Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report

Transcription

1 . Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report U.S. Department of Homeland Security In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation June 16, 2006 WORKING DRAFT AS OF 6/15/2006

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3 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD... v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... vii Overview...vii Key Findings and Initial Conclusions...viii Next Steps...xii INTRODUCTION... 1 Purpose... 1 Background... 1 President s Address to the Nation, September 15, Conference Report (House Report ) on H.R. 2360, DHS Appropriations Act of 2006, September 29, The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)... 2 Scope and Methods... 3 PHASE 2: RESULTS AND FINDINGS... 7 Statement of the Problem... 7 Analysis of Phase 1 Self-Assessments... 7 Current Capability for Mass Evacuations... 7 Catastrophic Event Planning... 9 Operational Solutions Preparedness Solutions Analysis of Plans and Supporting Materials Basic Plan Questions Common to All Functional Annexes Direction and Control Annex Communications Annex Warning Annex Emergency Public Information Annex Evacuation Annex Mass Care Annex Health and Medical Annex Resource Management Annex Overall Questions: Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability Comparative Analysis Comparison of Plans in the Hurricane Belt and the Balance of the Nation Comparison of Plans in EMAP-Accredited and Non-Accredited States Comparison of Planning Activities to Funding Priorities Page i

4 AREAS OF SPECIAL FOCUS Special Needs Overview Scope and Methods Results and Findings Citizen Preparedness Overview Scope and Methods Results and Findings Evacuation Plans Scope and Methods Findings INITIAL CONCLUSIONS For States and Urban Areas For the Federal Government SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS Appendix A: Acronyms... A-1 Appendix B: Information Bulletin B-1 Appendix C: Peer Review Template... C-1 Appendix D: References... D-1 Appendix E: Contributors...E-1 Appendix F: Phase 1 Report Executive Summary...F-1 Page ii

5 TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1: Participating States and Urban Areas...viii Figure 2: Results Current Capability for Mass Evacuations... 8 Figure 3: Results Catastrophic Event Planning... 9 Figure 4: Results Operational Solutions Figure 5: Results Preparedness Solutions Figure 6: Results Basic Plan Figure 7: Results Questions Common to All Functional Annexes Figure 8: Results Direction and Control Annex Figure 9: Results Communications Annex Figure 10: Results Warning Annex Figure 11: Results Emergency Public Information Annex Figure 12: Results Evacuation Annex Figure 13: Results Mass Care Annex Figure 14: Results Health and Medical Annex Figure 15: Results Resource Management Annex Figure 16: Results Overall Questions Figure 17: Map of States and Urban Areas in the Hurricane Belt Figure 18: State Plans in the Hurricane Belt (Y) and Balance of Nation (N) Figure 19: Urban Area Plans in the Hurricane Belt (Y) and Balance of Nation (N). 35 Figure 20: Map of EMAP-Accredited States and Urban Areas Figure 21: Plans in EMAP-Accredited (Y) and Non-Accredited States (N) Figure 22: SHSGP and UASI Funding Dedicated to Planning Figure 23: Special Needs Population in Hurricane Belt States by Disability Figure 24: Percent of Families with Disabilities by Region Figure 25: Citizen Preparedness Results Warning Annex Figure 26: Citizen Preparedness Results Emergency Public Information Annex. 50 Figure 27: Citizen Preparedness Results Evacuation Annex Figure 28: Citizen Preparedness Results Mass Care Annex Figure 29: Citizen Preparedness Results Companion and Service Animals Figure 30: Citizen Preparedness Results Non-Governmental Resources Figure 31: Citizen Preparedness Results Integration of Volunteers Figure 32: Citizen Preparedness Results Donations Management Figure 33: Question Ranking Used in the DOT Assessment Page iii

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7 FOREWORD The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for strengthening the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Planning is a key preparedness activity and a shared responsibility of all levels of government. The Department is committed to modernizing the collective planning capabilities of Federal, State, and local governments. All are making concerted efforts to improve plans, train, educate, and develop planners, and explore new means of collaboration. State and local governments have made admirable efforts in the face of difficult planning challenges. In his speech to the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, President Bush said, I consider detailed emergency planning to be a national security priority, and therefore, I ve ordered the Department of Homeland Security to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in every major city in America. I am pleased to submit the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report to Congress, as directed by the DHS FY 2006 Appropriations Act and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). This Report meets Congressional requirements to review and assess the status of catastrophic and evacuation planning in all States and 75 of the Nation s largest urban areas. It also addresses the President s directive to review emergency operations plans (EOPs) for the Nation s major cities. The Nationwide Plan Review consisted of two phases. The first phase involved selfassessment, in which each State and urban area certified the status of its EOP and identified when the plan was last updated and exercised. The findings from the selfassessment phase were provided to Congress on February 10, The second phase involved peer review, in which teams made up of former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials visited 131 States and urban areas. Over the course of 62 business days, these reviewers validated the self-assessments, determined requirements for Federal planning assistance, and drew initial conclusions for strengthening plans and planning processes at the Federal, State, and local levels of government for catastrophic events. This Report reflects findings from both phases of the Nationwide Plan Review. It also provides initial conclusions about measures required to make the United States better prepared to deal with catastrophes. I look forward to working with Congress to address the findings and initial conclusions described in this Report. Michael Chertoff Secretary Department of Homeland Security Page v

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9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overview Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left more than 1,300 dead in their wake, caused more than $80 billion in damage over 90,000 square miles, and forced mass evacuations from five States along the Gulf Coast. An estimated 600,000 households were displaced from affected areas and 50, ,000 remained in temporary housing six months later. As a result, 44 States and the District of Columbia received millions of evacuees, providing them with care and shelter over an extended period. These events tested the Nation s ability to respond to catastrophic events 1 and demonstrated the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of Federal, State, and local plans and the ability to quickly synchronize intergovernmental efforts. In response to these events, the President and Congress issued a series of calls for the Federal Government to determine the status of catastrophic planning in the States and Territories (hereinafter referred to as States) 2 and urban areas 3 across the Nation. In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and with support from the Department of Defense (DOD), launched the Nationwide Plan Review (or Review). The Review included two phases. In Phase 1, States and urban areas submitted self-assessments of their emergency operations plans (EOPs), focusing on their adequacy and feasibility to manage the consequences of a catastrophic event. In Phase 2, DHS employed Peer Review Teams consisting of 77 former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials to visit the States and urban areas, review and validate the self-assessments, and help determine requirements for Federal planning assistance. At the conclusion of each visit, the Peer Review Team completed a comprehensive report and submitted it to DHS. The speed and scope of data collection was extraordinary. The Peer Review Teams completed 131 site visits over the course of 62 business days, visited with over 1,086 public safety and homeland security officials, and collected and reviewed 2,757 EOPs and supporting documents. DHS and the Peer Review Teams conducted extensive coordination and analysis of self-assessments, field research, qualitative and quantitative 1 The National Response Plan (NRP) defines a catastrophic event as: any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. 2 As defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States. 6 U.S.C. 101(14). 3 As used in this report, the term urban areas refers to the 55 Fiscal Year 2005 Urban Areas Security Initiative program grantees and the 20 major cities selected for the Nationwide Plan Review by DHS based on an analysis of 2004 population, risk, and need. Page vii

10 data, and judgments of experienced interdisciplinary experts. In addition to a rapid assessment of the status of emergency planning, the Review provided other benefits, including: Collection and analysis of current plans from Review participants; Development of plan review criteria, validation of the peer review process, and creation of a core team of experts; and On-the-spot technical assistance and immediate feedback to other efforts, such as development of concepts of operation for the 2006 hurricane season. Figure 1: Participating States and Urban Areas Key Findings and Initial Conclusions While the Review found exemplary planners, renewed emphasis on planning, and many initiatives that are on the right trajectory, the current status of plans and planning gives grounds for significant national concern. Current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and not linked within a national planning system. This is incompatible with 21 st century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systemic problem: outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the Review support the need for a fundamental modernization of our Nation s planning processes. Page viii

11 Although the results of the Review were mixed, it clearly demonstrated that planners at every level of government are committed to strengthening their plans and planning processes. Planners interviewed during the Review overwhelmingly supported measures to reform current planning approaches. They recognize that the status quo makes the task of getting it right more difficult than any homeland security professional should be willing to accept. The threats and hazards we face are already sufficiently difficult; we should not have to fight our own plans and planning processes to prepare for or to perform our missions. The Nationwide Plan Review provided a rapid assessment of the status of catastrophic planning for States and 75 of the Nation s largest urban areas. For the purposes of this Executive Summary, the initial conclusions are summarized below. They are numbered for ease of reference, not prioritization. Each is explained in greater detail in the Initial Conclusions section of the Report. For States and Urban Areas: 1. The majority of the Nation s current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP). 2. States and urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of steady state preparedness. 3. Assumptions in Basic Plans do not adequately address catastrophic events. 4. Basic Plans do not adequately address continuity of operations and continuity of government. 5. The most common deficiency among State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes is the absence of a clearly defined command structure. 6. Many States and urban areas need to improve systems and procedures for communications among all operational components. 7. All Functional Annexes did not adequately address special needs populations. 8. States should designate a specific State agency that is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for including people with disabilities in the shelter operations process. 9. Timely warnings requiring emergency actions are not adequately disseminated to custodial institutions, appropriate government officials, and the public. 10. The ability to give the public accurate, timely, and useful information and instructions through the emergency period should be strengthened. 11. Significant weaknesses in evacuation planning are an area of profound concern. 12. Capabilities to manage reception and care for large numbers of evacuees are inadequate. 13. Capabilities to track patients under emergency or disaster conditions and license of out-of-state medical personnel are limited. Page ix

12 14. Resource management is the Achilles heel of emergency planning. Resource Management Annexes do not adequately describe in detail the means, organization, and process by which States and urban areas will find, obtain, allocate, track, and distribute resources to meet operational needs. 15. Plans should clearly define resource requirements, conduct resource inventories, match available resources to requirements, and identify and resolve shortfalls. For the Federal Government: 1. Planning products, processes, tools, and technologies should be developed to facilitate a common nationwide approach to catastrophic planning in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. 2. Planning modernization should be fully integrated with other key homeland security initiatives. 3. Clear guidance should be developed on how State and local governments plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners under the NRP. 4. Existing Federal technical assistance should be used to help States and urban areas address the specific issues identified during the Nationwide Plan Review. 5. Critical tasks, target capabilities, and associated performance measures, such as those identified in the National Preparedness Goal should serve as the common reference system for planning and the language of synchronization. 6. Detailed planning assumptions and planning magnitudes for catastrophic incidents should be defined, such as has been initiated through the National Planning Scenarios. 7. Current preparedness data should be readily accessible to planners. 8. Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal s National Priorities to Expand Regional Collaboration and Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. 9. Collaboration between government and non-governmental entities should be strengthened at all levels, as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal s National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration. 10. The Federal Government should develop a consistent definition of the term special needs. 11. The Federal Government should provide guidance to States and local governments on incorporation of disability-related demographic analysis into emergency planning. 12. Federal, State, and local governments should work with the private sector to identify and coordinate effective means of transporting individuals with disabilities before, during, and after an emergency. Page x

13 13. Improvements in public preparedness and emergency public information should be implemented in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. 14. Federal, State, and local governments should take action to better integrate nongovernmental resources to meet surge capacity. 15. The Federal Government should provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, standards, and resources necessary to build a shared national homeland security planning system. 16. Identification of desired technologies, tools, and architecture(s) for the national homeland security planning community should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. 17. Comprehensive national guidance on the potential consequences associated with catastrophic risks and hazards should be developed to drive risk management and operational planning. 18. Development of focused training, education, and professional development programs for homeland security planners should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. 19. Collaborative planning and planning excellence should be incentivized. Funding and projects should be linked to operational readiness through a specific task or capability in a plan or plan annex. 20. Federal, State, and local governments should increase the participation of people with disabilities and disability subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises. 21. The Federal Government should provide technical assistance to clarify the extent to which emergency communications, including public information associated with emergencies, must be in accessible formats for persons with disabilities. This assistance should address all aspects of communication, including, for example, televised and other types of emergency notification and instructions, shelter announcements, and applications and forms for government and private disaster benefits. 22. The status of the Nation s plans should be a central focus of the annual report to the President on the Nation s preparedness required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) 23. Emergency Operations Plans should be a focal point for resource allocation, accountability, and assessments of operational readiness. 24. Performance management frameworks to support the National Preparedness Goal should measure the ability to: Integrate a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response based on the intersection of tasks and capabilities in combined plans; and Maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical resources. Page xi

14 Next Steps Although our Nation s emergency services are the finest in the world, they labor under a handicap imposed by outmoded planning processes that are ill-suited to modern homeland security challenges. We rely to a troubling extent on plans that are created in isolation, are insufficiently detailed, and are not subject to adequate review. Time and again, these factors exact a severe penalty in the midst of a crisis: precious time is consumed in the race to correct the misperceptions of Federal, State, and local responders about roles, responsibilities, and actions. The result is uneven performance and repeated and costly operational miscues. Outmoded planning products, processes, and tools are primary contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. 4 These conclusions closely mirror findings in the Hurricane Katrina after-action reports. The complex reasons for the current status of plans, which are documented in this Report, reinforce the need to modernize our planning processes, products, tools, and the training, education, and development of homeland security planners who are expected to use them. When a catastrophic event overwhelms a single jurisdiction or has region-wide impact, effective response hinges on combined action and pooling of resources. Our large homeland security community is characterized by divided and decentralized planning responsibilities and highly diversified administration. Unity of effort is difficult without a consistent and logical way to synchronize combined Federal, multi-state, and multijurisdictional actions. Combined planning represents the single convergence point where Federal, State, and local concepts and resources can be translated into specific patterns of action and synchronized to achieve unity of effort. This point is the center of gravity for modernization. Planning modernization must be managed as a single program with established funding. The goal of the modernization program must be to establish a networked, collaborative national planning system that satisfies planners information needs; provides procedures and tools to accomplish pre-incident plan synchronization; allows faster development or revision of living plans; and provides flexible options that accommodate the diverse hazards and threats we face. The initial conclusions in this Report reflect an understanding that planning is a quest, not a guarantee. Even the best planners cannot fully anticipate surprise or novelty, or compensate for poor incident management. While no plan can guarantee success, inadequate plans are proven contributors to failure. 4 Federal Interagency planning is the subject of numerous recent reports and was not directly addressed in this Review. Where appropriate, the report references linkages and the relationship of Federal, State, and local planning. Page xii

15 INTRODUCTION Purpose The purpose of the Nationwide Plan Review was to assess the status of catastrophic planning and draw initial conclusions for strengthening plans and planning processes at the Federal, State, and local levels of government. Catastrophic planning should address: Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and privatesector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. 5 The guiding principles of the Nationwide Plan Review were to ensure the process promoted unity of effort; strengthened planning while preserving decentralized initiative; reinforced the role of States as intergovernmental pivot points; 6 identified systemic corrections for system-wide problems; and ensured plans target the delivery of precise effects that directly contribute to coping with catastrophic events. Background In the wake of the 2005 hurricane season, the President and Congress established a series of requirements to review the status of catastrophic planning across the Nation. President s Address to the Nation, September 15, 2005 On September 15, 2005, President Bush addressed the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, Louisiana on recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The President said: Our cities must have clear and up-to-date plans for responding to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, or terrorist attack... for evacuating large numbers of people in an emergency and for providing the food, water, and security they would need. In a time of terror threats and weapons of mass destruction, the danger to our citizens reaches much wider than a fault line or a flood plain. I consider detailed emergency planning to be a national security priority. Therefore, I have ordered the Department of Homeland Security to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in every major city in America. 5 National Response Plan, p Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States, Tierney, Lindell and Perry 2001, p. 63: State government has been described (Durham and Suiter, 1991) as the pivot in the intergovernmental system... in a position to determine the emergency management needs and capabilities of its political subdivisions and to channel State and Federal resources to local government. Page 1

16 Conference Report (House Report ) on H.R. 2360, DHS Appropriations Act of 2006, September 29, 2005 The Statement of the Managers accompanying the Conference Report (House Report ) on H.R. 2360, the DHS Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L ), directed the Secretary [of Homeland Security] to report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass evacuation planning, in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban areas by February 10, According to the conferees: It is imperative that all States and Urban Area Security Initiative grantees ensure there are sufficient resources devoted to putting in place plans for the complete evacuation of residents, including special needs groups in hospitals and nursing homes, or residents without access to transportation, in advance of and after such an event, as well as plans for sustenance of evacuees. Congress also established the requirement that the Nationwide Plan Review include certifications from each State and urban area on the status of evacuation plans, the date those plans were last updated and exercised, and plans for providing mass care. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) Section of P.L , the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) stated in part: The Secretary [of Transportation] and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with Gulf Coast States and contiguous States, shall jointly review and assess Federal and State evacuation plans for catastrophic hurricanes impacting the Gulf Coast Region and report its findings and recommendations to Congress The Secretaries shall consult with appropriate Federal, State, and local transportation and emergency management agencies and consider, at a minimum, all practical modes of transportation available for evacuations; the extent to which evacuation plans are coordinated with neighboring States; methods of communicating evacuation plans and preparing citizens in advance of evacuations; and methods of coordinating communication with evacuees during plan execution. Following the President s address, Secretary Chertoff directed development of a methodology to conduct the Review and wide consultation with the States and urban areas involved in the Review. DHS arranged a series of conference calls with State Homeland Security Advisors, emergency management directors, and major city and county homeland security officials to solicit their ideas on the most effective and expeditious means to accomplish the Review. These calls included nearly 300 participants. State and local officials pledged full cooperation and provided three important recommendations: first, to focus on urban areas rather than cities to promote a regional approach; second, to plan for evacuation from end-to-end, including reception and re-entry; and third, to leverage current national initiatives such as the National Response Plan (NRP), National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal. Based on the direction and deadlines provided by the President and Congress, DHS devised a two-phase methodology consisting of self-assessment and peer review. The proposed methodology was approved by Secretary Chertoff on October 25, He Page 2

17 directed the new Preparedness Directorate to lead the effort. Directorate representatives met frequently with counterparts in DOT to coordinate efforts. DOD planners provided valuable assistance in the design of the process and the development of the Review criteria. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of Community Preparedness provided assistance in the development of the Review criteria and in-depth analysis related to special needs populations and citizen preparedness. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided expert assistance throughout the course of the Review. Following an investigation into the Federal, State, and local response to Hurricane Katrina, in February 2006 the White House published The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, which amplified the President s direction by recommending that DHS coordinate with the Department of Transportation to evaluate all State evacuation plans as well as the evacuation plans of the 75 largest urban areas. In addition, the Report recommended an enhancement of the ongoing review to incorporate an assessment of planning for continuity of government. Scope and Methods Information Bulletin 197 (IB197), issued by DHS on November 23, 2005, organized the Nationwide Plan Review in two phases (see Appendix B). Phase 1 consisted of a selfassessment and certification of plan status by each State and urban area. States and urban areas were required to use FEMA s State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All- Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, as a reference. State and urban areas were requested to provide any recommended changes to SLG 101 that they identified during the course of their plan review. They were also instructed that they could supplement SLG 101 with information from other nationally accepted reference documents, provided that they cited those references. A list of suggested references was provided. FEMA published SLG 101, the Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, in September It replaced Civil Preparedness Guide (CPG) 1-8, Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Plans (September 1990), CPG 1-8a, Guide for the Review of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans (October 1992), and CPG 1-10, Guide for the Development of a State and Local Continuity of Government Capability (July 1987). It provides State and local officials with a concept for developing risk-based, all-hazard EOPs. SLG 101 provides a toolbox of ideas on the planning process and plan contents. It does not establish requirements and its recommendations may be used, adapted, or disregarded. Specifically, SLG 101 should help State and local emergency management organizations produce EOPs that: Serve as the basis for effective response to any hazard that threatens the jurisdiction; Facilitate integration of mitigation into response and recovery activities; and Facilitate coordination with the Federal Government during catastrophic disaster situations. Page 3

18 Phase 2 consisted of peer review by teams of former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials who visited each State and urban area to validate plan status and determine requirements for planning assistance. Peer review was an essential part of the process for several reasons: reviewers possessed in-depth expertise; the reviewers decades of experience were particularly important given the high turnover among homeland security and emergency management officials at all levels of government; and using reviewers with experience in hundreds of disasters compensated for uneven experience across the Nation with catastrophic incidents. Peer Review Teams worked with homeland security advisors to conduct site visits between February 1 and April 27, Site visits were scheduled to require no more than two business days. Secretary Chertoff sent a letter of introduction to the Governors and Mayors, asking each of them to identify a member of their immediate staff to attend the sessions, along with members of their leadership team with planning responsibilities. The Peer Review Teams used a standard Template which was provided to the State and urban area officials in advance to organize the review and guide discussion. DHS developed the Template (see Appendix C) in consultation with subject-matter experts from DOD, DOT, and senior members of the Peer Review Teams. The Template included a submission checklist, 11 questions related to the States and urban areas selfassessments, and 34 questions to guide review of the EOPs and supporting materials. The questions and review criteria were refined based upon test case analyses and feedback from early site visits. Since States and urban areas are not required to use a standard format or standard annexes or emergency support functions, the review process and Template were designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate variations in format and content of plans. The Template required answers to be stated in the form of strengths and potential best practices, areas for improvement, specific needs for Federal technical assistance, and secondary sources that provided additional evidence of capability, such as procedures and resource management tools. Each question in the Template included detailed criteria to determine whether responses were Sufficient, Partially Sufficient, or Not Sufficient. The criteria were based on specific indicators drawn from existing Federal planning guidance such as SLG 101 and voluntary standards such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity. The criteria helped to ensure consistency among Peer Review Team assessments. Generally speaking, these three assessment levels were defined as follows: Sufficient. Formal plan components and associated capabilities were in place at the time of the review that were compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could meet the requirements of a catastrophic incident. Partially Sufficient. Formal or informal plan components and associated capabilities were in place at the time of the Review that were partially compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could meet some, but not all, requirements of a catastrophic incident. Not Sufficient. Formal or informal plan components and associated capabilities were not in place at the time of the Review that were compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could not meet the requirements of a catastrophic incident. Page 4

19 The majority of responses over the course of the Phase 2 Peer Review Team assessments tended to fall in the Partially Sufficient category. Considerable planning activity is underway across the homeland security community, and this is reflected in the preponderance of Partially Sufficient ratings. However, the impact of the lack of an interrelated national planning system, inadequate national guidance, and outmoded planning processes was best summed up by one Peer Review Team member: They are doing a lot of things, but they are not sure they add up to catastrophic planning. Following each site visit, Peer Review Teams completed a comprehensive report. Drafts were submitted to DHS for review and approval. DHS shared final reports with the individual States and urban areas and offered the opportunity to submit written comments on their views of the process and findings. Access to individual reports for States and urban areas was restricted and reports are designated For Official Use Only. This process adhered to Secretary Chertoff s stated objective in the letter of introduction to the Governors and Mayors: I assure you that I am deeply committed to a process that provides you and your team with immediate feedback that you can use, and an opportunity to make specific recommendations regarding actions that we can take at the Federal level to help support and improve the quality and consistency of planning for catastrophic emergencies that can affect all Americans. Page 5

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21 PHASE 2: RESULTS AND FINDINGS Over the course of six months, DHS collected and analyzed self-assessments and EOPs and supporting materials from 131 States and urban areas to determine the status of catastrophic planning. Phase 2 results and findings build on the interim findings provided in the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1 Report (see Appendix F). Statement of the Problem The findings of the Nationwide Plan Review can be reduced to six major observations that highlight the need for fundamental planning modernization: Catastrophic planning efforts are unsystematic and uneven. Rapid homeland security mission expansion and the diversity of risks outpaced planning, and planning actions have outstripped planning documentation. Planning processes are outmoded, current tools and guidance are rudimentary, and planning expertise is insufficient for catastrophic incidents. Collaboration requirements are not well-defined, fostering a tendency to plan internally. The prevailing approach to planning emphasizes general roles and responsibilities over detailed procedures for specific hazards, scenarios, or thresholds of incidents. The feasibility of plans is dependent upon resource inventories, databases, and resource tracking mechanisms, all of which are areas of universal weakness. Analysis of Phase 1 Self-Assessments The Peer Review Template included 11 questions for review and validation of the selfassessments that were provided by the States and urban areas in Phase 1. The questions were organized into four categories: 1. Current Capability for Mass Evacuations 2. Catastrophic Event Planning 3. Operational Solutions (short-term actions to address critical issues) 4. Preparedness Solutions (long-term actions to address critical issues) The Peer Review Teams worked closely with the States and urban areas to review and validate the answers to these questions and determine requirements for planning assistance, which are summarized below. Current Capability for Mass Evacuations A majority of State and urban area self-assessments were rated as Partially Sufficient (see Figure 2). Many States are in the process of developing formal plans to strengthen evacuation capabilities and are establishing mechanisms for coordinating mass evacuation across local and surrounding jurisdictions. State assessments were rated as marginally more Sufficient than those of urban areas (13% versus 7%). Page 7

22 Figure 2: Results Current Capability for Mass Evacuations Current Capability for Mass Evacuations Does the narrative describe in specific and measurable terms how a successful mass evacuation could be conducted with current capability in the State/urban area (i.e. how many people in total, including what percentage with what types of special needs, over what time period, using what evacuation and shelter options)? States Urban Areas S PS NS S PS NS 13% 80% 7% 7% 82% 11% S = SUFFICIENT PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT NS = NOT SUFFICIENT State and urban area responses reflect the very different roles and responsibilities each level of government has in evacuation planning. Urban areas were much more likely to have completed some preparation for evacuating large segments of the population. Many included a greater level of detail; the likely scenarios that would require this action; and the evacuation volume and shelter requirements. In some cases, specific timelines by hazard for evacuating sectors of an urban area were charted and addressed in plans. Shortfalls included a lack of clear protocols and triggers for evacuation; weaknesses in procedures and means for warning and notification to initiate and manage the evacuation; and access to personnel trained in the tasks required for evacuations. While similar issues were identified for States during this effort, the context was significantly different. Many States identified little or no need to plan for evacuation of the entire state. Those States viewed their role as supporting local jurisdictions for conduct of evacuations. At the State level, there were generally two primary areas of focus: the need to support an evacuation of a region (e.g. urban areas or emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants); and the need to support a large-scale mass care and sheltering activity (discussed later in this Report). States raised general concerns that they had neither a clear understanding of the timelines, expectations, and metrics for evacuations, nor the planning and exercise expertise to fully address mass evacuation requirements. Page 8

23 Catastrophic Event Planning A majority of State and urban area self-assessments were rated Partially Sufficient on questions related to Catastrophic Event Planning (see Figure 3). Catastrophic Event Planning Figure 3: Results Catastrophic Event Planning What changes in authorities or regulations are necessary for your plan to meet the demands of a catastrophic event? What actions are being taken to ensure the resiliency of your social services and to ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event? What actions are being taken to fully address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities? What actions are being taken to ensure prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities? What actions are being taken to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e. law enforcement) following a catastrophic event? What actions are being taken to strengthen regional planning and to ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local State Federal), can meet needs? What actions are being taken to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event? What actions are being taken to ensure your evacuation planning is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, uses all available transportation modes (ground, rail, air, and sea) and resources, identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifies destinations and shelter options for displacement populations? States Urban Areas S PS NS S PS NS 55% 45% 0% 41% 55% 4% 27% 66% 7% 5% 91% 4% 5% 82% 13% 4% 85% 11% 9% 71% 20% 10% 82% 8% 39% 59% 2% 51% 49% 0% 45% 50% 5% 59% 41% 0% 14% 73% 13% 9% 84% 7% 9% 68% 23% 7% 86% 7% S = SUFFICIENT PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT NS = NOT SUFFICIENT Three questions (those related to emergency authorities, prompt augmentation of response resources, and regional planning) received significantly higher percentages of Sufficient ratings at both the State and urban area level. The question on planning for special needs populations, particularly persons with disabilities, received the lowest percentage of Sufficient responses at both the State and urban area level. DHS conducted a focused analysis of this issue (see Areas of Special Focus: Special Needs). Page 9

24 A number of trends pointed to differences in planning deficiencies of States and urban areas. For example, only 5% of urban areas were deemed to be taking sufficient actions to ensure the resiliency of social services for catastrophic events, compared to 27% of States. In addition, 59% of urban areas were determined to be undertaking sufficient action to strengthen regional planning, as opposed to only 45% of States. Finally, 23% of States plans were assessed as Not Sufficient to ensure evacuation planning that is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, compared to only 7% of urban areas. These findings indicate that States tend to struggle most with issues surrounding broader regional planning where planning requirements exceed their customary planning scope and require intricate coordination across State boundaries. The larger implication of these findings is, in general, that areas prone to a regular cycle of large-scale or catastrophic incidents (such as hurricanes, major earthquakes, or expansive wildfires) or that have been sites of large mass-casualty events (such as terrorism) are more likely to have undertaken what could be characterized as a reasonable level of catastrophic planning. Even in these cases, and in general across all the other Review participants, mutual aid agreements (MAAs) tend to be informal or do not cover critical issues such as liability. The critical capability to effectively manage resources is also limited. This is particularly acute where resource management spans jurisdictional boundaries and resource management transactions involve incompatible resource management systems. The likelihood and magnitude of catastrophic threats and hazards has not been adequately analyzed or articulated. In general, EOP annexes simply do not address catastrophic requirements or can be characterized as weak in relation to catastrophic incidents. States and urban areas recognize these areas of weakness, and Peer Review Teams observed that most Review participants are in the process of revising EOPs to incorporate catastrophic planning requirements. However, teams also found that jurisdictions were attempting to revise their EOPs to incorporate catastrophic event planning without adequate national direction and guidance. Observations from site visits strongly support the need for an interrelated national planning system with standard operational documentation that supports planning and resource activities at all levels. Operational Solutions Approximately three-quarters of State and urban area self-assessments were rated by Peer Review Teams as Partially Sufficient in identifying short-term operational solutions to critical issues and constraints associated with catastrophic event planning. In addition, 27% of States were judged Sufficient in identifying operational solutions compared to 15% of urban areas. Page 10

25 Figure 4: Results Operational Solutions States Urban Areas Operational Solutions S PS NS S PS NS Does the narrative identify short-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified above? Actions should include work-arounds that will be employed as interim measures pending longer term solutions. 27% 68% 5% 15% 77% 8% S = SUFFICIENT PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT NS = NOT SUFFICIENT States and urban areas indicated that operational solutions require institutionalized plans, processes, and protocols to support the principles of NIMS. Jurisdictions that identified strong operational solutions generally had NIMS-compliant plans and protocols. They also possessed standard mechanisms to identify, evaluate, and then correct critical operational issues. Other Review data suggests that development of operational solutions is hampered by systemic issues that include: the lack of planning guidance; the need for additional personnel and access to subject-matter expertise; and requirements for comprehensive hazard/vulnerability/impact analysis. Preparedness Solutions A third of States self-assessments were rated as Sufficient by Peer Review Teams in identifying long-term preparedness solutions to issues associated with catastrophic event planning, as opposed to 12% of urban areas. It is worth noting that States have been required as a condition of Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funding to develop three-year strategic plans. Of the 75 urban areas reviewed, only the 55 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) urban areas have a similar requirement. Figure 5: Results Preparedness Solutions States Urban Areas Preparedness Solutions S PS NS S PS NS Does the narrative describe long-term actions to build capability to address the critical issues/constraints identified above? These actions should be reflected in your State/urban area/major city homeland security strategy. 34% 57% 9% 12% 80% 8% S = SUFFICIENT PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT NS = NOT SUFFICIENT States and urban areas identified an inter-dependency between development of long-term, preparedness solutions and the cultivation of regional and inter-jurisdictional relationships. For both States and urban areas, development of preparedness solutions often took place via cooperative planning efforts with Federal, regional, State, and local Page 11

26 partners. For example, many urban areas identified the critical role of regional working groups in identifying long-term issues and developing corrective actions through multijurisdictional approaches. Many States also noted their efforts in assisting local jurisdictions to identify and resolve long-term planning issues. Other Review data suggests that preparedness solutions are also hampered by systemic issues that include: the lack of planning guidance; the need for additional personnel and access to subject-matter expertise; and requirements for comprehensive hazard/ vulnerability/impact analysis. Analysis of Plans and Supporting Materials The Peer Review Template included 34 questions to guide review of EOPs and supporting materials. These questions were organized into 11 categories: 1. Basic Plan 2. Questions Common to All Functional Annexes 3. Direction and Control Annex 4. Communications Annex 5. Warning Annex 6. Emergency Public Information Annex 7. Evacuation Annex 8. Mass Care Annex 9. Health and Medical Annex 10. Resource Management Annex 11. Overall Questions The Peer Review Teams reviewed plans and supporting materials prior to site visits and worked closely with the States and urban areas to gather additional information during the visit to fully address the questions and determine requirements for planning assistance, which are summarized below. Basic Plan The Basic Plan provides an overview of the jurisdiction s approach to emergency operations. It details emergency response policies, describes the response organization, and assigns tasks. Although the Basic Plan contributes to development of functional annexes, its primary intended audience consists of the jurisdiction s chief executive, his or her staff, and agency heads. 7 7 SLG 101, p Page 12