The attacks on the United States on 11 September have had a significant

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1 Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World Nice But Tough: A Framework for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World M.A. MUQTEDAR KHAN Assistant Professor of Political Science Adrian College The attacks on the United States on 11 September have had a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy thinking. The government has now reoriented its foreign policy approach, from one that was essentially geoeconomical to one that is quintessentially geopolitical. Under President Clinton, the United States focused primarily on advancing the so-called Washington consensus (World Bank, IMF and the White House) on globalization and tried its best to make the global economy a reality. Now there is a new consensus in Washington to fight terrorism globally. Security has replaced the economy as the primary concern. Realists are once again in the driver s seat and liberals increasingly find themselves forced to cheer an agenda that is reminiscent of the Cold War. Before 11 September, the United States had a segmented policy towards the Muslim world. The fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are predominantly Muslim nations was irrelevant to U.S. policy in the region. Indonesia was a major military ally and an important cog in the potential coalition against China, as well as the guardian of trading lanes in the Far East. On the other hand, Malaysia was important to the United States as a trading partner. But now both the Muslim Malay nations are seen as potential havens for anti-u.s. terrorists and are important stops on the anti-terrorism trail. During the Cold War, Pakistan was first seen as a major ally against the expanding Soviet Union, and has since been seen as a potential nuclear proliferator; conflict in the region could have global ramifications. Until 11 Sep- Spring 2002 Volume IX, Issue 1 355

2 M.A. Muqtedar Khan tember, Pakistan s importance to the United States was declining rapidly, but since then, it has become the most important ally in the U.S. war against al- Qaeda in Afghanistan. In the past, Washington has often perceived the Middle East, especially Iran, as the focal point of the Muslim world. Everyone was aware that not all Arabs are Muslims and that not all Muslims live in the Middle East, but this awareness did not permeate policy making. Since Washington has noted the presence of al-qaeda in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and other parts of the Muslim world, policy makers realized the security implication of the global nature of Muslim distribution. Things have indeed changed fundamentally. For the first time, U.S. foreign policy has a unified goal vis-à-vis the entire Muslim world. By defining the war on terror as a war against radical and militant expressions of Islam, Washington has taken a wide-angle view of the Muslim world from Indonesia and the Philippines in the east, to Canada and Dearborn, Michigan in the west. U.S. objectives are narrow and limited, concerned primarily with reducing if not eliminating the capacity of anti-western Islamists to hurt the United States and Israel. This simplistic goal is driving a foreign policy makeover that has much wider strategic and political implications for U.S. relations with Muslim nations. The new consensus in Washington is also redefining U.S.-Israeli relations. When Osama Bin Laden explained that one of his reasons for hating the United States was its support for Israel, he brought all anti-israel forces such as Hamas and Hezbollah within the ambit of U.S. response, uniting the United States and Israel in the war against Islamic militancy. The United States was formerly a passive guarantor of Israeli security, limiting its support to diplomatic and material aid. Now its commitment to Israeli security has become more active. The United States will itself seek to destroy the enemies of Israel such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The inclusion of Iran in the much-criticized idea of the axis of evil is primarily in the interest of Israeli security. The U.S.-Israel special relationship was historically regional in scope and limited to the Middle East, but has developed into one with a global scope. The tragedy of 11 September presents both opportunities and dangers to the United States. A finely calibrated and thoughtful foreign policy towards the Muslim world can have a globally transformative impact. It can not only make the United States more secure but also prompt the Muslim world to become more democratic, peaceful and an important member of the international community. A rash and insensitive foreign policy will only enhance insecurity and lead to a prolonged and bloody conflict that will undermine the global economy and subvert global stability. 356 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

3 Globalization of Anti-Americanism Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World American officials have found the al-qaeda network s presence in over sixty countries worldwide. It is indeed a multinational operation adapting and operating in culturally, politically, and economically diverse environments. Al-Qaeda s success lies in its ability to find local sympathizers. This ability to find supporters in such diverse environments is indicative of how a radical Muslim understanding of the United States as an enemy of Islam is globalizing. Radical Islamic grievances against the United States include: The United States uncritical support of Israeli occupation and colonization of Palestine; The human tragedy caused by the sanctions against Iraq; U.S. military, moral, and even financial support to undemocratic Arab regimes; U.S. opposition to Islamization in Muslim societies; Cultural Americanization of the Muslim world through globalization. These issues are finding global resonance among Muslims regardless of their ethnic origins or social class. It is this resonance among ordinary Muslims everywhere that has prompted some radical elements to align with the anti- Americanism engendered and fostered by al-qaeda and its associates. Americans have realized that there is a unifying streak of anti- Americanism pervading Muslim societies all over the world, 1 and that fighting it will entail a global enterprise. This is a fundamentally important conceptual outcome of the investigation of the global network of radical Islamic militancy that was responsible for the unprecedented attacks of 11 September This intellectual breakthrough presents Washington with a profound opportunity to completely rethink its foreign policy, not towards East Asia, South Asia, or the Middle East, but towards the entire Muslim world. What the United States does and does not do in the Middle East will affect how Muslims in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Europe, Australia, Africa, and America think of the United States. Muslims now enjoy a global presence. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. Nearly every fourth person in the world is a Muslim. Islam is the fastest growing religion in North America, Europe, Australia, Asia, and Africa, and in all these places it is either the largest or the second largest faith. This globalization of Islam along with the emergence of global media is constructing a global Muslim consciousness that is uniting Muslims. All over the world they see the images of Palestinians and Iraqis suffering on television, and everyday their anger towards the United States grows. Spring 2002 Volume IX, Issue 1 357

4 M.A. Muqtedar Khan Governments in much of the Muslim world are ineffective and authoritarian. They have failed to safeguard economic as well as political rights of their citizens. Over 60 percent of the Muslims in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and parts of Africa and Indonesia live in abject poverty. The corrupt and authoritarian regimes in these Muslim societies successfully channel Muslim discontent towards the West, and at the United States and Israel in particular. This is one of their major survival strategies, and many of these regimes have become masters at diverting frustration outwards. Islamists understand this situation. Some of them have tried to channel Muslim resentment inwards to precipitate fundamental socio-political changes in the Muslim nations. Syed Qutb, a firebrand ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, redefined the Islamic A finely calibrated and thoughtful foreign policy towards the Muslim world can have a globally transformative impact. theological concept of jahiliyyah (ignorance of God and faith) as non-islamic governance and declared a holy war against the corrupt and inept regime in Egypt. His book, Milestones, became very popular and is still the manifesto of many Islamic movements in the Arab world and elsewhere, but it has failed to galvanize the masses in sufficient numbers to overthrow the Egyptian state. Some Islamists believe that if Egypt did not receive nearly two billion dollars in foreign aid from the United States every year, the authoritarian state mechanism would collapse, allowing a popular revolution. For them the United States is the barrier to freedom. Regardless, Islamists have failed to achieve the change they desire and discontent in the Muslim world festers. 2 Many Muslims are not convinced that the United States is waging a war on terror and not against Islam. Sloppy discursive errors, such as the use of the word crusade by President Bush, and the U.S. insistence on expanding the military war to include Iraq and Iran regardless of their involvement in the 11 September attacks, cement these perceptions and undermine the United States diplomatic and communicative initiatives. The New Paradigm in Washington During the Clinton administration, a conscious decision was made not to have a policy towards Islam or political Islam. The state department recognized the diversity within Muslim nations and also within Islamic movements and concluded that any attempts to have a common policy towards the entire Islamic world would be counterproductive. 3 While Islamic states like Iran and Sudan were opposed to U.S. interests, countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan shared 358 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

5 Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World a wide range of objectives with the United States. Some Islamic movements such as the Hizbul Tahreer from Jordan and Palestine, were opposed to democracy, while others such as An-Nahda of Tunisia strongly favor it. The administration did not find a common thread that linked all the Islamic movements and Muslim nations and wisely decided to abstain from an umbrella policy towards them. But things are different now. Anti-Americanism fostered and nurtured by the strange alliance between the inequities of U.S. foreign policy and the rhetoric of radical Islam are uniting the Muslim world. The objective to fight anti-american sentiments and prevent them from translating into political violence now provides the justification for a unified U.S. foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Yet this policy gives rise to a strong feeling among many Muslims that the United States is against them. The present goals identified by the Bush administration are narrowly focused and may prove to be more detrimental than beneficial to U.S interests and security. In the aftermath of 11 September, the Bush administration has adopted, or is at least advocating, a policy of preemptive counterterrorism. President Bush has identified the following objectives as the main foci of his foreign policy: Eliminating the terror network and all its affiliates wherever they are. This involves extensive intelligence gathering and covert and overt military, as well as police operations for eliminating and apprehending terrorist assets. Undermining the capacity of the axis of evil Iran, Iraq, and North Korea to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. The most important goal under this objective is a change of regime in Iraq. Preventing the growth and influence of radical Islamists, particularly from the oil rich nations in the Gulf and Muslim diasporas in the West. While the administration has made these goals its priority and stated unequivocally that they will be pursued with or without international support, it has not made clear whether its interests in the Middle East remain unchanged. This is an important issue since much of the resentment against the United States in the Muslim world stems from U.S. policies in the Middle East. In this region, the traditional U.S. interests have included stability, support of Israel and the Middle East peace process, support of moderate (pro-western) regimes, unfettered access to oil at a reasonable price, and containment of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. Spring 2002 Volume IX, Issue 1 359

6 M.A. Muqtedar Khan While the new policy focuses on Iran and Iraq, it is also clear that Syria, Sudan, and Libya are not policy priorities. However, the administration is silent on two other crucial issues: U.S. support for Israel and U.S. support for the socalled moderate regimes. The United States has also remained conspicuously silent on its future relations with Saudi Arabia, which is increasingly implicated in the 11 September attacks. In the early stages of the war against Afghanistan, President Bush announced his desire to see a Palestinian state, but he has since said and done nothing to realize this goal. In the Muslim world, his continued silence and refusal to restrain Israel is seen as tacit support for Ariel Sharon s efforts to break the Palestinian resolve and destroy Chairman Arafat s capacity to govern the occupied territories. In the early days of the war against Afghanistan, the Bush administration also took great pains to win the Muslim world s support for its war on terror. The declaration supporting the Palestinian state, and constant statements explaining that the war was not aimed at ordinary Muslims, helped build a coalition that included many Muslim nations, including partial support and cooperation from Iran. But the victory in Afghanistan has changed the mood in Washington. The arrogance and swagger is back, and irresponsible and rash statements such as the declaration of intent against the axis of evil are becoming more and more common. This new belligerence from Washington has already alienated moderate pro-western states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia who are opposed to attacks against Iraq. Even Russia and Europe are opposed to these new policies of the Bush administration. Conclusion 11 September was a watershed event in U.S. relations with the Muslim world. Washington must realize that it cannot continue to do business as usual. Some analysts are suggesting that the United States has only two options, either to exit the Middle East or get tougher. 4 No one expects the United States to withdraw from the Middle East; it has too many interests in the region and any withdrawal would undermine its global prestige and invite others to use terrorism as a means to advance their interests. This leaves only one option get tougher. This path would be a serious mistake. Rather than addressing the conditions that engender anti-americanism and terrorism, simplistic military solutions will only aggravate the situation. Washington must adopt a multidimensional strategy that will foster a peaceful and cooperative relationship that recognizes and promotes mutual respect and cultural understanding. I would like to recommend the following principles as a framework for a new relationship. 360 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

7 Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World In the short term, Washington should reserve the right to use force against specific terrorist groups in any Muslim country that attacks or intends to attack the United States, its citizens, or its interests. Muslim nations must take actions against such groups to eliminate their capabilities, or they must allow the United States to take actions against such groups inside their territory. In exchange for this cooperation, the United States will agree to share intelligence and provide sufficient evidence of imminent threats to Muslim countries. Needless to say, this principle will not accommodate silly rhetoric such as the axis of evil or attempts to implicate groups or states the United States does not like. The key to this principle is credible intelligence. In the long term, promotion of democracy, political self-determination, and human rights should be the overarching goal for U.S. cooperation with the Muslim world. Washington should not support authoritarian regimes that undermine democracy and systematically violate the human rights of their own citizens. In addition, Washington should promote a program for cross-cultural understanding. Western allies should not only be asked to participate in this global program, but also to share the financial burden of the project. American and European Muslims can become a very important bridge between the two worlds and their involvement should be actively sought. The goal here is to arrest the growing anti-americanism in the Muslim world and reduce the prejudice and hostility towards Islam in the United States. Along with oil rich Arab states, Japan, and the European Union, the United States should put together a social aid package that will promote education, respect for women s rights, understanding of the principles of democracy, and help build institutions that will integrate local and global knowledge. This comprehensive package will enable underdeveloped Muslim societies to embark upon sustainable development programs. The United States should work to resolve regional disputes such as Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya that encourage militancy, war, and terrorism. While the United States cannot impose peace, it must foster conditions that make peace possible. Even as I make these proposals, I recognize that they may sound like a naïve wish list of a die-hard Muslim liberal. So be it. Unless we work towards building a relationship that is premised on mutual respect, and understanding and accommodating interests, we will be condemned to wage war. Above all, the events of 11 September have shown that the United States can be hurt in an era when it is the sole, dominant, and undisputed superpower. We live in an increasingly interdependent world, and in this world our insecurities are also interdependent. Unless others feel safe, we will not be safe. If we wish to Spring 2002 Volume IX, Issue 1 361

8 M.A. Muqtedar Khan safeguard our security, we must work with others to make them safer. In their security is our security. This is the only solution to the security dilemma. The basic idea here is to advocate a policy that can be summarized as nice but tough. In an interesting computer game theoretical experiment, Robert Axelrod (in Evolution of Cooperation), demonstrated that in the long run, international actors whose first move was nice and subsequent ones tough (employing a tit-for-tat strategy), were the most likely to escape the security dilemma. 5 The policy of nice but tough that I am recommending, not only makes rational sense, but will also stand up to systematic scientific inquiry. I also recognize that changes in Washington alone will not be enough to transform the fundamental character of the relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. But the framework I recommend will certainly reduce anti-americanism and will also enhance U.S. security and its image in W the eyes of Muslims everywhere. A Notes 1. Fareed Zakaria, Politics of Rage: Why do they Hate Us?, Newsweek, 15 October 2001; M. A. Muqtedar Khan, Understanding the Roots of Muslim Resentment, Canadian Dimensions, 35, 6, November/December 2001: 25-26; Peter Ford, Why do they hate us?, Christian Science Monitor, 27 September See Khalid Bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). Also see M. A. Muqtedar Khan, The Political Philosophy of Islamic Resurgence, Cultural Dynamics, 13, 2, July 2001: See M. A. Muqtedar Khan, U.S. Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas and Ideology, Security Dialogue, 29, 4, December 1998: Also see John Esposito, Political Islam and American Foreign Policy, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 1, 1 (Winter ): Bernard Lewis, Did You Say American Imperialism? National Review, 53, 24, (17 December 2001): Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 362 The Brown Journal of World Affairs