Reducing the Recidivism Rate for Non- Violent Felony Drug Offenders in California: Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Alternative Re- Entry Programs

Transcription

1 Reducing the Recidivism Rate for Non- Violent Felony Drug Offenders in California: Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Alternative Re- Entry Programs Katie Wagnon University of Denver Institute for Public Policy Spring 2014 Advisor: Professor Robert Fusfeld CBA Advisor: Dr. Andy Sharma

2 Table of Contents Executive Summary:... 4 Problem Definition and Introduction:... 5 Problem Definition:... 5 Introduction:... 5 Methodology:... 6 Status Quo- California:... 7 Recidivism:... 7 Prison Overcrowding:... 8 Cost of Incarceration:... 9 Link between Substance Abuse and Crime:... 9 Economic Impact of Substance Abuse: Why these Policy Alternatives: Identify Stakeholders: Issue Analysis: Correctional Programs: Historical Background: Policy Alternatives: Hawaii HOPE (Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement): HOPE Program Characteristics: Policy Advantages: Policy Disadvantages: The Kings County Drug Treatment Alternative- to- Prison (DTAP): DTAP Program Characteristics: Policy Advantages: Policy Disadvantages: Drug Courts- Portland, Oregon: Portland Drug Court Characteristics: Policy Advantages: Policy Disadvantages: Cost Benefit Analysis CBA Methodology CBA Matrix and Results: Results of CBA: Sensitivity Analysis- Adjustment in Social Discount Rate: Net Present Value- Adjustment in SDR: Sensitivity Analysis- Adjustment in offender population: Qualitative Costs: Weaknesses and Limitations: General Constraints: CBA constraints: Strategic Recommendations: Appendix A: Statistical Inputs- Status Quo

3 Appendix B: Statistical Inputs- Hawaii HOPE Appendix C: Statistical Inputs- DTAP Appendix D: Statistical Inputs- Drug Court Appendix E: CBA Calculations

4 Executive Summary: This policy memorandum evaluates the effectiveness of alternative re-entry programs for non-violent felony drug offenders. Using California as a representative case study, this analysis examines three different re-entry programs used to lower non-violent felony drug offenders recidivism rates and keep them out of prison. The three policy alternatives are: 1) Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE); 2) King s County Drug Treatment Alternative to-prison (DTAP); and 3) Multnomah County (Portland) Drug Court. Although these policy alternatives are analyzing data specific to California, they can be used for comparison when evaluating potential alternative re-entry programs for non-violent felony drug offenders in other states. California s three-year recidivism rate for all non-violent felony drug offenders is approximately 62%. This statistic is significant since non-violent felony drug offenders make up approximately 1/5 of California s prison population. Drug offenders recidivism rates are not only high in California, but are contributing to the state s overcrowded correctional facilities and expensive incarceration costs. California has one of the highest incarceration rates in the United States, and in 2011 California s prisons reached 144% of capacity. The Supreme Court ordered the state to reduce its prison population by at least 33,000 inmates. The state has until February 2016 to achieve this reduction in their prison population. In addition to having to cut the prison population, California is experiencing budget constraints. It currently has the highest cost of incarceration of any state (approximately $50,000 a year per inmate). California is expected to spend almost $1.7 billion to incarcerate non-violent felony drug offenders in This analysis concludes the Hawaii s HOPE program is the optimal policy for California. HOPE offenders will cost the state about $1,000 each and the program is expected to yield almost $2 billion more in financial net benefits than any other policy option. HOPE s behavioral triage model and demand for personal responsibility and accountability results in offenders who are 55% less likely to be arrested for a new crime, and are over 70% less likely to return to using drugs. - 4-

5 Problem Definition and Introduction: Problem Definition: The recidivism rate for non- violent felony drug offenders in California is contributing to the excessive overcrowding of prisons and the high costs of incarceration. Introduction: This policy memorandum addresses how the recidivism rate for non-violent felony drug offenders in California is contributing to the state s overcrowded prison system and exorbitant incarceration costs. Drug use, especially habitual usage, harms offenders and their families mentally, physically and socially. However, society as a whole is burdened with the responsibility of responding to the actions and consequences of their drug use. The most common correctional method used in response to non-violent felony drug offenders is a prison sentence. In California the average prison sentence for a non- violent felony drug offense is approximately 21 months. 1 When felony offenders are discharged from the correctional system they encounter several undesirable challenges, many of which are out of their control. The social stigma of being in prison and being labeled a convicted felon makes offenders transition back into society even more difficult. The label of convicted felon can strip an individual of the right to vote, serve on juries, own firearms, or hold public office. In many states, convicted felons are prohibited from obtaining student loans and employment in fields that work with vulnerable populations. 2 In addition, the label of convicted felon may contribute to various informal exclusions that can make access to noncriminal activities more difficult and criminal activities more attractive. 3 Therefore, a 1 The average sentence time served statistic is from 2010 and accounts for both sales related and possession crimes. California Prisoners and Parolees Statistical Summary. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Sacramento, California p The types of fields with legal prohibition against ex- offenders are childcare, education, security and healthcare. Employment Information Handbook for ex- offenders. U.S Department of Labor Bales, William, Kelle Barrick and Ted Chiricos. The Labeling of Convicted Felons and its Consequences for Recidivism. Criminology. Vol. 45(3):2007. p

6 significant consequence of a challenging transition is offenders have difficulty maintaining a lifestyle that is conducive for them to succeed. A critical goal of the criminal justice system is non-violent felony drug offenders will become productive members of society. A prison sentence is a not one-size fits all solution that guarantees when offenders leave prison they will remain rehabilitated and will not return to prison. Unfortunately many drug offenders return to committing the crimes that originally put them in prison. They often find themselves constantly in and out of the criminal justice system and never responsible for maintaining a steady and productive lifestyle. Prisons along with parole and probation agencies, social service providers and community organizations 4 strive to address offenders need of quitting their drug use and provide them with essential tools to help ease their transition back into the community. Policymakers across the nation are faced with the challenge of determining, which polices will successfully, and cost-effectively prevent drug offenders from committing new crimes. Preventing offenders from committing more crimes once released is a crucial both in terms of preventing future victimization and ensuring that taxpayers dollars are spent effectively. 5 This policy memorandum seeks to evaluate the public discussion about recidivism rates of non-violent felony drug offenders, dig more deeply into the factors that impact their rates of return to prison, and evaluate three strategies for reducing the recidivism rate of non-violent felony drug offenders in California. Methodology: California is a good case study to use when analyzing non-violent felony drug offenders because; this population of offenders makes up approximately 1/5 of the total prison population and their threeyear recidivism rate is 62%. Additionally the excessive prison overcrowding and the mandated reduction of inmates is forcing the state to decide which offenders to release from prison and where they need to allocate money in order to prevent these offenders from returning to prison. 4 State of Recidivism- The Revolving Door of America s Prisons. The PEW Center on the States. April p Ibid. - 6-

7 Status Quo- California: Recidivism: Recidivism is defined as A person s relapse into criminal behavior, often after receiving sanctions or undergoing intervention for a previous crime. 6 Recidivism studies typically follow offenders for three years after being released from the criminal justice system and track their criminal behavior. Offenders are often return to prison for one of two reasons 1) For committing a new crime that results in a new conviction or 2) For a technical violation of supervision, such as not reporting to their parole or probation officer or failing a drug test. 7 This policy memorandum will only use the single measure of re-arrest for a new crime when examining California s non-violent felony drug offenders recidivism rates. Re-arrest for new crimes was chosen, because offenders are most likely to commit new crimes within the first three years of their release from the criminal justice system. According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation s Evaluation Report, non-violent felony drug offenders have the second highest recidivism rate in the state. The report revealed the recidivism rate for nonviolent felony drug offenders increased significantly every year after the offender was released from prison. The recidivism rate for the first year was 45.5 % and eventually reached 61.5 % by the third year. 8 Figure 1- Recidivism Rate for California Non- Violent Felony Drug Offenders 6 Recidivism. National Institute of Justice < 7 State of Recidivism- The Revolving Door of America s Prisons. The PEW Center on the States. April p California Report,

8 Prison Overcrowding: In 2008 California s incarcerated population was 170,283 9 and the prisons were operating at close to 200% of design capacity. 10 However, California has experienced a noticeable decrease in its overall prison population, and the current prison population is 139, This has largely contributed to the 2009-court mandate that requires the correctional system to reduce its population by at least 33, prisoners to help alleviate the overcrowding. The court mandate also demands California s prisons to reach a prison population that falls between 120% and 145%, 13 which can be achieved without having adverse effects on public safety. Figure 2 depicts California s projected reduction goals for the next three years. 14 Despite the reduction in the prison population, California still incarcerates more individuals than any other state except for Texas. 15 Figure 2- Projected Reduction in Prison Population 9 Monthly Report of Population- December California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. < 10 Coleman v. Schwarzenegger. Three- Judge Ruling. U.S. District Court. 09 Feb < 11 Monthly Report of Population- March California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. < Coleman v. Schwarzenegger. Three- Judge Ruling. U.S. District Court. 09 Feb Three- Judge Court Update. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. < 15 Bureau of Justice Statistics,

9 Cost of Incarceration: In 2011, California faced a $26.6 billion General Fund Budget deficit, in part because the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation s budget had grown from $5 billion to almost $ 9 billion in a decade. 16 According the Vera Institute of Justice the average annual cost of incarcerating an offender in a California prison is $ 51, A non-violent felony drug offender with an average prison sentence of 21 months costs $90,788, and the entire non-violent felony drug offender population costs California approximately $1.7 billion. This is critical because non-violent felony drug offenders account for approximately 19% of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation s overall budget ($8.9 billion). 18 Table 1- California's Annual Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison (2014) 19 Type of Expenditure Per Inmate Costs Percentage of Total Security $21,657 42% Inmate Health Care $13,704 27% Operations $7,946 15% Administration $3,847 7% Inmate Support & Rehab. Programs $4,727 9% Total $51, % Link between Substance Abuse and Crime: Because so many drug felons are also drug abusers, the provision of drug abuse treatment services can have an impact on an individual s behavior where the behavior of interest includes criminal activity and substance use. There is a well-researched link between substance abuse and criminal behavior. In 1999, the ADAM program found that the percentage of adult male arrestees testing positive for an illicit drug at the time of arrest ranged from 50% in San Antonio, Texas, to 77% in Atlanta, Georgia. 20 The 16 The Future of California Corrections. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation < 17 How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate. California Legislative Analyst Office. < 18 CDRC Budget Information California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. < 19 For a delineated breakdown of the annual incarceration costs please refer to the Appendix 20 (ONDCP, 2003). - 9-

10 combined impact of criminal activity and substance abuse is also well documented. BJS reported in 2002 that 68% of jail inmates reported symptoms in the year before their admission to jail that met substance dependence or abuse criteria. 21 Furthermore, there is evidence that treating substance abuse leads to a reduction in criminal behavior. For individuals receiving substance abuse treatment, the National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study found significant declines in criminal activity between the 12 months prior to treatment and the 12 months subsequent to treatment. 22 Those declines included: Self-reported incidence of selling drugs by 78 percent, Supporting oneself largely through illegal activity by more than 48 percent, and Arrests for any crime by 64 percent. Gerstein et al. found positive effects of substance abuse treatment on self-reported subsequent criminal activity in a statewide sample in California. 23 In a study using administrative data, comparing those who completed treatment with a comparison group of those eligible but not receiving treatment in Oregon, Finigan also found significant reduction in police- report arrests for those who completed treatment. 24 Economic Impact of Substance Abuse: The economic consequences to society of substance have long been detailed. From a health perspective, untreated substance abusers produce tangible costs to health systems from both the health complications of substance use as well as increased accidents that result from the use of drugs. In addition, substance abuse leads to other negative social behaviors that have cost consequences to other systems, such as the criminal justice system. French described an array of tangible and intangible costs of substance abuse. This underscores the fundamental reasoning of a cost-benefit approach to substance abuse treatment: untreated substance abuse is very costly to the individual, the individual s family and 21 (Karberg & James, 2002) 22 (NTIES, 1997) 23 (1994) 24 (1996) - 10-

11 friends, and to taxpayers who must, in one way or another, fund the consequences of the negative social behaviors that result from substance abuse. Policymakers and practitioners need cost-benefit information because substance abuse treatment and the courts increasing involvement in the treatment system are perceived as expensive to implement, and data are needed to demonstrate that such treatment reduces costs and recidivism in the long run. Why these Policy Alternatives: California has significant problems affecting its correctional system and it is critical the state considers policy alternatives that could help alleviate some of these problems. This policy memorandum will present three different alternative re-entry programs, which help to rehabilitate drug offenders and keep them out of prison. These three programs were selected because of their successful outcomes. The three proposed policy alternatives are: Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) is a probation program that targets probationers at highest-risk of violating the rules of probations. This intensive supervision probation program incorporates immediate swift and certain for any violations. Some of HOPE s successful results illustrated offenders were 72% less likely to use drugs and half as likely to be arrested for new crimes. 25 Brooklyn s Drug Treatment Alternative-to-Prison (DTAP) is a therapeutic community that provides substance abuse treatment under a sentencing model. Participants plead guilty and upon successful completion of the program are allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas. While in DTAP participants experience lengthy residential treatment to address their drug issues and receive job counseling and placement before exiting the program. DTAP graduates have a recidivism rate that is almost half the rate for comparable offenders who served time in prison. 26 Portland Drug Court is a specialized court-based program that target criminal offenders who have drug issues. The drug court comprehensive model consists of: offender assessment, judicial 25 Hawaii HOPE: A new probation program beats the statistics. PBS News Hour. Nov. 24, Swern, Anne. Drug Treatment Alternative- to- Prison. Twenty- Second Annual Report. King s County District Attorney Office. Jan

12 interactions, monitoring and supervision (e.g., drug testing), graduated sanctions and incentives, and treatment services. 27 Since 1989, 2,374 drug courts have been established in the United States, and they have reduced recidivism rates across the country in of range of 17% to 26%. 28 Identify Stakeholders: When evaluating a policy option it is critical policymakers consider the stakeholders. Stakeholders have an invested interest in the policy issue and are often very influential in the policymaking process. It is impossible to evaluate the interest of every stakeholder, so this policy memorandum will weigh the interest of the stakeholders whom are most affected by the reduction of nonviolent felony drug offenders recidivism rates in California. Non-Violent Felony Drug Offenders: The offenders have the greatest interest in reducing their recidivism rate. The Government: The government consists of the judicial system, correctional system and the state (taxpayers). The judicial system is responsible for all the legal work that comes with charging an individual with a felony. Once the offender is convicted the State and the Correctional Systems are responsible for paying for the offender s incarceration costs. Incarceration costs include: housing, food, health care, clothing, security, operations and rehabilitation programs. If the offender is part of an alterative supervision program, such as probation, parole, or alternative- incarceration programs the taxpayers and the correctional system are also responsible for the cost associated with these programs. Offender s Family and loved ones: Offender s family and loved ones are significant stakeholder, because they not only are affected financially but emotionally as well. When offenders are away their families must continue to find ways to supplement their lost income. Emotionally the families are affected by the absence of the offender and the time they have lost with them. 27 Drug Courts. National Institute of Justice. < courts/pages/welcome.aspx>. 28 Ibid - 12-

13 Social Costs and Benefits: Policymakers must consider the society affects of non-violent felony drug offenders, because society as a whole is burdened with the responsibility of responding to these offenders actions. Offender s actions place additional unintended costs on the society, such as reduce productivity and economic mobility. Issue Analysis: This section will begin by providing an overview of the different correctional programs the alternative re-entry policy alternatives this policy memorandum is evaluating. Next, this section will briefly discuss a historical overview of drug policies in the United States and what we can expect to see in the future. Finally this section will discuss survivor bias and how this theory relates to the each policy alternative. Correctional Programs: In order for the correctional system to attempt to rehabilitate these offenders and ensure they are not a threat to themselves or the general public offenders are often place under additional supervision in the form of probation or parole. Probation Refers to adult offenders whom courts place on supervision in the community through a probation agency, generally in lieu of incarceration. 29 While on probation offenders are required to fulfill certain conditions of their supervision they have agreed to and adhere to specific rules of conduct while in the community. If the offender fails to comply with any of these conditions they most likely will find themselves incarcerated. Parole Refers to criminal offenders who are conditionally released from prison to serve the remaining portion of their sentence in the community. Prisoners may be released to parole either by a parole board decision (discretionary release/ mandatory parole) or according to provisions of a statute (mandatory release/ mandatory parole). 30 However, parole and probation programs are not always the most successful or cost-effective options for non-violent felony drug offenders. 29Some jurisdictions do sentence probationers to a combined short-term incarceration sentence immediately followed by probation, which is referred to as a split sentence. BJS 30 BJS - 13-

14 Historical Background: America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all- out offensive (Nixon, 1971). 31 The United States has taken various approaches to battling drug use. In 1969 In a special message to Congress, President Nixon identified drug abuse as a serious national threat. He called for a national anti-drug policies at both the state and federal levels. 32 After drawing public attention to the serious threat drugs posed, President Nixon decided to make a bold proposal. In June 1971, he officially declared a War on Drugs, 33 and his first major drug policy achievement was the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in DEA was created in order to establish a single unified command to combat an all-out global war on the drug menace. At its outset, DEA had 1,470 Special Agents and a budget less than $75 million. Today, the DEA has nearly 5,000 Special Agents and a budget of $2.02 billion. 34. President Nixon clearly began a national conversation about drug use in the Untied States, but he also paved the path for a national initiative to flourish for decades. Another president that had a significant influence over the War on Drugs was President Reagan. His presidency Marked the beginning of a long period of skyrocketing incarceration rates. The number of people behind bars for non-violent drug law offenses increased from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by Not only did President Reagan make an attempt to lower drug use in the United States, so did the first lady. Nancy Reagan began a highly-publicized anti-drug campaign, coining the slogan Just Say No. 36 The Reagan Presidency also signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which appropriated $1.7 billion and created mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses Nixon, Richard. Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control. June 17, 1971 < 32 The Forgotten War on Drugs. Timeline: America s War on Drugs. NPR < 33 Ibid 34 Drug Enforcement Administration. DEA History < 35 A Brief History of the Drug War. Drug Policy Alliance. < solutions- drug- policy/brief- history- drug- war>. 36 Ibid 37 The Forgotten War on Drugs. Timeline: America s War on Drugs. NPR <

15 In 1988, President George H. Bush implemented the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). ONDCP advises the President on drug-control issues, coordinates drug-control activities and related funding across the Federal government, and it produces the annual National Drug Control Strategy, which outlines Administration efforts to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing and trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health consequences. 38 The next three presidency expanded the War on Drugs to include the international arena, but President Obama has shifted the focus back to the United States. The current drug policies of the Obama Administration emphasize community- based prevention programs and aligning criminal justice policies and public health systems to divert non-violent drug offenders into treatment instead of jail. 39 Policy Alternatives: The three alternative re-entry programs used to reduce the recidivism rate of non-violent felony drug offenders are: 1. Hawaii HOPE (Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement) 2. New York State, King s County DTAP (Drug Treatment Alternative- to Prison) 3. Drug Court- Portland Oregon This policy memorandum will compare the advantages and disadvantages associated with each policy option. Even though these alternative re-entry programs are located in other states, this analysis will address the replication and feasibility of reproducing similar programs in California. Hawaii HOPE (Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement): In fall 2004, the Hawaii Judiciary implemented a new probation program called Hawaii s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE). The program targets highest-risk offenders on probation: those with the worst drug problems (usually methamphetamine). HOPE also includes sex 38 About ONDCP. Office of National Drug Control Policy. < 39 About ONDCP. Office of National Drug Control Policy. <

16 offenders and domestic violence offenders, 40 but this policy memorandum will only focus on the druginvolved offenders. Drug-involved offenders make up approximately 90% of all HOPE program participants. 41 Prior to participating in HOPE, high-risk offenders under the traditional probation system were breaking probation in noticeable amounts. Of a randomly drawn group of 100 probationers, about 10 would fail to appear for drug testing and another 20 would test dirty for one or more illicit drugs, even though the appointments were announced far enough in advanced that probationers could escape detection merely by abstaining from drug use. 42 Having 10 or 20% of probationers committing violations may not seem significant, but Hawaii has approximately 8,000 offenders on probation. 43 This means approximately 800 offenders will fail to show for appointments and 1,600 will test dirty for drugs. The traditional probation system lacks crucial sanctioning procedures that helped prevent these offenders from returning to prison. Offenders in traditional probation on average could commit about a dozen violations before their probation is revoked. 44 The lack of enforcement for violations and the prior knowledge of drug tests does not modify offenders behavior, but instead encourages offenders to continue to commit violations. HOPE addresses these weaknesses by immediately enforcing behavioral modifying sanctions for all violations and creates an environment that requires offenders to take personal responsibility for their actions. HOPE Program Characteristics: HOPE changes how the Hawaii Judiciary system reacts to offenders breaking probation, by implementing three very distinct program characteristics. Instead of a delaying sanctions and enforcing them long after a violation is committed, HOPE calls for sanctioning practices that incorporates swift and certain responses. The HOPE program is designed so high-risk offenders are held accountable for meeting the requirements of the their probation. If they break probation they will receive immediate 40 Alm, Steven. HOPE for the Criminal Justice System. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Aug p It is critical to note drug- involved offenders include both non- violent and violent offenders. Therefore only one recidivism rate is calculated for this entire group of drug- involved offenders. Ibid. 42 Kleiman, Mark. Angela Hawkin. Fixing the Parole System. Issues in Science and Technology. Vol. 4(4):2008. p Lopez, Steve. Hawaii finds success with tough- love approach to repeat offenders. Los Angeles Times. Dec. 1, Lopez, Steve. Hawaii finds success with tough- love approach to repeat offenders. Los Angeles Times. Dec. 1,

17 consequences, which usually comes in the form of a few days to a few weeks in jail. 45 HOPE s approach is to respond immediately to probation violations, emphasizing swiftness and certainty rather than severity. 46 Next, HOPE requires random drug testing to ensure the offenders are compiling with the rules of their probation. Unlike regular probation, in which probationers know in advance when they will be tested for drugs, HOPE probationers are told to call a drug-test hotline every weekday morning. 47 Probationers are assigned a number and color, and they are responsible to call the hotline everyday to see if they are chosen to go in for a drug test on that given day. Approximately 80 % of HOPE offenders abuse drugs and alcohol. 48 It is critical if offenders do not show up for drug testing or test dirty they receive immediate jail time, so they can learn from their consequences. 49 When probationers first enter HOPE they are randomly tested at least once a week for the first six months. Offenders with successful drug test results are rewarded with less frequent testing. 50 Participation in HOPE is not voluntary for those selected. HOPE participants are expected to follow all the rules and regulations, but if they fail to comply they are not removed from the program. Instead of facing removal participants endure longer jail sentences for their violations. If offenders have used drugs, but confess to the probation officer before taking the test, they might get three days in jail. But if they fail to report they used drugs and then test positive, they re likely to get 15 days, followed by 30 days for the next offense. 51 The goal is offenders take responsibility for their actions and turn their lives around. Therefore, HOPE provides a safety net for many defendants who learn to successfully follow the conditions of probation and do not become another prison statistics Kleiman, Mark. Angela Hawkin. Fixing the Parole System. Issues in Science and Technology. Vol. 4(4):2008. p. 46 Bulman, Philip. Hawaii HOPE. National Institute of Justice Journal. p Alm, Steven. HOPE for the Criminal Justice System. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Aug p. 48 Hawaii HOPE: A new probation program beats the statistics. PBS News Hour. Nov. 24, Employed probationers are often permitted to serve their jail time on weekends, at least initially, to encourage continued employment (Philip Bulman,) 50 Alm, Steven. HOPE for the Criminal Justice System. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Aug p. 51 Lopez, Steve. Hawaii finds success with tough- love approach to repeat offenders. Los Angeles Times. Dec. 1, Alm, Steven. HOPE for the Criminal Justice System. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Aug p

18 Policy Advantages: The policy advantages of the HOPE program are: the program implements a behavioral triage model and creates personal responsibility and accountability among the offenders. Behavioral Triage Model: HOPE implements a behavioral triage model, which means the program reacts to the offender s actions rather than creating cookie-cutter responses for all offenders. This is critical because the criminal justice system can effectively use scarce resources more efficiently and reduce costs. The flexibility and reactive nature of the HOPE program is designed to be efficient by only punishing offenders when they commit a violation. And the punishments are gradual sanctions that increase in severity every time a violation is committed. This means the criminal justice system could possible rehabilitate an offender with only 1month in jail rather than imposing the average 21 months prison sentence. 53 This reduction in incarceration time is critical for California, because of the state s current budget crisis and court mandated reduction goals. A probationer in HOPE will costs California about $1, for program treatment and approximately $3,400 for jail time, which is momentous difference from the approximately $90,000 for incarcerating a non-violent felony drug offender in California. 55 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume if this behavioral triage model is implemented in California the state could expect to save a great deal of money. Personal Responsibility and Accountability: Due to the swift and certain sanctions and the drug hotline, HOPE is able to create an environment that requires offenders to take personal responsibility and accountability for their actions. The swift and certain sanctions are immediate and consistent. A swift response to an infraction creates the perception that the sanction is fair and is vital for shaping offenders behavior. 56 When offenders do not receive delayed sanctions they learn their violations will result in them going to jail. Parsimonious 53 California Prisoners and Parolees 2010: Statistical Summary. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Sacramento, Cali Kleiman, Mark. Angela Hawkin. Fixing the Parole System. Issues in Science and Technology. Vol. 4(4): p. 55 Alm, Steven. HOPE for the Criminal Justice System. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Aug p Washington report - 18-

19 punishment 57 enhances the legitimacy of the sanction package and reduces the potential negative impacts of tougher sentences, such as long prison stays. 58 Before HOPE, offenders in traditional probation were violating probation a dozen or more times with no consequences and often no drug treatment. 59 Swift and certain sanctions is what s going to get people s attention and help them tie together bad behavior with a consequence and learn from it. 60. HOPE also instills responsibility and accountability through the drug hotline. Unlike regular probation, where offenders can usually anticipate a drug test at a scheduled appointment, HOPE imposes drug tests that are frequent and random. 61 The hotline ensures offenders are unable to temporarily abstain from drug use so they can have a clean drug test results. The combination of the swift and certain sanctions and the drug hotline are critical program characteristics that do more than place strict requirements on the offenders. Theses characteristics are modifying offenders behavior and creating other policy advantages. Table 2 illustrates that HOPE offenders are less likely to use drugs, commit a new crime, and spend less days in prison. These figures are important because they illustrate offenders in the HOPE program are modifying their behavior than those in the tradition probation system. Table 2- HOPE Results 57 The least amount of punishment necessary to bring about behavior change. 58 Ibid 59 Lopez, Steve. Hawaii finds success with tough- love approach to repeat offenders. Los Angeles Times. Dec. 1, Hawaii HOPE: A new probation program beats the statistics. PBS News Hour. Nov. 24, Ibid - 19-

20 Policy Disadvantages: The policy disadvantages of the Hawaii HOPE program are: it is very resource intensive, requires flexibility in an established structured legal system and lacks ease in its replication and transferability to other states. Resource Intensive: HOPE does have characteristics in common with the traditional probation programs, but this intensive supervision program requires additional coordination and commitment from several agencies to ensure the program works effectively. HOPE increases the demand on the criminal justice system s already scarce resources and requires increased workforce productivity. Since HOPE participants are at high-risk of reoffending, probation offices and local law enforcement agencies can expect to experience an increase in their work responsibilities. The traditional probation characteristics (scheduled drug tests and not punishing offenders for every violation of probation) have proven to not be effective in reducing these offenders recidivism rate. HOPE s swift and certain sanctions and random drug drugs are more effective but come at a cost. The stricter rules mean more work for probation officers, more drug tests, more strain on local jail and a bigger workload for police, who have to serve hundreds of warrants for HOPE probationers who ve gone on the run. 62 This is critical because as California continues to reduce its prison population to meet the requirements of their court mandate their probation population is rapidly growing. In order to ensure HOPE is capable of implementing the random drug tests and swift and certain sanctions all law enforcement and legal agencies involved in the program must be committed and willing to accept an increase in their workload and unexpected time sensitive demands. Required Flexibility in a Structured Legal System: The resource intensive disadvantage of the HOPE program creates a secondary disadvantage that requires flexibility in the strictly structured criminal justice system. When HOPE offenders commit violations there are several individuals whom must act immediately to ensure swift and certain 62 Hawaii HOPE: A new probation program beats the statistics. PBS News Hour. Nov. 24,