1 Terrorism Introduction & History Terrorism is a threat everywhere, but there are a number of important considerations in evaluating terrorism hazards, such as the existence of facilities, landmarks, or other buildings of international, national, or regional importance. High-risk targets for acts of terrorism include military and civilian government facilities, international airports, large cities, and high-profile landmarks. Terrorists might also target large public gatherings, water and food supplies, utilities, and corporate centers. Furthermore, terrorists are capable of spreading fear by sending explosives or chemical and biological agents through the mail (FEMA, April 2009). Nonetheless, terrorism can take many forms and terrorists have a wide range of personal, political, or cultural agendas. Therefore, there is no location that is not a potential terrorist target. Of particular concern to Arizona are the many critical facilities in the State. Police stations, hospitals, military installations, fire stations, schools, wastewater treatment plants, and nuclear power generation stations along with critical infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels, electric generation and distribution facilities, public water supplies, and government buildings may be potential terrorist targets. Damage to these facilities and infrastructure could cripple transportation routes and commerce. Additionally, there are many Title III facilities as well as transportation routes vital to the entire nation traversing Arizona; making intentional hazard material releases a potential threat to citizens and the environment. The term terrorism refers to intentional, criminal, malicious acts, but the functional definition of terrorism can be interpreted in many ways. Officially, terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 CFR 0.85). Terrorists use threats to create fear, to try to convince citizens of the powerlessness of their government, and/or to get publicity for their cause. Terrorist attacks can take many forms, including agriterrorism, arson/incendiary attack, armed attack, assassination, biological agent, chemical agent, cyberterrorism, conventional bomb, hijackings, intentional hazardous material release, kidnapping, nuclear bomb and radiological agent (FEMA April 2009). Explosives have been the traditional method of conducting terrorism, but intelligence suggests that the possibility of biological or chemical terrorism is increasing. The severity of terrorist incidents depends upon the method of attack, the proximity of the attack to people, animals, or other assets and the duration of exposure to the incident or attack device. For example, chemical agents are poisonous gases, liquids or solids that have toxic effects on people, animals, or plants. Many chemical agents can cause serious injuries or death. In this case, severity of injuries depends on the type and amount of the chemical agent used and the duration of exposure. Biological agents are organisms or toxins that have illness-producing effects on people, livestock and crops. Some biological agents cannot be easily detected and may take time to develop. Therefore, it can be difficult to know that a biological attack has occurred until victims display symptoms. In other cases, the effects are immediate. Those affected by a biological agent require the immediate attention of professional medical personnel. Some agents are contagious which may result in the need for victims to be quarantined. In recent years, cyber terrorism has become a larger threat. Cyber terrorism can be defined as activities intended to damage or disrupt vital computer systems. These acts can range from taking control of a host website to using networked resources to directly cause destruction and harm. Protection of databases and infrastructure appear to be the main goals at this point in time. Cyber terrorists can be difficult to identify because the internet provides a meeting place for individuals 289
2 from various parts of the world. Individuals or groups planning a cyber-attack are not organized in a traditional manner, as they are able to effectively communicate over long distances without delay. One of the more prominent groups involved in large-scale hacking events recently is the group Anonymous. They have been known to overtake websites, and alter the content that is presented to the public. The largest threat to institutions from cyber terrorism comes from any processes that are networked and controlled via computer. Any vulnerability that could allow access to sensitive data or processes should be addressed and any possible measures taken to harden those resources to attack. Active shooters, as defined by the US Department of Homeland Security, is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined area; in most cases, active shooters use firearm[s] and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Recent high-profile incidents involving active shooters include; the Sandy Hook Elementary school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, the shooting in the Aurora, Colorado movie theater and the shooting in Tucson, Arizona involving U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords. Historical active shooter events include the Virginia Tech shootings, the Columbine High School shootings and the University of Texas, Austin shootings. No substantive research has yet been compiled to address the potential vulnerability to an active shooter incident. As a very open, public society, these incidents are easier to accomplish for those bent on doing harm. Some of these incidents have occurred in public places, and some in places that are considered more restricted (like elementary schools and high schools). There is no discernible pattern to the location chosen by the shooter. Today, terrorism prevention initiatives in Arizona are guided largely through Securing Arizona, A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security, which was finalized in April of Through this initiative various aggressive action items were proposed which would assist the state in preventing terrorist action and mitigating the impact of such an event. Specifically: Establish a statewide integrated justice system that links the information systems used by federal, state, local and tribal criminal justice entities (police, corrections, courts, etc.) in such a way to support the identification of emerging terrorism related trends. Establish a 24/7 intelligence information analysis center that will serve as a central hub to facilitate the collection, analysis and dissemination of crime and terrorism related information. Establish a statewide disease surveillance system that collects information from emergency rooms, physicians, animal control entities, pharmacies, public safety entities and other public/private sector entities to identify emerging public health problems such as naturally occurring diseases, environmental problems, and biological and chemical weapons attacks. Supplementing the Securing Arizona initiative is the State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS), updated in This document establishes as a goal, To protect all of Arizona s citizens from potential terrorist attack and enhance the response and recovery capabilities of communities, whether urban or rural. Among the objectives supported through this document are the continued management and support for an anti-terrorism network that ensures that the proper resources, facilities, organization, plans and procedures, and training are all available to those responsible for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. Furthermore, the State Homeland Security Strategy provides that the State of Arizona will apply the resources available from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to support planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs of the State in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, respond to and recover from threats or acts of terrorism that may involve the use of a weapons of mass destruction. The Strategy also ensures that the State of Arizona will be able to detect, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a terrorism incident. Any subsequent plans are intended to utilize an all hazard approach. In addition, Arizona's approach to enhancing regional capability and capacity to prevent 290
3 and reduce the vulnerability of Arizona from weapons of mass destruction or terrorism incidents will be multidiscipline. Also, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) was established. The mission of the ACTIC is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Mission execution will be guided by the understanding that the key to effectiveness is the development and sharing of information between participants to the fullest extent as is permitted by law or agency policy. The objective of the ACTIC is to be a fusion center by establishing and maintaining an all-crimes approach to terrorism prevention. The ACTIC is a true cross-jurisdictional partnership, integrating local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well as first responders, emergency management and, when appropriate, the private sector. The evolution of federal-local collaboration at the ACTIC is accomplished by fully integrating human and technological components. The trend toward examining crime problems multi-dimensionally is a feature of intelligence led policing and relies heavily on the collaboration to access local-federal intelligence. Among the many agencies involved in this massive mitigation effort will be the Arizona Division of Emergency Management (ADEM) and the Arizona Department of Homeland Security (AZDOHS) which will be responsible for the administration of the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (SHSAS) program. The Governor s Homeland Security Coordinating Council (HSCC) will be responsible for review of these activities before going to the Governor s office for final approval. The Governors HSCC is a multidiscipline committee developed in order to help guide the strategy development process for equipment allocation and distribution among emergency responders in the state. This committee included representatives from law enforcement, emergency management, fire service, governmental administrative, tribal nations, and private sector and volunteer organizations assisting in disaster recovery. The worst-case scenario for a terrorism event in Arizona would be if a dirty bomb combining radioactive material with conventional explosives were to be detonated in Phoenix at lunchtime on a weekday. At that time of day and location, a significant number of individuals would be exposed to the bomb s radiation both at the time of detonation and after the fact as the radiation spread. The explosive device could damage or even topple buildings, spark utility outages citywide, and/or ignite large-scale urban fires. Prediction of terrorist attacks is almost impossible because terrorism is a result of human factors. As long as fringe groups maintain radically different ideas than that of the government or general population, terrorism is a possibility. Environmental Impacts The impacts of terrorism can vary in severity from nominal to catastrophic and are contingent upon the method of the attack, the volume of force applied, and the population density of the attack site. There may be significant loss of life for humans and animals as well as economic losses. Additionally, the impact of the attack itself may be exacerbated by the fact that human services agencies like community support programs, health and medical services, public assistance programs, and social services can experience physical damage to facilities, supplies, and equipment and disruption of emergency communications. There may also be ancillary effects of terrorism such as urban fires or, in the case of a radiological device, radioactive fallout that can multiply the impact of a terrorist event. Jurisdictional Vulnerability Assessment All communities in the State are vulnerable on some level, directly or indirectly, to a terrorist attack. However, communities where the previously mentioned potential targets are located should be considered more vulnerable. Larger cities like Phoenix and Tucson are the most vulnerable to 291
4 terrorist attacks due to the sheer size of these urban areas, density of the population, and concentration of critical infrastructure located there. Because of its status as the state capital, Phoenix has elevated vulnerability. State Facility Vulnerability Assessment Since the probability of terrorism occurring cannot be quantified in the same methodology of many natural hazards, it is not possible to assess vulnerability in terms of likelihood of occurrence. Instead, vulnerability is assessed in terms of specific assets. By identifying potentially at-risk terrorist targets in Arizona, planning efforts can be put in place to reduce the risk of attack. FEMA s Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning (2003) encourages site-specific assessments that should be based on the relative importance of a particular site to the surrounding community or population, threats that are known to exist and vulnerabilities including: Inherent vulnerability: o Visibility How aware is the public of the existence of the facility? o Utility How valuable might the place be in meeting the objectives of a potential terrorist? o Accessibility How accessible is the place to the public? o Asset mobility is the asset s location fixed or mobile? o Presence of hazardous materials Are flammable, explosive, biological, chemical and/or radiological materials present on site? If so, are they well secured? o Potential for collateral damage What are the potential consequences for the surrounding area if the asset is attacked or damaged? o Occupancy What is the potential for mass casualties based on the maximum number of individuals on site at a given time? Tactical vulnerability: o Site Perimeter Site planning and Landscape Design Is the facility designed with security in mind both site-specific and with regard to adjacent land uses? Parking Security Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that separates vehicles and structures? o Building Envelope Structural Engineering Is the building s envelope designed to be blast-resistant? Does it provide collective protection against chemical, biological and radiological contaminants? o Facility Interior Architectural and Interior Space Planning Does security screening cover all public and private areas? Mechanical Engineering Are utilities and Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems protected and/or backed up with redundant systems? Electrical Engineering Are emergency power and telecommunications available? Are alarm systems operational? Is lightning sufficient? Fire Protection Engineering Are the building s water supply and fire suppression systems adequate, code-compliant and protected? Are on-site personnel trained appropriately? Are local first responders aware of the nature of the operations at the facility? Electronic and Organized Security Are systems and personnel in place to monitor and protect the facility? Jurisdictional Loss Estimation Jurisdictional loss estimates can vary greatly in a terrorism event based on the magnitude and type of terrorist action. Catastrophic terrorism events will have proportionally catastrophic losses for the jurisdiction in question. For example, losses may be greater in an event that results in the complete 292
5 destruction of a high-rise building; in that scenario, losses will stem from loss of life, the actual destruction of the building, and business interruptions. For comparison s sake, the total losses incurred by New York City in the September 11, 2001 attacks are estimated at $83-95 billion. This loss estimate includes lost tax revenue for the city, the cost of response and recovery, business interruptions, deaths, building damage, and infrastructure damage. While Arizona s cities are certainly smaller than New York, losses could still be severe. State Facility Loss Estimation All state facilities are vulnerable to terrorism in some way, whether or not the facility itself is the target of an attack. While highly unlikely that all critical facilities would be destroyed in a single event, the total replacement cost of all state critical facilities is unpredictable. Risk & Vulnerability Based on the Index Values and Assigned Weighting Factors determined in the CPRI table discussed at the beginning of this section and updated by the Planning Team, the results based on Terrorism are shown below. Table RA-87: State CPRI Results for Terrorism Risk Due to Terrorism Hazard Probability Magnitude/ Severity Warning Time Duration CPRI Score (max: 4) Terrorism Possible Critical < 6 Hours < 6 Hours CPRI Score = (Probability x.45)+(magnitude/severity x.30)+(warning Time x.15)+(duration x.10). *None of the counties in Arizona profiled terrorism as a hazard, and as such, no CPRI results are available for compilation. Environmental Risk & Vulnerability Based on the Index Values and Assigned Weighting Factors determined in the Environmental Risk CPRI table discussed at the beginning of this section and updated by the Planning Team, the results based on Terrorism are shown below. Table RA-88: State Environmental CPRI Results for Terrorism Component Environmental Risk Due to Terrorism Probability of an Impact Magnitude/ Severity Duration of Impact/Damage CPRI Score (max: 3.6) Air Unlikely Negligible < 1 month.90 Water Unlikely Negligible < 1 month.90 Soil Unlikely Negligible < 1 month.90 Average CPRI Environmental Risk Rating:.90 (max 3.6) 293
6 Consequences / Impacts 2013 State of Arizona Hazard Mitigation Plan Threat is based upon the criticality of a site or event. The threat is collaborated with warning and indicators. This information is sensitive in nature and is maintained at the ACTIC. Personnel responsible to provide indications and warnings will do so at the direction of the Command of the ACTIC. The Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) is mandated by law to coordinate a program that uses state of the art technologies that is implemented based on the statewide assessment of threat and vulnerability by the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center. The Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) provides the data collection framework that guides the assessment process. The information that is gathered and evaluated is utilized by the Threat Mitigation Unit using the PACES system at the ACTIC to allocate resources to the areas of greatest need using the management structure established with the GABRIEL project. Public The effects of terrorism include, but are not limited to death, injury and a feeling of fear and helplessness in the general population. It can destroy property, lifelines and the basic social fabric. On a large scale, it destroys major portions of a large city s infrastructure creating physical and economic hardship for some time in addition to the initial death and destruction. Long term psychological damage to a portion of the population is also possible Responders to the Incident Impacts to responding personnel are similar to what can affect the citizens residing or working in the target area. They include medical problems and death from chemical agent exposure, explosion and fire trauma. There may long term hazards such as hazardous chemicals or material (asbestos) that can cause illness, either acute or chronic. Continuity of Operations / Delivery of Services Once again the magnitude and type of event determines the impact on agencies and services. Continuity of operations for agencies that have their main administration or critical components of their operations within the target area could find their operational continuity at risk. If files, paper or electronic, are damaged or destroyed, an organization may not be able to: contact clients; assign work; complete scheduled jobs; meet deadlines; access, track, and pay accounts; or pay staff. Without a Continuity of Operations Plan that takes these issues into account, they may not be able to operate in their normal mode, if at all. Property / Facilities / Infrastructure Arizona has been fortunate in the fact we have not had a terrorist attack other than some ecoterrorist groups causing minor disruption to railroad lines and some power lines. Most damage and disruption has been minor. The type and magnitude of the terrorist attack will determine the damage or destruction of a jurisdiction s facilities. Buildings can be destroyed or rendered unsafe, equipment, electronic or mechanical, ruined or in some cases made inaccessible due to damage or contamination. Files, electronic or paper, can be destroyed. Explosions and fire can render infrastructure such as roads, power lines, natural gas, fuel, water pipelines and sewage control facilities inoperable. Environment The impacts to the environment from a terrorist attack can be huge. The infrastructure of a large city if destroyed, can cause lingering problems with contaminates, pollutants, hazardous debris, etc. The effects of attacks on water supplies and food crops can linger for long periods of time rendering the land or water unusable. Radiological damage can close entire geographical areas for years. 294
7 Economic / Financial Condition of Jurisdiction Economically, the after effects will depend directly on how much damage was done to local businesses, the local tax base, and the local infrastructure, and the type of terrorist activity. An individual home or business damaged by the attack can be devastating to an individual or family, it has very little effect on the overall economic condition of the community. However when a large number of homes, and business, are damaged or destroyed it can negatively alter the tax base decreasing the ability of the local jurisdiction to pay, not just for infrastructure repair and community restoration, but also for the normal day to day programs that make the community a viable area in which to live and work. People and business may need to relocate and in some cases out of the community or State. Damage to the business and industry sector does not only affect the tax base, but may also remove jobs from the local economy. The loss of jobs can escalate into other problems. The unemployed may either move away, go on unemployment, or be forced to take a lower paying job, all of which further decreases the financial stability of the community. If the loss of financial stability is not corrected, there are other social problems that arise. Those out of work can develop a loss of self esteem that can lead to an increase in crime, alcohol and drug abuse, psychological problems, spouse abuse and an increase in medical problems In summary, the economic viability of the area will depend on not just how much damage was done, but also on how quickly the infrastructure can be repaired; how prepared businesses are to operate in the post disaster environment; how prepared citizens are for the possibility of an attack and its affects; and how well local governments and organizations can respond to the needs of the public for support, cleanup, and if necessary relocation. Public Confidence in Jurisdiction s Governance The reputation of any individual jurisdiction within Arizona or the public s confidence in the jurisdiction is highly dependent on the public s perception on how well response and recovery are handled during and after an event. A response that either shows or gives the impression the jurisdiction is prepared and responsive to the public s needs and that it manages a recovery to gets its services back and damage repaired in a timely manner will maintain or enhance a jurisdictions reputation. However, if the perception develops, rightly or wrongly, that the jurisdiction is incompetent, slow to react, or ignores the needs of its citizens, the reputation of the jurisdiction and the confidence in its abilities may suffer. 295
Chapter 2 Water/Wastewater Infrastructure Security: Threats and Vulnerabilities Laurie J. Van Leuven 2.1 Introduction The nation s critical infrastructure is made up of thousands of networks, pipelines,
Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry A Step-by-Step Approach to Emergency Planning, Response and Recovery for Companies of All Sizes FEMA 141/October 1993 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR
Minnesota Disaster Management Handbook Minnesota Department of Public Safety Homeland Security and Emergency Management 444 Cedar Street, Suite 223 St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-6223 Rev. 3/8/2011 Table of
National Preparedness Guidelines September 2007 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii PREFACE President Bush has led a committed effort to strengthen the Nation s preparedness capabilities. The national
Arizona Disaster Recovery Framework Updated: ANNEX to the Arizona State Emergency Response and Recovery Plan Introduction and Purpose Introduction The mission of the Arizona Disaster Recovery Framework
Change History and Document Control Rev. # Date Changes Approver 1.0 08/2013 Initial Issue ISC Document Control Although the main document is not designated For Official Use Only (FOUO), several of the
LOCAL CABLE SYSTEM MODEL DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN & INCIDENT RESPONSE MANUAL Developed by the Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council Working Group 2-B March 14, 2011 Document Status
STATE GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITY DISASTER RECOVERY: A CRITICAL ROLE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY STATE GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITY DISASTERS: A CRITICAL ROLE Two goals concerning community disasters are fundamental.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR Guideline for Program Development Manitoba Health Disaster Management Version 1 Printed November 21, 2002 Disaster Management Model for the Health Sector
APPENDIX 1 DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING FOR CITY COMPUTER FACILITIES March 2008 Auditor General s Office Jeffrey Griffiths, C.A., C.F.E. Auditor General City of Toronto TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...1
Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2010-2015 Rick Perry Governor i Table of Contents GOVERNOR S INTRODUCTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Council of State Community Development Agencies 1825 K Street NW Suite 515 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 293-5820 Fax: (202) 293-2820 http://www.coscda.org TABLE OF CONTENTS MODULE 1: OVERVIEW... 1 TARGET
Growing Business Dependence on the Internet New Risks Require CEO Action September 2007 Business Roundtable (www.businessroundtable.org) is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies
GAO United States General Accounting Office Accounting and Information Management Division November 1999 Information Security Risk Assessment Practices of Leading Organizations A Supplement to GAO s May
GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS U.S. Department of Education U.S. Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of Justice
Douglas County Disaster Recovery Plan December 3, 2014 Table of Contents Basic Plan... 3 1. Foreword... 3 2. Acknowledgements:... 4 3. Promulgation and Record of Changes:... 6 4. Introduction... 7 5. Purpose
Regulation of Physical Security for the Electric Distribution System February 2015 BEN BRINKMAN SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, ELECTRIC SAFETY AND RELIABILITY BRANCH CONNIE CHEN ENERGY DIVISION, INFRASTRUCTURE
Department of Budget & Management State of Maryland Information Technology (IT) Disaster Recovery Guidelines Version 4.0 July 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION...1 1.1 Purpose...1 1.2 Scope...1 1.3
Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports Information Publication A-001 May 2004 Version 1.0 This guidance document was developed by TSA, in cooperation with the General Aviation (GA) community.
Decision Making and Problem Solving Independent Study November 2005 FEMA TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Course Overview... 1 Unit 1: Course Introduction Introduction... 1.1 Decisions in Emergency Management...
812 RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION AFTER DISASTER RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION AFTER DISASTER Michael K. Lindell Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA Definition Disaster recovery. Disaster recovery
State Mitigation Plan Review Guide Released March 2015 Effective March 2016 FP 302-094-2 This page is intentionally blank. Table of Contents List of Acronyms and Abbreviations... iii SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION...
Business Continuity A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery ASIS INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON GUIDELINES The Commission on Guidelines was established in
United States Office of Solid Waste EPA 550-B99-003 Environmental Protection and Emergency Response November 1999 Agency (5104) www.epa.gov/ceppo/ RMPs Are on the Way! How LEPCs and Other Local Agencies
BUREAU OF HOMELAND SECURITY IDAHO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN November 2012 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK November 2012 ii EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS If immediate state assistance is required, contact