Evacuation and Rescue in the Barents Sea

Transcription

1 Evacuation and Rescue in the Barents Sea Critical issues for safe petroleum activity Master Thesis University of Stavanger July 2012 Sigurd R Jacobsen

2 UNIVERSITETET I STAVANGER MASTERGRADSSTUDIUM I RISIKOSTYRING OG SIKKERHETSLEDELSE MASTEROPPGAVE SEMESTER: Vår 2012 FORFATTER: Sigurd Robert Jacobsen VEILEDER: Professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad TITTEL PÅ MASTEROPPGAVE: Evacuation and Rescue in the Barents Sea, Critical issues for safe petroleum activity EMNEORD/STIKKORD: Beredskap, evakuering, redning, helikopter, livbåt, beredskapsfartøy, barrierer, risikoanalyse Emergency preparedness, evacuation, rescue, helicopter, lifeboat, emergency response vessel, barriers, bow tie, risk analysis SIDETALL: referanser og vedlegg STAVANGER..S.R.Jacobsen 17. juli

3 1 PREFACE The objective of the report Major contents of the report Disclaimer 5 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to others who have assisted and contributed Thanks to supervisor Thanks to sponsors 6 3 ABSTRACT A briefing on the objective of the work Information about the limitations of the report A briefing of the methods that are used The most important results Major findings and conclusions Recommendations for further work 9 4 INTRODUCTION Problem Reasons for choice of problem A brief description of the methods The limitations of the report Government premises for the area Regulatory requirements Requirements set by industry bodies History of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea The 22 nd concession round 17 5 METHODS (incl. theory) AND MATERIALS (background/facts) Introduction to methods employed for analysis Research design Review of the strength and weaknesses of the selected methods Reliability and validity of data Use of interviews Use of literature Bow Tie analysis Networks Use of calculations Risk management Risk analysis Emergency preparedness Risk communication Process risk analysis, risk communication, risk perception Barriers Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Evacuation Rescue 39 2

4 5.5 Barents Sea concerns as identified by others Barents Sea Climate Air temperature Sea temperature Visibility Sea conditions Wind Polar Lows Sea ice and icebergs Summary of main meteorological features Barents Sea Climate The Future Other specific features of the Barents Sea Icing on vessels Icing on aircraft Darkness Weather forecasting Radio communication at high latitudes Infrastructure, Facilities and Resources Helicopter operations Calculations Great circle calculations Effects of wind on helicopter ground speed Effects of cold on health Survival in cold water 69 6 ANALYSIS & RESULTS Barrier analysis of Medevac Barrier analysis of helicopter in sea Barrier analysis of lifeboat evacuation Evacuation Rescue Helicopter transport Helicopter coverage Effects of wind on helicopter flight Analysis of rescue capability en route for long-range locations Trial of immersion suit Medical doctor onboard facilities Operational planning Selection of personnel for work in the Barents Sea Critical issues related to helicopter transport, evacuation and rescue Risk management CONCLUSIONS Evacuation Rescue Medical resources Regulatory requirements 140 3

5 7.5 Risk communication and risk perception Final conclusion Recommendations REFERENCES APPENDICIES 150 A.1 Abbreviations 151 A.2 Beaufort scale 153 A.3 Polar lows in Barents Sea 2000 to A.4 Ice accretion on aircraft, statistics for route Hammerfest to Bjørnøya 156 A.5 Overview of exploration activity 1980 to A.6 22 nd licence round 159 A.7 Network facility evacuation 161 A.8 Calculations of helicopter ground speed taking into account the effect of wind 164 A.9 Calculation of helicopter round trip between Berlevåg and 74,5 N/37 E 165 4

6 1 PREFACE 1.1 The objective of the report Exploration for petroleum resources is increasing in the Barents Sea. Optimism is rising due to recent hydrocarbon discoveries on Skrugard, Havis and Norvarg and the agreement with Russia regarding the border at sea. There will potentially be all year activity in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea. Norwegian petroleum regulations require that personnel on a facility can be evacuated quickly and efficiently to a safe area at all times, Activity Regulation 77 d) [11], and in all weather conditions, Facilities Regulation 44 [12]. The objective of this thesis is to examine limitations and critical issues for emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea. The following hypothesis will be investigated: All year petroleum activity is not possible in the Barents Sea with regard to emergency preparedness unless sufficient attention is given to critical factors influencing evacuation and rescue. 1.2 Major contents of the report The report considers the Barents Sea area from the Norwegian coast to Bjørnøya in the north and the border with Russia in the east. Background information on the climate conditions in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea and special features of the area are presented. Use of helicopters, emergency response vessels, fast recovery daughter craft, man overboard boats, lifeboats and survival suits for evacuation and rescue purposes are discussed in order to identify critical issues with regard to successful and sound operations. 1.3 Disclaimer Although being an employee of the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority, views expressed in this thesis are not to be regarded as the view of the authorities. All views and interpretations of regulations expressed in this thesis are those of the author. Notes: 1. The use of [#] in this report indicates a document listed in the reference list in section The use of italics indicates that the text is quoted from the referenced document. 5

7 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2.1 Thanks to others who have assisted and contributed This thesis would not have been possible to write without support and assistance from many persons, colleagues and organisations who have willingly and enthusiastically engaged in discussion to provide experience and details related to operations in the Barents Sea. Members of 330 squadron at Banak who provided a unique insight into the challenges of flying Sea King helicopters on rescue missions in the Norwegian and Barents Sea. Representatives at the Joint Rescue and Co-ordination Centre in Bodø for setting aside time to share information related to rescue missions in a remote and harsh corner of the world. Erik Hamremoen, Statoil, for information related to helicopter operations in general and in the Barents Sea in particular. Svein Ove Roald, helicopter rescue man and fellow student, for valuable insights into the challenges posed to this occupation. Fellow course participants on Enjoy the cold, Svalbard, in March 2012, who allowed the use of temperature logs from trials of immersions suits. John Arne Ask, principal engineer, Petroleum Safety Authority, for reviewing the work done on immersion suit trials. Representatives of Transocean, Noreco and SAFE who provided interviews and experience with operations in the Barents Sea. Representatives of Simon Møkster Shipping who provided useful critique of the rescue scheme for long haul flights in the Barents Sea. I must also thank my wife, Eli, for support, commenting this document to help make it comprehensible and keeping our home operating for the last 6 months. From the autumn it is my turn to do the same for her as she embarks on her master s degree. 2.2 Thanks to supervisor Professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad, University of Stavanger, who has shown a keen interest in this work and provided excellent guidance and encouragement. 2.3 Thanks to sponsors The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority who, together with the University in Stavanger, has developed this course and sponsored my participation leading to a master s degree. 6

8 3 ABSTRACT 3.1 A briefing on the objective of the work All year petroleum activity is not possible in the Barents Sea with regard to emergency preparedness unless sufficient attention is given to critical factors influencing evacuation and rescue. The objective of this thesis is to examine conditions relevant to evacuation and rescue of personnel from facilities operating in the Barents Sea. We are concerned with the boundary between situations that we can manage within emergency preparedness, procedures, technology and the situations where we may not be able to expect success. Certain situations may not be covered by emergency preparedness procedures due to conscious decisions that are made in the process of risk and emergency preparedness analysis, the selection of acceptance criteria and situations of hazard and accident. Limiting factors can be identified within the areas of human, technology, operational or organisational perspectives. Experts are normally aware of the limitations that are designed into the system. Limitations should be dealt with openly and honestly within a risk management regime. 3.2 Information about the limitations of the report The report considers the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea north of the Norwegian mainland, south of Bjørnøya and extending eastwards towards the Norwegian/Russian border that came into effect in This corresponds roughly to the area that is open for exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea. 3.3 A briefing of the methods that are used Emergency preparedness for the petroleum activity in the Barents Sea is examined based on: Risk management theory: Risk Analysis, ALARP, Emergency Preparedness Analysis and Defined Situations of Hazard and Accident (DSHA). Examination of literature pertaining to emergency preparedness and survival in cold climates and remote areas. Performing analysis of barriers using event trees, bow ties and networks to identify critical issues related to successful emergency preparedness. Examination of information gathered from relevant accident investigation reports related to maritime and aviation accidents. 7

9 Performing interviews to gather experience from operations in the Barents Sea and to triangulate the results of analysis and calculations. Performing example calculations relevant to evacuation and rescue. 3.4 The most important results Every effort should be made to prevent the need for emergency preparedness resources and if required, evacuation, survival and rescue equipment should perform satisfactorily in order to eliminate or reduce injury and loss of life. Weather conditions in the Barents Sea are such that certain critical technical solutions may not be appropriate in some circumstances. Immersions suits are critical to survival of persons in the sea and should be used with caution outside of the design envelope. Helicopters are equipped with floatation systems that may be insufficient in sea states that are currently accepted for transport flights. It can be difficult to rescue persons from lifeboats in harsh weather and this may pose an extra threat to survival if ice accretion threatens the stability of the vessels. The useful operational window of equipment and a person s ability to use the equipment should be known and activities should be planned within this envelope. 3.5 Major findings and conclusions The lack of infrastructure and long distances combined with the climatic conditions of the Barents Sea lead to challenges that require special consideration and management. Performance requirements related to medical evacuation of ill or injured persons will be challenged as activity moves further north and away from mainland Norway. Compensating measures will need to be implemented to ensure that the need for emergency preparedness resources is reduced at the same time as improving access to these resources as the need cannot be eliminated. As work has progressed on this thesis, it has become increasingly clear that it is insufficient to only consider the traditional regimes of emergency preparedness within the area of evacuation and rescue. In the case of an accident involving many injured persons, there is a challenge with regard to the capacity of the public health services in Northern Norway. This is further aggravated by large distances and limited resources for transportation. In order to prevent the loss of life, the availability of emergency health services onshore must be considered when evaluating the total acceptability of petroleum operations in the Barents Sea. 8

10 Increased awareness of the physical and psychological limitations of a person and the limitations of evacuation, survival and rescue equipment is required combined with improved planning of activities based on this knowledge. Departure criteria for helicopter transport should be developed to ensure a reasonable prospect of rescue under the prevailing conditions during the flight. Ice accretion remains an issue that requires attention particularly for emergency response vessels, lifeboats, fast recovery daughter craft and man overboard boats. Emergency response vessels should be designed to retrieve lifeboats from the sea in a broad range of sea conditions and as far as reasonably practicable be able to perform this operation close to the limit of the conditions that can be anticipated. Improved access to medical assistance onboard the facility is required due to distance and unpredictable weather conditions. Improved health requirements and screening of personnel who will work on facilities in the Barents Sea is recommended. All year activity everywhere in the Barents Sea is only possible if comprehensive risk analysis is performed, the ALARP process applied and necessary measures are put in place to compensate for the specific challenges of the area. 3.6 Recommendations for further work Research helicopter ditching and accidents in the sea to identify critical issues related to escape and survival in order to improve helicopter underwater escape training. Research voluntary safety training involving developing tolerance to cold water and dealing with a stressful environment during escape from a helicopter and subsequent survival in the sea. Evaluate the benefits compared to current helicopter underwater escape training. Develop a decision support tool based on a comprehensive set of departure criteria for helicopter flights. Develop a civilian helicopter in flight refuelling system (HIFR) suited for use in the Arctic. Develop suitable methods for evacuation in cold climates where sea conditions can vary from calm to violent storm or even hurricane in open water conditions to many varieties of ice types and cover. 9

11 4 INTRODUCTION There is an assumption that a large part of the world's undiscovered petroleum resources are located in the Arctic. This has caused increasing interest in the High North. The Barents Sea in particular is one of the areas where it is expected to find large petroleum resources [27 p12], and petroleum related activity is increasing in the Barents Sea. Optimism is rising due to recent hydrocarbon discoveries on Skrugard, Havis and Norvarg, the agreement reached for the border with Russia, the planned start of production on Goliat 2013 and the announcement of the 22nd concession round in Norway. There will potentially be all year activities (year round exploration activity & permanent production installations: subsea, floating or fixed) in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea. 4.1 Problem Hypothesis: All year petroleum activity is not possible everywhere in the Barents Sea with regard to emergency preparedness unless sufficient attention is given to critical factors influencing evacuation and rescue. What critical factors influence emergency preparedness, rescue operations and survival in the Barents Sea? Can these critical factors be managed effectively? The critical factors and limitations are evaluated in a human, technology, operational and organisational perspective. Humans: A person can limit successful emergency preparedness operations because they are not able to use the equipment properly (lack of competence). There may be reasons (individual, mental and physical strength) that make them unable to use the equipment or act correctly under prevailing conditions in an emergency situation. Human limitation is of particular concern in the case of cold weather and winter darkness. Technology: Emergency equipment has inherent technical limitations. Safe and successful use of the equipment cannot be guaranteed if used outside the design envelope. Operations: Operational measures and procedures are often defined in order to increase safety. If these are violated or the assumptions are neglected, they may no longer provide the intended protection. Organisation: The organisation sets the framework within which humans (H) operate (O) equipment (T). The decisions made within an organisation have a direct impact on the performance and safety level of the organisation. For example, the organisation, during risk 10

12 management processes, may choose not to have emergency preparedness for rare events. This is a conscious decision that defines a limiting condition for performance in given situations. 4.2 Reasons for choice of problem The objective of this thesis is to examine conditions relevant to evacuation and rescue of personnel from facilities operating in the Barents Sea. The boundary between situations that can be managed within emergency preparedness procedures and technology and the situations where failure may be expected are of interest when making decisions to perform an operation. Certain situations are not covered by emergency preparedness procedures due to conscious decisions that are made in the process of risk and emergency preparedness analysis and the selection of acceptance criteria and situations of hazard and accident. Other limiting factors can be identified within the areas of human, technology, operational or organisational perspectives. Experts are normally aware of the limitations that are designed into the system. These limitations are not necessarily well communicated to society but may be exposed in the case of an accident. This may lead to a media crisis and public outrage if an accident should occur and emergency preparedness appears insufficient compared to society s expectations. Limitations should be dealt with openly and honestly in a risk management regime. 4.3 A brief description of the methods Emergency preparedness for petroleum activity in the Barents Sea is analysed with regard to issues that may be critical to success during all year operations. A study of search and rescue (SAR) in the United Kingdom using a Bayesian Belief Network has been used as a basis when starting to identify critical issues. This has been compared with literature regarding emergency preparedness, survival in cold climates and remote areas and information gathered from relevant accident investigation reports related to maritime and aviation accidents. The results of risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis have been used to identify situations that occur and need to be planned for in order to avoid the loss of life. Incidents or defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA) that have occurred and unfortunately, occur with a significant frequency are investigated. Accident investigation reports are reviewed to gather information that is critical to evacuation, rescue and ultimately survival. The findings from these activities have been used in analysis of barriers using bow ties and 11

13 event trees to identify critical issues related to successful emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea. Calculations have been performed to investigate issues affecting the availability and capacity of rescue resources for incidents that may occur far from shore. Interviews have been used to gather experience from persons who are familiar with operations and conditions in the Barents Sea. The interviews have been used to triangulate and test the results of analysis and calculations. Finally some recommendations are offered to improve the overall probability of survival and success in emergency preparedness operations in a remote area and a cold climate. 4.4 The limitations of the report This report concentrates on the phases of evacuation and rescue. Escape within or on a facility to the location of the means of evacuation is considered being outside of the scope of work. The area considered is limited to the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea south of Bjørnøya and extending eastwards towards the Norwegian/Russian border. This area is enclosed by the red and blue lines as shown on the map in figure 1. Figure 1, Map of the area and the Norwegian/Russian border in the Barents Sea [78 & 87] The border between the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea is defined by the International Hydrographic Organization as a line joining the southernmost point of West Spitzbergen to North Cape of Bear Island, through this island to Cape Bull and thence on to North Cape in 12

14 Norway at 27 45'E [98]. In this report, the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea is defined as the area from 15 E to the Norwegian/Russian border at 37 E and from 70 N to the latitude of Bjørnøya at 74,5 N. This corresponds roughly to the area of the south western Barents Sea that is or will soon be opened for petroleum activities [87]. The Norwegian/Russian border from the coast through the Barents Sea to the North Pole has been disputed for approximately 40 years. In September 2010 the border dispute between Norway and Russia was resolved and an agreement was signed [78]. The border is shown as the blue line in figure 1. Methods for anti-icing, protecting vessels and structures against ice accretion, and for the removal of ice, de-icing, are not discussed in detail this thesis. Information on this subject is available in the following documents: Assessment of Superstructure ice protection as Applied to Offshore Oil Operations Safety, Charles Ryerson, April 2009 [55] Secure launch of lifeboats in cold climate, looking into requirements for winterisation, S. Torheim and O.T. Gudmestad, 2011, [43] 4.5 Government premises for the area The Norwegian government has stated its visions, ambitions and strategies for the High North and the petroleum industry in a white paper to Parliament in 2012 [28]. In addition to the regulations, important documents, for example white papers to Parliament, have been published which define frame conditions [27-33]. It is important to bear this in mind when evaluating evacuation and rescue in the Barents Sea. The petroleum sector is one of the most important industries in Norway. The petroleum industry is characterised by high risk potential for harm to persons, the environment and material assets. After the Alexander Kielland accident in 1980, there has been consensus in government and the petroleum industry that the activity must be performed with the lowest possible reasonable risk of injury and accidents. The Norwegian government s Soria Moria declaration of 2005 stated that the petroleum industry in Norway should be world leaders in the area of Health, Safety and Environment. This vision reflects and reinforces long and systematic work to strengthen HSE in the sector [27]. Management There is a regulatory requirement that the activities shall be carried out in a prudent manner based both on an individual and an overall assessment of all factors of relevance for planning and implementation with regard to health, safety and the environment. A high level for health, 13

15 safety and the environment shall be established, maintained and further developed, cf. Frame Regulation 10 [9]. The key requirement to further develop and continuously improve the level of health, safety and environment is well known and an established principle for the petroleum industry [27 p280]. The Norwegian Ministry of Labour underpins that the principles of holistic management and continuous improvement are two particularly important preconditions for achieving improvements in the safety level [27 p280]. Visions for the High North The high north is Norway s most important strategic priority for foreign policy. The key foreign policy objectives in the high north are to safeguard peace, stability and predictability and to ensure a comprehensive ecosystem based management protecting biodiversity and thereby providing a basis for sustainable exploitation of resources [28 p19]. It is Norway s ambition to be a leader in key areas of wealth creation in the north and the best steward of the environment and resource exploitation in the north. This requires close interaction between national, regional and local authorities, businesses and relevant research institutions [28 p20]. The Government will facilitate the development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea and ensure that the activities will have positive implications for local and regional wealth creation. It is important that there is a good basis for sound resource management and sustainable development in this region. This demands high standards of health, safety and environment, that Norway is a leader in research and development and use of technological solutions offshore, and that Norway has robust oil spill response and search and rescue capacity [28 p110&111]. Evacuation The regulations stipulate that it should be possible to evacuate personnel from the facilities to a safe area quickly and effectively under all weather conditions. The Ministry of Labour emphasizes that it is important that all personnel on board facilities are to be evacuated quickly in a dangerous situation, regardless of weather, and will ensure that the PSA follows up the issue [27 p301]. Emergency preparedness in the High North The Arctic is a region characterized by long distances, difficult climate and relatively few rescue resources. Three factors are therefore essential. First the prevention of accidents is important because the consequences for personnel and the environment may be greater with 14

16 accidents in the North. Secondly, cooperation between countries is essential for the effective utilization of available rescue resources and to execute rescue as quickly as possible. Finally, it is important to note that time factors, distances and the climate will render certain actions impossible, no matter how large resources are provided for emergency services. It is therefore important that participating companies and their sector organizations work systematically to reduce the risk of accidents and in the event of an incident are able to handle deal with a crisis with their own resources to a greater extent than is necessary in other sea areas. The Government wants to promote transparency concerning the challenges, development of knowledge and experience transfer [28 p101]. Summary of visions, ambitions, goals and strategies The Barents Sea (High North) is a prioritised area of strategic importance to Norway. Norwegian petroleum industry shall be world leaders in HSE. It is Norway s ambition to be a leader in key areas of wealth creation in the north and the best steward of the environment and resource exploitation in the north. The industry shall further develop and continuously improve the level of health, safety and environment. All personnel on board facilities are to be evacuated quickly in a dangerous situation, regardless of weather. The Government wants to promote transparency concerning the challenges, development of knowledge and experience transfer. The industry shall work systematically to reduce the risk of accidents and be able to handle (resolve/deal with) a crisis with their own resources. 4.6 Regulatory requirements Unless specifically stated, reference to regulations in this thesis means the common Norwegian HSE regulations issued jointly by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), the Norwegian Climate and Pollution Agency (CPA) and Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (BHS). The combined regulations are comprised of the Framework Regulation [9], the Management Regulation [10], the Activities Regulation [11] and the Facilities Regulation [12]. The overruling requirement is that all activities shall be performed in a prudent manner as stipulated in the Frame Regulation 10 [9] 15

17 The activities shall be prudent, based both on an individual and an overall assessment of all factors of relevance for planning and implementation of the activities as regards health, safety and the environment. Consideration shall also be given to the specific nature of the activities, local conditions and operational assumptions. A high level for health, safety and the environment shall be established, maintained and further developed. The Norwegian regulations are built around the requirement of functionality. The regulations refer to industry standards and norms where the authorities have found that the safety level required by the regulation can be met by using the referenced standard. This is a principle laid down in the Frame Regulation 24 [9]. 4.7 Requirements set by industry bodies When the responsible party uses a standard referenced in the guidelines to the regulations, it can normally be assumed that the regulatory requirements have been met [9]. It is in the industries own interest to develop standards that the authorities can refer to in the guidelines to the regulations. Some of the most commonly referenced standards and norms are the international standards developed by ISO and the Norwegian standards developed by the Petroleum industry and known as Norsok standards. In addition, the industry has developed guidelines through the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). These guidelines are normally not referred to in the regulations but are an important contribution to a common set of requirements for the industry. The OLF guidelines for emergency preparedness and for helicopter operations are referred to in this thesis. 4.8 History of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea The information in this section is the result of an analysis of Barents Sea exploration well data gathered from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate s fact pages on Internet [92]. Background information for this section is provided in appendix A.4. Exploration in the Norwegian sector of the Barents began on 1st June 1980 with Treasure Seeker drilling well 7120/12-1 for Norsk Hydro. The well was permanently abandoned as dry with weak hydrocarbon shows on 12 th October 1980 Exploration in the Barents Sea was a summer activity from the first exploration wells in 1980 until During this period there were normally two or more rigs drilling in the region. This period has been the most active exploration period so far. Ross Rig and Polar Pioneer 16

18 were the first rigs with a full winter drilling program starting in the winter of 1987/1988. From 1987 until 1994 exploration became an all year activity but predominantly a winter activity. Normally there was one rig active, occasionally two in this period. After a period of low or no exploration from 1994 to 2004, exploration is increasing. In the period from 2000 to 2011, exploration has been an all year activity. Predominantly there has only been one rig active at a time, drilling being performed mainly in autumn and winter. There is all year production on the subsea Snøhvit field, started in The first manned production installation will be the Goliat FPSO planned to be installed in New field developments can be expected in the near future for the Skrugard and Havis fields. As a curiosity it can be mentioned that the exploration well drilled furthest from mainland Norway in the Barents Sea was operated by Norsk Hydro using Polar Pioneer in 1992 on block 7316/5-1. The well location was N, E, ca 217 NM or 402 km from Hammerfest. 4.9 The 22 nd concession round On the 2 nd November 2011, qualified companies were invited to nominate blocks of interest for the 22 nd concession round. The Norwegian oil and energy minister, Ola Borten Moe, announced at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø in January 2012 that interest was particularly high for the Barents Sea. A total of 181 blocks were nominated in this area, the highest number ever [79]. In this nomination, there has been particular interest in our northern seas, which confirms the Barents Sea as an exciting and internationally attractive petroleum province. This represents a great opportunity for the entire region. Exploration of all opened areas is also very important to achieve further activity, employment and spin-offs in all of Norway, said the oil and energy minister, Ola Borten Moe [79]. A total of 37 companies have nominated blocks on the Norwegian continental shelf and the Barents Sea. The Norwegian Oil and Energy department (OED) has reduced the number of blocks from the nominated 181 to 72 open for application. OED has mainly concentrated on blocks that are of interest to more than one operator. A number of the blocks are at or beyond 200 NM from Hammerfest. Maps are included in appendix A.6. The invitation to apply for participation in blocks in the 22 nd round was announced on 26 th June 2012 and the granting of new licenses is scheduled for the spring of 2013 [80]. 17

19 In connection with the announcement of opening the 22 nd concession round for application, the oil and energy minister, Ola Borten Moe said, We are now experiencing record levels of interest in the Barents Sea. With 72 of a total of 86 open blocks the Barents Sea stands out as the sea of opportunity in the 22 nd round. We have had very encouraging exploration results, and I will now give the industry access to new areas related to these discoveries [80]. 18

20 5 METHODS (incl. theory) AND MATERIALS (background/facts) 5.1 Introduction to methods employed for analysis Emergency preparedness for petroleum activities in the Barents Sea is examined based on: Risk management theory: Risk Analysis, ALARP, Emergency Preparedness Analysis and Defined Situations of Hazard and Accident (DSHA). Examination of literature pertaining to emergency preparedness and survival in cold climates and remote areas. Performing analysis of barriers using event trees, bow ties and networks to identify critical issues related to successful emergency preparedness. Examination of information gathered from relevant accident investigation reports related to maritime and aviation accidents. Performing interviews to gather experience from operations in the Barents Sea. This information is used to triangulate results of analysis and calculations. Performing example calculations relevant to evacuation from facilities far from shore Research design Qualitative scenario analysis is used as the main research method in this thesis. Bow tie analysis, supported by event trees and influence networks have been used to examine the effects of findings in literature and interviews when applied to specific scenarios Review of the strength and weaknesses of the selected methods The main analysis in this thesis is performed using event trees and bow ties to identify critical issues. The analysis has been performed with a basis in literature and interviews with personnel who have experience from the Barents Sea. A qualitative approach has been used rather than quantitative. This approach has been chosen because the goal has been to screen the information to identify critical issues that should be given consideration when planning petroleum activity in the Barents Sea. A more detailed qualitative and quantitative approach should be employed by those venturing into the Barents Sea to identify issues and optimise the choice of solutions through risk analysis and ALARP process. The quality of the work done in this thesis may have been improved if it had concentrated on one detailed analysis rather than on three situations and a proposal for rescue on long haul routes. The work in this thesis is potentially too broad to give an in depth insight into specific issues. However, the author considers that attention drawn to specific issues is documented, 19

21 justified and does provide a basis for increased awareness of challenges to evacuation and rescue in petroleum activity in the Barents Sea Reliability and validity of data When performing interviews with persons involved in the petroleum industry, trade unions and search and rescue organisations, it has been made clear that a student is enquiring about relevant issues and that information provided is for the student s thesis and not to an employee of the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). Even though an attempt has been made to keep the two different roles of the author separate, it cannot be ruled out that the response to the questions has been influenced by the fact that the student is an employee of the Norwegian authorities. There is, however, no reason to believe that information has been withheld or that incorrect information has been provided. When considering information found in investigation reports from previous accidents, it is important to be aware of the relevance of the information in today s operations. There have been many improvements made to equipment, personnel competence and the way in which operations are performed today. The information gathered from investigation reports has been of a generic nature related to the challenges posed during evacuation and rescue. The aim has been to evaluate issues related to methods and operations that are relevant independently of a specific make of equipment. Another issue that needs to be addressed is the experience that the author has gained from working with these issues in the capacity of an employee of the PSA. It cannot be ruled out that the author has been influenced in discussions with colleagues at the PSA and his supervisor at the University of Stavanger. It is difficult to separate oneself from the experience one has and the knowledge base that has been developed. There is a danger that the author is biased and interprets findings in light of prior knowledge rather than taking a broad and open look at the collected data. A final comment needs to be made concerning the authors background as an engineer rather than a social scientist. This may lead to a bias towards placing greater emphasis on technical aspects rather than the role of social issues like the role people, operations and organisations play in robust evacuation and rescue systems. 20

22 5.1.4 Use of interviews Interviews have been conducted with personnel working at the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre in Bodø, members of the crew on the Sea King rescue helicopter stationed at Banak and Sola, personnel responsible for helicopter operations a petroleum company, personnel responsible for HSE in a trade union, personnel in a drilling entrepreneur company, an operating company and personnel with experience in operation of emergency response vessels. These persons have a considerable combined experience of issues that are important to both emergency preparedness and helicopter operations in the Barents Sea. They have provided valuable insights into the specifics of the problems examined in this thesis Use of literature There is extensive literature available covering specific issues related to operation in cold climates, the Barents Sea and issues related to survival at sea after marine or aviation accidents. As far as possible, it has been an objective to confirm information found in literature sources through interviews with persons familiar with operation in the Barents Sea. The documents that are used as a source of information in this thesis are listed in the reference section. Some of the most important documents that have been used in order to triangulate and verify critical issues regarding survival and rescue of persons at sea and in cold climates are listed below: Frank Golden, Michael Tipton, 2002, Essentials of Sea Survival, Human Kinetics [7] Lisa Norrington, John Quigley, Ashley Russell, Robert Van der Meer, 2008, Modelling the reliability of search and rescue operations with Bayesian Belief Networks, Reliability Engineering and System Safety no. 93 p [44] CAP 641 Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival, Civil Aviation Authority, First published February 1995 [63] Cold challenges, Health and working environment on facilities in northern areas, 2010, Thelma/PSA [45] Work by Golden and Tipton [7] is referenced in the Thelma [45] and NATO [26] documents reducing independence between sources to some extent. The following documents are not used directly as references in this thesis, however they provide useful background information supporting the issues discussed. International Maritime Organisation (IMO), May 2006, Guide for cold water survival, MSC.1/Circ.1185, Ref: T2/6.01 [25] 21

23 NATO Research and Technology Organisation, February 2008, Survival at Sea for Mariners, Aviators and Search and Rescue Personnel, RTO-AG-HFM-152 [26] Bow Tie analysis The Bow Tie method and its associated diagrams will be used to analyse barriers in place to ensure that threats, hazards and consequences are managed. The bow tie method has been developed by combining fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and the concept of barriers Networks Lisa Norrington, John Quigley, Ashley Russel and Robert van der Meer have published a paper Modelling the reliability of search and rescue operations with Bayesian Belief Networks. It considers the effectiveness of Search and Rescue operations coordinated by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency [44]. Figure 2, Bayesian Belief Network used in analysis of UK marine rescue centres [44] They have used the method to evaluate the probability of success of a search and rescue operation in light of a reorganisation of the Main Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) in the UK. The probability of success of a search and rescue operation has, however not been calculated in this thesis. The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) in figure 2 above has been used as a starting point to identify and evaluate critical issues that have an effect on the outcome of 22

24 evacuation and rescue operations in the Barents Sea. The network provides a basis to explore relevant issues influencing the processes of evacuation and rescue. These issues are explored in section 6 using event trees and bow tie diagrams to identify barriers to protect against negative development of situations of hazard Use of calculations Great circle routes providing the shortest distance between to points are used. In the cases where distances have been analysed, the Haversine formula [93] is used to calculate the distance and the heading. The calculations have been verified by using an Internet program [94] based on the Vincenty method of great circle calculation [56]. The effect of wind on the helicopter trajectory has also been considered and calculation of the ground speed based on air speed and wind speed has been performed. The position of airports is taken from Airport- Data.com on Internet [96] 5.2 Risk management Risk analysis In this thesis, emphasis is placed on some processes within risk management without covering all aspects of the concept. The focus is on risk analysis, acceptance criteria, defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA) and the concept of ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable). Risk is a natural part of society and is controlled through risk management processes. We cannot choose to live without risk and therefore, we define an acceptable level for the residual risk that we cannot remove. Risk analysts may approach risk with a scientific rationality, while ordinary persons, those who must live with decisions based on the mechanical and mathematical results of risk analysis, have a perception of the risk. A person s perception is often complicated and based on a variety of issues that are difficult to define with numbers. Risk perception has to do with how individuals understand, experience and deal with risk. Risk has to do with all aspects of a person s perception of danger and hazards, the consequences the hazards may lead to and what they consider to be acceptable risk levels [1 p40]. Risk acceptance criteria (RAC) are defined in advance of a risk analysis process. RAC set the upper limit of risk that will be accepted. They are also used as a decision basis when evaluating choice of solutions and risk mitigation measures. Acceptance criteria are usually 23

25 defined for risk of loss or damage to persons, environmental and economic values [1 p153]. It is normal to define a lower limit of risk. If the results of the risk analysis calculations in a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) fall below the lower limit, the risk level is considered as negligible. The area between the upper and lower risk acceptance level define the ALARP area. Risks that fall within this range should be dealt with employing risk-reducing measures. Risk reducing measures should be identified and implemented to reduce the risk level in the ALARP area unless there is a disproportionately large negative relationship between the benefits (risk reduction) and disadvantages (cost or practical) to achieve reduction [4 p118]. Figure 3 Risk acceptance criteria and the ALARP principle Most persons have a relationship to risk and risk acceptance criteria. In the simplest form, we have an opinion about the "chances" that we are willing to take. It can be anything from buying a lottery ticket to investing large sums of money on the share market (economic risk), or cycling to work or participating in an extreme sport like skydiving (risk of personal injury or even death). Risk analysis is based on generic statistical information of events at similar facilities or activities that are to be analysed. Based on this information and taking into account plantspecific factors (e.g. safety systems) a prediction of the probability of events occurring at the facility being analysed is calculated. This is not an exact science because one cannot predict the future of the plant by analyzing possible scenarios and potential outcomes. The results of a risk analysis are an estimate of the future, the plant's history cannot be written in advance. According to Aven et.al., "It is important to distinguish between the statistical analysis of historical data, and assessments of what the world will look like in the future [1 p42]. 24

26 Based on the risk that one has chosen to accept, an assessment of potential situations of hazard and accident is performed. These situations are called defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA) and govern the design of emergency response measures that are established. If the probability of an event occurring is above a predefined level, emergency response measures need to be established in order to take care of the consequences. In this process the "worst case" events often have such a low probability that the emergency response plans are not designed to cover these rare events. Contingency plans for a worst-case event, may well be developed but the requirements set for performance of emergency response will not necessarily be met if the event occurs. An example of this would be a disaster with 1000 critically injured persons. The selection of DSHAs and associated performance requirements for emergency response measures, set significant limits on how contingency measures are dimensioned. At this stage a latent future crisis may be designed into the system if "probability" turns out not to be on our side and the "improbable" event occurs. If an accident outside of the design criteria occurs at some stage in the lifetime of the system, attention may be drawn to an apparent lack of emergency response if the limitations have not been communicated. This may occur even though the situation is handled properly within the plan, acceptance criteria and performance requirements. Figure 4 Simplified model for risk and emergency preparedness analysis The process of risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis is a requirement in the regulations, cf. Management Regulation 17 [9] and is normally performed according to the methods described in Norsok Z-13 [17]. It is important that the data used in risk analysis is relevant and qualified for the activity. Recognised sources for generic data for use in risk analysis are listed in Norsok Z-013 Annex D. This generic data may not be relevant for the Barents Sea without further qualification. Norsok Z-013 recommends the use of data from the Gulf of Mexico and the UK for helicopter transport [17 p83]. Data from the Gulf of Mexico will need to be evaluated carefully for 25

27 relevance. The UK document deals with some issues that are relevant to the Barents Sea and is a reference document in this thesis [63] Emergency preparedness An emergency is defined as a hazardous event that cannot be handled by normal measures and requires immediate action to limit its extent, duration or consequences [15]. Emergency preparedness includes all technical, operational and organisational measures to prevent a hazardous situation developing into an accident, or that prevents or reduces the harmful effects of an accident. In the petroleum industry it is common to limit emergency preparedness to the measures that are implemented under the leadership of the emergency response organisation [1 p121]. The process of risk and emergency preparedness analysis leads to defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA). The DSHAs are the hazardous and accidental events that will be used for dimensioning of emergency preparedness and the basis for the emergency preparedness plan [17]. According to the Activity Regulation 73, the responsible party, i.e. the operator, shall establish emergency preparedness measures for the DSHA s [11]. A list of typical DSHA s for operations on the Norwegian continental shelf is shown below [41]. Acute pollution to sea HC leak in process area, process fire or explosion, riser leak followed by fire/explosion Loss of well control, blowout followed by fire/explosion Fire in living quarters, electrical rooms, auxiliary equipment Falling object Personal injury/illness (Medevac) Man overboard when working over the sea Loss of control of radioactive source Ship on collision course, collision with platform supply vessel Personnel in the sea in connection with emergency evacuation Helicopter accident in the sea, helicopter accident on facility Accident with radioactive source Terror or act of sabotage Epidemic Extreme weather (forecast) There are four regions on the Norwegian continental shelf where operators have chosen to cooperate and share resources, typically helicopters and vessels. These four areas are the Southern Fields, Troll-Oseberg, Tampen and Halten. There are 7 DSHAs defined within the 26