COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Transcription

1 SUFFOLK, ss. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS RICHARD CONSTANTINO, M.D. v. SUPERIOR COURT 2084CV00944-BLS1 UNUM GROUP AND THE PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A RULING THAT NEW YORK LAW APPLIES AND PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Richard Constantino bought a long-term disability insurance policy from the The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company, which later merged into or became a subsidiary of the Unum Group. Dr. Constantino alleges that Paul Revere and Unum found that Dr. Constantino became eligible for residual disability benefits in 2013 and total disability benefits in early Constantino contends that he actually became totally disabled in 2013, and as a result is entitled to a much higher monthly disability payment than Paul Revere has been paying. Dr. Constantino asserts a number of claims against Unum and Paul Revere, including that the manner in which they handled his disability claim violated G.L. c. 176D, 3(9), and as a result constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice that also violated G.L. c. 93A. Unum and Paul Revere contend that Dr. Constantino cannot sue them under c. 93A because his consumer protection claim is governed by New York law. The Court disagrees; it concludes that under applicable choice-of-law rules this claim is governed by Massachusetts law. It will therefore deny Defendant s motion for a ruling that New York law governs this claim. The Court will also deny Plaintiff s motion to compel further production of documents, as the disputed requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of relevant information. 1. Choice of Law as to Consumer Protection Statutes. The parties disagree as to whether Massachusetts or New York consumer protection law applies in this case. If Massachusetts law applies, then Dr. Constantino may press his claim under G.L. c. 93A. The parties agree that if New York law were to apply, then

2 Dr. Constantino would not have a viable claim under the New York consumer protection law. 1 Massachusetts has adopted a functional choice-of-law approach to conflictof-laws rules that follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Clarendon Nat l Ins. Co. v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 492, (2004); accord Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, (1985). General Laws c. 93A is a statute of broad impact which creates new substantive rights and provides new procedural devices for the enforcement of those rights. Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 822 (2014), quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693 (1975). The statute is neither wholly tortious nor wholly contractual in nature. Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 12 (2000), quoting Slaney, supra, at 704. Nonetheless, a claim that a defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of c. 93A may be founded on activities that more closely resemble either a traditional breach of contract action or an action in tort. Kitner v. CTW Transport, Inc., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 741, 746 (2002), quoting Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, Inc., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 548 (1995). Whether a c. 93A claim is more contract-like or tort-like determines what choice of law rules apply in that case. Id. (contractual choice of law provision did not apply to tort-like claim under c. 93A based on misrepresentations). Thus, when a chapter 93A claim and the requested remedy are highly analogous to a tort claim and remedy, the chapter 93A claim should be considered as a tort for choice-of-law purposes. Crellin Technologies, Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994). Defendants reliance on Restatement 192 and 188 is misplaced. 1 The parties also agree that there is no material difference between Massachusetts and New York law with respect to Dr. Constantino s other claims, and that the Court therefore need not engage in any choice of law analysis as to those claims. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Richmond, 442 Mass. 1010, 1012 (2004) (rescript) ( It is a fundamental choice of law principle that only actual conflicts between the laws of different jurisdictions must be resolved. Choice of law analysis is unnecessary when that choice will not affect the outcome of the case. ). Constantino made this point in his written opposition. Unum and Paul Revere conceded during oral argument that it is correct

3 Section 192 describes the choice-of-law rule that applies to disputes about the validity of a life insurance policy, annuity, or disability insurance policy. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws ( Restatement ) 192 and comment l (1971). It does not apply here because this lawsuit concerns what amount Paul Revere must pay under a disability insurance policy and whether it engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct; it does not concern the validity of the policy. Section 188 of this Restatement describes the general choice-of-law rule that applies to contract claims and issues. But Dr. Constantino s claim under G.L. c. 93A is not a contract claim. [E]ngaging in the conduct prohibited by G.L. c. 176D, and made unfair and deceptive by G.L. c. 93A, 9, creates an action independent from the contract. Schwartz v. Travelers Indem. Co., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 675 (2001). Dr. Constantino s claim under G.L. c. 93A is based on allegations that Unum and Paul Revere violated G.L. c. 176D, 3(9) by, among other things, refusing to pay his claim without conducting a reasonable investigation, providing a false basis for denying his claim, and making misrepresentations in connection with investigating his claim. This claim is much more analogous to a tort claim than to a cause of action for breach of contract. See Brown v. Savings Bank Life Ins. Co., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 572, 580 (2018) (where c. 93A resembles tort of misrepresentation, it is treated as a tort for statute of limitations purposes). As a result, the choice-of-law issue in this case is governed by the principles set forth in Restatement 145 for tort claims. For any issue concerning a tort claim or tort-like claim under c. 93A that does not involve personal injury, Massachusetts applies the law of the state that has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 417 Mass. 643, 647 n.3 (1994), quoting Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws 145(1). To determine which state has the most significant relationship, a court must consider where the injury occurred; where the conduct causing the injury occurred; where the parties reside, are incorporated, and conduct business; and where the relationship between the parties is centered. Id. at 647 & n.3 (applying Restatement 145(2)). These are choiceinfluencing considerations that do not dictate any particular result. See Cosme, 417 Mass. at 646, quoting Bushkin Assocs., 393 Mass. at 631. The following facts about this case appear to be undisputed: - 3 -

4 o the allegedly unfair and deceptive conduct all took place in Massachusetts, which is where Defendants received, evaluated, and acted on Constantino s disability claim and appeals; o Paul Revere is a Massachusetts corporation, Unum is a Delaware corporation, and both regularly conduct business in Massachusetts; and o Dr. Constantino resides in New York. In contrast, the place where the injury occurred in this case is indeterminate, because the alleged injury occurred as a result of payments made from companies doing business in Massachusetts to an insured residing in New York. See Restatement 148, comment c ( When the loss is pecuniary in its nature, the place of loss is far more difficult to locate than when the damage consists of physical injury to persons or to tangible things. ). Similarly, the place where the parties relationship is centered is also indeterminate, because it arises from the interaction of Defendants employees in Massachusetts with Dr. Constantino in New York. Though the place of injury is an important factor in cases involving personal injury or damage to tangible things, it does not play an important role in a choice-of-law analysis in cases of fraud or misrepresentation, or other cases where the ultimate place of injury may bear little relation to the alleged misconduct. See Restatement 145, comment e. Instead, in a case involving or having aspects of a claim of fraud or misrepresentation, the place where the defendant engaged in the alleged misconduct will have much more weight in deciding which jurisdiction s law should govern. See Restatement 148, comment c. This factor therefore weighs heavily in favor of applying Massachusetts law to Dr. Constantino s consumer protection claim. On balance, the Court concludes that Massachusetts has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, and that therefore Massachusetts law applies to Dr. Constantino s consumer protection claim and he may sue Unum and Paul Revere under G.L. c. 93A. 2 2 Defendants reliance on W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 407 Mass. 572 (1990), is misplaced. That case concerned which insurers had a duty to defend or to indemnify against asbestos-related claims under different comprehensive general liability policies. Id. at Under those circumstances, it made sense for the law of one state the state where most of - 4 -

5 2. Compelling Production of Documents. Defendants have produced Dr. Constantino s disability insurance policy; his application and claims files; his premium history; the claim manual used to administer his claim; and the curricula vitae of four physicians and two nurses, presumably because they were involved in evaluating Constantino s claim. Dr. Constantino has asked the Court to compel Defendants also to produce all other documents from 2010 to the present 3 concerning Defendants claims handling, risk management, quality assurance, claim management, communications with actuaries about own-occupation disability income insurance policies, the ratio of administrative expenses to terminations for own-occupation disability income policies, or analyses of reserved ratios to actual payments of claims. Gathering, reviewing, and producing twelve-years of documents concerning a wide swath of Defendants business would be incredibly burdensome. Dr. Constantino has not shown that any of the categories of requested documents is needed to try his claims, or even likely to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence at all. The Court will therefore deny this motion to compel. ORDER Defendants motion for a ruling that New York law applies to Plaintiff s consumer protection act claim is denied, because the Court finds that Massachusetts law governs that claim. Plaintiffs motion to compel the production of documents is also denied, because the disputed document requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 19 April 2022 /s/ Kenneth W. Salinger Justice of the Superior Court the policies were negotiated and delivered to govern the interpretation of all policies. Id. at But the c. 93A claim in this case is very different; it concerns Defendants handling and decision of a single disability insurance claim, not policy interpretation that will affect thousands of similar claims. 3 Dr. Constantino originally asked for these categories of documents from 1986 to the present, but later revised these requests