TOP SECRET: OPERATION RESTORE

Transcription

1 TOP SECRET: OPERATION RESTORE Nancy Cortés POLS 594: Special Topics in Intelligence Professor Barbara Tato May 21, 2014

2 Cortés 1 Threat Relevance to the United States The 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment reports Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) as a current threat to U.S. economic and national security. The U.S. Intelligence Community specifically identifies drug trafficking as a major TOC threat. Mexican drug cartels are singled out and blamed for high levels of violence and corruption in Mexico. Violence escalated in Mexico after former Mexican president Felipe Calderón officially launched a war on drugs sending troops to various regions in the country. According to Mexico s National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) Mexico s homicide rate rose from 8.1 homicides per 100,000 in 2007 to 23.7 per 100,000 in 2011 (cited in Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk 6-7). Mexico s homicide rate began to decline in 2012, but although improvements have been made, violence remains high. Adding to the problems of violence in Mexico, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are diversifying their operations to include kidnappings, extortion, and theft. The United States southern neighbor is currently in the process of implementing a judicial reform in an effort to tackle corruption and impunity. However, rule of law in Mexico remains weak. As noted by the 2010 White House s National Security Strategy, the United States maintains a strategic partnership and a unique relationship with Mexico, which are considered critical to U.S. national security (U.S. White House 42). Mexico is the United States secondlargest export market after Canada (O Neil 7). Moreover, Mexico and the United States share a near 2,000 mile-long border through which goods and people continuously move back and forth. The fact that the American Embassy in Mexico is one of the largest in the world speaks volumes of the importance of the relationship between the two countries. Since the 1990s the U.S. relationship with Mexico has become stronger, reaching an unprecedented level under the

3 Cortés 2 presidency of Felipe Calderón, whose top domestic priority became combatting drug trafficking and organized crime (Seelke and Finklea 3). In 2007, the United States and Mexico announced a joint security plan called the Merida Initiative. The package of U.S. assistance to Mexico was developed by the United States as a response to the many requests by the Calderón administration of increased U.S. support and involvement in fighting drug trafficking and organized crime. The Merida Initiative began in 2008 and initially focused on providing training and equipment to Mexican security forces. Since, the plan gradually shifted to address weak institutions and other underlying problems contributing to the increased power of DTOs. (Seelke and Finklea 6). The current four pillars of the Merida Initiative are: (1) combatting organized crime, (2) judicial sector reform, (3) improved border security, and (4) promoting community resilience (Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk 48). Stability in Mexico is of critical importance to the United States. The near 2,000-mile border that both countries share in addition to close trade and demographic ties have led U.S. Congress to be concerned with the nature and intensity of the violence of Mexico and the potential of it spilling over into the United States (Beittel 5). Furthermore, the occasional use of car bombs, grenades, and rocket launchers has raised the concern that insurgent or terrorist techniques may be adopted by DTOs (Beittel 6). Congress has played a significant role in the war against drugs by determining the amount and purpose of funding for the Merida Initiative. $2.4 billion have been appropriated by Congress for Mexico under the Merida Initiative from FY2008 to FY2014. Earmarks have been used by Congress to ensure that certain programs are prioritized (Seelke and Finklea 7). Congressional support for Merida Initiative reflects its

4 Cortés 3 commitment to ensure stability in Mexico and to fight the threat that DTOs pose to the economic and security well-being of the United States. The Obama administration has also shown continued support for Mexico s efforts to combat DTOs. In its FY2015 budget request, the Obama administration asked for $115 million to fund the Merida Initiative. When Calderón s successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto took office in December of 2012, there was a concern among U.S. government officials of a possible scale back in the bilateral efforts. The concern was legitimate. President Enrique Peña Nieto belongs to a party that for decades allowed drug traffickers to operate without government disruption. Furthermore, shortly after taking office, the new administration announced a change in priority from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins to a strategy that focused on prevention and violence affecting ordinary citizens (Priest). According to a Washington Post article by Dana Priest, during the Calderón administration the U.S. and Mexico had become deeply entwined in the battle against DTOs. For instance, Calderón granted access to high-flying U.S. spy planes and allowed the use of drones deep into the country. Furthermore, Mexico and the U.S. built complex physical infrastructure and developed protocols to share sensitive intelligence. By 2011, that infrastructure included a CIA-run fusion center in Mexico City and a DEA-sponsored fusion center in Monterrey as well as other military and federal police intelligence centers and one inside the headquarters of Mexico s Central Intelligence Agency (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, CISEN). By the end of the Calderón administration, these joint efforts led to the capture or killing of 25 out of the 37 most wanted criminals identified back in 2009 (Priest). When Peña Nieto assumed office, the Mexican delegation in Washington informed U.S. authorities that Americans would no longer be allowed to work inside any of the fusion centers.

5 Cortés 4 Under the Peña Nieto administration the relationships between various U.S. and Mexican agencies were to be coordinated by the interior minister, who would decide which Mexican agency receives and acts on the sensitive intelligence provided by the United States (Priest). However, despite the change in narrative and almost suspicious attitude of the current Mexican administration, Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto reaffirmed their commitment to the four pillars of the Merida Initiative during President Obama s visit to Mexico in May 2013 (Seelke and Finklea 7). Furthermore, according to the testimony of John Feeley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in August 2013 both governments agreed to focus on justice sector reform, efforts against money laundering, police and corrections professionalization at the federal and state level, border security both north and south, and piloting approaches to address root causes of violence (quoted in Seelke and Finklea 7). Current policy towards DTOs in Mexico is driven by the perceived importance of Mexico s stability and strategic partnership. According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, [w]ith Mexico we are working together to identify and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity, even before they reach North America. Stability and security in Mexico are indispensable to building a strong economic partnership, fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting sound immigration policy (U.S. White House). Based on current U.S. current policy on Mexico, further efforts to continue the battle against drug traffickers require some level of cooperation with the Mexican government. While the collaboration has continued under the Peña Nieto administration, the United States might deem necessary to persuade the Mexican government to focus on issues of growing concern to the U.S. According to the State Department s 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCSR), U.S. assistance aims to help Mexico develop more effective and transparent security and rule of law institutions, and to

6 Cortés 5 foster cooperation with international partners to reduce threat from transnational and domestic crime, improve border security, and protect human rights (U.S. Department of State). What We Currently Know In order to understand the nature of Mexico s current situation a brief account of the development of contemporary DTOs in the country is warranted. Astorga and Shirk explain that U.S. increasing consumption of cocaine in the 1970s and 1980s led to the rise of powerful Colombian DTOs. As the United States expanded interdiction efforts in the Gulf, Mexican DTOs, which date back to the early twentieth century, benefited from the Colombian s increasing reliance on Mexican smuggling networks to the United States. When the Colombian DTOs began to disintegrate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the role of Mexican DTOs in controlling illicit traffic grew (Astorga and Shirk 33). Beittel notes that with the break-up of Colombian DTOs, Mexican DTOs were able to gradually take over the highly profitable traffic of cocaine to the United States (Beittel 8). At the domestic level, DTOs benefited from a highly centralized political structure that was not only permissive, but protective of organized criminal activities from the 1950s through the 1980s (Astorga and Shirk 33). It was under these conditions that Mexican DTOs grew in power and were able to operate without government interference. The relationship between drug traffickers and the Mexican government began to fracture in The allegation that the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a DEA agent Enrique Camarena involved the approval of high-ranking Mexican government officials and members of the Guadalajara cartel, led to increased U.S. pressure to dismantle the Federal Security Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS). Corrupt high-ranking officials working for DFS protected criminals in exchange for substantial payoffs. Astorga and Shirk note that

7 Cortés 6 [a]lthough other federal law enforcement organizations, notably the Federal Judicial Police, also became thoroughly corrupted in subsequent years, the hierarchy and controls that once protected and facilitated coordination among Mexican DTOs were significantly compromised and a once grand coalition began to fracture. Furthermore, with arrest of the leader of the Guadalajara Cartel in 1989, Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, traffickers battled over the remnants of the organization (Astorga and Shirk 36). Political developments in Mexico that began in the late 1980s further contributed to the fracturing of the coalition between the government and DTOs. As political pluralism expanded and power began to decentralize, the equilibrium that had allowed DTOs to operate freely began to falter (Astorga and Shirk 30). Political pluralism, which had started at the local level, gradually rose to the national level as exemplified by the opposition victories in the 1997 midterm election and the 2000 presidential election. After ruling the country for over seventy years, in 2000 the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) ceded the presidency to the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) candidate Vicente Fox. Astorga and Shirk note that [i]n some cases, political change increased the political impetus to promote transparency, good governance, and a tougher approach toward organized crime; in others, it merely disrupted political connections to favor one organized crime group over another (Astorga and Shirk 40). Furthermore, the tighter border controls implemented as a result of 9/11 terrorist attacks and the sharing of U.S. intelligence with Mexican law enforcement contributed to higher drug interdictions, altered the balance of power and led to further fractionalization and infighting (Astorga and Shirk 41). According to Beittel s analysis, by the time PAN s second president Felipe Calderón took office in 2006, there were four major DTOs operating in Mexico: the Tijuana/Arellano Félix

8 Cortés 7 organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carrillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Since then, once stable DTOs have experienced fragmentation. Beittel notes that for some time the DEA recognized seven dominant organizations. Those included Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana (LFM) and the Beltrán Leyva in addition to the four DTOs aforementioned (Beittel 9). Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana gained notoriety for the brutality of their crimes. Up until 2008, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva and the Juarez DTO were part of a federation dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel. When the federation broke apart, great animosity emerged between the Sinaloa Cartel and the other two DTOs. Arrests and killings of leadership of the Juarez and the Beltrán Leyva DTOs resulted in infighting for control and the weakening of these two organizations (Beittel 12-13, 16-17). On the other hand, the Sinaloa Cartel rose to become one of Mexico s current two dominant cartels. Mexico s other dominant DTO is known as Los Zetas. Los Zetas were originally elite Mexican military personnel from the Army Special Forces Air and Amphibian units. In 2001, Osiel Cárdenas, at the time leader of the Gulf Cartel, succeeded in corrupting them to become the Gulf s enforcement arm (Beittel 15; Astorga and Shirk 39). At the beginning of the 21 st century, The Gulf Cartel was one of Mexico s most powerful DTOs. The extradition of Cárdenas in 2007, infighting, and the killing of Cárdenas brother and successor in 2010 contributed to the weakening of the Gulf DTO (Beittel 15). In 2008, Los Zetas began to contract their services to other Mexican DTOs. They split form the Gulf DTO sometime between 2008 and In February 2010, they began a battle against the Gulf Cartel for smuggling corridors in Tamaulipas. The Gulf Cartel allied itself with former enemies, LFM and the Sinaloa Cartel, in order to fight Los Zetas. This inter-dtos combatting resulted in what Beittel describes as an environment of urban warfare with commando-style raids on state prisons, abduction of

9 Cortés 8 journalists, murder of police, and attacks on military posts (Beittel 15). In 2011, Los Zetas were the DTO with the largest geographic control in Mexico and were known as the most violent (Beittel 22). However, both the Mexican and U.S. government have targeted the DTO since, resulting in various arrests and killings of its leadership (Beittel 16). One of the most resent and notable arrests was that of Miguel Angel Z-40 Treviño Morales (Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk 42). The arrest of high-profile drug trafficker Z-40 is one of the various arrests that have occurred under the Peña Nieto administration. Despite the rhetoric that he employed, some analysts assess that he has quietly continued Calderón s strategy 1. Albeit with some restrictions placed on U.S. agencies operating in Mexico, collaboration between the United States and Mexico has continued and has led to other high-profile arrests such as Juaquín El Chapo Guzman Loera, head of the Sinaloa Cartel (Seelke and Finklea 11). El Chapo was captured in February 2014 and was considered the most wanted drug trafficker in the Western Hemisphere (Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira and Shirk 41). Unfortunately, the capture of more than twenty of the 37 most wanted traffickers listed in 2009 did not lead to stability in Mexico. The 2014 INCSR notes that success in bringing leaders of DTOs to justice has resulted in smaller, fractured groups that have violently attempted to consolidate their power (U.S. Department of State). The seven DTOs listed above are now thought to have fragmented to between 9 and 20 major organizations (Beittel 10). Another problem contributing to increased violence is the diversification of DTOs into other criminal activities such as kidnapping, assassination for hire, auto theft, controlling prostitution, extortion, money-laundering, software piracy, resource theft, and human smuggling (Beittel 20). From 1 See for example Alejandro Hope, Menos ruido, misma furia. Nexos. 1 July 2013.

10 Cortés to 2013, the Mexican government reported a 20.5% increase in kidnapping and a 10.6% increase in extortion (U.S. Department of State). There is an ongoing debate on whether diversification is a sign of organization vitality and growth, or success of government efforts into cutting cartel profits (Beittel 20). While the Peña Nieto administration has showed continuance in Calderón s kingpin strategy, he has lagged behind in interdictions. According to interdiction reports by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), there is a clear downwards trend in seizures following the Calderón administration. Table 1: Average Annual Drug Seizures by Mexican Administrations, SALINAS ZEDILLO FOX CALDERÓN PEÑA NIETO Seizures ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (2013-) Opium (kg) Heroin (kg) Cocaine (mt) Cannabis (mt) , , , Methamphetamine (kg) , , Source: Justice in Mexico Project; Original Source: INL Based on the information on Table 1, Peña Nieto s average annual seizures of Opium for instance fell by 61.7%. More dramatically, cocaine seizures fell by 78.9%. Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira, and Shirk observe that the focus maintained on heroin and methamphetamine during the Peña Nieto administration is in line with the government s efforts against the Knights Templar Organization, which reportedly heavily traffics these drugs. In addition to U.S. concern of declining interdictions, the 2014 INCSR reports a 52.6% decrease in clandestine drug labs in 2013 compared to the previous year (U.S. Department of State). Seelke and Finklea assess that Mexico has not given equal attention to interdictions as it has to arresting kingpins. They note that seizures of cocaine are higher in Nicaragua and other Central American than at Mexico s ports of entry (Seelke and Finklea). Unfortunately, despite bilateral efforts, Mexico continues to

11 Cortés 10 be a major source and transit country for illicit drugs destined for the U.S. market (U.S. Department of State). Crisis in Michoacán The southwestern state of Michoacán is a notable witness of the brutality, competition, fragmentation, and diversification of cartels seen across Mexico. According to Miroff, the state has been a battleground for years and has become a major producer of methamphetamine. In fact, when President Felipe Calderón took office, Michoacán became the first state to which he deployed troops to (Miroff). Moreover, Michoacán has been home to two knowingly brutal regional DTOs: La Familia Michoacana and Knights Templar. La Familia Michoacana started as a vigilant group that eventually became a DTO specialized in methamphetamine production and smuggling. LFM gained attention in 2006 for its extreme, symbolic violence and a pseudo-ideological or religious justification for its existence (Beittel 17-18). LFM was affiliated to Los Zetas at some point prior to Los Zetas split from the Gulf DTO. LFM learned their violent techniques from Los Zetas (Beittel 18). Because LFM did not control significant access points to the United States, Astorga and Shirk assert that LFM had to vigorously fight for market share and forge alliances with more established DTOs (Astorga and Shirk 42). According to Beittel, LFM s relevance decreased in 2010 (Beittel 18). In December 2010, Mexican forces with the aid of U.S. technology 2 found and killed LFM s founder Nazario Moreno González (Booth and Miroff). In June 2011, LFM s leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas was arrested (Beittel 18). 2 U.S. technology and intelligence aid included drone aircraft over-flights and sophisticated cellphone eavesdropping software. William Booth and Nick Miroff, Mexico s drug lord fall, but war goes on. The Washington Post. 31 March 2011.

12 Cortés 11 With the death of LFM s founder Moreno González, also known as El Chayo, the organization split into two separate groups: the one that kept LFM s name and was led by Méndez Vargas and a splinter group called Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios), commanded by Servando Gómez Martínez. The latter went public in March After the arrest of LFM s leader Méndez Vargas, the Knights Templar DTO continued to compete for influence in Michoacán in disputes with LFM and Los Zetas 3 (Molzahn, Rodríguez Ferreira, and Shirk 38). At the present time, the Knights Templar, who embrace a religious ideology and brutality similar to LFM s, has managed to push LFM aside. Tierra Caliente, a relatively isolated area in Michoacán has become their favored safe haven (Krauze). The Knights Templar main source of income comes from the illicit traffic of methamphetamine to the United States. However, the DTO has diversified and now profits from other criminal activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and illegally mined iron ore (Archibold). Their infiltration of the mining industry provided another major source of income until last November, when the Mexican Navy took control over Lázaro Cárdenas, the country s second larger port used by Knights Templar to ship the iron ore to China (Villegas, Mexico Targets ). According to Villegas, the Knights Templar organization has become a violent menace in western Mexico, giving rise to vigilante groups that formed to stop its reign of extortion, kidnapping and murder. That in turn, forced the government to send the federal police and the military to try to take back a region it conceded had fallen out of state control (Villegas, Mexico Targets ). These emergent vigilant groups, also seen in other regions of the country, have added an additional layer of complexity to the situation in Michoacán. 3 When LFM s founder El Chayo was killed, the government declared LFM on the brink of collapse; however locals reported that in terms of violence, nothing had changed. William Booth and Nick Miroff, Mexico s drug lord fall, but war goes on. The Washington Post. 31 March 2011.

13 Cortés 12 According to historian Enrique Krauze, Mexican citizens fed up with the situation in Michoacán began to form armed self-defense groups since February Members of these groups reportedly come from various backgrounds, including small ranchers, business people, and emigrants returning from the United States (Krauze). Asfura-Heim and Espach report that self-defense forces claim to have no choice but to take matters into their own hands as criminals exacerbate violence and both the government and the police are either absent, corrupt, or themselves working with the criminals (Asfura-Heim and Espach). Armed conflict between the Knights Templar broke out in mid-january 2014 (Seelke and Finklea 12). As of March 25 th, selfdefense groups had expanded their control to 29 out of the 113 municipalities that constitute the state of Michoacán (Macías). The rise of self-defense groups has brought multiple concerns to the surface. Some worry that these groups might be connected or financed by a rival cartel in the neighboring state of Jalisco (Abad; Krauze). Others question the mysterious source of their weapons (Miroff; Cave). Divisions among self-defense groups are also of growing concern. In March, Hipólito Mora, a prominent leader of a self-defense group, was detained in March as a suspect in the homicide of two members of a rival self-defense group (Cave). In an effort to assert control over the situation, the government opted to offer some form of institutionalization of these groups. The government called members of self-defense groups to either join the newly created Self-Defense Corps, under the authority of the army or to disarm. Members choosing to join the Self-Defense Corps are required to register their weapons (Fausset). On April 14 th, The General Counsel representing self-defense groups in Michoacán (Consejo General de Autodefensas y Comunitarios de Michoacán) and Michoacán s Security and Development Commission agreed on a May 10 deadline to clean-up Michoacán (this involved either disarming or registering weapons and joining the Self-Defense Corps) in exchange of

14 Cortés 13 releasing an estimated 100 self-defense members that had been incarcerated (Castellanos Enviada). However, Allison reports that despite the passing deadline, disarmament is far from being completed and the divide between self-defense groups continues (Allison). The Peña Nieto administration s attempt to institutionalize self-defense groups is the most recent effort to stabilize the situation in Michoacán. However, since May 2013, Peña Nieto sent troops to Michoacán as the Knights Templar continued to terrorize towns and torch business and homes (Miroff). On February 2014, Peña Nieto announced Plan Michoacán, a $3.4 billion investment that Peña Nieto hopes will recover security, establish conditions of social order and spur economic development (quoted in Fausset and Sanchez). The program will involve funding student scholarships, pensions for the elderly, credits for small business, as well as infrastructure projects, including highways and a new hospital (Fausset and Sanchez). Within the first three months of 2014, Dionicio El Tio Loya Placarte, Nazario El Chayo Moreno González, and Enrique Kike Placarte, three out of the four main leaders of the Knights Templar have fallen. 4 Currently only Servando La Tuta Gómez Garcia remains (Heinle, Rodríguez Ferreira, and Shirk 43). Unfortunately, despite government efforts, the situation remains frail in Michoacán. Recommendation for U.S. Action Plan Michoacán has potential to address the root causes that turned Michoacán into a battle field. However, any significant positive effects from Plan Michoacán will take time. Based on the situation developing in Michoacán and the threat that DTOs pose to Mexico s stability 4 Dionicio El Tio Loya Placarte was arrested and Nazario El Chayo Moreno González, and Enrique Kike Placarte were reportedly killed. Villegas, Paulina. Authorities Kill Gang Leader, Mexico Says. The New York Times. 1 April 2014.

15 Cortés 14 and U.S. economy and security, this report finds the following activities important for U.S. national security: In cooperation with the Mexican government, identify and seize methamphetamine labs operating in Mexico, but particularly in the state of Michoacán. As noted in this report, lab seizures declined in With the Peña Nieto administration current focus on the Knights Templar DTO threat, it is possible to persuade them to increase lab seizures in order to disrupt their operations and cut down their profits. In cooperation with the Mexican government, ensure that current leader of Knights Templar is taken down. Since the Mexican government does not allow U.S. agents to participate in raids, the United States should use available resources to locate Servando La Tuta Gómez Garcia and provide Mexican authorities with intelligence that will lead to his capture. Seek to infiltrate self-defense groups in Michoacán. Given the current uncertainty regarding the future of these groups, developing assets and gathering intelligence could potentially serve as a foundation of future operations in the region. United States independent action hidden from the Mexican Government must be kept at a minimum. Given the historic relationship between Mexico and the United States, many in Mexico remain suspicious of U.S. intervention. It is of great importance not to compromise the strong collaborative relationship developed in recent years. Operation Plan Justification of Covert Action It is in the interest of the United States to help its southern neighbor regain stability. The current violence and corruption in Mexico is hindering the establishment of rule of law. By

16 Cortés 15 helping Mexico undermine DTOs, the U.S. is contributing to the strengthening of rule of law in Mexico. Violence in Mexico is regionalized and Michoacán has occupied a national spotlight for quite some time. Increasing seizures of methamphetamine labs and the capture of La Tuta will represent a major hit for the Knights Templar, which recently lost three major leaders and revenue from the illicit trade of iron ore in Michoacán. Furthermore, gaining intelligence and developing assets within Michoacán s self-defense groups could be beneficial in future efforts to stabilize the region. The United States has successfully built a robust relationship with Mexico. At no other point in history have the U.S. and Mexico been so closely tied. Operating covertly in Mexico while collaborating with the government helps pacify sovereignty concerns that have prevailed in Mexico. The Mexican government is concerned with maintaining control within its territory. On the other hand, the United States is concerned with achieving tangible results that address or lessen the threat that DTOs represent to U.S. national security. Given the importance of the special relationship and strategic partnership between the two countries, the interests of the United States are best served by collaborating with Mexico than by acting unilaterally at the risk of damaging the partnership. Responsibility and Accountability Given the nature of the criminal organization targeted by this operation, the DEA is deemed as the agency with higher probability of achieving success in this operation. This is permissible based on Executive Order 12,333 (cited in Mustin and Rishikof 1242). In addition to DEA s expertise dealing with drug related crimes, the DEA has available resources in Mexico that the agency has built over time. Since the late 1990s the DEA has funded the creation of Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) made up by foreign nationals. The first SIU were created in

17 Cortés 16 Colombia, but the model was later exported to other Latin American countries (Priest). According to a report by DEA inspector general, by mid-2006 the DEA had two SIUs in Mexico consisting of 184 members (cited in Priest). Furthermore, the DEA has developed an exhaustive network of informants and undercover agents which has already contributed to the finding of cartel members (Priest). The DEA will be expected to provide weekly briefings to the National Security Council (NSC). Furthermore, no unilateral action shall be taken by DEA without the authorization of the NSC. Logistical and Financial Requirements Tracking clandestine labs and Knights Templar leader La Tuta will require the use of DEA s network of informants, SIUs, as well as surveillance technological equipment including but not limited to drones and software to eavesdrop cellphone calls. Once significant leads are identified, the information will be communicated to the Office of the Interior Ministry as currently required by the Peña Nieto administration. Although direct U.S. agents are prohibited from participating in raids, DEA should offer to help plan and possibly direct the operation remotely as has been done in the past. SIUs and DEA agents will work together in coming up with a program designed to infiltrate self-defense groups. Once successful infiltration is achieved, the main goal will be to gather intelligence. Particular attention should be paid to sources of armament and financing of self-defense groups as well as their vulnerability to cartel infiltration. In terms of financing, with the authorization of Congress, funds appropriated to the Merida Initiative might be diverted to fund operation RESTORE.

18 Cortés 17 Potential Risk and Termination Assessment There are three main sources of risk associated with this operation. First, there is a risk of cartel infiltration of SIUs. Successful cartel infiltration could result in the sabotage of the operation and in cartels gaining access to sensitive intelligence. Second, there is the risk that once sensitive intelligence is communicated to the Mexican government, a corrupt official might leak the information to the DTOs. Lastly, there is the risk of unilateral action by an U.S. agent or liaison that could potentially harm U.S. relations with Mexico. In order to ameliorate these risks, DEA top officials must established tight controls and make sure that any person with access to sensitive intelligence is properly vetted. The three components of this operation (capturing La Tuta, seizing clandestine methamphetamine labs, particularly in Michoacán, and infiltrating self-defense groups) allow for the termination of the entire or part of the operation at any point in time. Reasons for termination include but are not limited to achieving the goals of the operation or a changing U.S. policy in regards to Mexico or drug trafficking in general. The scope of this operation makes it easy to evaluate success. The incarceration or killing of La Tuta would result in the termination of that component of the operation. Although, there might be a future need to revise that goal to include the identification and tracking of possible emerging leadership figures within the Knights Templar DTO. Success in seizure of clandestine labs will be measured in terms of increased lab seizures from 2013 to Success might be more difficult to measure in regards to the infiltration of self-defense units. Further consultation with NSC will be required to redefine the objectives regarding this component of the operation.

19 Cortés 18 Conclusion Seelke and Finklea assert that the Mexican government has not traditionally provided support for alternative development even though many drug-producing regions of the country are impoverished rural areas where few licit employment opportunities exist. Alternative development programs may be designed more broadly to assist any individuals who collaborate with DTOs out of economic necessity. Additionally, Seelke and Finklea observe that studies in Colombia have found that the simultaneous implementation of eradication, alternative development, and interdiction is more effective than the independent implementation of any of these (Seelke 28). If that holds true in Mexico, with the implementation of Plan Michoacán, there is a higher probability that the seizure of methamphetamine labs will have more positive visible effects in the state of Michoacán. The operation proposed in this report is a continuation of existing U.S. policy towards Mexico and drug trafficking. For years, U.S. policy has focused on the capture of kingpins and interdictions. Given the increased level of violence during the Calderón administration in spite of success in interdictions and the capture of high-profile criminals, the success of this strategy might be disputed. Both Mexico and the United States have agreed that addressing the root causes of this ongoing problem is essential to achieve long lasting stability. This requires Mexico to institutionalize rule of law the United States to address the south-bound flow of arms and cash as well as domestic drug consumption. If the U.S. or Mexico change their policies towards the drug problem 5, current strategies will need to be reconfigured. 5 Astorga and Shirk suggest the drug consumption and organized crime should be treated as separate problems. They believe benefits could be gained from treating drug consumption as a health issue instead of a violation of the law. Astorga, Luis and David A. Shirk. Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.- Mexican Context in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. Edited by Olson, Eric L., David A. Shirk and Andrew Seele. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute.

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