Territorial Interests in Europe

Transcription

1 Exam Spring 2010, 10 ECTS Territorial Interests in Europe How do regions engage in EU policy-making: a multi-level governance perspective Torsten Asbjørn Andersen and Trygve Ilkjær as Professors Policy Advocacy in the European Union

2 Table of contents 1. Introduction Definition of regional interests The different ways of political engagement for regional actors in Europe Strengths and weaknesses of regional involvement Multi-level governance: pros and cons Conclusion Literature list Introduction

3 One way to look upon and theorize about interest representation in the EU is to take into account the different territorial levels of these interests. Imagine a three-level governance system in which national, supranational and subnational actors are parts of a common and interrelated system and are all able to influence each other. In that system, regions understood as the subnational territorial entities immediately below the State would also play a significant role. While only consisting of a minor part of the whole Brussels lobbying industry (Greenwood, 2007: 11), the impact and activity of European regions remains surprisingly high. Their success lies in their capacity of combining both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms to maximize the satisfaction of political and economic goals. This is what makes the study of territorial interests particularly interesting to EU analysts. In recent times, the topic of regional involvement in Brussels has been largely discussed by scholars. Marks et al. were one of the first to identify the mechanisms used by subnational actors from a cost-benefit utilitarian point of view (Heasly, Marks & Mbaye, 2002). More recently, Bernitz and Weatherill have conducted some interesting comparative studies from a legal and institutional point of view (Bernitz & Weatherill, 2005). Moore has focused on the regional lobbying industry in Brussels with particular attention to the case of German Länder (Moore, 2006, 2008). The problem of formulation of regional interests is the topic of Hooghe and Keating s contribution (Hooghe & Keating, 2006). Greenwood has also a chapter about territorial interests in his analytical description of EU lobbying (Greenwood, 2007). Finally, Eising offers one of the most complete and exhaustive theoretical discussions about multi-level governance in relation to interest representation at the EU level (Eising, 2004), a topic also discussed by Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007). These and other authors will be referred to throughout this paper. Now, which mechanisms do regional actors have to influence the EU policymaking process? Departing from a multi-level governance approach, the paper will analyze and discuss the political means that regions, as policy advocates, possess, and the different channels institutionalized or not that they can use in order to maximize their political benefits. The analysis starts by questioning what a regional interest is and which actors participate in their formulation. The second section argues that the different institutional arrangements that regions enjoy in each Member State create differentiated regional interests and so regions choose different political means to fulfill

4 them. The next section analyzes whether regional interests are actually satisfied through these political channels or if further institutional developments are needed in order to improve regional engagement in Brussels. The fourth part is a discussion of the appropriateness of multi-level governance theory, based on the conceptualization made by Eising (Eising, 2004), to comprehend the role of regional entities in the EU. When applied to the study of the European Union, the theory focuses on the three existent levels of political power: the Union, the national governments and subnational entities; opposed to the classical conception of the State as the only relevant political actor. The paper finishes with a conclusion as a summary of the main points founded on this work. Definition of regional interests Before analyzing the different ways in which regions involve on European politics, one basic question raises: What is a regional interest and who has the power to create it? The answer is not quite simple but it is important for the purpose of this paper to investigate further into the origins of regional interests before moving forward. The first idea to bear in mind is that before going to Brussels and lobby, each European region has an institutionalized process by which it can formulate its position and the strategy which should be followed in order to accomplish its interests. The process can take multiple forms and involve different kinds of actors. On this chapter I will state some theories which can help to clear this complex situation. Much of the differences in the way by which regions formulate their interests at the European level can be attributed to their own legal and constitutional status, their level of autonomy, administrative arrangements, number of competences and their relations with the Nation-State of which they are part (Bache & George, 2006: 472). The fact is that the same concept of region as a political entity has broader meaning depending on the political context. Some European regions, like the German and Austrian Länder or the Belgian Communities, are members of a federal State while others are administrative subdivisions of a unitary State, like French regions or Polish voivodeships. Between these two terms lie a number of quasi federal arrangements and self-government levels which cannot be so easily classified, such as Italian regions or

5 British devolved institutions. These differences can even make the establishment of a single definition for the term region impossible (Wagstaff, 2007). An alternative and more accurate division is the one between regions with or without legislative power an issue which is the basis of the creation of Regleg as an alternative to the Committee of the Regions (CoR). This diversity of actors is also present in the different ways to define regional interests. Keating and Hooghe reach the conclusion that some regional governments are politically strong enough to defend their own positions at the EU level. When they are weaker, the situation becomes much more complex, with other actors intervening in the process (Hooghe & Keating, 2006: 245). These other actors can be the national government, the regional legislative assembly in the cases where there is such institution, the European supranational institutions, territorial business associations or organized civil society. Regional governments have a clear an undisputed political legitimacy and make use of it to present themselves as the only official interlocutors and promoters of the interests of the region. Some of them have even been recognized a sort of foreign policy competences by their State governments and have an EU-relations department which can help creating this regional position. This is the case of nearly all Spanish autonomous communities, all Belgian communities and regions and the Finnish Åland Islands. Other regional executives choose to share that power with others and keep a more modest role as coordinators or initiators of a broader coalition of regional interests. A typical example is that of the Scottish Government, which promotes Scottish interests by indirectly involving other organizations such as private business lobbying or smaller local agencies (Scotland Europa, 2010). Many national governments are reluctant to cede such important matter as EU relations to the regional level. They may keep the monopoly of negotiations with European authorities or consent arrangements to involve the regional level in one way or another. All German federal decisions concerning exclusive Länder competences need the previous approval of the Bundesrat (Moore, 2006: 193); while Spain and Italy held periodical conferences between the State and all the regions to decide what a common position will be in these cases (Brunazzo, 2010: 303).

6 Regional parliaments and other legislative assemblies, also use their democratic legitimacy to participate in the region s European policy, often in parallel with government s actions. The Parliament and Assemblies of all British devolved institutions are competent on European policy and have offices in Brussels (Moore, 2008: 530), although in the majority of cases there is no separated parliamentary policy or this is developed in close cooperation with the government s one. EU supranational institutions may also promote regional interests as a way to balance the Member States by adding a third level in the bargaining system (Brunazzo, 2010: 300). The Commission has always been very interested in this strategy. Some authors argue that, in some ways, European structural funds can also be seen as a tool to force the engagement of regional actors and develop multi-level governance relations (Bache & George, 2006: 480) (Brunazzo, 2010: 300). Nevertheless, this situation is unlikely to happen, since central States continue to be the main gatekeepers of regional budgets (Greenwood: 2007: 175). Private business associations may rely on the regional level rather than the national one to defend their interests. Sometimes, regional business associations directly lobby the European institutions, and sometimes they work closely with official regional institutions. Some weaker regions rely on mixed or entirely privately-owned foundations to be the region s voice in Europe. This is the model followed by Scotland. In some cases, that might even make difficult to distinguish between public and private regional interests because the former promote business involvement as a way to increase legitimacy and the latter, of course, want to participate in setting the interests of the region (Greenwood, 2007: 159). Finally, citizen s organizations of any kind may pressure regional authorities to follow a particular European policy and to defend their perceived particular interests in Europe. From consumers to green, cultural or political associations, pro-european and eurosceptical, they join forces to participate in the definition of regional interests in a very similar way than what is done at the national level. At the end of the day, a regional interest is nothing but the aggregation of distinct ideas, concerns and proposals coming from different parties and joined into a single position. In most cases, this final position is ultimately defended by the regional government as the most legitimized authority; even though it has only participated in an

7 indirect way. At this point, we can turn to the ways by which regional entities advocate these interests. The different ways of political engagement for regional actors in Europe Regions, as any other lobbying group, have rationalized and diversified their strategies to influence European policy and make use of one or another depending on their constitutional and legal status, institutional arrangements, economic strength, the fluidity of their relations with the central State and cultural and identity feelings of the population (Brunazzo, 2010: 301). They also embark on stable coalitions to maximize their common interests and speak with a single voice at the European stage. Some academics have made their own division of these political mechanisms. One of them is a two-level division consisting on the combination of their source of legitimacy whether it is national or European and their kind of access which can be direct or mediated by a third actor (Brunazzo, 2010: ). A possible alternative is to classify them on whether they have direct access, via the national government, via European-wide lobbies or consultative mechanisms (Hooghe & Keating, 2006: ). This paper will be focused on the four main ways of political involvement, which are the Brussels representation offices, the Committee of the Regions, participation in the Council of the EU and interregional cooperation. Regional offices next to EU institutions are the main way that most regions and in particular the most powerful ones have to influence EU policy-making. And furthermore, they are a key point of the European multi-level governance framework. Its increasing number from 185 in 2005 to more than 250 in 2010 (Greenwood, 2007: 169) (Brunazzo, 2010: 303) and multiple and growing activities mean that after 15 years, there is a need to update the original sub-national mobilization theories (Hooghe, 1995) to make them receptive to this ever growing reality. The traditional purposes of these offices and representations was information gathering, networking with other regions, serving as a link between the region and the EU, and influencing

8 policy-making (Heasly, Marks & Mbaye, 2002: 4-6). Nonetheless, as clearly depicted by Moore in her studies (Moore 2006, 2008), they are more and more turning from a download collection of information to an upload streaming of influence, political pressure and demands; all of them well-targeted towards the key actors within the European Commission, the Parliament (EP) and national representations. From its polemical and newly renovated Schloss Neuwahnstein (Moore, 2006), for instance, the Bavarian representation has the functions of exerting influence on policy formation in the EU, representing Bavaria s interests to the institutions of the EU, to provide [...] advice and support for Bavarian industry as regards contacts to the EU and [...] cooperation with other European regional representations based in Brussels (Bavarian State Chancellery, 2008: 5). This resurgence is by no means a challenge to the Nation- State power not least because the Member States are the ones who continue to decide the allocation of European structural funds (Greenwood, 2007: ) but a challenge to the classic conception of how do relations between political actors in Brussels take place. Nevertheless, if regions appear to be strong players with the support of supranational institutions, then the States should adapt to a new situation in which, for the first time in EU s history, they cannot take their supremacy for granted and may look for alternative mechanisms and processes to avoid being bypassed. The CoR was intended to be an institutionalized alternative in a moment when regional mobilization was entering the stage, although its success is yet to be proved. Authors differ in their perception of that assembly, but there is a common perception that CoR failed to achieve the opportunity of giving sub-national actors a central role in European legislative process or even of exercising a minimum influence in EU policymaking (Warleigh, 2002: ) (Greenwood, 2007: 156) (Brunazzo, 2010: 302). Internal divisions mainly between the local/regional issues in combination with a lack of institutional capacity have made the CoR a very neglectful actor, in spite of enjoying the Commission patronage. Aware of that situation, the Committee puts its efforts on image cleaning in an attempt to improve external perception. A good example is its annual set of recommendations for relations with the media, addressed to all its members (Committe of the Regions, 2010a). With such an indirect influence, regional actors have returned to the traditional non-institutionalized ways of lobbying, leaving only the more symbolic and soft

9 lobbying activities for the CoR. In parallel, the most powerful regions, headed by the German Länder, push for reformations, even though they are in a minority situation in the Committee (Warleigh, 2002: ). The Lisbon Treaty has opened the door for reforms (Committee of the Regions, 2010b) and it is still early to say if that would mean any change in actual relations. All in all, if the CoR is to be a powerful tool for regional lobbying in Europe, and not only a mere forum for political discussion, there is a need to revise and enlarge its competences. And what is more important, it needs to engage in close cooperation with the rest of EU official institutions and establish links with the key actors there (Warleigh, 2002: 187), not only the Directorate General for Regional Policy and the EP Regional Development Committee but in all areas and policies in which regions have a say. Of course this would be difficult as long as CoR is a place where authorities of so distinct levels and responsibilities sit next to each other. Unofficial and ad hoc regional associations like Regleg may be more suitable. This option would be discussed later on. The third mechanism was established by article 203 of the Maastricht Treaty, which gives sub-national authorities at ministerial level the possibility to appoint a representative with full negotiating powers in the Council of the EU, if designated by their Member State (Treaty on European Union, 1992). Strictly speaking, this cannot be considered a lobbying activity of the regions, as these representatives are on any case expected to defend the interests of the whole State and not those of their particular constituency. Nonetheless, it provides some particular regions with a direct access to one of the two legislative bodies of the Union in an equal status with the nation-states. This formula was defended by the German Länder and is an option that is only used by regions with strong traditions of self-governing and external relations, i.e. German and Austrian Länder, Belgian regions and communities, British devolved institutions and Spanish autonomous communities (Moore, 2008: 525). Even though, Member States are reluctant to accept such kind of sub-national involvement and always impose their own conditions. German Länder, for instance, only intervene in the case of proposals which primarily affect exclusive Länder legislative competencies (Auswärtiges Amt, 2006). The final implications of that practice are that politically strong regions are the main benefited while the rest of European regions are not capable of deposing the central State from its monopoly on foreign policy. Thus it reinforces some kind of two-

10 level regionalism although, at the end of the day, it is a formal procedure with only ceremonial implications and not a real case of decentralization of Foreign Policy. The last mechanisms for regional involvement in the EU discussed on this paper are interregional networks and cooperation. As any other lobbying group, territorial interests organize themselves to take advantage of common interests and to be more efficient in their demands. These coalitions may take different forms, for instance, cooperation agreements, associations, sectoral links or more institutionalized organizations. No matter if the basis is economical, geographical or political. The Assembly of European Regions, created in 1985, is the largest of them, encompassing more than 270 regions including some from outside the Union and has a pan- European vision. A useful and more manageable alternative to the official CoR is the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power (Regleg) which has a reduced number of members, with more common status and aspirations. It maintains a close relationship with the Commission, who often prefers it to CoR for negotiations about regional policy. An even more focused model of cooperation is that of the Four Motors for Europe, a cooperation agreement of some of the most industrialized regions of the EU. The formation of coalitions of regional interest actors is determined by rational calculations of the utility of taking such actions in a cost-benefit analysis. Regions with a high-level economic performance, solid political institutionalization and widespread foreign recognition are more likely to join coalitions with similar entities that regions without such background. This goes in line with some of the findings that Christine Mahoney made in her study about coalition formation among interests groups. Some of the conclusions are that [...] it is the wealthier organizations that are engaging in this lobbying strategy [of joining coalitions] and [...] the larger the scope of the issue, the higher the probability of coalition membership (Mahoney, 2007: 372, 378). An immediate consequence is that while this lobbying mechanism is open to all actors, it is the most developed regions who take the best profit of regional cooperation. Notice that there are some alternative ways for regional actors to defend their interests at the European level, although they are used at a much lesser extent. These can be engagement through national representations (Hooghe & Keating, 2006) or direct lobbying to DG Regional Policy and the EP Committee of Regional Development

11 (Greenwood, 2007). On this paper, I have focused on the most relevant mechanisms in order to understand the whole idea of territorial interests and its implications for multilevel governance theories. I refer to the former authors for further reading on the topic. In conclusion, the general idea behind this chapter is that differences in the regions due to different political status, levels of self-government, economic developments and social perceptions explain the different objectives of regional actors, and they in turn explain the political instruments that these actors decide to use. For instance, a region with a high level of competences, strong economic contribution and solid sentiments of identity (what I call the Bavarian model ) may have a wellresourced and active representation in Brussels; make use of the full powers of CoR; possess the institutional power to participate in Council meetings as representative of the whole central State, and have developed close links with similar industrialized regions in other Member States to have a common lobbying strategy. By contrast, a region without legislative power, limited administrative autonomy or part of a centralized State (the French regional model ) may have a weak, merely ceremonial office in Brussels; see the CoR as a limited institution to defend its interests; not participate at all in Council meetings nor in the definition of the European policy of their home State, and may be a member of only general, European-wide associations and not bilateral partnership agreements. Generally speaking, we can talk about a twolevel regional involvement in the European Union. Strengths and weaknesses of regional involvement So far, we have seen the process of creation of regional interests and the ways that regional actors have at their disposal to accomplish them. At this point, the question is: Are the precedent methods really effective? Some of them may be and some may need reforms if they are to be viable lobbying channels. Effectiveness in lobbying is

12 always very difficult to measure and only some studies have dealt with the topic (Coen & Richardson, 2009: ). What I will do on this chapter is to weigh the weaknesses and strengths of the different methods discussed above and venture some lines of reform on the basis of increasing productivity from the regional actors point of view. Starting with the most visible and used method, that of direct representations, the first point to mention is that their success is generally undisputed, as the number of regions with such offices is increasing year by year. But, direct representations can only influence EU legislative process if they are able to join forces with representations of other regions, with the Central State or with private business groups that can reinforce their position. The problem in most cases is the perceived regional blindness of the EU (Weatherill, 2005). They are in fact responsible for the implementation and even legislation of EU normative without being properly represented. This can be a serious problem for EU legitimacy among large parts of the population. The Lisbon Treaty acknowledges regional self-government for the first time (Committee of the Regions, 2010b) but this should be a first step towards full recognition of sub-national actors and making their representations official. That would create a fluid dialogue between EU institutions and regional entities. The Lisbon Treaty has also enlarged the role of CoR. Now it has consultative powers throughout the whole legislative process in a number of areas; it works closely with national parliaments, and has the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice. For the first time, regions with legislative power are granted special attention (Committee of the Regions, 2010b), thus recognizing the existence of the two-level regionalism. But it is still early to say if these mechanisms can be sufficient to give regional authorities the status they are seeking. For the moment, the new competences and the closer relationship with the Commission are signs that regional involvement is becoming a priority for the EU. The right of becoming part of the Council of the EU is a useful way of managing the problem that arises when the question at debate is exclusively or mainly of subnational competence in some of the Member States. But again, the procedure should be normalized and explicitly recognized on the Treaty so that regional representatives could do their work with absolute normality. Some years ago, there was a proposal for,

13 on some matters, splitting some countries qualified majority votes into single votes, so that sub-national entities could have a say (Weatherill, 2005: 31). This could be an alternative for the problem of exclusive regional competences in the three federal States and possibly the UK, Italy and Spain, but its viability needs to be secured. Interregional cooperation is probably the most effective way for regions to influence the EU policy-making. By organizing and creating large lobbying groups, regional actors can embark on a single dialogue with EU institutions, mainly with the Commission. It is remarkable the particular success of Regleg and its annual Conference of Presidents to consolidate its position, aided by the pragmatic composition of its members: only regions with high levels of self-government (Greenwood, 2007: 159). These ideas may be useful to help solve the problem of inserting the regional level of government to the already complex and overweight institutional system of the EU. Summary Returning to the initial question of the paper, the previous analysis tells us that European regions have at their disposal many different options to be involved on policymaking and they rationally use one or another in relation to a clear cleavage, which creates what can be called a two-level regionalism. The cleavage can be observed on each of the mechanisms detailed on the previous section and crosses between regions who have high self-government and those who do not; those who have a number of competences and those who are mere administrative sub-divisions, and those who represent a strong economy and those who do not. To sum-up: a cleavage between consolidated and non-consolidated regions. And that difference is what primarily explains how regions are involved on EU policy-making. Once made this conceptual analysis we can turn on to the theoretical discussion about multi-level governance and the role of regions as policy advocates in the European Union.

14 Multi-level governance: pros and cons The emergence of a multi-level governance system to explain relations between European, national and regional levels of government is assumed by most of the authors examined on this paper (Warleigh, 2002: ) (Heasly, Marks & Mbaye, 2002: 1) (Bache & George, 2006: 480) (Greenwood, 2007: 156) (Brunazzo, 2010: 304). They explicitly mention, by one way or another, that the involvement of regional interest groups on EU decision-making demonstrates the change to a multi-level governance system. The EU is in the process of becoming a multi-level governance system and subnational actors are given a role in policy-making (Warleigh, 2002: ). But, is really multi-level governance approach, the best analytical tool to determine how regions are involved? Multi-level governance comprises three basic assumptions. First of all, there is a coexistence of actors from different levels of government (in the case of the EU, between supranational, national and subnational level) that share political powers. Secondly, political competences are not perfectly distributed among these levels, but they are often exercised in common. And thirdly, actors from these levels interact in multiple forms, which can be both institutionalized and non-institutionalized (Eising, 2004: 215, 216). This is what Kohler-Koch and Rittberger call the type one governance or vertical governance in their book (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007: 7-8). The former three statements may help us to understand why and how regions are engaged in Brussels. The first assumption is basic to understand why sub-national actors like regions are involved. The European political system is extremely complex and policy-making process is mainly characterized by its openness and, to some extent, its deinstitutionalization. So it is vital for regional authorities to reaffirm its position as autonomous bodies if they want to survive in this insecure environment. The great fear of many regional institutions is that European integration can deprive them from the self-government mechanisms that they arranged within its State, sometimes after long and costly political struggle. Regional actors want to participate in the input side of the EU political system and not only to implement the output side (Weatherill, 2005). By establishing a direct access to European institutions, they can control that risk. This

15 linkage strategy was the original reason why regions established separate delegations and representations to the European institutions. The issue of overlapped competences, exercised in common by regional and European actors and usually also national actors creates a very favorable situation for political bargaining, for cooperation and conflict. The best example, as mentioned above, is the situation in the Council of the EU, where some national ministers discuss an area in which they actually have no, or virtually no competences. The solution may come from a negotiated agreement between the regions and the State who represents them or from an arrangement by which one of the implicated regions temporary represents the whole State in the Council. The last and maybe most important point about multi-level governance is the diversity of relations that can be established between the actors implicated. Through this paper we have seen the different channels of communication between regional institutions and the European ones and how the former prefer non-institutionalized practices to defend their interests. Nevertheless, a multi-level governance system may have also negative consequences for the well-functioning of the European Union. The fact that the Union does not explicitly recognize the role of regions means that all negotiations with such actors are held in a very unofficial way. For Marks, They [subnational government s offices] are a part of the subterranean political world of multi-level governance that lies beneath and beyond EU treaties (Heasly, Marks & Mbaye, 2002: 1). This perceived opacity has negative implications for the debated democratic legitimacy of the EU. After the abandonment of the Europe of the Regions project, that was intended to increase democratic legitimacy by involving sub-national actors and bringing citizens closer to EU institutions, there is an urgent need to establish networks to clean up the obscure image of European supranational institutions. Official recognition of the role of subnational actors might be a solution but it is not that easy. It could help coordination with some key actors in the implementation process. But it can also make EU s system even more complex and disaggregated and create serious legal cleavages between States with and without legislative regions (Weatherill, 2005: 31). Notwithstanding, recognition could also benefit the Member States themselves because it is not unusual that they have to pay the bill for their regions slow or inaccurate implementation of EU

16 legislation (Weatherill, 2005: 27-28). The Commission has steadily made steps towards this recognition (Weatherill: 2005: 27-28) and, with the Lisbon Treaty, opted for recognition of regional autonomy without giving it any specific role, except the one provided by the consultative Committee of the Regions. To finish with, there is an important question that multi-level governance is unable to explain. Some supranational institutions, particularly the European Commission, encourage regional engagement and are a major explaining factor for why regions have organized to defend their interests at the European level. There is a kind of feedback. Indeed, Europe needs a strong and legitimized interlocutor in order to legitimize itself. On this paper I have focused on how do regional actors influence the EU policy-making. But the topic could be taken the other way: how and why do EU actors influence regional actors. This approach can be the basis for future research on the topic. Conclusion Regional interests emerge from the confluence of many different actors interests, both public and private. Later on, these interests are sent as an input to EU institutions through four main channels. And return to the previous actors as political answers or output. We have seen how the existence of a two-level regionalism the Bavarian model of developed, highly self-governed regions; and the French regional model of weak, State-controlled ones is the main explanations behind regions using one or another way to represent their interests. Multi-level governance is, certainly, the most used and useful theoretical way to explain the role of regional actors because it assumes the existence of separate supranational, national and sub-national levels of government which are nonetheless capable of influencing each other in multiple ways. But some challenges are still outside the scope of this paper: the problem of democratic legitimacy and unofficial lobbying practices, and the fact that regional involvement itself can be promoted and organized by European supranational institutions.

17 Literature list Auswärtiges Amt (2006): Participation of the Federal States (Länder) in EU affairs.

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