Note on a generalized wage rigidity result. Abstract


 Abel Booker
 2 years ago
 Views:
Transcription
1 Note on a generalized age rigidity result Ariit Mukheree University of Nottingha Abstract Considering Cournot copetition, this note shos that, if the firs differ in labor productivities, the equilibriu age rates under a centralized labor union are not independent of the nuber of firs and product differentiation if the labor union charges a unifor age rate. Hoever, if the centralized labor union can discriinate age rate beteen the firs, the equilibriu age rates do not depend on the nuber of firs and product differentiation. Hence, hether the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 holds ith asyetric firs depends on the age setting behavior of the labor union. The effects of the nuber of firs and product differentiation on the equilibriu age rate are also shon. I ould like to thank an anonyous referee of this ournal for helpful coents. The usual disclaier applies. Citation: Mukheree, Ariit, (007 "Note on a generalized age rigidity result." Econoics Bulletin, Vol. 0, No. pp. 9 Subitted: August 7, 007. Accepted: October 9, 007. URL:
2 . Introduction The epirically observed age rigidity has attracted attention of the researchers orking on Industrial Organization and Labor Econoics. Recently, Dhillon and Petrakis (00 sho that, under fairly general conditions, if there is a centralized labor union, the equilibriu ag rates do not depend on the nuber of firs and product differentiation. Considering Cournot copetition, this note extends this line of research ith asyetric firs. We sho that if the firs differ in labor productivities, the equilibriu age rates under a centralized labor union are not independent of the nuber of firs and product differentiation if the labor union charges a unifor age rate. Hoever, if the centralized labor union can discriinate age rate beteen the firs, the equilibriu age rates do not depend of the nuber of firs and product differentiation. Hence, hether the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 extends to the case of asyetric firs depends on the age setting behavior of the labor union. Epirical evidence suggests that, in any situations, centralized labor unions charge unifor age rates irrespective of the differences beteen the firs. As discussed in Haucap et al. (000 and 00, a coon feature of any labor arkets in continental Europe is coverage extension rules, hich iplies that soe or all eployent ters are ade generally binding for all industry participants and not only for the ebers of unions and eployers associations. In Gerany, for exaple, collective age agreeents beteen a union and an eployers association can be ade copulsory even for independent eployers through socalled Allgeeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE The Ministry of Labor can, on application of either unions or eployers associations, use an AVE to ake soe or all ters of a collectively negotiated eployent contract generally binding for an entire industry, here otherise only those unions, eployers and eployers associations that have actually negotiated and signed the contract ould be directly bound by it ( 3 I TVG (Haucap et al., 00. It is also noted in Haucap et al. (00 that the nuber of AVEs alost continuously increased fro 448 in 975 to 588 in 998. Thus, it ustifies our analysis ith unifor age setting by a centralized labor union. 3 The reainder of the paper is organized as follos. The next section describes the odel and shos the results. Section 3 concludes.. The odel and the results Since, in the presence of asyetric firs, the calculations for shoing the effects of the nuber of firs and product differentiation are cubersoe, e sho these effects separately. In section., e consider the case of a hoogeneous product and sho the effects of the nuber of firs. In section., e consider a duopoly arket structure and sho the effects of product differentiation. The irrelevance of the nuber of donstrea firs on the upstrea input price can also be found in the earlier orks by Greenhut and Ohta (976 and Tyagi (999. Haucap et al. (00 also sho hen the labor union ay prefer unifor age over discriinatory age. 3 The age bargaining by the labor union for the UK Universities ay also support the unifor age setting by a centralized labor union in the presence of productivity differences. While the people orking in different Universities ay differ in productivities, the national labor union bargains for the siilar age rates for all the UK Universities.
3 .. The effects of the nuber of firs Let us consider an econoy ith ( n + firs producing a hoogeneous product. Assue that production requires only labor. For notational convenience arrange the firs as,,... n, n +, n +,..., n +. Without loss of generality, assue that each of the firs in [, n ] requires one labor to produce one unit of output, hile each of the firs in [ n +, n + ] requires λ orkers to produce one unit of output, here λ. Hence, e consider asyetry in labor productivities of the firs. Also, to ake asyetry eaningful in our analysis, assue that n and. Assue that the inverse arket deand function for the product is P a q, ( here the notations have usual eanings. We assue that there is a centralized labor union that sets the age rates for the firs. We ill consider to possibilities: (i here the labor union sets a unifor age rate for all firs, and (ii here the labor union can charge different age rates to different firs. Folloing Haucap and Wey (004, e can call the forer age setting behavior as centralization and the latter as coordination. As a siplification, e assue that the reservation age rates of the labors are zero. We consider the folloing gae. At stage, the labor union sets the age rates. At stage, the firs produce like Cournot oligopolists and the profits are realized. We solve the gae through backard induction. Hence, e consider the case of a onopoly labor union as in Dunlop (944 and Osald (98. Since, the purpose of this paper is to sho that, under a centralized labor union, the equilibriu age rates can depend on the nuber of firs and product differentiation in presence of asyetric firs, it is enough for us to consider a onopoly labor union. Hoever, note that our qualitative results holds even if there is bargaining beteen the labor union and the firs. Bargaining beteen the labor union and the firs ill only coplicate the calculations ithout adding uch to the ain purpose of the paper. Further, to ake our point, e concentrate on the righttoanage odel of labor union, hich is perhaps the ost idely used odel of labor union in the Industrial Organization literature Unifor age setting by the labor union In this subsection e assue that the labor union charges a unifor age rate to all firs. Given the deand function and the unifor age rate, the equilibriu ( a ( λ + output of each of the firs in [, n ] is q i, and the equilibriu ( n + + ( a ( λ + λn n output of each of the firs in [ n +, n + ] is q. ( n + + Therefore, the labor union axiizes the folloing expression to deterine the age rate: 5 4 See, Layard et al. (99 for arguents in favor of righttoanage odels. 5 It is iportant to note that, due to asyetry aong the firs, the labor union ay not ish to serve all the firs. Hence, the labor union ay charge a sufficiently high age rate that encourages only the relatively efficient firs to hire labors and producing the product. Hoever, it can be shon that the labor union prefers to serve all the firs if λ is not sufficiently different fro. Since, age deterination in the presence of asyetric firs is the ain eleent of this paper, e do our analysis
4 n( a ( λ + + λ( a ( λ + λn n Max. ( ( n + + The equilibriu age rate is a( n + λ, (3 ( n( + + λ( λ + λn n hich clearly shos that the equilibriu age rate depends on the nuber of firs. Note that is independent of the nuber of firs if either λ or n 0 or 0. Hence, the folloing proposition is iediate. Proposition : If there is a centralized labor union that sets a unifor age rate for all firs, the equilibriu age rate depends on the nuber of firs if the firs differ in labor productivities. The reason for the above result follos easily fro Dhillon and Petrakis (00. They sho that, if the fir s equilibriu output and profit are loglinear in the age rate and the arket features such as the nuber of firs and product differentiation, the equilibriu age rate is independent of the arket features. If the firs are asyetric in labor productivities, it is iediate fro the above analysis that the fir s equilibriu output and the profit 6 is not loglinear in the age rate and the nuber of firs, and therefore, the equilibriu age rate depends on the nuber of firs. It is iportant to note that, like Dhillon and Petrakis (00, e have also considered that the production technologies of the firs are loglinear and the union utility is loglinear in the age rate and aggregate eployent. Hoever, the asyetry beteen the firs does not satisfy that the fir s equilibriu output and the profit are loglinear in the age rate and the nuber of firs. Let us no see the effects of the nuber of firs on the equilibriu age rate. Proposition : (i Assue λ > 0. If e get 0 for ( λ >. 7 λ, e get 0 (ii If λ >, e get 0. Hoever, if λ, e get 0 for. Hoever, if λ, λ ( λ n. 8 under the assuption that λ is sufficiently close to so that the labor union serves all the firs and solves the axiization proble (. 6 It is easy to check that the profit of the i th fir is 3 q i, i,,..., n +. 7 Though it ill be iediate fro the proof of this proposition that 0 if λ >, e ill not focus on the higher values of λ, since as entioned in footnote 5, the labor union ould serve only the relatively efficient fir for higher values of λ. For exaple, it is easy to sho that if λ >, n and the centralized labor union charges a unifor age rate to all firs, then the labor union prefers to serve both firs instead of serving only the fir ith higher labor productivity provided λ. When n, >, the relevant values of λ for hich the labor union serves all the firs are less than λ ( n that is loer than. So, for n, >, e need to restrict λ beteen and λ (. n
5 Proof: (i We find fro (3 that if λ > 0 and λ, then 0 ( λ Hence, if provided. (4 λ, e get 0, since provided λ. Hence, for λ, e get 0 for (ii We find fro (3 that if λ, then 0 provided λ (λ Hence, if >. Hoever, if λ >, e get > ( λ. ( λ > n. (5 λ, e get 0. Hoever, if λ >. Hence, for λ, e get 0 for λ λ, e get that > provided ( λ λ ( λ n. Q.E.D. The reason for the above result is easy to understand. The presence of asyetric firs akes the total labor deand curve as a kinked function, and the kink occurs at that age rate here the firs ith relatively loer labor productivities do not find it profitable to produce. Let us no consider Proposition (i. If λ, then, in our analysis, the firs in [, n ] are relatively inefficient, and none of the deand labor if a >. An increase in n iplies that the nuber of inefficient firs ( λ + increases, hich akes the segent of the labor deand curve, here all firs find production profitable, ore elastic, but does not affect. This is shon in Figure. Figure : The effect of a higher n hen λ. 8 Though it ill be iediate that 0 attention to λ >. for λ, folloing footnotes 5 and 7, e restrict our 4
6 Assue that the total labor deand curve for a given λ, n and is given by the kinked curve ABC. The age rate is the age rate at hich the labor deand by the loer productive firs is zero. The labor deand is coing fro all the firs on the segent BC, hile, on the segent AB, the labor deand is coing only fro the firs ith higher labor productivities, i.e., fro the firs in [ n +, n + ]. No, if n increases, it rotates BC to BC ', and akes this segent ore elastic. As a result, the equilibriu age rate reduces ith n. Hoever, if λ >, then, the firs in [, n ] are relatively efficient, and these a firs stop producing if > '. If n increases, it shifts the segent of ( λ + λn n the labor deand curve above ' outard. Hoever, higher n also iplies that ' falls, since, no the inefficient firs are facing copetition fro ore efficient firs. Hence, in this situation, higher n not only shifts the labor deand curve outard, it also reduces the critical level of the age rate at hich kink occurs. This is shon in Figure. Figure : The effect of a higher n hen λ >. Assue that the labor deand curve for a given λ >, n and is given by the kinked curve MNP. The age rate ' is the age rate at hich the labor deand by the loer productive firs is zero. No, if n increases, it shifts the labor deand curve to MN ' P', and the kink occurs at ". So, hile the outard shift of the labor deand curve tends to increase the equilibriu age rate, the fall of ' to " tends to reduce the equilibriu age rate. Hence, the net effect of a change in n depends on the nuber of inefficient firs and the labor productivities of the inefficient firs. Siilar arguent follos for the case of Proposition (ii.... Wage discriination We have shon in the previous section that the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 does not hold if the centralized labor union sets a unifor age rate and the firs differ in labor productivities. In this section e sho that if the centralized union keeps the flexibility of charging different age rates to different firs, the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 holds in the presence of the asyetric firs. Let us no consider age discriination beteen the firs. Given the age rates, the equilibriu output 5
7 ( a ( n + + of each of the firs in [, n ] is qi and the ( n + + equilibriu output of each of the firs in [ n +, n + ] is ( a λ( n + + n i + λ i s s s q. ( n + + Therefore, the labor union axiizes the folloing expression to deterine the age rates for each fir: n iqi + λ q i Max,...,,,..., + ( n + n n + n. (6 a a The equilibriu age rates are i, i,..., n, and, n +,..., n +. λ Hence, the folloing proposition is iediate. Proposition 3: If a centralized labor union can discriinate age rate beteen the firs, the equilibriu age rates are independent of the nuber of firs even if the firs differ in labor productivities. If the union discriinates age rate beteen the firs, it considers the labor deand of different firs separately. Hence, it is iportant to see hether, in the fir s output and the profit, the fir s on age rate and arket features such as the nuber of firs behave like a loglinear function. It follos fro the above analysis that, in the fir s equilibriu output and profit, the fir s on age rate and the nuber of firs behave like a loglinear function. As a result, the equilibriu age rate of each fir is independent of the nuber of firs... The effects of product differentiation Let us no consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly arket structure. Assue that fir requires one labor to produce one unit of output, and fir requires λ labors to produce one unit of output. Like section., e assue that the reservation age rates for the labors are zero. Assue that the inverse arket deand function for fir i is Pi a qi γq, i, (7 here γ [0,] shos the degree of product differentiation. γ 0 iplies that the products are isolated, hile γ iplies that the products are hoogeneous.... Unifor age setting Let us first consider the situation here the centralized labor union sets a unifor age rate for both firs. Given the deand specification and the unifor age rate, the equilibriu outputs of firs and are respectively ( a( γ + γλ ( a( γ λ + γ q and q. (4 γ (4 γ i n i k k k + λ 6
8 The centralized labor union deterines the unifor age rate by axiizing the folloing expression: 9 ( a( γ + γλ + λ( a( γ λ + γ Max. (8 (4 γ ( γ ( + λ The equilibriu age rate is a. We also find that 0. 4( + λ λγ γ Hence the folloing proposition is iediate. Proposition 4: If the firs differ in labor productivities and a centralized labor union charges unifor age rate to the firs, the equilibriu age rate depends on the degree of product differentiation. As the degree of product differentiation increases (i.e., γ falls, the equilibriu age rate increases.... The intuition of this result is siilar to the intuition provided in subsection... Wage discriination Let us no consider the situation here the labor union discriinates age beteen the firs. Given that the labor union charges and to firs and respectively, ( a( γ + γλ the equilibriu outputs of firs and are respectively q (4 γ ( a( γ λ + γ and q. (4 γ The labor union deterines the age rates by axiizing the folloing expression: ( a( γ + γλ + λ ( a( γ λ + γ Max, (4 γ. (9 a a The equilibriu age rates are and. λ Hence, the proposition is iediate. Proposition 5: If a centralized labor union can discriinate age beteen the firs, the equilibriu age rates are independent of the degree of product differentiation even if the firs differ in labor productivities.... The intuition of this result is siilar to the intuition provided in subsection 3. Conclusion Considering Cournot copetition, this note shos that if the firs differ in labor productivities and the centralized labor union charges a unifor age rate to the firs, the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 does not hold. The asyetry beteen the firs does not satisfy that the fir s output and profit is loglinear in the age rate and the arket features such as the nuber of firs and 9 The qualification ade in footnote 5 also holds for the subsection.. 7
9 product differentiation. As a result, the equilibriu age rate depends on the nuber of firs and product differentiation. Hoever, if the centralized labor union can discriinate age beteen the firs, the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 holds even if the firs differ in labor productivities. In this situation, the fir s on age rate and the arket features such as the nuber of firs and product differentiation behave like a loglinear function in the fir s equilibriu output and profit. Hence, hether the age rigidity result of Dhillon and Petrakis (00 extends to the case of asyetric firs depends on the age setting behavior of the labor union. References Dhillon, A. and E. Petrakis, 00, A generalized age rigidity result, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 0: Dunlop, J. T., 944, Wage deterination under trade union, Ne York, Macillan. Greenhut, M. L. and H. Ohta, 976, Related arket conditions and interindustrial ergers, The Aerican Econoic Revie, 66: Haucap, J., U. Pauly and C. Wey, 000, The incentives of eployers associations to raise rivals costs in the presence of collective bargaining, in de Gisel, Olthoff and Zick (Eds., The uneployent debate: current issues, 85 6, Marburg, Metropolis Verlag. Haucap, J., U. Pauly and C. Wey, 00, Collective age setting hen ages generally are generally binding: an antitrust perspective, International Revie of La and Econoics, : Haucap, J. and C. Wey, 004, Unionisation structures and innovation incentives, Econoic Journal, 4: C Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackan, 99, Uneployent, acroeconoic perforance and the labour arket, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Osald, A. J., 98, The icroeconoic theory of the trade union, Econoic Journal, 9: Tyagi, R. K., 999, On the effects of donstrea entry, Manageent Science, 45:
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM. Discussion Papers in Economics. Note on a generalized wage rigidity result
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM Discussion Papers in Economics Discussion Paper No. 07/04 Note on a generalized age rigidity result By Arijit Mukherjee June 007 007 DP 07/04 Note on a generalized age rigidity
More informationOnline Appendix I: A Model of Household Bargaining with Violence. In this appendix I develop a simple model of household bargaining that
Online Appendix I: A Model of Household Bargaining ith Violence In this appendix I develop a siple odel of household bargaining that incorporates violence and shos under hat assuptions an increase in oen
More informationEndogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm
Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Fir Brent Hueth and GianCarlo Moschini Working Paper 14WP 547 May 2014 Center for Agricultural and Rural Developent Iowa State University Aes, Iowa 500111070
More informationTopic 4: Introduction to Labour Market, Aggregate Supply and ADAS model
Topic 4: Introduction to Labour Market, Aggregate Supply and ADAS model 1. In order to model the labour market at a microeconomic level, e simplify greatly by assuming that all jobs are the same in terms
More informationLEASING, LEMONS, AND MORAL HAZARD
LEASING, LEMONS, AND MORAL HAZARD by Justin P. Johnson Johnson Graduate School of Manageent Cornell University Sage Hall Ithaca, NY 14853 jpj25@cornell.edu and Michael Waldan Johnson Graduate School of
More informationJournal of Industrial Organization Education
Journal of Industrial Organization Education Volue 1, Issue 1 2006 Article 8 Copetition and Innovation Richard J. Gilbert Econoics Departent, University of California, Berkeley, gilbert@econ.berkeley.edu
More informationA Strategic Approach to Software Protection U
Â Â Strategic pproach to Software Protection U OZ SHY University of Haifa, Israel and Stockhol School of Econoics, Sweden ozshy@econ.haifa.ac.il JCQUESFRNCË OIS THISSE CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain,
More informationJournal of International Economics
Journal of International Econoics 84 (2011) 26 36 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of International Econoics journal hoepage: www.elsevier.co/locate/jie Good jobs, bad jobs, and trade
More informationPosition Auctions and Nonuniform Conversion Rates
Position Auctions and Nonunifor Conversion Rates Liad Blurosen Microsoft Research Mountain View, CA 944 liadbl@icrosoft.co Jason D. Hartline Shuzhen Nong Electrical Engineering and Microsoft AdCenter
More informationSemiinvariants IMOTC 2013 Simple semiinvariants
Seiinvariants IMOTC 2013 Siple seiinvariants These are soe notes (written by Tejaswi Navilarekallu) used at the International Matheatical Olypiad Training Cap (IMOTC) 2013 held in Mubai during AprilMay,
More informationESTIMATING LIQUIDITY PREMIA IN THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET
ESTIMATING LIQUIDITY PREMIA IN THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET Francisco Alonso, Roberto Blanco, Ana del Río and Alicia Sanchis Banco de España Banco de España Servicio de Estudios Docuento de
More informationPrivacy, Exposure and Price Discrimination
Privacy, Exposure and Price Discriination Luc Wathieu 1 Harvard usiness School, Soldiers Field, oston, M 02163 (eail) lwathieu@hbs.edu (Tel) 6174951016 Subitted for presentation at the first QME conference
More informationFactor Model. Arbitrage Pricing Theory. Systematic Versus NonSystematic Risk. Intuitive Argument
Ross [1],[]) presents the aritrage pricing theory. The idea is that the structure of asset returns leads naturally to a odel of risk preia, for otherwise there would exist an opportunity for aritrage profit.
More informationEndogenous CreditCard Acceptance in a Model of Precautionary Demand for Money
Endogenous CreditCard Acceptance in a Model of Precautionary Deand for Money Adrian Masters University of Essex and SUNY Albany Luis Raúl RodríguezReyes University of Essex March 24 Abstract A creditcard
More informationInt. J. Production Economics
Int. J. Production Econoics 18 (1) 175 187 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Int. J. Production Econoics journal hoepage www.elsevier.co/locate/ijpe Outsourcing structures and inforation flow in
More informationADVERSE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS IN VIEW OF INDUSTRY ASYMMETRY
Journal of Applied Econoic Sciences ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS IN VIEW OF INDUSTRY ASYMMETRY Evgenia MOTCHENKOVA, Daniel LELIEFELD VU University Asterda, NETHERLANDS, Dutch Antitrust
More informationThree Essays on Oligopoly: Product Bundling, TwoSided Markets, and Vertical Product Differentiation
Three Essays on Oligopoly: Product Bundling, TwoSided Markets, and Vertical Product Differentiation InauguralDissertation zur Erlangung des Grades Doctor oeconoiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.) an der LudwigMaxiiliansUniversität
More informationThis paper studies a rental firm that offers reusable products to price and qualityofservice sensitive
MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Vol., No. 3, Suer 28, pp. 429 447 issn 523464 eissn 5265498 8 3 429 infors doi.287/so.7.8 28 INFORMS INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed
More informationThe Virtual Spring Mass System
The Virtual Spring Mass Syste J. S. Freudenberg EECS 6 Ebedded Control Systes Huan Coputer Interaction A force feedbac syste, such as the haptic heel used in the EECS 6 lab, is capable of exhibiting a
More informationAnalysis of the purchase option of computers
Analysis of the of coputers N. Ahituv and I. Borovits Faculty of Manageent, The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Adinistration, TelAviv University, University Capus, RaatAviv, TelAviv, Israel
More informationHORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TAKEOVER AND SELLOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS: ABNORMAL RETURNS DIFFER BY INDUSTRY
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TAKEOVER AND SELLOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS: ABNORMAL RETURNS DIFFER BY INDUSTRY Stephan K.H. Gross*, Hagen Lindstädt** Abstract We begin with the hypothesis that shareholderwealth effects
More informationProducts vs. Advertising: Media Competition and the. Relative Source of Firm Profits
Products vs. Advertising: Media Copetition and the Relative Source of Fir Profits David Godes, Elie Ofek and Miklos Sarvary February 2003 The authors would like to thank Dina Mayzlin, and participants
More informationEvaluating Inventory Management Performance: a Preliminary DeskSimulation Study Based on IOC Model
Evaluating Inventory Manageent Perforance: a Preliinary DeskSiulation Study Based on IOC Model Flora Bernardel, Roberto Panizzolo, and Davide Martinazzo Abstract The focus of this study is on preliinary
More informationON SELFROUTING IN CLOS CONNECTION NETWORKS. BARRY G. DOUGLASS Electrical Engineering Department Texas A&M University College Station, TX 778433128
ON SELFROUTING IN CLOS CONNECTION NETWORKS BARRY G. DOUGLASS Electrical Engineering Departent Texas A&M University College Station, TX 7788 A. YAVUZ ORUÇ Electrical Engineering Departent and Institute
More informationAlgorithmica 2001 SpringerVerlag New York Inc.
Algorithica 2001) 30: 101 139 DOI: 101007/s0045300100030 Algorithica 2001 SpringerVerlag New York Inc Optial Search and OneWay Trading Online Algoriths R ElYaniv, 1 A Fiat, 2 R M Karp, 3 and G Turpin
More informationThe public private partnership paradox
The public private partnership paradox Stephen Gray * UQ Business School, University of Queensland Jason Hall UQ Business School, University of Queensland Grant Pollard Value Decisions ABSTRACT A public
More informationQuality evaluation of the modelbased forecasts of implied volatility index
Quality evaluation of the odelbased forecasts of iplied volatility index Katarzyna Łęczycka 1 Abstract Influence of volatility on financial arket forecasts is very high. It appears as a specific factor
More informationUse of extrapolation to forecast the working capital in the mechanical engineering companies
ECONTECHMOD. AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY JOURNAL 2014. Vol. 1. No. 1. 23 28 Use of extrapolation to forecast the working capital in the echanical engineering copanies A. Cherep, Y. Shvets Departent of finance
More informationIs PayasYouDrive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes?
Is PayasYouDrive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes? By Ian W.H. Parry Despite concerns about US dependence on a volatile world oil arket, greenhouse gases fro fuel cobustion,
More informationStudy on the development of statistical data on the European security technological and industrial base
Study on the developent of statistical data on the European security technological and industrial base Security Sector Survey Analysis: Poland Client: European Coission DG Migration and Hoe Affairs Brussels,
More informationFuzzy Sets in HR Management
Acta Polytechnica Hungarica Vol. 8, No. 3, 2011 Fuzzy Sets in HR Manageent Blanka Zeková AXIOM SW, s.r.o., 760 01 Zlín, Czech Republic blanka.zekova@sezna.cz Jana Talašová Faculty of Science, Palacký Univerzity,
More informationADJUSTING FOR QUALITY CHANGE
ADJUSTING FOR QUALITY CHANGE 7 Introduction 7.1 The easureent of changes in the level of consuer prices is coplicated by the appearance and disappearance of new and old goods and services, as well as changes
More informationMINIMUM VERTEX DEGREE THRESHOLD FOR LOOSE HAMILTON CYCLES IN 3UNIFORM HYPERGRAPHS
MINIMUM VERTEX DEGREE THRESHOLD FOR LOOSE HAMILTON CYCLES IN 3UNIFORM HYPERGRAPHS JIE HAN AND YI ZHAO Abstract. We show that for sufficiently large n, every 3unifor hypergraph on n vertices with iniu
More informationPaying a Premium on your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry. By Leemore Dafny, Mark Duggan and Subramaniam Ramanarayanan*
Paying a Preiu on your Preiu? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry By Leeore Dafny, Mark Duggan and Subraania Raanarayanan* We exaine whether and to what extent consolidation in the U.S.
More informationSelfenforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits
Fakultät III Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinforatik und Wirtschaftsrecht Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge Discussion Papers in Econoics No. 17615 Deceber 2015 Thoas Eichner Rüdiger Pethig
More informationSmall Business Environment and Investment Climate*
Small Business Environment and Investment Climate* Maxim Mironov Ne Economic School October 28, 2003 Abstract One of the main problems of the Russian economy in transition is the segmentation of its capital
More informationThe Stock Market and the Financing of Corporate Growth in Africa: The Case of Ghana
WP/06/201 The Stock Market and the Financing of Corporate Growth in Africa: The Case of Ghana Charles Ao Yartey 2006 International Monetary Fund WP/06/201 IMF Working Paper Research Departent The Stock
More informationStudy on the development of statistical data on the European security technological and industrial base
Study on the developent of statistical data on the European security technological and industrial base Security Sector Survey Analysis: France Client: European Coission DG Migration and Hoe Affairs Brussels,
More informationThe Velocities of Gas Molecules
he Velocities of Gas Molecules by Flick Colean Departent of Cheistry Wellesley College Wellesley MA 8 Copyright Flick Colean 996 All rights reserved You are welcoe to use this docuent in your own classes
More informationPure Bending Determination of StressStrain Curves for an Aluminum Alloy
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 0 Vol III WCE 0, July 68, 0, London, U.K. Pure Bending Deterination of StressStrain Curves for an Aluinu Alloy D. TorresFranco, G. UrriolagoitiaSosa,
More informationDISCUSSION PAPER. Is PayAsYouDrive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes? Ian W.H. Parry. April 2005 RFF DP 0515
DISCUSSION PAPER April 25 R DP 515 Is PayAsYouDrive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes? Ian W.H. 1616 P St. NW Washington, DC 236 223285 www.rff.org Is PayAsYouDrive
More informationGlobal Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages
Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages Robert C. Feenstra Departent of Econoics University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Econoic Research Gordon H. Hanson
More informationThe Effects of Child Care Provision in Mexico
The Effects of Child Care Provision in Mexico Gabriela Calderon Stanford University February, 2012 Abstract In 2007, seeking to increase feale labor force participation and ore generally ease burdens on
More informationEarnings and Community College Field of Study Choice in Canada
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 1156 Earnings and Counity College Field of Study Choice in Canada Brahi Boudarbat May 2004 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor
More informationFinancial Risk: Credit Risk, Lecture 1
Financial Risk: Credit Risk, Lecture 1 Alexander Herbertsson Centre For Finance/Departent of Econoics School of Econoics, Business and Law, University of Gothenburg Eail: Alexander.Herbertsson@econoics.gu.se
More informationAn Improved Decisionmaking Model of Human Resource Outsourcing Based on Internet Collaboration
International Journal of Hybrid Inforation Technology, pp. 339350 http://dx.doi.org/10.14257/hit.2016.9.4.28 An Iproved Decisionaking Model of Huan Resource Outsourcing Based on Internet Collaboration
More informationSOME APPLICATIONS OF FORECASTING Prof. Thomas B. Fomby Department of Economics Southern Methodist University May 2008
SOME APPLCATONS OF FORECASTNG Prof. Thoas B. Foby Departent of Econoics Southern Methodist University May 8 To deonstrate the usefulness of forecasting ethods this note discusses four applications of forecasting
More informationSAMPLING METHODS LEARNING OBJECTIVES
6 SAMPLING METHODS 6 Using Statistics 66 2 Nonprobability Sapling and Bias 66 Stratified Rando Sapling 62 6 4 Cluster Sapling 64 6 5 Systeatic Sapling 69 6 6 Nonresponse 62 6 7 Suary and Review of
More informationREDUCING RISK OF HANDARM VIBRATION INJURY FROM HANDHELD POWER TOOLS INTRODUCTION
Health and Safety Executive Information Document HSE 246/31 REDUCING RISK OF HANDARM VIBRATION INJURY FROM HANDHELD POWER TOOLS INTRODUCTION 1 This document contains internal guidance hich has been made
More informationFixedIncome Securities and Interest Rates
Chapter 2 FixedIncoe Securities and Interest Rates We now begin a systeatic study of fixedincoe securities and interest rates. The literal definition of a fixedincoe security is a financial instruent
More informationDemand  Basic Review and Examples 1
Deand  Basic Review and Exaples The Basic Deand For What exactly is a deand function? In Varian s words, a consuer s deand functions give the optial aounts of each of the goods as a function of the prices
More informationIV Approximation of Rational Functions 1. IV.C Bounding (Rational) Functions on Intervals... 4
Contents IV Approxiation of Rational Functions 1 IV.A Constant Approxiation..................................... 1 IV.B Linear Approxiation....................................... 3 IV.C Bounding (Rational)
More informationPERFORMANCE METRICS FOR THE IT SERVICES PORTFOLIO
Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov Series I: Engineering Sciences Vol. 4 (53) No.  0 PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR THE IT SERVICES PORTFOLIO V. CAZACU I. SZÉKELY F. SANDU 3 T. BĂLAN Abstract:
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PAYING A PREMIUM ON YOUR PREMIUM? CONSOLIDATION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PAYING A PREMIUM ON YOUR PREMIUM? CONSOLIDATION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY Leeore Dafny Mark Duggan Subraania Raanarayanan Working Paper 15434 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15434
More informationConstruction Economics & Finance. Module 3 Lecture1
Depreciation: Construction Econoics & Finance Module 3 Lecture It represents the reduction in arket value of an asset due to age, wear and tear and obsolescence. The physical deterioration of the asset
More informationThe Dot Product. If v = a 1 i + b 1 j and w = a 2 i + b 2 j are vectors then their dot product is given by: v w = a 1 a 2 + b 1 b 2
The Dot Product In this section, e ill no concentrate on the vector operation called the dot product. The dot product of to vectors ill produce a scalar instead of a vector as in the other operations that
More informationLabor Demand. 1. The Derivation of the Labor Demand Curve in the Short Run:
CON 361: Labor conomics 1. The Derivation o the Curve in the Short Run: We ill no complete our discussion o the components o a labor market by considering a irm s choice o labor demand, beore e consider
More informationGraphing Exponential Functions
Graphing Eponential Functions Another coonly used type of nonlinear function is the eponential function. We focus in this section on eponential graphs and solving equations. Another section is loaded
More informationProblem Set 5 Answers. A grocery shop is owned by Mr. Moore and has the following statement of revenues and costs:
Problem Set 5 Ansers 1. Ch 7, Problem 7. A grocery shop is oned by Mr. Moore and has the folloing statement of revenues and costs: Revenues $5, Supplies $5, Electricity $6, Employee salaries $75, Mr. Moore
More informationProject Evaluation Roadmap. Capital Budgeting Process. Capital Expenditure. Major Cash Flow Components. Cash Flows... COMM2501 Financial Management
COMM501 Financial Manageent Project Evaluation 1 (Capital Budgeting) Project Evaluation Roadap COMM501 Financial Manageent Week 7 Week 7 Project dependencies Net present value ethod Relevant cash flows
More informationCRM FACTORS ASSESSMENT USING ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
641 CRM FACTORS ASSESSMENT USING ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS Marketa Zajarosova 1* *Ph.D. VSB  Technical University of Ostrava, THE CZECH REPUBLIC arketa.zajarosova@vsb.cz Abstract Custoer relationship
More informationCalculating the Return on Investment (ROI) for DMSMS Management. The Problem with Cost Avoidance
Calculating the Return on nvestent () for DMSMS Manageent Peter Sandborn CALCE, Departent of Mechanical Engineering (31) 453167 sandborn@calce.ud.edu www.ene.ud.edu/escml/obsolescence.ht October 28, 21
More informationA Quantitative Approach to the Performance of Internet Telephony to Ebusiness Sites
A Quantitative Approach to the Performance of Internet Telephony to Ebusiness Sites Prathiusha Chinnusamy TransSolutions Fort Worth, TX 76155, USA Natarajan Gautam Harold and Inge Marcus Department of
More informationExtendedHorizon Analysis of Pressure Sensitivities for Leak Detection in Water Distribution Networks: Application to the Barcelona Network
2013 European Control Conference (ECC) July 1719, 2013, Zürich, Switzerland. ExtendedHorizon Analysis of Pressure Sensitivities for Leak Detection in Water Distribution Networks: Application to the Barcelona
More informationPlane Trusses. Section 7: Flexibility Method  Trusses. A plane truss is defined as a twodimensional
lane Trusses A plane truss is defined as a twodiensional fraework of straight prisatic ebers connected at their ends by frictionless hinged joints, and subjected to loads and reactions that act only at
More informationFourier Series, Integrals, and Transforms
Chap. Sec.. Fourier Series, Integrals, and Transforms Fourier Series Content: Fourier series (5) and their coefficients (6) Calculation of Fourier coefficients by integration (Example ) Reason hy (6) gives
More informationLesson 44: Acceleration, Velocity, and Period in SHM
Lesson 44: Acceleration, Velocity, and Period in SHM Since there is a restoring force acting on objects in SHM it akes sense that the object will accelerate. In Physics 20 you are only required to explain
More informationModeling operational risk data reported above a timevarying threshold
Modeling operational risk data reported above a tievarying threshold Pavel V. Shevchenko CSIRO Matheatical and Inforation Sciences, Sydney, Locked bag 7, North Ryde, NSW, 670, Australia. eail: Pavel.Shevchenko@csiro.au
More informationRisk Sharing, Risk Shifting and Optimality of Convertible Debt in Venture Capital
Risk Sharing, Risk Shifting and Optiality of Convertible Debt in Venture Capital Saltuk Ozerturk Departent of Econoics, Southern Methodist University June 22 Abstract This paper adopts an optial contracting
More informationMultiproduct Pricing Made Simple
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Multiproduct Pricing Made Siple Mark Arstrong and John Vickers Departent of Econoics, University of Oxford 8. January 2016 Online at https://pra.ub.uniuenchen.de/68717/
More informationarxiv:0805.1434v1 [math.pr] 9 May 2008
Degreedistribution stability of scalefree networs Zhenting Hou, Xiangxing Kong, Dinghua Shi,2, and Guanrong Chen 3 School of Matheatics, Central South University, Changsha 40083, China 2 Departent of
More informationComment on On Discriminative vs. Generative Classifiers: A Comparison of Logistic Regression and Naive Bayes
Coent on On Discriinative vs. Generative Classifiers: A Coparison of Logistic Regression and Naive Bayes JingHao Xue (jinghao@stats.gla.ac.uk) and D. Michael Titterington (ike@stats.gla.ac.uk) Departent
More informationEcon 100A: Intermediate Microeconomics Notes on Consumer Theory
Econ 100A: Interediate Microeconoics Notes on Consuer Theory Linh Bun Winter 2012 (UCSC 1. Consuer Theory Utility Functions 1.1. Types of Utility Functions The following are soe of the type of the utility
More informationand virtually all 4yearolds are now enrolled in education.
MEXICO Attainent rates are steadily increasing Mexico has the highest average annual rate of growth of firsttie upper secondary graduation rates aong OECD countries for which inforation is available.
More informationA Fuzzy AHP Approach for Selection of Measuring. Instrument for Engineering College Selection
Applied Matheatical Sciences, Vol. 8, 204, no. 44, 24926 HIKARI Ltd, www.hikari.co http://dx.doi.org/0.2988/as.204.44232 A Fuzzy AHP Approach for Selection of Measuring Instruent for Engineering College
More informationWORK TRAVEL MODE CHOICE MODELING USING DATA MINING: DECISION TREES AND NEURAL NETWORKS
TRB Paper No. 034348 WORK TRAVEL MODE CHOICE MODELING USING DATA MINING: DECISION TREES AND NEURAL NETWORKS Chi Xie Research Assistant Departent of Civil and Environental Engineering University of Massachusetts,
More informationManaging Complex Network Operation with Predictive Analytics
Managing Coplex Network Operation with Predictive Analytics Zhenyu Huang, Pak Chung Wong, Patrick Mackey, Yousu Chen, Jian Ma, Kevin Schneider, and Frank L. Greitzer Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
More informationPhysics 211: Lab Oscillations. Simple Harmonic Motion.
Physics 11: Lab Oscillations. Siple Haronic Motion. Reading Assignent: Chapter 15 Introduction: As we learned in class, physical systes will undergo an oscillatory otion, when displaced fro a stable equilibriu.
More informationApplying Multiple Neural Networks on Large Scale Data
0 International Conference on Inforation and Electronics Engineering IPCSIT vol6 (0) (0) IACSIT Press, Singapore Applying Multiple Neural Networks on Large Scale Data Kritsanatt Boonkiatpong and Sukree
More informationPaying a Premium on your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry. Leemore Dafny Northwestern University and NBER
Paying a Preiu on your Preiu? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry Leeore Dafny Northwestern University and NBER Mark Duggan University of Maryland and NBER Subraania Raanarayanan University
More informationSoftware Quality Characteristics Tested For Mobile Application Development
Thesis no: MGSE201502 Software Quality Characteristics Tested For Mobile Application Developent Literature Review and Epirical Survey WALEED ANWAR Faculty of Coputing Blekinge Institute of Technology
More informationModeling Strategic Investment Decisions in Spatial Markets
Modeling Strategic Investent Decisions in Spatial Markets AUTHORS Stefan Lorenczik (EWI) Raiund Malischek (EWI) Johannes Trüby (IEA) EWI Working Paper, No 14/9 April 214 Institute of Energy Econoics at
More informationCHAPTER 2 OPERATIONS ON FUZZY SETS. Remark: 1. All functions that satisfy axioms c1 and c2 form the most general class of fuzzy complements.
CHPTER OPERTIONS ON FUZZY SETS Fuzzy Complement Fuzzy Union Fuzzy Intersection Combinations of Operations General ggregation Operations Fuzzy Complement Remark: ll functions that satisfy axioms c and c
More informationInternational Journal of Management & Information Systems First Quarter 2012 Volume 16, Number 1
International Journal of Manageent & Inforation Systes First Quarter 2012 Volue 16, Nuber 1 Proposal And Effectiveness Of A Highly Copelling Direct Mail Method  Establishent And Deployent Of PMOSDM Hisatoshi
More informationMATHEMATICAL MODELS Vol. III  Mathematical Modeling in Social and Behavioral Sciences  WeiBin Zhang
MATHEMATICAL MODELS Vol. III  Matheatical Modeling in Social and Behavioral Sciences  WeiBin Zhang MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES WeiBin Zhang Ritsueikan Asia Pacific University,
More informationKeywords: Threedegree of freedom, mathematical model, free vibration, axial motion, simulate.
ISSN: 95967 ISO 900:008 Certiied International Journal o Engineering Science and Innovative Technolog (IJESIT) Volue, Issue 4, Jul 0 A ThreeDegree o Freedo Matheatical Model Siulating Free Vibration
More informationInterIndustry Gender Wage Gaps by Knowledge Intensity: Discrimination and Technology in Korea
InterIndustry Gender Wage Gaps by Knowledge Intensity: Discriination and Technology in Korea Beyza P. Ural Departent o Econoics, Syracuse University, Syracuse NY, 13244, USA. Willia C. Horrace * Center
More informationResearch Article Performance Evaluation of Human Resource Outsourcing in Food Processing Enterprises
Advance Journal of Food Science and Technology 9(2): 964969, 205 ISSN: 20424868; eissn: 20424876 205 Maxwell Scientific Publication Corp. Subitted: August 0, 205 Accepted: Septeber 3, 205 Published:
More informationFactored Models for Probabilistic Modal Logic
Proceedings of the TwentyThird AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2008 Factored Models for Probabilistic Modal Logic Afsaneh Shirazi and Eyal Air Coputer Science Departent, University of Illinois
More informationMinimum Wage Violation in South Africa
Miniu Wage Violation in South Africa Haroon Bhorat Developent Policy Research Unit Robert Leslie Social Science Building, 4th Floor, Upper Capus, Rondebosch. University of Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa
More informationMetric of Carbon Equity: Carbon Gini Index Based on Historical Cumulative Emission per Capita
ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 2(3): 134 140, 2011 www.cliatechange.cn DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2011.00134 POLICY FORUM Metric of Carbon Equity: Carbon Gini Index Based on Historical Cuulative Eission
More informationOptimal Sequential Paging in Cellular Networks
Optimal Sequential Paging in Cellular Netorks Bhaskar Krishnamachari, RungHung Gau, Stephen B. Wicker, Zygmunt J. Haas School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
More informationWe introduce the concept of marketing avoidance consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 54, No. 6, June 2008, pp. 1094 1103 issn 00251909 eissn 15265501 08 5406 1094 infors doi 10.1287/nsc.1070.0837 2008 INFORMS Consuer Privacy and Marketing Avoidance: A Static Model
More informationEvaluating the Effectiveness of Task Overlapping as a Risk Response Strategy in Engineering Projects
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Task Overlapping as a Risk Response Strategy in Engineering Projects Lucas Grèze Robert Pellerin Nathalie Perrier Patrice Leclaire February 2011 CIRRELT201111 Bureaux
More informationMarkov Models and Their Use for Calculations of Important Traffic Parameters of Contact Center
Markov Models and Their Use for Calculations of Iportant Traffic Paraeters of Contact Center ERIK CHROMY, JAN DIEZKA, MATEJ KAVACKY Institute of Telecounications Slovak University of Technology Bratislava
More informationMethod of supply chain optimization in Ecommerce
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Method of supply chain optiization in Ecoerce Petr Suchánek and Robert Bucki Silesian University  School of Business Adinistration, The College of Inforatics and Manageent
More informationOptimal Pricing Decision and Assessing Factors in. ClosedLoop Supply Chain
Applied Matheatical Sciences, Vol. 5, 2011, no. 80, 40154031 Optial Picing Decision and Assessing Factos in ClosedLoop Supply Chain Yang Tan Picing Science and Engineeing Depatent, FedEx Expess Wold
More informationA Study on the Chain Restaurants Dynamic Negotiation Games of the Optimization of Joint Procurement of Food Materials
International Journal of Coputer Science & Inforation Technology (IJCSIT) Vol 6, No 1, February 2014 A Study on the Chain estaurants Dynaic Negotiation aes of the Optiization of Joint Procureent of Food
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DRUG INSURANCE. Darius Lakdawalla Neeraj Sood
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DRUG INSURANCE Darius Lakdawalla Neeraj Sood Working Paper 1351 http://www.nber.org/papers/w1351 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 15 Massachusetts
More informationLecture L9  Linear Impulse and Momentum. Collisions
J. Peraire, S. Widnall 16.07 Dynaics Fall 009 Version.0 Lecture L9  Linear Ipulse and Moentu. Collisions In this lecture, we will consider the equations that result fro integrating Newton s second law,
More information