1 Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care? Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, Chairs Dimitri K. Simes, Project Director Paul J. Saunders, Senior Advisor and Editor October 2011
3 Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care? Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, Chairs Dimitri K. Simes, Project Director Paul J. Saunders, Senior Advisor and Editor Center for the National Interest Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
4 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA Center for the National Interest 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250 Washington, DC Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Center for the National Interest. All Rights Reserved. Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care? A Report of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests
5 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs The Belfer Center is the hub of the Harvard Kennedy School s research, teaching, and training in international security affairs and diplomacy, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy. Graham Allison is the Center s director. The Center has a dual mission: (1) to provide leadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledge about the most important challenges of international security and other critical issues where science, technology, environmental policy, and international affairs intersect; and (2) to prepare future generations of leaders for these arenas. Center researchers not only conduct scholarly research, but also develop prescriptions for policy reform. Faculty and fellows analyze global challenges from nuclear proliferation and terrorism to climate change and energy policy. The Belfer Center is grateful to the Stanton Foundation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative for their support of its work on the nuclear security and arms control aspects of U.S.-Russian relations. Center for the National Interest The Center for the National Interest is a Washington-based non-partisan foreign policy research institute committed to the pragmatic analysis of U.S. foreign and security policy opportunities, challenges and options. Maurice R. Greenberg is the Center s chairman; Henry Kissinger is its honorary chairman. In addition to U.S.-Russian relations, Center programs focus on U.S. foreign policy, China, Japan, the Middle East, and Mexico as well as arms control and non-proliferation, energy and climate change, terrorism, and immigration. The Center also publishes the prominent foreign policy magazine The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest is grateful for the support of the United States Institute of Peace for its support of its work on arms control and non-proliferation in the U.S.-Russian relationship. The Center also appreciates the support of Carnegie Corporation of New York for its wider U.S.- Russian dialogue programs.
6 Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Task force members endorsed the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. They participated in the task force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. Institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only. Graham Allison Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Robert Blackwill Council on Foreign Relations Charles Boyd Center for the National Interest Richard Burt McLarty Associates James Collins Carnegie Endowment for International Peace John Deutch Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard Falkenrath Chertoff Group Thomas Graham Kissinger Associates, Inc Michael Green Center for Strategic and International Studies Maurice Greenberg C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Fiona Hill Brookings Institution Kenneth Juster Warburg Pincus Zalmay Khalilzad Khalilzad Associates LLC James Jones Jones Group International Richard Myers Kansas State University Sam Nunn Nuclear Threat Initiative Paul J. Saunders Center for the National Interest Dimitri Simes Center for the National Interest Ashley Tellis Carnegie Endowment for International Peace J. Robinson West PFC Energy Dov Zakheim Center for Strategic and International Studies Philip Zelikow University of Virginia Corcoran Department of History Simon Saradzhyan of Harvard University s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs served as a consultant during the preparation of this report.
7 Contents Executive Summary 2 Russia and U.S. National Interests 8 Introduction 8 America s Vital National Interests 8 Why Russia Matters to the United States 9 Can and Should the United States Seek to Work with Russia? 10 Russia s National Interests 16 Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Russia 18 The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Proliferation 19 Arms Control and Missile Defense 23 The United States, Russia, and Geopolitics 25 The United States, Russia, and Energy Security 27 The United States, Russia, and Counter-Terrorism 30 The United States, Russia, and Central Asia, including Afghanistan 31 The United States, Russia, and Trade and Investment 32 The United States, Russia, and Democratic Values 34 The Consequences of Failure 37 Task Force Members 38
8 Executive Summary Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia s emergence as an independent state, Moscow is no longer America s strategic rival. Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it become a friend. Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations. A better-managed bilateral relationship is critical for the advancement of America s vital national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia s President next year does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia s national interests with respect to the United States. Still, at a minimum, Russia s rhetoric vis-à-vis America and the West may become tougher under Putin. Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. policymakers. This report, the result of deliberations by a distinguished working group of former senior officials and military officers, business leaders, and top experts, analyzes the U.S.-Russia relationship through the lens of American national interests; argues that Russia is a pivotal country in promoting these U.S. national interests; and offers prescriptions for U.S. policy toward Russia in the period ahead. We believe Russia must be a top priority for the United States because its conduct can have a profound impact on America s vital national interests: Nuclear weapons Non-proliferation Counter-terrorism Geopolitics, including managing China s emergence as a global power Afghanistan Energy International finance, in the G8 and the G20 Strategic geography Reviewing these areas makes clear that Russia s choices and actions impact the full range of vital U.S. national interests significantly and directly. Few other nations are as important to the United States. 2 Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?
9 The Obama Administration s reset policy has contributed to significant improvements in the U.S.- Russian relations. Unfortunately, the reset is still fragile and what remains to be done is likely to be much more difficult than what has been accomplished so far. Twice before, under the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, the U.S.and Russia moved in the direction of a new and different relationship yet both times, the efforts stalled. In some respects, the difficulty in sustaining improvements in the U.S.-Russia relationship has had less to do with specific differences and more to do with an inability to break down lasting mutual distrust. This suspicion of one another s motives may in fact be a greater obstacle to cooperation than sometimes divergent national interests and values. Domestic politics in each country makes this even more challenging. When U.S. and Russian leaders seek to portray their improving relations as important diplomatic successes, their political opponents naturally take a contrary view. More generally, even in the absence of partisan political differences, U.S. leaders have often fueled unrealistic expectations about the U.S.-Russian relationship and developments in Russia. This leads inevitably to disillusionment and frustration that weaken any administration s ability to conduct a sustainable policy in service of U.S. national interests. Because U.S. and Russian interests and values are not aligned, and perspectives and strategies are often even farther apart, Washington and Moscow at best will make progress in some areas and see setbacks in others a reality that makes mutual trust even more important for managing differences. Finally, given the disparities between U.S. and Russian interests and governance, lasting cooperation is unlikely if not impossible without determined leadership from far-sighted leaders in the executive and legislative branches, particularly the President. And even a purposeful U.S. policy is in itself insufficient to ensure sustainable cooperation in the absence of Russian efforts to make a cooperative relationship succeed. Having worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group are painfully aware of how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be. Selected Policy Prescriptions from the Report The United States should engage Russia to develop and implement a jointly produced and concrete roadmap with a firm timeline to attaining the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium (HEU) everywhere in the world. Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report 3
10 The United States should engage Russia to orchestrate international consensus that there will be no new national HEU enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. The United States should explore with Russia a new strategic stability concept that reflects the fact that Washington and Moscow are no longer enemies prepared to destroy each other, but rather potential partners. The next round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction should combine deployed and nondeployed weapons to lower the ceiling of strategic warheads to 1,000 or fewer. In discussing tactical nuclear weapons with Russia, the United States should focus first on negotiating consolidation, transparency and verification measures rather than reductions. The United States should proceed with developing anti-missile systems in Europe and globally, in line with the realistic assessment of existing and future threats and available technologies and funds. The United States should be prepared to launch a genuine and substantive dialogue first with its NATO allies and then with Russia about a new inclusive European security system that would give Russia a meaningful voice and that would include an effective rapid response mechanism of conflict prevention, interdiction and resolution. In making major international policy decisions, the United States should consider whether U.S. actions could consolidate Russian-Chinese cooperation at the expense of wider U.S. goals. As long as it appears feasible, achieving broader U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Russia should have priority over expanding NATO membership in ways that could undermine cooperation on greater U.S. priorities. The United States should raise the priority of the U.S.-Russian energy dialogue and focus on removing obstacles to bilateral investment, trade, and research. The United States should press Russia to improve investment conditions in the energy sector and in Russia s overall economy and make clear to Moscow that mistreating U.S. and Western companies damages Russia s investment climate and international image, and is an obstacle to improving relations with the United States. The United States should strengthen joint capabilities with Russia to collect and analyze intelligence on terrorist threats, including nuclear, biological, and conventional catastrophic terrorism threats to the two nations and their allies. 4 Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?
11 The United States should seek to harmonize U.S. and Russian government lists of terrorist organizations subject to sanctions. The United States should engage Russia in pressing Pakistan to end sanctuaries and support for groups fighting in Afghanistan and for promoting a diplomatic settlement of Afghanistan-Pakistan differences. The United States should intensify discussions of the end-game in Afghanistan with the Russian government, including military-to-military talks. The United States and Russia should rapidly complete the U.S.-Russian agreement on Russia s WTO accession. The United States should work with the European Union to press Russia to negotiate seriously with Georgia to complete a Georgia-Russia WTO agreement, while encouraging Georgia to limit talks to issues that are within the scope of the WTO s work. The United States Congress should graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment s restrictions and develop new legislation on Russian corruption and human rights. In reviewing the Magnitsky bill, the U.S. Congress should focus on discouraging largescale corrupt practices and major human rights violations in Russia by identifying those responsible and applying appropriate penalties, while ensuring due process to the accused, providing good safeguards, and allowing sufficient flexibility for the executive branch. The United States should revive efforts to sign the bilateral investment treaty negotiated in the mid-1990s, in order to address some of the primary concerns U.S. investors face in Russia and to provide them with recourse in the event of nationalization of U.S. companies investments in Russia, or other actions that are tantamount to nationalization. When Russia violates international commitments or its own laws through its domestic practices, the United States should express U.S. concerns while avoiding a patronizing tone. U.S. leaders should also avoid appearing to endorse Russian domestic practices that conflict with basic American values and Russia s international obligations. The United States should accept that democratic political change within Russia will likely occur gradually and need not necessarily lead to American-style democracy. The United States should support Russian-led efforts at democratic and market reform when they occur, but should avoid steps likely to be viewed as interference in Russia s domestic politics, which are often counterproductive. Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report 5
12 In view of the vital American interests at stake in the U.S.-Russian relations, and Washington s limited leverage over Russia s slow domestic transition, the United States should not allow democracy promotion to dominate its approach to Russia. The Consequences of Failure Just as the United States should expect Russia to adjust many of its policies to achieve a sustainable cooperative relationship, Washington should recognize that Moscow is unlikely to support U.S. policy goals if the U.S.-Russian relationship significantly deteriorates. As a result, the failure to establish an ongoing working relationship with Russia would be quite costly for the United States. As a practical matter, even a stalled relationship could be problematic. The United States and Russia are both motivated to improve relations largely on the basis of hopes for what a stronger relationship could produce. If the prospects for realizing those hopes become too remote, it is uncertain whether what has been accomplished so far is sufficient to prevent our substantial remaining differences from tearing the U.S.-Russian relationship apart. U.S. officials must carefully weigh not only the American national interests in working more closely with Russia, but also the costs and benefits of failing to do so, keeping in mind Moscow s capacity to act as a spoiler in a number of areas and on a number of issues that are of vital national interest to Washington. In our considered judgment, the choice is clear: the United States should pursue a sustainable cooperative relationship with Russia to advance vital American national interests, but do so without illusions regarding either Moscow s sometimes neo-imperial ambitions, or the pace of democratic change in Russia. 6 Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?
14 Russia and U.S. National Interests Introduction Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia s emergence as an independent state, Moscow is no longer America s strategic rival. Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it become a friend. Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations. A better-managed bilateral relationship is critical for the advancement of America s vital national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia s President next year does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia s national interests with respect to the United States. Still, at a minimum, Russia s rhetoric vis-à-vis America and the West may become tougher under Putin. Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. policymakers. This report, the result of deliberations by a distinguished working group of former senior officials and military officers, business leaders, and top experts, analyzes the U.S.-Russia relationship through the lens of American national interests; argues that Russia is a pivotal country in promoting these U.S. national interests; and offers prescriptions for U.S. policy toward Russia in the period ahead. America s Vital National Interests Although politicians and pundits routinely invoke the concept of vital national interests to justify virtually any desired course of action, we hold to a narrow view of U.S. vital interests. Specifically, vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans survival and well-being in a free and secure nation. From this perspective, we can identify five American vital national interests: Preventing the use and slowing the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, securing nuclear weapons and materials, and preventing proliferation of intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons; 8 Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?
15 Maintaining a balance of power in Europe and Asia that promotes peace and stability with a continuing U.S. leadership role; Preventing large-scale or sustained terrorist attacks on the American Homeland; Ensuring energy security; and Assuring the stability of the international economy. Why Russia Matters to the United States In view of Russia s difficult history, sometimes troubling behavior, relatively small economy, and reduced international role since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to ask whether the United States needs Moscow as a partner. We believe Russia must be a top priority for the United States because its conduct can have a profound impact on America s vital national interests: Nuclear Weapons. President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush each identified nuclear terrorism as the number one threat to American national security. The United States and Russia together possess 95% of the world s nuclear weapons and most of the world s weapons-usable material, and both are major suppliers of civilian nuclear technologies around the world. Also, Russia is the only nation that could destroy America as we know it in thirty minutes. Russia s meaningful assistance and support is critical to preventing nuclear war. Non-Proliferation. Russia plays a key role in U.S.-led international efforts to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials and technologies, which are sought not only by nation states, but also by non-state actors. Moscow has generally supported American initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism and shared intelligence on al Qaeda with Washington. Without Russia s assistance, the United States will face considerable additional difficulties in seeking to slow down nuclear proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism. Geopolitics. Russia is an important nation in today s international system. Aligning Moscow more closely with American goals would bring significant balance of power advantages to the United States including in managing China s emergence as a global power. Ignoring Russian perspectives can have substantial costs. Russia s vote in the United Nations Security Council and its influence elsewhere is consequential to the success of U.S. international diplomacy on a host of issues. Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report 9
16 Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives have engaged in terrorist attacks against the United States and have encouraged and supported attacks by domestic terrorist groups in Russia. Russia has provided the United States with access to its airspace and territory as a critical alternative supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, something that has grown in importance as America s relations with Pakistan have deteriorated. Moscow has also shared intelligence on Afghanistan and al Qaeda, helps to train Afghan law enforcement officers, and supplies hardware to them and to the Afghan National Army. Energy. Russia is one of the world s leading energy producers and is the top holder of natural gas reserves.russia thus has a substantial role in maintaining and expanding energy supplies that keep the global economy stable and enable economic growth in the United States and around the world. Finance. Russia s membership in the G8 and the G20 gives it a seat at the table for the most important financial and economic meetings and deliberations. Strategic Geography. Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area and the largest in Europe by population. It is located at a strategic crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the greater Middle East and is America s neighbor in the Arctic. As a result, Russia is close to trouble-spots and a critical transit corridor for energy and other goods. Reviewing these areas makes clear that Russia s choices and actions impact the full range of vital U.S. national interests significantly and directly. Few other nations are as important to the United States. Can and Should the United States Seek to Work with Russia? Some acknowledge that Russia matters to the United States, but argue that the Russian government s foreign and domestic conduct prevents the U.S. from cooperating effectively with Moscow. Having worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group are painfully aware of how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that America can engage effectively with Moscow in ways that advance U.S. national interests and values. Where best efforts by the United States are rebuffed, Washington should act to achieve what it can and continue to engage toward further progress. Those who dismiss efforts to collaborate with Moscow typically argue that the U.S. cannot collaborate with Russia because: American and Russian national interests diverge so substantially that cooperation is impractical and unlikely to achieve substantial results. 10 Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?
17 American and Russian values differ so significantly that cooperation is impossible without sacrificing key U.S. principles. The possible benefits to the United States will not justify the effort, either because Russia is too difficult or unreliable an interlocutor or, alternatively, because Moscow is not able to deliver on important issues. This section briefly responds to each of these objections. First, U.S. and Russian national interests do indeed diverge in many areas. Despite this, however, the United States and Russia share many common interests, including some which are vital: slowing the spread of nuclear weapons; combatting international terrorism; promoting a reliable international energy system; and sustaining a prosperous world economy. Of course, American and Russian national interests, priorities, and perspectives will likely always differ in significant respects. Thus U.S. leaders must recall clearly that their obligation is to advance American national interests rather than U.S.-Russian relations. Sustainable cooperative relations with Moscow are an instrument to achieve key U.S. goals, not an end in themselves, and Washington must be prepared to confront Russia when U.S. national interests require it. Second, the fact that the United States and Russia have different political systems, and that many Americans see considerable flaws in how Russia is ruled, should not prevent cooperation with Moscow to advance American national interests. The first responsibility of the U.S. government is to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people. Because many nations important to the United States are governed differently, the U.S. government continues to have no alternative but to work with undemocratic governments when important national interests are at stake. In this context, there is no real substitute for dealing with Russia, in particular on countering proliferation, combating international terrorism and enhancing energy security. Finally, concerns about Russia s present unreliability or long-term prospects are not entirely misplaced. Russia is not an easy partner. Moreover, while Russia has considerable strengths, including its nuclear arsenal, vast energy reserves, still-considerable military power in Eurasia, and a highly developed scientific establishment, it also faces enormous challenges, including shrinking population, low life expectancy, dilapidated infrastructure, and massive corruption. The charts on the following pages illustrate these enduring contradictions. Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report 11
18 Category Deployed strategic nuclear weapons Russia from the perspective of U.S. interests No. 2 (1,537) No. 1 (1,800) USA from the perspective of Russian interests Oil production No. 1 (9,934 thousand barrels No. 3 (9,141 thousand barrels per day) per day) Natural gas production No. 2 (21,545 billion cubic feet) No. 1 (21,577 billion cubic feet) GDP (dollar exchange rate) No. 11 ($1,479,819 million) No. 1 ($14,582,400 million) GDP (PPP) No. 6 ($2,812,383 million) No. 1 ($14,582,400 million) Global exports No. 10 ($ 400,100 million) No. 3 ($1,289,000 million) Global imports No. 18 ($ 248,700 million) No. 1 ($1,936,000 million) Bilateral trade No. 24 on the list of U.S. trading No. 11 on the list of Russia s partners trading partners Population No. 9 (141.7 million) No. 3 (309.7 million) Total area No. 1 (17,098,242 sq. km.) No. 3. (9,826,675 sq. km.) Life expectancy No. 161 (66 years) No. 50 (78 years) Sources: U.S. Department of State, 2011; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2009; Central Intelligence Agency, 2010; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2011; Federal Customs Service of Russia, 2011; World Bank New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms Number of Units Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed Heavy Bombers Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads counted for deployed Heavy Bombers Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed Heavy Bombers Russian Federation United States Source: U.S. Department of State
19 Total Armed Forces Personnel (2009) UK France Russia USA India China 0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 Source: World Bank. Personnel Natural Gas Exports, 2009 Russia 20.28% Others 24.66% Australia 2.29% USA 3.44% Malaysia 3.49% Indonesia 4.04% Algeria 5.96% Netherlands 6.30% Norway 11.20% Canada 10.62% Qatar 7.72% Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Crude Oil Exports, 2009 Saudi Arabia 12.02% Russia 10.27% Others 50.00% USA 0.08% Kuwait 2.55% Iran 4.24% Nigeria 3.96% UAE 3.70% Iraq 3.55% Angola 3.44% Norway 3.35% Canada 2.82% Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
20 Russian Demographic Data, Births and Deaths per 1000 People 150,000, ,000, ,000, ,000, ,000, ,000, ,000, Year Population Births per 1000 people Deaths per 1000 people Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 15 GDP Growth of BRIC Countries, Growth (Annual %) Brazil Russia India China Source: World Bank.
21 GDP (PPP) in 2010 USD (2010 est.) Italy France Brazil UK Russia Germany India Japan China USA Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Billions of USD Freedom House Rankings, Russia 2010 Civil Liberties score: 5 Political Rights score: 6 Status: Not Free Levels of political rights and civil liberties are scored on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Depending on the ratings, the nations are then classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. Score: 81 Rank: 175 Status: Not Free Levels of freedom and editorial independence enjoyed by the press are scored on a scale from 1 (most free) to 100 (least free). Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Russia Score: 2.1 The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
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