SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION. Mihir Bellare UCSD 1


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1 SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION Mihir Bellare UCSD 1
2 Syntax A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K,E,D) consists of three algorithms: K and E may be randomized, but D must be deterministic. Mihir Bellare UCSD 2
3 Correct decryption requirement Formally: For all K and M we have Pr[D K (E K (M)) = M] = 1, where the probability is over the coins of E Mihir Bellare UCSD 3
4 Block cipher modes of operation E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n a block cipher Notation: x[i] is the ith nbit block of a string x, so that x = x[1]...x[m] if x = nm. Always: Alg K K $ {0,1} k return K Mihir Bellare UCSD 4
5 Block cipher modes of operation Block cipher provides parties sharing K with M E K C which enables them to encrypt a 1block message. How do we encrypt a long message using a primitive that only applies to nbit blocks? Mihir Bellare UCSD 5
6 ECB: Electronic Codebook Mode SE = (K,E,D) where: Alg E K (M) for i = 1,...,m do C[i] E K (M[i]) return C Alg D K (C) for i = 1,...,m do M[i] E 1 K (C[i]) return M Correct decryption relies on E being a block cipher, so that E K is invertible Mihir Bellare UCSD 6
7 Security of ECB Weakness: M 1 = M 2 C 1 = C 2 Why is the above true? Because E K is deterministic: M 1 [1] M 1 [m] M 2 [1] M 2 [m] E K... E K E K... E K C 1 [1] C 1 [m] C 2 [1] C 2 [m] Why does this matter? Mihir Bellare UCSD 7
8 Security of ECB Suppose we know that there are only two possible messages, Y = 1 n and N = 0 n, for example representing FIRE or DON T FIRE a missile BUY or SELL a stock Vote YES or NO Then ECB algorithm will be E K (M) = E K (M). M E K C Mihir Bellare UCSD 8
9 Security of ECB Votes M 1,M 2 {Y,N} are ECB encrypted and adversary sees ciphertexts C 1 = E K (M 1 ) and C 2 = E K (M 2 ) M 1 M 2 E K E K C 1 C 2 Adversary may have cast the first vote and thus knows M 1 ; say M 1 = Y. Then adversary can figure out M 2 : If C 2 = C 1 then M 2 must be Y Else M 2 must be N Mihir Bellare UCSD 9
10 Is this avoidable? Let SE = (K,E,D) be ANY encryption scheme. Suppose M 1,M 2 {Y,N} and Sender sends ciphertexts C 1 E K (M 1 ) and C 2 E K (M 2 ) Adversary A knows that M 1 = Y Adversary says: If C 2 = C 1 then M 2 must be Y else it must be N. Does this attack work? Mihir Bellare UCSD 10
11 Is this avoidable? Let SE = (K,E,D) be ANY encryption scheme. Suppose M 1,M 2 {Y,N} and Sender sends ciphertexts C 1 E K (M 1 ) and C 2 E K (M 2 ) Adversary A knows that M 1 = Y Adversary says: If C 2 = C 1 then M 2 must be Y else it must be N. Does this attack work? Yes, if E is deterministic. Mihir Bellare UCSD 11
12 Randomized encryption For encryption to be secure it must be randomized That is, algorithm E K flips coins. If the same message is encrypted twice, we are likely to get back different answers. That is, if M 1 = M 2 and we let then $ $ C 1 E K (M 1 ) and C 2 E K (M 2 ) Pr[C 1 = C 2 ] will (should) be small, where the probability is over the coins of E. Mihir Bellare UCSD 12
13 Randomized encryption There are many possible ciphertexts corresponding to each message. If so, how can we decrypt? We will see examples soon. C 1 C 2 M E K D K M C s Mihir Bellare UCSD 13
14 Randomized encryption A fundamental departure from classical and conventional notions of encryption. Clasically, encryption (e.g., substitution cipher) is a code, associating to each message a unique ciphertext. Now, we are saying no such code is secure, and we look to encryption mechanisms which associate to each message a number of different possible ciphertexts. Mihir Bellare UCSD 14
15 CBC$: Cipher Block Chaining with random IV mode SE = (K,E,D) where: Alg E K (M) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do C[i] E K (M[i] C[i 1]) return C Alg D K (C) for i = 1,...,m do M[i] E 1 K (C[i]) C[i 1] return M Correct decryption relies on E being a block cipher. Mihir Bellare UCSD 15
16 CTR$ mode If X {0,1} n and i N then X +i denotes the nbit string formed by converting X to an integer, adding i modulo 2 n, and converting the result back to an nbit string. Alg E K (M) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P[i] E K (C[0]+i) C[i] P[i] M[i] return C Alg D K (C) for i = 1,...,m do P[i] E K (C[0]+i) M[i] P[i] C[i] return M Mihir Bellare UCSD 16
17 CTR$ mode Alg E K (M) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P[i] E K (C[0]+i) C[i] P[i] M[i] return C Alg D K (C) for i = 1,...,m do P[i] E K (C[0]+i) M[i] P[i] C[i] return M D does not use E 1 K! So one can run CTR$ with a PRF that is not a blockcipher. Encryption and Decryption are parallelizable. Mihir Bellare UCSD 17
18 Voting with CBC$ Suppose we encrypt M 1,M 2 {Y,N} with CBC$. M 1 M 2 E K E K {0,1} n $ C 1 [0] C 1 [1] {0,1} n $ C 2 [0] C 2 [1] Adversary A sees C 1 = C 1 [0]C 1 [1] and C 2 = C 2 [0]C 2 [1]. Suppose A knows that M 1 = Y. Can A determine whether M 2 = Y or M 2 = N? Mihir Bellare UCSD 18
19 Voting with CBC$ Suppose we encrypt M 1,M 2 {Y,N} with CBC$. M 1 M 2 E K E K {0,1} n $ C 1 [0] C 1 [1] {0,1} n $ C 2 [0] C 2 [1] Adversary A sees C 1 = C 1 [0]C 1 [1] and C 2 = C 2 [0]C 2 [1]. Suppose A knows that M 1 = Y. Can A determine whether M 2 = Y or M 2 = N? NO! Mihir Bellare UCSD 19
20 Assessing security So CBC$ is better than ECB. But is it secure? CBC$ is widely used so knowing whether it is secure is important To answer this we first need to decide and formalize what we mean by secure. Mihir Bellare UCSD 20
21 Security requirements Suppose sender computes $ $ C 1 E K (M 1 ); ; C q E K (M q ) Adversary A has C 1,...,C q What if A Retrieves K Bad! Retrieves M 1 Bad! But also we want to hide all partial information about the data stream, such as Does M 1 = M 2? What is first bit of M 1? What is XOR of first bits of M 1,M 2? Something we won t hide: the length of the message Mihir Bellare UCSD 21
22 What we seek We want a single master property MP of an encryption scheme such that MP can be easily specified We can evaluate whether a scheme meets it MP implies ALL the security conditions we want: it guarantees that a ciphertext reveals NO partial information about the plaintext. Mihir Bellare UCSD 22
23 Intuition for definition of INDCPA The master property MP is called INDCPA (indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack). Consider encrypting one of two possible message streams, either or M 1 0,...,Mq 0 M 1 1,...,M q 1 Adversary, given ciphertexts and both data streams, has to figure out which of the two streams was encrypted. Mihir Bellare UCSD 23
24 Games for indcpaadvantage of an adversary A Let SE = (K,E,D) be an encryption scheme Game Left SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return C $ E K (M 0 ) Game Right SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return C $ E K (M 1 ) Associated to SE, A are the probabilities [ ] Pr Left A SE 1 [ ] Pr Right A SE 1 that A outputs 1 in each world. The (indcpa) advantage of A is ] ] Adv indcpa SE (A) = Pr [Right A SE 1 Pr [Left A SE 1 Mihir Bellare UCSD 24
25 The measure of success Adv indcpa SE (A) 1 means A is doing well and SE is not indcpasecure. Adv indcpa SE (A) 0 (or 0) means A is doing poorly and SE resists the attack A is mounting. Adversary resources are its running time t and the number q of its oracle queries, the latter representing the number of messages encrypted. Security: SE is INDCPAsecure if Adv indcpa SE (A) is small for ALL A that use practical amounts of resources. Insecurity: SE is not INDCPAsecure if we can specify an explicit A that uses few resources yet achieves high indcpaadvantage. Mihir Bellare UCSD 25
26 ECB is not INDCPAsecure Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher. Recall that ECB mode defines symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K,E,D) with Can we design A so that is close to 1? E K (M) = E K (M[1])E K (M[2]) E K (M[m]) ] ] Adv indcpa SE (A) = Pr [Right A SE 1 Pr [Left A SE 1 Mihir Bellare UCSD 26
27 ECB is not INDCPAsecure Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher. Recall that ECB mode defines symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K,E,D) with Can we design A so that is close to 1? E K (M) = E K (M[1])E K (M[2]) E K (M[m]) ] ] Adv indcpa SE (A) = Pr [Right A SE 1 Pr [Left A SE 1 Exploitable weakness of SE: M 1 = M 2 implies E K (M 1 ) = E K (M 2 ). Mihir Bellare UCSD 27
28 ECB is not INDCPAsecure Let E K (M) = E K (M[1]) E K (M[m]). adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Mihir Bellare UCSD 28
29 Right game analysis E is defined by E K (M) = E K (M[1]) E K (M[m]). adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Game Right SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return E K (M 1 ) Then [ ] Pr Right A SE 1 = Mihir Bellare UCSD 29
30 Right game analysis E is defined by E K (M) = E K (M[1]) E K (M[m]). adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Game Right SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return E K (M 1 ) Then [ ] Pr Right A SE 1 = 1 because C 1 = E K (0 n ) and C 2 = E K (0 n ). Mihir Bellare UCSD 30
31 Left game analysis E is defined by E K (M) = E K (M[1]) E K (M[m]). adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Game Left SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return E K (M 0 ) Then [ ] Pr Left A SE 1 = Mihir Bellare UCSD 31
32 Left game analysis E is defined by E K (M) = E K (M[1]) E K (M[m]). adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Game Left SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) Return E K (M 0 ) Then [ ] Pr Left A SE 1 = 0 because C 1 = E K (0 n ) E K (1 n ) = C 2. Mihir Bellare UCSD 32
33 ECB is not INDCPA secure adversary A C 1 LR(0 n,0 n ); C 2 LR(1 n,0 n ) if C 1 = C 2 then return 1 else return 0 Adv indcpa SE (A) = = 1 1 { [ }} ]{ { [ }} ]{ Pr Right A SE = 1 Pr Right A SE = 1 And A is very efficient, making only two queries. Thus ECB is not INDCPA secure. 0 Mihir Bellare UCSD 33
34 Exercise Let SE = (K,E,D) be any symmetric encryption scheme for which E is deterministic. Show that SE is not INDCPA secure by giving pseudocode for an efficient adversary A that achieves Adv indcpa SE (A) = 1. Assume the message space is some nonempty subset of {0,1} with the property that if M is a legitimate message then so is any other string of length M. Mihir Bellare UCSD 34
35 Exercise: Setup Let K be the keygeneration algorithm that returns a random 128bit string as the key K. Define Alg E K (M) R $ {0,1} 128 ; M[1]...M[m] M; C[0] R for i = 1,...,m do W[i] (R +i) mod ; C[i] AES K (M[i] W[i]) C C[0]C[1]...C[n]; Return C Above W[i] (R +i) mod means we regard R as an interger, add i to it, take the result modulo 2 128, view this as a 128bit string, and assign it to W[i]. The message space is the set of all strings whose length is a positive multiple of 128. Mihir Bellare UCSD 35
36 Exercise: Questions 1. Specify a decryption algorithm D such that SE = (K,E,D) is a symmetric encryption scheme satisfying the correct decryption condition. 2. Show that this scheme is insecure by presenting a practical adversary A such that Adv indcpa SE (A) is high. State the value of the advantage achieved by your adversary and the number of oracle queries it makes. Your adversary for 2. should as usual be specified in clear pseudocode, not in a text description. There should be a succinct analysis justifying the claimed advantage. Mihir Bellare UCSD 36
37 Why is INDCPA the master property? We claim that if encryption scheme SE = (K,E,D) is INDCPA secure then the ciphertext hides ALL partial information about the plaintext. $ $ For example, from C 1 E K (M 1 ) and C 2 E K (M 2 ) the adversary cannot get M 1 get 1st bit of M 1 get XOR of the 1st bits of M 1,M 2 etc. Exercise: State and prove such claims formally. This could be a quiz question! Mihir Bellare UCSD 37
38 Birthday attack on CTR$ Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a blockcipher and SE = (K,E,D) the corresponding CTR$ symmetric encryption scheme. Suppose 1block messages M 0,M 1 are encrypted: $ $ C 0 [0]C 0 [1] E(K,M 0 ) C 1 [0]C 1 [1] E(K,M 1 ) Let us say we are lucky If C 0 [0] = C 1 [0]. If so: C 0 [1] = C 1 [1] if and only if M 0 = M 1 So if we are lucky we can detect message equality and violate INDCPA. Mihir Bellare UCSD 38
39 Birthday attack on CTR$ Let 1 q < 2 n be a parameter and let i be integer i encoded as an nbit string. adversary A for i = 1,...,q do C i [0]C i $ [1] LR( i, 0 ) S {(j,l): C j [0] = C l [0] and j < l} If S, then (j,l) S $ If C j [1] = C l [1] then return 1 return 0 Mihir Bellare UCSD 39
40 Birthday attack on CTR$: Right game analysis adversary A for i = 1,...,q do C i [0]C i $ [1] LR( i, 0 ) S {(j,l): C j [0] = C l [0] and j < l} If S, then (j,l) S $ If C j [1] = C l [1] then return 1 return 0 Game Right SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) $ C[0] {0,1} n P E(K,C[0]+1) C[1] P M 1 Return C[0]C[1] If C j [0] = C l [0] (lucky) then C j [1] = 0 E K (C j [0]+1) = 0 E K (C l [0]+1) = C l [1] so [ ] Pr Right A SE 1 = Pr[S ] = C(2 n,q) Mihir Bellare UCSD 40
41 Birthday attack on CTR$: Left game analysis adversary A for i = 1,...,q do C i [0]C i $ [1] LR( i, 0 ) S {(j,l): C j [0] = C l [0] and j < l} If S, then (j,l) S $ If C j [1] = C l [1] then return 1 return 0 Game Left SE procedure Initialize K $ K procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) $ C[0] {0,1} n P E(K,C[0]+1) C[1] P M 0 Return C[0]C[1] If C j [0] = C l [0] (lucky) then C j [1] = j E K (C j [0]+1) l E K (C l [0]+1) = C l [1] so [ ] Pr Left A SE 1 = 0. Mihir Bellare UCSD 41
42 Birthday attack on CTR$ ] ] Adv indcpa SE (A) = Pr [Right A SE 1 Pr [Left A SE 1 = C(2 n,q) q(q 1) 2 n Conclusion: CTR$ can be broken (in the INDCPA sense) in about 2 n/2 queries, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher, regardless of the cryptanalytic strength of the block cipher. Mihir Bellare UCSD 42
43 Exercise The above attack on CTR$ uses 1block messages. Letting SE be the same scheme, give an adversary A that makes q LRqueries, each consisting of two mblock messages, and achieves ( Adv indcpa m 2 q 2 ) SE (A) = Ω The running time of A should be about O(mqn log(mqn)). 2 n Mihir Bellare UCSD 43
44 Security of CTR$ So far: A qquery adversary can break CTR$ with advantage q2 2 n+1 Question: Is there any better attack? Mihir Bellare UCSD 44
45 Security of CTR$ So far: A qquery adversary can break CTR$ with advantage q2 2 n+1 Question: Is there any better attack? Answer: NO! We can prove that the best qquery attack short of breaking the block cipher has advantage at most σ 2 2 n where σ is the total number of blocks encrypted. Example: If q 1block messages are encrypted then σ = q so the adversary advantage is not more than q 2 /2 n. For E = AES this means up to 2 64 blocks may be securely encrypted, which is good. Mihir Bellare UCSD 45
46 Security of CTR$ Theorem: [BDJR98] Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher and SE = (K, E, D) the corresponding CTR$ symmetric encryption scheme. Let A be an indcpa adversary against SE that has running time t and makes at most q LR queries, these totalling at most σ blocks. Then there is a prfadversary B against E such that Adv indcpa SE (A) 2 Adv prf σ2 E (B)+ 2 n Furthermore, B makes at most σ oracle queries and has running time t +Θ(σ n). Mihir Bellare UCSD 46
47 Intuition and proof We first give some intuition for the proof and then the proof itself. We assume for simplicity that A makes q = σ/m LR queries in each of which both messages are m blocks long. Extending the proof to the general case is an exercise. We let C i = C i [0]C i [1]...C i [m] denote the response of the LR oracle to A s ith query. Mihir Bellare UCSD 47
48 Intuition for INDCPA security of CTR$ Consider the CTR$ scheme with E K replaced by a random function Fn. Alg E Fn (M) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P[i] Fn(C[0]+i) C[i] P[i] M[i] return C Analyzing this is a thought experiment, but we can ask whether it is INDCPA secure. If so, the assumption that E is a PRF says CTR$ with E is INDCPA secure. Mihir Bellare UCSD 48
49 CTR$ with a random function Let E be the event that the points C 1 [0]+1,...,C 1 [0]+m,...,C q [0]+1,...,C q [0]+m, on which Fn is evaluated across the q encryptions, are all distinct. Case 1: E happens. Then the encryption is a onetimepad: ciphertexts are random, independent strings, regardless of which message is encrypted. So A has zero advantage. Case 2: E doesn t happen. Then A may have high advantage but it does not matter because Pr[E] doesn t happen is small. (It is the small additive term in the theorem.) Mihir Bellare UCSD 49
50 Alternative formulation of advantage Let SE = (K,E,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme and A an adversary. Game Guess SE procedure Initialize K $ K; b $ {0,1} procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) return C $ E K (M b ) procedure Finalize(b ) return (b = b ) ] Proposition: Adv indcpa SE (A) = 2 Pr [Guess A SE true 1. Proof: Observe Pr [ b = 1 b = 1 ] [ ] = Pr Right A SE 1 Pr [ b = 1 b = 0 ] [ ] = Pr Left A SE 1 Mihir Bellare UCSD 50
51 Proof of Proposition, continued [ ] Pr Guess A SE true = Pr [ b = b ] = Pr [ b = b b = 1 ] Pr[b = 1]+Pr [ b = b b = 0 ] Pr[b = 0] = Pr [ b = b b = 1 ] 1 2 +Pr[ b = b b = 0 ] 1 2 = Pr [ b = 1 b = 1 ] 1 2 +Pr[ b = 0 b = 0 ] 1 2 = Pr [ b = 1 b = 1 ] 1 2 +( 1 Pr [ b = 1 b = 0 ]) 1 2 = (Pr [ b = 1 b = 1 ] Pr [ b = 1 b = 0 ]) 2 = ( [ ] [ ]) 2 Pr Right A SE 1 Pr Left A SE 1 = Advindcpa SE (A). Mihir Bellare UCSD 51
52 A gameplaying proof The proof uses a sequence of games and invokes the fundamental lemma of game playing [BR96]. The games have the following Initialize and Finalize procedures: Initialize // G 0 b $ {0,1}; S K $ {0,1} k Initialize // G 1,G 2,G 3 b $ {0,1}; S Finalize // All games Return (b = b ) For brevity we omit writing these procedures explicitly in the games, but you should remember they are there. Also for brevity if G is a game and A is an adversary then we let Pr[G A ] = Pr[G A true] Mihir Bellare UCSD 52
53 Games G 0,G 1 for the proof Game G 0 procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P C[0]+i if P S then T[P] E K (P) C[i] T[P] M b [i] S S {P} return C Then [ ] Adv indcpa SE (A) = 2 Pr G0 A 1 Game G 1 procedure LR(M 0,M 1 ) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P C[0]+i $ if P / S then T[P] {0,1} n C[i] T[P] M b [i] S S {P} return C Mihir Bellare UCSD 53
54 Analysis Clearly Pr[G A 0 ] = Pr[GA 1 ]+( Pr[G A 0 ] Pr[GA 1 ]). Claim 1: We can design prfadversary B so that Claim 2: Pr[G A 1 ] σ2 2 n+1 Given these, we have Adv indcpa SE (A) 2 Pr[G A 0 ] Pr[GA 1 ] Advprf E (B) ( ) σ2 2 n Adv prf E (B) = σ2 2 n +2 Advprf E (B) which proves the theorem. It remains to prove the claims. Mihir Bellare UCSD 54
55 Proof of Claim 1 adversary B b $ {0,1}; S b $ A LRSim if (b = b ) then return 1 else return 0 subroutine LRSim(M 0,M 1 ) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P C[0]+i if P / S then T[P] Fn(P) C[i] T[P] M b [i] S S {P} return C Pr ] Pr [Real B E 1 ] [Rand B {0,1} n 1 [ ] = Pr G0 A [ ] = Pr G1 A Subtracting, we get Claim 1. Mihir Bellare UCSD 55
56 Where we are It remains to prove: Claim 2: Pr[G A 1 ] σ2 2 n+1 Mihir Bellare UCSD 56
57 Introducing the bad flag Game G 1 procedure LR(M 0,M 1) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P C[0] +i If P / S then $ T[P] {0,1} n C[i] T[P] M b [i] S S {P} return C Game G 2, G 3 procedure LR(M 0,M 1) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do P C[0]+i $ C[i] {0,1} n If P S then bad true; C[i] T[P] M b [i] T[P] C[i] M b [i] S S {P} return C Pr[G A 1 ] = Pr[GA 2 ] = Pr[GA 3 ]+ ( Pr[G A 2 ] Pr[GA 3 ] ) Mihir Bellare UCSD 57
58 Analysis of G 3 Game G 3 procedure LR(M 0,M 1) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do $ P C[0] +i; C[i] {0,1} n If P S then bad true T[P] C[i] M b [i]; S S {P} return C Ciphertext C in G 3 is always random, independently of b, so [ ] Pr G3 A = 1 2. Mihir Bellare UCSD 58
59 Fundamental Lemma of game playing Games G, H are identicaluntilbad if their code differs only in statements following the setting of bad to true. Lemma: [BR96] If G,H are identicaluntilbad, then for any adversary A and any y [ ] [ ] [ ] Pr G A y Pr H A y Pr H A setsbad Mihir Bellare UCSD 59
60 Using the fundamental lemma Game G 2, G 3 procedure LR(M 0,M 1) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do $ P C[0] +i; C[i] {0,1} n If P S then bad true; C[i] T[P] M b [i] T[P] C[i] M b [i]; S S {P} return C G 2 and G 3 are identicaluntilbad, so Fundamental Lemma implies [ ] [ ] [ ] Pr G2 A Pr G3 A Pr G3 A setsbad. Mihir Bellare UCSD 60
61 Bounding the probability that G 3 sets bad Game G 3 procedure LR(M 0,M 1) $ C[0] {0,1} n for i = 1,...,m do $ P C[0] +i; C[i] {0,1} n If P S then bad true T[P] C[i] M b [i]; S S {P} return C ] Pr [G3 A setsbad q m i=1 = m2 q(q 1) 2 n+1 σ2 2 n+1 m(i 1) 2 n Mihir Bellare UCSD 61
62 Security of CTR$ Theorem: [BDJR98] Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher and SE = (K, E, D) the corresponding CTR$ symmetric encryption scheme. Let A be an indcpa adversary against SE that has running time t and makes at most q LR queries, these totalling at most σ blocks. Then there is a prfadversary B against E such that Adv indcpa SE (A) 2 Adv prf σ2 E (B)+ 2 n Furthermore, B makes at most σ oracle queries and has running time t +Θ(σ n). Mihir Bellare UCSD 62
63 Security of CBC$ Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher and SE = (K,E,D) the corresponding CBC$ symmetric encryption scheme. Exercise: Give an adversary A that makes q LRqueries, each consisting of two 1block messages, and achieves ( ) Adv indcpa q 2 SE (A) = Ω The running time of A should be about O(qn log(qn)). Can you generalize this to mblock messages? What is the best advantage you can get? 2 n Mihir Bellare UCSD 63
64 Security of CBC$ Theorem: [BDJR98] Let E : {0,1} k {0,1} n {0,1} n be a block cipher and SE = (K, E, D) the corresponding CBC$ symmetric encryption scheme. Let A be an indcpa adversary against SE that has running time t and makes at most q LR queries, these totalling at most σ blocks. Then there is a prfadversary B against E such that Adv indcpa SE (A) 2 Adv prf σ2 E (B)+ 2 n Furthermore, B makes at most σ oracle queries and has running time t +Θ(σ n). Exercise: Prove the above theorem. Mihir Bellare UCSD 64
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