UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST UPDATE

Transcription

1 UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST UPDATE Presented and Prepared by: Dana J. Hughes Rockford, Illinois Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen PEORIA SPRINGFIELD URBANA ROCKFORD EDWARDSVILLE CHICAGO 2013 Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen F-1

2 UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST UPDATE I. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED COVERAGE... F-3 II. CASE LAW UPDATE... F-3 A. Apportionment of Policy Proceeds... F-3 B. Arbitration Provisions... F-4 C. Set-offs... F-6 D. Bad Faith: Unreasonable and Vexatious Delay... F-8 E. Cooperation Clause... F-9 F. Statutory Rejections of Coverage...F-10 The cases and materials presented here are in summary and outline form. To be certain of their applicability and use for specific claims, we recommend the entire opinions and statutes be read and counsel consulted. F-2

3 UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST UPDATE I. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED COVERAGE The Illinois Legislature has drafted the Illinois Insurance Code, in part, to ensure that people suffering damages at the hands of uninsured or underinsured motorists are compensated as though the offending, financially irresponsible motorist had been properly insured. Hence, the Code contains a significant number of provisions devoted to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that seek to protect insurance consumers while balancing the right of the issuing insurers. A fairly sophisticated process has been established to resolve the vast majority of these types of claims. Both UM and UIM claims are usually resolved in binding arbitration. In order to establish the ground rules for the actual arbitration, the parties/companies to the claim normally reference their policy/contract language, the Illinois Insurance Code and the Uniform Arbitration Act. The systems and processes designed to resolve the vast majority of UM/UIM claims seek to establish as much certainty as possible. The language of the insurance policy is designed to document the precise meaning of the terms of the policy and to define the various rights and obligations of the parties to the contract/policy, namely the insurer and the insured. Although this appears to be a relatively straight-forward process, the volume of UM/UIM related cases decided by the appellate courts reflect that the process of selecting the correct contract/policy language is not all that simple. The courts are constantly weighing the rights of the parties with the public policy of Illinois to decide these disputes. Below you will find a brief discussion of some of the UM/UIM cases that were decided since our 2012 publication on this issue. We encourage you to contact a Heyl Royster attorney to discuss any specific questions you may encounter in your claims handling process. II. CASE LAW UPDATE A. Apportionment of Policy Proceeds Columbia Mutual Ins. Co. v. Herrin, 2012 IL App (5th) , 965 N.E.2d 422 This case involves a dispute over the distribution of UIM proceeds after a serious auto accident injured three (K. Duncan, R. Duncan and Head) and killed one (Herrin). R. Duncan, Head, and Herrin were all passengers in a car driven by K. Duncan when Duncan s car was struck by an uninsured tortfeasor. The four filed separate personal injury suits against the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor was insured by Columbia Mutual, who tendered its $100,000 limits. The trial court conducted a bench trial to establish values of the claims in order to distribute the $100,000 liability limits. All claimants participated, and none appealed. The trial court found the claims were worth the following amounts: F-3

4 Herrin: $10m Head: $633k K. Duncan: $155k R. Duncan: $125k Two of the claimants had UIM coverage available exclusively to their respective claims. Herrin s father had $5.5 million in applicable UIM coverage available exclusively to Herrin s claim; Herrin s estate settled for $1.6 million with those insurers. Head had UIM coverage of $100,000 available exclusively to him, but that insurer set-off the $100,000 liability limits paid on behalf of the tortfeasor, so Head recovered nothing under that UIM policy. The Duncans (the host vehicle) had $900,000 in UIM coverage through Encompass, which was applicable to all four claimants. The $100,000 set-off of liability limits left $800,000 in available coverage to be distributed amongst all claimants. Encompass deposited the UIM proceeds with the court and was discharged from liability. The claimants objected to the trial court apportioning the $800,000 and argued that the appropriate means for apportionment was arbitration (per Encompass policy) rather than by court order establishing value of claims for distribution of the liability limits. The court used a ratio method and distributed the UIM proceeds accordingly: Herrin: $677k Head: $147k K. Duncan: $36k R. Duncan: $29k R. Duncan (loss of consortium): $9k Head and the Duncans sought reconsideration, which the trial court denied, and they appealed. The appellate court held that the trial court was the proper venue for distributing UIM policy proceeds. However, it further found that the trial court should have considered the UIM coverage available exclusively to each claimant before it distributed $800,000 available to all claimants from the host vehicle. Janes v. Western States Ins. Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 783 N.E.2d 37 (5th Dist. 2001). Applying the trial court s determination of valuation, Herrin could recover nothing from the $800,000 (because of the $1.6 million set-off) and the rest was to be distributed on remand to the claimants according to trial court s findings regarding the claims values. B. Arbitration Provisions Country Preferred Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 2012 IL , 979 N.E. 2d 35 * We reported on the appellate court s holding in this case in our 2012 claims handling seminar materials. Since our 2012 seminar, the Illinois Supreme Court has reversed the appellate court s holding. Below you will find our summary and analysis of the appellate court s decision, followed by the Supreme Court s decision. F-4

5 On July 27, 2007, Whitehead was in an accident with Lopez-Juarez in Wisconsin. Lopez-Juarez was at-fault and uninsured. At the time of the accident, Whitehead had uninsured motorist coverage through a policy with Country Preferred Insurance Company ( Country Preferred ). The policy provided that disputes were to be resolved through arbitration, and that if there was any dispute between the company and the insured, either party was required to make a demand for arbitration. Further, the policy provided that arbitration must be commenced within two years of the accident. Illinois has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, but Wisconsin has a three-year statute of limitations. In October 2007, Whitehead notified Country Preferred of her claim. Country Preferred assigned a claim number, and communicated with Whitehead s attorney about the claim. In October 2009, Whitehead made a formal demand for arbitration. Country Preferred responded by filing a declaratory action in Illinois asserting that Whitehead was barred from making any claim because she failed to make her arbitration demand within two years of the accident. Whitehead filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied Whitehead s motion and Whitehead appealed. The issue before the appellate court was whether Country Preferred s policy of requiring an arbitration demand within two years violated Illinois public policy of placing the insured involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist in the same position as if the at-fault driver was also insured, when the subject accident occurred in a state with a three-year statute of limitations. In examining the issue, the appellate court discussed prior decisions involving other contract provisions that were held to violate Illinois public policy with respect to time limits. For example, the court looked at Burgo, where the court held that an insurance policy that required the insured to demand arbitration within one year was unenforceable in light of Illinois two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. Burgo v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 259, 290 N.E.2d 371 (1st Dist. 1972). The court also referenced the Severs case, which held that a twoyear contractual limitation on arbitration was unenforceable as applied to a minor because Illinois allows minors an additional two years after reaching age 18 to file a personal injury suit. Severs v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 89 Ill. 2d 515, 434 N.E.2d 290 (1982). The appellate court held that the contractual limitations periods in these UM policies violated public policy because they put the insured in a worse position than the insured would have been in had the driver been insured. The court reasoned that the two-year limitations period violated Illinois public policy because it effectively shortened Wisconsin s statute of limitations. Justice McDade wrote a dissenting opinion, however, stating that the majority was affording Whitehead greater rights than those provided by Illinois statute merely because she was in an accident in Wisconsin. The judge s dissent noted that Whitehead and Country Preferred contractually agreed to resolve their grievances under the policy in Illinois rather than Wisconsin, and thus, the majority improperly assumed the applicability of Wisconsin law in this case. Justice McDade argued that the majority used a foreign jurisdiction s laws to find a violation of Illinois public policy an act that itself violates sound public policy. F-5

6 Country Preferred was granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The sole issue before the court was whether the two-year arbitration provision violated Illinois public policy given that the underlying accident occurred in a forum with a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The court focused on the fact that the dispute was between the insurer and the insured, as opposed to the insured and the tortfeasor. Specifically, the dispute concerned the enforceability of the insurance policy of an insurance provision that was contracted to by the parties, rather than a dispute over a personal injury limitations period. The court pointed out that legally, parties can agree to a contractual limitation period shorter than that of the statute of limitations, so long as the limitation period is reasonable. The supreme court held that a two-year contractual limitation period was reasonable and consistent with Illinois public policy. Over 185 years ago, the Illinois legislature determined that two years was an appropriate time by which an injured party could reasonably ascertain the extent of their injuries as well as identify the person who allegedly caused them, and file suit for damages. Although Wisconsin decided that three years is appropriate for its citizens, and six years is appropriate for bringing an action against an insurer for uninsured motorist benefits, Wisconsin public policy does not dictate the public policy of Illinois. Citing dissenting Appellate Justice McDade, the court indicated that it could identify no precedent supporting the proposition that Wisconsin law (or the laws of any other jurisdiction) can be used to demonstrate a violation of Illinois public policy. Also absent was any precedent dictating that the contractual limitation period must mirror the applicable statute of limitations for a suit against the tortfeasor. The above said, the court found the policy limitation period reasonable in light of the fact that it does mirror Illinois statute of limitations for suit against the tortfeasor. C. Set-offs Katz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2012 IL App (1st) , 965 N.E.2d 636 Katz was involved in an automobile accident, at which time he was the named insured on three automobile policies issued by State Farm. The policies were identical and provided for underinsured motorist benefit coverage limits of $250,000 per person. The tortfeasor was also insured by State Farm and had liability limits of $100,000 per person. Katz filed suit against the tortfeasor wherein State Farm tendered its $100,000 policy limits on behalf of the tortfeasor. The $100,000 was apportioned as follows: $60,000 to Katz, $40,000 to Katz s wife for her loss of consortium claim. At the time of the accident, Katz was driving his employer s vehicle, which was insured by Sentry Select Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Sentry Select ), which provided underinsured motorist coverage limits of $50,000 per person. Katz collected approximately $48,000 in workers compensation benefits as a result of the accident. Sentry Select set off the $48,000 and paid Katz the remaining $2,000 in available UIM limits per its policy with Katz s employer. State Farm tendered approximately $160,000 to Katz of the $250,000 limits available in Katz s personal UIM policy. Katz argued that State Farm was precluded from applying a set-off F-6

7 pursuant to the terms of the policy; therefore, the court should order State Farm to tender the remainder of its UIM limits to Katz. State Farm argued that it had actually paid Katz more than it was required to pay pursuant to its policy, and asked the court to find that it owed Katz no additional UIM benefits. The trial court found in favor of State Farm, and Katz appealed. On appeal, the main issue was whether State Farm s policy language regarding other underinsured motor vehicle coverage required the State Farm UIM policy to apply on an excess basis, leaving no available set-off for State Farm. The applicable language was as follows (paraphrased): If there is other available underinsured motor vehicle coverage, any coverage applicable under this policy shall apply: a. On a primary basis if the insured sustains body injury while occupying your car, or b. On an excess basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a vehicle other than your car. Katz argued that because he was occupying his employer s vehicle a vehicle other than his carand because his employer had UIM coverage available for the incident, that State Farm s UIM policy should apply on an excess basis, meaning Katz would be entitled to the full $250,000 limits. State Farm argued that because Sentry Select s UIM limits were $50,000, and the tortfeasor s liability limits were $100,000, the tortfeasor could not be classified as an underinsured motorist for purposes of the Sentry Select policy. Thus, there was no other available underinsured motorist coverable available to Katz, and the State Farm policy should be applied on a primary basis. Katz countered that Sentry Select issued underinsured benefits to him pursuant to its policy; thus triggering subsection b. He argued that Sentry Select properly issued underinsured motorist benefits to him pursuant to the plain language of its policy, after properly applying the workers compensation set-off. Katz further argued that since Sentry Select had already set off the workers compensation benefits, State Farm could not set them off as well. The court found Sentry Select s actions irrelevant to the issue of whether the tortfeasor was actually an underinsured motorist pursuant to Sentry s policy, triggering subsection b. The court found that the tortfeasor who had liability limits of $100,000 was not underinsured per the Sentry Select policy with $50,000 underinsured limits. The appellate court affirmed the trial court s finding that State Farm had the primary UIM coverage and was entitled to set off the liability limits, as well as the workers compensation limits, and therefore owed Katz no additional benefits under its policy. F-7

8 D. Bad Faith: Unreasonable and Vexatious Delay O Connor v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 IL App (3d) O Connor was involved in an automobile accident wherein she suffered a broken leg and sustained approximately $24,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, O Connor had $250,000 in underinsured motorist coverage and $10,000 in medical payments coverage with Country Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as Country ). The tortfeasor s insurer settled with O Connor for $105,000 as a result of the accident. O Connor had a good recovery from the injury, suffered no lost wages, and suffered no permanent disability. After settling with the tortfeasor s insurer, O Connor sought underinsured motorist benefits from Country. Applying $115,000 in set-offs, Country offered $40,000 to settle O Connor s claim. O Connor demanded $97,500. O Connor s underinsured claim then proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrators awarded O Connor $213,295, subject to $115,000 in set-offs, for a net award of $98,295. Country promptly paid the award. O Connor then sued Country for bad faith, alleging that she was entitled to Section 155 damages because (1) the arbitration award was more than twice Country s $40,000 offer, raising an inference that the defendant failed and refused to evaluate and pay plaintiff s claim in an objectively reasonable sum prior to arbitration ; (2) Country gave insufficient deference to O Connor s interests; and (3) Country failed to use objective criteria in evaluating O Connor s underinsured claim. At trial, Country called two of its claims handling attorneys, as well as outside counsel, to establish the reasonableness of Country s claims evaluation process. Generally, the testimony was that outside counsel would conduct discovery, evaluate the issues, and provide an opinion with respect to value of the claim. Country s claims handling attorneys testified that they evaluated claims on a case by case basis and settled the majority of UIM claims as opposed to proceeding to arbitration. Country offered testimony that it had valued the claim at $145,000-$155,000. It argued that there was not a substantial difference in the arbitrator s award. At the close of evidence, the trial court found in Country s favor, ruling that O Connor failed to prove that Country conducted itself in an unreasonable and vexatious manner in concluding her claim. O Connor appealed. The appellate court examined Country s actions to determine whether it fully engaged in attempting to present a bona fide defense as to the magnitude of O Connor s loss. When an insurer presents a bona fide defense, a section 155 claim for damages cannot be maintained. The court noted the extent of O Connor s injury and the amount of special damages sought by O Connor in evaluating Country s settlement position. The court observed that the arbitration award was approximately ten times the medical special damages incurred by O Connor; thus, the fact that Country s offer did not approach the arbitration award did not amount to unreasonable and vexatious behavior it constituted a bona fide defense. The court also examined the process by which Country s outside counsel and claims handling attorneys evaluate cases to determine their reasonable value. Although Country did not utilize a formulaic approach, per se, it reasonably evaluated claims on a case by case basis. For the above-stated F-8

9 reasons, Country s actions were not unreasonable and vexatious. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. E. Cooperation Clause Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Jungkans, 2012 IL App (2d) , 972 N.E.2d 807 Jungkans was injured while riding in a car driven by Watts. Jungkans settled with Watts, and Watts insurer, State Farm, paid Jungkans its policy limits of $100,000. Jungkans sought underinsured motorist coverage through his policy with Progressive. Progressive denied coverage because Jungkans failed to notify Progressive of his settlement with Watts insurer, State Farm. Progressive claimed that Jungkans violated the policy s cooperation clause by not notifying Progressive of his settlement with Watts, thus impacting its subrogation rights. Progressive argued that this violation barred his UIM claim. Progressive filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an order from the court that Jungkans UIM claim was barred based on his failure to cooperate pursuant to the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment on Progressive s behalf. Jungkans appealed, arguing that the trial court erred for two reasons: (1) Progressive s right of subrogation survived his settlement with Watts because Watts insurer, State Farm, knew of Progressive s subrogation right before the settlement; and (2) Progressive did not establish that it was substantially prejudiced by his violation of the policy s cooperation clause because Watts and Walker were judgment-proof. The trial court ruled that Jungkans violated the cooperation clause, and found in Progressive s favor. Jungkans appealed. On appeal, the parties agreed that Progressive s policy was clear and that Jungkans was contractually required to notify Progressive within 30 days of entering into any settlement agreement with Watts. The parties also did not dispute that Jungkans failed to notify Progressive of the settlement with Watts. The policy clearly stated that if Jungkans recovered from Watts without Progressive s consent, that Jungkans right to payment under the UIM portion of the policy would no longer exist. Under applicable Illinois law, however, the central question was one of prejudice whether Progressive was actually substantially prejudiced by Jungkans actions or omissions. The court initially determined that Progressive s subrogation rights survived Jungkans settlement with Watts, then examined the issue of whether Progressive suffered substantial prejudice. The court noted that the documentation Jungkans and State Farm had obtained from Watts attorney indicated that Watts was incarcerated, had unsatisfied judgments against him, and possessed no immediate assets. Walker, who owned the vehicle driven by Watts at the time of Jungkans injuries, also had no assets. Based on this, Jungkans argued that even if Progressive could exercise its subrogation rights against Watts or Walker, it would likely not recover against either because they are each judgment-proof. Jungkans argued that Progressive suffered no prejudice as a result of his actions, and that the cooperation clause would not apply to bar his UIM claim. F-9

10 The appellate court noted that only one Illinois opinion addressed whether a judgment-proof tortfeasor negates an insurer s claim of prejudice due to its insured s violation of a policy s cooperation clause. In applying Mulholland, the court framed the issue as follows: whether Progressive suffered substantial prejudice required Progressive to prove that its subrogation rights were actually worth something more than the ability to litigate. For all practical purposes, the Mullholland court held that a judgment-proof tortfeasor defeats an insurer s claim that it was substantially prejudiced by the insured s violation of a cooperation clause. The Mulholland court, however, still went on to analyze whether the insurer had been hurt by the mere loss of its subrogation rights even though the rights were worth nothing. Mulholland v. State Farm Mutual. Ins. Co., 171 Ill. App. 3d 600, 527 N.E.2d 29 (5th Dist. 1988). Based on this, the court in the instant case looked to other jurisdictions which had interpreted the issue. Other jurisdictions had ruled that a loss of worthless subrogation rights does not defeat an insured s claim due to an alleged violation of a cooperation clause. The court held that allowing an insurer to avoid coverage because of an insurer s loss of worthless subrogation rights would produce an undeserved windfall to the insurer. The appellate court reversed the trial court, and found that Jungkans could proceed with his UIM claim under his policy with Progressive. F. Statutory Rejections of Coverage Alshwaiyat v. American Service Ins. Co., 2013 IL App (1st) Alshwaiyat was injured and his wife was killed in an automobile accident caused by Pas. At the time of the accident, Alshwaiyat was employed by Mojo as a taxi driver, and was driving one of Mojo s vehicles. Mojo was insured by American Service Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as ASI ). Alshwaiyat and his wife s claims were settled for $100,000 each, the liability limits of Pas insurer. Alshwaiyat then pursued underinsured motorist benefits through his employer s carrier, ASI, claiming that the ASI policy provided $500,000 in benefits and coverage. ASI claimed that it owed Alshwaiyat nothing under the policy because it specifically provided UM benefits coverage of $20,000/$40,000 (and no UIM coverage.) Alshwaiyat argued, and the trial court agreed, that $500,000 in coverage was available due to ASI s failure to seek a rejection of increased UM/UIM limits from Mojo, when Mojo requested an endorsement to increase the combined bodily injury and property damage liability limits to $500,000. ASI did not require a written rejection of an increase in UM/UIM coverage at the time of the endorsement. When ASI renewed the policy, it provided $500,000 in liability limits and $20,000/$40,000 UM limits. ASI did not require a written rejection with respect to UM/UIM limits when it issued the renewal to Mojo. Alshwaiyat argued, and the trial court agreed, that ASI s failure to obtain these rejections violated the Insurance Code s requirements and should result in a reformation of the renewal policy to provide $500,000 in UM/UIM limits the same amount of the combined bodily injury and liability limits. Alshwaiyat and the trial court relied on Nicholson v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 282, 949 N.E.2d 666 (2d Dist. 2010) (* which we discussed in our 2010 seminar materials), a case that contained a slightly different set of facts and an analysis of an earlier version of the insurance code which required that insurers must offer and obtain a written rejection of higher F-10

11 UM/UIM coverage whenever there is a material change to an original insurance policy (more specifically, whenever there is an increase in the amount of liability coverage in a subsequent policy). Pursuant to Nicholson, if an issuer fails to obtain the statutorily required rejection, then the applicable policy will be reformed to reflect UM/UIM benefits in the amount of the increased liability coverage. Here, the trial court found that the endorsement and renewal each triggered ASI s obligation to offer increased UM/UIM coverage and to require a written rejection of such coverage from Mojo if Mojo refused the additional coverage. ASI appealed the trial court s decision. On appeal, ASI argued that it was neither required to offer increased UM/UIM coverage to Mojo nor to obtain a rejection from Mojo in the endorsement or renewal. The appellate court analyzed Section 143A-2 of the Insurance Code and the court noted that in a case where the insured has elected to purchase limits of uninsured motorist coverage which are less than bodily injury limits, or has chosen to reject limits in excess of those required by law, the insurer need not provide in any renewal coverage in excess of that which was elected by the insured, unless the insured subsequently makes a specific request for increased coverage. In this case, Mojo s original policy with ASI contained a specific rejection by Mojo of an increase in UM coverage in excess of $20,000/$40,000. It is undisputed that Mojo specifically rejected UM and UIM insurance in excess of the statutory minimum in the original policy. Subsequently, Mojo requested an increase in liability limits, which were reflected in the endorsement, but Mojo did not make a specific request for additional UM/UIM coverage. The court noted that even if Mojo did request an increase in liability limits, the endorsement did not trigger the statutory requirement to obtain a new rejection. Section 143A-2 states that an endorsement is not a separate policy requiring an additional rejection; rather, it is merely an amendment to a policy rather than a new policy itself. The court thus found that the requirements of section 143A-2 were not implicated at the time of the endorsement even though the endorsement increased the limits of liability coverage in the original policy. The court held that the applicable policy was Mojo s renewal; therefore, the issue was whether ASI was required to obtain a new rejection in conjunction with the renewal. The court stressed the commonalties between the original policy and the renewal, and rejected the significance of the increase in liability limits, before holding that the renewal would not be reformed as the trial court held it would be. It specifically rejected the trial court s heavy reliance on the Nicholson decision in which the court held that a renewal policy containing a material change to the terms of the previous policy could not simply be designated as a continuation of the previous policy, but must instead be seen as a new policy requiring the insurer to offer UM/UIM coverage equal to the amount of liability coverage. Nicholson was not controlling or persuasive in the context of this case because the Nicholson court interpreted the pre-2004 version of the statute. This Alshwaiyet court held that section 143A-2 of the Illinois Insurance Code no longer requires an insurer to offer UM coverage in an amount matching liability limits. The reasoning of the Nicholson court could not be extended to the endorsement in this case, nor could it be extended to the renewal policy at issue. The court found that the endorsement was a part of the F-11

12 original policy and did not constitute a separate policy requiring a new offer and rejection of increased UM/UIM coverage. The court further found that the renewal policy at issue in this case merely incorporated the increased liability limits that had already been added to the original policy by the endorsement, so it did not require a new rejection. The court held that pursuant to the 2004 statutory exception, ASI was not required in the endorsement or renewal to offer or provide any greater UM/UIM coverage than the minimum amounts contained in the original policy because Mojo did not specifically request it after originally rejecting UM coverage greater than $20,000/$40,000. The trial court s decision to reform the renewal to provide for $500,000 in UM/UIM coverage was thereby reversed. F-12

13 Dana J. Hughes - Associate Dana concentrates her practice on protecting the rights of employers at the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission and in state and federal courts, including employment, third party, and subrogation claims. Dana's civil practice also includes defending businesses and individuals in property damage claims, motor vehicle accidents, construction and premises liability cases. Born and raised in Rockford, Dana joined the firm's Rockford office as an associate in She is an active member in the Winnebago County Bar Association, formerly serving on its Board of Directors. Currently, Dana is a member of the association's Diversity Committee as well as the firm's Diversity Committee. Dana is an annual contributor to the firm's claims handling seminar publication and the firm's monthly publication devoted to workers' compensation issues, Below the Red Line. She has contributed to in-house newsletters for clients and has presented before the ISBA's Insurance Law Section. She has been a guest speaker to local community college and high school students on topics such as leadership and the practice of law. Dana serves as an arbitrator for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit's Court-Annexed Arbitration System. Public Speaking Social Media: A New Litigation Tool? Winnebago County Bar Association s Trial Section (2012) Uninsured & Underinsured Motorist Coverage ISBA Insurance Law Section (2011) Professional Associations Winnebago County Bar Association (Board of Directors, ) Illinois State Bar Association Court Admissions State Courts of Illinois United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois Education Juris Doctor (Cum Laude), Northern Illinois University College of Law, 2006 Bachelor of Arts-Sociology, Northern Illinois University, 2003 While in law school, Dana was a student representative to the Illinois State Bar Association. She served as a judicial law clerk in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. She was member of the NIU Law Review, where her writing was published in the Northern Illinois University Law Review and Kane County Bar Journal. Dana was also recipient of the Women's Bar Foundation's scholarship, which is awarded to a select group of female law students. F-13 Learn more about our speakers at