Implementing IP Traceback in the Internet An ISP Perspective

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1 Implementing IP Traceback in the Internet An ISP Perspective Dong Wei, Stuent Member, IEEE, an Nirwan Ansari, Senior Member, IEEE Abstract--Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks consume the resources of remote hosts an the network in terms of buffers, processing power, an connections, thus enying or egraing the Internet services to legitimate users. Manage security service (MSS) has been evelope to provie better network performance in aition to protect customers from being attacke. IP traceback is one of the most important features incorporate in MSS. Probabilistic packet marking, a promising IP traceback scheme, has receive much attention in the past couple of years, owing to its esirable properties. In this paper, we iscuss the implementation issues of IP traceback technology from an ISP perspective. We introuce a practical marking scheme, in which the marking ege is a label representing a router instea of the router s IP aress, an the marking probability is a function of the istance of the first truste router on the attack path. To eal with spoofe marking, we also propose a hash-base scheme to valiate the information in the marking fiel. Inex Terms--security, IP traceback, probabilistic packet marking I. INTRODUCTION Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks exploit the weakness of TCP/IP protocols to create a large number of half-open connections, or generate a huge amount of traffics, with spoofe IP source aresses, thus consuming resources of a remote host an the network in terms of buffers, processing power, an connections, an then egrae an even prevent services to other legitimate users. In February 2000, some major web sites, such as Yahoo!, ebay, Amazon an CNN were completely shut own by DoS attacks. Firewall is a technology to provie a perimeter security service to prevent DoS attacks. However, it can only ecrease the averse effect of DoS, such as buffer overflow or epletion of connections of the remote host; it cannot prevent the service egraation to legitimate users. Therefore, it cannot eliminate this problem completely. In a typical DoS attack, as shown in Figure, an attacker is trying to attack a victim via the Internet by sening a huge Dong Wei an Nirwan Ansari are with the Avance Networking Lab (ANL), Department of Electrical an Computer Engineering, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, NJ 0702, USA ( xw3077@njit.eu; nirwan.ansari@njit.eu). This work has been supporte in part by the New Jersey Commission on Higher Eucation via the NJI-TOWER project, an the New Jersey Commission on Science an Technology via the NJCTW. amount of attacking packets. By issuing ping s , ICMP request messages are sent continuously to the reflector, an then each workstation or PC on the reflector subnet is suppose to sen an ICMP reply message to the attacker. If the attacker uses the IP aress of the victim as his own IP aress, i.e., place the victim s IP aress in the source aress fiel in those ICMP packets, those ICMP reply packets woul be reirecte to the victim. Thus, the victim woul receive a large amount of ICMP packets, which woul eplete its buffer an processing power. A firewall, which can filter those attacking packets, is usually place between the victim an the ege router - ER. This firewall is able to protect the victim from running out of its buffers, processing power, an connections. However, the buffer of each router is share by all packets it forwars. At ege router ER, if the attacker is sening a huge amount of packets to the victim, the buffer of ER woul be eplete, an therefore packets sent by the legitimate user woul be iscare by ER. Thus, the Internet service to the legitimate user coul be egrae an even enie. A straightforwar solution [] is to fin where the attacker is an block its traffic or enforce the corresponing security policies at the router closest to the attacker, ER xxx.xxx Reflector Attacker ER2 Internet Figure A scenario of DoS attack ER Legitimate User Victim xxx The objective of IP traceback technologies is to trace attacks back to their origins. However, ) an attacker can use a fake, or spoofe IP aress, 2) he/she can even use a fake MAC aress, an 3) the IP network is stateless, an therefore, it is very ifficult to trace an attack to its origin. Thus, up to now, most IP traceback techniques try to trace the attacking traffic as close to their origins as possible. ISBN /$ IEEE Page 326

2 This paper is organize as follows. In Section II, the backgroun of IP traceback techniques, an several approaches are reviewe. The current probabilistic packet marking schemes along with their limitations are iscusse in Section III. In Section IV, we present an iscuss our propose scheme. Finally, conclusions are rawn in Section V. II. BACKGROUND Designing an IP traceback scheme shoul consier the following factors: Management overhea Network overhea Router overhea Distribute Capability Scalability Robustness Post-mortem Capability (for forensic purpose) Capability to traceback multiple attackers, i.e., istribute enial-of-service (DDoS) In the context of IP traceback, robustness implies the following: ) Low false positive an false negative False positive: A router is sai to be false positive if it is in the reconstructe path, but it is not in the real attack path. False negative: A router is sai to be false negative if it is not in the reconstructe path, but it is in the real attack graph. Most current schemes achieve zero false negative, an try to minimize false positive. 2) The capability to cope with the subverte routers Some schemes are able to traceback to the router closest to the origin of the attacking traffics even when several routers, in the real attack path, are subverte by the attacker. Here, we assume routers may be subverte, but not often. 3) Even though the attacker is aware of the traceback scheme an able to generate spoofe information, the scheme shoul be able to fin the target with a relatively high certainty. In the remaining part of the section, we briefly review some IP traceback techniques, an iscuss their avantages an limitations. A. Link test Some IP traceback schemes, starting from the router closest to the victim, test its upstream links, trying to fin out from which link the offensive traffics come. This approach can be repeate recursively at the upstream routers until the router closest to the attacker is reache. Controlle flooing an input ebugging are two typical link test schemes. ) Controlle flooing Controlle flooing was propose by Burch an Cheswick [2]. This scheme, starting from the router closest to the victim, floos upstream links iniviually, an observes the traffic pattern of the attacking packets, an then ecies from which uplink the attacking packets come. Because the buffer of each router is share by packets it forwars, the probability to rop the attacking packets will increase when the upstream router from which the attacking packets come is flooe. Then, the upstream router from which the attacking packets come oes the same to fin its upstream router, until the router closest to the attacker is reache. Although controlle flooing is very practical an easy to implement, it has several isavantages an limitations. First, flooing is DoS itself, an can egrae the Internet services to legitimate users, because their packets can also be roppe ue to buffer overflow. Secon, if the attacker finishes his attack before the target router is foun, the target router can no longer be foun, thus implying that this scheme oes not have any post-mortem capability. Finally, it works poorly with DDoS attacks. 2) Input ebugging Input ebugging scheme was propose by Stone [3]. Most routers in the market can be configure, by the aministrator, to filter specific packets on some output ports an fin which input port they are associate to. When a host (victim) fins an attack, the network aministrator shoul be informe. The aministrator shoul, first, configure the filtering table of the router which is closest to the victim, an fin from which uplink the attacking packets come from, by eploying input ebugging; then o the same at the upstream router, until the router closest to the attacker is reache. A high management overhea is the most important rawback of input ebugging. Secon, it nees communication an coorination between ifferent ISPs, when the attacking packets traverse ifferent ISPs networks. Furthermore, this scheme works only for ongoing attacks. The last but not the least, it requires network aministrators to have the appropriate technical skills an capabilities. B. Ingress Filtering Ingress filtering is actually not an IP traceback technique [4], but it is inclue here because it aresses those attacks with spoofe IP aresses. Since most attacks use spoofe IP aresses; a preventative approach of these attacks is to block packets with spoofe IP aresses. This approach requires that each router has sufficient knowlege on which IP aress is legitimate an which is not. The first problem of ingress filtering is the scalability issue; the legitimate users table of one router grows exponentially when the network size increases. The secon problem is the overhea (to look-up the table of legitimate users) of the ingress filter is prohibitive on high-spee links, especially in core routers. The thir problem is that link status in the Internet is ynamic; we nee to evelop a new protocol to exchange information of all users an upate the table of legitimate users in each router. The last issue is that attackers coul still use spoofe IP aresses from many hosts within a vali customer network. ISBN /$ IEEE Page 327

3 C. ICMP traceback Bellovin, et al, [5], evelope an Internet raft on IP traceback. The principle is that each router samples, with very low probability, packets it forwars, an copies the contents into a specific ICMP traceback packet incluing the information of ajacent routers to the source an estination. The victim uner attack will use this information to reconstruct the path from the attacker to the victim. There are several rawbacks with this approach: first, ICMP packets are consiere to be intrusive, most ISPs filter ICMP packets at ege routers; secon, it oes not work well with DDoS. Although a newer version [6] was propose to improve its capability to eal with DDoS, the first problem still remains. D. Data logging Each router is suppose to recor the information of each packet it forwars. If the victim informs the aministrator what the attacking packet is, the aministrator sens this information to all routers. Each router compares it with all recors, if a matche recor is foun, the router woul inform the aministrator. ) Data mining with logging An approach was propose by Stone [3] to log packets at key routers an then use ata mining techniques to reconstruct the attacking path after the victim fins an attack. The most important property of this approach is that it can be use even a long time after the attack has occurre. However, its rawback is obvious, i.e., a large amount of resource is require to store an eliver ata. It woul increase the network overhea an management overhea ramatically. Privacy is another issue, because it is require to store all packets elivere by key routers; if these routers are subverte, the information exchange by customers can be eavesroppe. 2) Signature-base logging Snoeren, et al, propose a so-calle hash-base IP traceback scheme [7], which can trace a single packet to its origin. The scheme works as follows: When a packet passes a router, the router generates a packet igest accoring to a hash function. The input of this hash function shoul be those invariant fiels in the IP heaer an the first eight bytes in the payloa. After that, a spaceefficient ata structure, known as a bloom filter, is use to store the packet igest. When the victim iscovers it is being attacke, it is suppose to sen a request, with the signature of this attacking packet, to the central traceback manager. Then, the traceback manager broacasts a request, with the corresponing signature, waiting for reply from those routers who have this signature in their recor. The most significant features of this scheme are ) it is able to trace a single packet; 2) it has esirable performance in terms of robustness, i.e., even some routers, in the real attack path, may be subverte, it can still trace to the router closest to the origin of attacking traffics; 3) much less storage space is neee than logging with ata mining; 4) it is able to maintain customers privacy. The most significant rawbacks are ) it nees new harware to store an process the signature of each packet; 2) it nees a new protocol to eliver the signature, request, an reply. III. PROBABILISTIC PACKET MARKING SCHEMES Burch an Cheswick mentione the possibility of tracing flooing attacks by marking packets, either probabilistically or eterministically, with the aresses of the routers they traverse [2]. The victim uses the information in the marke packets to trace an attack back to its source. The first probabilistic marking scheme [8] was propose by Savage, et al, base on their paper of SIGCOM2000. Some alternations have been propose in [9][0][] [2]. Generally, a probabilistic packet marking scheme consists of two algorithms: ) A marking algorithm, which is implemente in routers between the attackers an the victim. It requires a small router overhea, because the traffic volume is huge an the processing power an memory are limite. 2) An attack path reconstruction algorithm, which is implemente at the victim. The victim might have high processing power an sufficient memory because the victim coul be a PC or workstation. In orer to evaluate the performance of a scheme quantitatively, the following benchmarks have been introuce [8]: The marking probability by each router (router overhea). The expecte number of packet trials neee to reconstruct the attack path (or convergence time). The expecte number of false paths (or false positive) A. Network Moel u r 4 r r u r r 2 v Figure 2 Directe acyclic graph (DAG) The network is given as a irecte graph G = (N, E), where N is the set of noes an E is the set of irecte ege. N can be categorize as hosts (leaf noes) an routers (intermeiate noes). An ege is a physical link between elements in N. Denote the set of attackers by A, where A N, an the victim by v, where v N. An attack path is enote as P = ( ar,, r2,... r, v). The attack path r 3 a r 6 r 7 r u ISBN /$ IEEE Page 328

4 inclues routers; the istance between the victim an the attacker is +. A path P f, whose estination is v an the source is u, where u A, is calle a false attack path. Figure 2 emonstrates a typical irecte acyclic graph (DAG). In Fig. 2, the attacking path is a, r 7, r 6, r 3, r 2 an v. u represents legitimate users. is 4 in this example. B. Assumptions All probabilistic packet marking schemes make the following assumptions: Multiple attackers may conspire. Attackers may be aware of being trace. Packets may be lost or reorere. Attackers sen numerous packets (so the statistical approach can be use). The route between the attacker an the victim is stable uring the attack. Routers are both CPU an memory limite. Routers coul be compromise, but not wiely compromise. An attacker may generate any packet, with a spoofe IP aress an even a spoofe marking fiel. In [8], Savage, et al, propose an ege sampling scheme, in which two static aress fiels are reserve, start an en. When a router ecies to mark a packet, it writes its own aress into the start fiel an writes a zero into the istance fiel. Otherwise, if the istance fiel is alreay zero, this inicates that the packet was marke by the previous router. In this case, the router writes its own aress into the en fiel, representing the ege between itself an the previous router, an finally increments the istance fiel by one. If the router oes not mark the packet, then it always increments the istance fiel by one. The victim uses the eges sample in the receive packets to reconstruct the attack path. The expecte number of packets require for the victim to reconstruct the attack path of length is boune by: ln( ) E( X) <, () q( q) where q is the marking probability of each router. To implement this marking scheme, the compresse ege fragmentation an hash function are employe in [8]. The compresse ege fragmentation is use because the size of the marking fiel is only 6 bits an the ege marking fiel requires at least 69 bits (32-bit start IP aress, 32-bit en IP aress, an 5-bit istance). Each ege is encoe by executing exclusive-or of the two IP aresses making up the ege. The ranom hash function is employe to reuce the false positive when reconstructing the attack path. In [], Song an Perrig propose to use an -bit hash function to represent the IP aress of each router, that can ramatically reuce the size of the marking fiel an the reconstructing complexity. Thus, it can reuce the expecte number of packets for the victim to reconstruct the attack path. They also propose an approach to use multiple 8-bit hash functions to represent the IP aress of each router, thus reucing the false positive. However, there are still some limitations in current probabilistic packet marking schemes: In orer to reconstruct the attack paths, the victim has to have the prior knowlege of its entire upstream topology. In [], the victim is also suppose to have the knowlege of all hash functions of each upstream router. There coul still be false positive [], even there is only a single attacking origin. An attacker is able to use a spoofe IP aress; he is able to forge the marking aress as well. As shown in Figure 3, if the attacker forges the marking fiel accoring to the precise probability istribution, when constructing the attack path, the victim woul regar r m as the router closest to the attacker. If the security policies are enforce at this router, it cannot prevent the attacking traffics. To reconstruct the attack path, one sample of each ege on the path is require. However, the probability of a packet marke by the router closest to the victim is higher than that by the router closest to the attacker, i.e., q>q(-q) -. Thus, some samples are waste uring reconstruction, an hence more convergence time is require. When a router is subverte, such as r in Figure 3, the attacker is able to copy the marking fiel of packets receive from the upstream routers (r, r 2, ) an place his own attacking contents, an then sens these packets to the victim. In this case, the victim cannot trace the attacking packets back to the router closest to the attacker either. The initial intention is to fin the router closest to the attacker an then we are able to enforce the security policies at that router. Due to the above mentione reasons, using current probabilistic packet marking, we still cannot be sure which router is the target, even though we can be sure that it must be in the reconstructe paths. Therefore, we nee to evelop a scheme to valiate the path an then the target router. a r r 2 r k r v r r 2 r m Figure 3 A attacker iverts the traceback to upstream routers IV. IMPLEMENTING PROBABILISTIC PACKET MARKING BY ISPS In orer to implement IP traceback in the Internet, from the ISP point of view, we propose another probabilistic packet marking scheme. It iffers from the previous work [8][] ISBN /$ IEEE Page 329

5 in the following areas: ) marking ege, 2) hash-base message igest, an 3) variable marking probability. A. Marking ege We assume each marking router is at the ege of an autonomous system (AS). Ege routers, having less traffic than core routers, have more processing power an buffers to run the marking scheme. We further assume there are no more than 32 ege routers in one AS. If an AS has more than 32 ege routers, we can ivie this AS into some small sub-ass, which have no more than 32 ege routers. During reconstruction, this representation coul lea to false positive when there are multiple attackers, an routers in ifferent ASs coul have the same label. Just as the previous work, we also nee an approach to valiate true attack paths. B. Authentication of the marking fiel In orer to prevent the attacker from spoofing the marking fiel or copying the marking fiel of other legitimate user s packets an placing his/her offensive contents, each router is suppose to have its own hash function. The marking fiel an a certain part of the atagram are entere as the input to the hash function. Each marking router has prior knowlege (hash function) of its neighboring routers. Thus, upon receiving a packet, the router can ientify if the marking information can be truste or not, through the output of the hash function. C. Variable marking probability Denote the marking probability of router r i by q i. Denote Pr{m r i } as the probability of a packet receive by the victim that is marke by router r i. Thus, Pr { m r} = q ( ), i i qk i [, ] (2) k=+ i Intuitively, the minimum boun of the expecte number of packets for the victim to reconstruct the attack path can be achieve when packets receive by the victim are uniformly marke by routers along the attack path, i.e., Pr{ m r} = Pr { m r }, i j i, j [, ] (3) Therefore, we can obtain the following relationship: q = q ( q ) q ( q ) = q ( q )( q ) 2 : (4) q ( q ) q ( q ) 2 = k k k= 3 k= 2 Thus, q i =, i i [, ] (5) an Pr { m r i } =, i [, ] (6) Hence, E( X) < ln. (7) Table shows the comparison between our propose marking scheme an the scheme in [8] with a marking probability for each router q=0.04. Distance Boun of E[x] the scheme in [8] Boun of E[x] our propose scheme Table Comparison of the expecte number of packets for the victim to reconstruct the attack path As compare to [8], the convergence time of our propose algorithm to reconstruct the attack path is ramatically reuce at the cost of the router overhea. For instance, the first router on the attack path is suppose to mark every packet, the secon router is suppose to mark every other packet. Another issue is that each marking router is suppose to know its own position on the attack path, i.e., its istance to the first router in the attack path. This can be resolve by the authentication techniques escribe in the previous subsection. D. Implementation of the propose scheme As shown in Figure 4, there are 25 bits (in shaow) in the IP heaer that might be use as the marking fiel. It was claime, in [2], that the TOS fiel has been rarely use, an in some limite experiments, setting this fiel arbitrarily makes no measurable ifference in packet elivery. Since less than 0.25% Internet traffics are fragmente, overloaing the Fragment Ientification fiel is consiere to be acceptable [3]. A etaile iscussion of overloaing Fragment ID can be foun in [8]. One flag bit, not use in the current Internet stanar, can also be use as the marking fiel. Ver 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits start en t_ist m_ist m HLen TOS 25 bits D M F F Total Length Ientification Fragment Offset TTL Protocol Checksum Source Aress Destination Aress Figure 4 Encoing traceback information in the IP heaer Note that t_ist represents the travele istance of a packet from the first truste router, an it is use to compute the marking probability at each iniviual router. m_ist represents the travele istance from the router which marks this packet; it is use to etermine the position of the marking ege in the attack path. m represents the message ISBN /$ IEEE Page 330

6 igest of the marking fiel an a certain part of this packet; it is for authentication use, i.e., to guarantee the marking fiel is not spoofe. Figure 5 illustrates the generation of the message igest m via a hash function. Note that 8-bit ata represents a certain part of the atagram, for instance, the first 8 bits in the atagram, an h i (.) represents the hash function of router r i. The pseuo-coe of the propose marking scheme is illustrate in Figure 6. E. Discussion One of the most important features of the propose scheme, which is better than the previous probabilistic marking scheme, is that it is able to achieves zero false positive when there is only a single attacker. When there are multiple attackers, the istance from the first truste router (t_ist) can be use to reuce the number of false positive. During reconstruction, the victim can only retrieve orere router labels instea of IP aresses, an thus reconstructe paths must be valiate. 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 5 bits 8 bits start en t_ist m_ist ata m 5 bits h i (.) Figure 5 Generation of message igest m Marking proceure at router r i: for each packet x from r j if x.m=h j(x.start, x.en, x.t_ist, x.m_ist, x.ata) then let q i xt. _ ist+ let y be a ranom number, where y [0,] if y qi then write label of r i into x.start an 0 into x.m_ist else if x.m_ist=0 then write label of r i into x.en else x.t_ist x.t_ist+ x.m_ist x.m_ist+ else write label of r i into x.start, 0 into x.m_ist an x.t_ist x.m (x.start, x.en, x.t_ist, x.m_ist, x.ata) Figure 6 The propose marking scheme V. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we have propose a novel probabilistic packet marking scheme, which possesses the following esirable properties: ) minimum convergence time; 2) capable of preventing attackers from spoofing marking fiel; 3) zero false positive for a single attacker; 4) no nee to have prior knowlege of the entire upstream topology. However, as compare with previous works on probabilistic packet marking scheme, one significant rawback is that the router overhea has to be increase significantly ue to the following two reasons: ) when a packet arrives, each marking router has to valiate the information in the marking fiel, i.e., the message igest, an then generates a new message igest before the router transmits the packet; 2) the marking probability of each router increases as well. There are still some open issues for future research: ) to traceback attackers themselves instea of the sources of the offensive traffic; 2) to evelop an attack path valiation mechanism; 3) to fin a compensation for overloaing the Fragment ID fiel. VI. REFERENCE [] K. Park an H. Lee, On the effectiveness of routebase packet filtering for istribute DoS attack prevention in power-law internets, Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 200, pp [2] H. Burch an B. Cheswick, Tracing anonymous packets to their approximate source, Proc USENIX LISA Conference, Dec. 2000, pp [3] R. Stone, CenterTrack: An IP overlay network for tracking DoS floos, Proc USENIX Security Symposium, July 2000, pp [4] P. Ferguson an D. Senie, Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Aress Spoofing, May 2000, [5] S. Bellovin, M. Leech, an T. Taylor, ICMP Traceback Messages, [6] S.F.Wu, W. Huang, D. Massey, A. Mankin, C.L. Wu, X.L. Zhao, an L. Zhang, Intention-Driven ICMP Trace-Back, [7] A.C. Snoeren, C. Partige, L.A. Sanchez, C.E. Jones, F. Tchakountio, S.T. Kent, an W.T. Strayer, Hashebase IP traceback, Proc. 200 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, an Protocols for Computer Communications, pp [8] S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, an T. Anerson, Network support for IP traceback, IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 9, no. 3, June 200, pp [9] K. Park an H. Lee, On the effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback uner enial of service attack, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 200, pp [0] T.W. Doeppner, P.N. Klein, an A. Koyfman, Using router stamping to ientify the source of IP packets, Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Computer an Communications Security, Nov. 2000,. pp ISBN /$ IEEE Page 33

7 [] D. X. Song an A. Perrig., Avance an authenticate marking schemes for IP traceback, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 200, pp [2] D. Dean, M. Franklin, an A. Stubblefiel, An algebraic approach to IP traceback, ACM Transactions on Information an System Security, vol. 5, no. 2, May 2002, pp [3] I. Stoica an H. Zhang, Proviing guarantee services without per flow management, Proc. ACM SIGCOM 99, pp ISBN /$ IEEE Page 332

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