MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS. N I N A N I T U & A F R I C A N Z E B R A C o l l i s i o n 6 J u l y

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1 MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS N I N A N I T U & A F R I C A N Z E B R A C o l l i s i o n 6 J u l y

2 Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents Danish Maritime Authority Vermundsgade 38 C, DK 2100 Copenhagen Phone: , Fax: CVR-nr.: The casualty report has been issued on 10 December 2010 Case: Frontpage: NINANITU and AFRICAN ZEBRA after the collision. The casualty report is available on our homepage: The Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents The Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents is responsible for investigating accidents and serious occupational accidents on Danish merchant and fishing vessels. The Division also investigates accidents at sea on foreign ships in Danish waters. Purpose The purpose of the investigation is to clarify the actual sequence of events leading to the accident. With this information in hand, others can take measures to prevent similar accidents in the future. The aim of the investigations is not to establish legal or economic liability. The Division s work is separated from other functions and activities of the Danish Maritime Authority. Reporting obligation When a Danish merchant or fishing vessel has been involved in a serious accident at sea, the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents must be informed immediately. Phone: Fax: oke@dma.dk Page 2

3 Contents 1 Summary Conclusion Recommendations The investigation Factual Information Accident data Navigation Data Ship data Weather data The Crew Narratives NINANITU AIS-track Chart segment VDR recordings of radar pictures Executive Order on Watchkeeping International Regulations for Preventing Collisions (COLREG) Radar reflector Analysis Watchkeeping and COLREG Radar reflector TV in the wheel house Summary Fishing vessel NINANITU departed from Grenaa for fishing at Store Middelgrund in Kattegat. On board were two men, and the vessel was navigating by auto pilot on course 085 at approx. 8 knots. During the passage the best hand rested in the cabin forward while the skipper stayed in the wheel house. At some time the skipper observed AFRICAN ZEBRA on the radar at approx. two miles and approx. 40 to port. It seemed to the skipper a s AFRICAN ZEBRA was going to pass astern of NINANITU and thus he took no action with regard to that ship. Bulk carrier AFRICAN ZEBRA was navigating southward by Route T at course 209 at approx. 13 knots. On duty on the bridge were an officer and an AB as a lookout. After having his dinner, the master came to the bridge. He saw immediately visually a fishing vessel approx. 1½ cable from the ship on starboard bow obviously at risk of a collision. The duty officer and the lookout had not seen the fishing vessel. Both ships were manoeuvred in attempt to avoid a collision but NINANITU hit into the staboard side of AFRICAN ZEBRA. AFRICAN ZEBRA turned around and a lifeboat was launched to relieve the fishermen on NINANITU that was at risk of sinking. But none of the fishermen wanted to board the lifeboat. Via a pilot boat and a Dutch navy ship in the area an alert was raised and a rescue operation was initiated. Both fishermen were rescued by a Swedish rescue helicopter. Page 3

4 2 Conclusion It is the assessment of the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents that the collision was caused by the following factors: A proper bridge discipline was not conducted by the skipper on his watch in the wheel house. (6.1). A proper lookout was not kept in NINANITU (6.1). The skipper made his assumptions that the other ship would pass astern of NI- NANITU on the basis of scanty information (6.1). A proper bridge discipline was not conducted by the officer on the watch and the lookout on AFRICAN ZEBRA (6.1). A proper lookout was not kept in AFRICAN ZEBRA (6.1). Lack of the usage of the radar s ARPA-function and adjustments of gain, sea and rain clutter on AFRICAN ZEBRA (6.1). Furthermore it is the assessment of the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents: That an efficient radar reflector on NINANITU would have resulted in a clearer echo from the vessel also on the 6 miles range (6.2). That a TV-set in the wheel house has been contributing that the skipper did not keep a proper lookout (6.3). 3 Recommendations The Investigation division recommends the Danish Maritime Authority call attention to the importance of a proper bridge discipline and in connection with general survey activities to animadvert upon things making a risk of disregard of proper bridge discipline. 4 The investigation The Investigation Division has obtained statements from the master, the chief officer and the lookout on AFRICAN ZEBRA. The Investigation Division has obtained statements from the skipper and the best hand on NINANITU. The Investigation Division has obtained VDR-recordings of radar pictures from AFRI- CAN ZEBRA. The Investigation Division has obtained AIS-tracks for AFRICAN ZEBRA for the passage just before and after the collision. The Investigation Division has obtained copy of the ship s log book entries for AFRI- CAN ZEBRA for 6 July The Investigation Division has copy of AFRICAN ZEBRAs route planning, crew list and ship s particulars. The Investigation Division has obtained the SAR log from the Admiral Danish Fleet. Page 4

5 5 Factual Information 5.1 Accident data Type of accident (the incident in details) Time and date of the accident Position of the accident Area of accident Injured persons IMO Casualty Class Collision 6 July 2010, 1841 hours 56 26,33 N 11 32,5 E Kattegat, Route T One fisherman on NINANITU Very serious accident 5.2 Navigation Data NINANITU Stage of navigation Port and time of departure Passage towards fishing ground Grenaa, 6 July 2010, 1600 hours AFRICAN ZEBRA Stage of navigation Sejlads i Rute T, sydgående Port and time of departure Maputa, Mozambique, 8 June 2010 Draught on departure 9.6 metre Pilot on board No 5.3 Ship data Name NINANITU AFRICAN ZEBRA Home port Grenaa Nassau Call sign XP 2048 C6UE7 IMO No Fishing vessel No AS 100 Owner The skipper ISM responsible operator/owner Enterprises Shipping & Trading SA, Greece Flag State Denmark Bahamas Construction year Type of ship Fishing vessel Bulk carrier Tonnage (GT) ,207 Classification society Unclassed Bureau Veritas Length metre metre Engine power 140 kw 5,726 kw 5.4 Weather data Wind direction and speed Visibility Light/dark NV, 10 m/s Good Day light, bright sunshine Page 5

6 5.5 The Crew AFRICAN ZEBRA Number of crewmembers 21 Number of crewmembers certified to act as 4 bridge watch Watch on the bridge 3- shift Occupation on board the ship at the time of Age, Certificate of Competency the accident (crewmembers relevant to the accident) Master Chief officer Lookout 54 years of age, STCW-certificate as a master 40 years of age, STCW-certificate as a chief officer 33 years of age, able bodied seaman NINANITU Number of crewmembers 2 Number of crewmembers certified to act as No certificate required for persons to act bridge watch as a bridge watch on this vessel Watch on the bridge Varying Occupation on board the ship at the time of the accident (crewmembers relevant to the accident) Skipper Best hand Age, experience 61 years of age, engaged as a fisherman during the entire adult life 60 years of age, engaged as a fisherman during the entire adult life 5.6 Narratives The following in this chapter is based on the statements from the skipper and the best hand on NINANITU: NINANITU departed from Grenaa on 6 July 2010 at 1550 hours for trawl fishing in Kattegat, the area SW of Store Middelgrund. On board were as usual the skipper and the best hand. They used to fish for two three days at a time. There was north-westerly wind 10 m/s, good visibility and bright sunshine. There is normally approx. five hours sail from Grenaa to the fishing ground when the vessel, as in this case, made approx. eight knots. The vessel was navigating by auto pilot on course 085. After the departure the skipper and the best hand had coffee together in the wheel house after which the best hand went to cabin forward to sleep before he was going to have the first watch on the fishing ground. This was their normal routine. Page 6

7 Thereafter the skipper still drank coffee and watched TV. The TV-set was placed in the wheel house s starboard side. There was during the passage towards the fishing ground not much traffic. He spoke via the VHF on channel 9 with a colleague on another vessel, and meanwhile he turned down on the VHF on channel 16 to keep the noise down. This happened approx. one hour before the collision. At some time, the skipper observed on the radar another ship in a distance of approx. two nm approx. 40 to port, and it seemed to him as the other ship would pass astern of NINANITU. The skipper therefore took no action with regard to that ship. Later, the skipper suddenly saw a large ship through front window of the wheel house to port in a distance of approx. 25 metres. The skipper reversed the propeller, but the propeller took air, and the reverse manoeuvre was not effective. Then he heard the other ship give signals with the whistle after which NINANITU hit the other ship s starboard side and eased off along the ship s side at risk of being hit by the ship s propeller. The skipper called in Danish the other ship via VHF on channel 16 saying the other ship had to turn around because they might need help. There came no answer from the other ship. However, the call was heard by a pilot boat from Grenaa. The pilot asked and was told the position of NINANITU and said something in English which the skipper did not understand. The skipper then hurried to the fore part of the ship to strip off the sky light and help the best hand to get up from the cabin. The best hand already stood at the entrance at the ladder. He was severely bleeding from a laceration in his head and he was confused and bruised. The best hand had not been asleep yet. He noticed that the skipper began menoeuvring. This was unexpected and therefore he rose from the bunk and stood on the floor when the collision occurred. He was thrown down by the collision and had a serious laceration in the left forehead/vertex, hit his neck, shoulders and spine etc. The entrance in front of the cabin was totally destroyed by collision so the best hand had to struggle with removing ship timber and splintered wood to reach the ladder to come up. The best hand was assisted by the skipper to come up the ladder and they both went into the wheel house. Lyngby Radio called NINANITU and was informed by the skipper about the situation. The skipper then remembered to launch the life raft. He and the best hand launched the raft without any problems. The life jackets however, were placed in the cabin forward, and they were not accessible, because the fore part of the vessel had been crushed by the collision and was full of water. Page 7

8 The other ship AFRICAN ZEBRA turned around and a life boat was launched. The life boat approached close to NINANITU and the crew of the life boat offered to take on board the skipper and the best hand, but they, however, declined. NINANITU was about half full of water, but they believed the vessel would remain afloat, and they knew that rescue vessels from Grenaa and Anholt and the pilot boat from Grenaa were approaching. Later, also two helicopters, a Swedish and a Danish one, approached. The best hand, who was injured, was lifted up into the first helicopter, the Swedish one. The skipper then went into the wheel house to have a cup of coffee. The helicopter was waiting until the pilot boat arrived, but suddenly NINANITU sank and the skipper had to jump into the water. He could not use the life raft because it had been launched at the weather side of the vessel and drifted by the wind over the sinking vessel. The skipper is an able swimmer and he did not worry about jumping into the water. He was picked up quickly and lifted up into the same helicopter as for the best hand after which they were flown to Tirstrup Airport. The following in this chapter is based on statements from the master, the chief officer and the lookout on AFRICAN ZEBRA: AFRICAN ZEBRA departed from Maputa, Mozambique, on 8 June 2010 for Gdansk, Poland, loaded with 29,467 tons of sugar in bulk. The ship s draught on departure was 9.6 metres aft and the ship service speed was 13 knots. It was steered by auto pilot and navigated by paper charts. One of the ship s radars (ARPA-radar) was in service. The other one was switched off and besides, it was rarely used because it made much noise. The voyage was without any certain occurrences until this collision. When the ship entered Kattegat, it followed the Route T and the intension was to take pilot at buoy 23 for the passage of the Great Belt Bridge. The chief officer and an AB as a lookout took over the bridge watch at 1600 hours. The chief officer had rested since 1100 hours. The day before the chief officer and the AB as well had usual work and rest hours according to routine. There was westerly wind, 3 4 Beaufort, approx. waves approx. 1½ metre, good visibility and bright sunshine reflecting on the sea. At 1700 hours, the chief officer changed to chart No WGS84 and altered course to 209. Between approx hours and 1800 hours he had his dinner in the mess room while the 2 nd officer had the bridge watch. The AB stayed on the bridge. After having his dinner, the master went to the bridge to check something not related to this incident. The chief officer stood at the ARPA-radar, and the AB stood in starbord side of the bridge looking out through the front windows. The chief officer changed the radar setting from 12 to 6 nm range. Page 8

9 When the master entered the bridge, he immediately saw, visually, a fishing vessel on an easterly course at a distance of 1½ cable on starboard bow. The master asked the chief officer: What happens?, and the chief officer answered that he had not seen the fishing vessel. Neither had the AB seen the fishing vessel. The master changed to manual steering, the AB took the helm, and the chief officer gave on the master s order five or six short blasts with the ship s whistle. The chief officer ordered hard to port, and the AB gave hard to port on the helm. No reaction on the fishing was observed. The master saw no persons on board the fishing vessel that proceeded with unchanged speed and course. AFRICAN ZEBRA turned hard to port, and when the master saw that the ship s stern turned to starboard, he turned to starboard probably 5 to steady the course, after which the fishing vessel hit AFRICAN ZEBRA on starboard side at hold No. 4 in an angle of The master ran to the deck from where he watched the fishing vessel drifting away. He did not see any damage to the fishing vessel and ran back to the bridge and called the fishing vessel by VHF on channel 16. There came no reply from the fishing vessel but a navy ship heard the call from AFRI- CAN ZEBRA and called the fishing and helped with the communication. The navy ship informed by VHF to AFRICAN ZEBRA that the fishing vessel needed assistance. On board the AFRICAN ZEBRA was prepared for manoeuvring and the crew prepared the life boat for launching. AFRICAN ZEBRA turned around approx. two cables from the fishing vessel. When the AFRICAN ZEBRA approached the fishing vessel, the lifeboat was launched. This was approx. 40 minutes after the collision. The lifeboat approached the fishing vessel and the crew offered the fishermen to enter the lifeboat, but they declined and stayed on board the fishing vessel. Later, the two fishermen were rescued by a helicopter. No damage was made to AFRICAN ZEBRA by the collision. 5.7 NINANITU NINANITU was arranged traditionally with cabin, entrance and ladder forward (forecastle). The vessel was equipped with one Furuno-radar of an old model placed high in the wheel house s port side, and the range setting was almost always 3 nm also at the time of the collision. In front of the wheel house the vessel had an aluminum forecastle and a canvas protection at port side. According to the skipper there was a good view from the wheel house. NINANITU was not equipped with any radar reflector. Page 9

10 5.8 AIS-track The AIS-track of AFRICAN ZEBRA shows the ship s navigation and manoeuvring before, during and after the collision. NINANITU had no AIS-equipment. 5.9 Chart segment AIS-spor: Farvandsvæsenet Chart segment showing the area of the incident Photo: Investigation Division Page 10

11 5.10 VDR recordings of radar pictures AFRICAN ZEBRA s VDR depicts the ARPA radar s readings as a long range of stills. The VDR shows that the chief officer was using the ship s ARPA radar on his watch. The chief officer did not change the settings for gain, sea and rain clutter. At 1644 hours the radar setting was changed from 12 to 6 nm. At 1744, when in position 56 37,346 N ,201 E, the setting was changed from 6 to 12 nm. According to the VDR recordings, some targets had been acquired the latest of which with ID 43 having been overtaking the AFRICAN ZEBRA before the chief officer took over the watch on the bridge at 1800 hours, after having had his dinner. No guard zone was established for automatic acquiring objects coming inside this zone, and no objects had been acquired nor had any information about other objects but the ship with target ID 43 been obtained. From 1800 hours, an eastbound object with an afterglow was visible on the radar approx. 12 nm and approx. 16 to starboard. This obje ct remained visible on the radar in an unchanged bearing until 1840 hours when the radar setting was changed from 12 to 6 nm in position 56 26,809 N ,555 E. Page 11

12 At 1840 hours the distance to the eastbound object was scanty 1 nm. The object became then hardly visible because of sea clutter, and after the changing of the radar setting from 12 to 6 nm, it was no longer visible. Above is shown two of the radar pictures from 1800 hours and 1820 hours (Danish time). The radar pictures indicate the time in UTC (two hours less than Danish time). The yellow arrows are put in to show the object (the echo from NINANITU) Executive Order on Watchkeeping The section A-VIII/2 Part 3-1 of the STCW Code on watchkeeping contains principles to be observed for watchkeeping on the bridge. According to the STCW Code, section A-VIII/2 Part 3-1, 43, the officer on navigational watch shall take frequent and accurate compass bearings of approaching ships as a means of early detection of risk of collision and bear in mind that such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large ship or a tow or when approaching a ship at close range. According to the STCW Code, section B-VIII/2, Part 3-1, Guidance on keeping a navigational watch 5.10 and 5.13 non-essential activity and distractions should be avoided, suppressed or removed, and non-essential materials should not be placed on the bridge... The STCW Code does not apply to fishing vessels, but the Executive Order no of 22 December 2006 on Watchkeeping on Ships (The Watchkeeping Executive Order) does apply to Danish fishing vessels, and the STCW Code, section A-VIII/2 and section B-VIII/2 are enclosures to this executive order. Page 12

13 5.12 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions (COLREG) Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions (COLREG) prescribes that every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Rule 7 (a) of COLREG prescribes that every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist. Rule 7 (b) of COLREG prescribes that proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects. Rule 7 (c) of COLREG prescribes that assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar information Radar reflector NINANITU was covered by Notice F from the Danish Maritime Authority. Technical regulation on the construction, equipment, etc. of small commercial vessels According to this technical regulation, Chapter X, Regulation 19.4, all vessels shall, insofar as possible, be equipped with an approved radar reflector. 6 Analysis 6.1 Watchkeeping and COLREG NINANITU The skipper of NINANITU was in the wheel house observing a large ship, that later showed up being AFRICAN ZEBRA, on the radar approx 2 nm and approx. 40 to port. The skipper unterstood the other ship was going to pass astern of NINANITU and thus he took no action with regard to this ship. The skipper omitted to keep this ship under observation and taking bearing of it to ascertain if there was risk of collision. The skipper watched TV on his watch in the wheel house. Suddenly the skipper saw the other ship in a distance of approx. 25 metre, too late to avoid a collision. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that a proper bridge discipline was not conducted by the skipper on his watch in the wheel house. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that the presence of a TV set in the wheel house has been contributing that the skipper did not keep a proper lookout. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that a proper lookout was not kept in NI- NANITU. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that the skipper made his assumptions that the other ship would pass astern of NINANITU on the basis of scanty information. Page 13

14 AFRICAN ZEBRA In AFRiCAN ZEBRA two men were on duty watch on the bridge. Prior to the collision the chief officer stood by ARPA radar and the lookout stood in starboard side looking out the windows. The weather was clear with bright sunshine and many reflections in the water when looking westward, from where NINANITU was approaching. Neither the lookout nor the chief officer in AFRICAN ZEBRA had observed NINANITU. When the master arrived to the bridge, he promptly saw NINANITU before the beam to starboard and with an immediate risk of a collision. NINANITU gave a visible echo with afterglow on the 12 nm range from 1800 hours and minutes on and then a constantly weakening echo that finally disappeared. On the chief officer s watch the settings of gain, sea and rain clutter were not changed. Thus the radar echo of NINANITU was not recognized while the radar setting was 12 nm, as it became blurred by echoes of the sea within a distance of approx. 4 nm from AFRICAN ZEBRA. The VDR recordings indicate that the chief officer did not use the radar s ARPA functions. The fact, that no guard zone automatically acquiring objects within the guard zone was used, caused that the echo of NINANITU was not automatically noticed and gave no alarm. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that a proper bridge discipline was not conducted on the bridge watch. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that lack of the usage of the radar s ARPAfunction and adjustments of gain, sea and rain clutter on AFRICAN ZEBRA was a contributing factor to the collision. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that a proper lookout was not kept in AFRICAN ZEBRA. 6.2 Radar reflector NINANITU was not equipped with a radar reflector. NINANITU gave on AFRICAN ZEBRA s radar a visible echo with afterglow from approx. 40 minutes prior to the collision, which however, after minutes became steadily weaker. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that an efficient radar reflector on NINANI- TU would have resulted in a clearer echo from the vessel also on the 6 miles range. 6.3 TV in the wheel house The skipper was watching TV during the passage towards the fishing ground. Page 14

15 The skipper did not keep AFRICAN ZEBRA under observation during the onward passage after the first observation of the ship. It is the Investigation Division s assessment that a TV-set in the wheel house has been contributing that the skipper did not keep a proper lookout. Page 15