionally used rainy day funds on the state level as counter cyclical budget tools to hedge against revenue volatility and economic downturns by closing budget shortfalls and avoiding cuts to essential services. The evidence suggests that these funds are most effective when rules are set for mandatory deposits and clear withdrawal conditions. 49 In the spirit of the Council s recent request, the city should consider creating a dedicated resiliency fund with statutory deposit and withdrawal conditions to ensure the city s ability to efficiently fund resiliency projects. Unlike New York State s Rainy Day Reserve Fund, whose deposits are at the discretion of the legislature and Executive, the resiliency fund should have statutorily automatic contributions to allow the city to make targeted resiliency investments to protect infrastructure against the effects of climate change. 50 Separating resiliency investments from the regular capital budgeting process can help the city maintain current infrastructure, build resiliency and, if necessary, help finance repairs following an extreme weather event. Whether New York City can fund all necessary resiliency projects alongside traditional capital investments without detriment remains to be seen. Regardless of how the city chooses to fund resiliency projects, the impacts of climate change continue to threaten the city s economy, infrastructure, and public services. 6

7 ENDNOTES 1 New York City Panel on Climate Change. (2013). Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations, Climate Change, Projections, and Map. Retrieved from 2 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Chapter 10). Retrieved from 3 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Introduction). Retrieved from Zandi, M. (2012). The Economic Impact of Sandy. Retrieved from 4 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Chapter 6). Retrieved from 5 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Chapter 8). Retrieved from 6 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Chapter 10). Retrieved from 7 The City of New York. (2013). PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Chapter 10). Retrieved from Governor s Press Office. (2013). MTA Delivers Updates on Superstorm Sandy Recovery and Rebuilding Effort. Retrieved from 8 Metropolitan Transit Authority. MTA River Crossings Damaged by Superstorm Sandy. Retrieved from 9 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014). Queens Firm to be Awarded $282.5 Million Contract for Sandy Repairs at Hugh L. Carey Tunnel. Retrieved from 10 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. MTA River Crossings Damaged by Superstorm Sandy. Retrieved from Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2015). Governor Cuomo Announces MTA to Award Superstorm Sandy Repair and Capital Improvement Projects at Queens Midtown Tunnel. Retrieved from 11 Governor s Press Office. (2015). Governor Cuomo Announces MTA to Award Superstorm Sandy Repair and Capital Improvement Projects at Queens Midtown Tunnel. Retrieved from 12 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014). Queens Firm to be Awarded $282.5 Million Contract for Sandy Repairs at Hugh L. Carey Tunnel. Retrieved from 13 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. South Ferry Terminal Project. Retrieved from Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Superstorm Sandy: Fix & Fortify Efforts Continue. Retrieved from 14 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2013). Sandy Repairs Require Extensive Work on Montague and Greenpoint Subway Tubes. Retrieved from 15 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. MTA River Crossings Damaged by Superstorm Sandy. Retrieved from 16 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Superstorm Sandy: Fix & Fortify Efforts Continue. Retrieved from 17 Amtrack. (2013). Construction Begins to Preserve Possible Pathway of New Train Tunnels into Penn Station, New York. Retrieved from 7

8 18 HNTB (2014). Confidential: Structural Assessment of the Amtrak Under River Tunnels in NYC Inundated by Super Storm Sandy. HNTB. Retrieved from: 8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=fflb. 19 HNTB (2014). Confidential: Structural Assessment of the Amtrak Under River Tunnels in NYC Inundated by Super Storm Sandy. HNTB. Retrieved from: 8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=fflb. 20 Rizzi, N. & Penhirin, S. (2015). 3 Injured After G Train Crashes into Deteriorating Subway Wall: Officials. DNAInfo. Retrieved from: 21 HNTB (2014). Confidential: Structural Assessment of the Amtrak Under River Tunnels in NYC Inundated by Super Storm Sandy. HNTB. Retrieved from: 8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=fflb. 22 Center for an Urban Future. (2014). Caution Ahead: Overdue investments for New York s Aging Infrastructure. Retrieved from 23 The Society of American Military Engineers New York City Post (2013). Infrastructure Challenge and NYC Climate Risks. Society of American Military Engineers. Retrieved from: 24 American Water Works Association. (2001). Down of the Replacement Era: Reinvesting in Drinking Water Infrastructure. Retrieved from 25 New York City Department of Environmental Protection. (2006). Water Conservation Program. Retrieved from 26 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014). Average Weekday Subway Ridership. Retrieved from 27 The City of New York. (2013). Mayor s Management Report. Retrieved from 28 The City of New York. (2013). Mayor s Management Report. Retrieved from 29 New York State Department of Transportation. (2014). Pavement Data Report. Retrieved from New York State Department of Transportation. (2014). Pavement Data Report. Retrieved from 30 The City of New York. (2013). Mayor s Management Report. Retrieved from New York City Department of Transportation. (2013). Bridges & Tunnels Annual Condition Report. Retrieved from 31 Center for an Urban Future. (2014). Caution Ahead: Overdue investments for New York s Aging Infrastructure. Retrieved from 32 Center for an Urban Future. (2014). Caution Ahead: Overdue investments for New York s Aging Infrastructure. Retrieved from 33 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2015). Subways. Retrieved from 34 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2013). MTA Twenty-Year Capital Needs Assessment Retrieved from 35 Office of the State Comptroller. (2014). Metropolitan Transportation Authority: Subway Station Conditions. Retrieved from 36 MTA Office of the Inspector General. (2013). Improving Structural Inspections at MTA New York City Transit. Retrieved from 37 Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2013). MTA Twenty-Year Capital Needs Assessment Retrieved from 38 Citizens Budget Commission (2013). Planning After PLANYC: A Framework for Developing New York City s Next Ten-Year Capital Strategy. Retrieved from: 8

9 39 OneNYC (2015). One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City. The City of New York. Retrieved from 40 City Hall of New York Press Office (2015). Mayor de Blasio Releases One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City. The City of New York. Retrieved from 41 Department of Environmental Protection Press Office (2015). Croton Water Filtration Plant Activated. NYC Environmental Protection. Retrieved from: 42 NYC Department of Environmental Protection. Climate Executive Summary. NYC Environmental Protection. Retrieved from: 43 Sklerov, F. & Roman, A. (2011). DEP Certifies That Newtown Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant Is Meeting Clean Water Act Secondary Treatment Standards Fulfills Key Wastewater Treatment Goal in DEP s Strategic Plan. NYC Department of Environmental Protection. Retrieved from: 44 The Mayor s Office of Recovery and Resiliency (2015). Critical Infrastructure & Services: Utilities. The City of New York. Retrieved from: 45 Citizens Budget Commission (2013). Planning After PLANYC: A Framework for Developing New York City s Next Ten-Year Capital Strategy. Retrieved from: 46 Citizens Budget Commission (2013). Planning After PLANYC: A Framework for Developing New York City s Next Ten-Year Capital Strategy. Retrieved from: 47 Citizens Budget Commission (2007). Capital Budgeting for 2030: Achieving the Goals of PLANYC. Citizens Budget Commission. Retrieved from: 48 The Council the City of New York (2015). The City Council Response to the Mayor s FY 2016 Preliminary Budget and FY 2015 Preliminary Mayor s Management Report. The New York City Council. Retrieved from: 49 Citizens Budget Commission (2011). The Broken Umbrella: How to Make New York s Rainy Day Fund More Useful. Citizens Budget Commission. Retrieved from 50 Citizens Budget Commission (2011). The Broken Umbrella: How to Make New York s Rainy Day Fund More Useful. Citizens Budget Commission. Retrieved from 9