Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management. Consultative document

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management. Consultative document"

Transcription

1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative document Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management Issued for comment by 14 September 2012 July 2012

2 This publication is available on the BIS website ( Bank for International Settlements All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is cited. ISBN (print) ISBN (online)

3 Contents I Introduction... 1 A Background... 1 B Consultative document... 2 C Definition and constituent elements of intraday liquidity... 3 II The intraday liquidity monitoring indicators... 4 A The set of monitoring indicators... 5 (i) Daily maximum liquidity requirement... 5 (ii) Available intraday liquidity... 6 (iii) Total payments... 7 (iv) Time-specific and other critical obligations... 7 (v) Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institution customers (vi) Intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers... 7 (vii) Timing of intraday payments... 8 (viii) Intraday throughput... 8 B Intraday liquidity stress scenarios... 8 C Key application issues D Reporting frequency and granularity III Request for comments Annex 1: Practical example of the monitoring indicators Annex 2: Sample intraday liquidity monitoring return Annex 3: Combining the indicators The Basel Committee welcomes comments on this consultative document. Comments should be submitted by Friday 14 September 2012 by to: baselcommittee@bis.org. Alternatively, comments may be sent by post to the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. All comments may be published on the website of the Bank for International Settlements unless a comment contributor specifically requests confidential treatment. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management i

4

5 I. Introduction A. Background 1. The management of intraday liquidity risk forms a key element of a bank s overall liquidity risk management framework. In September 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 1 published its Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (Sound Principles), which set guidelines for banks on their management of liquidity risk and collateral. Principle 8 of the Sound Principles focuses specifically on intraday liquidity risk and states that: A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions and thus contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems. 2. Principle 8 identifies six operational elements that should be included in a bank s strategy for managing intraday liquidity risk and indicate that a bank should: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) have the capacity to measure expected daily gross liquidity inflows and outflows, anticipate the intraday timing of these flows where possible, and forecast the range of potential net funding shortfalls that might arise at different points during the day; have the capacity to monitor intraday liquidity positions against expected activities and available resources (balances, remaining intraday credit capacity, available collateral); arrange to acquire sufficient intraday funding to meet its intraday objectives; have the ability to manage and mobilise collateral as necessary to obtain intraday funds; have a robust capability to manage the timing of its liquidity outflows in line with its intraday objectives; and be prepared to deal with unexpected disruptions to its intraday liquidity flows. 3. In December 2010, the BCBS published Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring (Basel III liquidity rules), which set out the Basel Committee s reforms to strengthen liquidity regulations. The framework is centred upon two new minimum liquidity standards: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio. Although the LCR is designed to promote the short term resilience of a bank s liquidity profile, it does not currently include intraday liquidity within its calibration. The Basel III liquidity rules state: 2 Banks and regulators should be aware that the LCR stress does not cover expected or unexpected intraday liquidity needs that occur during the day and disappear by the end of 1 2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in It now consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, where its permanent Secretariat is located. See paragraph 31 of BCBS Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring, December Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 1

6 the day... The Committee is currently reviewing if and how intraday liquidity risk should be addressed. The liquidity rules also state that: One area in particular where more work on monitoring tools will be conducted relates to intraday liquidity risk To complement the guidance in the Sound Principles and to take forward its further work on monitoring tools for intraday liquidity, the BCBS, in consultation with the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS 4 ), has developed a proposed set of indicators to monitor banks intraday liquidity risk. The aim of the proposed indicators is to enable banking supervisors to monitor a bank s intraday liquidity risk management and its ability to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis, both in normal times and in stressed scenarios. Over time, the indicators will also enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of payment and settlement behaviour and the management of intraday liquidity risk by banks. 5. Given the close relationship between the management of banks intraday liquidity risk and the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems, 5 the indicators are also likely to be of benefit to overseers of payment and settlement systems. Close cooperation between banking supervisors and the overseers is envisaged. 6. It should be noted that the proposed indicators are for monitoring purposes only and do not represent the introduction of new standards around intraday liquidity management. B. Consultative document 7. This consultative document seeks comments on the design of the proposed indicators and on the supporting regulatory reporting regime. Although the indicators will apply specifically to internationally active banks, they have been designed equally to apply to all banks, including those that access payment and settlement systems indirectly via the services of a correspondent bank This document sets out: The definition of intraday liquidity and the elements that constitute a bank s intraday liquidity sources and needs; See paragraph 138 of BCBS Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring, December The CPSS serves as a forum for central banks to monitor and analyse developments in payment and settlement arrangements as well as in cross-border and multicurrency settlement schemes. It consists of senior officials responsible for payment and settlement systems in central banks. The CPSS Secretariat is hosted by the BIS. When reference is made in this paper to payment and settlement systems, this term is understood to encompass payment systems and clearing and settlement systems for securities and derivatives (including central counterparties). Banks can access payment and settlement systems directly or indirectly. Direct participation means a participant in a transfer system that can settle transactions without using an intermediary. Indirect participation means a participant with a tiering arrangement that uses the services of a direct participant (a correspondent bank) to perform particular settlements on its behalf. Banks can be a direct participant in one system as well as an indirect participant in another. 2 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

7 The detailed design of the proposed monitoring indicators of a bank s intraday liquidity risk in normal times; Proposed stress scenarios; Key application issues; and The proposed reporting regime. 9. Comments are welcomed on the proposed monitoring framework generally, but specifically on the following questions: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Do the proposed indicators adequately capture the intraday liquidity risk run by banks? Are the stress scenarios identified in the paper comprehensive? Is the proposed scope of application of the indicators clear? What, if any, implementation challenges would the proposed reporting requirements present to banks? Are the different monitoring and reporting requirements for direct and indirect payment and settlement system participants clear? 10. Further guidance on the detailed implementation of the indicators will be issued by the BCBS when the proposals are finalised. C. Definition and constituent elements of intraday liquidity 11. Intraday liquidity is defined by the CPSS as Funds which can be accessed during the business day, usually to enable financial institutions to make payments in real time. 7 For the purpose of this document, business day is defined as the opening hours of the payment and settlement system (or group of systems) during which it is possible for a bank to receive and make payments. 12. The following are the constituent elements of a bank s intraday liquidity sources and needs. 8 Intraday Liquidity Sources Own sources Reserve balances at the central bank; Eligible collateral pledged with the central bank; Unencumbered liquid assets on a bank s balance sheet that can be freely transferred to the central bank and converted into central bank money; Secured or unsecured, committed or uncommitted credit lines available intraday; 7 8 CPSS: A glossary of terms used in payments and settlements systems, March Not all of the elements will be relevant to all banks as intraday liquidity profiles will differ between banks depending on, for instance, whether they access payment and settlement systems directly or indirectly or whether or not they provide correspondent banking services and intraday credit facilities to other banks etc. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 3

8 Balances with other banks that can be used for settlement on the same day. Other sources Payments received from other payment system participants, 9 including operations carried out in intraday, 10 and/or overnight money markets; Payments received from ancillary systems. 11 Intraday Liquidity Needs These arise from: Payments that need to be made, directly or indirectly, to other system participants, including operations carried out in intraday, and/or overnight money markets; Payments to be made to ancillary systems; 12 Contingent payments (eg as an emergency liquidity provider) relating to a payment system s failure to settle procedures; Contingent intraday liquidity liabilities to customers. Payments arising from providing correspondent banking services In practice, some customer banks payments are made to other customers of the same correspondent bank. These payments do not give rise to intraday liquidity needs for the correspondent bank as they are made across its own books and do not enter the payment system. However, these internalised payments do have intraday liquidity implications for both the sending and receiving customer banks. II. The intraday liquidity monitoring indicators 13. A number of factors influence a bank s usage of intraday liquidity in payment and settlement systems and the vulnerability to intraday liquidity shocks. As such, no single indicator can provide supervisors with sufficient information on intraday liquidity risks or on how well risks are managed. For this reason a set of indicators is proposed. These aim to monitor: Although payments received represent an intraday source of liquidity for a bank, they are netted out against payments made, for the purpose of monitoring intraday liquidity. Timing differences between payments received and payments made will result in a bank being a net receiver or payer vis-à-vis the system during the day. Intraday money markets exist in a limited number of jurisdictions. For example, intraday transfers from other payment systems such as retail systems, CLS, securities settlement systems and central counterparties (including intraday margin reimbursements). Some securities settlement systems offer self-collateralisation facilities in co-operation with the central bank. Through these, participants can automatically post incoming securities from the settlement process as collateral at the central bank to obtain liquidity to fund their securities settlement systems obligations. In these cases, intraday liquidity needs are only those related to the haircut applied by the central bank. 4 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

9 A bank s usage of, and requirement for, intraday liquidity both in normal times and in times of stress; The intraday liquidity available to each bank on a daily basis, both in normal times and times of stress; and Changes in banks behaviour over time within the payment and settlement systems. A. The set of monitoring indicators 14. The detailed description of each indicator is set out below and stylised examples of the indicators are given in Annex 1. The reporting requirements of each indicator are set out in Section D. Indicator of: Table 1 The proposed set of indicators (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) Daily maximum liquidity requirement Available intraday liquidity Total payments Time-specific and other critical obligations Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institution customers Intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers Timing of intraday payments Intraday throughput (i) Daily maximum liquidity requirement 15. This indicator will show a bank s daily maximum requirement for intraday liquidity in normal times by establishing its net cumulative intraday liquidity position over a period of time. The net cumulative intraday liquidity position of a bank is the difference between the value of its payments received and the value of its payments made at any point in the day. The bank s largest negative net cumulative position during the day will determine its maximum intraday liquidity requirement on that day. 16. The indicator is shown in figure 1. A positive net cumulative position signifies that the bank has received more payments than it has made at a point in time during the day. Conversely, a negative net cumulative position signifies that the bank has made more payments than it has received. 13 For direct participants, the net position represents the change in its opening balance with the central bank. For indirect participants, the net position represents the change in the opening balance on its account(s) with its correspondent bank(s). 13 For the calculation of the net cumulative position, payments received do not include funds obtained through central bank intraday liquidity facilities. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 5

10 Figure 1 Daily maximum liquidity requirement Net Position Largest net cumulative inflow (8.6) Largest net cumulative outflow (10) Time 17. For the purpose of this indicator, intraday liquidity positions should be calculated on actual settlement times, rather than on submission times of payments to the system or to a correspondent bank, as appropriate. 18. Assuming that a bank runs a negative net cumulative position at some point intraday, it will need access to intraday liquidity to fund this balance. The minimum amount of intraday liquidity that a bank would need to have available on any given day would be equivalent to its largest negative net cumulative position. (In the illustration above, the intraday liquidity requirement would be 10 units.) 19. Conversely, when a bank runs a positive net cumulative position at some point intraday, it has surplus liquidity available to meet its intraday liquidity obligations. This position may arise because the bank is relying on payments received from other system participants to fund its outgoing payments. The larger the positive net cumulative position, the greater a bank s usage of incoming payments to fund its own payment obligations. (In the illustration above, the largest positive net cumulative position would be 8.6 units.) 20. For an indirect participant, payments are made across the bank s account(s) held with its correspondent bank(s). The timing of receipts to, and payments made from, the account(s) will determine the bank s intraday liquidity usage/requirement. (ii) Available intraday liquidity 21. This indicator will show the amount of intraday liquidity available to a bank on a daily basis in normal times. Banks will be required to report the amount of intraday liquidity available to them at the start of each business day and the lowest amount of available intraday liquidity by value on a daily basis throughout the reporting period. This will require banks to monitor changes to their available intraday liquidity. The indicator will enable supervisors to assess whether a bank has sufficient intraday liquidity available on a daily 6 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

11 basis to meet its normal intraday liquidity requirement. The Own Sources of liquidity set out in Section I C above are available for inclusion in the calculation of this indicator. 22. Where banks manage collateral on a cross-currency and/or cross-system basis, liquidity sources not denominated in the currency of the intraday liquidity requirement and/or which are located in a different jurisdiction, may be included in the calculation of the indicator if the bank can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its supervisor that the collateral can be transferred intraday freely to the system where it is needed. (iii) Total payments 23. This indicator will require banks to report the total value of their gross daily payments made and received in payment and settlement systems. This will enable supervisors to establish the overall scale of their payment and settlement activity. (iv) Time-specific and other critical obligations 24. The Sound Principles state that a bank should adopt intraday liquidity management objectives that allow it to identify and prioritise time-specific and other critical obligations in order to meet them when expected. These are obligations which must be settled at a specific time within the day or have an expected intraday settlement deadline. 14 Failure to settle such obligations on time could result in financial penalty, reputational damage or loss of future business. 25. This indicator has two components. Banks will be required to report the volume and value of their time-specific and other critical obligations and the total number and value of time critical obligations that were missed during the reporting period. This will enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of banks time-specific obligations and to monitor that those obligations are being managed appropriately. The following two indicators apply to banks which provide correspondent banking services or extend intraday credit as part of providing payment services to other customers. (v) Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institution customers 26. This indicator will require correspondent banks to report the gross value of their daily payments made on behalf of all of their financial institution customers. This will enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of the drivers of a correspondent bank s payment flows. The bank will also be required to report the value of payments settled on behalf of each of its five largest financial institution customers (by value), including internalised payments that are settled across its books. This will enable supervisors to assess the degree of payment concentration in the bank s provision of correspondent banking services (vi) Intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers 27. This indicator will require correspondent banks to report the total sum of intraday credit lines extended by them to all of their financial institution customers. The correspondent bank will also be required to report the value of the credit lines extended to each of its largest 14 Examples might include the settlement of obligations in ancillary systems, CLS pay-ins or the return of overnight loans. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 7

12 five financial institution customers (by value), distinguishing between secured and unsecured credit and committed and uncommitted lines. For those same five customers, the bank will also be required to report the maximum daily usage of credit lines granted, again distinguishing between secured and unsecured and committed and uncommitted lines. 15 This indicator will enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of a bank s correspondent banking business and the extent of any concentration in its provision of intraday credit. (vii) Timing of intraday payments 28. This indicator, which applies only to direct participants, will show the average time of a bank s daily payment settlements over a reporting period. It will enable supervisors to identify changes to the timing of a bank s intraday outgoing payments over time. The indicator can be described as the value-weighted average time of settlement and is represented formulaically as follows: Σ (Value * Time of settlement) Σ Value 29. Banks can use the underlying data of timing inflows and outflows to construct stress scenarios that reflect changes in payment timings. (viii) Intraday throughput 30. This indicator will show the proportion, by value, of a bank s outgoing payments that settle by specific times during the day (eg the percentage of a day s payments that settles by 9 am, 10 am etc.). 16 This will enable supervisors to identify changes over time to a bank s intraday throughput. It would also enable supervisors to identify specific times during the day when a bank might be particularly vulnerable to liquidity or operational difficulties. B. Intraday liquidity stress scenarios 31. The indicators in Section II aim to determine a bank s requirement for, and usage of, intraday liquidity in normal times. However, intraday liquidity requirements and usage can increase markedly in times of stress. It is proposed, therefore, that banks should apply one or more broadly defined stresses to the above indicators to determine the likely impact on their normal intraday liquidity requirements. The information from this exercise will enable supervisors to assess a bank s vulnerability to a stress event and inform a discussion between the supervisor and the bank on the adequacy of its liquidity risk management framework, including its contingency funding planning arrangements. 32. Four stress scenarios have been identified and are described below, 17 not all of which will be appropriate to all banks. Banks should therefore agree with their supervisor which of the scenarios are relevant to their particular circumstances and business model The disclosure of these credit lines does not change their legal nature. It should be noted that some jurisdictions already have throughput rules or guidelines in place. Firms should not limit themselves to the stress test scenarios described in the document and are encouraged to consider reverse stress scenarios and other stress testing scenarios as appropriate (for example, the impact of natural disasters, currency crisis, etc). In addition, firms should use these stress testing scenarios to 8 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

13 (i) Own financial stress: A bank suffers, or is perceived to be suffering from, a stress event 33. For a direct participant, own financial stress may result in counterparties deferring payments and/or withdrawing intraday credit lines. This, in turn, may result in the bank having to fund more of its payments from its own liquidity sources to avoid being forced to defer its own payments. 34. For an indirect participant, an own financial stress may result in intraday credit lines being withdrawn by its correspondent bank(s), and/or its own counterparties deferring payments. This may require the indirect participant having either to prefund its payments and/or to collateralise its intraday credit line(s). (ii) Counterparty stress: A major financial institution counterparty suffers an intraday stress event which prevents it from making payments 35. A counterparty stress may result in both direct and indirect participants being unable to rely on incoming payments from the stressed counterparty, reducing the availability of intraday liquidity that can be sourced from the receipt of its payments. (iii) Customer stress: The customer bank of a correspondent bank suffers a stress event 36. A customer bank stress may result in other banks deferring payments to the customer, creating a further loss of intraday liquidity at the correspondent bank. (iv) Market-wide credit or liquidity stress 37. A market-wide credit or liquidity stress may have adverse implications for the value of liquid assets that a bank holds to meet its intraday liquidity needs. A widespread fall in the market value and/or credit rating of a bank s unencumbered liquid assets may constrain its ability to raise intraday liquidity from the central bank. In a worst case scenario, a material credit downgrade of these assets may result in the assets no longer meeting the eligibility criteria for the central bank s intraday liquidity facilities. 38. For an indirect participant, a widespread fall in the market value and/or credit rating of its unencumbered liquid assets may constrain the bank s ability to raise intraday liquidity from its correspondent bank(s). 39. Banks which manage intraday liquidity on a cross-currency basis should consider the intraday liquidity implications of closure of, or operational difficulties in, currency swap markets and stresses occurring in multiple systems simultaneously. Application of the stress scenarios 40. In conjunction with their supervisor, banks should consider the impact of the above stress scenarios on their normal intraday liquidity monitoring indicators set out in Section II. inform their intraday liquidity risk appetite and contingency funding plans (CFPs). CFPs should have intraday liquidity metrics included in the set of early warning indicators (EWIs). Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 9

14 41. The information available from the stress scenarios will inform a discussion between the bank and its supervisor to agree realistic stressed indicators. The discussion should consider the impact of the stresses in isolation and in combination and take into account the effectiveness of wider systems and controls and contingency plans that a bank may have in place to manage intraday liquidity. 42. For the own financial stress, counterparty stress and customer stress scenarios, direct participants will be required to report on the likely impact that these stress scenarios would have on the following indicators: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Daily maximum liquidity requirement; Available intraday liquidity; Total payments; Time specific and other critical obligations; Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institutions; and Intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers. 43. For the own financial stress and counterparty stress scenarios, indirect participants will be required to report on the likely impact that these stress scenarios would have on the following indicators: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Daily maximum liquidity requirement; Available intraday liquidity; Total payments; and Time-specific and other critical obligations. 44. For the market-wide stress, both direct and indirect participants would be expected to consider the impact of the stress on their sources of available intraday liquidity. 45. While each of the monitoring indicators has value in itself, combining the information provided by the individual normal and stress indicators will give supervisors a comprehensive view of a bank s resilience to intraday liquidity shocks. Examples on how the indicators could be used in different combinations by banking supervisors to assess a bank s resilience to intraday liquidity risk are presented in Annex 3. C. Key application issues 46. Banks generally manage their intraday liquidity risk on a system-by-system basis in a single currency, but it is recognised that practices differ across banks and jurisdictions, depending on the institutional set up of a bank and the specifics of the systems in which it operates. The following considerations aim to help banks and supervisors determine the most appropriate way to apply the indicators. (i) Scope of application: systems 47. Banks which are direct participants to payment and settlement systems manage intraday liquidity in very different ways. Some banks manage their payment and settlement 10 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

15 activity on a system-by-system basis. Others make use of direct intraday liquidity bridges 18 between payment and settlement systems that allow excess liquidity to be transferred from one system to another without restriction. Other formal arrangements exist, which allow funds to be transferred from one system to another (such as agreements for foreign currency cash to be used as collateral for domestic systems). 48. Given these variations in payment and settlement systems and the different approaches to intraday liquidity management, it is proposed that direct participants should apply a bottom-up approach to the application of the monitoring indicators. The following sets out the principles which such banks should follow: As a baseline, individual banks should apply the monitoring indicators to each payment and settlement system in which they participate on a system-by-systembasis; If there is a direct real-time technical liquidity bridge between two or more payment and settlement systems, the intraday liquidity in those systems may be considered fungible. The linked systems may therefore be aggregated as one for the purpose of the indicators; If a bank can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its local supervisor that it regularly monitors positions and uses other formal arrangements to transfer liquidity intraday between systems which do not have a direct technical liquidity bridge, those systems may also be aggregated for the purpose of monitoring indicators Other ancillary payment and settlement systems (eg retail payment systems, CLS, some securities settlement systems and central counterparties), place demands on a bank s intraday liquidity when these systems settle their obligations in another system (typically large value payment systems). The intraday liquidity requirements arising from the settlement obligations of these ancillary systems are to be treated as the equivalent of time critical obligations. Consequently, separate monitoring indicators will not be necessary for such ancillary systems. 50. Indirect participants to payment and settlement systems should apply the monitoring indicators to the payment and settlement activity over their account(s) with their correspondent bank(s). 51. Banks which operate as both direct and indirect participants to payment and settlement systems should discuss the appropriate application of the indicators with their local supervisor, taking into account the significance of payments made directly through the payment and settlement systems and those made indirectly through correspondent banks. (ii) Scope of application: currency 52. Most banks manage their intraday liquidity on a currency-by-currency basis. In these circumstances, the above indicators should be applied and reported on an individual currency basis A direct intraday liquidity bridge is a technical functionality built into two or more payment and settlement systems that allows banks to make transfers directly from one system to the other intraday. Analogously, for banks which access a payment system indirectly through more than one correspondent bank, the indicators may be aggregated, provided that the reporting bank can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its local supervisor that it is able to move liquidity between its correspondents. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 11

16 53. While not common practice, some banks manage their intraday liquidity on a multicurrency basis. If a bank can prove to the satisfaction of its local supervisor that it manages liquidity on a cross-currency basis and has the ability to transfer funds intraday with minimal delay including in periods of acute stress then the intraday liquidity positions across currencies may be aggregated for the purposes of the monitoring indicators. However, banks should also report the indicators at an individual currency level so that supervisors can monitor the extent to which firms are reliant on foreign exchange swap markets. 54. When the level of activity of a bank s payment and settlement activity in any one particular currency is de minimis with the agreement of the local supervisor, a reporting exemption could apply and separate returns need not be submitted. (iii) Scope of application: organisational structure 55. The appropriate organisational level for each bank s reporting of its intraday liquidity indicators should ultimately be determined by the home supervisor, but it is expected that the monitoring indicators will typically be applied at a significant individual legal entity level. The decision on the appropriate entity should consider any potential impediments to moving intraday liquidity between entities within a group (including timing differences), the ability of supervisory jurisdictions to ring-fence liquid assets, and any logistical constraints on the movement of collateral. 56. Where there are no impediments or constraints to transferring intraday liquidity between two (or more) legal entities intraday and banks can demonstrate this to the satisfaction of their supervisor, the intraday liquidity requirements of the entities may be aggregated for monitoring indicator purposes. (iv) Scope of application: responsibilities of the home and host supervisor 57. For cross-border banking groups, where a bank operates in a payment or settlement system either directly or indirectly outside the jurisdiction where it is domiciled, both home and host supervisors will have an interest in ensuring that the bank has sufficient intraday liquidity to meet its obligations in that system. 20 The allocation of responsibility between home and host supervisor will ultimately depend upon whether the bank operating in the nondomestic jurisdiction does so via a branch or a subsidiary. For a branch operation The home (consolidated) supervisor should have responsibility for ensuring that its banking groups can meet their payment and settlement responsibilities in all countries and all currencies in which they operate. The home supervisor should therefore receive a full set of intraday liquidity indicators for its banking groups covering both domestic payment and settlement obligations and obligations in nondomestic payment and settlement systems. The host supervisor should have the option to require foreign branches in their jurisdiction to report intraday indicators to them as appropriate. 20 Paragraph 143 of the Sound Principles 17 states the host supervisor needs to understand how the liquidity profile of the group contributes to risks to the entity in its jurisdiction, while the home supervisor requires information on material risks a foreign branch or subsidiary poses to the banking group as a whole. 12 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

17 For a subsidiary active in a non-domestic payment or settlement system The host supervisor should have primary responsible for receiving the relevant set of intraday indicators for that subsidiary. The supervisor of the parent bank (the home consolidated supervisor) will have an interest in ensuring that a non-domestic subsidiary has sufficient intraday liquidity to participate in all payment and settlement systems. The home supervisor should therefore have the option to require non-domestic subsidiaries to report intraday indicators to them as appropriate. D. Reporting frequency and granularity 58. Banks are expected to report the monitoring indicators to their supervisor on a monthly basis in line with proposed LCR reporting requirements. A template reporting form can be found in Annex 2. As noted above, the indicators have been designed to apply to all banks, but it will be left to local supervisors to determine the scope of firms required to report the indicators. 59. Direct participants are expected to report the monthly average and maximum and minimum value for all of the monitoring indicators set out in Section A. In addition, they are expected to report the 5 th percentile for the indicator of available intraday liquidity and the 95 th percentile 21 figure for the following indicators: Daily maximum liquidity requirement; Total payments; Time-specific and other critical obligations; Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institution customers; Value of intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers?; and Timing of intraday settlements 60. Indirect participants are expected to report the monthly average, maximum and minimum value for those indicators in Section II A above which are relevant to their business model. They are also expected to report the 5 th percentile for the indicator of available intraday liquidity and the 95 th percentile figure for the following indicators: Daily maximum liquidity requirement; Total payments; and Time-specific and other critical obligations. 21 The 5 th and 95 th percentiles for certain indicators are required because there will be occasions, even in normal times, when a bank s intraday activity may be exceptionally high (or low) due to unusual payment and settlement transactions. Such exceptional behaviour may distort the indicators for a bank s normal intraday liquidity behaviour and should be excluded by supervisors. Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 13

18 III. Request for comments 61. The Basel Committee welcomes comments on this consultative document. Comments should be submitted by Friday 14 September 2012 by to: Alternatively, comments may be sent by post to the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. All comments may be published on the website of the Bank for International Settlements unless a comment contributor specifically requests confidential treatment. 14 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

19 Annex 1 Practical example of the monitoring indicators The following example illustrates how the indicators would operate for a bank on a particular day. Bank A has to settle the following 6 payments: Payment A: 450 Payment B: 100 to settle obligations in an auxiliary net retail payment system Payment C: 200 which has to be settled by 10am Payment D: 300 on behalf of a customer bank using some of a 500 unit unsecured credit line that the bank extends to the customer bank Payment E: 250 Payment F: 100 The bank has 300 units of central bank reserves and 500 units of eligible collateral. On the given day, the bank s payment profile and liquidity usage is as follows: Time Sent Received Net 07: : : : : : : : : : : (i) (ii) Daily maximum liquidity requirement: outflow: 550 units inflow: 200 units Available intraday liquidity: start of day: 300 units of central bank reserves units of eligible collateral (routinely transferred to the central bank) = 800 units minimum intraday: 800 units 550 units = 250 units Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 15

20 (iii) (iv) Total payments: = 1,400 units Time-specific and other critical payments: value of auxiliary payment (100) = 300 units Number of time critical payments not settled on time: 0 (v) Value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institution customers: 300 units Value of intraday credit lines extended to financial institution customers: 500 units Usage of credit lines extended to financial institution customers: 300 units (vi) (vii) Timing of intraday payments (07:00*450+09:00*100+10:00*200+13:00*300+15:00*250+16:00*100)/1400 = 10:55 Intraday throughput Time Cumulative sent % sent 07: : : : : : : : : : : Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

21 Annex 2 Sample intraday liquidity monitoring return System (or group of systems) Daily maximum liquidity requirement 1a. Largest positive net cumulative position 1b. Largest negative net cumulative position Reporting period Expected value in stress Average Max Min 95th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress Reporting period Expected value in stress Available intraday liquidity Average Max Min 5th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress 2a. Central bank reserves at the start of the business day 3a. Lowest amount of available central bank reserves during the business day 2b. Unencumbered central bank eligible assets at the start of the business day 2c. of which routinely transferred to central bank 3b. Lowest amount of unencumbered central bank eligible assets during the business day 3c. of which routinely transferred to central bank 2d. Committed intraday credit lines at the start of the business day 2e. Of which secured 3d. Lowest amount of committed intraday credit lines during the business day 3e Of which secured 2f. Uncommitted intraday credit lines at the start of the business day 2g. Of which secured 3f. Lowest amount of uncommitted intraday credit lines during the business day 3g. Of which secured 2h. Lowest amount of available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day (2a+2b+2d+2f) 3h. Lowest amount of available intraday liquidity during the business day (3a+3b+3d+3f) Total payments 4. Gross value of payments sent 5. Gross value of payments received Reporting period Expected value in stress Average Max Min 95th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress Reporting period Expected value in stress Time-specific and other critical obligations Average Max Min 95th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress 6a. Total number of time-specific and other critical obligations settled 6b. Total value of time-specific and other critical obligations settled 6c. Total number of failed time-specific and other critical obligations over period 6d. Total value of failed time-specific and other critical obligations over period Correspondent banking indicators 7a. Gross value of payments made on behalf of all financial institution customers. 8a. Total value of intraday credit lines extended to all financial institutions customers Reporting period Expected value in stress Average Max Min 95th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress Correspondent banking indicators - for each of the largest five financial institution Reporting period Expected value in stress customers Average Max Min 95th Percentile Own stress Counterparty stress Customer stress Market stress 7b. Gross value of payments made on behalf of that customer 7c. of which internalised 8b. Total value of intraday credit lines extended to that customer 8c. of which secured 8d. of which committed 8e. Maximum daily usage of intraday credit lines extended to that customer 8f. of which secured 8g. of which committed Timing of intraday payments 9. Average time of settlement Reporting period Average Max Min 95th Percentile 10a. Throughput at 9am 10b. Throughput at 10am 10c. Throughput at 11am 10d. Throughput at 12pm 10e. Throughput at 1pm 10f. Throughput at 2pm 10g. Throughput at 3pm 10h. Throughput at 4pm 10i. Throughput at 5pm Intraday throughput Reporting period Average Max Min Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management 17

22 Annex 3 Combining the indicators The following is a non-exhaustive set of examples which illustrate how the indicators could be used in different combinations by banks and their supervisors to assess a bank s resilience to intraday liquidity risk: (1) Time-specific and other critical obligations relative to total payments and available intraday liquidity If a high proportion of a bank s payment activity is time critical, the bank has less flexibility to deal with unexpected shocks by managing its payment flows, especially when its amount of available intraday liquidity is typically low. In such circumstances the supervisor might expect the bank to have adequate risk management tools in place or to hold a higher proportion of unencumbered assets to mitigate this risk. (2) Available intraday liquidity relative to the impact of intraday stresses on the bank s daily maximum liquidity need If the impact of an intraday liquidity stress on a bank s daily maximum liquidity figure is large relative to its available intraday liquidity, it suggests that the bank may struggle to settle payments in a timely manner during a stress event. (3) Relationship between daily maximum liquidity need, available intraday liquidity and the number of time-specific and other critical obligations not settled on time If a bank is missing its time-specific and other critical obligations, this could prompt investigation by the supervisor. If it were demonstrated that the bank s maximum liquidity need was high and the lowest amount of available intraday liquidity were close to zero, it might suggest that the bank is managing its payment flows with an insufficient pool of liquid assets. (4) Total payments and value of customer payments made on behalf of financial institutions If a large proportion of a bank s total payment activity is made on behalf of financial institution customers, and depending on the type of the extended credit lines, the settlement bank could be more vulnerable to a stress experienced by a customer. The supervisor may wish to understand how this risk is being mitigated by the bank. (5) Timing of intraday payments and daily maximum liquidity need: If a bank starts to defer its payments and this coincides with a reduction in its liquidity usage (as measured by its largest net cumulative outflow), the supervisor may wish to establish whether the bank has taken a strategic decision to delay payments to reduce its usage of intraday liquidity. This behavioural change might also be of interest to the payment system overseer given the potential knock-on implications to other participants in the payments system. 18 Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management April 2013 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International Settlements

More information

Basel Intraday Liquidity Framework

Basel Intraday Liquidity Framework Basel Committee Publishes Final Document on Monitoring Tools for Intraday Liquidity Management SUMMARY The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee ), in consultation with the Committee

More information

Comments on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision s Consultative Document: Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management

Comments on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision s Consultative Document: Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management September 14, 2012 Comments on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision s Consultative Document: Monitoring indicators for intraday liquidity management Japanese Bankers Association We, the Japanese

More information

Liquidity Coverage Ratio

Liquidity Coverage Ratio Liquidity Coverage Ratio Aims to ensure banks maintain adequate levels of unencumbered high quality assets (numerator) against net cash outflows (denominator) over a 30 day significant stress period. High

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Liquidity coverage ratio disclosure standards January 2014 (rev. March 2014) This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Implementation of Basel standards A report to G20 Leaders on implementation of the Basel III regulatory reforms November 2015 This publication is available on the

More information

Press release Press enquiries: +41 61 280 8188 press@bis.org www.bis.org

Press release Press enquiries: +41 61 280 8188 press@bis.org www.bis.org Press release Press enquiries: +41 61 280 8188 press@bis.org www.bis.org Ref no: 35/2010 12 September 2010 Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards

More information

NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA

NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA Regulation No. 18/2009 on governance arrangements of the credit institutions, internal capital adequacy assessment process and the conditions for outsourcing their activities,

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards June 2015 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International Settlements 2015. All

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. A framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks Basel Committee on Banking Supervision A framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks October 2012 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision A Sound Capital Planning Process: Fundamental Elements Sound practices January 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

NOVEMBER 2010 (REVISED)

NOVEMBER 2010 (REVISED) CENTRAL BANK OF CYPRUS BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION DIVISION DIRECTIVE TO BANKS ON THE COMPUTATION OF PRUDENTIAL LIQUIDITY IN ALL CURRENCIES NOVEMBER 2010 (REVISED) DIRECTIVE TO BANKS ON THE COMPUTATION

More information

Risk & Capital Management under Basel III

Risk & Capital Management under Basel III www.pwc.com Risk & Capital Management under Basel III London, 15 Draft Agenda Basel III changes to capital rules - Definition of capital - Minimum capital ratios - Leverage ratio - Buffer requirements

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III framework for liquidity - Frequently asked questions

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III framework for liquidity - Frequently asked questions Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III framework for liquidity - Frequently asked questions July 2011 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Communications

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently Asked Questions on Basel III s January 2013 Liquidity Coverage Ratio framework

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently Asked Questions on Basel III s January 2013 Liquidity Coverage Ratio framework Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Frequently Asked Questions on Basel III s January 2013 Liquidity Coverage Ratio framework April 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org).

More information

Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International Settlements CH-4002 Basel Switzerland

Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International Settlements CH-4002 Basel Switzerland National Association of German Cooperative Banks Schellingstraße 4 10785 Berlin Germany Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International Settlements CH-4002 Basel Switzerland

More information

Banking Regulation. Pros and Cons

Banking Regulation. Pros and Cons Certificate in Social Banking Money and Society Banking Regulation Pros and Cons Professor Dr. Gregor Krämer Chair for Banking, Finance, and Accounting Alanus University of Arts and Social Sciences, Alfter,

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards. Issued for comment by 6 March 2015

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards. Issued for comment by 6 March 2015 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards Issued for comment by 6 March 2015 December 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Ninth progress report on adoption of the Basel regulatory framework

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Ninth progress report on adoption of the Basel regulatory framework Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Ninth progress report on adoption of the Basel regulatory framework October 2015 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

Liquidity Stress Testing

Liquidity Stress Testing Liquidity Stress Testing Scenario modelling in a globally operating bank APRA Liquidity Risk Management Conference Sydney, 3-4 May 2007 Andrew Martin Head of Funding & Liquidity Risk Management, Asia/Pacific

More information

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems January 2001 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Information,

More information

BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS

BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD: TREATMENT OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE FOR OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Basle April 1995 The treatment of potential exposure for off-balance-sheet items

More information

Key matters in examining Liquidity Risk Management at Large Complex Financial Groups

Key matters in examining Liquidity Risk Management at Large Complex Financial Groups Key matters in examining Liquidity Risk Management at Large Complex Financial Groups (1) Governance of liquidity risk management Senior management of a large complex financial group (hereinafter referred

More information

Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs. Proposed Enhancements to the Deposit Protection Scheme

Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs. Proposed Enhancements to the Deposit Protection Scheme CB(1)780/14-15(05) For discussion on 4 May 2015 Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs Proposed Enhancements to the Deposit Protection Scheme PURPOSE This paper briefs Members on the legislative

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Peer review of supervisory authorities implementation of stress testing principles

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Peer review of supervisory authorities implementation of stress testing principles Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Peer review of supervisory authorities implementation of stress testing principles April 2012 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements

More information

Consultation Paper on Liquidity Coverage Ratio Disclosure Requirements

Consultation Paper on Liquidity Coverage Ratio Disclosure Requirements CONSULTATION PAPER P018-2015 Consultation Paper on Disclosure Requirements October 2015 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS... ii 1 Preface... 1 2 Specific Areas for Comment... 3 2.1 Scope of Application...

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: the net stable funding ratio

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: the net stable funding ratio Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: the net stable funding ratio October 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International Settlements 2014. All

More information

Criteria and Risk-Management Standards for Prominent Payment Systems

Criteria and Risk-Management Standards for Prominent Payment Systems Criteria and Risk-Management Standards for Prominent Payment Systems Designation Criteria for Prominent Payment Systems The Bank of Canada has established five high-level criteria to help identify prominent

More information

DNB Liquidity Pillar 2 Supervision. Seminar Das neue SREP Konzept der Aufsicht Clemens Bonner (c.bonner@dnb.nl)

DNB Liquidity Pillar 2 Supervision. Seminar Das neue SREP Konzept der Aufsicht Clemens Bonner (c.bonner@dnb.nl) DNB Liquidity Pillar 2 Supervision Seminar Das neue SREP Konzept der Aufsicht Clemens Bonner (c.bonner@dnb.nl) Legal framework Act on Financial Supervision (Wft) Decree on Prudential Rules pursuant to

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Supervisory guidance for managing risks associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Supervisory guidance for managing risks associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative document Supervisory guidance for managing risks associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions Issued for comment by 12 October 2012

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision September 2008 Requests for copies of publications, or for additions/changes to the mailing list,

More information

Net Stable Funding Ratio

Net Stable Funding Ratio Net Stable Funding Ratio Aims to establish a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the liquidity characteristics of an institution s assets and activities over a one year horizon. The amount

More information

Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity and Leverage Ratios as per Basel III Framework. as at March 31, 2015 PUBLIC

Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity and Leverage Ratios as per Basel III Framework. as at March 31, 2015 PUBLIC Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity and Leverage Ratios as per Basel III Framework as at Table of Contents Capital Structure Page Statement of Financial Position - Step 1 (Table 2(b)) 3 Statement

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results from the 2008 Loss Data Collection Exercise for Operational Risk

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results from the 2008 Loss Data Collection Exercise for Operational Risk Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Results from the 2008 Loss Data Collection Exercise for Operational Risk July 2009 Requests for copies of publications, or for additions/changes to the mailing list,

More information

Liquidity Cash Flow Planning and Stress Testing Model. User s Guide. Version 2.1

Liquidity Cash Flow Planning and Stress Testing Model. User s Guide. Version 2.1 Liquidity Cash Flow Planning and Stress Testing Model User s Guide Version 2.1 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...1 MODEL STRUCTURE...2 BASE CASE ASSUMPTIONS...3 KEY LIQUIDITY VARIABLES...3 WORKSHEET MAINTENANCE...3

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. June 2008 DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. June 2008 DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision June 2008 DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION Requests for copies of publications, or for additions/changes to

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools January 2013 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for

More information

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems May 2005 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Press & Communications

More information

Consultation Paper. Draft regulatory technical standards

Consultation Paper. Draft regulatory technical standards EBA/CP/2013/39 22.10.2013 Consultation Paper Draft regulatory technical standards On derogations for currencies with constraints on the availability of liquid assets under Article 419(5) of Regulation

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. TLAC Holdings. Issued for comment by 12 February 2016

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. TLAC Holdings. Issued for comment by 12 February 2016 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document TLAC Holdings Issued for comment by 12 February 2016 November 2015 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on the Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on the Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Frequently asked questions on the Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer October 2015 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

Prof Kevin Davis Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies. Managing Liquidity Risks. Session 5.1. Training Program ~ 8 12 December 2008 SHANGHAI, CHINA

Prof Kevin Davis Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies. Managing Liquidity Risks. Session 5.1. Training Program ~ 8 12 December 2008 SHANGHAI, CHINA Enhancing Risk Management and Governance in the Region s Banking System to Implement Basel II and to Meet Contemporary Risks and Challenges Arising from the Global Banking System Training Program ~ 8 12

More information

Liquidity Coverage Ratio: A Quick Reference. February 2015

Liquidity Coverage Ratio: A Quick Reference. February 2015 Liquidity Coverage Ratio: A Quick Reference February 2015 2015 Morrison & Foerster LLP All Rights Reserved mofo.com The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (the LCR or the rule ) adopted by the Office of the Comptroller

More information

CHAPS Market Report 2015

CHAPS Market Report 2015 Market Report 205 Market Report 205 0 Introduction 2 Overview 4. Key Statistics 4.2 Value Breakdowns by Market and Country 4.3 Drivers of CHAPS Use 5.4 CHAPS Forecasts 6 2 CHAPS Markets 7 2. Wholesale

More information

Impact of Basel III Liquidity Requirements on the Payments Industry

Impact of Basel III Liquidity Requirements on the Payments Industry Cards & Payments the way we see it Impact of Basel III Liquidity Requirements on the Payments Industry Liquidity management strategy for banks providing payment services Table of Contents 1. Summary 3

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring Issued for comment by 16 April 2010 December 2009 Requests

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Frequently asked questions on the Basel III leverage ratio framework April 2016 (update of FAQs published in July 2015) This publication is available on the BIS website

More information

Interagency Guidance on Funds Transfer Pricing Related to Funding and Contingent Liquidity Risks. March 1, 2016

Interagency Guidance on Funds Transfer Pricing Related to Funding and Contingent Liquidity Risks. March 1, 2016 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Interagency Guidance on Funds Transfer Pricing Related to Funding and Contingent

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Fundamental review of the trading book interim impact analysis

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Fundamental review of the trading book interim impact analysis Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Fundamental review of the trading book interim impact analysis November 2015 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio. Issued for comment by 11 April 2014

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio. Issued for comment by 11 April 2014 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio Issued for comment by 11 April 2014 January 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org).

More information

Policy on the Management of Country Risk by Credit Institutions

Policy on the Management of Country Risk by Credit Institutions 2013 Policy on the Management of Country Risk by Credit Institutions 1 Policy on the Management of Country Risk by Credit Institutions Contents 1. Introduction and Application 2 1.1 Application of this

More information

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS Standard No. 13 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS STANDARD ON ASSET-LIABILITY MANAGEMENT OCTOBER 2006 This document was prepared by the Solvency and Actuarial Issues Subcommittee in consultation

More information

CLIENT UPDATE BROKER-DEALERS AFFILIATED WITH BANKS MEET THE LCR: FIVE KEY POINTS

CLIENT UPDATE BROKER-DEALERS AFFILIATED WITH BANKS MEET THE LCR: FIVE KEY POINTS CLIENT UPDATE BROKER-DEALERS AFFILIATED WITH BANKS MEET THE LCR: FIVE KEY POINTS NEW YORK Gregory A. Lyons gjlyons@debevoise.com Lee A. Schneider lschneider@debevoise.com David L. Portilla dlportilla@debevoise.com

More information

Comparative tables. CPSS Red Book statistical update 427

Comparative tables. CPSS Red Book statistical update 427 CPSS Red Book statistical update 427 January 2013 Table 1 Basic statistical data GDP (USD billions) 1 Population (millions, yearly average) Australia 952 1,050 999 1,246 1,500 21.1 21.4 21.8 22.1 22.4

More information

Capital Requirements Directive IV Framework Liquidity Requirements. Allen & Overy Client Briefing Paper 15 January 2014. www.allenovery.

Capital Requirements Directive IV Framework Liquidity Requirements. Allen & Overy Client Briefing Paper 15 January 2014. www.allenovery. Capital Requirements Directive IV Framework Liquidity Requirements Allen & Overy Client Briefing Paper 15 January 2014 2 CRD IV Framework: Liquidity Requirements January 2014 CRD IV Framework: Liquidity

More information

RTGS operating hours review

RTGS operating hours review RTGS operating hours review November 2014 Executive Summary 1. As settlement agent for the main sterling payment systems, the Bank of England operates the UK s Real Time Gross Settlement infrastructure

More information

Working Group on U.S. RMB Trading and Clearing New York, January 2016. Discussion Outline: Possible RMB Clearing Operating Models

Working Group on U.S. RMB Trading and Clearing New York, January 2016. Discussion Outline: Possible RMB Clearing Operating Models Working Group on U.S. RMB Trading and Clearing New York, January 2016 Discussion Outline: Possible RMB Clearing Operating Models The purpose of this note to is to introduce possible RMB clearing operating

More information

Economic Commentaries

Economic Commentaries n Economic Commentaries In its Financial Stability Report 214:1, the Riksbank recommended that a requirement for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in Swedish kronor be introduced. The background to this

More information

Challenges for Capital Market Development in Asia

Challenges for Capital Market Development in Asia Challenges for Capital Market Development in Asia Osaka, 30 October 2014 Masamichi Kono Vice Minister for International Affairs President, Asian Financial Partnership Center Financial Services Agency,

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring December 2010 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International

More information

Regulatory Practice Letter November 2014 RPL 14-20

Regulatory Practice Letter November 2014 RPL 14-20 Regulatory Practice Letter November 2014 RPL 14-20 BCBS Issues Final Net Stable Funding Ratio Standard Executive Summary The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ( BCBS or Basel Committee ) issued its

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Charter

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Charter Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Charter January 2013 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International Settlements 2013. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts

More information

Principles on Outsourcing by Markets

Principles on Outsourcing by Markets Principles on Outsourcing by Markets Final Report TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS July 2009 CONTENTS I. Introduction 3 II. Survey Results 5 A. Outsourced

More information

CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures*

CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures* CSS-IOSCO rinciples for Financial Market Infrastructures* Workshop on ayments Systems Oversight Banco de Guatemala Guatemala, Guatemala, October 16-18, 2013 Klaus Löber CSS Secretariat Bank for International

More information

This section outlines the Solvency II requirements for a syndicate s own risk and solvency assessment (ORSA).

This section outlines the Solvency II requirements for a syndicate s own risk and solvency assessment (ORSA). Section 9: ORSA Overview This section outlines the Solvency II requirements for a syndicate s own risk and solvency assessment (ORSA). The ORSA can be defined as the entirety of the processes and procedures

More information

MEDIA RELEASE. IOSCO reports on business continuity plans for trading venues and intermediaries

MEDIA RELEASE. IOSCO reports on business continuity plans for trading venues and intermediaries IOSCO/MR/54/2015 Madrid, 22 December 2015 IOSCO reports on business continuity plans for trading venues and intermediaries The Board of the (IOSCO) today published two reports that seek to enhance the

More information

Financial Stability Forum Recommends Actions to Enhance Market and Institutional Resilience

Financial Stability Forum Recommends Actions to Enhance Market and Institutional Resilience FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM Press release Press enquiries: Washington +41 76 350 8430 Basel +41 76 350 8421 fsforum@bis.org Ref no: 7/2008E Financial Stability Forum Recommends Actions to Enhance Market

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Standards. Capital floors: the design of a framework based on standardised approaches

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Standards. Capital floors: the design of a framework based on standardised approaches Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document Standards Capital floors: the design of a framework based on standardised approaches Issued for comment by 27 March 2015 December 2014 This

More information

EBA REPORT ON ASSET ENCUMBRANCE JUNE 2016

EBA REPORT ON ASSET ENCUMBRANCE JUNE 2016 EBA REPORT ON ASSET ENCUMBRANCE JUNE 2016 1 Contents List of figures 3 Executive summary 4 Analysis of the asset encumbrance of European banks 6 Sample 6 Scope of the report 6 Total encumbrance 7 Encumbrance

More information

FSB launches peer review on deposit insurance systems and invites feedback from stakeholders

FSB launches peer review on deposit insurance systems and invites feedback from stakeholders Press release Press enquiries: Basel +41 61 280 8037 Press.service@bis.org Ref no: 26/2011 1 July 2011 FSB launches peer review on deposit insurance systems and invites feedback from stakeholders The Financial

More information

Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions

Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions Advisory Category: Capital Subject: Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions Date: June 2013 Introduction This Advisory establishes OSFI s expectations regarding the management of foreign exchange

More information

ICAAP Report Q2 2015

ICAAP Report Q2 2015 ICAAP Report Q2 2015 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION... 3 1.1 THE THREE PILLARS FROM THE BASEL COMMITTEE... 3 1.2 BOARD OF MANAGEMENT APPROVAL OF THE ICAAP Q2 2015... 3 1.3 CAPITAL CALCULATION... 3 1.1.1 Use

More information

The PRA s approach to supervising liquidity and funding risks

The PRA s approach to supervising liquidity and funding risks Supervisory Statement SS24/15 The PRA s approach to supervising liquidity and funding risks June 2015 Prudential Regulation Authority 20 Moorgate London EC2R 6DA Prudential Regulation Authority, registered

More information

Guideline. No: B-6 Date: February 2012

Guideline. No: B-6 Date: February 2012 Guideline Subject: No: B-6 Date: February 2012 This Guideline sets out prudential considerations relating to the liquidity risk management programs of federally regulated deposit-taking institutions and

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration Issued for comment by 25 February 2011 December 2010 Copies of publications are available

More information

Basel II, Pillar 3 Disclosure for Sun Life Financial Trust Inc.

Basel II, Pillar 3 Disclosure for Sun Life Financial Trust Inc. Basel II, Pillar 3 Disclosure for Sun Life Financial Trust Inc. Introduction Basel II is an international framework on capital that applies to deposit taking institutions in many countries, including Canada.

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives September 2013 This publication is available

More information

How To Understand The Interdependencies Of Payment And Settlement Systems In Hong Kong

How To Understand The Interdependencies Of Payment And Settlement Systems In Hong Kong Interdependencies of payment and settlement systems: the Hong Kong experience by the Financial Infrastructure Department Payment and settlement systems around the world have become more interdependent

More information

Prudential Standard APS 210 Liquidity

Prudential Standard APS 210 Liquidity Prudential Standard APS 210 Liquidity Objectives and key requirements of this Prudential Standard This Prudential Standard requires an authorised deposit-taking institution to adopt prudent practices in

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III counterparty credit risk - Frequently asked questions

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III counterparty credit risk - Frequently asked questions Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III counterparty credit risk - Frequently asked questions November 2011 Copies of publications are available from: Bank for International Settlements Communications

More information

Deutsche Bank Global Transaction Banking. Securities Services. Overview

Deutsche Bank Global Transaction Banking. Securities Services. Overview Deutsche Bank Global Transaction Banking Direct Securities Services Securities Services Overview Finding the right custodian with a long-term commitment to supporting its clients business is critical for

More information

The Role of Exchange Settlement Accounts

The Role of Exchange Settlement Accounts Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin March 1999 The Role of Exchange Settlement Accounts Introduction Exchange Settlement (ES) Accounts provided by the Reserve Bank play an important role in the Australian

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Working Paper on the IRB Treatment of Expected Losses and Future Margin Income

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Working Paper on the IRB Treatment of Expected Losses and Future Margin Income Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Paper on the IRB Treatment of Expected Losses and Future Margin Income July 2001 Working Paper on the IRB Treatment of Expected Losses and Future Margin

More information

Capital Market Services UK Limited Pillar 3 Disclosure

Capital Market Services UK Limited Pillar 3 Disclosure February 2013 Capital Market Services UK Limited Pillar 3 Disclosure Contents 1.0 Overview 2.0 Frequency and location of disclosure 3.0 Verification 4.0 Scope of application 5.1 Risk Management objectives

More information

Model Template for 165(d) Tailored Resolution Plan

Model Template for 165(d) Tailored Resolution Plan Federal Reserve System Reporting Requirements Associated with Regulation QQ (Resolution Plans Required) OMB Number 7100-0346 Approval expires January 31, 2016 Model Template for 165(d) Tailored Resolution

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements January 2014 This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). Bank for International

More information

EBA-GL-2015-02. 23 July 2015. Guidelines. on the minimum list of qualitative and quantitative recovery plan indicators

EBA-GL-2015-02. 23 July 2015. Guidelines. on the minimum list of qualitative and quantitative recovery plan indicators EBA-GL-2015-02 23 July 2015 Guidelines on the minimum list of qualitative and quantitative recovery plan indicators Contents EBA Guidelines on the minimum list of qualitative and quantitative recovery

More information

2015 Growth in data center employment continues but the workforce is changing

2015 Growth in data center employment continues but the workforce is changing Published in Conjunction with MARKET BRIEFING GLOBAL DATA CENTER EMPLOYMENT 2015 2015 Growth in data center employment continues but the workforce is changing Globally, the number of people working in

More information

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring. February 2013 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring. February 2013 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring February 2013 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org).

More information

How To Assess A Critical Service Provider

How To Assess A Critical Service Provider Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Principles for financial market infrastructures: Assessment methodology for the oversight

More information

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS P.O. BOX, 4002 BASLE, SWITZERLAND

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS P.O. BOX, 4002 BASLE, SWITZERLAND BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS P.O. BOX, 4002 BASLE, SWITZERLAND PRESS RELEASE CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL 1998: PRELIMINARY GLOBAL DATA The BIS

More information

The Role of Banks in Global Mergers and Acquisitions by James R. Barth, Triphon Phumiwasana, and Keven Yost *

The Role of Banks in Global Mergers and Acquisitions by James R. Barth, Triphon Phumiwasana, and Keven Yost * The Role of Banks in Global Mergers and Acquisitions by James R. Barth, Triphon Phumiwasana, and Keven Yost * There has been substantial consolidation among firms in many industries in countries around

More information

Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity Coverage and Leverage Ratios as per Basel-III Framework as at March 31, 2016

Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity Coverage and Leverage Ratios as per Basel-III Framework as at March 31, 2016 Information on Capital Structure, Liquidity Coverage and Leverage Ratios as per Basel-III Framework as at March 31, 2016 Table of Contents Capital Structure Statement of Financial Position - Step 1 ( Table

More information

BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

BOARD OF GOVERNORS FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM WASHINGTON, D.C. 20551 DIVISION OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION DIVISION OF CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS SR 12-17 CA 12-14 December 17, 2012 TO

More information

Basel III: Liquidity Rules

Basel III: Liquidity Rules February 2011 Basel III: Liquidity Rules 1 Introduction and timing On 16 December 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee ) published the final form of a set of reforms to strengthen

More information

MINIMUM LIQUID ASSETS ( MLA ) AND LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO ( LCR )

MINIMUM LIQUID ASSETS ( MLA ) AND LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO ( LCR ) MAS 649 NOTICE TO BANKS BANKING ACT, CAP 19 MINIMUM LIQUID ASSETS ( MLA ) AND LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO ( LCR ) 1 This Notice is issued pursuant to sections 36 and 38 of the Banking Act (Cap. 19) ( the

More information

What Is the Total Public Spending on Education?

What Is the Total Public Spending on Education? What Is the Total Public Spending on Education? Indicator On average, OECD countries devote 12.9% of total public expenditure to, but values for individual countries range from less than 10% in the Czech

More information

8th IMF Public Debt Managers Forum July 14-15, 2008 Warsaw, Poland. Agenda. July 13, 2008. July 14, 2008 Day 1 Market Developments and Prospects

8th IMF Public Debt Managers Forum July 14-15, 2008 Warsaw, Poland. Agenda. July 13, 2008. July 14, 2008 Day 1 Market Developments and Prospects 6 p.m. 7.30 p.m. Welcome reception Agenda July 13, 2008 July 14, 2008 Day 1 Market Developments and Prospects 8.15 a.m.-8.45 a.m. Registration 8.45 a.m. 9.15 a.m. Welcome remarks by Mr. Murilo Portugal

More information

Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) PCL & its Financial Business Group Pillar 3 Disclosures 30 June 2015

Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) PCL & its Financial Business Group Pillar 3 Disclosures 30 June 2015 Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) PCL & its Financial Business Group Registered Office: 90 North Sathorn Road, Silom Bangkok, 10500, Thailand Overview During 2013, the Bank of Thailand ( BOT ) published the

More information

Consultative report. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions

Consultative report. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Consultative report Principles for financial market infrastructures: Assessment methodology

More information