Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation
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- Shavonne Francis
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From this document you will learn the answers to the following questions:
What kind of certification is needed to certify already certified components?
What is the abbreviation for the organization that provides the support for the certification?
Transcription
1 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation How to Exchange Components without Re-Evaluation? Igor Furgel, Viola Saftig, Tobias Wagner (T-Systems) Kevin Müller (Airbus Group Innovations) Reinhard Schwarz (Fraunhofer IESE) Axel Söding-Freiherr von Blomberg (OpenSynergy) Contact: MILS Workshop 2016, in cooperation with HiPEAC 16, Prague 15/03/2016
2 Outline Industrial use cases have shown limitations of current compositional methodologies New Common Criteria evaluation method for evaluating one composed target of evaluation (TOE) based on two (or more) already certified TOEs Application cases 2 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
3 State of the Art and Motivation ACO / CAP (Composed Assurance Package) Composed certification of already certified components Just conformance checks at component s boundaries without proof of execution boundaries (no non-interference proof) Up to CAP-C (attack potential: enhanced basic, i.e. EAL 4 like) No conformance claim to an EAL package possible Not widely applied in the real world 3 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
4 State of the Art and Motivation CCDB Composition Composite certification of already certified platform and noncertified application using this platform Using the development documents and the vulnerability analysis of platform to ensure security properties of final Composite TOE EAL package claim is possible No limitation on assurance level, i.e. EAL 7 possible Drawbacks: Re-usability of evaluation results for the application is difficult Effort for re-certification may be quite high 4 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
5 Puzzle Composition Motivation Exchange a system component with interface/function-compatible one Use-cases Product from Vendor-A is replaced by product from Vendor-B Flexible in-the-field update MILS Architecture Low-criticality App New Mediumcriticality App High-criticality App MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 5 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
6 Definitions a) Component TOE: input to the evaluation; two or more already certified products b) Composed TOE: output of the evaluation; one certified final product based on the set of Component TOEs c) Interaction: the allowed communication of two certified Component TOEs according to a given information flow policy inside the Composed TOE d) Interference: any communication or influence on a Component TOE that is not explicitly authorized by the certified security policy for this Component TOE 6 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
7 Proposal New methodology based on non-interfering between Component TOEs Interaction between Component TOEs possible only according to a given information flow policy inside the Composed TOE Interference is not possible inside the Composed TOE 7 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
8 Idea and Principle of Non-Interference Execution of one Component TOE does not undermine the certified security policy of other Component TOE The complete internal state of each Component TOE is well-defined and -known at any time Non-interference between the Component TOEs shall be evidently demonstrated The non-interference property of the Component TOEs shall be verified during the dedicated evaluation processes of each Component TOE non-interference analysis by responsible Component TOE evaluator This methodology is a peer-to-peer one: it treats Component TOEs in a symmetric way as equal entities from the point of view of their non-interference 8 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
9 Step 1: A priori analysis of the Component TOEs A priori evidence of fundamental non-interference between the Component TOEs This a priori determination is one of the principal distinctions between the new methodology and the ACO and CCDB methodologies relying on an a posteriori determination of the level of non-interference between the Component TOEs Preparing non-interfering composed evaluation Analysis of all possible internal states of Component TOEs Analysis of non-bypassability and non-tampering Yielding a list of non-interference requirements Single Components need to be made suitable for this approach 9 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
10 Step 2: Evaluation of the Non-Interfering Composed TOE Relies on the analysis of certified non-interfering properties of the Component TOEs (see Step #1) Analysis of mapping between the requirements of each Component TOE with the SFRs of the other Component TOEs Analysis of functional interactions between Component TOEs Verification of the fulfilment of non-interference requirements If necessary (incomplete requirement matching) perform reduced vulnerability assessment 10 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
11 Application Case 1 Non-Interfering Composed TOE for Base and Dependent TOE Non-interference is shown if: 1. The Base TOE strictly and evidently separates the application from the Base TOE 2. The fulfilment of all requirements for running the application in a non-interfered way (wrt. app-certificate) can be evidently guaranteed by the Base TOE 3. The fulfilment of all requirements for running the Base TOE in a non-interfered way (wrt. base-certificate) can be evidently guaranteed by the application 11 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
12 Component TOE 3 (options) Application Case 2 Non-Interfering Composed TOE: Interaction via the underlying platform Domain Separation Service Component TOE 1 Component TOE 2 A 1 A 2 A IPC OS IPC HW External Bus 12 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
13 Application Case 2 (cont.) Interaction via the underlying platform Non-interference is shown if: 1. The fulfilment of all requirements for executing the Component TOE 1 and TOE 2 in a non-interfered way, as imposed by their certificates, can be evidently guaranteed by the Component TOE 3 (underlying platform) and by its concrete configuration. 2. The fulfilment of all requirements for executing the Component TOE 3 (underlying platform) in a non-interfered way, as imposed by its certificate, can be evidently guaranteed by the Component TOE 1, Component TOE 2 and given a concrete configuration of the Component TOE Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
14 Separation Kernel as Base TOE Low-criticality Partition MILS Architecture Mediumcriticality Partition High-criticality Partition Separation Kernel Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator Separation Kernel Certifiable Operating System layer Separates system and processing resources Provides separated runtime environments to host applications mandatory property to evidently proof non-interference Provide controlled communication between runtime environment controls interactions and defines interfaces/access point to applications 14 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
15 Base TOE: Certified Separation Kernel (with HW) Dependent TOE 1: Generic Gateway (R, T) Dependent TOE 2: Specific Protocol Filters Challenges: Use Case: Non-Interfering Composed Firewall TOE 1. Evidently secure (= certified) Composed Firewall using filter configuration A 2. Evolutionary Evaluation by enhancing filter configuration A (updates) 3. Incremental Improvement by adding filter configuration B (from the box of certified filters) 15 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
16 Puzzle Composition Back to the motivation Exchange a system component with interface/function-compatible one Use-cases Product from Vendor-A is replaced by product from Vendor-B Flexible in-the-field update MILS Architecture Low-criticality App New Mediumcriticality App High-criticality App MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 16 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
17 Summary and Benefits Common Criteria does not currently offer a highly flexible methodology for compositional evaluation regarding: Reusability of single components Independent evaluation of components Compositional assurance of products from different vendors Non-interfering methodology shifts effort for vulnerability assessment to component evaluation to avoid duplication of effort during the compositional step when performing re-evaluations (however for initial certification, efforts likely similar to CCDB composite methodology) Evaluation effort for Non-Interfering Composed TOE can significantly be reduced due to the non-interfering property of and the related evidence for Component TOEs 17 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
18 Summary and Benefits (cont.) Targets certifications of dynamic high-assurance systems Conformance claim to each EAL package is possible Enables a verdict for the TOE resistance to attacks by an attacker with even high attack potential A Component TOE (e.g., an application) can be replaced with less effort A supplemental application can be added to an already existing Composed TOE by only evaluating the new application Component TOE The new evaluation methodology for non-interfering Composed TOE enables a higher business flexibility for the vendors and operators of Composed TOEs 18 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
19 EURO-MILS CONTRACT N0: This project has received funding from the European Union s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement n If you need further information, please contact the coordinator: Technikon Forschungs- und Planungsgesellschaft mbh Burgplatz 3a, 9500 Villach, AUSTRIA Tel: Fax: coordination@euromils.eu The information in this document is provided as is, and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability. 19 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
20 BACKUP Slides or to be used 20 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
21 Component TOE 1 Component TOE 2 A 1 A OS A 2 3 OS A 2 4 HW HW External Bus Sketch of a Non-Interfering Composed TOE: consisting of physically separated Component TOEs 21 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
22 Component TOE 3 (options) Component TOE 1 Component TOE 2 A 1 A 2 A OS HW External Bus Sketch of a Non-Interfering Composed TOE: same execution environment and direct interaction (N*(N-1)/2 evidences) 22 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
23 Compositional Certification: Scenario-T MILS architecture is the enabler for high-assurance compositional certification The core is Separation Kernel Components under certified composition Hardware, Separation kernel, Applications Low-criticality Partition MILS Architecture Mediumcriticality Partition High-criticality Partition MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 23 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
24 Compositional Certification: Scenario-T MILS architecture is the enabler for high-assurance compositional certification The core is Separation Kernel Components under certified composition Hardware, Separation kernel, Applications Low-criticality Partition MILS Architecture Mediumcriticality Partition High-criticality Partition MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 24 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
25 Compositional Certification: Scenario-T MILS architecture is the enabler for high-assurance compositional certification The core is Separation Kernel T - composition Components under certified composition Hardware, Separation kernel, Applications Low-criticality Partition MILS Architecture Mediumcriticality Partition High-criticality Partition MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 25 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
26 Compositional Certification: Scenario-P Puzzle Composition Exchange system component with interface/functioncompatible one Use-cases Product from Vendor-A is replaced by product from Vendor-B Flexible in-the-field update MILS Architecture Low-criticality App New Mediumcriticality App High-criticality App MILS Platform (Separation Kernel) Hardware (CPUs, memory, and devices) Network Actuator 26 Non-Interfering Composed Evaluation, I. Furgel, K. Müller, T. Wagner, 2 nd MILS -WS, Prague 2016
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