X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Individual Software Certificates (Medium Assurance)

Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Individual Software Certificates (Medium Assurance)"

Transcription

1 X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Individual Software Certificates (Medium Assurance) Version 4.0 May 2014

2 Notice to all parties seeking to rely Reliance on a Certificate issued under this Certificate Policy, identified by subarcs of the object identifier , is only permitted as set forth in this document. Use of this document constitutes acceptance of the terms and conditions set out in this document. The acceptance of a certificate by a Relying Party for a prohibited purpose is at the Relying Party s risk. Engaging in a prohibited Certificate use is a breach of this Certificate Policy and Defence disclaims any and all liability in such circumstances. The conditions applicable to each type of Defence Certificate will vary. Document Management This document is controlled by: Changes are authorised by: Defence Public Key Infrastructure Policy Board. Defence Public Key Infrastructure Policy Board. Gatekeeper Competent Authority. Change History Signatures Version Issue Date Description/ Amendment Changed by 0.1 Draft April 2011 Initial Draft Verizon Business 1.0 June 2011 Initial Version GJF 1.1 June 2011 Comments from AGIMO and AGS incorporated. AKK 2.0 Nov 2011 Release SJP 2.1 Dec 2011 Updated for OCSP Verizon Business 2.2 May 2012 Minor updates, harmonisation with doc suite AKK 2.3 June 2012 AGIMO & AGS review. Minor amendments AKK 3.0 July 2012 Released SJP 3.1 Amend Cogito (SJL) 4.0 May 2014 Reviewed for Release PKI Ops Man Appointment Organisation Signature DPKIPB Chair Dept. of Defence Gatekeeper Competent Authority Dept. of Finance Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 ii

3 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION Overview Document name and identification PKI participants Certification authorities Registration authorities Subscribers Relying parties Other participants Certificate usage Appropriate certificate uses Prohibited certificate uses Policy administration Organisation administering the document Contact person Authority determining CPS suitability for the policy CPS approval procedures Definitions, acronyms and interpretation PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES Repositories Publication of certificate information Time or frequency of publication Access controls on repositories IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION Naming Types of names Need for names to be meaningful Anonymity or pseudonymity of Subscribers Rules for interpreting various name forms Uniqueness of names Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key Authentication of organisation identity Authentication of individual identity Non verified subscriber information Validation of authority Criteria for interoperation Identification and Authentication for Re Key Requests Identification and authentication for routine re key Identification and authentication for re key after revocation Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests CERTIFICATE LIFE CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Certificate application Who can submit a certificate application Enrolment process and responsibilities Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 iii

4 4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications Time to process certificate applications Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Publication of the certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage Relying party public key and certificate usage Certificate renewal Circumstance for certificate renewal Who may request renewal Processing certificate renewal requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate re key Circumstance for certificate re key Who may request certification of a new public key Processing certificate re keying requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a re keyed certificate Publication of the re keyed certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate modification Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation Who can request revocation Procedure for revocation request Revocation request grace period Time within which CA must process the revocation request Revocation checking requirement for relying parties CRL issuance frequency (if applicable) Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable) On line revocation/status checking availability On line revocation checking requirements Other forms of revocation advertisements available Special requirements re key compromise Circumstances for suspension Who can request suspension Procedure for suspension request Limits on suspension period Certificate status services Operational characteristics Service availability Optional features End of subscription Key escrow and recovery Key escrow and recovery policy and practices Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 iv

5 5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS Physical controls Procedural controls Personnel controls Audit logging procedures Records archival Key changeover Compromise and disaster recovery CA or RA termination TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS Key pair generation and installation Key pair generation Private key delivery to subscriber Public key delivery to certificate issuer CA public key delivery to relying parties Key sizes Public key parameters generation and quality checking Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls Cryptographic module standards and controls Private key (n out of m) multi person control Private key escrow Private key backup Private key archival Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module Private key storage on cryptographic module Method of activating private key Method of deactivating private key Method of destroying private key Cryptographic Module Rating Other aspects of key pair management Public key archival Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods Activation data Activation data generation and installation Activation data protection Other aspects of activation data Computer security controls Life cycle technical controls Network security controls Time stamping CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILES Certificate profile Version number(s) Certificate extensions Algorithm object identifiers Name forms Name constraints Certificate policy object identifier Usage of policy constraints extension Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics Processing semantics for the critical certificate policies extension CRL profile...24 Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 v

6 7.2.1 Version number(s) CRL and CRL entry extensions OCSP profile Version Numbers OCSP Extensions COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS Frequency or circumstances of assessment Identity/qualifications of assessor Assessor's relationship to assessed entity Topics covered by assessment Actions taken as a result of deficiency Communication of results OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS Fees Certificate issuance or renewal fees Certificate access fees Revocation or status information access fees Fees for other services Refund policy Financial responsibility Insurance Other assets Insurance or warranty coverage for end entities Confidentiality of business information Privacy of personal information Privacy plan Information treated as private Information not deemed private Responsibility to protect private information Notice and consent to use private information Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process Other information disclosure circumstances Intellectual property rights Representations and warranties CA representations and warranties RA representations and warranties Subscriber representations and warranties Relying party representations and warranties Representations and warranties of other participants Disclaimer of warranties Limitations of liability Indemnities Term and termination Term Termination Effect of termination and survival Individual notices and communications with participants Amendments Dispute resolution provisions Governing Law Compliance with Applicable Law Miscellaneous provisions Other provisions...29 Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 vi

7 APPENDIX A. REFERENCES...30 APPENDIX B. CERTIFICATE PROFILES...31 B.1 Individual Software (Medium Assurance) Certificate Authentication...31 B.2 Individual Software (Medium Assurance) Certificate Confidentiality...33 APPENDIX C. CRL FORMAT...35 LEVEL OF ASSURANCE MAPPING...36 Assurance Level...36 A.1 Risk Assessment...37 List of Tables Table 1 Signature OIDs Table 2 Algorithm OIDs Table 3 References Table 4 Certificate Profile ADO User Authentication Table 5 Certificate Profile ADO User Confidentiality Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version 4.0 vii

8 X.509 Certificate Policy Introduction 1. INTRODUCTION Certificate policies are, in the X.509 version 3 digital certificate standard, the named set of rules regarding the applicability of a certificate to a particular community (eg. Defence) and contain information about the specific structure of the relevant certificate type and grade. This Certificate Policy (CP) identifies the rules to manage the Australian Department of Defence (Defence) Individual Software (Medium Assurance) identity certificates, including the obligations of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) entities, and how the parties, indicated below, use them. It does not describe how to implement these rules as that information is in the Certification Practice Statement (CPS), or documents referenced by the CPS. In general, the rules identify the minimum standards in terms of performance, security and/or quality. The headings in this CP follow the framework set out in the Internet Engineering Task Force Request for Comment 3647: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework. This section identifies and introduces the set of provisions, and indicates the types of entities and applications applicable for this Australian Defence Individual Software (Medium Assurance) Certificate (AD ID MAC) Policy. 1.1 Overview An AD ID MAC is used to identify an individual who has an affiliation with Defence (Active Military Member, Reservist Military Member, Australian Public Servant employed by the Australian Defence, Cadet, Contractor or Consultant etc) and who has a requirement, which has been approved by Defence, to: i. Interact directly with Defence assets or systems, using Public Key Technology (PKT); ii. Authenticate with a third party, as an affiliate of Defence; or iii. Provide a digital signature, as an individual affiliated with Defence. There are two types of certificates issued under this CP, namely: i. Signing/authentication certificates; and ii. Encryption/confidentiality certificates. No authority, or privilege, applies to an individual by becoming an approved AD ID MAC holder, other than confirming an affiliation with Defence. This CP allows Subscribers keys and certificates to reside on soft or hardware based tokens. 1.2 Document name and identification The title for this CP is X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Individual Software (Medium Assurance) Certificates. The Object Identifier (OID) for this CP is {iso (1) iso member (2) australia (36) government (1) department of defence (334) pki (1) certificate policy (1) individual (2) software (1)} Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

9 X.509 Certificate Policy Introduction 1.3 PKI participants Certification authorities The Certification Authorities (CAs) that issue certificates under this CP is a Gatekeeper accredited CA under the High Assurance category subordinate to the Defence Root CA (DRCA) Registration authorities The Registration Authorities (RAs) that perform the registration function under this CP are Gatekeeper accredited Defence RAs. For further information, see CPS Subscribers A Subscriber is defined in Appendix B of the CPS to be, as the context allows: a) the entity (e.g. an individual, device, web site, application or resource) whose Distinguished Name appears as the "Subject Distinguished Name" on the relevant Certificate, and / or b) the person or legal entity that applied for that Certificate, and / or entered into the Subscriber Agreement in respect of that Certificate. Without limiting the foregoing, in this CP the Subscriber generally refers to the individual whose name appears as the subject in a certificate. Subscribers in this context include any individual that has been approved as having a requirement to be authenticated as affiliated with Defence. Subscribers in this context include: i. Defence personnel (permanent and reserve members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and APS employees); ii. Members of the ADF Cadets; iii. Contractors, Consultants and Professional Service Providers (individuals); and iv. Other individuals approved by Defence as having a requirement for an AD ID MAC. A Subscriber issued a certificate under this CP does not automatically receive access, authority or privilege to Defence assets or systems. Defence assets and systems may act as a Relying Party having granted access, authority or privilege to an individual Relying parties A Relying Party uses an AD ID MAC to: i. Verify the identity of a Subscriber; ii. Verify the integrity of a communication with the Subscriber; iii. Establish confidential communications with a Subscriber; and iv. Ensure the non repudiation of a communication with a Subscriber. Before relying on the Subscriber certificate, a Relying Party must: i. verify the validity of a digital certificate; ii. iii. verify that the digital certificate is being used within the limits specified in the CP; and promptly notify the RA in the event that it suspects that there has been a compromise of the Subscriber s Private Keys. A Relying Party is responsible for deciding whether, and how, to establish: i. The processes of checking validity of the Subscriber s certificate; ii. Any authority, or privilege, of the Subscriber to act on behalf of Defence; and iii. Any authority, access or privilege the Subscriber has to the Relying Party s assets or systems. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

10 X.509 Certificate Policy Introduction A Relying Party agrees to the conditions of this CP and the CPS. The use of a certificate, or associated revocation information, issued under this CP is the Relying Party s acceptance of the terms and conditions of this CP and CPS Other participants Other participants include: i. The Defence PKI Policy Board (DPKIPB) refer to the CPS for their responsibilities which specifically include: a) Review and approval of this CP; b) Presiding over the PKI audit process; c) Approving mechanisms and controls for the management of the accredited infrastructure (CA/RA); and d) Approval of operational standards and guidelines to be followed. ii. Accreditation Agencies to provide independent assurance that the facilities, practices and procedures used to issue AD ID MACs comply with this CP, the Certification Practice Statement and other relevant documentation (policy and legal). iii. Directory Service providers to provide a repository for certificates and certificate status information issued under this CP. 1.4 Certificate usage Certificates issued under this CP, in conjunction with their associated private keys, allow a Subscriber to: i. Authenticate themselves to a Relying Party electronically in online transactions; ii. Digitally sign electronic documents, transactions and communications; and iii. Confidentially communicate with a Relying Party Appropriate certificate uses Certificates issued under this CP, in conjunction with their associated private key, may be used: i. For the authentication of the identity of a Subscriber, during the conduct of any lawful business with that individual, as an individual affiliated with Defence and for which the level of assurance has been assessed as sufficient by the DPKIPB and the Relying Party organisation; ii. To provide accountability and non repudiation 1 of AD ID MAC Subscriber transactions or communications; iii. iv. To verify the integrity of a communication from a Subscriber to a Relying Party; and For the sending and receiving of confidential communications, provided such communication is in accordance with normal Defence business and security policy and procedures. Relying Parties should note the risks identified as per Appendix D in relation to the Defence requirements of Individual Software (Medium Assurance) certificates. 1 Acceptable for non repudiation of Routine Orders, administrative processes and minor value financial transactions other than transactions involving issuance or acceptance of contracts or contract modifications. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

11 X.509 Certificate Policy Publication and Repository Responsibilities Prohibited certificate uses The prohibited uses for certificates issued under this CP are: i. To use the certificate in a way that represents that the certificate possesses any attribute, authority, access, privilege or delegations that may be afforded to the Subscriber. ii. To use the certificate in a way that represents that communications and transactions can only occur over certain specified infrastructure for that transaction or communication. iii. For a Subscriber to conduct any transaction, or communication, which is any or all of the following: a) Unrelated to Defence business; b) Illegal; c) Unauthorised; d) Unethical, or e) Contrary to Defence policy. The acceptance of a certificate by a Relying Party for a prohibited purpose is at the Relying Party s risk. Engaging in a prohibited certificate use is a breach of the responsibilities and obligations agreed to by the Subscriber and Defence disclaims any and all liability in such circumstances. 1.5 Policy administration Organisation administering the document Contact person Authority determining CPS suitability for the policy CPS approval procedures 1.6 Definitions, acronyms and interpretation Acronyms and terms used in this CP are defined in the CPS. Note that defined terms in this CP appear in italics the first time they are used and otherwise are not identified in this manner when appearing later throughout the CP. Defined terms may be upper or lower case. The interpretation clause in Part 3 of Appendix B of the CPS (B.3) also applies to this CP. 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 Repositories Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

12 X.509 Certificate Policy Identification and Authentication 2.2 Publication of certificate information Defence publishes Subscriber certificates, the issuing CA certificate, and the issuing CA s latest Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in its repository. This information is available to Relying Parties internal and external to Defence. Defence provides for Subscribers and Relying Parties the URL of a website that Defence uses to publish: i. This CP; and ii. The CPS. 2.3 Time or frequency of publication Published documentation is updated on approved change. The issuing CA publishes new certificates and CRL at least once every week. 2.4 Access controls on repositories 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 3.1 Naming Types of names Every certificate issued under this CP: i. Must have a clear distinguishable and unique Distinguished Name (DN) in the certificate subjectname field; ii. Will have as an alternative name in the subjectalternativename field the Subscriber s Defence address, as well as the Microsoft Unique Principal Name (UPN); and iii. Must have common name components of the name, for both the subjectname and subjectalternativename that are unique to the individual within the Defence name space. The DN is in the form of a X.501 printable string and is not blank. To achieve a unique DN the Common Name (CN) component is based on the Subscriber s Defence address Need for names to be meaningful Names used to identify the Subscriber are to be based on the Subscriber s Defence address and: i. Relate to identity of the Subscriber as provided by the Defence Directory entry; ii. iii. Must not identify the Subscriber by role or position; and Evidence of Identity (EOI) information verifying the identity of the Subscriber must relate to the Subscriber s Defence Directory entry. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

13 X.509 Certificate Policy Identification and Authentication Anonymity or pseudonymity of Subscribers This CP prohibits using an anonymous or pseudonymous Subscriber name. However, the Subscribers common name as identified in the Defence Directory may be used if it is their Defence address as well Rules for interpreting various name forms No stipulation as there is only one form Uniqueness of names Names are unique within the Defence name space. Names used in certificates are unique to the individual and valid for that individual irrespective of their affiliation or relative location to, or within, Defence. A name issued to an individual is permanent, even after the Subscriber s affiliation expires, and this CP prohibits the re use of that name by another individual as a Subscriber name Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks 3.2 Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key The creation of a Defence network account initiates the certificate issuance. A soft token containing the key pair is generated for the individual on the workstation the first time the user logs in to their account. To prove possession of the private key, a digitally signed certificate request is submitted to the RA. The submission is made using the credentials supporting access to the individuals account within the Defence Information Environment (DIE) which includes the Defence Restricted Network (DRN) and Defence Secret Network (DSN) Authentication of organisation identity To be identified as affiliated with Defence the Subscriber must be identified in the Defence Directory. This identification is validated by aligning their unique identifier during the enrolment process Authentication of individual identity Prior to certificate issuance the individual s identity is authenticated by the following processes: i. The Subscriber undergoes the Defence security clearance process to obtain access to an ADF network. This process validates the Subscriber s identity. ii. The Subscriber s identity is re validated as part of the process to issue a Defence facility access card (positive face to face identification using a government issued token with photograph). iii. Depending on the Subscriber s role within Defence (whether an Defence employee or contractor), the Subscriber is: a) Registered within the Personnel Management Key Solution (PMKeyS) system for Defence employees; or b) Registered within the Other Defence Support (ODS) system for Defence contractors. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

14 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements iv. Once registered in either PMKeys or ODS, the Subscriber is registered within the Everybody Database (EBDb) which populates the Defence Directory. v. To obtain a network account, the Subscriber s sponsor validates the Subscriber s security clearance, positively identifies the applicant (Drivers Licence, Passport, etc), confirms the Defence Directory entry and submits a network access request. The Defence Directory is used as the authoritative source when creating a user s account within the DIE Non verified subscriber information All Subscriber information contained in a certificate is verified against the Defence Directory Validation of authority Applicants must have an account within the DIE, thus the affiliation with Defence is validated Criteria for interoperation 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re Key Requests Identification and authentication for routine re key No additional identification is required for routine re key. Authentication to the network automatically generates a routine re key, where applicable Identification and authentication for re key after revocation See 3.2 (Initial Identity Validation). 3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests Certificates issued through auto enrolment are normally not revoked; if there is a need to revoke because of actual or suspected compromise, the account will be disabled or disconnected. If a Subscriber knows or suspects that their Windows login has been compromised, they must contact DIE support immediately. Identification for such a support call follows normal Defence procedures. See 4.9 (Certificate revocation and suspension) in this CP and the CPS for more information on revocation. 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 Certificate application Who can submit a certificate application An individual who has an approved affiliation with Defence, and who has been assigned a user account in a DIE network is eligible for an AD ID MAC. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

15 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements Enrolment process and responsibilities Once the process described in (Authentication of individual identity) has been completed and an applicant has been granted a network user account, the act of the applicant logging on for the first time initiates the certificate application process. This process is automated, using Windows auto enrol feature integrated with the Defence PKI. The applicant s supervisor (or sponsor) is responsible for submitting the request for a network account via the Electronic Network Access Request (enar) system. The supervisor or sponsor must validate the applicant s identity against their record in the Defence Directory and ensure their security clearance is sufficient for the network account requested. 4.2 Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions See (Authentication of individual identity) Approval or rejection of certificate applications All requests that meet the conditions of the policy permissions in Active Directory (AD) will be approved and passed to the RA; others are rejected. The RA signs and forwards the certificate request to the CA. The CA only certifies certificate requests that are signed by an approved Defence RA Time to process certificate applications No stipulation. 4.3 Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate The auto enrolment process returns the certificate directly to the Subscriber s certificate store within the specific network that the Subscriber is connected to. There is no other notification. 4.4 Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance The Subscriber is deemed to have accepted the certificate when they have exercised the private key Publication of the certificate by the CA The Defence repository will publish all certificates. All certificates will be available in external Defence repositories Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

16 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements 4.5 Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage is defined above in 1.4 (Certificate Usage). Subscriber responsibilities are described below in (Subscriber Representations and Warranties). If the extended key usage extension is present and implies any limitation on the use of the certificate and/or private key, the Subscriber must operate within those limitations Relying party public key and certificate usage 1.4 (Certificate Usage) and (Relying Parties) detail the Relying Party s public key and certificate usage and responsibilities. The interpretation and compliance with extended KeyUsage attributes, and any associated limitations on the use of the certificate and/or private key, is in accordance with RFC Certificate renewal Circumstance for certificate renewal This CP permits certificate renewal. The criteria for certificate renewal are defined in the CPS Who may request renewal See (Who can submit a certificate application) Processing certificate renewal requests The process for certificate renewal is consistent with the enrolment process defined in 4.1 (Certificate Application). The identification and authentication procedures must comply with 3.3 (Identification and Authentication for Re Key Requests) Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See (Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate) Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate See (Conduct constituting certificate acceptance) Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA See (Publication of the certificate by the CA) Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation. 4.7 Certificate re key Circumstance for certificate re key This CP permits certificate re key. See CPS for relevant circumstances. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

17 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements Who may request certification of a new public key Certificate re key may be requested by the: i. DPKIPB; or ii. Subscriber Processing certificate re keying requests The process for certificate re key is consistent with the enrolment process defined in 4.1 (Certificate Application). The identification and authentication procedures must comply with 3.3 (Identification and Authentication for Re Key Requests) Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See (Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate) Conduct constituting acceptance of a re keyed certificate See (Conduct constituting certificate acceptance) Publication of the re keyed certificate by the CA See (Publication of the certificate by the CA) Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation. 4.8 Certificate modification This CP does not support certificate modification. If a certificate needs to be modified, it will be re keyed. 4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation If a Subscriber s account has been compromised, or the identification of the Subscriber changes, they are obliged to report this to the relevant DIE support channel. The account itself will then be disabled or re keyed, requiring the Subscriber to create a new password. Its Auto enrol Certificate will not normally be revoked or suspended. An Auto enrol Resource Certificate may be revoked where an authorised revocation requestor (see CPS 4.9.2) consider it desirable to do so Who can request revocation Procedure for revocation request Where used, revocation requests received by PKI operators are to be verified on receipt in accordance with 3.4 (Identification and authentication for revocation request) and processed in priority order. After verification the Registration Officer (RO) or PKI Operator processes revocation requests by using the PKI software, which captures an auditable record of the process. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

18 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements After a certificate is revoked, the CA includes the applicable certificate (certificate serial number) in the CRL that is signed by the CA and published in the repositories Revocation request grace period A grace period of one Operational Day is permitted. The DPKIPB, or an approved delegate, in exceptional circumstances (such as a security or law enforcement investigation), may approve a delay in the submission of a revocation request. An audit record of this approval is required, and must be submitted with the revocation request upon expiry of the approved delay Time within which CA must process the revocation request A CA shall process revocation requests for certificates issued under this CP promptly after receipt Revocation checking requirement for relying parties Before using a certificate the Relying Party must validate it against the CRL. It is the Relying Party s responsibility to determine their requirement for revocation checking. Certificates issued under this CP are unsuitable for a Relying Party s use if the requirements for revocation checking conflict with the clauses in 4.9 of this CP CRL issuance frequency (if applicable) Refer to the issuing CA s CP for CRL issuance frequency Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable) Refer to the issuing CA s CP On line revocation/status checking availability Online Certificate Status Protocol service (OCSP) is available at: Refer to the relevant Certificate Profile in Appendix B if the certificate is issued with an OCSP access location reference (Authority Information Access extension), OCSP is available to the Relying Party as a certificate status checking method. The latest CRL is available from the published repositories; refer to 2.1 (Repositories) and the certificates CRL Distribution Point for further information On line revocation checking requirements No stipulation Other forms of revocation advertisements available Special requirements re key compromise No stipulation Circumstances for suspension This CP does not support certificate suspension. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

19 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements Who can request suspension This CP does not support certificate suspension Procedure for suspension request This CP does not support certificate suspension Limits on suspension period This CP does not support certificate suspension Certificate status services Externally Defence will provide all certificates and the most up to date CRL Operational characteristics Service availability Optional features No stipulation End of subscription 4.12 Key escrow and recovery Key escrow and recovery policy and practices Escrow practices differ for the two types of private keys issued under this CP (see 1.1) Escrow, backup and archiving of private authentication keys issued is not permitted under this CP. However, escrow, backup and archiving of private confidentiality keys is permitted. The Authorised Key Retriever (AKR) must submit either a signed or memorandum to an RO or PKI operator. The operator undertakes recovery of a private confidentiality key from escrow after validating the identity of the AKR and rationale for the recovery. After validation, the RO uses the approved software to implement the process, which will log the transaction Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices Symmetric keys are not required to be escrowed. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

20 X.509 Certificate Policy Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS 5.1 Physical controls 5.2 Procedural controls 5.3 Personnel controls 5.4 Audit logging procedures 5.5 Records archival 5.6 Key changeover 5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery 5.8 CA or RA termination 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS 6.1 Key pair generation and installation Key pair generation Subscriber keys are generated in the operating system s cryptographic application programming interface (API) during the requesting process based on rules defined by the account creation policy Private key delivery to subscriber The key generation is performed on the Subscriber s workstation and stored directly in the Subscriber s operating system certificate store, so no delivery is required. Private confidentiality keys, if issued, are always encrypted in transit. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

21 X.509 Certificate Policy Technical Security Controls Public key delivery to certificate issuer The Subscriber s public key is provided to the CA in a PKCS#10 certificate request file signed with the corresponding private key CA public key delivery to relying parties Key sizes See Appendix B Public key parameters generation and quality checking Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) Subscriber key and certificate usage is defined above in 1.4 (Certificate Usage). Subscriber certificates include key usage extension fields to specify the purposes for which the keys may be used, and also to technically limit the functionality of the certificate when used with X.509v3 compliant software. Reliance on key usage extension fields is dependent on correct software implementations of the X.509v3 standard and is outside of the control of the Defence PKI. Key usages are specified in the Certificate Profile set forth in Appendix B. 6.2 Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls Cryptographic module standards and controls Subscriber keys are stored in the user account certificate store, protected by the Subscriber s user account password. All PKI core component cryptographic modules have been evaluated under Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)4 and approved for the uses intended in this CP by the NCA and listed on the Evaluated Products List Private key (n out of m) multi person control Private key escrow Escrow of private authentication keys does not occur, however, private confidentiality keys are subject to escrow. Refer to CPS for escrow controls Private key backup Private key archival Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

22 X.509 Certificate Policy Technical Security Controls Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module Private confidentiality keys, if issued, are escrowed, and will be stored in encrypted form in the key management archive. Private confidentiality keys are always transferred using the PKI software confidentiality key(s) Private key storage on cryptographic module Method of activating private key To activate key usage, the Subscriber must authenticate into their DIE account, which gives the Subscriber access to the token associated with the Subscriber s key pair Method of deactivating private key The Subscriber s private key will be deactivated when they log out of the network account to which the certificate has been issued Method of destroying private key Cryptographic Module Rating See of this CP. 6.3 Other aspects of key pair management Public key archival Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The Subscriber certificate has a maximum validity period of 2 years to limit the key lifetime. For further information, see CPS. 6.4 Activation data Activation data generation and installation No Stipulation Activation data protection All passphrases used to activate the private key shall be kept in accordance with Defence security policy for the applicable network Other aspects of activation data No stipulation. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

23 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles 6.5 Computer security controls 6.6 Life cycle technical controls 6.7 Network security controls 6.8 Time stamping 7. CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILES Appendix B contains the formats for the certificates, and CRL profiles and formats relative to this CP. The only certificates issued under this CP are: i. Identity Signature/Authentication Certificate; and ii. Identity Encryption/Confidentiality Certificate. 7.1 Certificate profile Version number(s) All certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates Certificate extensions See Appendix B Algorithm object identifiers Certificates under this CP will use one of the following OIDs for signatures. sha 1WithRSAEncryption {iso(1) member body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs 1(1) 11} sha256withrsaencryption {iso(1) member body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs 1(1) 11} Table 1 Signature OIDs Certificates under this CP will use one of the following OIDs for identifying the algorithm for which the subject key was generated. id ecpublickey {iso(1) member body(2) us(840) ansi x9 62(10045) public key type (2) 1} rsaencryption {iso(1) member body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs 1(1) 1} Dhpublicnumber {iso(1) member body(2) us(840) ansi x942(10046) number type(2) 1} id keyexchangealgorithm {joint iso ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 22} Table 2 Algorithm OIDs CAs shall certify only public keys associated with the crypto algorithms identified above, and shall only use the signature crypto algorithms described above to sign certificates, CRLs and any other PKI product, including other forms of revocation information, such as OCSP responses. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

24 X.509 Certificate Policy Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles Name forms The Common Name (CN) component is based on the Subscriber s Defence address and defined as <firstname> <lastname> <serial 2 >. It is encoded as an X.501 printable string where possible, and using UTF 8 otherwise. All other DN components are fixed and defined in Appendix B Name constraints Name constraints are not present Certificate policy object identifier Certificates issued under this policy shall assert this CP s OID: { } Certificates issued under this policy shall also assert the following LoA OID: { } Level of Assurance Medium (Individual) In addition; to enable the use of the certificate at lower Levels of Assurance, this policy also asserts the following OID: { } Level of Assurance Low (Individual) See also Appendix B Usage of policy constraints extension Policy constraints are not present Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics The only policy qualifiers that are permitted are the CPS Pointer qualifier and the User notice qualifier. The CPS Pointer, if used, shall contain a HTTP URI link to the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA, or to a webpage from which the CPS can then be downloaded. The User notice, if used, shall only contain the explicittext field Processing semantics for the critical certificate policies extension This CP does not require the certificate policies extension to be critical. Relying Parties whose client software does not process this extension do so at their own risk. 7.2 CRL profile Version number(s) CRLs issued shall be X.509 version 2 CRLs CRL and CRL entry extensions See Appendix C. 2 In some instances the serial is blank Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

25 X.509 Certificate Policy Compliance Audit and Other Assessments 7.3 OCSP profile Version Numbers OSCP is implemented using version 1 as specified under RFC OCSP Extensions Refer to CPS and Validation Authority (VA) CP for full OCSP profile. 8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS 8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.4 Topics covered by assessment 8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.6 Communication of results 9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS 9.1 Fees Certificate issuance or renewal fees No stipulation Certificate access fees There is no fee for accessing Certificates from approved repositories. Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

26 X.509 Certificate Policy Other Business and Legal Matters Revocation or status information access fees There is no fee for accessing the CRL from approved repositories Fees for other services See CPS regarding fees for access to this CP. No fee has been stipulated for other services Refund policy 9.2 Financial responsibility In addition, certificates issued under this CP do not contain, or imply, any authority, access or privilege. Relying Parties assume responsibility for any financial limit they may wish to apply for transactions authenticated using certificates issued under this CP Insurance No stipulation Other assets No stipulation Insurance or warranty coverage for end entities No stipulation. 9.3 Confidentiality of business information 9.4 Privacy of personal information Privacy plan In order to provide an audit and evidentiary trail of the verification process, and documentation presented to confirm an individual s identity, Defence is required to collect Personal Information (as defined in the Privacy Act 1988). The collection, use and disclosure of such information is governed by the Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act). At enrolment, applicants agree to the terms and conditions of being given an account on a Defence system, acknowledging that Defence may collect, use or disclose Personal Information about them, for the purposes discussed below. The Defence PKI Privacy Statement is available from Information treated as private Personal Information, other than the name and e mail address of the applicant, is not published in the Digital Certificate. The Defence PKI relies on the Subscriber being given an account within the Defence network, and relies on the management of Evidence of Identity (EOI) Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

27 X.509 Certificate Policy Other Business and Legal Matters documentation presented and the unique document identifiers being undertaken by Defence security Information not deemed private Responsibility to protect private information Notice and consent to use private information Consent by the Subscriber to the use of Personal Information is given by signing the enar Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process Other information disclosure circumstances No stipulation. 9.5 Intellectual property rights 9.6 Representations and warranties CA representations and warranties RA representations and warranties Subscriber representations and warranties The Subscriber, in obtaining access to the Defence network warrants that the information provided by them is true to the best of their knowledge. In addition, Subscribers warrant to: i. only use Keys and digital certificates within the limits specified in the CP; ii. take all reasonable measures to protect their Private Key(s) from compromise and take all necessary precautions to prevent loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorised use of their Private Key(s); iii. promptly notify the RA in the event that they consider or suspect there has been a compromise of their Private Key(s); and iv. promptly notify the RA in the event that they consider the EOI information provided by them is or may be incorrect Relying party representations and warranties Individual Software (Medium Assurance) CP, Version of 38

X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities

X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Root Certificate Authority and Subordinate Certificate Authorities Version 5.1 May 2014 Notice to all parties seeking to rely Reliance

More information

1.1.1 Additional requirements for Trusted Root Issuer CAs Appropriate Certificate Usage Prohibited Certificate Usage...

1.1.1 Additional requirements for Trusted Root Issuer CAs Appropriate Certificate Usage Prohibited Certificate Usage... 1.1.1 Additional requirements for Trusted Root Issuer CAs... 10 1.3.1 Certification Authorities ( Issuer CAs )... 11 1.3.2 Registration Authorities... 11 1.3.3 Subscribers... 12 1.3.4 Relying Parties...

More information

CERITIFICATE POLICY CONCERNING PERSONAL DIGITAL CERTIFICATES OF BANK OF FINLAND AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES

CERITIFICATE POLICY CONCERNING PERSONAL DIGITAL CERTIFICATES OF BANK OF FINLAND AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES Certificate Policy 1 (18) CERITIFICATE POLICY CONCERNING PERSONAL DIGITAL CERTIFICATES OF BANK OF FINLAND AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES 1 INTRODUCTION... 4 1.1 Overview... 4 1.2 Document

More information

X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence

X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence Version 5.1 December 2014 Document Management This document is controlled by: Changes are authorised by: Defence Public Key

More information

TAIWAN-CA INC. Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (Version 2.0)

TAIWAN-CA INC. Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (Version 2.0) TAIWAN-CA INC. Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (Version 2.0) Effective Date: 23 November 2012 1 Revision Record Rev Effective Date Issuer Note 1.0 1 Apr 2001 TaiCA PMA CP first issue 1.1 1

More information

TeliaSonera Public Root CA. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 2006-11-17. Version: Rev A. Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB

TeliaSonera Public Root CA. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 2006-11-17. Version: Rev A. Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB Document no 1/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev A TeliaSonera Public Root CA Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 2006-11-17 Version: Rev A Published

More information

CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services

CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services CMS Illinois Department of Central Management Services State of Illinois Public Key Infrastructure Certification Practices Statement For Digital Signature And Encryption Applications Version 3.3 (IETF

More information

Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015

Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015 Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 5 1.1. Trademarks...

More information

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.1 January, 2009 Table of Contents: TABLE OF CONTENTS:...2 1. INTRODUCTION...7 1.1 OVERVIEW...7 1.2 DOCUMENT

More information

Certification Practice Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks Services Public Key Infrastructure

Certification Practice Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks Services Public Key Infrastructure Certification Practice Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks Services Public Key Infrastructure 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview The Federal Reserve Banks operate a public key infrastructure (PKI) that manages

More information

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY. July 2011 Version 2.0. Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY. July 2011 Version 2.0. Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY July 2011 Version 2.0 Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company Version Control Version Revision Date Revision Description Revised

More information

Apple Corporate Email Certificates Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Apple Inc.

Apple Corporate Email Certificates Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Apple Inc. Apple Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: April 10, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2. Table of acronyms... 4 1.3.

More information

THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Published By: RSA Security Inc.

THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Published By: RSA Security Inc. THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Last Revision Date: June 28, 2007 Version: 3.0 Published By: RSA Security Inc. Copyright 2002-2007 by

More information

SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY

SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Classification: Public Version Number: 2.5 Issue Date: June 25, 2015 National Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department Digitally

More information

apple WWDR Certification Practice Statement Version 1.8 June 11, 2012 Apple Inc.

apple WWDR Certification Practice Statement Version 1.8 June 11, 2012 Apple Inc. Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.8 Effective Date: June 11, 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2.

More information

Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement

Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement Gandi SAS 15 Place de la Nation Paris 75011 France Version 1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION...10 1.1.Overview...10 1.2.Document Name and Identification...10

More information

Certificate Policy. SWIFT Qualified Certificates SWIFT

Certificate Policy. SWIFT Qualified Certificates SWIFT SWIFT SWIFT Qualified Certificates Certificate Policy This Certificate Policy applies to Qualified Certificates issued by SWIFT. It indicates the requirements and procedures to be followed, and the responsibilities

More information

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY

TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.3 May 15, 2014 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS:... 2 1. INTRODUCTION... 7 1.1 OVERVIEW... 7 1.2 DOCUMENT

More information

Neutralus Certification Practices Statement

Neutralus Certification Practices Statement Neutralus Certification Practices Statement Version 2.8 April, 2013 INDEX INDEX...1 1.0 INTRODUCTION...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.2 Policy Identification...3 1.3 Community & Applicability...3 1.4 Contact Details...3

More information

Equens Certificate Policy

Equens Certificate Policy Equens Certificate Policy WebServices and Connectivity Final H.C. van der Wijck 11 March 2015 Classification: Open Version 3.0 Version history Version no. Version date Status Edited by Most important edit(s)

More information

Certification Practice Statement

Certification Practice Statement FernUniversität in Hagen: Certification Authority (CA) Certification Practice Statement VERSION 1.1 Ralph Knoche 18.12.2009 Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Overview... 4 1.2. Scope of the Certification

More information

California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority. Version 3.

California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority. Version 3. California Independent System Operator Certification Practice Statement for Basic Assurance Certification Authority Version 3.4 April 2015 Table of Contents 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 8 1.1 OVERVIEW... 8 1.2

More information

Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 10 th June 2009. Version: 1.0

Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: 10 th June 2009. Version: 1.0 Document no 4/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev. 1.0 Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2 Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 10 th June 2009

More information

PEXA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certification Authority Certificate Policy

PEXA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certification Authority Certificate Policy PEXA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certification Authority Certificate Policy Version: 1.0 Issued: August 2014 Status: Final PEXA Certification Authority Certificate Profile 1. Introduction Property

More information

CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Document version: 1.2 Date: 15 September OID for this CPS: None

CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Document version: 1.2 Date: 15 September OID for this CPS: None CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Document version: 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007 OID for this CPS: None Information in this document is subject to change without notice. No part of this document may be copied,

More information

Polish Grid Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

Polish Grid Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Polish Grid Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement version 0.4 (DRAFT ) September 2, 2002 1 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview This document is written according to the

More information

TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA)

TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA) TELSTRA RSS CA Subscriber Agreement (SA) Last Revision Date: December 16, 2009 Version: Published By: Telstra Corporation Ltd Copyright 2009 by Telstra Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this

More information

[COMPANY CA] Certification Practice Statement

[COMPANY CA] Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement Date: [PUBLICATION DATE] Version: v. X.X Table of Contents Document History...1 Acknowledgments...2 1. Introduction...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.2

More information

VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies

VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies Version 2.8.1 Effective Date: February 1, 2009 VeriSign, Inc. 487 E. Middlefield Road Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.961.7500 http//:www.verisign.com - 1-

More information

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CNRS/CNRS-Projets/Datagrid-fr Version 0.3 August 2002 Online : http://www.urec.cnrs.fr/igc/doc/datagrid-fr.policy.pdf Old versions Version 0.2 :

More information

The Boeing Company. Boeing Commercial Airline PKI. Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY

The Boeing Company. Boeing Commercial Airline PKI. Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY The Boeing Company Boeing Commercial Airline PKI Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY Version 1.4 PA Board Approved: 7-19-2013 via e-mal PKI-233 BCA PKI Basic Assurance Certificate Policy Page 1 of 69 Signature

More information

Federal Reserve Banks Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement

Federal Reserve Banks Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 OVERVIEW The Federal Reserve Banks ( FRBs ), utilizing Public Key Infrastructure ( PKI ) technology and operating as a Certification Authority ( FR-CA

More information

Vodafone Group CA Automated Code- Signing Certificate Policy

Vodafone Group CA Automated Code- Signing Certificate Policy Vodafone Group CA Automated Code- Signing Certificate Policy Publication Date: 05/05/09 Copyright 2009 Vodafone Group Table of Contents Acknowledgments...1 1. INTRODUCTION...2 1.1 Overview...3 1.2 Document

More information

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy

Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Version 2.8.5 Effective Date: September 8, 2011 Symantec Corporation 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.527.8000 http//:www.symantec.com

More information

Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States

Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States www.globessl.com TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION...

More information

Danske Bank Group Certificate Policy

Danske Bank Group Certificate Policy Document history Version Date Remarks 1.0 19-05-2011 finalized 1.01 15-11-2012 URL updated after web page restructuring. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 2. Policy administration... 4 2.1 Overview...

More information

Ford Motor Company CA Certification Practice Statement

Ford Motor Company CA Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement Date: February 21, 2008 Version: 1.0.1 Table of Contents Document History... 1 Acknowledgments... 1 1. Introduction... 2 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Ford Motor Company Certificate

More information

Lockheed Martin Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (CP)

Lockheed Martin Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (CP) Lockheed Martin Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (CP) Version 8.10 April 2016 Copyright, Lockheed Martin, 2016 Questions or comments regarding the Lockheed Martin epki Certification

More information

KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates

KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates KIBS Certification Practice Statement for non-qualified Certificates Version 1.0 Effective Date: September, 2012 KIBS AD Skopje Kuzman Josifovski Pitu 1 1000, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia Phone number:

More information

Certification Practice Statement

Certification Practice Statement Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: October 1, 2006 Continovation Services Inc. (CSI) Certification Practice Statement 2006 Continovation Services Inc. All rights reserved. Trademark

More information

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement HKUST CA Certification Practice Statement IN SUPPORT OF HKUST CA CERTIFICATION SERVICES Version : 1.1 Date : 3 March 2000 Prepared by : Information Technology Services Center Hong Kong University of Science

More information

Registration Practices Statement. Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00

Registration Practices Statement. Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00 Registration Practices Statement Grid Registration Authority Approved December, 2011 Version 1.00 i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction... 1 1.1. Overview... 1 1.2. Document name and Identification... 1

More information

Fraunhofer Corporate PKI. Certification Practice Statement

Fraunhofer Corporate PKI. Certification Practice Statement Fraunhofer Corporate PKI Certification Practice Statement Version 1.1 Published in June 2012 Object Identifier of this Document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.778.80.3.2.1 Contact: Fraunhofer Competence Center PKI Fraunhofer

More information

Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.2 Document OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.36355.2.1.2.2 February 2012 Contents

More information

EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement

EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement EuropeanSSL Secure Certification Practice Statement Eunetic GmbH Version 1.0 14 July 2008 Wagnerstrasse 25 76448 Durmersheim Tel: +49 (0) 180 / 386 384 2 Fax: +49 (0) 180 / 329 329 329 www.eunetic.eu TABLE

More information

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Client Certificates

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Client Certificates InCommon Certification Practices Statement for Client Certificates 14 February 2011 Version 1.0 Latest version: 14 February 2011 This version: 14 February 2011 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 4 1.1

More information

L@Wtrust Class 3 Registration Authority Charter

L@Wtrust Class 3 Registration Authority Charter Class 3 Registration Authority Charter Version 1.0 applicable from 09 November 2010 Building A, Cambridge Park, 5 Bauhinia Street, Highveld Park, South Africa, 0046 Phone +27 (0)12 676 9240 Fax +27 (0)12

More information

Committee on National Security Systems

Committee on National Security Systems Committee on National Security Systems CNSS Instruction No. 1300 October 2009 INSTRUCTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE X.509 CERTIFICATE POLICY Under CNSS Policy No. 25 National

More information

TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement v.1.4 TeliaSonera Server Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement CA name Validation OID TeliaSonera Server CA

More information

Certification Practice Statement (ANZ PKI)

Certification Practice Statement (ANZ PKI) Certification Practice Statement March 2009 1. Overview 1.1 What is a Certification Practice Statement? A certification practice statement is a statement of the practices that a Certification Authority

More information

Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013

Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013 COMPANY INFO 1 (23) Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013 COMPANY INFO 2 (23) Contents 1 Ericsson Certificate Value Statement... 3 2 Introduction... 3 2.1 Overview... 3 3 Contact information...

More information

Federal Reserve Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement for United States Treasury Auctions

Federal Reserve Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement for United States Treasury Auctions Federal Reserve Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement for United States Treasury Auctions 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 OVERVIEW The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( FRBNY ) acts as

More information

SWITCHaai Metadata CA. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

SWITCHaai Metadata CA. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement SWITCHaai Metadata CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0, OID 2.16.756.1.2.6.7.1.0 July 15, 2008 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...6 1.1 Overview...6 1.2 Document name

More information

SSL.com Certification Practice Statement

SSL.com Certification Practice Statement SSL.com Certification Practice Statement SSL.com Version 1.0 February 15, 2012 2260 W Holcombe Blvd Ste 700 Houston, Texas, 77019 US Tel: +1 SSL-CERTIFICATE (+1-775-237-8434) Fax: +1 832-201-7706 www.ssl.com

More information

PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified certificates for electronic signature

PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified certificates for electronic signature PostSignum CA Certification Policy applicable to qualified certificates for electronic signature Version 1.0 7565 Page 1/67 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction... 10 1.1 Overview... 10 1.2 Document Name and

More information

SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates

SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates Version March 2004 Version 2004-03 SwissSign Gold CP/CPS Page 1 of 66 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...9 1.1 Overview...

More information

QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.

QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0. QUOVADIS ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY/ CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT OIDs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8024.0.3 Effective Date: 03 April 2007 Version: 4.3 Copyright QuoVadis

More information

TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR INTEROPERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC ID CARDS

TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR INTEROPERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC ID CARDS Représentant les avocats d Europe Representing Europe s lawyers TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR INTEROPERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC ID CARDS Technical standards for interoperability of electronic ID cards 1. Introduction

More information

Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy

Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy Vodafone Group CA Web Server Certificate Policy Publication Date: 06/09/10 Copyright 2010 Vodafone Group Table of Contents Acknowledgments... 1 1. INTRODUCTION... 2 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Document Name

More information

Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI. Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy. Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI. Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy. Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Metropolitan Police Service Enterprise PKI Root Certificate Authority, Certificate Policy Version 6.1 10 th February 2012 Version Control Issue Release Date Comments A 02/11/07 First draft release of CP

More information

CA Certificate Policy. SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT

CA Certificate Policy. SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT CA Certificate Policy SCHEDULE 1 to the SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT This page is intentionally left blank. 2 ODETTE CA Certificate Policy Version Number Issue Date Changed By 1.0 1 st April 2009 Original

More information

TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY

TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY TACC ROOT CA CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PRACTICES STATEMENT (In RFC 3647 format) January 20, 2009 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17940.5.1.1.1 Version 1.2 1 INTRODUCTION... 3 1.1 Overview...3 1.2 Document Name

More information

REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY. Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007. OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1.

REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY. Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007. OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1. REVENUE ON-LINE SERVICE CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Version 1.2 Date: 15 September 2007 OID for this CP: 1.2.372.980003.1.1.1.1.1 No part of this document may be copied, reproduced, translated, or reduced

More information

Version 3.0. Effective Date: 15 october, 2008

Version 3.0. Effective Date: 15 october, 2008 Getronics Version 3.0 Effective Date: 15 october, 2008 Getronics Nederland B.V. Fauststraat 1 P.O. Box 9105 7300 HN Apeldoorn The Netherlands Phone: +31 (0)20 570 4511 http://www.pki.getronicspinkroccade.nl

More information

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement

HKUST CA. Certification Practice Statement HKUST CA Certification Practice Statement IN SUPPORT OF HKUST CA CERTIFICATION SERVICES Version : 2.1 Date : 12 November 2003 Prepared by : Information Technology Services Center Hong Kong University of

More information

Dexia Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0

Dexia Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0 Dexia Root CA Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 Version History Version Description Date Author 0.1 Initial Draft 17 September 2001 Jan Raes 0.2 Minor adaptation after review PA 16 October 2001

More information

Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [Draft] Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Version: 1.00 August, 2015 Bangladesh Bank Page 2 of 42 Document Reference Title Document Type Bangladesh Bank

More information

X.509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA)

X.509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA) .509 Certification Practices Statement for the U.S. Government Printing Office Principal Certification Authority (GPO-PCA) June 11, 2007 FINAL Version 1.6.1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SIGNATURE PAGE U.S. Government

More information

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Server Certificates

InCommon Certification Practices Statement. Server Certificates InCommon Certification Practices Statement for Server Certificates 16 August 2010 Version 1.0 Latest version: https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl.pdf This version: https://www.incommon.org/cert/repository/cps_ssl_20100816.pdf

More information

ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0

ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 June 30, 2004 Table of Contents Table of Contents...2 1 Introduction...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.1.1 General Definitions...4

More information

SYMANTEC NON-FEDERAL SHARED SERVICE PROVIDER PKI SERVICE DESCRIPTION

SYMANTEC NON-FEDERAL SHARED SERVICE PROVIDER PKI SERVICE DESCRIPTION SYMANTEC NON-FEDERAL SHARED SERVICE PROVIDER PKI SERVICE DESCRIPTION I. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this Service Description, capitalized terms have the meaning defined herein. All other capitalized

More information

Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Version 2.5

Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Version 2.5 Certificate Policy for the United States Patent and Trademark Office November 26, 2013 Prepared by: United States Patent and Trademark Office Public Key Infrastructure Policy Authority This page is intentionally

More information

Trusted Certificate Service

Trusted Certificate Service TCS Server and Code Signing Personal CA CPS Version 2.0 (rev 15) Page 1/40 Trusted Certificate Service TCS Server CAs, escience Server CA, and Code Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement Version 2.0

More information

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5 PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Signature Certificates OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.2.1 version 1.5 Security Department NBP Warsaw, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Overview 1 1.2 Document

More information

CERTIFICATE POLICY (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates)

CERTIFICATE POLICY (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates) (CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates) VERSION : 09 DATE : 01.12.2014 1. INTRODUCTION... 10 1.1. Overview... 10 1.2. Document Name and Identification... 11 1.3. Participants...

More information

ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES

ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES Certification Practice Statement Version: 2.13 February 12, 2016 2016 Entrust Limited. All rights reserved. Revision History Issue Date Changes in this Revision 1.0 May 26,

More information

ARTL PKI. Certificate Policy PKI Disclosure Statement

ARTL PKI. Certificate Policy PKI Disclosure Statement ARTL PKI Certificate Policy PKI Disclosure Statement Important Notice: This document (PKI Disclosure Statement, PDS) does not by itself constitute the Certificate Policy under which Certificates governed

More information

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2

PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates. OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2 PKI NBP Certification Policy for ESCB Encryption Certificates OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.31995.1.2.3.1 version 1.2 Security Department NBP Warsaw, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Overview 1 1.2 Document

More information

epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2

epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2 epki Root Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Version 1.2 Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. August 21, 2015 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION... 1 1.1 OVERVIEW... 1 1.1.1 Certification Practice Statement...

More information

Certification Practice Statement For Non-Qualified Certificates

Certification Practice Statement For Non-Qualified Certificates Malta Electronic Certification Services Ltd For Non-Qualified Certificates Government of Malta Certification Authority Date: 14/09/2012 Version: 1.3 Unclassified Malta Electronic Certification Services

More information

Northrop Grumman Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy

Northrop Grumman Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy Northrop Grumman Enterprise Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy Version 1.8 Copyright, Northrop Grumman, 2006 1-1 Document Change History NG PKI Certificate Policy VER DATE INFORMATION AFFECTED

More information

Eskom Registration Authority Charter

Eskom Registration Authority Charter REGISTRATION WWW..CO.ZA Eskom Registration Authority Charter Version 2.0 applicable from 20 November 2009 Megawatt Park Maxwell Drive Sunninghill, SOUTH AFRICA, 2157 Phone +27 (0)11 800 8111 Fax +27 (0)11

More information

GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS)

GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS) GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS) Version 1.1 PLEASE READ THIS AGREEMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE USING THE DIGITAL CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO YOU

More information

TrustAssured Service Policy (PKI) Disclosure Statement Version 1.1

TrustAssured Service Policy (PKI) Disclosure Statement Version 1.1 TrustAssured Service Policy (PKI) Disclosure Statement Version 1.1 1. Contact Information Enquiries or other communications about this statement should be addressed to: The Royal Bank of Scotland TrustAssured

More information

TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Version 2.0

TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT. Version 2.0 TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.0 Effective Date: 14 April 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview 1.2 Document name and identification 1.3 PKI participants 1.3.1

More information

Version: 2.6 Issued: January 2015 Status: Final

Version: 2.6 Issued: January 2015 Status: Final PEXA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) PEXA Digital Signing Certificate Policy Version: 2.6 Issued: January 2015 Status: Final VERSION CONTROL Version No. Version Details Date 2.5 Initial accredited document

More information

Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement

Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement Version 3.8.5 Effective Date: 01/01/2012 Advantage Security S. de R.L. de C.V. Prol. Paseo de la Reforma # 625 Int 402, Col Paseo de las Lomas. Del Alvaro

More information

Adobe Systems Incorporated. Adobe Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Revision #5. Revision History

Adobe Systems Incorporated. Adobe Root CA Certification Practice Statement. Revision #5. Revision History Adobe Systems Incorporated Adobe Root CA Revision #5 Revision History Rev # Date Author Description of Change(s) 1 4/1/03 Deloitte & Touche First draft 2 4/7/03 Deloitte & Touche Further refinements 3

More information

phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement

phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement Version 1. 1 Effective Date: March 31, 2014 Copyright 2013-2014 EMR Direct. All rights reserved. [Trademark Notices] phicert is a

More information

DirectTrust Community X.509 Certificate Policy. Current Version: Version 1.2.1, 12/15/2014

DirectTrust Community X.509 Certificate Policy. Current Version: Version 1.2.1, 12/15/2014 Community X.509 Certificate Policy Current Version: Version 1.2.1, 12/15/2014 Consensus approved by WG on 10/17/2014. Approved by DirectTrust Policy Committee on 12/11/2014 Approved by DirectTrust Board

More information

E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA)

E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA) E-TUGRA INFORMATIC TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES CORP (E-TUGRA) QUALIFIED CERTIFICATE POLICY AND PRACTICE STATEMENT (CP-CPS) VERSION 1.0 DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE : JUNE, 2008 OID 2.16.792.3.0.4.1.1.2 E-TUGRA

More information

GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0

GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement. Version 1.0 GARR Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 November 2006 The PDF version of this document has been signed with following PGP key: pub 1024R/5BA9D271

More information

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AUDIT OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES Table of contents 1.0 SOFTWARE 1 2.0 HARDWARE 2 3.0 TECHNICAL COMPONENTS 2 3.1 KEY MANAGEMENT

More information

ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement. Version 5.3 - June 2015

ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement. Version 5.3 - June 2015 ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement Version 5.3 - June 2015 Colophon Commissioned by Additional copies ING Corporate PKI Policy Approval Authority Additional copies of this document

More information

Gatekeeper PKI Framework. February 2009. Registration Authority Operations Manual Review Criteria

Gatekeeper PKI Framework. February 2009. Registration Authority Operations Manual Review Criteria Gatekeeper PKI Framework ISBN 1 921182 24 5 Department of Finance and Deregulation Australian Government Information Management Office Commonwealth of Australia 2009 This work is copyright. Apart from

More information

Symantec Managed PKI (MPKI) for Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL)

Symantec Managed PKI (MPKI) for Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL) Symantec Managed PKI (MPKI) for Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL) Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 9 Feb 2015 Symantec Corporation 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 +1 650.527.8000 http://www.symantec.com

More information

TC TrustCenter GmbH. Certification Practice Statement

TC TrustCenter GmbH. Certification Practice Statement TC TrustCenter GmbH Certification Practice Statement NOTE: The information contained in this document is the property of TC TrustCenter GmbH. This Certification Practice Statement is published in conformance

More information

Land Registry. Version 4.0 10/09/2009. Certificate Policy

Land Registry. Version 4.0 10/09/2009. Certificate Policy Land Registry Version 4.0 10/09/2009 Certificate Policy Contents 1 Background 5 2 Scope 6 3 References 6 4 Definitions 7 5 General approach policy and contract responsibilities 9 5.1 Background 9 5.2

More information

Trusted Certificate Service (TCS)

Trusted Certificate Service (TCS) TCS Personal and escience Personal CA CPS Version 2.0 (rev 15) Page 1/40 Trusted Certificate Service (TCS) TCS Personal CA, escience Personal CA, and Document Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement

More information

Starfield Technologies, Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS)

Starfield Technologies, Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) Starfield Technologies, Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) Version 1.8 May 30, 2006 i Starfield CP-CPS V1.8 Table of Contents 1 Introduction... 1 1.1 Overview... 1 1.2

More information