REPORT Dry cargo ship STEEL QUEEN - PBDM grounding on 20 March 2005
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- Roderick Jonas Sherman
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1 Dry cargo ship STEEL QUEEN - PBDM grounding on 20 March
2 Dry Cargo Ship -STEEL QUEEN - PBDM grounding on 20 March 2005 Our reference: Maritime Casualty Sten Anderson Investigation Division The report can also be - Sjöfartsinspektion read in Swedish on our website - Olyckor och tillbud Haverirapporter Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. SWEDISH MARITIME SAFETY INSPECTORATE SE NORRKÖPING, Sweden Phone: +46 (0) Fax: +46 (0)
3 List of Contents 1 Summary Account of facts The ship The crew The fairway at the time of the grounding Chart extract Compulsory pilotage The weather Icy waters Course of events Before the grounding Excerpt from the AIS After the grounding Analysis Circumstances at the grounding Fatigue Cause Remark General recommendations Injuries and Damage Personal injuries and damage to the environment Material damage Result of the investigation Picture 1: Drawing of ship page 4 Picture 2: Excerpt from chart page 6 Picture 3: Excerpt from AIS page 9
4 1 Summary STEEL QUEEN left Oxelösund loaded with steel coils, carrying no pilot. The port and the bay outside were covered by broken ice. The master and the maritime officer (combined deck and engine officer) were on the bridge. When the ship, after leaving the port, should turn into a leading line astern (see chart extract) it was not possible to see the mark since the setting sun was dazzling. The first buoy to starboard was not visible, but the master saw a green spar without top mark meant to pass to port, and which he thought himself to have identified. At about 1615 on 20 March 2005 STEEL QUEEN run onto a 4.3 m ground on the wrong side of the first green buoy, which was a light-buoy. It later turned out that the two first buoys, one to port and one to starboard, were pressed down under the ice and thus not visible from the bridge of the ship. The grounding took place at position 58º40'.8 N 17º09'.0 E. Page 1
5 2 Account of facts 2.1 The ship Name: STEEL QUEEN IMO No.: Call sign: Port of registry: Shipowner: PBDM Tholen Geuze Shipping B.V. Gross tonnage: 2535 Dead weight: Length over all: Breadth Draught: Classification society 3850 ton m m F=4.95 m A=5.65 m Average=5.30 m Lloyd s Register of Shipping Year built: 2003 Construction material: Engine power: Steel 1520 kw Crew: 5 The ship was built in 2003 at B.V. Scheepswerf Damen Bergum in the Netherlands for Dutch owners and was named ESPOIRE. In 2004 she got her present name. The ship has sailed under Dutch flag since she was delivered. Page 2
6 STEEL QUEEN was constructed with crew area and navigation bridge in the deckhouse by the stern on weather deck and the engine room underneath. The most interesting equipment on the bridge related to the accident was two Furuno Marine Radar equipments, one Furuno GPS (Global Positioning System) and one Cortron gyro compass. All instruments were in operation and in good working order at the grounding; they were well arranged in front of the navigator, positioned around the centre line of the ship at the front edge of the bridge. The ship was not equipped with an electronic chart, and the AIS (Automatic Identification System) was not displayed on a screen but digitally only. On each side of the bridge was a wing, about 2.5 m wide. The visibility from the navigator s seat was excellent since there was no equipment for loading/unloading nor was there a rig. Ahead of the engine room, located aft, was the cargo area, which consisted of one large hold only, 62.8 x 10.1 m. It was covered by a hatch of steel, composed by 10 pontoon sections which were placed on a coaming that was 2.3 m high. The hatch was dimensioned to load containers and could take 181 TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, standard containers). The cargo hold was box shaped. The breadth of the weather deck on each side of the coaming was 1.3 m. Under the whole cargo hold there was a double bottom, 0.90 m high, divided into tanks. No. 1 to port and starboard had a capacity of 50 tons each, No. 2 to port and starboard 75 tons each and No. 3 to port and starboard 77 tons each. Ahead of these double bottom tanks was the forepeak tank which could take 114 tons and by the stern the aft peak tank that took 56 tons. They were all ballast tanks. Aft of No. 3 double bottom tanks were No. 4 double bottom tanks, 4 in number and intended for bunker. The tanks close to the centre line could hold 38 tons each, and the outer ones 40 tons each. From the weather deck and down to the double bottom tanks there were wing tanks on each side between the cargo hold and the shell plating. No. 1 tanks could hold 125 Page 3
7 tons each, No. 2 took 163 tons each and No. 3 took 136 and 125 respectively. All wing tanks were intended for ballast water. All tanks for settling, sludge, lubricating oil and day tanks were located in the engine room area, as were also the fresh water tanks. At departure from Oxelösund there was ballast water in the both No. 3 wing tanks. All other ballast tanks were empty. There was also 90 tons marine diesel oil on board. The propulsion machinery consisted of one 8 cylinder MAK which made 1520 kw. It was connected to a propeller with fixed blades. Forward was a bow-thruster unit of 220 kw. The rudder was of so-called fishtail type, which gives an improved steering capacity compared to a conventional rudder. Page 4
8 Page 5
9 2.2 The crew The crew comprised five persons: master, chief officer, one combined deck and engine officer (maritime officer) and two ABs (able bodied seamen). The master and the maritime officer were of Dutch nationality, the chief officer was Russian and the ABs were of Philippine nationality. The master was 29 years old. 2.3 The fairway at the time of the grounding Outside the quay is an island called Korpholmen. This island can be rounded to the north and to the south. At the occurrence the northern route was planned. Just after leaving the quay a pair of buoys is passed, where the port side buoy has a diamond shaped top mark and the starboard mark is a spar without top mark. After passing the pair of buoys Korpholmen is rounded in a turn to starboard to steer a course of 91º following a leading line astern. The leading line astern was shown by two fixed red lights. The leading line then leads between a black-yellow flashlight buoy to starboard and one cable (185 m) further on a green light-buoy to port. The light-buoy is of Fl G 3s character, which means that it flashes a green light every third second. The black-yellow light-buoy is positioned north of a ground of 2.3 m and the green one south of a ground of 4.3 m. Another 3.5 cables further out is a green spar without top mark, but this one is about 1.4 cables to the north of the leading line. The leading line leads into the white sector of lighthouse Korpholmen, aft at course 068º, which leads out to the bay Ålöfjärden. Page 6
10 2.4 Chart extract Page 7
11 2.5 Compulsory pilotage For running a ship in the fairway from lighthouse Gustav Dalén via Lillhammarsgrund to Oxelösund Ironworks or the opposite pilotage is not compulsory for dry cargo ships with a length and breadth of less than 90.0 and 16.0 metres respectively. On his voyage to Oxelösund the master used a pilot, since the fairway was not completely familiar to him, but he refrained from using a pilot on this specific voyage. 2.6 The weather At departure the weather was very nice with slight wind, clear sky and good visibility. 2.7 Icy waters In Notices to Mariners (NtM) (Ufs A) a warning is issued that floating seamarks may be undependable. In the NtM is written that the seafarer should not determine his position only by means of floating marks without first having made sure that the mark is correctly positioned. The floating seamarks of the Swedish Maritime Administration are made for icy conditions and are therefore in general not removed for the winter season. However, buoys and spars may move due to ice moving about, and in some cases they may also get down under the ice. When icy conditions are prevailing the floating seamarks should in general be considered to be most undependable. The port of Oxelösund Ironworks and the waters close by were covered by broken ice. 3 Course of events 3.1 Before the grounding STEEL QUEEN arrived at Oxelösund from Rotterdam on 15 March at Since the cargo was not ready for loading she anchored off the port of the ironworks. A pilot was engaged for the inward voyage. Page 8
12 At 2210 on 18 March the anchor was weighed and the ship moored at 1200 at the quay of Oxelösund Ironworks with the port side towards the quay. At 1600 on 20 March the loading was finished and the ship ready for sea. The cargo consisted of 3157 tons of steel coils in various sizes. After having reported the departure to Oxelösund VTS on VHF channel 09 STEEL QUEEN sailed under the master s command and with himself at the helm, assisted by a maritime officer. No pilot was engaged. Since the ship had her port side towards the quay it was planned to go north of Korpholmen. The master intended to round Korpholmen and keep a passage distance of 1.4 cables. He also put the range ring at 1.4 cables. Afterwards the ship should be steering in the leading line on course 91º. However, when the maritime officer was to check the leading line it was not possible to see since the setting sun was dazzling. Since the black-yellow buoy which should be rounded to starboard was not visible the master steered towards a green spar. He carefully kept distance from the 2.3 m ground, and hence the green spar came very close to port. Suddenly, at 1615, the ship run aground on the 4.3 m ground at position 58º40'.8 N 17º09'.0 E at a speed of just above 6 knots according to the AIS. Page 9
13 3.2 Excerpt from the AIS Page 10
14 3.3 After the grounding Soundings around the ship showed that she was aground by about L/2 (half of the ship s length) and that there was plenty of water under bows and stern. The grounding caused a list to starboard of 4º. The total draught had decreased by about 0.5 m and the trim had increased by about 1 m. Neither the rudder nor the propeller were damaged, nor was there a leak in any of the bottom tanks. At an attempt on the same day to take the ship afloat by one tug boat the No. 2 doublebottom tank to starboard sprang a leak. On the next day another attempt was made by three tug boats. They did not manage to get the ship off the ground but could turn her to starboard. At that attempt No. 2 to port and both Nos. 3 sprang leaks. These double bottom tanks could hold 300 tons totally. The first two days of the grounding a ship surveyor was on board. Effortless attempts were then made to take the ship off the ground both by own engine and by assistance of two tug boats. Since STEEL QUEEN had no possibilities to unload, the barge OXELÖSUND was engaged with the pusher KARL-JOHAN. Calculations showed that the ship rested on the ground by 940 tons, since the water had fallen by about 10 cm. A plan for salvage was presented by the shipping company on 24 March, where one condition for refloating was that the main engine and the bow thruster would be operational and could be used if needed. While 1100 tons of cargo was unloaded, 800 to 900 tons of ballast water was filled to keep the ship steady on the ground during the preparation phase. When the operation was finished the ballast was pumped out while the four damaged tanks were blown for water. STEEL QUEEN could be taken off the ground on 26 March, but the main engine could not be used. A pilot by means of two tug boats took the ship to quay at Oxelösund, where divers examined the damage. It was then established that one propeller blade was missing and two other blades were folded. Page 11
15 After unloading STEEL QUEEN left Oxelösund on 30 March and was tugged to a shipyard in Gdynia. 4 Analysis 4.1 Circumstances at the grounding Since it was not possible on board STEEL QUEEN to get the leading line in sight to aft due to dazzling sun, it became very important to the master to identify the buoys between which he would pass. It was not possible to see the buoy to starboard but he thought he saw the green buoy to port. He was afraid of getting too close to the 2.3 m ground, marked by the unseen buoy, and therefore he kept very close to the green buoy to port of the course to steer. The master was very astonished when the ship ran aground since he felt completely sure of his position in the fairway. When it was getting dark the light from the green buoy under an ice flake was discovered from the ship only about 15 m to starboard. Later on the two unseen buoys came into sight when the ice moved and dispersed. The buoy which led the master turned out to be the second green buoy, a spar. The difference between a spar and a light-buoy is obvious and should have been noted. The course steered when having the green spar close to port when hitting the 4.3 m grond must have been about 76º instead of 91º shown by the leading line. Thus the difference in course is about 15º, which should have made the master suspicious, had he glanced at the compass. The spar, which was the second green buoy, is located 3.5 cables further out than the light-buoy that was pressed down by the ice. This should easily have been noticed by the master if he had consulted the radar image. Astern was land with the industrial plant which made an excellent radar echo. The distance from there to the grounding site was 5 cables, whereas the distance from the buoy was 8.5 cables. Page 12
16 The master had prepared the departure by placing the variable range marker of the radar on 1.4 cables. He would then use it as a minimum distance when turning around Korpholmen. He had also settled that the turn would be completed when the course was 91º. The master deviated from his planned navigation, based upon fixed echoes and radar distances, when he could not verify his position by the leading line. He then completely trusted the floating spar. 4.2 Fatigue The master did not feel tired at the departure. There is no reason to assume that this was the case since STEEL QUEEN first was anchored 3 days off Oxelösund and then another 2 days at quay. 5 Cause The cause of the accident was that only floating buoys were consulted to decide the ship s position in the fairway although it was covered with broken ice. An additional cause was that the light buoys had been pressed down under the ice and were not visible. Another additional cause was that it was not possible to see the leading line in the west due to the setting sun. 6 Remark The master used only one method to establish the ship s position in the fairway although he had prepared the navigation with both radar distance and course. When it became impossible to check the leading line he completely trusted floating buoys without considering that this is very uncertain, especially in icy waters. Page 13
17 7 General recommendations The position of a ship should always be established by more than one method of navigation. The position of a ship must therefore never be established by means of floating buoys only. When navigating in icy waters one must always be extremely cautious where floating buoys are used. 8 Injuries and Damage 8.1 Personal injuries and damage to the environment Personal injuries and damage to the environment are not known to have occurred. 8.2 Material damage Four of the double bottom tanks of the ship, No. 2 to port and to starboard and No.3 to port and to starboard, were damaged and sprung leaks. There were indentations in the bottom between frames 70 and 115. The first two days of the grounding a ship surveyor from the Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate was on board when the engine was run for several hours. Nothing unusual could then be noted, nor were there any vibrations. When the ship had been taken off ground the main engine was out of order and the ship had to be tugged to quay. The examination by divers there displayed great damage to the propeller. It has not been possible to determine when the damage to the main engine and the propeller had occurred; this may have been when taking the ship off the ground on 26 March. One condition of the salvage plan presented on 24 March was that the main engine and the bow thrusters were operational, if needed. Page 14
18 9 Result of the investigation The ship s equipment was in good working order at departure from Oxelösund, and the crew were competent and thoroughly rested. The weather was nice with light winds and clear sky. The fairway was covered with broken ice which pressed two lightbuoys down under the ice. The setting sun was dazzling and made it impossible to see the leading line. Since the leading line could not be used the master chose to steer by a spar further out in the fairway. The master mistook the spar for the invisible green light-buoy. Page 15
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