Monitoring the Abuse of Open Proxies for Sending Spam
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1 Monitoring the Abuse of Open Proxies for Sending Spam Klaus Steding-Jessen CERT.br Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil NIC.br Network Information Center Brazil CGI.br Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 1/25
2 About CERT.br Created in 1997 to receive, review and respond to computer security incident reports and activities related to networks connected to the Internet in Brazil. National focal point for reporting security incidents Establishes collaborative relationships with other entities Helps new CSIRTs to establish their activities Provides training in incident handling Provides statistics and best practices documents Helps raise the security awareness in the country 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 2/25
3 Our Parent Organization: CGI.br Among the diverse responsibilities of The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee CGI.br, the main attributions are: to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of the Internet activities to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil to promote studies and technical standards for the network and services security in the country to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IPs) and the registration of domain names using <.br> to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 3/25
4 CGI.br Structure 01- Ministry of Science and Technology 02- Ministry of Communications 03- Presidential Cabinet 04- Ministry of Defense 05- Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 06- Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 07- National Telecommunications Agency 08- National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 09- National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries 10- Internet Expert 11- Internet Service Providers 12- Telecom Infrastructure Providers 13- Hardware and Software Industries 14- General Business Sector Users 15- Non-governamental Entity 16- Non-governamental Entity 17- Non-governamental Entity 18- Non-governamental Entity 19- Academia 20- Academia 21- Academia 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 4/25
5 Agenda Motivation The SpamPots Project Open Proxy Abuse Scenario Architecture Honeypots Server Statistics Future Work References 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 5/25
6 Motivation The Nature of the Problem Spam is a source of malware/phishing decrease in productivity increase in infrastructure costs Congress and regulators Are pressed by the general public to do something about it Have several questionable law projects to consider Don t have data that show the real spam scenario 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 6/25
7 Motivation (2) Different Views, Different Data What we hear Open proxies are not an issue anymore Only botnets are used nowadays to send/relay spam Brazil is a big source of spam Our data Spam complaints related to open proxy abuse have increased in the past few years Scans for open proxies are always in the top 10 ports in our honeypots network statistics 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 7/25
8 Motivation (3) Still Lots of Questions How to convince business people of possible mitigation measures needs/effectiveness? Port 25 management, reputation, etc Who is abusing our infrastructure? And How? Do we have national metrics or only international? How can we gather data and generate metrics to help the formulation of policies and the understanding of the problem? Need to better understand the problem and have more data about it 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 8/25
9 The SpamPots Project Supported by the CGI.br/NIC.br as part of the Anti-spam Commission work Deployment of 10 low-interaction honeypots, emulating open proxy/relay services and capturing spam Installed on Brazilian ADSL/cable networks, for 15 months 5 broadband providers, 1 home and 1 business connection each Measure the abuse of end-user machines to send spam 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 9/25
10 Open Proxy Abuse Scenario End users broadband computers Computer with Open Proxy Victim Victim Computer with Open Proxy Mail Server 1 Victim spammer Computer with Open Proxy Victim Mail Server N Computer with Open Proxy Victim Victim 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 10/25
11 Architecture End users broadband computers Server: Collects data daily; Monitors the honeypots resources. Honeypot emulating an Open Proxy Computer with Open Proxy Victim spammer Honeypot emulating an Open Proxy Mail Server 1 Victim Computer with Open Proxy Mail Server N Victim 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 11/25
12 Honeypots OpenBSD as the base OS good proactive security features pf packet filter: stateful, integrated queueing (ALTQ), port redirect logs in libpcap format: allows passive fingerprinting Honeyd emulating services Niels Provos SMTP and HTTP Proxy emulator (with minor modifications) SOCKS 4/5 emulator written by ourselves pretends to connect to the final SMTP server destination and starts receiving the s doesn t deliver the s Fools spammers confirmation attempts 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 12/25
13 Server Collects and stores data from honeypots initiates transfers through ssh connections uses rsync over ssh to copy spam from the honeypots Performs status checks in all honeypots daemons, ntp, disk space, load, rsync status Web page interface honeypot status s stats: daily, last 15min MRTG: bandwidth, ports used, s/min, etc 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 13/25
14 Statistics 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 14/25
15 Statistics period to days 466 s avg. s/day recipients avg. recpts/ 9,2 unique IPs unique ASNs 3006 unique CCs 165 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 15/25
16 Top ASNs sending spam Top 10 s/asn: # ASN ASN Name s % TFN-TW (TW) , HINET (TW) , CNCGROUP (CN) , SEEDNET (TW) , NCIC-TW (TW) , CHINA169 (CN) , NDCHOST (US) , CHINANET (CN) , EXTRALAN (TW) , LOOKAS (CA) ,07 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 16/25
17 Top ASNs sending spam (2) 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 17/25
18 Top CCs sending spam Top 10 s/cc: # CC s % 01 TW ,43 02 CN ,80 03 US ,67 04 CA ,27 05 JP ,03 06 HK ,84 07 KR ,78 08 UA ,34 09 DE ,18 10 BR ,16 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 18/25
19 Top CCs sending spam (2) 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 19/25
20 Top TCP ports used TCP ports used: # TCP Port protocol used by % SOCKS socks 37, HTTP alt http 34, HTTP http 10, HTTP Squid 6, HTTP alt http 2, HTTP AnalogX 2, SMTP smtp 1, HTTP Proxy SOCKS MyDoom 1, HTTP Sobig.f 0, HTTP alt http 0,96 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 20/25
21 Top TCP ports used (2) 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 21/25
22 Request Types Module Type Requests % HTTP connect to 25/TCP 89,496, connect to others 106, get requests 225, errors 1,847, total 91,677, SOCKS connect to 25/TCP 46,776, connect to others 1,055, errors 5,741, total 53,573, th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 22/25
23 Future Work 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 23/25
24 Future Work Comprehensive spam analysis using Data Mining techniques determine patterns in language, embedded URLs, etc phishing and other online crime activities Propose best practices to ISPs port 25 management proxy abuse monitoring International cooperation 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 24/25
25 References This presentation can be found at: Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil CERT.br NIC.br Brazilian Internet Steering Comittee CGI.br OpenBSD Honeyd Brazilian Honeypots Alliance 6th International GOVCERT.NL Symposium Noordwijk, The Netherlands October 18 19, 2007 p. 25/25
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