ZigBee Security. Robert Cragie Chair, ZigBee Alliance ZARC Securit y Task Group Principal Engineer, Jennic Ltd.

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1 ZigBee Security Robert Cragie Chair, ZigBee Alliance ZARC Securit y Task Group Principal Engineer, Jennic Ltd. 1

2 Security in the ZigBee stack 2

3 Specification constraints The specification assumes an 'open trust' model where the protocol stack layers trust each other This is not unreasonable for the type of devices ZigBee is aimed at, e.g. single-chip wireless microcontrollers executing the whole stack on a single CPU This implies that cryptographic protection only occurs bet ween devices The same security suite level is used for all services 3

4 Security services provided The ZigBee Security Services provided in the specificat ion are: Key est ablishment Key transport Frame protection Device authorization 4

5 The Trust Center To function securely in a network, a device must have a counterpart device which it can trust to obtain keys and which controls access ZigBee therefore introduces the concept of the Trust Center, which Stores the keys for the network Uses the security services to configure a device with its key(s) Uses the security services to authorize a device onto the network The ZigBee Coordinator is usually designated the Trust Center 5

6 Sym metric key dist ribution ZigBee security is based on symmetric keys Both originator and recipient of a protected transaction need to share the same key That key is used directly in the security t ransformat ion How does this key get to both ends? Three basic met hods Pre-inst allat ion Transport Est ablishment 6

7 Distribution m ethods Pre-installation is where keys are placed into device using out-of-band method, e.g. commissioning t ool Transport is where the Trust Center sends the key (securely wherever possible) to the device Establishment is where the device negotiates with the Trust Center and keys are established at either end without being transported SKKE (Symmetric Key Key Establishment) CBKE (Certificate-based Key Establishment) ASKE (Alpha-secure Key Est ablishment) 7

8 Key types There are three key types: Master key Shared key for SKKE only Link key Network key 8

9 Link key Key which is uniquely shared between two and only two devices for protecting frames at the APS layer One of those devices is normally the Trust Cent er Usually dynamically established using key est ablishment service Can also be pre-installed or transported from the Trust Center 9

10 Network key Global key which is used by all devices in the net work A set of network keys is held by the Trust Center and current network key is identified by a key sequence number Usually transported from the Trust Center Can also be pre-inst alled Two stage update mechanism Update new key and associated key sequence number Switch to new key sequence number 10

11 Common Security Model Some confusion due to flexibility in specificat ion A common secur ity model was developed Use of network key with pre-configured Trust Center link keys Pre-configured TC link key protects the transport of the network key Additional link keys can be transported or est ablished using higher-layer mechanism Secure communication cluster in SE/ HC profile 11

12 Fram e protection The security suite used is AES-CCM* The security level used in ZigBee (level 5) means AES_CCM* is the same as AES-CCM AES-CCM is NIST special publicat ion C Low-cost implementation in terms of resources Some wireless microcontrollers have hardware support for AES-CCM or AES-CCM* Two parts to protection Encrypt ion Integrity protection ZigBee security uses level 5 in the AES-CCM* suite Encrypt ed MIC length 4 octets 12

13 Encryption and Integrity protection Encryption scrambles the original data (called plaintext in 'security speak') into cipher text Encryption prevents an eavesdropper from being able to int erpret frame payload Integrity protection adds a Message Integrity Code (MIC) to be transported along with the data to be protected The MIC 'signs' the data and allows the recipient to verify that the data has not been tampered with The MIC is also bound to the identity (IEEE address) of the originator and thus provides origin authenticity Without integrity protection, a rogue device could modify a transmitted frame and the modification may not be detected by the recipient 13

14 Protecting at NWK layer PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Unsecured NWK PDU NWK Plaintext NWK Payload PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Secured NWK PDU NWK Auxiliary Header Ciphertext NWK Payload MIC 14

15 Protecting at APS layer PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Unsecured NWK PDU NWK Plaintext NWK Payload Unsecured APS PDU APS Plaintext APS Payload PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Unsecured NWK PDU NWK Plaintext NWK Payload Secured APS PDU APS Auxiliary Header Ciphertext APS Payload MIC 15

16 Protecting at NWK and APS layer PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Unsecured NWK PDU NWK Plaintext NWK Payload Unsecured APS PDU APS Plaintext APS Payload PDU SYNC MAC Plaintext MAC Payload FCS Secured NWK PDU NWK Auxiliary Header Ciphertext NWK Payload MIC Secured APS PDU APS Auxiliary Header Ciphertext APS Payload MIC 16

17 Joining scenario ZigBee Coordinator normally acts as Trust Center Walk through device without network key and with preconfigured TC link key Common security model Coordinator Router End Device Mesh link End device star link 17

18 Joining scenario walkthrough 1: Device does unsecured join : Router sends device update to TC for authorization 3: TC prepares network key transport for joining device secured with pre-configured TC link key shared between TC and joining device and tunnels it to router Trust Center Router End Device Mesh link End device star link APSME commands 4: Router unpacks tunneled network key transport and sends to device unsecured at network layer 5: Device retrieves network key from network key transport using pre-configured TC link key 18

19 ZigBee SE 2.0 security requirem ents SE 2.0 requires a more flexible security implementation Both federated and end-to-end models need to be considered Existing standards from IETF, IEEE, IEC etc. need to be used Multiple sources for implementation and multiple CAs required 19

20 ZigBee SE 2.0 security initial technical requirem ents Link layer security provided by frame prot ection EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) used for net work admission Certificates Passphrases PINs TLS (Transport Layer Security) used for secure associations at application level Locally within HAN Across the wider network to utility TRD available on ZigBee/ Homeplug document server 20