Institut d'économie appliquée. Health and Labor Economics (Public)

Transcription

1 PHD Institut d'économie appliquée Health and Labor Economics (Public) Group J01 Lecturer(s) Pierre Thomas Léger Associate Professor pierre-thomas.leger@hec.ca (514) Office :4.111 Daniel Parent Associate Professor daniel.parent@hec.ca (514) Office :4.348a Secretary(ies) Jocelyne Brodeur Secretary jocelyne.brodeur@hec.ca (514) Office :4.108 Presentation The first part focuses on selected topics in health economics. In this part of the course, five generally defined topics will be discussed. First, we present Grossman's model of the demand for healthcare (as well as some extensions), including the concept of a health production function. The empirical literature testing different predictions from this model will also be discussed. Next, we present both the theoretical and empirical literature examining the health insurance insurance. We then present the supply-side of the equation including while separately examining the hospital market and the physician (healthcare provider) market. Finally, we examine several different healthcare systems (including different funding options) with reference to the topics already seen in class. The second part is at the level of a first graduate course in labour economics in which selected topics will be covered. Since labour economics is a field combining the theoretical and empirical dimensions some time will be spent to cover empirical techniques, as required. In fact the first lecture will be devoted to the econometric techniques used in the articles. It is assumed that students are familiar with the basic multivariate linear model. Given the time constraint (six 3-hour lectures), we will cover only a few topics. I prefer to go through 2-3 topics in some depth than to superficially cover topics. Learning Material HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 1/6

2 Evaluations Assessment Summary Final Exam 50 % See HEC en ligne for date Presentation 25 % Literature Review (individual or 25 % team) Final Exam (50 %) See HEC en ligne for date Individual Presentation (25 %) Individual Literature Review (individual or team) (25 %) Team Course Organisation 1 - Introduction to the consumer/patient's problem 1.1 The Grossman model of healthcare consumption/investment 1.2 The health-production function 1.3 The price and income elasticity of healthcare consumption Grossman, M (1972 ). «On the concept of health capital and the demand for health», Journal of Political Economy 80, vol., no.. Manning, W.G, Newhouse, J.P. N. Duan and al (1987). «Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment», American Economic Review 77, vol., no.. HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 2/6

3 Grossman, M (2000). The Human Capital Model,, Eds: Culyer, AJ and J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier). Chapter 7, pages The Insurance Market 2.1 Risk aversion 2.2 Risk and behaviour (ex ante moral hazard) 2.3 Insurance and healthcare consumption (ex post moral hazard) 2.4 Adverse selection 2.5 Cost-sharing (co-payments ) Rothschild, M. and J.E. Stiglitz (1976 ). «Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information», Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, vol., no.. Cutler, D.M. and R. J. Zeckhauser (2000). The Anatomy of Helath Insurance,, Eds: Culyer, AJ et J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 11, pages Introduction to the physician's problem 3.1 The physician's ojective function 3.2 Information asymmetry 3.3 Fee-for-service payments and supplier induced demand 3.4 Prospective payment systems (capitation, fundholding, profit sharing ) 3.5 Medical malpractice HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 3/6

4 Blomqvist, A (1991). «The doctor as a double agent: information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care», Journal of Health Economics 10, vol., no.. Blomqvist, A. and P.T. Léger (2005). «Information Asymmetry and the Decision to Hospitalize», Journal of Health Economics 24, vol., no.. Danzon, P (2000). Liabiliity for Medical Malpractice,, Eds: Culyer, AJ et J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 26, pages Léger, P.T (2008). Physician Payment Mechanisms,, Eds: M. Lu and Egon Jonsson, Wiley VCH. in Financing Health Care Chapter 7, pages Ma, C.A. and T.G. McGuire (1997). «Optimal health insurance and provider payment», American Economic Review 87, vol., no.. Devlin, R.A. and S. Sarma (2008). «Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian Family Physicians», Journal of Health Economics 27, vol., no.. Available at the library Dumont, E., Fortin, B., Jacquemet, N. and B. Shearer (2008). «Physician multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment», Journal of Health Economics 27, vol., no The Healthcare Market 4.1 The industrial organization of healthcare 4.2 The hospital 4.3 Hospital competition 4.4 Managed care HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 4/6

5 Dranove, D. and M.A. Satterthwaite (2000). The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets,, Eds: Culyer, AJ and J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 20, pages Glied, S (2000). Managed Care,, Eds: Culyer, AJ et J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 13, pages Sloan, F.A (2000). Not-For-Profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior,, Eds: Culyer, AJ et J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 21, pages Cutler, D. and M. McClellan et J.P. Newhouse (2000). «How does managed care do it?», Rand 31, vol., no.. Gaynor, M., J.B. Rebitzer, and L.J. Taylor (2004 ). «Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organization», Journal of Political Economy 112, vol., no.. Available at the library 5 - Healthcare systems 5.1 A single-payer Canadian type system 5.2 An American type system 5.3 Other types HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 5/6

6 Gerdtham, U.G. and B. Jonsson (2000). International Comparisons of Health Expenditure,, Eds: Culyer, AJ et J.P. Newhouse: Elsevier. Chapter 1, pages Blomqvist, A (2008). Social Health Insurance: Government Funding of Health Care,, Eds: M. Lu and Egon Jonsson, Wiley-VCH. in Financing Health Care Chapter 2, pages HEC Montréal Regulations Plagiarism Please consult the acts and gestures that are considered plagiarism or another academic violation, along with the applicable procedure and sanctions, which range up to suspension and even expulsion from HEC Montréal. Violations are analyzed based on the facts and circumstances, and sanctions are applied accordingly. Learn more about plagiarism... Calculators Please consult the calculator usage policy during exams when applicable. HEC Montréal 2013, All rights reserved 6/6