POST- CRISIS BUSINESS MODEL OF BANKS IN THE REGION

Transcription

1 POST- CRISIS BUSINESS MODEL OF BANKS IN THE REGION Dr. György Surányi Resident Regional Head 16-17, November, 29

2 BEFORE THE CRISIS: A MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW 2

3 GDP GROWTH RATES WELL ABOVE THE EMU AVERAGE... EST LT LV CAGR OF GDP ,4% 7,4% 7,7% ,9 5,1 GDP GROWTH,CEE REGION 4,4 4,8 7,3 6 6,6 5,5 3 SK PL HU 4,3% 4,1% 5,1% % 2,7,2 CR BG CZ SRB 3,1% 3,% 4,% 3,9% average: 2% average:5,4% -5 RO 2,7% -6 1,% 3,% 5,% 7,% 9,% Before the crisis the consensus view was that in case of small, open, converging economies the sustainable growth strategies are export and investment-driven growth strategies actively supported by capital inflows (both debt- and non-debt type financing) Source: Eurostat, IMF (C/A deficits!) 3

4 EXPORT AND INVESTMENT DRIVEN GROWTH STRATEGIES TOTAL INVESTMENTS (yearly growth rates%) EXPORTS (yearly growth rates%) average: 7,8% average: 9,1% 27 average:13,5% average: 9,9% average: 1,1% 27 average:9% Slovakia Romania Poland Hungary Lithuania Latvia Estonia Czech Rep Bulgaria Slovakia Romania Poland Hungary Lithuania Latvia Estonia Czech Rep Bulgaria Source: Eurostat 4

5 STRONG GROWTH RATES PUSHED AHEAD REAL CONVERGENCE GDP/CAPITA (PPP, EU27 average=1) Bulgaria Romania Croatia Poland 26,4 26, ,8 38,1 4,4 53,2 54,6 Latvia Lithuania 34,6 38,6 58, Hungary Slovakia 53,1 51,3 64,5 68,6 Estonia Czech Republic 42 72,9 71,6 81, Source: Eurostat 5

6 C/A DEFICIT A REGIONAL PHENOMENON -1 CEE REGION, C/A DEFICIT AS A % OF GDP ,1-4,4-4, ,4-5 -3,1-3,9-7 -6, ,9-8 21* 29* In the CEE region almost all countries run external deficits or to put it another way: net domestic savings were negative Source: IMF Before the current crisis it was considered sustainable A natural side effect of the catching up process 6

7 DISCIPLINED FISCAL POLICIES BUDGET BALANCE (as a % of GDP) CEE CIS The external deficit was not the result of loose fiscal policies (SGP, Maastricht!) Source: IMF 7

8 LOW DEBT LEVELS 8 7 GOVERNMENT DEBT (as a % of GDP) 69,5 7 68, EMU 4 average NMS+SK 6% 3 2 3,3 28,1 26,8 25, Source: Eurostat 8

9 BUT THERE WERE DIFFERENCIES ACROSS THE REGION STABLE GROWTH, SUSTAINABLE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCES SERIOUS IMBALANCES Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Serbia Croatia Romania Bulgaria The Baltic states Ukraine The first group: low inflation, healthy fiscal balances, acceptable external position, no asset price bubble The second group: high inflation, huge external imbalances, asset price bubbles, consumption driven growth financed by cheap external funding BUT DUE TO THE GLOBAL CRISIS ALL COUNTRIES FACE ALMOST SIMILAR CHALLENGES 9

10 BUT THERE WERE DIFFERENCIES ACROSS THE REGION HOUSEHOLDS' CONSUMPTION (%) average: 3,7% average: 7,4% 27 average: 7,8% NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED (%) average: 11,7% average: 1,9% 27 average: 6,8% Bulgaria Czech Rep Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 4 2 Bulgaria Czech Rep Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia In some countries domestic demand rose strongly in spite of disciplined fiscal policies Source: Eurostat 1

11 THE CRISIS: THE REGION ENTERED A DEEP RECESSION 11

12 THE CRISIS: THE REGION ENTERED A DEEP RECESSION GDP GROWTH RATES,CEE (%) GDP GROWTH RATES (%) CEE AND CIS 8 6 5, , versus 27: ~-1,5% change in the grow th rate average CEE: 5.8% CIS: 7.3% CEE CIS -5-6, * Source: IMF 12

13 EXPORT MARKETS COLLAPSED IMPORT VALUE (change, %) EXPORT VALUE (change, %) average CEE: 23.8% CIS: 25.7% CEE CIS -31, * -33, average CEE: 22.5% CIS: 24.1% CEE CIS , * Exports are down ~25-35% y-o-y Source: IMF 13

14 SUDDEN STOP OF CAPITAL INFLOWS 1 NET CAPITAL INFLOWS TO THE CEE REGION * (as a % of GDP) Source: IMF, IMF sraff estimates 14

15 FISCAL POLICIES ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE A SHELTER CHANGE IN THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP) CHANGE (average: -1,1%) CHANGE (average: +,1%) CHANGE (average:-1,3%) CHANGE IN THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP) SK RO PL HU LIT LV EST CZ BG CHANGE (average: -7.3%) CHANGE (average: -3.3%) CHANGE (average: -5.8%) FR ESP IRE GER Source: Eurostat, Brussel Commission 15 EMU 28-21: -2.5% Sustainability fears (even in case of low debt countries), the appearance of rollover risks! Fiscal policies are not in a position to give a countercyclical boost to the economy

16 RISING UNEMPLOYMENT, FALLING CONSUMPTION NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED (%) 27 average: 6,8% 28 average:6,6% 29* average:11% HOUSEHOLDS' CONSUMPTION (%) 3 27 average: 7,8% 28 average:1,3% 29* average:-9,1% Slovakia Romania Poland Hungary Lithuania Latvia Estonia Czech Rep Bulgaria Slovakia Romania Poland Hungary Lithuania Latvia Estonia Czech Rep Bulgaria Source: Eurostat, Brussel Commission 16

17 REAL CONVERGENCE CAME TO A HALT CHANGE IN REAL PER CAPITA GDP (%) CEE CIS * Source: IMF 17

18 THE BANKING SECTOR 18

19 BEFORE THE CRISIS: STRONG CREDIT GROWTH ACROSS THE REGION AVERAGE REAL CREDIT GROWTH OVER THE LAST 5 YEARS (%) 6 47,1 47,5 5,1 5 43,2 35,9 38,4 34,5 4 27,3 29,8 26, ,1 14,3 14,7 1 Kazakhstan Ukraine Romania Lithuania Latvia Bulgaria Russia Turkey Estonia Serbia Czech Republic Poland Hungary Croatia Source: IMF,

20 STILL RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT TO GDP IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (eop,%) 16% 14% 12% 1% 8% 6% 4% 2% % Bulgaria Croatia Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia euro zone Source:IMF 2

21 THE CREDIT GROWTH WAS FINANCED BY CHEAP EXTERNAL FUNDING % RATIO OF FOREIGN BORROWING TO TOTAL FUNDS IN THE CEE BANKING SECTORS ( as of December 28, values indicates the value of total foreign loans in bln EUR) Baltic states BG CZ HU PL RO SI SK Foreign banks play a leading role in the region Source: NBH Foreign-controlled equity/total equity: ~7-9% 21

22 THE CRISIS: SUDDEN STOP OF CREDIT % LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIOS OF EU BANKING SECTORS AVERAGE: 14.6% EMU AVERAGE: 112% BALTIC STATES: 223% CEE6: 15% Denmark Latvia Sweden Estonia Lithuania Ireland Slovenia Hungary Finland Italy Portugal Rumania France Bulgaria the Netherlands Spain Austria Cyprus Poland Malta Germany Greece Slovakia Czech Republic Belgium Luxembourg The growth strategies built on cheap external financing are not sustainable any more Domestic savings will not be sufficient to substitute external funding Source: ECB, NBH, data as of end-28 22

23 THE RISING RATIO OF FX TRANSACTIONS AND BOOMING FX LENDING IS A REGIONAL PHENOMENON Small, open, export-driven economies, liberalized FX transaction among residents, and/or currency board or spontaneous euroization or the voluntary interpretation of IT (high interest rate differential) NO LENDER OF LAST RESORT % SHARE OF FX LOANS WITHIN THE BANKS' HOUSEHOLD LOAN PORTFOLIO Latvia Estonia Hungary Lithuania Romania Poland Bulgaria Slovakia Czech Republic % Source: NBH 23

24 UNHEDGED FX POSITIONS A natural consequence of the permanent external deficits in the region Net domestic savings were insufficient to finance investments and exports, hence external capital inflows were needed to finance the deficit. The debt-generating part of the capital inflows necessarily resulted in the formation of an unhedged FX position at one or more domestic agents. The balance sheet of the banking sector purely mirrors the macro imbalances. 24

25 THE CRISIS: IS THERE A WAY OUT? The region imported the financial crisis Collapsing export markets: a huge shock to the real economy Sudden-stop of capital inflows: financial sector shock The room for fiscal maneuver is limited The central banks are unable to provide the system with foreign currency liquidity If in the midst of the crisis- governments intend to improve external balances, to keep budget deficits under control, the banking sector aims for lower L/D rates, authorities, financial watchdogs demand higher capital adequacy ratios, impose limitations to FX lending simultaneously, the result would be an even deeper recession 25

26 THE CRISIS: IS THERE A WAY OUT? Due to the cross border dependencies coordinated actions are needed The problems can not be solved on a national basis Governments, central banks in the region should act jointly with the ECB, the European authorities, international organizations and foreign owners of the banking sector Not to fund a credit boom, but to create the conditions for a moderate 5-8% yearly growth rate in credit and avoid a long-lasting depression 26

27 DID THE EURO PROVIDE A SHELTER? The EUR on its own was not able to provide a shelter The ECB could have helped by providing EUR liquidity to the region The main issue was: Whether the given banking sector had a liquidity buffer? Slovakia versus Czech Republic The Czech Republic managed the crisis well and so did Slovakia. The pace of GDP contraction is similar in both countries. 27

28 FUTURE CHALLENGES Macroeconomic policies The external deficits that had been considered sustainable before the crisis are no longer sustainable The region will not be able to return to the growth levels seen before the crisis, economies should adjust to a lower path. Germany: should take over as the final consumer of Europe instead of pushing ahead with a purely export-driven growth strategy. 28

29 FUTURE CHALLENGES Banking sector L/D ratios should adjust, but it would be a mistake to target L/D at or even below 1%, as it would kill growth and convergence Limiting FX based lending is acceptable only if medium and long-term domestic currency- based financing is available at a reasonable price Killing FX-based lending and at the same time not providing domestic currency based financing would result in a prolonged economic stagnation In an economy that is heading towards the euro, the dynamic expansion of CHF or JPY denominated loans in the household sector is clearly not a welcome development (especially if these loans are short-term instruments), but there are serious arguments supporting EUR-based lending in case of mortgages and investments If the economy as a whole is on a sustainable path primarily the external position is sustainable- the risk of the open, unhedged FX position is manageable, both on a macro and on a micro level. 29