Lost Power The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation

Transcription

1 Lost Power The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation Birthe Hansen, Peter Toft and Anders Wivel Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdspapir 2003/04

2 Institut for Statskundskab Københavns Universitet Rosenborggade København K. ISSN ISBN

3 Lost Power The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation Birthe Hansen, Peter Toft, and Anders Wivel The contemporary world order has produced winners as well as losers. The United States now enjoys unprecedented power and leverage to influence the global agenda as the only remaining superpower. Germany, divided and severely constrained in its foreign policy options during the Cold War, is now reunited and a major political and economic force in most aspects of European politics. The states of Central and Eastern Europe, freed from Soviet dominance, are now able to pursue their own foreign policy goals. China, for most of the Cold War locked into the bipolar conflict, is now emerging as the dominant power in Asia. By contrast, the vast majority of states have lost strategic importance and foreign policy leverage. Russia, a former superpower, is now reduced to a regional power focused mainly on problems in its immediate vicinity rather than influencing the global agenda. The former Soviet allies in the Third World and members of the Cold War non-aligned movement, enjoying a number of side-benefits from the superpower conflict, are now politically and strategically marginalized. Finally, the European and Asian allies of the United States, highly important in the American containment policy during the Cold War, have lost strategic importance and political influence as the United States increasingly dominates the international agenda. However, while the foreign policy strategies of the winners of the Cold War have been explored in great detail this is not the case as to the strategies of the losers. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to outline the basic components of a research project Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation - on the foreign policy strategy of the losers of the contemporary world order. 1 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We begin with a short elaboration of the main problem identified and explicate the aim of the research project. Next the paper outlines our theoretical point of departure and delineates our fundamental theoretical assumptions. This enables us to suggest three preliminary expectations of the 1 The adaptation framework for studying foreign policy behaviour (Mouritzen, 1988; Petersen 1977; 1998,; 2000; Rosenau 1970) has been an inspiration for parts of this research project. However, the adaptation framework is mainly based on the conceptualisation of different foreign policy strategies, including a typology and relates primarily to European politics.

4 project and we briefly present three cases from the contemporary world order to be studied as part of the project. 2 Finally, we delineate and substantiate the methods and research strategy chosen. The Problem and the Aim The Cold War left the United States in a position of unprecedented power. Accordingly, we characterise the contemporary order as unipolar, because a defining characteristic is the asymmetric distribution of power favouring the United States as the only superpower, a unipole. However, so far research on the unipolar world order has focused largely on the general dynamics of the system and the actions of the American unipole. 3 In contrast, we focus on the states that lost relatively as a consequence of unipolarity and seek to explain how this loss has affected their foreign policy strategies and why they have chosen different strategies. There are three reasons why this is important. First, in order to explain world politics, we need to understand the challenges, options and choices of the losers just as well as those of the winners. The war in Chechnya, the rise in terrorist activity based in the Middle East and South Asia, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction epitomised in the Iraq-crisis are all examples of losers seeking to adapt to the unipolar world order, but so is the desire of many European states to participate in NATO and the European Union. Thus, it is impossible to assess whether the world is becoming a more peaceful or a more dangerous place to live in, if we have no knowledge of what lies behind the strategic choices and actions by the losers. The hitherto rather narrow focus on the United States and the general dynamics of the system only tells one side of the story. This project, however, seeks to tell the other side of the story. Second, the losers face a huge task of formulating and implementing policies of adaptation to the unipolar world order. The adjustment process includes a change of foreign policy strategy and military doctrine often combined with a restructuring of domestic society, and a search for new allies and partners. In addition, the adaptation strategy of the losers may pose a potential source of instability globally, regionally or locally - and therefore a threat to other states and the political order. Because of the complex nature of this process and the high risk of failure associated with it, solid empirical investigation based on a coherent 2 Continuously updated information on the research project including information on publications and project participants can be found at 3 This focus reflects the American bias in the study of international relations in general and in the study of unipolarity in particular. An exception, however, is Hansen (2000a), which serves as the theoretical starting point for our conceptualisation of unipolar dynamics.

5 theoretical framework of how and why losers adapt, and why they choose one course of action over another is needed in order to provide a more sound basis for political debate and decision-making. For these reasons the project is highly relevant at the policy level supplying us with systematised information about the strategy and motivations of the losers and a coherent theoretical framework enabling us to explain their actions. Third, the theoretical implications of Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation are just as important. In the discipline of international relations, the concept of unipolarity is currently the subject of a scholarly debate. 4 This is particularly true of the realist research programme, which traditionally focuses on the effect of the distribution of power on international and foreign policy. This focus combined with the complexity and novelty of the new world order has resulted in a rich and fruitful debate modifying and re-invigorating the realist tradition over the past decade. 5 Of particular importance has been the specification of realist predictions of international outcomes and the attempts to develop a theoretical understanding of how international structure affects foreign policy. At the same time however, theory development and empirical analysis have been biased toward the winners of the new world order: the United States and its major allies and potential challengers. Accordingly, an important blind spot of the contemporary development of the realist research programme is how the losers of power, prestige and influence adapt to the contemporary world order. This research project aims to tell the other side of the story about the contemporary world order by focusing on the losing states from a realist perspective. In particular, it will allow us to answer two questions: 1) How have the states under investigation chosen to adapt to the American world order? 2) Why have they preferred one type of response to their new situation over others? In addition, our realist point of departure prompts us to ask a number of more specific sub-questions such as: How do changes in the international structure affect the foreign policy strategy of the losers? Why do some of them 4 See e.g. Hansen (2000a; 2000b), Ikenberry (2001), Joffe (2001), Kissinger (2001), Krauthammer (1990/91; 2002/03), Layne (1998), Heurlin (1998), Walt (1998), Waltz (2000a), Wohlforth (1999) and the essays collected in Kapstein and Mastanduno (1999) and Kristol and Kagan (2000). 5 Major contributions to this debate include Brooks (1997), Glaser (1995; 1997), Mearsheimer (1994/95; 2001), Posen and Ross (1996/97), Rose (1998), Schweller (1998), Snyder (1991), Taliaferro (2000/01), Van Evera (1999), Walt (1987), Zakaria (1998) and the essays collected in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1995), Frankel (1996) and Kapstein and Mastanduno (1999). An influential European intervention in this otherwise predominantly American debate is Buzan, Jones and Little (1993). For discussions of the development of the realist tradition after Waltz, see Legro and Moravcsik (1999), Vasquez et al. (1997), Walt (2002) and Wivel (2002a). For a discussion of how this debate is related to the broader realist tradition, see Rosecrance (2001) and Wivel (2002b). Recent comprehensive assessments of the broader realist tradition include Donnelly (2000) and Haslam (2002).

6 choose a revisionist strategy while others support maintenance of the status quo? Asking and answering these questions from a realist perspective is likely to cause international attention and debate, because it challenges the current focus while at the same time putting forward a constructive answer to the challenge by providing theoretical and conceptual developments and empirical investigation complementary to contemporary research. Theoretical Framework Our theoretical framework takes its point of departure in the contemporary structural realist research programme. Realism, however, like most other perspectives on international relations is a continuous work in progress with a myriad of different theories and models. In particular, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent critique of the (neo)realist perspective on international relations led to a proliferation of new realist approaches and theories. In addition to the conventional notions of classical realism and neorealism, the post-cold War era has added at least 20 different realisms to the tradition. 6 The new developments have allowed for more detailed studies of foreign policy, but to the outsider this has created a sprawling and often impenetrable intra-realist debate. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the exact nature of the realist framework used here and explain its contribution to the contemporary debate and development of the realist tradition. This project takes its point of departure in neorealist theory as formulated by Kenneth Waltz. 7 We start from the premise that the international system is anarchic. Anarchy is not meant in the sense of disorder but as an ordering principle. Thus, as phrased by Joseph Grieco international anarchy implies that there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to dominate or even destroy them. 8 The absence of a central authority that could protect the states against each other, leads every state to focus primarily on its own security and survival. When every state ultimately depends on itself to take care of its own security, it worries about its relative power vis-à-vis other states. Since there is no overarching authority to prevent states from taking advantage of each other and since states cannot be sure about each other s future intentions, they tend to base their 6 These include structural realism (Buzan, Jones & Little, 1993), neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998), postclassical realism (Brooks, 1997), defensive and aggressive realism (Snyder, 1991), human-nature realism (Mearsheimer, 2001), motive based realism (Kydd, 1997), state centric realism (Zakaria, 1998), fine-grained structural realism (Van Evera, 1999), Machiavellian fundamentalism, Hobbesian structuralism and Rousseau an constitutionalism (Doyle, 1997), specific and general realism (Rosecrance, 2001), romantic realism (Liska 1998), subordinate realism (Ayoob, 1998), periphery realism (Escudé, 1998) in addition to contingent and universal realism (Wivel, 2000; 2002a). 7 Waltz (1979). 8 Grieco (1990: 38).

7 foreign policy on power calculations rather than ideational factors. Simply put, they cannot afford to base their foreign policy entirely on ideology or culture, because this would put their survival at risk. Therefore, the international realm is dominated by power politics. Power politics, according to Waltz, are played out in different ways depending on the distribution of power in the international system. 9 The central issue here is the number of great powers. The most important distinction is between bipolar systems - systems with two great powers - and multipolar systems - systems with more than two great powers. 10 Waltz posits that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, but also that the two types of structure entail different dangers. In a multipolar world, miscalculation is the greatest danger to international security and the probability of conflict is impossible to calculate. No state is strong enough to balance the others by internal means. Accordingly, all must rely on external means of balancing, i.e. alliances. Since alliance patterns shift easily, today s friend might be tomorrow s foe, and it is unclear who should deal with a threat when it arises. Dangers may emerge from multiple sources, not easily discernible in advance. By contrast, in a bipolar world the two great powers are mostly self-reliant. Compared to multipolarity, uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation are reduced in a bipolar world, because each great power can concentrate its efforts on focusing on its main adversary. This, however, entails the risk of overreaction, because of the intense monitoring of the adversary s every move. We make three modifications to Waltz s theory. First, in accordance with most contemporary realists we see the present international system as unipolar, i.e. with only one superpower. Applying Hansen s model for unipolarity, we assume the peripheral powers range of response to be restricted, because they have only one option for super power alignment: the United States. 11 Second, we find that a state s response to a particular world order is influenced by the likelihood of military conflict. This likelihood varies widely across the international system and conditions the type of response by the losing powers; in particular whether military or political-economic means are seen as the most efficient instruments to further state interests. 12 We investigate one case of low likelihood of military conflict (the Nordic states), one case of medium likelihood of military conflict (Russia) and one case of high level of military conflict (former Soviet allies in the Third World). Third, 9 Waltz (1979: ). 10 See e.g. Waltz (1988: 44-48). 11 Hansen (1995; 2000a; 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2002). For discussions of its logic and application, see Sheikh (2002) and Toft (2002). 12 Wivel (2000). The most important determinants of the likelihood of conflict are assumed to be the geopolitical environment and nuclear weapons.

8 rather than assuming states to be either offensive or defensive, we investigate what factors lead to offensive and defensive foreign policy postures. The three modifications place our study at the heart of the contemporary realist debate. First, the dividing line between offensive and defensive realists has been central since the early 1990s. 13 Offensive realists assume that states continuously strive to maximise their relative power with the ultimate aim of hegemony. However, because not everyone can maximise relative power at the same time conflict is frequent in the international system. By contrast, defensive realists assume that states aim at maintaining their relative position of power in the international system, but do not aim for hegemony since this would prompt a countervailing alliance that might in the end defeat the first state. Conflicts are therefore the result, not of conflicting interests, but of overreaction and miscalculations stemming from the anarchic structure of the international system. Rather than taking sides in this debate we seek to nuance it by investigating the exact conditions under which states choose one of the strategies over the other. Second, an important result of the contemporary realist debate has been to specify the implications of realist thought for the conduct of foreign policy. 14 Our research project adds to this development of realist foreign policy theory by exploring how and why losers choose one strategy over another. Finally, the realist debate on the policy implications of unipolarity has so far focused on the winners, in particular the United States. 15 By applying realism to the analysis of states that suffered a loss as a result of unipolarity we gain new insights about the policy options of the losers as well as the winners. Thus, while our main intention is to tell the other side of the story, this other side has significant importance for the policy options of the United States, its allies and potential challengers. Our modification of neorealist theory fits into a broader trend in contemporary realism that aims to explore the potential of realism as a foreign policy theory. Critics have argued that this development has led to the creation of an ever-larger number of auxiliary hypotheses protecting the elusive core of the realist research programme by explaining away anomalies. 16 According to this line of criticism the new realist developments have failed to specify the conditions necessary for a test of the realist research programme and, therefore, realism is impossible to falsify. It has become a menu for choice that can never be proven wrong. A second - but related argument finds that the recent developments of the realist 13 The most comprehensive statement of the defensive realist position is Waltz (1979). The most comprehensive statement of the offensive realist position is Mearsheimer (2001). Only recently has there been a call for reconciliation between the two positions (Snyder, 2002). 14 See e.g. Elman (1996), Guzzini and Rynning (2001), Rose (1998), Wivel (2002a; 2002b). 15 See e.g. the essays collected in Brown et al. (2000). 16 Vasquez (1997).

9 research programme have undermined the shared identity of realism and made realism indistinguishable from other perspectives on international relations. 17 We disagree that the contemporary development of realist foreign policy theory necessarily leads to an undermining of the explanatory power or identity of the realist research programme. Arguably, the addition of new and better specified hypotheses should not be seen as a challenge or contradiction to neorealist theory, but as a development of its basic insights. The choice between a general theory of international politics and a specific foreign policy theory is not an either/or choice between parsimony and contextual subtlety but a question of different stages in theory development. 18 At first we should seek parsimony and then gradually add complexity in order to enhance the explanatory power of the approach. Each step is equally valuable, but tells us different things. The most parsimonious version of the theory lays out the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the international system and the character of its units. The more complex versions of the theory adds contextual subtlety thereby increasing the explanatory power over a selected range of cases, but at the same time reducing the number of cases that the theory applies to. Thus, in our case, we share the neorealist understanding of international relations presented above but add a number of specific assumptions in order to create a theoretical framework applicable to the losers of the American world order after the Cold War. What are the specific assumptions of this theoretical framework? The next section presents a preliminary answer. Specific Assumptions and Expectations In addition to the neorealist starting point and the three modifications outlined above, we share a set of specific assumptions and expectations about the adaptation process of the losers of the unipolar world order. Even though the assumptions, concepts and expectations will be refined and further developed in the research process, it is possible to outline a number of preliminary expectations. We define a unipolar world order as the combination of 1) a highly asymmetric distribution of strength in the international system leaving one state significantly stronger than the rest (in the contemporary world order this position is occupied by the United States); and 2) the political project of the unipole (in the contemporary world order the American model for market economy, liberal democracy, human rights, and horizontal non- 17 Legro and Moravcsik (1999). 18 Cf. Keohane (1986) and Wivel (2000).

10 proliferation of nuclear weapons. 19 We define a loser as an actor, which has been subject to a relative decline in position: that is, an international decrease in aggregate capabilities (territory, population, economy, military, resource endowment, political stability and competence, 20 to the loss of major political allies, and/or to the loss of influence in terms of strategic importance. In contrast, a winner is defined as an actor, which has improved its international position. In accordance with these definitions of losers and winners, we define politics of adaptation as the formulation and implementation of foreign policy strategies necessary to preserve or improve the international position of the state. These strategies span a continuum from dominance, over bullying, balancing, opposition, neutrality, and bandwagoning to integration. Thus, the politics of adaptation may be offensive as well as defensive and an important goal of our study is to explain why states choose one particular strategy of adaptation over alternative policy options. All losers share a common challenge, because they find that their strategic options are now fewer and less desirable than in the past. In case of security problems they have only one option for superpower alignment, the United States, and in general they need to provide for their own security and contribute to the maintenance of the stability of their geopolitical environment to a larger degree than in the past. Therefore, we expect states to flock around the unipole in case of immediate threats to their survival and to engage in hard work in order to maintain order and security regionally. 21 This general trend may take many different forms and lead to various foreign policy strategies. It leads to general outcomes in the international system, rather than specific foreign policy strategies. Thus, unipolarity is an important condition for the foreign policy strategy of the losers, but it does not cause specific strategies, nor can it explain variations between states. Instead following the general logic of the argument above - we expect the variations to be in accordance with the (geo)political location vis-à-vis the unipolar core of the system. We argue that there are at least three different categories of location. Each of them constitutes a particular part of the periphery around the unipolar core in the contemporary world order Hansen (2000a). The model is globalised through the lack of powerful constraints and through the U.S. active policy for globalising its model (Hansen 2000c; 2002): the model thereby makes up the content of what is being globalised, and the current globalisation process is facilitated by the lack of competition and constraints. Other realist analyses that couple globalisation and unipolarity include Wolfowitz (2000), Kapstein (1999) and Waltz (2000b). For an overview and discussion of how this argument relates to other realist arguments on globalisation, see Wivel (2002c). 20 Cf. Waltz (1979: 131) 21 For a discussion of these concepts, see Hansen (2000a: Chapter 2). 22 Thus, the international system may be pictured as a U.S. core surrounded by concentric circles. Picturing an international system as a system of concentric circles is usually associated with the English School of

11 The first category comprises the states facing a low probability of military conflict. They are fully integrated into the American world order and mainly located in Western Europe and Latin America, i.e. regions characterised by a low probability of conflict, because the unipole guarantees security and stability. They share the basic norms promoted by the unipole and are members of most of the international organisations used by the unipole to promote these norms, e.g. the WTO and NATO. In short, these states are the insiders of the unipolar world order. The second category comprises the states facing a medium probability of conflict. They are neither fully integrated in the unipolar world order, nor representing an alternative vision of order. These states are located in regions with no superpower security guarantee. Therefore, they constantly face the challenge of maintaining stability in their geopolitical environment and containing low-level conflicts before they develop into existential threats. They are the potential insiders of the American world order. The third category comprises the states facing a comparatively high probability of military conflict. They explicitly denounce the norms and values dominating the system as decadent and threatening and they actively engage in a fight against the values by means ranging from terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction to economic and ideological support to political groups. As we expect states within each of these spheres to share some important behavioural characteristics our stated theoretical framework enables us to suggest the following preliminary expectations. The insiders are dependent on the United States for their security and generally face a low probability of conflict. Thus, flocking is permanent and institutionalised and hard work takes place through regional organisations of security and trade. Therefore, we expect the adaptation strategies of the losers in the insider category to be peaceful and focused on the long-term. international relations (Watson, 1992). However, the model is in accordance with our modified neorealist perspective as well. For a discussion of how and why neorealism and the English School (and regime theory) may be understood as complementary rather than competing approaches, see Buzan (1993). The direct source of inspiration for our model is Mouritzen, Wæver and Wiberg (1996). However, Mouritzen, Wæver and Wiberg s development and application of adaptation theory on Europe results in a different theoretical framework than the one suggested here, even though we use the basic logic of their model as our starting point for theorising about the periphery.

12 The potential insiders on the contrary have to take care of their own security. Therefore, the superpower is unlikely to interfere with their military actions as long as they do not threaten the stability of the system or its insiders. Accordingly, we expect the adaptation strategies of the losers in the potential insider category to be a combination of military actions on the regional level and diplomatic efforts on the global level. We expect flocking to take place when the survival of the state is under immediate threat and hard work to take place through military build-up and alliances. The focus is on the medium term as the states attempt to strike a compromise between managing regional security problems and exploring the possibility of joining the insider category. Finally, the outsiders focus strictly on the short term as they strive to promote an alternative order. Flocking is difficult and hard work in the form of symmetric alliances is likely to be seldom and short-lived, because of the sanctions from the unipole and its allies. Three Cases According to the expectations outlined above the project aims at investigating three cases comprising losers within each category. In the insider category Anders Wivel aims to explore how the Nordic countries - on the winning side of the Cold War - have been marginalized in the unipolar world order. Positing the existence of a particular Nordic balance and a Nordic model of foreign policy promoting progressive values such as democracy peace and global equality, the Nordic countries enjoyed a unique position during the Cold War. 23 However, global and regional developments following from the unipolar world order have severely restrained their potential for independent foreign policy making, and consequently the Nordic countries are now situated in the international and European periphery. In accordance with the general ambitions of Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation, Wivel focuses on three issues in particular. First, he focuses on how unipolar dynamics affect the Nordic states strategic room for manoeuvre. The project investigates how and why the contemporary world order 23 The Nordic balance does not refer to an internal balance between the Nordic countries, but to an effect of the Nordic states strategic position in the bipolar struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War creating stability and peace through various security arrangements (Solheim, 1994: Chapter 1). On the Nordic model of foreign policy-making, see Mouritzen (1995).

13 affects different issue areas differently and to what extent the Nordic countries have been able to influence global and regional agendas in these areas. 24 Second, the effect of the very low probability of military conflict and the institutionalised nature of the European region on the Nordic states possibilities for international influence and agenda setting is explored. 25 A particularly interesting question in this regard is what institutional strategies the Nordic States may use most effectively when exercising their politics of adaptation. For instance, it has been argued that in the EU system even small states may achieve a considerable level of influence by coming up with innovative initiatives, presenting themselves as honest brokers and building supportive alliances or networks. 26 Thus, the project considers how the particular nature of the periphery in Europe peaceful and highly institutionalised - may be used by the Nordic and other marginalized states to gain more influence over international developments in the future. Finally, Wivel examines whether offensive or defensive strategies have been most effective in general and in regard to specific issues and how this has affected the position of the Nordic countries and their relations to the American superpower. 27 In accordance with the methodology and analytical procedure outlined below the research process explores the nature and degree of loss experienced by the Nordic states, and how their relative loss is related to the unipolar world order. It analyses how the peripheral position of the Nordic states affects their foreign policy options and explores and evaluates the strategies used by the Nordic states in the present world order. In the potential insider category Peter Toft aims to explore how the successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the major loser of the Cold War has dealt with the transition from a position as a global superpower to a major, albeit regional great power. Although, Russia is weakened severely the country continues to possess considerable conventional forces and has nuclear weapons with second strike capability. Furthermore, Russia has a large well-educated population, vast natural resources, and economic potential. Thus, Russia s policy continues to be of importance internationally. Moreover, as a Eurasian power, Russia has traditionally played an important role in European politics since it first emerged as a great power in the 17 th century. And even though the dominance of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe 24 A recent study suggests that the Nordic countries have been able to play a role as norm entrepreneurs in regard to environmental norms, multilateral security and global welfare (Ingebritsen, 2002). 25 Gruber (2000) and Wivel (2000) suggest that the basic dynamics of power politics persist, but that they are now exercised within and by means of international institutions. 26 See e.g. Arter (2000) who explores the case of Finland s Northern Dimension Initiative. 27 See e.g. Hanhimäki (1997) on the complex nature of this relationship during and after the Cold War.

14 disappeared after 1989, the Russian successor state of the former USSR continues to be a major power by European standards and commands an array of political, economical, and strategic interests in Europe, Northeast and Central Asia. Thus, Russia s politics of adaptation to the unipolar world order is a crucial case. Furthermore, being a losing major power, Russia constitutes an important case concerning how a great power deals with the effects of having lost its former international position of power and prestige. In accordance with the general ambition of Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation, Toft focuses on three issues in particular. First, the aim is to investigate how Russia has coped with its decline since its voluntary unconditional surrender in In particular, it is investigated how the unipolar dynamics have influenced and constrained Russia s foreign policy options. Compared to most other losing states Russia probably lost the most as its position of power went into a steep decline. In 1989 it had to abandon the outer layers of empire in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 further reduced the core state of Russia roughly to the size it entertained in However, Russia also maintains certain valuable assets. Most importantly the country continues to possess a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, since 1991 it also has improved its dominant position within its near abroad as the newly independent states of the former USSR declined even more than Russia. 29 This situation provided Russia with a host of policy options. Second, it is explored how Russia in the context of a medium probability of military conflict chose between these options. A particularly interesting question in this regard is how Russia in exercising its politics of adaptation has attempted to use its predominant position within the borders of the former Soviet Union to establish closer ties with a list of the post-soviet republics and at the same time used its relative weakness as a potential asset to gain support from the West. 30 Third, the project explores whether Russian foreign policy strategy can be characterised in terms offensive and defensive strategies and to which extent each type has proved most effective in general and in regard to specific issues. To be sure, elements of both strategies have been evident. For instance, in relation to the plans for NATO-enlargement Russia has attempted to scare off the new NATO members is East and Central Europe from joining the alliance while at the same time putting pressure on NATO not to accept new 28 Heurlin (1991: 7-8) 29 Cf. Mandelbaum (1998) 30 McFarlane (1999)

15 members in that area as well as in the Baltic region. 31 Furthermore, Russia has frequently intervened militarily in the other post-soviet states and used their dependence of i.e. Russian energy supplies to extract political, military, and economical concessions. At the same time, however, Russia has pursued a strategic partnership with the United States and pursued accommodation with the West in general. In accordance with the general aim of the project this part of the research process investigates the character and degree of loss experienced by Russia, and how its politics of adaptation is affected by the unipolar dynamics. Thus, it is analysed how the reduced international position of the Russian Federation has influenced its foreign policy options and its eventual strategic choices are evaluated on the background of the dynamics of the contemporary unipolar world order. In the outsider category Birthe Hansen argues that the emergence of offensive strategies and large-scale international terrorism during the first phase of unipolarity ( ) is closely linked to relative decline 32. In accordance with the general ambition of Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation Hansen aims at explaining the choice of strategies of the states in the outsider category with a reference to their post-cold war loss of international position rather than explaining their behaviour by a reference to the character of their regimes or degree of development. Likewise, the emergence of large-scale international terrorism is explained by the penetration of specific unipolar features causing the fear of losing position among middle-level strata in states poorly suited to cope with the challenges. This explanation is different from e.g. the poverty-thesis or Samuel Huntington s civilization-thesis. States and terrorists belong to different categories of actors, and consequently two sets of specific hypotheses are put on trial although sharing the basic explanatory reference of decline. In the case of states, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are assumingly enhancing the incentive to opt for offensive strategies. In the case of terrorism, the relative decline is specified and combined with the regional and popular ability to cope with the spread of the specific features of the U.S. unipolar world order (described as the globalization of democracy and market economy). A capability analysis is carried out and the findings are compared to average measures. For the states this is done in terms of relative, aggregate capabilities (cf. Waltz 31 Cf. Prizel & Michta (1995); Toft (2002) 32 The argument was presented in Hansen (2000) but needs elaboration and further evidence.

16 1979) including the notion of nuclear threshold capabilities, which provides an incentive to pursue non-adaptive strategies, 33 for the terrorist groups this is done in terms of strata of recruitment. The results should inform us to what extent decline holds explanatory power regarding non-adaptive strategies. In the first place, states in the periphery subject to 1989-decline are identified: These are mainly Middle Eastern states 34. The four main losers among those are then selected for closer examination: Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Yemens (which soon after merged into the Republic of Yemen). These states chose a variety of offensive strategies (and some strategies were altered in the course of the 1990 s). In addition, a non-mideast actor, North Korea, is examined for relative decline because it followed a strategy of confrontation during the 1990 s. In the second place, the post-cold War wave of international terrorism is identified and described as an anti-american, international wave with Middle Eastern roots. In the third place, the methodological questions according to the research project Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation are asked to both the losing states and the terrorist groups. Unipolarity is distinct from other polarities in the sense that there are no competing superpowers: consequently, in order to balance a superpower, actors cannot ally with another superpower. Likewise, powerful internal parties in support of their demands are hard to find. Unipolarity does not provide the actors with the same amount of superpowerrelated options, but it stands out as the centre of attention. This leads to two hypotheses on the relationship between unipolarity and terrorism: 1) The unipole invites terrorist response as the unipole cannot help provoke some groups and actors by its dominant position, and 2) unipolarity invites terrorism because the weary groups and actors lack powerful allies to forward their case. We also have to look at the project pursued by the unipole in order to specify the actors and groups, which are poorly suited to cope with the American project and likely to become dissatisfied. While other factors may interfere, we can point to the losing position as a risk factor in itself, and we can also point to some areas at risk of producing terrorism. After 1989, the Middle East as a region has so far has been subject to an immense relative decline. The region was weakened in all capabilities, including the classic economic parameters 35 and is therefore regarded a high risk area. In addition, many groups in the 33 Hansen (2002b) 34 Henry & Springborg (2001) 35 Ibid.

17 Middle East are poorly suited to cope with the decline as well as the changes. 36 In accordance with the general ambition and method of Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation, Hansen focuses on three issues in particular. First, she aims to demonstrate that political strategies of non-adaptation are found among states, which are subject to relative decline related to the end of the Cold War, and that the degree of non-adaptation corresponds by the relative size of the decline in combination with a WMD-capacity. Second, it is shown that international terrorist attacks primarily have their origins in areas subject to a relative decline in combination with being poorly suited to cope with the spread of the specific features of U.S. Unipolarity. Third, these findings are related to the hypotheses in order to investigate the opposition policies of the rogue states and terrorist groups. Depending on the character of the findings the hypotheses are developed into the theoretical framework for unipolarity in accordance with the general aim of the research project. This enables us to offer a different explanation for e.g. the behaviour and the changes of Yemenite policy and the Iraqi reluctance of eliminating its WMD-capacity (in contrast to explanations based on nationhood respectively tyranny) as well as of the attacks of the al- Qaida network (in contrast to explanations based on the poverty-thesis or Huntington s civilization-thesis). Method and Research Strategy In accordance with contemporary realism our methodological starting point is modified critical rationalism. 37 Critical rationalism provides a template upon which we model our research process. It tells us that we should start by stating an initial problem. Then suggest a trial solution and confront the trial solution with empirical evidence. Finally, this process allows us to restate the problem based on the analysis and to repeat the basic procedure but from a better starting point. 36 While some areas are clearly more at risk than others, there will be segments within also areas, which are apparently not at risk. Even within the United States, losers emerge, which has led to terrorism (Hansen 2001a). 37 The most important modification is that IR scholars (like most other social scientists) do not give the same weight to falsification as Karl Popper did in the original statement of the position (Popper, 1959; 1989). For a discussion of falsification and the social sciences, see King, Keohane and Verba (1994: ). For discussions of contemporary realism and critical rationalism, see Mouritzen (1997) and Wivel (2000: Chapter 1).

18 The research strategy chosen is the case study. 38 The case study is particularly suitable for this project, because it has a specific advantage over other potential research strategies when an explanatory question of how or why is being asked. The proposed research project asks two main questions: How have the states under investigation adapted to the American world order, and why have they preferred one type of response to their new situation over others. Furthermore, the case study is a good choice when dealing with a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control. 39 The project certainly deals with contemporary events over which we have little or no control, since our main focus is on the foreign policies of states. As the aim is primarily to substantiate and qualify our findings concerning patterns of strategies, we are using secondary and already known primary sources. The sources are selected in order to provide representative information regarding all the relevant questions of the adaptation process of the actors such as the loss related to the end of the Cold War, type and degree of decline, capability profiles (as background for action), alignment options, political room for manoeuvre, and their ability and readiness to benefit from the new world order. The objection raised most often against case study research is that the results of a case study cannot be generalised to other cases. 40 This is because data points are too few to check adequately for omitted variables, and because it is difficult to assess the relative importance of antecedent conditions that magnify the effect of independent and intervening variables. However, while it is true that case studies cannot be used for statistical generalisation, i.e. generalisation to a population or a universe, they can be used for analytical generalisation, i.e. generalisation to a theory as part of the process of theory development. 41 The basic idea, which is applied here, is that a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed. 42 We select our cases and conduct our case studies in accordance with the method of structured, focused comparison, which is designed to facilitate the use of case studies in 38 For general discussions of the nature and use of case studies in Political Science, see Eckstein (1975), George (1979), George and Mckeown (1985), King, Keohane and Verba (1994:43-46), McKeown (1999) and Van Evera (1997: Chapter 2). The choice of the case study as a research strategy is in accordance with most contemporary realist analyses of international relations, see e.g. Grieco (1990), Schweller (1998), Snyder (1991), Walt (1987) and Zakaria (1998). 39 Yin (1994: 4). 40 For discussions, see Stake (1995: 7-9), Van Evera (1997: Chapter 2) and Yin (1994: Chapter 1). 41 Yin (1994: 30-32). 42 Ibid.: (1994: 31).

19 theory development (George and McKeown, 1985). According to this method, we should choose cases that differ either on the value of the independent or dependent variable, because this will facilitate a robust analysis (George, 1979). We choose cases that differ on the dependent variable: foreign policy strategies. In the insider category, we choose the Nordic states, five small states in a benign and stable region protected by an American security guarantee. These states were on the winning side, but afterwards they have lost strategic importance and international prestige, because they are no longer able to point to a specific Nordic balance and exercise a particular Nordic model of foreign policy making. In the potential insider category we choose the successor state of the major loser of the Cold War, Russia, which had to cope with the transition from being a superpower to becoming a peripheral regional power while in the midst of an internal break-up that transformed its political and economic system as well as produced new unstable states at its borders. Finally in the outsider category we choose a group of states and non-state actors 43 in a truly peripheral situation. These states were previously aligned to the Soviet Union or benefited from the superpower rivalry in the so-called Third World. Today, they have lost support and their major ally, and they are under pressure from the spread of the unipolar world order. Some of these, most notably Iraq, chose to oppose the world order. The analysis stretches from the end of the Cold War in 1989 to the end of the first phase of the new world order by This way, an adequate time-span is provided while other factors are held constant. In addition, adaptation is a process, and the analysis thus needs a time-span. However, if the time-span were extended, it would hardly be possible to trace the effects of the 1989-decline. The effects might then be blurred or overshadowed by subsequent effects caused by other events. According to the method of focused, structured comparison, we should formulate a theoretically relevant general question to guide the examination of each case (as we have done above) in order to define and standardise the data requirements of the study and deal selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study (George and McKeown, 1985: 43 The al-qaida network is included in the group of actors being in a truly peripheral situation. The hypothesis is that the network represents losing strata. It will be analysed in a way similar to the state actors with slightly different methods. 44 Hansen and Jensen (2003)

20 41). In accordance with these criteria, all three case studies follow the same 8-step analytical procedure: 1. Were the cases subject to a relative loss/decline? (Measured in terms of loss of powerful allies, military and economic support and benefits, strategic importance, political representation and influence) 2. Description of the character and the degree of the relative decline (in quantitative terms) 3. To what extent was the loss related to the systemic change of 1989? 4. To what extent was the decline related to the globalisation of the unipolar world order? (Measured in terms of discrepancies between dominant trends economic, political, alignment related, ideological/religious/cultural and the actors own direction; lack of powerful allies, lack of integrative incentives) 5. To what extent are the actors subject to a peripheral (geographic, political, other capabilities) position? 6. Which alternative strategies were available to the losers? 7. How did they choose to adapt? 8. Why did they choose the actual strategies for adaptation? The purpose of this procedure is three-fold. First we need to characterise the losers and to map the periphery (step 1 and 2). Second, we wish to explore the relationship between the international systemic change of 1989 and between the globalisation of the unipolar world order and the decline of the losers (step 3, 4 and 5). Third we aim to identify the losers strategic options and to explain their choices (step 6, 7 and 8). Based on this procedure, the conclusions are drawn and perspectives outlined. Conclusions In sum, Lost Power: The American World Order and the Politics of Adaptation aims at shedding light on the strategies of the losers that emerged from the systemic transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity in 1989 and raises two related questions: 1) How have the losing states chosen to adapt to the American world order? 2) Why have they preferred one type of response to their new situation over others? Providing compelling answers to these questions is important because most theory development and empirical analysis within the