The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

Transcription

1 EXAMPLE Aeronautical Outlook Aviation Crisis Management Workshop Brussels, May 2012 Ricardo Alonso Safety Air Navigation Coordinator AESA- Spanish NSA The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

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3 One National Crisis Conducting the National Crisis: Government Delegate Commission for Crisis Situations Commission Support Committee. Support Groups Various Ministries Cells Interministerial Crisis Ad Hoc Department of Infrastructure and Crisis Monitoring Alert and Monitoring Unit Permanent Service Alerts Unit Conduct of Crisis National Center for Crisis Conduct Infrastructure Unit

4 Government Delegate Commission for Crisis Situations The Government Delegate Commission for Crisis Situations, according to according to Royal Decree 1886/2011 will have the following composition: The Prime Minister, who shall preside. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Presidency. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation The Minister of Defense The Minister for Internal Affairs The Minister of Public Works. The Director of the Office of the Prime Minister The Secretary of State for Security The Secretary of State-Director of National Intelligence Center. The Director of the Office of the Prime Minister shall act as Secretary to the Government Commission for Crisis Situations. Corresponds to that Commission approve the necessary legislation for the establishment of a driving emergency or crisis, both nationally and internationally, which could threaten the life, safety or welfare of the Spanish, to approve the plans and infrastructure programs and actions that are needed to ensure continuity of government action and normal functioning of city life, and lead and coordinate actions to prevent, control and conduct crisis.

5 Committee to Support the Government's Delegate Commission for Crisis Situations There is a committee in support of CDGSC, most executive functions on the system and be responsible for meeting medium-profile crises, and support groups in the various ministries. To some crises can be created specifically inter cells. Composition: Secretary General of the Presidency of the Government Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Secretary of State for Security Secretary of State for Budget and Expenditure Director General for Defence Policy Director General of Civil Protection Director General of the Office of Government Spokesperson Assistant Director of the Office of the Prime Minister

6 Depending of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. The Operations Coordination Board (SACOP) Civil Protection, coordinates and centralizes the operational actions in this area. At the peripheral level are the so-called Civil Protection Units and Sub-delegations of the Government. The reception, assessment and recording of information from the Civil Protection Units and Sub-delegations of the Government and other agencies, both domestic and foreign. Monitoring and analysis of emergency situations that occur anywhere in the country. Be the instrument of coordination of the Directorate General of Civil Protection between the agencies involved in a situation of national emergency, and how to carry out its responsibilities of emergency management. Provide the necessary support to the actions of the Civil Protection Units and Subdelegations of the Government in managing emergencies. Extraordinary means mobilizing domestic and foreign intervention in emergency situations. The General Subdirector of the SACOP is the Secretary of the CECO, Coordination State Committee for Volcanic Risk, created on February 21st, 1996.

7 CECO: Comité Estatal de Coord. de Protección Civil para el Riesgo Volcánico: (State Coordination Comitee of Civil Protection for Volcanic Risk) established by Ministeries Council Agreement. Jannuary 19th,1996 (B.O.E (State Official Bulletin) March 4th, 1996). Participants: Presidency: Civil Protection General Directorate Secretary: General Sub-directorate of plans and operations Infrastructures and monitoring of crisis situations Directorate (Feedback to the CDSC) Police General Directorate General-Traffic Directorate Public Health General Directorate CECO: El Hierro Volcanic Crisis, Daily situation reports Marine General Directorate Civil Aviation General Directorate Geographic National Institute CSIC (High level Scientific Research Centre) AEMET Different emergency plans. 7

8 CECO Special Plans for Volcanic Risk in Canary Islands (PEVOLCA).

9 CECO, State Coordination Committee of Civil Protection for Volcanic Risk meeting. We were informed about the seismic process evolution: According to the registered seismic activity, there was a 10% probability of volcanic eruption. In case of volcanic eruption taking place, its severity would be limited. The most likely location would be the north of the island. The most likely effects would be an ash and water steam plume of 2-3 kilometre height, and a fragmentation between the north and the south of the island due to landslides over one main tunnel, which would cut communications between the north of the island, its capital and the airport. 9

10 With this situation, the most serious problem: Evacuation of 4000 people from the north of the island. It was agreed to set up a working group for studying all the possibilities regarding the evacuation. On September 22nd, 2011, according to the cooperation protocol between IGN (National Geographic Institute) and CSIC (Superior Centre for Scientific Research), the warning level was risen to 3. It is recommended that the emergency plan be prepared for activity. On September 23rd, 2011, after a meeting between the Emergency Management Committee and the Scientific Committee for Volcano Phenomena (belonging to the Emergency Plan for Volcano Risk in the Canary Autonomous Community (PEVOLCA)), decided to move from green to yellow colour: The Plan is activated. 10

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12 On September 26 th, 2011, the seismic activity grows, and some earthquakes around 5 points (Richter scale) are measured. The released energy in the earthquakes was also growing The measurements of GPS deflections was increasing. The average depth of the 7900 earthquakes was around Kms. The total island surface deflection was 35 mm. The rising magma volume was around 40 x10 6 m 3 The earthquake frequency and its magnitude were growing. The likelihood of the eruption was reaching 40%. Due to the slide of submarine layers, a small tsunami was possible. 12

13 The type of magma is basaltic. In this condition the eruption would show low explosiveness, anyway if the centre of emission is close to the shore, the water would increase this explosiveness. Due to the basalt type of the magma, the eruption forecast would take less than three days. On September 28th, 2011, the number of earthquakes was increasing and so was the ground deflection. The emergency level is risen to 5. Evacuation is started. Eruption will be in short. According to what is established in the ICAO contingency plan, the alert phase should be activated: 120 NM round the predicted position of the volcano, in which no clearances should be given. 13

14 120 nm.

15 By Security reasons, one Restricted Área is issued for flight, except for State aircrafts and emergencies and emergency services aircrafts: 5NM(8kms) of radius, point 27ª36'36" N, 18º W, from MSL to FL 150 All aircrafts from/to El Hierro should fly the published SID/STAR. VFR flights over FL150 are not allowed in CANARIAS FIR. NOTAM

16 October 23th, 2011 Risk has increased. EL HIERRO: CRISIS MANAGEMENT

17 October 23th, Mar de las Calmas, La Restinga Zone 17

18 Satellite: October 23th, 18

19 The IGN pointed out that the eruption had taken place and: The submarine eruption (in the south of the island) reduce the likelihood of eruptions in other locations. In case of aerial eruption, in the present location, the plume wouldn t be up to 500 m. high, due to the water column height: Location affected: La Restinga zone EL HIERRO: CRISIS MANAGEMENT 19

20 Aeronautical working group was needed (possibility of eruption in surface Volcanic Ash) One coordination meeting was arranged by Spanish NSA (AESA): Assessment of the situation in El Hierro Updating and review of the Aeronautical Emergency Protocol in Volcanic Ash Crisis. The group is composed of every Organization participating in the protocol: Regulator and NSA ANSPs MWO (AEMET) IGN INTA (National Institute for Aerospace Technology) SENASA Air Military Force 20

21 The MET Office, with the information provided by the IGN and winds forecast, guaranteed they could provide expected coverage information. All the organizations intervening in the meeting, constituted the Aeronautical Operational Coordination Group, and its Terms of Reference were established in the Protocol. According to the Protocol for Volcanic Ash Pre-alert phase. The most relevant characteristic of this phase is the uncertainty in time, location and physical characteristics. 21

22 Dealing with: 120NM restrictive area, lots of arguments. Big impact on air traffic in the canary islands. New Pre-Alert phase, not identified in ICAO EUR/NAT doc.019. Concept of SRA methodology, based on restricction, no exclusion. Problems: Difficulties in speeding the SRA s for the spanish ACFTs. Difficulties involving AOs Achieved Goals: Aeronautical Protocol for Volcanic Ash Crisis v1.0. Putting on the table the SRA methodology. Constitution of the Aeronautical Coordination Group for Volcanic Ash Crisis. Identification of people involved Quick answer. All identified organizations to be aware and prepare for future crises. Identifying roles and responsibilities. 22

23 Protocol in Volcanic Ash Crises, v1.0 23

24 Main characteristics : EL HIERRO: CRISIS MANAGEMENT Facing El Hierro situation. It s neccesary extend the 3 stablished ICAO/EUR/NAT phases defined in doc.019 (1) Pre-Alert phase: Uncertainty of the moment, location and physical features. Goal: To determine the most likely scenario with the inputs from IGN and MET. Output: First VONA (Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation) from IGN in yellow/orange colour. Likelihood of air space restriction for precautionary purpose. (2) Alert Phase: IGN-CSIC predict immediate ash emission to the atmosphere (from 6 hours to 72 hours in advance to the emission). AEMET emission of SIGMET with the alert information about the imminent eruption. AENA emission of NOTAM/ASHTAM IGN and AEMET will specify the scenario, mainly the affected air space. The restriction will consider the operators safety cases, according to the predicted ash concentration. 24

25 Main characteristics : (3) Reactive phase: AEMET emission of SIGMET with the alert information about the eruption. AENA (NOF Office) emission of NOTAM/ASHTAM. Output: VONA (Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation) from IGN in Red colour. Dangers Areas deployed, ATFM to plan rerouting. Coordination, changing information is essential. (4) Proactive Phase: Output: Reception of the first VAA and VAG from the associated VACC. Emission of SIGMETs (AEMET) and VAA and VAGs (implies ash concentration) from the associated VAAC ANSPs emission of local NOTAM/ASHTAM, if necessary Concretion of the scenario, mainly the affected air space. The restriction will consider the operators safety cases, according to the predicted ash concentration. ANSPs (AENA upper airspace) re-routing ACFTs (ATFM measures) 25

26 New meeting of the Aeronautical Operational Coordination Group. New meeting of the State Coordination Committee of Civil Protection for Volcanic Risk was held: The seismicity lately was located at the south of the island. The tremble measurement and the analysis of the material showed that there was a big and high explosive magma bag in the north, connected with the one in the south that had erupted, and they were connected. The only way to see and anticipate the evolution was the scanning of the sea floor, with appropriate ships. There was a reference scanning made in 1998, which enabled comparison with the 26 present situation.

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28 PEVOLCA had confirmed that the eruption started in october 2011 had finished (march 2012). Nevertheless, the volcanic process initiated on july 17th, 2011 was still happening because seismic anomalies was still present.. Advice: Keep a scientific survillance system to monitor it.. 28

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30 CONCLUSIONS: Multi-discipline groups must work their plans in coordination with other groups. Coordination Units should be established at any specific area. Review the area plans, taking into account different likely scenarios and taking care of not increasing the alarm level unnecessarily. Apply the plan for a specific scenario. Intercommunication between areas. 30

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32 Thanks for your attention! Ricardo Alonso González / AESA, Spain ralonsog@fomento.es 32