4. Mr Joseph was holding Ms Julie Moyses at knifepoint inside the flat during the period after the police arrived and before he was fatally shot.

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1 Summary of investigation, conclusions and recommendations Background 1. Dean Joseph was 40 years old when he was fatally shot by a Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officer in the early hours of Friday 5 September 2014 in Shepperton Road, Islington, north London. 2. Mr Joseph had been shot twice by the officer and his cause of death was recorded as shock and haemorrhage as the result of a gunshot wound to the back of the rear left chest. He had also suffered a bullet wound to his upper left arm. 3. The first of a number of MPS officers arrived at the flat in Shepperton Road at around 11.20pm on Thursday 4 September following a 999 call from a resident in the road reporting a disturbance at the address. 4. Mr Joseph was holding Ms Julie Moyses at knifepoint inside the flat during the period after the police arrived and before he was fatally shot. 5. In the hour and a half between the first officers arriving at the address and the fatal shooting a number of police officers including firearms officers, trained negotiators and local police officers attended the address. Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation 6. The IPCC was notified of the fatal police shooting by the MPS at 1.55am on 5 September and immediately started an independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding Mr Joseph s death. 7. The independent investigation examined the circumstances surrounding the fatal shooting of Mr Joseph on Friday 5 September at Shepperton Road. Specifically: the police response to the 999 call made reporting a disturbance at Shepperton Road including the actions and decisions of the officers at the scene, tactics used and the rationale for the use of lethal force. the adequacy of medical care afforded to Mr Joseph by police after he was shot. the circumstances that led to Mr Joseph attending Shepperton Road on 4 September 2014 and the events at the address that led to the police response.

2 8. The investigation also considered a complaint made by family members about the manner in which the accounts of the officers involved were compiled during the post incident procedures. This complaint was upheld. 9. The investigation gathered more than 650 documents, 150 statements and 230 exhibits. Expert reports in ballistics and toxicology were commissioned and analysed against the available evidence. 10. In order to identify independent witnesses, IPCC investigators conducted house to house enquiries and made witness appeals. CCTV was also recovered from the street where the shooting took place and from the bus Mr Joseph travelled on to get to Shepperton Road. 11. Copies of the telephone calls made by officers to and from the scene, the 999 call and all radio transmissions made during the incident were gathered and analysed. 12. The investigation was finished and the final investigation report was completed on 17 July The report and underlying evidence were provided to the relevant Coroner the following day. 13. An inquest before a jury was held between 20 July and 12 August The jury determined that Mr Joseph had been lawfully killed. In its narrative the jury said: Communication and consideration regarding whether the firearms operation was covert or overt was inadequate. An armed challenge was not given. These possibly had an effect on the outcome of the incident. There was no guidance from trained police negotiators, either on site or via telecommunications, when there was sufficient time to do so. This possibly affected the outcome of the incident. IPCC findings and recommendations 14. Following the IPCC investigation, the IPCC commissioner issued formal recommendations to the Metropolitan Police Service relating to improving practice. 15. The recommendations listed below were all accepted by the MPS in its response dated 4 September 2015 and those responses are reproduced below.

3 Armed deployment Investigator conclusion 1 Based on the evidence available to the investigation, the initial and continued deployment of armed officers to this incident is found to have been appropriate and in line with policy. Containment of the scene Investigator conclusion 2 The evidence available to the investigation indicates that the instructions given by the commanding officers did not result in officers treating the containment as overt, despite their accounts that the containment was overt. Recommendation 1 In firearms incidents commanding officers should continually assess the nature of any containment and ensure that this is clearly communicated and understood by the officers carrying out the containment. MPS response During armed operations, Tactical Firearm Commanders (TFC) do continually assess the nature of any containment, particularly the positioning of armed officers, to ensure the officers are positioned at strategic locations outside the premises and in the best position to deal with any immediate threat posed (both to any innocent parties inside, and also to the armed subject themselves). TFCs will use the National Decision Making (NDM) model in assessing every part of the armed operation, which includes the containment of the premises. The MPS accepts this recommendation and will make clear in training to both firearms officers and commanders what is meant by overt and discreet containment according to the APP. The MPS will ensure that TFCs are aware of the need to communicate to containment officers what type of containment is being carried out (overt/discreet). Investigator conclusion 3 Based on the evidence available to the investigation, it is more likely than not Mr Joseph was not made aware armed officers were at the scene.

4 Investigator conclusion 4 Notwithstanding the confusion arising from the commanding officers evidence that the containment was overt despite their communication to the contrary, on the evidence available to this investigation it is found that it was appropriate and in line with policy, in the circumstances, not to announce the presence of armed officers. Use of negotiators Investigator conclusion 5 Based on the evidence available to this investigation it is found that it was appropriate and in line with policy to call out trained hostage negotiators. Investigator conclusion 6 Based on the evidence available to this investigation it is found that there were no unnecessary delays in the contacting of trained hostage negotiators or in their arrival at the scene. Less lethal weapons Investigator conclusion 7 Based on the evidence available to this investigation, the IPCC investigator is of the view that the decision not to deploy baton guns was in line with policy and appropriate in the circumstances of this incident. Investigator conclusion 8 Based on the evidence available to the investigation, the IPCC investigator considers that the decision not to deploy a Taser was justified in the circumstances due to the potential risk such an attempt may have posed. Counter terrorist and specialist firearms officers Recommendation 2 No CTSFO [counter terrorist and specialist firearms officer] policy is in place within SC&O19 [specialist firearms command]. It is therefore not clear in what circumstances they should be contacted and when. The MPS should consider drawing up a policy which outlines when CTSFOs should be contacted for potential deployment to spontaneous incidents.

5 MPS response While there is not detailed policy at present the MPS believe there is understanding by Strategic Firearms Commanders, TFCs and Tactical Advisors, of the need to consider the additional skills a CTSFO team can offer. However, the MPS recognises that setting this out in policy will provide clarity and may be of assistance to commanders. The MPS accepts this recommendation and will develop policy guidance for commanders on when to seek advice on the utilisation of CTSFO officers. Authorisation and use of distraction devices Investigator conclusion 9 On the evidence available to this investigation, the IPCC investigator considers that distraction devices were authorised and deployed in line with policy. Information gathering Investigator conclusion 10 The way in which intelligence was obtained was appropriate and in line with policy. It allowed relevant information concerning Ms Moyses and Mr Joseph to be available to the commanding officers. PC Clark s interaction with Mr Joseph Investigator conclusion 11 All the evidence gathered by this investigation suggests that PC Clark remained calm while speaking with Mr Joseph and his actions were in line with policy. There is no evidence to indicate that PC Clark agitated Mr Joseph. Given that PC Clark has no additional training in negotiations his actions exceeded his training and were in line with policy concerning negotiations in these circumstances. Use of lethal force Investigator conclusion 12 Based on the evidence available to this investigation it is found that Mr Joseph was shot twice by PC Brown using a G36 rifle and 0.233, soft nose, Remmington bullets.

6 Investigator conclusion 13 Based on the evidence available to this investigation there is clear evidence to support the officers conclusion that Ms Moyses life was in imminent danger immediately prior to the first shot being fired and that PC Brown believed this to be the case. As such, the first shot fired by PC Brown would have been in line with policy and legislation. Investigator conclusion 14 The investigation has not found material evidence to undermine the assertions of PC Brown, PC Robinson and PC Barrow that they genuinely and reasonably believed that Ms Moyses life continued to be in imminent danger following the first shot. On that basis, in the opinion of the IPCC investigator, there is no indication that the second shot fired by PC Brown was unlawful or contrary to policy. Entry into the property and the provision of first aid Investigator conclusion 15 Based on the evidence available to this investigation it is found that PC Minister and PC Matthews actions, prior to starting first aid, were appropriate in the circumstances and in line with policy. Investigator conclusion 16 Based on the evidence available to the investigation it is found that the medical care provided to Mr Joseph by officers was appropriate and in line with policy and training. Issues arising during the IPCC investigation Investigator conclusion 17 Based on the evidence available to this investigation there is no indication of a deliberate attempt to mislead the IPCC investigation during the post incident procedure. However, for the reasons outlined [in the report], the IPCC investigator shares the concerns raised by the family of Mr Joseph about the conferring which was allowed to take place. Investigator conclusion 18 The credibility of officers accounts was impacted by the material placed on the wall during the procedure and the way in which the room was set up for them to write their statements.

7 Recommendation 3 It is recognised that current APP [authorised professional practice] guidance states that separation should only be considered when it is both practicable and necessary to do so, and where there are no implications for the safety of the public of officers. Where officers remain together while writing their statements consideration should be given to sitting the officers in a manner which minimises rather than encourages conferring about their accounts. MPS response The MPS approach follows the Armed Policing Authorised Professional Practice (AP APP) and in doing so has considered the assessment of the Court of Appeal on separation in the case brought by Dellzuch [sic] and Duggan. As set out by the Court of Appeal separation is likely to be an exceptional measure and that the normal position is that this will not be required. The MPS believe that the conferring warning, the presence of an appointed officer and the recording of the reasons for conferring provides strong safeguards. The MPS believe these safeguards provide a regime of transparency and accountability. The MPS accepts that the PIM will want to consider where officers sit when making their initial accounts and there is value in recording this and any reasons/considerations. Recommendation 4 Evidence about an incident, factual or not, should not be provided to officers during the post incident procedure. Providing such information risks influencing the officers recollection of events and contaminating their evidence. This is likely to undermine the integrity of the process, leave officers vulnerable to criticism and reduce public confidence in the investigation. MPS response The Authorised Professional Practice (APP) identifies that officers may use reference material when writing their accounts. The Appointed Officer (AO) should ensure that any reference material used by officers is secured and handed to investigators against a receipt/exhibit number. The MPS has sought legal advice and based on this will be re-drafting guidance to provide specific clarification for the nature and suitability of reference material. In a PIP the PIM should consult with the DPS and the IPCC on the reference materials proposed to be utilised. The PIM should record their decision and reasons.

8 Pseudonyms Recommendation 5 Consideration should be given to a formal agreement between the IPCC and the MPS setting out timescales in which true identities of officers who have been given pseudonyms will be provided to the IPCC following a PIP [post incident procedure]. MPS response Every request from the IPCC for officers true identities is risk assessed based upon the nature of the incident and also the intelligence surrounding any identified (and/or perceived) threat/risk to officers and their families. It is therefore difficult to agree arbitrary timescales since each DSI incident may have unique circumstances. The MPS agrees that it will explore this consideration in more detail and that greater clarity, perhaps in the form of memorandum of understanding, would ensure clarity of the process and key decision points.