GEYER v. INGERSOLL PUBLICATIONS CO.: INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN FROM SHAREHOLDERS TO CREDITORS
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1 GEYER v. INGERSOLL PUBLICATIONS CO.: INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN FROM SHAREHOLDERS TO CREDITORS I. INTRODUCTION As a result of the continued increase in the number of corporations facing bankruptcy,' Geer v. Ingersoll Publications Co. 2 may have a profound impact on the standard of corporate governance in Delaware, America's leading corporate state. In Gejer, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation's creditors upon "insolvency in fact" or at the moment its liabilities exceed the fair market value 3 of its assets. 4 Ambiguities created by the language applied by the court of chancery in Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland, N V. v. Pathe Communications Corp Lewis U. Davis, Jr. et al., Corporate Reorganization in the 1990's: Guiding Directors of Troubled Corporations Through Uncertain Territory, 47 Bus. LAw. 1, 1 (1991). In 1989 the filings of Chapter 11 business reorganizations rose five percent to 16,303. In 1990, the number of Chapter 11 business reorganizations was 18,282, an increase of approximately 12% over In addition, the size of the bankruptcies is also increasing. The total asset size of bankruptcies of publicly-held companies has increased since 1985 as follows ($ in billions): 1985-S5; 1986-$12; 1987-$40; 1988-S43; 1989-$72; 1990-$83; through June 1991-S52. Davis, supra, at 1 n.1 (citations omitted) A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992). This decision by Vice- Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery considers the defendant Ralph Ingersoll's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at "Fair market value" is defined as the reasonable cash price for which the property may be sold on the market. BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 597 (6th ed. 1990). 4. Ge'er, 621 A.2d at 787, No. 12,150, 1991 WL (Del. Oh. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L (1992). In Credit Lyonnaise, Chancellor Allen addressed the duties of directors toward creditors and stated that "[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." Id. at *34, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at In addition, in a now infamous footnote, Chancellor Allen provided an illustration of what he cor~idered to be a situation where a director may be held liable to creditors for failing to adequately consider their interests. Id. at *36 n.55, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at n.55. The illustration implied that where a corporation's only asset was a favorable judgment against a third party (which is being appealed), the corporation's directors may be held liable for failing to settle the lawsuit for an amount greater or equal to the corporation's liabilities in the event the judgment is overturned. Id.
2 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 19 left nervous directors of financially troubled Delaware corporations anxioutsly awaiting the Geyer decision. 6 In Credit Lyonnaise, the court of chancery implied that a director of a corporation which was in the "vicinity of insolvency" may owe a duty to the corporation's creditors. 7 This implication was ambiguous as to when a director's duty to creditors arises and was also ambiguous as to the standard by which a director's decisions are to be reviewed. The court in Geyer attempted to clarify these ambiguities. Ingersoll Publishing Company evolved out of a partnership between the plaintiff, Thomas P. Geyer, and the defendant, Ralph Ingersoll, II.8 Mr. Ingersoll was the controlling stockholder, president, and chairman of the new corporation; Mr. Geyer was an employee and the only other shareholder. 9 In the fall of 1988, Ingersoll Publishing used a $2 million note to repurchase Mr. Geyer's shares of stock.' 0 Ingersoll Publishing defaulted on the note in June of Mr. Geyer alleged that the default was the result of Mr. Ingersoll's fraudulent conveyance of the company's major assets to a third party in return for personal benefits.' 2 In determining whether it had jurisdiction over the defendant as the director of a Delaware corporation,' 3 the court of chancery 6. Barbara Franklin, Directors' Duties; Insolvency Shifts Burden From Shareholder to Creditor, 208 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (1992). 7. Credit Lyonnaise, No. 12,150, 1991 WL , at *34, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1155 (emphasis added). 8. Geyer, 621 A.2d at Id. 10. Id. 11. Id. 12. Geyer, 621 A.2d at Id. at 786. The defendant was served with process in accordance with 3114(a) of the Delaware Code. Id. Section 3114(a) provides for service of process on nonresident directors, trustees, or members of the governing body of a Delaware corporation. Id. at The statute states in pertinent part: (a) Every nonresident of this State who after September 1, 1977, accepts election or appointment as a director, trustee or member of the governing body of a corporation organized under the laws of this State or who after June 30, 1978, serves in such capacity and every resident of this State who so accepts election or appointment or serves in such capacity and thereafter removes his residence from this State shall, by such acceptance or by such service, be deemed thereby to have consented to the appointment of the registered agent of such corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) as his agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings brought in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation, in which such director, trustee or member is a
3 1994] INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN held that upon "insolvency in fact" a director owes a fiduciary' 4 duty to the corporation's creditors." 5 The court rejected the defendant's assertion that statutory proceedings were necessary to invoke the insolvency exception, which would cause a director's fiduciary duty to "shift" from the corporation's shareholders to its creditors.' 6 The court of chancery based its decision upon Delaware case law and also upon its interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the word insolvency. 1 7 The court particularly noted Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby necessary or proper party, or in any action or proceeding against such director, trustee or member for violation of his duty in such capacity, whether or not he continues to serve as such director, trustee or member at the time suit is commenced. Such acceptance or service as such director, trustee or member shall be a signification of the consent of such director, trustee or member that any process when so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon such director, trustee or member within this State and such appointment of the registered agent (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) shall be irrevocable. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 3114(a) (Gum. Supp. 1992). 14. A fiduciary is "[a] person having [a] duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected wilh such undertaking." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). 15. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787. A prerequisite for obtaining service of process under 3114(a) is a breach of an existing fiduciary duty. Id. Se Pcstolite Inc. v. Cordura Corp., 449 A.2d 263, (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (finding jurisdiction lacking where claims involved breach of contract and tort relating to affairs of a corporation, but not stemming from breaches of a fiduciary duty); Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, n.5 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding 3114 to be constitutional as applied by the Delaware courts only when "directors, trustees, or members of the governing body of a Delaware corporation are necessary and proper parties or where the cause of action is grounded on such individuals' breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and its owners"). See also Prudential- Bache Sec. Inc. v. Franz Mfg. Co., 531 A.2d 953, 954 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (determining that in personam jurisdiction over a director did not exist because creditor's cause of action could not be characterized as an action for breach of fiduciary duty). Delaware law recognizes that [i]f the statute permits in personam jurisdiction over a director, it must be because a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis shows such a relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.., that the exercise of such jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Pestolite, 449 A.2d at 265 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 16. G er, 621 A.2d at Id. at The court stated that the ordinary meaning of insolvency occurs when an entity "is unable to pay its debts as they fall due to the usual course of business." Id. at 789 (citing WEBsTER's NirNrH NEw CoLLEciATE Dic- TIONARY 626 (1988)).
4 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 19 & Co.,18 in which the Supreme Court of Delaware stated, "'[T]he fact which creates the trust [for the benefit of creditors] is the insolvency, and when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality of the acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in the case of solvency."" ' 9 Vice-Chancellor Chandler interpreted this language as switching a director's fiduciary obligation, imposed for the benefit of the corporation's stockholders during solvency, to the corporation's creditors at the moment the corporation becomes insolvent. 2 0 While the shifting of duties is not a new concept, Geyer appears to be the first modern Delaware decision to specify when the shift occurs. 2 ' This comment will discuss the evolution, development, and application of the insolvency exception. Specifically, this comment addresses the effect of the Geyer decision on a director's business decisions which are made during insolvency, but prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, and also the decision's effect upon future litigation involving creditors' rights. The ambiguities created by the court of chancery may have a negative impact upon Delaware's position as America's leading state of incorporation. 22 Directors of Delaware corporations, fearing the imposition of personal liability, may be hesitant to accept or remain in their positions. This negative impact may only be avoided if Delaware follows other jurisdictions and continues to apply the business judgment rule for informed business decisions made in good faith after the corporation has been deemed insolvent. II. BACKGROUND A. Duties of Directors of Solvent Corporations A basic principle of corporate governance is that a solvent corporation's board of directors has the ultimate responsibility of A.2d 808 (Del. 1944). In Bovay, corporate officers perpetrated fraud by transferring funds of the corporation for their personal benefit, rendering the corporation insolvent from its inception. Id. See Gregory Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAw. 239, (1992) (discussing Bovay and the principles upon which the Supreme Court of Delaware based its decision). 19. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787 (quoting Bovay, 38 A.2d at 813). 20. Id. at Franklin, supra note 6, at As of December 28, 1987, Delaware was the home of approximately 179,000, companies, including 56% of the Fortune 500 companies and 45% of the companies which appeared on the New York Stock Exchange. Delaware Eyes Takeover Laws, CH!. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1987, at 7.
5 1994] INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN managing the business and affairs of the corporation. 2s In discharging this duty, the board owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporate shareholders. 24 The duty of care requires the directors to inform themselves of all material information before making a business decision. 25 After reviewing all of the relevant information, the directors must act with "requisite care in the discharge of their duties." 26 The duty of care is imposed to "ensure that the board in fact fulfills its function of monitoring management, or at least to provide legal redress in the event that it fails to do so." 2 ' Thus, a director may not claim ignorance where information which affects his decision is readily available. The duty of loyalty requires that a director not stand on both sides of the transaction or have any financial interest in the transaction other than the "benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally. "28 If a majority of the directors are tainted with self-interest, they may delegate their authority to a committee 23. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). InAronson, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a board of directors or committee of independent disinterested directors could properly secure the dismissal of a stockholder's derivative action. Id. at In setting forth its interpretation of the Delaware business judgment rule the court noted the following language of 5 141(a) of the Delaware Code: "The business and affairs of a corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." Id. at 811 (quoting Da.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 9 141(a) (1983)). 24. See id. at 811 (noting that in discharging their function the directors owe certain "fiduciary" obligations to the corporation and its shareholders). &e also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, (Del. 1985) (holding that fiduciary duties apply with equal force when a board approves a corporate merger). 25. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 & n.19 (1990) (discussing a director's duty of care in monitoring corporate management). Many state corporation statutes provide a formulation of the directors' duty of care similar to that of Rev. Model Business Corp. Act (1984), which provides that: "[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director... (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." Id. at 1172 n.19 (quoting REV. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT (1984)). 26. Aronson, 473 A.2d at Mitchell, supra note 25, at Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The independence of a director is directly related to disinterestedness. Id. A director must not be subject to influence from outside sources such as a majority shareholder or corporate officer. Id. at 816.
6 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 19 of independent disinterested directors to determine the issue. 29 The duty of loyalty, which evolved from fiduciary principles, is imposed to prevent any improper use of position by directors for personal benefit. 3 0 In determining whether the directors of a solvent corporation have breached their fiduciary duties, Delaware courts apply the business judgment rule. 3 1 This rule creates a presumption that, absent an abuse of discretion, any action taken by the director of a corporation was made "on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. "32 This presumption includes conscious decisions to refrain from acting. However, the rule will not apply if the directors stood on both sides of the transaction, had a personal financial interest in the transaction, lacked independence, did not inform themselves of all information that was reasonably available, or failed to exercise the requisite level of care Id. at 813. See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that when directors stand "on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith' and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain"). See generally Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738, (1978) (discussing legal controls or conflicts of interest between shareholders and corporate management); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, (1966) (suggesting a fairness standard for evaluating actions of corporate directors where there is a conflict of interest). 30. Mitchell, supra note 25, at See Aronson, 473 A.2d at Id. at 812 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)). Legal redress for the breach of a director's fiduciary duties is usually in the form of a stockholder derivative action which is two-fold in nature: it is the equivalent of a "suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue"; and it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on [the corporation's] behalf against those liable to it. Id. at 811. Under Delaware law, a shareholder must make a "demand" on the board of directors that the action desired be taken by the directors on behalf of the corporation. Id. at The board's decision to refuse demand is subject to the traditional business judgment rule standard. Id. at 812. See generally Donald E. Pease, Aronson v. Lewis: When Demand is Excused and Delaware's Business Judgment Rule, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 39 (1984) (discussing demand requirements under Delaware law). 33. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Delaware applies the standard of gross negligence in determining the validity of a director's decision which falls under the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. See also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (holding that a board of directors was grossly negligent in approving a merger where the facts indicated that the board's decision was made in a hurried manner, without reading all of the reports or considering alternatives).
7 1994] INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN Generally, the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the duty of care do not extend to a corporation's creditors. This is based upon the fact that creditors do not have an existing property right or an equitable interest which supports these duties when a corporation is solvent.4 The basic relationship between a corporation and its creditors is contractual in nature. 3 5 Consequently, the rights of the parties are determined by principles of contract law, not by the. broad concept of fiduciary obligations. 3 6 Modern contract law has recognized that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in all contracts. 3 7 This implication, however, does not rise to the level of a fiduciary duty. 38 The purpose of the covenant is to ensure that the "reasonable expectations" of the parties are met and that neither party deprives the other of the "fruits of the agreement." 3 The 34. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988). In determining that directors of a solvent corporation owed no fiduciary duty to holders of convertible debentures, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that "[b]cfore a fiduciary duty arises, an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist." Id. In Association of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, the court stated, "It is true... that while corporate directors do owe fiduciary duties, the duties are not owed to the world at large." Association of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 122, 125 (Vt. 1985). 35. Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974). In Harf/, the court noted, "[U]nIess there are special circumstances which affect the rights of the debenture holders as creditors of the corporation, e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a violation of a statute, the rights of the debenture holders are confined to the terms of the Indenture Agreement... " Id. See also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that bondholders' rights are governed by the terms of the contract). In Katz, bondholders sought an injunction to prevent the consummation of an exchange offer and consent solicitation made by the corporation to holders of its long term debt. Id. at 873. In refusing to grant the injunction, the court noted that the directors generally owed no fiduciary duties to debt holders and the exchange offer did not violate any express contractual provisions. Id. at 879 n.7 & Katz, 508 A.2d at Id. at 880. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT LAW 205 (1981) (imposing "upon each party [to a contract] a duty of good faith and fair dealing in [the contract's] performance and... enforcement"). 38. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 504, 510 (Del. 1939). The Supreme Court of Delaware has described a director's fiduciary duty toward a corporation's shareholders as a duty not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. Id. 39. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
8 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 19 covenant may only aid in the interpretation of the contract and will never impose an obligation inconsistent with its terms. 4 0 The "implied covenant of good faith is breached only when one party seeks to prevent the contract's performance or to withhold its benefits." '41 Where a party's contractual rights have not been violated, there can be no breach of an implied covenant. 4 2 While the duties owed by a director to a solvent corporation's creditors are clear, the duties owed to creditors upon insolvency are ambiguous. B. Duties of Directors of Insolvent Corporations A corporation is considered insolvent when either the fair market value of its assets is less than its total liabilities, 43 when it is unable to meet its obligations as they become due, 44 or when the company has instituted statutory bankruptcy proceedings. 45 Upon insolvency, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See, e.g., Greenwich Village Assocs. v. Salle, 493 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 40. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. at 1517 (citing Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987)). 41. Id. See Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 427 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 42. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). 43. Geyer, 621 A.2d at Under 1302 of the Delaware Code, a "person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 1302 (1975). 45. Congress has defined "insolvency in 101(32) of the United States Code. Section 101(32) states, in pertinent part: "insolvent" means: (A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality, financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of- (i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors; and (ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section 522 of this title [11 U.S.C. 522]; (B) with reference to a partnership, financial condition such that the sum of such partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate of, at a fair valuation- (i) all of such partnership's property, exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph (A)(i) of this paragraph; and (ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartnership property, exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, over such partner's nonpartnership debts U.S.C. 101(32) (1988).
9 1994] INSOLVENCY SHIFTS DIRECTORS' BURDEN the "duties" of the directors of the financially troubled corporation shift from the stockholders to the creditors. 46 The rationale for the shift upon insolvency is that creditors become the equitable owners of the corporation because they are the only parties with an interest in the corporation's assets. 47 Therefore, the officers and directors of the corporation which becomes insolvent or in a failing condition no longer represent stockholders, but due to the insolvency become trustees, 4 or quasi- trustees, of the corporation's assets for the benefit of its creditors. 49 The directors are then charged with the fiduciary duty of assuring that creditors of the corporation are either paid in full or pro-rata from the remaining assets.s0 Consequently, directors cannot give preference to themselves or particular creditors by transfer of corporate property or cash payments. 5 ' Notwithstanding the almost universal recognition. of a director's heightened or shifting duty upon insolvency, 52 case law provides little 46. See Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953)) (noting that "[i]f the corporation was insolvent at that time it is clear that the defendants, as officers and directors thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the property for the corporate- beneficiaries"); Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945). "The law by the great weight of authority seems to be settled that when a corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and directors no longer represent the stockholder, but by the fact of insolvency, become trustees for the creditors...." Davis, 147 F.2d at 633 (quoting Arnold v. Knapp, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (W. Va. 1915)). 47. Steven R. Gross et al., Shifting Duties: Directors Face Risks in Workout, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 19 (citation omitted). 48. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Davis, 147 F.2d at 633). "The general standard of conduct for trustees is 'to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property."' Margaret A. Brown et al., Fiducaiy Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Corporations, in FORMULATING REORGANIZATIO PLANS: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 137, 146 (PLI Com. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 611, 1991) (quoting AusTi W. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS $174 (3d ed. 1967)). 49. Brown et al., supra note 48, at 146. Se Gross et al., supra note 47, at 16. See generally New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, 110 N.E.2d at 398 (holding that upon insolvency, directors are to be considered trustees for the benefit of the corporation's creditors). 50. In re Mortgage Am. Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 40 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1931)). 51. Davis, 147 F.2d at 633 (quoting Arnold, 84 S.E. at 899). Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (holding that directors may not prefer their salary claims over the claims of outside creditors). 52. Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 A.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Davis, 147 F.2d at 633).
10 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 19 guidance about the extent of this duty or when it arises. 5 3 In order to fully understand the impact of Geyer, and its bearing on Delaware law, it is necessary to look at the historical basis of the insolvency exception and the modern trend toward the recognition of a duty or obligation to protect the rights of constituencies other than stockholders. 1. Recognition of the Insolvency Exception In its earliest form, the insolvency exception held that the assets of an insolvent corporation were to be held in "trust" for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. The "trust fund doctrine" was first asserted by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer. 5 4 In Wood, an action was brought by the holders of a corporation's notes who alleged fraud on the part of the corporation's directors regarding certain distributions made to stockholders. 5 Relying upon principles of trust, Justice Story promulgated a rule of priority giving preference to debt holders once a corporation became insolvent. 5 " In reaching his conclusion, Justice Story noted that "stockholders have no right to anything but the residuum of the capital stock, after payment of all the debts of the bank. The funds in their hands, therefore, have an equity attached to them, in favour of the creditors, which it is against conscience to resist." ' 57 Thus, the court concluded that the assets were to be held in trust for the corporation's creditors. As the trust fund doctrine developed, it was generally applied in cases of director's self-dealings after bankruptcy had been declared or when the corporation was hopelessly insolvent. 58 The Supreme 53. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at (discussing the rigorous standard of review applied to directors' business decisions upon insolvency). 54. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944); Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 18, at 245. See Reif v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 197 N.E. 278, 280 (N.Y. 1935). 55. Varallo & Finkelstein, supra note 18, at 245. In Wood, the opinion is unclear about whether the corporation was insolvent prior to the distribution or whether the distribution caused the insolvency. In either case, the corporation was not in a financially healthy condition when the distribution was made. 56. Wood, 30 F. Cas. at Id. at See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving a creditor's action against corporation's controlling shareholders, officers and directors alleging that a leveraged buyout transaction was fraudulent); In re STN Enterprises, Inc., 73 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (involving a suit brought by a creditor's committee petitioning the court for leave to sue the estate
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