Labor Supply. Where we re going:

Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Labor Supply. Where we re going:"

Transcription

1 Labor Supply Where we re gong: I m gong to spend about 4 lectures talkng about labor supply. Along the way, I m gong to ntroduce some econometrc ssues and tools that we commonly use. Today s lecture and probably some of the next lecture wll cover the theory of statc and ntertemporal labor supply. You should read Blundell and Macurdy s Handbook chapter, as well as Davd Card s crtque of ntertemporal labor supply. The chapter n Cahuc and Zylberbeg mght also be helpful. The emprcal papers I hope to cover over the next few lectures are: Essa and Lebman (QJE 96) (on the earned ncome tax credt) Angrst and Evans (AER 96) (on labor supply of women) Card and Robbns (NBER5701) (self suffcency project experment) And a couple of papers on the ntertemporal labor supply of cab drvers and bcycle courers Gelbach (AER 02) wll be covered n the frst problem set. Questons before I start? Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 1

2 Decomposton of labor supply n term of substtuton, ncome, and endowment effects The statc (one perod) model of labor supply you ve seen before, probably n terms of a graph, wth lesure on the x axs and consumpton on the y axs. The set-up s straghtforward: maxu ( C, L, X ) where C s consumpton, L s lesure (any tme spend not workng), and X are ndvdual attrbutes. Utlty s quas-concave, so: U 0, U < 0, U 0, U < 0 c > cc L > LL subject to: s. t. C + wl Y + wt, L T ( C Y + w( T L) ) w s the wage rate, Y s non-labor ncome, and T s the total tme avalable, and a sngle sonsumpton good s taken as the numerare (the prce of consumpton s one). The prce of one unt of not workng s the wage (opportunty cost). Note that t s not clear n the statc model over what length of tme s beng examned. Are we lookng over a week, or a year? Also, t s not clear how an ndvdual decdes to allocate ther tme: by hours, or by days? For now, let s thnk of T n terms of a one week perod, wth the ndvdual decdng whether not to work, or to work n jobs that pay the same wage, but for dfferent hours (e.g. part-tme or full-tme). M Y + wt (full ncome) Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 2

3 The lagrangan s: L U ( C, L, X ) λ ( C + wl M ) µ ( L T ) F.O.C.: U c ( C, L, X ) λ U L ( C, L, X ) λ w + µ Alternatvely, we can express the soluton n terms of the margnal rates of substtuton: U U L c MRS ( C, L, X ) w, whch s equal f the ndvdual works at all. L We can use the frst order condtons to solve for consumpton and lesure choces that maxmze utlty: Interor Soluton: L* L * ( w, M, X ) T, C * C *( w, M, X ), or we nstead look at work rather than lesure, snce: H* T L *, where H s hours worked (I d prefer to use W for weeks worked, but W already stands for wages). Note, the reservaton wage, when an ndvdual s ndfferent between workng and not workng, can be computed by settng: U L ( C, L, X ) λw and TL. Many studes n labor focus on the response tme worked from changes n the wage. Easer to go through the response to lesure from a change n wage, because lesure s a good, whereas hours worked s a bad. For nteror soluton: Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 3

4 * * ( w, Y + wt, X ) * * + * M curr.inc M curr.inc * + T Holdng ndvdual attrbutes constant (ths could be a bg assumpton, as we ll see when lookng at ths response over tme). We can compute * M curr.inc smply from slutsky equaton: [see Varan or other mcro text for dervaton of Slutsky equaton] * M curr.inc * ( w, M, X ) U U* *( w, C + wl*) L * (so here we are usng the ncome expresson on the left hand sde of the budget constrant, whereas for the full expresson, we defned ncome as full ncome the rght hand of the budget constrant). * M curr.inc s the Marshalan demand for lesure whereas * ( w, M, X ) U U* s the Hcksan demand for lesure. Recall from your earler mcro classes that the substtuton effect, H *( w, M ) U U*, s negatve f the prce of lesure goes up, holdng utlty constant, people buy less lesure. We also usually assume lesure s a normal good. If wages ncrease, the total amount of thngs an ndvdual can buy consumpton of lesure, goes down. So ths ncome effect s negatve. Both effects are negatve, so ths gves us the standard result that the Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 4

5 Marshallan response (elastcty) to the wage change s larger (n absolute value) than the hcksan response. Substtutng the slutsky equaton nto the full response from a change n the wage: * * ( w, M ) * ( w, M ) U U * U U * * ( w, C + wl*) * ( w, C + wl*) L * + T * ( w, C + wl*) + ( T L*) We have the substtuton effect, the ncome effect and the endowment effect. The endowment effect leads ndvdual to take more lesure, snce a rse n the wage rate makes them overall rcher (the ncome effect s smaller than the endowment effect). Note the dfference between ths result and that from conventonal demand theory, whch only ncludes ncome and substtuton effects (whch are both negatve f the good wth a prce ncrease s a normal good). The conventonal case concerns goods that are consumed, not sold no endowments. Here, an ndvdual not only consumes lesure, but also may sell t to obtan a wage, to obtan consumable goods. The man pont of the statc model s to show that the response from a wage change s ambguous there s both a postve and a negatve effect, and t s not clear whch one domnates, and under what crcumstances. For prme age men, most evdence ndcates that the ncome effect domnates (men tend to work less from an ncrease n wage). For women and others wth currently lower labor force partcpaton, the response to an ncrease n wage tends to generate more of a response towards workng more hours. Note, the response s not ambguous f an ndvdual s currently not workng. An ncrease n the wage wll lead to a zero or postve ncrease n hours worked. Indvduals that work a Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 5

6 lttle are more lkely to have the substtuton effect domnate the ncome effect. The less an ndvdual works, the smaller the ncome and endowment effects are. Ths s useful to know n practce, because many emprcal studes suggest that movements n labor supply are prncpally owng to varatons n the partcpaton rate, and that the elastcty of the supply of female labor, especally that of marred women, s greater than that of men. The general emprcal equaton for estmatng the overall marshallan labor supply elastcty s: log H β β β X + v log wt + 2 Where β 1 s the estmated elastcty of hours worked (nstead of hour of lesure taken: T-H) wth respect to wages. Note the endogenety problem (or the omtted varables problem): clearly there may be many factors that affect both wages and hours worked. We wll look at some ways of addressng ths shortly. A few nterestng ponts arse from workng wth ths smple model you can just as easly realze these ponts by workng through the graphcal verson of the statc model. 1) the elastcty of supply of labor depends ndvdually on preferences for lesure and consumpton, as well as ndvdual crcumstances (e.g. wth chldren, wthout). 2) Dfferences n responses to wage changes may be drven purely by dfferences n tastes (because the ndfference curves take on dfferent shapes). 3) statc model assumes wages are parameters (that don t change when other characterstcs change), but clearly ths s not the case. Perhaps as a frst approxmaton, or for smplfcaton, t s OK. Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 6

7 Incorporatng taxes, transfers, welfare, and lump sum costs to workng nto model: If taxes and transfers do not affect the shape of ndfference curves (a reasonable assumpton, but one dscussed more by Kllngsworth), then ntroducton of taxes or transfers merely alters the shape of the ndvdual s budget lne. Smlarly, we mght also consder one tme costs assocated wth workng or not workng (e.g. transportaton costs, day care costs, welfare, ). If addtons only affect the budget lne, the analyss s the same as before, except the budget lne looks slghtly dfferent. Specfcally, C Y + welf ( H 0) + w( T L)(1 τ ) LC1( H 0) where welf s welfare payments f not workng, τ s the tax rate of work, and LC s the labor costs wth workng. Snce the budget constrant s now dscontnuous, t s a pan to derve the frst order condtons. It s a lot easer just to consder how these changes affect the budget constrant graphcally (see Kllngsworth for a dscusson) Note, the response to a transfer or tax depends both how the revenue rased va those taxes s used. Even f we focus on stuatons where revenue rased to make transfer payments to other ndvduals, the effect of a tax on ndvduals s stll ambguous because of substtuton and ncome/endowment effects. Just as the effect from lowerng the wage was ambguous, so too s the effect from ncreasng taxes. On the one hand, the prce of lesure s reduced, makng t more lkely to reduce employment. On the other hand, ncome s reduced, makng lesure less attractve (f lesure s a normal good). The response wll also depend on people s tastes. Therefore, the aggregate, overall, response from a change n the budget constrant wll depend on many thngs, and the overall (average) effect on labor supply s a pror unknown. It s an emprcal queston, one that we wll look at shortly below. Negatve Income Tax Example Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 7

8 Transfer programs tend to generate dsncentves to work. Introducng a guaranteed welfare amount has an unambguous affect on the ncentve to work. Suppose we ntroduce an ncome floor, where everyone Is guaranteed an ncome G. The new budget constrant s: C Y + w( T L) + G f G Y + w( T L), C G f G > Y + w( T L) The margnal tax rate for a non worker, n ths case, s 1. For those affected by ntroducng the guarantee, the effect n unambguous n leadng these workers to stop workng. An example of a program not as extreme s a negatve ncome tax. The general set-up consders both a guarantee and a subsdy to work. The subsdy s: S G t(wh ) f G > t(wh ), S 0 otherwse, where G s the guarantee level and t s the tax rate. Non wage ncome s left out. In practce, Y s hard to assess. wh G / t s the breakeven ncome level when the ncome supplement ends. If G $20,000 for famly of 4 and t.5, government has to pay famles wth ncomes up to $40,000. We can descrbe the effects of the NIT graphcally, or we can sgn the effects more explctly from the slutsky equaton (show frst on graph). In effect, what s happened s two smultaneous changes: a shft n Y by G, and a fall n wages by tw (for those wth G > t(wh ) ) Total dfferentatng effect on tme worked: dh( w, M ) dw + dm Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 8

9 The frst term, can be decomposed as before: U U * dw + h, so: dh( w, M ) U U * dw + [ hdw + dm ] For ndvduals workng before the program, earnng less than the breakpont (G>t(wH)) Before the program: After change ( d ) W (1-t)w -tw MwT wt+g G So dh U U * ( tw) + [ S] both terms are negatve f lesure s a normal good. The effect s unambguous because the ncome effect from the guarantee even f not workng s larger than the ncome effect generated from workng more. Note that sometmes t s convenent for emprcal applcatons to convert the analyss n terms of elastctes. Take the last example: Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 9

10 Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 10 M S M h h M t w h h w h d h dh c + ) ( log M S t h M c η +η ) ( % If we had varaton n t and S, we could us regresson to try and estmate c η and M η.

11 Emprcal Example 1: The Self-Suffcency Project Experment The self-suffcency project was started n 1991 desgned to explore such a program. In 1991, the SRDC collected a lst of all long-term sngle parent welfare recpents (on welfare for at least 1 year) n Vancouver and rural New Brunswck (n Canada). They randomly selected half of these people on ths lst and nvted them to partcpate n a work subsdy program. The SSP offered a temporary, but generous earnngs supplement to these selected sngle parents. To take advantage of the supplement offer, the ndvduals had to begn workng full tme (30 hours or more per week) and stop recevng welfare wthn a year of beng offered the supplement. The supplement was pad on top of earnngs. Those who were elgble to receve t could do so for up to three years after fndng full-tme work, as long as they were stll workng full tme and not recevng welfare. The supplement s calculated as half the dfference between a partcpants earnngs from employment and $37,000. So the supplement s reduced by 50 cents for every dollar of ncreased earnngs: [ 18,500 w / 2L] 1( w 25,000)1( H 30h / week Y wt C + w + ) + <draw on board> As an example, a sngle parent wth two chldren n Vancouver receved $17,111 annually n socal assstance (welfare) n If they obtaned a job workng 35 hours at $7 an hour and worked 52 weeks, ther annual ncome would be $12,740, much less than welfare!! Unless there was utlty from workng, statc model predcts unambguously parent would not work. The work subsdy from the program s $12,130, so f the parent partcpated n the program, she would earn nstead $24,870. In general, most partcpants faced ncomes $3,000-$7,000 hgher, when ncludng the subsdy, compared to welfare ncomes. Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 11

12 One thng we mght lke to know s the effect of the program on every partcpant. Let s defne D as an ndcator for whether a partcpant was selected to receve the subsdy, D 1, or not, D 0. Let Y 1 be woman s crcumstances (hours worked, welfare status, famly health, etc ) f D 1 (say, for example, 3 years nto the program), and Y 0 be her crcumstances otherwse. Assume both these potental outcomes are well defned for everyone. The problem s, only one s ever observed for each woman. Formally, ths can be expressed by wrtng the observed outcomes, Y, as: Y Y0 ( 1 D ) + Y1 D We cannot know the counterfactual outcome for each woman wthout beng able to observe alternate unverses (whch we can t). Instead, the Self-suffcency project tres to estmate the average effect on partcpants usng observed outcomes only. If we smply take the dfference n mean outcomes between those selected and those not, we get: E( Y D 1) E( Y D 0) E( Y 1 D 1) E( Y 0 D 0) E( Y 1 Y + [ E( Y 0 0 D D 1) 1) E( Y 0 D 0] and because partcpants are randomly assgned, whch means D s ndependent of any ntal crcumstances before the program, the expected counterfactual outcome for partcpants selected s the same as the expected outcome for partcpants not selected. Expected outcomes are the same for both groups, condtonal on program assgnment. The last term of ths expresson, E ( Y D 1) E( Y D 0] 0, s zero. Thus, by [ 0 0 comparng observed means, random assgnment allows us to estmate the average effect from beng offered the subsdy. Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 12

13 Essentally, the study looked at the followng: H β 0 + β T + v t 1 t where T 1 f offered the subsdy, 0 otherwse. Notce we are examnng the labor supply effect over dfferent perods n tme, ncludng the perod after the subsdy s removed. As we ll see when we turn to the ntertemporal model of labor supply, t may matter whether such polcy change s temporary or permanent. Assgnment to T s random, so there s no omtted varables bas: v s ndependent of T, and the sample s condtonal on beng a sngle parent, and on welfare for at least one year. The counterfactual s obvous: what would have happened had the treatment not been gven, and the average effect for the populaton s dentfed. Expected effects: The wage rate for workng full tme s beng subsdzed. The antcpated effect over the 3 year perod the program s offered s unambguously zero or postve, snce there s no short-run ncome effect among the populaton. But here s where the ntertemporal model s useful: t remnds us that the program s short term, and the effect of the program s transtory. Lfetme wealth ncreases as a result of the program, for those that partcpate. The effect of labor supply after the subsdy runs out s ambguous, snce there s a (small) wealth effect spread out over the lfetme. What s nterestng s that the model predcts once the subsdy goes away, ndvduals that dd change ther labor supply should reduce t once the subsdy has ended, maybe even to levels lower than the control group. Results: Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 13

14 Fgure 3.1 It s nterestng to note that only 30% of those treated decded to swtch to workng full tme, compared to 15% of the control group n the frst year of the study. Therefore, many n the treatment group dd not take up the subsdy, and analyzng the labor supply dynamcs of the program are confounded by ncludng the part of the treatment group that was elgble, but dd not partcpate. Another way to examne the experment s to focus on the Treatment of the treated. That s, to focus on just the effects of those that dd take up the program, among those who were elgble. It s crucal to note that the characterstcs of ths group are unlkely to be smlar to the characterstcs of the control group, so any analyss of the treatment of the treated must be treated wth ths understandng of lkely omtted varables bas. Fgure 3.4 shows the effect of the treatment on the treated over tme. Obvously the full tme employment for ths group wll ntally ncrease to almost 100%, by defnton of those who took up the program. But now notce how quckly the fall n full employment among them occurs almost 20 percentage ponts over the 3 years, compared to a slow, but steady rse for those that dd not take up the program. Note, the slower change n employment between the control group and the treated group that dd not take up the program ndcates the potental that these groups are dfferent. Fgure 6.1. What s nterestng s how relatvely small the labor supply decrease occurred followng mmedately after the drop n subsdes. I would have expected to see a larger reacton. On the other hand, by the tme the subsdy was removed, the treatment group had no dfferent employment rates than the control group, whch s generally what would be expected from the theory, f wealth effects were small. It seems the overall effect of the program was to ncrease the speed at whch welfare parents took up full-tme employment. Analyzng the program. Should ths program be adopted? Tables 7.4 and 7.5 look at the benefts and costs of the program. For ndvduals that would have stayed on welfare, but Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 14

15 nstead work wth the subsdy, the cost s less to subsdze than for welfare. But the program also subsdzes ndvduals that would have started full tme employment anyway - for these ndvduals (wnd-fall recpents), the program cost even more. Targetng only long-term welfare recpents and requrng fulltme employment for take-up helps mnmze the number of wnd-fall recpents, but the study reveals that overall, ths program costs more the 5-year per program group member cost for the treatment group was $40,000, whereas for the control group t was $37,000 (gnorng admnstratve costs). If we nclude addtonal earnngs as a beneft (payment for value added), then we mght be able to justfy program earnngs were, on average, about $4,000 hgher for the treatment group than for the control. But ths analyss completely gnores redstrbutonal ssues: the earnngs are receved by the partcpant, the subsdy s receved by the partcpant, and the costs are born by the tax-payer. A varaton of ths program mght lower overall costs f t could do a better job targetng those that would have stayed on welfare otherwse. It would be nterestng to see the same program set up for only those wth at least 2 years on welfare (not clear what results would show, however). Another consderaton s that f ths program was ntroduced, t mght provde ncentve to stay on welfare longer. A separate sample for the SSP was carred out, where a random sample from a group of welfare recpents wth less than 1 year on welfare was told they would be elgble for the program f they were stll on welfare after a year. Interestngly, Card, Robns, and Lm fnd mnmal effects. What were the effects of the self-suffcency project? Introducng the program led to about a 25 percentage pont rse n full-tme employment rate relatve to the control group (from 5 to 30%). Note that about 70% of those on welfare ddn t react to the program at all. Fve years nto the experment, the control group had caught up: about the same percentage of welfare recpents were employed full tme n both groups (about 30%). So the program seems to have had a very large effect n makng some welfare recpents start work early, Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 15

16 but lttle long-run effect. Strong tendency to stay on welfare even f offered very large fnancal ncentve to work. Interestng to know why. Phlp Oreopoulos Labor Economcs Notes for Fall Lecture 2 16

Problem Set 3. a) We are asked how people will react, if the interest rate i on bonds is negative.

Problem Set 3. a) We are asked how people will react, if the interest rate i on bonds is negative. Queston roblem Set 3 a) We are asked how people wll react, f the nterest rate on bonds s negatve. When

More information

Section 5.4 Annuities, Present Value, and Amortization

Section 5.4 Annuities, Present Value, and Amortization Secton 5.4 Annutes, Present Value, and Amortzaton Present Value In Secton 5.2, we saw that the present value of A dollars at nterest rate per perod for n perods s the amount that must be deposted today

More information

Answer: A). There is a flatter IS curve in the high MPC economy. Original LM LM after increase in M. IS curve for low MPC economy

Answer: A). There is a flatter IS curve in the high MPC economy. Original LM LM after increase in M. IS curve for low MPC economy 4.02 Quz Solutons Fall 2004 Multple-Choce Questons (30/00 ponts) Please, crcle the correct answer for each of the followng 0 multple-choce questons. For each queston, only one of the answers s correct.

More information

Chapter 4 Financial Markets

Chapter 4 Financial Markets Chapter 4 Fnancal Markets ECON2123 (Sprng 2012) 14 & 15.3.2012 (Tutoral 5) The demand for money Assumptons: There are only two assets n the fnancal market: money and bonds Prce s fxed and s gven, that

More information

Solutions to First Midterm

Solutions to First Midterm rofessor Chrstano Economcs 3, Wnter 2004 Solutons to Frst Mdterm. Multple Choce. 2. (a) v. (b). (c) v. (d) v. (e). (f). (g) v. (a) The goods market s n equlbrum when total demand equals total producton,.e.

More information

An Alternative Way to Measure Private Equity Performance

An Alternative Way to Measure Private Equity Performance An Alternatve Way to Measure Prvate Equty Performance Peter Todd Parlux Investment Technology LLC Summary Internal Rate of Return (IRR) s probably the most common way to measure the performance of prvate

More information

Introduction: Analysis of Electronic Circuits

Introduction: Analysis of Electronic Circuits /30/008 ntroducton / ntroducton: Analyss of Electronc Crcuts Readng Assgnment: KVL and KCL text from EECS Just lke EECS, the majorty of problems (hw and exam) n EECS 3 wll be crcut analyss problems. Thus,

More information

Texas Instruments 30X IIS Calculator

Texas Instruments 30X IIS Calculator Texas Instruments 30X IIS Calculator Keystrokes for the TI-30X IIS are shown for a few topcs n whch keystrokes are unque. Start by readng the Quk Start secton. Then, before begnnng a specfc unt of the

More information

Module 2 LOSSLESS IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur

Module 2 LOSSLESS IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur Module LOSSLESS IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS Lesson 3 Lossless Compresson: Huffman Codng Instructonal Objectves At the end of ths lesson, the students should be able to:. Defne and measure source entropy..

More information

1. Measuring association using correlation and regression

1. Measuring association using correlation and regression How to measure assocaton I: Correlaton. 1. Measurng assocaton usng correlaton and regresson We often would lke to know how one varable, such as a mother's weght, s related to another varable, such as a

More information

Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Business and Management, Brno University of Technology,Czech Republic

Institute of Informatics, Faculty of Business and Management, Brno University of Technology,Czech Republic Lagrange Multplers as Quanttatve Indcators n Economcs Ivan Mezník Insttute of Informatcs, Faculty of Busness and Management, Brno Unversty of TechnologCzech Republc Abstract The quanttatve role of Lagrange

More information

Week 6 Market Failure due to Externalities

Week 6 Market Failure due to Externalities Week 6 Market Falure due to Externaltes 1. Externaltes n externalty exsts when the acton of one agent unavodably affects the welfare of another agent. The affected agent may be a consumer, gvng rse to

More information

Descriptive Statistics (60 points)

Descriptive Statistics (60 points) Economcs 30330: Statstcs for Economcs Problem Set 2 Unversty of otre Dame Instructor: Julo Garín Sprng 2012 Descrptve Statstcs (60 ponts) 1. Followng a recent government shutdown, Mnnesota Governor Mark

More information

Texas Instruments 30Xa Calculator

Texas Instruments 30Xa Calculator Teas Instruments 30Xa Calculator Keystrokes for the TI-30Xa are shown for a few topcs n whch keystrokes are unque. Start by readng the Quk Start secton. Then, before begnnng a specfc unt of the tet, check

More information

The Analysis of Covariance. ERSH 8310 Keppel and Wickens Chapter 15

The Analysis of Covariance. ERSH 8310 Keppel and Wickens Chapter 15 The Analyss of Covarance ERSH 830 Keppel and Wckens Chapter 5 Today s Class Intal Consderatons Covarance and Lnear Regresson The Lnear Regresson Equaton TheAnalyss of Covarance Assumptons Underlyng the

More information

CHAPTER 18 INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND AGGREGATE SUPPLY. Themes of the chapter. Nominal rigidities, expectational errors and employment fluctuations

CHAPTER 18 INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND AGGREGATE SUPPLY. Themes of the chapter. Nominal rigidities, expectational errors and employment fluctuations CHAPTER 18 INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND AGGREGATE SUPPLY Themes of the chapter Nomnal rgdtes, expectatonal errors and employment fluctuatons The short-run trade-off between nflaton and unemployment The

More information

Inequality and The Accounting Period. Quentin Wodon and Shlomo Yitzhaki. World Bank and Hebrew University. September 2001.

Inequality and The Accounting Period. Quentin Wodon and Shlomo Yitzhaki. World Bank and Hebrew University. September 2001. Inequalty and The Accountng Perod Quentn Wodon and Shlomo Ytzha World Ban and Hebrew Unversty September Abstract Income nequalty typcally declnes wth the length of tme taen nto account for measurement.

More information

benefit is 2, paid if the policyholder dies within the year, and probability of death within the year is ).

benefit is 2, paid if the policyholder dies within the year, and probability of death within the year is ). REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS AND INSURANCE Loss and nsurance: When someone s subject to the rsk of ncurrng a fnancal loss, the loss s generally modeled usng a random varable or

More information

PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: THE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND PARTICIPATION

PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: THE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND PARTICIPATION PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE: THE EFFECTS OF RELIIOUS AFFILIATION AND PARTICIPATION Danny Cohen-Zada Department of Economcs, Ben-uron Unversty, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel Wllam Sander Department of Economcs, DePaul

More information

x f(x) 1 0.25 1 0.75 x 1 0 1 1 0.04 0.01 0.20 1 0.12 0.03 0.60

x f(x) 1 0.25 1 0.75 x 1 0 1 1 0.04 0.01 0.20 1 0.12 0.03 0.60 BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTIONS Let be a varable that assumes the values { 1,,..., n }. Then, a functon that epresses the relatve frequenc of these values s called a unvarate frequenc functon. It must be true

More information

Using Series to Analyze Financial Situations: Present Value

Using Series to Analyze Financial Situations: Present Value 2.8 Usng Seres to Analyze Fnancal Stuatons: Present Value In the prevous secton, you learned how to calculate the amount, or future value, of an ordnary smple annuty. The amount s the sum of the accumulated

More information

9.1 The Cumulative Sum Control Chart

9.1 The Cumulative Sum Control Chart Learnng Objectves 9.1 The Cumulatve Sum Control Chart 9.1.1 Basc Prncples: Cusum Control Chart for Montorng the Process Mean If s the target for the process mean, then the cumulatve sum control chart s

More information

Financial Mathemetics

Financial Mathemetics Fnancal Mathemetcs 15 Mathematcs Grade 12 Teacher Gude Fnancal Maths Seres Overvew In ths seres we am to show how Mathematcs can be used to support personal fnancal decsons. In ths seres we jon Tebogo,

More information

Number of Levels Cumulative Annual operating Income per year construction costs costs ($) ($) ($) 1 600,000 35,000 100,000 2 2,200,000 60,000 350,000

Number of Levels Cumulative Annual operating Income per year construction costs costs ($) ($) ($) 1 600,000 35,000 100,000 2 2,200,000 60,000 350,000 Problem Set 5 Solutons 1 MIT s consderng buldng a new car park near Kendall Square. o unversty funds are avalable (overhead rates are under pressure and the new faclty would have to pay for tself from

More information

Nasdaq Iceland Bond Indices 01 April 2015

Nasdaq Iceland Bond Indices 01 April 2015 Nasdaq Iceland Bond Indces 01 Aprl 2015 -Fxed duraton Indces Introducton Nasdaq Iceland (the Exchange) began calculatng ts current bond ndces n the begnnng of 2005. They were a response to recent changes

More information

Graph Theory and Cayley s Formula

Graph Theory and Cayley s Formula Graph Theory and Cayley s Formula Chad Casarotto August 10, 2006 Contents 1 Introducton 1 2 Bascs and Defntons 1 Cayley s Formula 4 4 Prüfer Encodng A Forest of Trees 7 1 Introducton In ths paper, I wll

More information

Time Value of Money. Types of Interest. Compounding and Discounting Single Sums. Page 1. Ch. 6 - The Time Value of Money. The Time Value of Money

Time Value of Money. Types of Interest. Compounding and Discounting Single Sums. Page 1. Ch. 6 - The Time Value of Money. The Time Value of Money Ch. 6 - The Tme Value of Money Tme Value of Money The Interest Rate Smple Interest Compound Interest Amortzng a Loan FIN21- Ahmed Y, Dasht TIME VALUE OF MONEY OR DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS Very Important

More information

CHAPTER 5 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES

CHAPTER 5 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES CHAPTER 5 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES In ths chapter, we wll learn how to descrbe the relatonshp between two quanttatve varables. Remember (from Chapter 2) that the terms quanttatve varable

More information

The covariance is the two variable analog to the variance. The formula for the covariance between two variables is

The covariance is the two variable analog to the variance. The formula for the covariance between two variables is Regresson Lectures So far we have talked only about statstcs that descrbe one varable. What we are gong to be dscussng for much of the remander of the course s relatonshps between two or more varables.

More information

DEFINING %COMPLETE IN MICROSOFT PROJECT

DEFINING %COMPLETE IN MICROSOFT PROJECT CelersSystems DEFINING %COMPLETE IN MICROSOFT PROJECT PREPARED BY James E Aksel, PMP, PMI-SP, MVP For Addtonal Informaton about Earned Value Management Systems and reportng, please contact: CelersSystems,

More information

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (PYC 304-C) Lecture 12

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (PYC 304-C) Lecture 12 14 The Ch-squared dstrbuton PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (PYC 304-C) Lecture 1 If a normal varable X, havng mean µ and varance σ, s standardsed, the new varable Z has a mean 0 and varance 1. When ths standardsed

More information

8.5 UNITARY AND HERMITIAN MATRICES. The conjugate transpose of a complex matrix A, denoted by A*, is given by

8.5 UNITARY AND HERMITIAN MATRICES. The conjugate transpose of a complex matrix A, denoted by A*, is given by 6 CHAPTER 8 COMPLEX VECTOR SPACES 5. Fnd the kernel of the lnear transformaton gven n Exercse 5. In Exercses 55 and 56, fnd the mage of v, for the ndcated composton, where and are gven by the followng

More information

Finite Math Chapter 10: Study Guide and Solution to Problems

Finite Math Chapter 10: Study Guide and Solution to Problems Fnte Math Chapter 10: Study Gude and Soluton to Problems Basc Formulas and Concepts 10.1 Interest Basc Concepts Interest A fee a bank pays you for money you depost nto a savngs account. Prncpal P The amount

More information

Study on CET4 Marks in China s Graded English Teaching

Study on CET4 Marks in China s Graded English Teaching Study on CET4 Marks n Chna s Graded Englsh Teachng CHE We College of Foregn Studes, Shandong Insttute of Busness and Technology, P.R.Chna, 264005 Abstract: Ths paper deploys Logt model, and decomposes

More information

Lecture 3: Force of Interest, Real Interest Rate, Annuity

Lecture 3: Force of Interest, Real Interest Rate, Annuity Lecture 3: Force of Interest, Real Interest Rate, Annuty Goals: Study contnuous compoundng and force of nterest Dscuss real nterest rate Learn annuty-mmedate, and ts present value Study annuty-due, and

More information

Start me up: The Effectiveness of a Self-Employment Programme for Needy Unemployed People in Germany*

Start me up: The Effectiveness of a Self-Employment Programme for Needy Unemployed People in Germany* Start me up: The Effectveness of a Self-Employment Programme for Needy Unemployed People n Germany* Joachm Wolff Anton Nvorozhkn Date: 22/10/2008 Abstract In recent years actvaton of means-tested unemployment

More information

Understanding the Impact of Marketing Actions in Traditional Channels on the Internet: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment

Understanding the Impact of Marketing Actions in Traditional Channels on the Internet: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment A research and educaton ntatve at the MT Sloan School of Management Understandng the mpact of Marketng Actons n Tradtonal Channels on the nternet: Evdence from a Large Scale Feld Experment Paper 216 Erc

More information

1 Approximation Algorithms

1 Approximation Algorithms CME 305: Dscrete Mathematcs and Algorthms 1 Approxmaton Algorthms In lght of the apparent ntractablty of the problems we beleve not to le n P, t makes sense to pursue deas other than complete solutons

More information

Lecture 3: Annuity. Study annuities whose payments form a geometric progression or a arithmetic progression.

Lecture 3: Annuity. Study annuities whose payments form a geometric progression or a arithmetic progression. Lecture 3: Annuty Goals: Learn contnuous annuty and perpetuty. Study annutes whose payments form a geometrc progresson or a arthmetc progresson. Dscuss yeld rates. Introduce Amortzaton Suggested Textbook

More information

Causal, Explanatory Forecasting. Analysis. Regression Analysis. Simple Linear Regression. Which is Independent? Forecasting

Causal, Explanatory Forecasting. Analysis. Regression Analysis. Simple Linear Regression. Which is Independent? Forecasting Causal, Explanatory Forecastng Assumes cause-and-effect relatonshp between system nputs and ts output Forecastng wth Regresson Analyss Rchard S. Barr Inputs System Cause + Effect Relatonshp The job of

More information

ErrorPropagation.nb 1. Error Propagation

ErrorPropagation.nb 1. Error Propagation ErrorPropagaton.nb Error Propagaton Suppose that we make observatons of a quantty x that s subject to random fluctuatons or measurement errors. Our best estmate of the true value for ths quantty s then

More information

THE TITANIC SHIPWRECK: WHO WAS

THE TITANIC SHIPWRECK: WHO WAS THE TITANIC SHIPWRECK: WHO WAS MOST LIKELY TO SURVIVE? A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Ths paper examnes the probablty of survvng the Ttanc shpwreck usng lmted dependent varable regresson analyss. Ths appled analyss

More information

14.74 Lecture 5: Health (2)

14.74 Lecture 5: Health (2) 14.74 Lecture 5: Health (2) Esther Duflo February 17, 2004 1 Possble Interventons Last tme we dscussed possble nterventons. Let s take one: provdng ron supplements to people, for example. From the data,

More information

Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises. Online Appendix May 2013. Appendix A: Derivation of Equations for Productivity

Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises. Online Appendix May 2013. Appendix A: Derivation of Equations for Productivity Trade Adjustment Productvty n Large Crses Gta Gopnath Department of Economcs Harvard Unversty NBER Brent Neman Booth School of Busness Unversty of Chcago NBER Onlne Appendx May 2013 Appendx A: Dervaton

More information

Can Auto Liability Insurance Purchases Signal Risk Attitude?

Can Auto Liability Insurance Purchases Signal Risk Attitude? Internatonal Journal of Busness and Economcs, 2011, Vol. 10, No. 2, 159-164 Can Auto Lablty Insurance Purchases Sgnal Rsk Atttude? Chu-Shu L Department of Internatonal Busness, Asa Unversty, Tawan Sheng-Chang

More information

Staff Paper. Farm Savings Accounts: Examining Income Variability, Eligibility, and Benefits. Brent Gloy, Eddy LaDue, and Charles Cuykendall

Staff Paper. Farm Savings Accounts: Examining Income Variability, Eligibility, and Benefits. Brent Gloy, Eddy LaDue, and Charles Cuykendall SP 2005-02 August 2005 Staff Paper Department of Appled Economcs and Management Cornell Unversty, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA Farm Savngs Accounts: Examnng Income Varablty, Elgblty, and Benefts Brent

More information

Health Insurance and Household Savings

Health Insurance and Household Savings Health Insurance and Household Savngs Mnchung Hsu Job Market Paper Last Updated: November, 2006 Abstract Recent emprcal studes have documented a puzzlng pattern of household savngs n the U.S.: households

More information

Lecture 10: Linear Regression Approach, Assumptions and Diagnostics

Lecture 10: Linear Regression Approach, Assumptions and Diagnostics Approach to Modelng I Lecture 1: Lnear Regresson Approach, Assumptons and Dagnostcs Sandy Eckel seckel@jhsph.edu 8 May 8 General approach for most statstcal modelng: Defne the populaton of nterest State

More information

Communication Networks II Contents

Communication Networks II Contents 8 / 1 -- Communcaton Networs II (Görg) -- www.comnets.un-bremen.de Communcaton Networs II Contents 1 Fundamentals of probablty theory 2 Traffc n communcaton networs 3 Stochastc & Marovan Processes (SP

More information

PROFIT RATIO AND MARKET STRUCTURE

PROFIT RATIO AND MARKET STRUCTURE POFIT ATIO AND MAKET STUCTUE By Yong Yun Introducton: Industral economsts followng from Mason and Ban have run nnumerable tests of the relaton between varous market structural varables and varous dmensons

More information

Multivariate EWMA Control Chart

Multivariate EWMA Control Chart Multvarate EWMA Control Chart Summary The Multvarate EWMA Control Chart procedure creates control charts for two or more numerc varables. Examnng the varables n a multvarate sense s extremely mportant

More information

Formula of Total Probability, Bayes Rule, and Applications

Formula of Total Probability, Bayes Rule, and Applications 1 Formula of Total Probablty, Bayes Rule, and Applcatons Recall that for any event A, the par of events A and A has an ntersecton that s empty, whereas the unon A A represents the total populaton of nterest.

More information

Section B9: Zener Diodes

Section B9: Zener Diodes Secton B9: Zener Dodes When we frst talked about practcal dodes, t was mentoned that a parameter assocated wth the dode n the reverse bas regon was the breakdown voltage, BR, also known as the peak-nverse

More information

Passive Filters. References: Barbow (pp 265-275), Hayes & Horowitz (pp 32-60), Rizzoni (Chap. 6)

Passive Filters. References: Barbow (pp 265-275), Hayes & Horowitz (pp 32-60), Rizzoni (Chap. 6) Passve Flters eferences: Barbow (pp 6575), Hayes & Horowtz (pp 360), zzon (Chap. 6) Frequencyselectve or flter crcuts pass to the output only those nput sgnals that are n a desred range of frequences (called

More information

The OC Curve of Attribute Acceptance Plans

The OC Curve of Attribute Acceptance Plans The OC Curve of Attrbute Acceptance Plans The Operatng Characterstc (OC) curve descrbes the probablty of acceptng a lot as a functon of the lot s qualty. Fgure 1 shows a typcal OC Curve. 10 8 6 4 1 3 4

More information

Lossless Data Compression

Lossless Data Compression Lossless Data Compresson Lecture : Unquely Decodable and Instantaneous Codes Sam Rowes September 5, 005 Let s focus on the lossless data compresson problem for now, and not worry about nosy channel codng

More information

EE201 Circuit Theory I 2015 Spring. Dr. Yılmaz KALKAN

EE201 Circuit Theory I 2015 Spring. Dr. Yılmaz KALKAN EE201 Crcut Theory I 2015 Sprng Dr. Yılmaz KALKAN 1. Basc Concepts (Chapter 1 of Nlsson - 3 Hrs.) Introducton, Current and Voltage, Power and Energy 2. Basc Laws (Chapter 2&3 of Nlsson - 6 Hrs.) Voltage

More information

Calculation of Sampling Weights

Calculation of Sampling Weights Perre Foy Statstcs Canada 4 Calculaton of Samplng Weghts 4.1 OVERVIEW The basc sample desgn used n TIMSS Populatons 1 and 2 was a two-stage stratfed cluster desgn. 1 The frst stage conssted of a sample

More information

An Interactive Computer Model of Two-Country Trade

An Interactive Computer Model of Two-Country Trade An Interactve Computer Model of Two-Country Trade Bll Hamlen and Kevn Hamlen Abstract We ntroduce an nteractve computer model of two-country trade that allows students to nvestgate the consequences of

More information

Quality Adjustment of Second-hand Motor Vehicle Application of Hedonic Approach in Hong Kong s Consumer Price Index

Quality Adjustment of Second-hand Motor Vehicle Application of Hedonic Approach in Hong Kong s Consumer Price Index Qualty Adustment of Second-hand Motor Vehcle Applcaton of Hedonc Approach n Hong Kong s Consumer Prce Index Prepared for the 14 th Meetng of the Ottawa Group on Prce Indces 20 22 May 2015, Tokyo, Japan

More information

In our example i = r/12 =.0825/12 At the end of the first month after your payment is received your amount owed is. P (1 + i) A

In our example i = r/12 =.0825/12 At the end of the first month after your payment is received your amount owed is. P (1 + i) A Amortzed loans: Suppose you borrow P dollars, e.g., P = 100, 000 for a house wth a 30 year mortgage wth an nterest rate of 8.25% (compounded monthly). In ths type of loan you make equal payments of A dollars

More information

7.5. Present Value of an Annuity. Investigate

7.5. Present Value of an Annuity. Investigate 7.5 Present Value of an Annuty Owen and Anna are approachng retrement and are puttng ther fnances n order. They have worked hard and nvested ther earnngs so that they now have a large amount of money on

More information

2.4 Bivariate distributions

2.4 Bivariate distributions page 28 2.4 Bvarate dstrbutons 2.4.1 Defntons Let X and Y be dscrete r.v.s defned on the same probablty space (S, F, P). Instead of treatng them separately, t s often necessary to thnk of them actng together

More information

Capital asset pricing model, arbitrage pricing theory and portfolio management

Capital asset pricing model, arbitrage pricing theory and portfolio management Captal asset prcng model, arbtrage prcng theory and portfolo management Vnod Kothar The captal asset prcng model (CAPM) s great n terms of ts understandng of rsk decomposton of rsk nto securty-specfc rsk

More information

Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis Using a Single Cross-section of Data. Mohamed Ihsan Ajwad and Quentin Wodon 1. World Bank.

Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis Using a Single Cross-section of Data. Mohamed Ihsan Ajwad and Quentin Wodon 1. World Bank. Margnal Beneft Incdence Analyss Usng a Sngle Cross-secton of Data Mohamed Ihsan Ajwad and uentn Wodon World Bank August 200 Abstract In a recent paper, Lanjouw and Ravallon proposed an attractve and smple

More information

The Classical Model. Gauss-Markov Theorem, Specification, Endogeneity

The Classical Model. Gauss-Markov Theorem, Specification, Endogeneity The Classcal Model Gauss-Markov Theorem, Specfcaton, Endogenety Propertes of Least Squares Estmators Here s the model: Y = β + β + β + β + L+ β + ε 0 For the case wth regressor and constant, I showed some

More information

Hollinger Canadian Publishing Holdings Co. ( HCPH ) proceeding under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act ( CCAA )

Hollinger Canadian Publishing Holdings Co. ( HCPH ) proceeding under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act ( CCAA ) February 17, 2011 Andrew J. Hatnay ahatnay@kmlaw.ca Dear Sr/Madam: Re: Re: Hollnger Canadan Publshng Holdngs Co. ( HCPH ) proceedng under the Companes Credtors Arrangement Act ( CCAA ) Update on CCAA Proceedngs

More information

CHAPTER 14 MORE ABOUT REGRESSION

CHAPTER 14 MORE ABOUT REGRESSION CHAPTER 14 MORE ABOUT REGRESSION We learned n Chapter 5 that often a straght lne descrbes the pattern of a relatonshp between two quanttatve varables. For nstance, n Example 5.1 we explored the relatonshp

More information

Section 5.3 Annuities, Future Value, and Sinking Funds

Section 5.3 Annuities, Future Value, and Sinking Funds Secton 5.3 Annutes, Future Value, and Snkng Funds Ordnary Annutes A sequence of equal payments made at equal perods of tme s called an annuty. The tme between payments s the payment perod, and the tme

More information

! # %& ( ) +,../ 0 1 2 3 4 0 4 # 5##&.6 7% 8 # 0 4 2 #...

! # %& ( ) +,../ 0 1 2 3 4 0 4 # 5##&.6 7% 8 # 0 4 2 #... ! # %& ( ) +,../ 0 1 2 3 4 0 4 # 5##&.6 7% 8 # 0 4 2 #... 9 Sheffeld Economc Research Paper Seres SERP Number: 2011010 ISSN 1749-8368 Sarah Brown, Aurora Ortz-Núñez and Karl Taylor Educatonal loans and

More information

HOUSEHOLDS DEBT BURDEN: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON MICROECONOMIC DATA*

HOUSEHOLDS DEBT BURDEN: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON MICROECONOMIC DATA* HOUSEHOLDS DEBT BURDEN: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON MICROECONOMIC DATA* Luísa Farnha** 1. INTRODUCTION The rapd growth n Portuguese households ndebtedness n the past few years ncreased the concerns that debt

More information

Questions that we may have about the variables

Questions that we may have about the variables Antono Olmos, 01 Multple Regresson Problem: we want to determne the effect of Desre for control, Famly support, Number of frends, and Score on the BDI test on Perceved Support of Latno women. Dependent

More information

Marginal Returns to Education For Teachers

Marginal Returns to Education For Teachers The Onlne Journal of New Horzons n Educaton Volume 4, Issue 3 MargnalReturnstoEducatonForTeachers RamleeIsmal,MarnahAwang ABSTRACT FacultyofManagementand Economcs UnverstPenddkanSultan Idrs ramlee@fpe.ups.edu.my

More information

The Greedy Method. Introduction. 0/1 Knapsack Problem

The Greedy Method. Introduction. 0/1 Knapsack Problem The Greedy Method Introducton We have completed data structures. We now are gong to look at algorthm desgn methods. Often we are lookng at optmzaton problems whose performance s exponental. For an optmzaton

More information

Support Vector Machines

Support Vector Machines Support Vector Machnes Max Wellng Department of Computer Scence Unversty of Toronto 10 Kng s College Road Toronto, M5S 3G5 Canada wellng@cs.toronto.edu Abstract Ths s a note to explan support vector machnes.

More information

Small pots lump sum payment instruction

Small pots lump sum payment instruction For customers Small pots lump sum payment nstructon Please read these notes before completng ths nstructon About ths nstructon Use ths nstructon f you re an ndvdual wth Aegon Retrement Choces Self Invested

More information

IS-LM Model 1 C' dy = di

IS-LM Model 1 C' dy = di - odel Solow Assumptons - demand rrelevant n long run; assumes economy s operatng at potental GDP; concerned wth growth - Assumptons - supply s rrelevant n short run; assumes economy s operatng below potental

More information

Section C2: BJT Structure and Operational Modes

Section C2: BJT Structure and Operational Modes Secton 2: JT Structure and Operatonal Modes Recall that the semconductor dode s smply a pn juncton. Dependng on how the juncton s based, current may easly flow between the dode termnals (forward bas, v

More information

Chapter 7: Answers to Questions and Problems

Chapter 7: Answers to Questions and Problems 19. Based on the nformaton contaned n Table 7-3 of the text, the food and apparel ndustres are most compettve and therefore probably represent the best match for the expertse of these managers. Chapter

More information

SIX WAYS TO SOLVE A SIMPLE PROBLEM: FITTING A STRAIGHT LINE TO MEASUREMENT DATA

SIX WAYS TO SOLVE A SIMPLE PROBLEM: FITTING A STRAIGHT LINE TO MEASUREMENT DATA SIX WAYS TO SOLVE A SIMPLE PROBLEM: FITTING A STRAIGHT LINE TO MEASUREMENT DATA E. LAGENDIJK Department of Appled Physcs, Delft Unversty of Technology Lorentzweg 1, 68 CJ, The Netherlands E-mal: e.lagendjk@tnw.tudelft.nl

More information

Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Social Security Systems

Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Social Security Systems Quas-Hyperbolc Dscountng and Socal Securty Systems Mordecha E. Schwarz a and Eytan Sheshnsk b May 22, 26 Abstract Hyperbolc countng has become a common assumpton for modelng bounded ratonalty wth respect

More information

The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Canadian Provincial Governments

The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Canadian Provincial Governments The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax Bases and the Margnal Cost of Publc Funds for Canadan Provncal Governments Bev Dahlby a and Ergete Ferede b a Department of Economcs, Unversty of Alberta, Edmonton,

More information

SIMPLE LINEAR CORRELATION

SIMPLE LINEAR CORRELATION SIMPLE LINEAR CORRELATION Smple lnear correlaton s a measure of the degree to whch two varables vary together, or a measure of the ntensty of the assocaton between two varables. Correlaton often s abused.

More information

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence on Swiss data

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence on Swiss data Workng Paper n 07-02 The nfluence of supplementary health nsurance on swtchng behavour: evdence on Swss data Brgtte Dormont, Perre- Yves Geoffard, Karne Lamraud The nfluence of supplementary health nsurance

More information

STAMP DUTY ON SHARES AND ITS EFFECT ON SHARE PRICES

STAMP DUTY ON SHARES AND ITS EFFECT ON SHARE PRICES STAMP UTY ON SHARES AN ITS EFFECT ON SHARE PRICES Steve Bond Mke Hawkns Alexander Klemm THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUIES WP04/11 STAMP UTY ON SHARES AN ITS EFFECT ON SHARE PRICES Steve Bond (IFS and Unversty

More information

VLSI Technology Dr. Nandita Dasgupta Department of Electrical Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

VLSI Technology Dr. Nandita Dasgupta Department of Electrical Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras VLI Technology Dr. Nandta Dasgupta Department of Electrcal Engneerng Indan Insttute of Technology, Madras Lecture - 11 Oxdaton I netcs of Oxdaton o, the unt process step that we are gong to dscuss today

More information

Evaluating the Effects of FUNDEF on Wages and Test Scores in Brazil *

Evaluating the Effects of FUNDEF on Wages and Test Scores in Brazil * Evaluatng the Effects of FUNDEF on Wages and Test Scores n Brazl * Naérco Menezes-Flho Elane Pazello Unversty of São Paulo Abstract In ths paper we nvestgate the effects of the 1998 reform n the fundng

More information

SPEE Recommended Evaluation Practice #6 Definition of Decline Curve Parameters Background:

SPEE Recommended Evaluation Practice #6 Definition of Decline Curve Parameters Background: SPEE Recommended Evaluaton Practce #6 efnton of eclne Curve Parameters Background: The producton hstores of ol and gas wells can be analyzed to estmate reserves and future ol and gas producton rates and

More information

Returns to Experience in Mozambique: A Nonparametric Regression Approach

Returns to Experience in Mozambique: A Nonparametric Regression Approach Returns to Experence n Mozambque: A Nonparametrc Regresson Approach Joel Muzma Conference Paper nº 27 Conferênca Inaugural do IESE Desafos para a nvestgação socal e económca em Moçambque 19 de Setembro

More information

What is Candidate Sampling

What is Candidate Sampling What s Canddate Samplng Say we have a multclass or mult label problem where each tranng example ( x, T ) conssts of a context x a small (mult)set of target classes T out of a large unverse L of possble

More information

Simple Interest Loans (Section 5.1) :

Simple Interest Loans (Section 5.1) : Chapter 5 Fnance The frst part of ths revew wll explan the dfferent nterest and nvestment equatons you learned n secton 5.1 through 5.4 of your textbook and go through several examples. The second part

More information

A pedagogical Excel application of cumulative abnormal returns to Hewlett-Packard Company s takeover of 3Com Corporation

A pedagogical Excel application of cumulative abnormal returns to Hewlett-Packard Company s takeover of 3Com Corporation Journal of Fnance and Accountancy A pedagogcal Excel applcaton of cumulatve abnormal returns to Hewlett-Packard Company s takeover of 3Com Corporaton Abstract Mchael R. Santos Sonoma State Unversy Antong

More information

Portfolio Risk Decomposition (and Risk Budgeting)

Portfolio Risk Decomposition (and Risk Budgeting) ortfolo Rsk Decomposton (and Rsk Budgetng) Jason MacQueen R-Squared Rsk Management Introducton to Rsk Decomposton Actve managers take rsk n the expectaton of achevng outperformance of ther benchmark Mandates

More information

Extending Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Extending Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic Extendng Probablstc Dynamc Epstemc Logc Joshua Sack May 29, 2008 Probablty Space Defnton A probablty space s a tuple (S, A, µ), where 1 S s a set called the sample space. 2 A P(S) s a σ-algebra: a set

More information

Describing Communities. Species Diversity Concepts. Species Richness. Species Richness. Species-Area Curve. Species-Area Curve

Describing Communities. Species Diversity Concepts. Species Richness. Species Richness. Species-Area Curve. Species-Area Curve peces versty Concepts peces Rchness peces-area Curves versty Indces - mpson's Index - hannon-wener Index - rlloun Index peces Abundance Models escrbng Communtes There are two mportant descrptors of a communty:

More information

The Complementarities of Competition in Charitable Fundraising

The Complementarities of Competition in Charitable Fundraising The Complementartes of Competton n Chartable Fundrasng Andreas Lange Unversty of Hamburg Department of Economcs Von-Melle-Park 5 D-20146 Hamburg Germany andreas.lange@wso.un-hamburg.de Andrew Stockng Congressonal

More information

When Talk is Free : The Effect of Tariff Structure on Usage under Two- and Three-Part Tariffs

When Talk is Free : The Effect of Tariff Structure on Usage under Two- and Three-Part Tariffs 0 When Talk s Free : The Effect of Tarff Structure on Usage under Two- and Three-Part Tarffs Eva Ascarza Ana Lambrecht Naufel Vlcassm July 2012 (Forthcomng at Journal of Marketng Research) Eva Ascarza

More information

Linear Circuits Analysis. Superposition, Thevenin /Norton Equivalent circuits

Linear Circuits Analysis. Superposition, Thevenin /Norton Equivalent circuits Lnear Crcuts Analyss. Superposton, Theenn /Norton Equalent crcuts So far we hae explored tmendependent (resste) elements that are also lnear. A tmendependent elements s one for whch we can plot an / cure.

More information

HARVARD John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business

HARVARD John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business HARVARD John M. Oln Center for Law, Economcs, and Busness ISSN 1045-6333 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND LEARNING IN THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE MARKET Alma Cohen Dscusson Paper No. 371 6/2002 Harvard Law School

More information

n + d + q = 24 and.05n +.1d +.25q = 2 { n + d + q = 24 (3) n + 2d + 5q = 40 (2)

n + d + q = 24 and.05n +.1d +.25q = 2 { n + d + q = 24 (3) n + 2d + 5q = 40 (2) MATH 16T Exam 1 : Part I (In-Class) Solutons 1. (0 pts) A pggy bank contans 4 cons, all of whch are nckels (5 ), dmes (10 ) or quarters (5 ). The pggy bank also contans a con of each denomnaton. The total

More information