Nuclear Industry Summit

Transcription

1 Grand Intercontinental Hotel, Seoul, Korea / March 23-24, 2012 The role of the nuclear industry in enhancing nuclear security & safety Preliminary Program March 23, 2012 (Friday) 07:30-08:30 Networking Breakfast & Registration 08:30-12:20 Opening Ceremony - Opening Remarks (CEO, KHNP) - Welcoming Remarks (Chairman, KAIF) - Congratulatory Remarks (Korean Prime Minister) Keynote Address - International Organizations (TBD) Presentations - International Organization Activities related to Nuclear Security - Nuclear Security Best Practices - Topical Presentations from Working Groups 12:20-14:00 Luncheon (Hosted by Korean Minister of Knowledge Economy) 14:00-16:00 Panel Discussion Adoption of Communiqué (CEO, KHNP) Closing Remarks (President, KAERI) 18:00-20:00 Dinner (Hosted by Korean Prime Minister) - Grand Hilton Seoul Hotel March 24, 2012 (Saturday) 08:00-21:00 Technical Tour - Nuclear construction site, Heavy equipment facility or Research facility

2 International Advisory Committee 0 Purpose To build consensus on the goal and product of the To gather opinions and receive recommendations from committee members in order to align the with the Nuclear Security Summit 0 To provide guidance on: The s subject and program Resolutions from each working group The Communiqué to be submitted to the Nuclear Security Summit The future direction for enhancing nuclear security and safety 0 Committee members (proposed) Co-chairs: IAEA, WNA, WANO, OECD/NEA, NEI, WINS Members Research Institutions Power Generation Companies Suppliers Nuclear Fuel Companies Other Organizations CRIEPI, EPRI, INVAP, NECSA CNNC, EDF, Entergy, TEPCO AREVA, GE-Hitach, Rosatom Toshiba, Westinghouse JNFL, TENEX, URENCO, USEC INPO, JAIF, NTI, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 0 Communication will be used as a major communication way but other means such as conference call, meeting etc. can be utilized when necessary.

3 W o rking Gr oup 0 Composition Each Working Group will consist of CEOs from approximately 10 nuclear related organizations. All group members may appoint deputy representatives for their convenience. Deputies are requested to be executives of their respective organizations. 0 Role To present the results of WG activities to the To compose recommendations to the Communiqué to be submitted to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit which corresponding with the purpose of the and its agenda 0 Topics 1. Minimization of Civilian Uses of HEU 2. Securing Sensitive Information 3. Nexus between Security and Safety Post-Fukushima 0 Work Process 0 Communication will be used as a major communication way but other means such as conference call, meeting etc. can be utilized when necessary.

4 WG 1. Minimization of Civilian Uses of HEU 0 Background Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) requires special precautions, the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit recommended the minimization of its use and agreed to fulfill the related resolution described in the Communiqué as follows: 0 Participating States agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate, and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible. To this end, the following two items were included in the Work Plan, which supports the above Communiqué item: 0 Participating States will consider, where appropriate, converting highly-enricheduranium fueled research reactors, and other nuclear facilities using highly enriched uranium, to use low enriched uranium, where it is technically and economically feasible; and 0 Participating States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various commercial applications such as isotope production. Following the 2010 Washington Nuclear Industry Conference, participating states of the Buenos Aires meeting mainly discussed current issues and future prospects of the technologies for the use of low enriched uranium, in relation to the status of civilian uses of HEU. 0 While there are no critical problems in the appropriateness of HEU replacement and the related technology aspects, a strategic approach to implementation should be developed due to replacement costs and increased volume of radioactive waste.

5 Based on the aforementioned background concerning HEU minimization, this Working Group will continuously discuss this topic at the 2012 Seoul in order to establish a strategy to minimize the civilian uses of HEU. 0 In order to perform the work, this Working Group will evaluate relevant international efforts, will determine a cooperative strategy of nuclear industries for further development, and will suggest a consensus to governments and international organizations.

6 WG 2. Securing Sensitive Information 0 Background With awareness of the significance of the management of sensitive nuclear information, the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit agreed to fulfill the relevant resolution described in the Communiqué as follows: 0 Participating States reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control, and to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; 0 Participating States agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies; and 0 Participating States will support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security. In order to support the aforementioned Communiqué of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, the following Work Plan was established: 0 Participating States recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are particularly sensitive and require special precautions; and 0 Participating States will encourage the implementation of national measures to ensure the proper management of sensitive information in order to prevent illicit acquisition or use of nuclear material. As an action plan of the related resolution and Work Plan, a strategy for sensitive nuclear information security was proposed at the Sous-Sherpa Meeting, held in Vienna, Austria in

7 March Following this meeting, an international conference on the security of sensitive nuclear information was held in West Sussex, U.K. in September Regarding the Protection of Sensitive Nuclear Technologies which have been discussed since the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit based on the aforementioned background, a strategy for strengthening the security needs to be established and carried out efficiently by continued addressing this topic at the 2012 Seoul.

8 WG 3. Nexus between Security and Safety Post-Fukushima 0 Background Understanding the role of the nuclear industry in nuclear security, the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit agreed to work together to enhance nuclear security through the Communiqué as follows: 0 Participating States recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture. In connection with the aforementioned resolution in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the following Work Plan was established: 0 Participating States will work, in guiding the nuclear industry, to promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate commitment to implement robust security practices, including regular exercises and performance testing of nuclear security features, consistent with national regulations; 0 Consistent with State requirements, Participating States will facilitate exchange of best practices, where legally and practically feasible, in nuclear security in the nuclear industry, and in this respect, will utilize relevant institutions to support such exchanges; and 0 Participating States will encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so. After the Fukushima disaster, there has been an international consensus that a strategy on nuclear security and safety should be developed with a view toward integration. In particular, the UN report entitled ˈNations System-wide Study on the Implications of the Accident at the Fukushima NPPˉ states that the destruction of nuclear facilities by both natural disasters and terrorism share the same characteristics.

9 As the unimaginable accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant was caused by a natural disaster, if a similar situation that seriously threatens public safety in terms of nuclear security occurs again, it could lead to a fatal influence regarding the public acceptance of nuclear energy. 0 It is anticipated that if the role of the nuclear industry as an economic energy source, and as a potential solution to global warming, is restricted, there will be a harmful influence on the sustainable development. This Working Group consisting of players in the nuclear industry will discuss the linkage between security and safety, and will establish a strategy to simultaneously enhance the levels of security and safety.