Critical Geopolitical Reasoning on Poland s Eastern Policy in the Post-Cold War Period

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1 Maciej Bartkowski Ph.D. Candidate, International Relations and European Studies Central European University, Budapest, Hungary CEP Visiting Faculty Fellow, Department of International Relations, Odessa National University, Odessa, Ukraine Critical Geopolitical Reasoning on Poland s Eastern Policy in the Post-Cold War Period The paper presented at the conference: Power and Power Relations in East European Politics and Societies. Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, the University of California, Berkeley, 8-10 of November Abstract: This paper embarks on a critical journey of the Polish eastern policy towards in the 1990s applying geopolitical analysis. It takes on critical geopolitics studies in order to show how a certain geopolitical reasoning shaped the Polish eastern policy in the last decade. The Polish eastern policy in the 1990s was driven by the specific geopolitical discourses and practices that were promoted by the influential actors. These discourses and practices, which were rooted in a historically-driven promethean thinking, underlined the significance of Ukraine for Poland s security and independence. A primacy of a promethean geopolitical reasoning brought about important implications related to a specific formulation and interpretation of foreign policy objectives as well as an understanding of Poland s role towards her eastern neighbor. Finally, this study also reveals the consequences associated with the existence of a hegemonic geopolitical reasoning, which led to silencing other alternatives and choices connected with a formulation and implementation of the Polish eastern policy. Introduction This paper purports to explain the formulation and the conduct of the Polish eastern policy in the 1990s through the lenses of critical geopolitics. Specifically, this study wants to show that the Polish eastern policy in the 1990s is determined by a hegemonic geopolitical reasoning that places Ukraine in the center of Poland s security, which, in turn, has a significant consequence for the discussion about and the way Polish foreign policy is carried out. The application of critical geopolitical research underlines the importance of the study of geography and its impact on the Polish foreign policy. According to critical approaches to geopolitics, geography is not neutral because is determined by social and historical discourses, which, in turn, are strongly connected with ideology and politics 1. Therefore geopolitics should be examined as a discursive practice, which spatialize the foreign policy of a state 2. Geopolitical reasoning, whose origin can be traced back to a specific historical and geographical circumstances, strengthens the production and maintenance of continuity in the thinking about foreign policy. Geopolitical reasoning is based on a specific set of strategic terms, models, concepts, key metaphors, analogies and symbols. All of them claim to convey 1 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy, Political Geography Quarterly, (1992): Ibid., 80. 1

2 a true picture of what is going on in and around a country and how it should be interpreted 3. The difference between geopolitical reasoning and any other discursive reasoning is based on the underlining importance of geography and its understanding and interpretation, which are produced and reproduced in a specific historical context. The concept of geopolitical reasoning includes two important elements: a specific geopolitical discourse and geopolitical practice. Both, geopolitical practice and geopolitical discourse are mutually constitutive and eventually strengthen the impact of geopolitical reasoning. Geopolitical discourse, in this study, is understood as the linguistic construction of (geopolitical) reality 4, in which the way political actors talk about geopolitical situation generates specific perception and understanding of the reality. In turn, geopolitical practice is understood as an institutionalization of already existing geopolitical discourse into a fabric of certain, very often formal structures, which provide the discourse with materiality and regularity that appear in a set of social relations 5. These social relations constitute a specific reality, in which foreign policy practitioners operate. Thus, geopolitical reasoning (practice and discourse) works by the active suppression of the complex geographical reality of places in favor of controllable geopolitical abstractions 6. Geopolitical discourse because of its institutionalization force and geopolitical practice because of its generation or construction force, always involve the exercise of power, which manifests itself through the process of inclusion or exclusion of specific issues and possibilities. Eventually, this process determines the emergence and the maintenance of an unchallenged, hegemonic geopolitical reasoning, which suppresses other possible reasonings. The agents of a dominant geopolitical reasoning usually hold important power positions within political, intellectual and academic circles, which allow them to effectively influence the on-going debate. This study wants to focus on two basic questions: How, by way of which geopolitical reasoning, the Polish eastern policy was formulated in the 1990s and how is this geopolitical reasoning structured and composed of? The how-questions allows, in turn, to address another important issue: What are the consequences of a dominance of a specific geopolitical reasoning for the ways in which the Polish eastern policy is understood and conducted? These questions aim at exposing the impact of space, power, certain spatial images and territoriality on the thinking and general behavior of the policy-makers, identifying a dominant geopolitical reasoning and revealing how certain notions and spatial concepts were formulated and reproduced and eventually shaped the Polish eastern policy. The questions will also enable to show that because of the dominance of one characteristic discourse alternatives were not recognize (although they did exist), or were latent behind the walls of the dominant thinking and understanding. In other words, this study will try to explain how the alternative accounts were excluded or silenced by a hegemonic geopolitical reasoning. This study will first identify two conflicting with each other discursive approaches ( realist and promethean ), which had an impact on shaping Polish eastern policy. It will briefly elaborate on their historical origin and ultimately focus on a dominance of a promethean-based geopolitical reasoning, which was established through certain discourses and practices of top policy makers, well-known publicists and intellectuals during the 1990s. Subsequently, this paper will explore the consequences of a dominant geopolitical reasoning for the conduct of the Polish foreign policy, its effects on the suppression of alternative approaches and understandings and finally the study will look at the impact of the 3 Ibid., 83 and Roxanne Lynn Doty, Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines, International Studies Quarterly, vol.37 (1993): Doty (1993): Hege Haaland, Bulwark, Bridge or Periphery? Polish Discourse on Poland and Europe, unpublished manuscript, Oslo, November Tuathail and Agnew (1992): 82. 2

3 promethean geopolitical reasoning on the creation of different concepts and metaphors that eventually structured certain meanings for the actors involved 7. Genealogy of realist and promethean approaches and the emergence of a dominant geopolitical reasoning In the 1989 Poland regained her full sovereign rights to formulate an independent foreign policy. One of the elements of this new independent foreign policy was its eastern dimension, which focused specifically on Russia and Poland s closest eastern neighbors: Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The ramifications, in which the Polish eastern policy was produced in the post cold war period, were already given and were based on two competing discourses, which created a fixed bi-polarity in thinking about and understanding the Polish eastern policy. The first approach is known as a promethean doctrine, whereas the second one is named a realist doctrine 8. Their roots can be traced back to the sixteenth century when Poland became actively engaged in the eastern affairs shaping the fate of the nations and ethnic groups located in this part of the region as well as being shaped by them. Since the power of these two doctrines stems from the past thinking and actions it is, therefore, necessary to briefly elaborate on the history of the approaches before focusing on their contemporary significance. The two, conflicting with each other, discourses (doctrines) were the product of both, the Polish geographical location and historical circumstances. In this context, Jerzy Giedroyć, one of the Polish canonical personalities (meaning the ones, who are often referred to and quoted) noted that Poland lies not only in the area delineated by geography but also by history 9 and added the past will always determine our policy 10. In other words, both history and geography are inextricably connected with each other and will be seen as determining a certain geopolitical reasoning. The origin of the analyzed approaches is found in a specific perception related to a unique geographical location of Poland, which, more often than not, brought about calamities and tragedies. Poland was viewed as a nut squeezed between two rocks (Germany and Russia) 11. In the 1990s, although the situation was still perceived in geopolitical terms, the images were much more positive. Various publicists, academicians and policy-makers started looking at Poland as a linchpin or a bridge between the East and the West, which depicted Poland s role as a natural intermediary (middleman) between the West (the EU and NATO) and the East (newly independent states, including Russia). In both, pre and post-1990 visions, a geopolitical dimension highlighted Poland s unique geographical position, which in the past brought disasters and blessing in the present days. The two, realist and promethean, discursive approaches crystallized during the interwar period. On one hand, a promethean discourse, promulgated by the camp associated with the Polish authoritarian ruler Marshal Józef Piłsudski, saw the Polish eastern security built on the strong relations with Poland s neighboring states: Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, which would be reflected in Poland s support for their independence. On the other hand, realist discourse was associated with the right-wing ideologists and politicians grouped in the political party National Democracy headed by Roman Dmowski. They advocated that the Polish eastern security be based on the positive relations between Russia and Poland while paying less attention to the states placed between these two countries. 7 Doty (1993): Marek Janusz Całka, Polska polityka wschodnia w latach Próba oceny, nowe wyzwania i perspektywy. Accessed on Aleksander Smolar quoting Giedroyć in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny). 10 Ibid. 11 Jerzy Pomianowski, Koncert na jedną rękę, Rzeczpospolita,

4 During the communist rule in Poland, the communist government was closer to the realist position 12, whereas the promethean doctrine was kept alive and refined by the Polish intellectuals (publicists and writers), particularly by Jerzy Giedroyć and Juliusz Mieroszewski, who lived in France and were associated with the Paris-based journal Kultura. They both believed that the earlier conflicts between Poland and its neighbors: Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians ultimately served the Russian interests. Therefore, Giedroyć and Mieroszewski advocated a strong collaboration between Poland and its eastern neighbors, which could truly came into being only if Poland renunciated her territorial claims in the east. Their views had an important influence on the political dissidents and thinkers in Solidarity, who after 1989 came to power and took posts in the political and administrative structures of the new government. From this position of power they officially became not only part of the discussion about the Polish eastern policy but actually gained a dominant voice in this debate. This was particularly visible after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, which at the same time ended a delicate balance between the two enduring discourses, institutionalized in the form of a two-track Polish eastern policy that was pursued between This policy was based on a parallel diplomacy characterized by giving equal importance and attention to still existing Soviet Union and to the emerging states behind the Polish eastern border. During the period of its execution, the two-track policy was strongly criticized by the representatives of Kultura and the supporters of a more aggressive promethean approach in the Polish foreign policy. They argued that the period of the two-track policy was a time lost for the Polish eastern policy because it was too much pro-russian (pro-soviet), while at the same time ignoring the newly emerging Poland s eastern neighbors 13. The final impetus for the promethean discourse to become dominant in the Polish foreign policy was provided by the changes taking place behind the Polish borders. In the second half of 1992 the Polish eastern neighbors were, one by one, declaring their independence and in December 1992, the Soviet Union was finally dissolved. These events strengthened the position of the promethean advocates. Starting from 1993, the two-track eastern policy was gradually substituted by the increasingly dominant promethean discourse, which stressed a particular importance of one of the Polish eastern neighbor: Ukraine. In 1993, the President of Poland Lech Wałęsa was reminding to the Ukrainian officials that the Polish government oftentimes emphasized that there is no free Poland without free Ukraine 14. This statement reverberated the position of the inter-war leader Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who believed that there is no freedom for Poland without a free Ukraine. At the same time, the first Polish non-communist foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, was underlining that the independence and security of the eastern neighbors: Belarus, Lithuania and particularly that of Ukraine decide about Poland s independence and Poland s security 15. At the same time Jerzy Giedroyć was voicing a warning: Ukraine is in danger, not many people realize that the loss of independence by Ukraine constitutes a deadly threat for us (Poland- M.B.) 16. Thus, Giedroyć indirectly articulated a belief that the loss of independence by Ukraine would result in a domino effect with other eastern and central European states falling down 17. In May 1994, in his exposé the foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski made explicit that the priorities of the Polish eastern 12 Całka, 13 See Jerzy Pomianowski, Koncert na jedną rękę, Rzeczpospolita, See Piotr Kościński, Polska Ukraina, Rzeczpospolita, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Perspektywy polityki zagranicznej RP w Europie Accessed on Jerzy Giedroyc cited by Elżbieta Sawicka and Halina Szopska, Okruchy urodzinowego tortu, Rzeczpospolita, Jerzy Pomianowski, The Debate over Eastern Policy: All Possible Mistakes Have Already Been Made, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest vol.1, no.1 (2001):

5 diplomacy are connected with the relations between Poland and Ukraine 18. In 1996, Dariusz Rosati, the new foreign minister, stated in the parliamentary exposé: we regard the independence of the Ukraine as one of the essential guarantees of Poland's security ( ) 19. One year later, Rosati reaffirmed this point of view by saying: we treat the independence of democratic Ukraine ( ) as one of the major guarantees of Poland's security 20. His successor, Bronisław Gieremek, followed the same line: independent Ukraine is of key and strategic importance for Poland, its security and stability in the whole region 21. The current President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski is also a very important and influential carrier of the dominant discourse. He strongly believes that without Ukraine, security and the possibilities of Europe would be incomplete 22. In the recent interview Kwaśniewski faced the question: Are you Ukraine s advocate? He was firm and confident: Yes, I am, from my deepest belief 23. The above statements of the top policy makers and intellectuals do not belong to isolated events and citing them in this study served two important purposes. The first objective was to demonstrate that the promethean discourse was conducted from the position of power. The advocates of the concept that Ukrainian independence is crucial for the Polish security and of the idea that there may be no free Poland without free Ukraine 24 usually held the official top positions in the Polish governments or enjoyed (like Jerzy Giedroyć) a high authority and drew attention of a wider audience from the political, publicist and intellectual circles. The second goal was to show that the promethean discourse was mainly focused on Ukraine. A specific geopolitico-promethean discourse in the 1990s privileged relations between Poland and her eastern neighbor Ukraine over the other eastern countries and strengthened Poland s attachment to Ukraine by explicitly linking Poland s security to Ukrainian independence. This biased commitment of the Polish authorities towards the relations with Ukraine raised the voices that Poland did not have a true eastern foreign policy but rather a foreign policy focused only on Ukraine 25. The policy of privileging Ukraine was mirrored by certain practices. For example, Poland recognized Ukrainian independence as a first country in the world few hours after the Ukrainians officially declared it in December At the same time, Poland procrastinated in establishing official relations with Lithuanian and she was a twenty sixth country, which recognized Lithuanian independence. Poland also signed the treaty on good-neighborly relations first with Ukraine followed by similar treaties with Russia and Belarus concluded in 1992, whereas the treaty on good-neighborly relations with Lithuania was signed only in In 1993, the Consultative Committee of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents was formed as a forum for the exchange of ideas and opinions on the issues important for both 18 Marek Janusz Całka, Polska polityka wschodnia w 1994, Accessed on Expose by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Dariusz Rosati to the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, May 9, 1996, 20 Expose by Minister of Foreign Affairs Dariusz Rosati to the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, May 8, 1997, 21 Exposé by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Geremek to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 1998, Warsaw, March 5, 1998, 22 Address by President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski at the International Conference at the Forum of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, November 3, 1999, 23 Interview with the President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski, in Bolesław Broszczak and Ryszard Malik, Chcemy być w centrum, Rzeczpospolita Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, Dispute Around Poland s Eastern Policy: State Interest Comes First, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol.1, no.1 (2001): Janusz Reiter in the discussion at the Center for International Relations on Polityka polska wobec Ukrainy i jej postrzeganie w krajach Unii Europejskiej (Polish policy towards Ukraine and its perception among the EU member states), Raporty i Analizy, no.3/

6 parties. This is the only institution between Poland and another eastern neighbor that function on a such high diplomatic level. In June 1996, both Ukrainian and Polish Presidents, Leonid Kuchma and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, officially announced launching a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. One year later, with a strong involvement of Poland and its diplomatic lobbying, NATO signed the charter with Ukraine regulating relations between the alliance and Poland s eastern neighbor. Finally, in 1999, the permanent Polish-Ukrainian conference on issues of European integration was established to discuss the problems related to the integration with the EU. The above examples of certain practices show a high degree of institutionalization of the promethean discourse on Ukraine within more or less formal structures, which, in turn, strengthened the impact of this geopolitical reasoning even further. The influence of a promethean geopolitical reasoning on the conduct of the Polish foreign policy The consequences of the dominant geopolitical reasoning in Poland have a very practical dimension and are connected with certain diplomatic policies and actions. The consequence of the current geopolitical reasoning relate to overemphasizing the importance of Ukraine, which, in turn, led to a peculiar behavior of the Polish officials and to frustration of their foreign counterparts. A telling example is Polish efforts to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union (EU) by pressing the latter to open accession negotiations with the former. This lobbying takes place despite the fact that Ukraine is not ready to meet even basic criteria, which the EU member states laid down during the European Council summit in Copenhagen in 1993 for the countries that want to join the EU. In the words of the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder inviting Ukraine to start negotiations is like offering membership in the EU to China 26. Regardless of a prevailing negative opinion about a possible Ukrainian membership in the EU, Polish diplomacy nevertheless pressed ahead with their Ukrainian policy. Before the Helsinki summit in December 1999, during which the EU member states issued formal invitations to five more Central and East European countries and Malta to start direct negotiations with the EU, a Polish delegation sturdily insisted that the EU added also Ukraine to the group of the new candidate states. This policy backfired as it only caused exasperation among the EU delegates and warnings that Polish behavior may actually lead to the delays in the EU enlargement 27. Because of the dominant discourse and practice, a Polish diplomacy often fails to acknowledge that Ukraine is governed in a half-dictatorial way, where the economic reforms remain stagnant. Thus, the Ukrainian government is neither able nor willing to meet the EU Copenhagen criteria 28. Additionally, through the existing geopolitical reasoning Poland lends almost unconditional support for Ukraine while, at the same time, failing to recognize that Ukraine has a different understanding of the integration with the EU and different goals connected with it. For example, the Ukrainian President and various Ukrainian foreign ministers often stressed that Ukraine was going to Europe together with Russia 29 and that 26 Jerzy Marek Nowakowski in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny). 27 Klaus Bauchmann in the discussion at the Center for International Relations on Polityka polska wobec Ukrainy i jej postrzeganie w krajach Unii Europejskiej (Polish policy towards Ukraine and its perception among the EU member states), Raporty i Analizy, no.3/ Although there were many political declarations about the Ukrainian desire to integrate with the EU, but no practical steps followed. For example, in Ukraine there is still no separate governmental structure, which would deal with the integration issues. See Paweł Wołowski, Anna Górska, "Europejski wybór Ukrainy" - hasło czy polityczny projekt, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Ibid. 6

7 Ukraine s integration with Europe should go parallel to Russia s integration with the EU 30. Indeed, after studying Ukrainian internal and external policies, Paweł Wołowski concluded that Kiev s attitude towards integration with the EU is based on a strong belief that there is no alternative to Russian-Ukrainian economic and political cooperation 31, the very thing Poland refuses to take into considering while wholeheartedly supporting Ukraine on the EU forums. Geopetro considerations within geopolitical reasoning A particular geopolitical reasoning about the importance of Ukraine for Poland, which, as it was argued above, includes an implicitly or explicitly stated belief about a threat of Russia, was powerful enough to securitize other areas, particularly connected with natural resources. Thus, geopolitical reasoning spilled over and included also geopetro dimension. In the geopolitical discourse, geopetro issues are strongly intertwined with economic issues because of a conviction that there is no economic independence without independence of energy resources 32. A vivid example of the importance of geopetro issues within geopolitical reasoning is a Polish opposition towards building a new oil pipeline linking Russia and the Western countries, which would omit Ukraine. The Polish perception about the importance of Ukraine, which took an institutionalized form of an unwritten principle that there should be nothing about us [Poles and Russians] without them [Ukrainians] 33, was translated into Poland s worries that Ukrainian position as a transit country could be weakened vis-à-vis Russia if the new pipeline does not go through Ukraine. The debate in Polish media and press, combined with an involvement of the top Polish officials strongly contrasted with virtual non-existence of this issue in Ukraine 34 and with how little attention this problem gained among the Ukrainian officials who view the matter not in security (as it is in Poland) but more in economic terms. The issue of a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine In the 1990s, Poland unwaveringly took the stance that the existence of an independent Ukraine is vital for Poland s security and independence. As a result, Poland upgraded her relations with Ukraine to the level of a strategic partnership, which was advocated by the top political figures, including Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and various Polish foreign ministers. In the discourse about a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine it was automatically assumed that similar stance is also advocated by the Ukrainian counterparts. As Bronisław Gieremek, the Polish foreign minister, noted ( ) strategic partnership with Ukraine [is] constant element of our attitude towards Eastern Europe [and] ( ) the maintenance of privileged relations with Ukraine lies in the interest of both countries ( ) 35 [author s italic]. This attitude, however, belongs to a political wishful-thinking and shows how naïve the Polish officials are while their minds and thinking are captured by a specific geopolitical reasoning. For the Polish policy makers it is self-explanatory why a strategic partnership with Ukraine is beneficial for Poland and for her long-term interest. However, because of this 30 Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, Ukraina wobec Rosji: stosunki dwustronne i ich uwarunkowania, Praca no.3, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, September Paweł Wołowski, Anna Górska, "Europejski wybór Ukrainy" - hasło czy polityczny projekt, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Janusz Rolicki, Czas na myślenie, Rzeczpospolita, Jerzy Pomianowski quoted by Klaus Bachmann, Nie budzić nadziei niemożliwych do spełnienia, Rzeczpospolita, Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, Ukraina wobec Rosji: stosunki dwustronne i ich uwarunkowania, Praca no.3, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, September 2001, 35 Exposé by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Geremek to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 1998, Warsaw, March 5, 1998, 7

8 view, there is a general lack of realization that the strategic partnership may not be as valuable for Ukraine as it is for Poland. Because of the dominant geopolitical reasoning about a strategic partnership with Ukraine, it is difficult for Poland to recognize the fact that most of the Ukrainian political establishment favors relation with Russia over the contacts with any Western country. In October 2000, the survey, which included one hundred top political experts (top civil servants, political officials, analysts from media and various research centers), showed that eighty of them though that priority should be given to the relations between Ukraine and Russia, only then followed: United States, Germany, Poland and Chine 36. In January 2001, the Ukrainian foreign minister, Anatolij Zlenko, officially announced that Ukraine has two strategic partners : Russian Federation and the United States and her foreign policy will be conducted accordingly ( Zlenko doctrine ). The relations with the EU and, for that matter, with Poland were reduced to partnership contacts 37. Because of a prevailing geopolitical reasoning about a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine, the above facts are either completely ignored or played down. An acknowledgement not only of their existence but also of the importance and influential role they play in the Ukrainian politics would require a revolution in the Polish dominant geopolitical reasoning. This would allow to realize that Ukraine s interpretation of her geopolitical reality produces a set of objectives, which may not match Poland s own foreign policy goals. In this way, one could understand why Ukraine advocates multi-vectored rather than pro-western foreign policy and balances her relations with Russia not through a strategic partnership with Poland or the EU but by maintaining close contacts with the US (at least until the Kolchuga-gate ). The current geopolitical reasoning and the suppression of alternative views. A dominant geopolitical reasoning about the strategic relations with Ukraine is like a silencer, which keeps down the clamor of other alternative voices. One of such suppressed discourses relates to the criticism of the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma. Poland s tolerance of Kuchma s regime contrasts with a much more critical attitude of the Western countries towards the Ukrainian president. Because of the geopolitical reasoning that constantly highlights the importance of Ukraine for Poland s security, there is a tendency among the Polish policy makers and publicists to soften criticism of the current Ukrainian political regime. One of the means to do that is by differentiating political situation in Ukraine from the political turmoil in Belarus. In Poland, there is a general agreement that Kuchma did not become a second Lukaszenko because he still follows democratic rules and maintains the elements of a law-abiding state 38. The above-mentioned discourse prevails in the press and in the Polish political establishment despite the fact that Kuchma as well as Lukaszenko are both accused by their opponents of the involvement in murders, corruption and a violation of the constitutional order. Lukaszenko is a tyrant but Kuchma is better known in Ukraine as Tsar 39. Both of the terms are, however, equivalent and equally negative. Additionally, political regimes in Belarus as well as Ukraine are based on authoritarian bureaucratism 40 legitimated through quasi democratic elections. Finally, the international community is more and more concerned about President Kuchma s a possible violation of the United Nation embargo and a breach of the international law connected with the alleged sell of Kolczuga radar system by Ukraine via Jordan to Iraq. 36 Ukraina wobec Rosji: stosunki dwustronne i ich uwarunkowania, Praca no.3, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, September Ibid. 38 Polska - Ukraina Obrady prezydenckiego Komitetu Konsultacyjnego, Rzeczpospolita, Maja Narbutt, Cara nam nie potrzeba, Rzeczpospolita, Bohdan Osadczuk, Kryzys władzy i opozycji nad Dnieprem, Rzeczpospolita,

9 In the prevailing discourse about a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine, it is difficult to recognize that Ukraine is (in the same way Belarus is) run by a dire president, who uses authoritarian measures, violates human rights, suppresses freedom of press and applies bureaucratic and legal harassments against his opponents. However, because of the dominant discourses and practices, in which Ukraine is treated as a strategic partner of Poland, which has a geopolitical importance for the latter s security and independence, a lot of misgivings about the Ukrainian system and thus also about the Ukrainian president are toned down, disregarded or openly rejected. Russian threat as an integral part of the promethean geopolitical reasoning In the geopolitical reasoning about the importance of Ukraine there is an implicit and often an explicit assumption about the existing threat of Russia. In fact, the promethean doctrine is based on the assumption about the threat, which comes from Russia 41. A canonical public figure, Zbigniew Brzeziński, noted independent Ukraine strengthens independence of Poland because it prevents Russia from pursuing imperialist policies 42. In his well-known book, Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski warns that the loss of Ukrainian independence would jeopardize Polish sovereignty whereas Russia would acquire means to return to its imperial position it lost at the beginning of the 1990s 43. In other words, a loss of Ukraine (to Russia) would mean that Russia again aims at reestablishing her empire and domination in Central Europe 44. Therefore, Poland needs to create a counterbalance to Russia by allying with independent eastern neighbors, particularly with Ukraine 45. One of the most well-known Polish publicists, Zdzisław Najder, emphasized: If we support Ukrainian independence, we cannot support Russian policies, because our policy towards Ukraine contradicts the Russian policy 46. The discourse based on the fear of a Russian new imperialism characterized by territorial expansion and dictatorship to control the newly acquired territories, reproduces a spatio-territorial understanding of what separates Russia from Poland, in which a conflict over spheres of influence is seen as inherent and thus also inevitable. Additionally, a perception generated by the current geopolitical reasoning about the Russian threat raises important issue about Poland ability to maintain impartial stance in her relations with the eastern neighbors. A dominance of the promethean geopolitical reasoning essentially leaves Polish government vulnerable to Russia s criticism that Poland flares up anti-russian sentiments and separatist movements in the region 47. Geopolitical reasoning about Ukraine creates bipolar thinking about the future of this country: either Ukraine will go to Moscow or will be with Europe 48. This binary opposition, which implies that Ukraine has only two choices to integrate with the West or be sucked into the Russian sphere of influence, leaves no middle way or, for that matter, any other possibility for Ukrainian foreign policy. As Najder stressed Ukraine ( ) can choose 41 Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz qouted by Jerzy Pomianowski, The Debate over Eastern Policy: All Possible Mistakes Have Already Been Made, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest vol.1, no.1 (2001): Interview with Zbigniew Brzeziński, Rzeczpospolita, Zbigniew Brzezinki, Vielkaya Shahmatanya Doska, Miezdunarodnyje Otnoshenia, (Moskva 2000): 62, 114 and This view was not only expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski but also by Henry Kissinger see Jerzy Pomianowski, Koncert na jedną rękę, Rzeczpospolita, See Andrzej W Pawluczuk, Daleko i blisko Rosji, Rzeczpospolita, Zdzisław Najder in the discussion at the Center for International Relations on Polityka polska wobec Ukrainy i jej postrzeganie w krajach Unii Europejskiej (Polish policy towards Ukraine and its perception among the EU member states), Raporty i Analizy, no.3/ This view was presented by Professor Stanislaw Stomma, quoted by Jerzy Pomianowski, Koncert na jedną rękę, Rzeczpospolita, Juliusz Urbanowicz, Kierunek Moskwa: Rosjanie opanowali już ukraińską gospodarkę, teraz budują frakcję w parlamencie, Wprost, No. 13, See also: Grzegorz Przebinda, Ukraińskie 'święto wiosny'? Rzeczpospolita,

10 the European or the Russian way. There is no third way 49. However, the choices for Ukraine can be seen as being multidimensional rather than bipolar as the dominant geopolitical reasoning suggests. For example, one can envisage that Ukraine will come even closer to Russia than she is right now, which is determined by the existing cultural, political and economic ties between these two countries. It does not, however, necessary mean that Ukraine will lose her independence or cease to be a sovereign country 50. Since Russia integrates with the West, there is no contradiction in advocating that Ukraine can lead two separate and parallel processes that bring this country simultaneously closer to Russia and to the Western countries. Polish foreign policy makers often fail to realize that Russia and Poland may eventually have similar rather than conflicting interests in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and that neither Ukrainian independence nor, for that matter, security of Poland will be compromised if a closer economic or political cooperation develops between Ukraine and Russia. The dominant promethean geopolitical reasoning suggests that the loss of Ukrainian independence would be because of Russia and Russia would always benefit from it. However, it is more likely that Ukraine may lose its independence because of herself (not being able to establish strong democratic institutions), which may hurt both, Russia and Poland because of the political vacuum and a general instability that would occur next to their eastern and western borders respectively. Also, as a result of the existing reasoning, it is somehow assumed that Russia would want to incorporate Ukraine if it had a chance. However, alternative views that Russia is neither willing nor able to incorporate Ukraine or that there are different possible forms of integration of both countries (in contrast to incorporation ), which will not necessary lead to a renewal of Russian imperialism or to the loss of Ukrainian independence, are somehow disregarded and overpowered by the dominant geopolitical reasoning. Due to the existing geopolitical reasoning, there is a prevailing thinking that Ukraine, similarly to Poland, cultivates anti Russian attitude 51 and pro-western behavior because otherwise Ukraine would risk jeopardizing her own national interests and, at the same time, strengthening Russia. When Kiev, for example, was taking a similar position to Russia on certain foreign policy issues, e.g. a suspicious Ukrainian attitude towards the idea of Poland joining NATO or Ukrainian criticism of bombing Serbia by NATO, it meant that Kiev was, at the same, implementing anti-ukrainian approach 52. Or, when Ukrainian nationalists blocked solving the problem between Poland and Ukraine about the cemetery in Lviev, this behavior helped Russian imperialism 53. In other words, the Ukrainian foreign policy is advantageous for Ukraine only when it matches Poland s interest and Polish pro-western policy objectives and is harmful when Ukraine s attitude is somehow closer to that of Russia or aims at protecting wrongly-imagined Ukrainian national interests. Because of a prevailing geopolitical reasoning in Poland there is a failure to accept that Ukrainian society can express very skeptical views about the Western countries, which does not imply that the Ukrainians are more pro-russian than any other nations nor that Ukraine loses its sovereignty. 49 Zdzisław Najder, Polska w roli partnera, Rzeczpospolita, Similar opinion was expressed by the former Polish ambassador to Germany Janusz Reiter, Nowa mapa świata, Rzeczpospolita, The opinion expressed by Dariusz Rosati, the former Polish Foreign Minister in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny) 52 See Andrzej W Pawluczuk, Daleko i blisko Rosji, Rzeczpospolita, Interview with Zbigniew Brzeziński, Rzeczpospolita,

11 Production of certain geopolitical images: the division between eastern and western civilizations and Poland as a borderline of civilization The current geopolitical reasoning about Ukraine mobilizes certain spatially-bounded images, which, being set in a specific geopolitical context, provide the way through which certain foreign policy activities are explained and understood. One of these images relates to a civilization, or, precisely writing, to a division between western and eastern civilizations. The use of these images in the geopolitical reasoning about the Polish eastern policy leads to the situation, in which one term always privileges the other. This is due to the established perception and thinking about the eastern civilization that is economically and politically backward, struggling with organized crime and skyrocketing corruption and its western, richer, civilized and highly developed counterpart. This binary opposition of the western and the eastern civilizations provides a simplistic rational for assuming that the countries verging between these two civilization would naturally want to disengage themselves from the east and grab every opportunity to join the western club. In other words, the binary opposition and thinking, which stands behind it, treats Ukraine as an object, imposing on her certain, rational behavior, behavior which should naturally be pro-western. This happens without asking Ukrainians and giving them opportunities to voice their own opinions about where they actually see themselves. It is assumed that since Poland and Ukraine were both part of the Commonwealth, Ukraine must inevitably feel the need to belong to the common western-european civilization 54. This dominant view is strengthened further by the fact that a specific geopolitical reasoning about Ukraine is responsible for producing and sustaining so called mirror image syndrome that refers to the situation in which Polish officials think of Ukraine in the same way they think about Poland. In other words, Polish policy makers assign Ukraine and Ukrainians the same visions, goals and thinking Poland and Poles have 55. Thus, we applied our value system 56 to the situation in Ukraine, which means that what is good for Poland is viewed as being good per se for her eastern neighbor. A binary opposition between the west and the east is an artificial construct based on a psychological (cultural) rather than a physical existence of certain civilization boundaries. These spatial exclusions and inclusions take place despite a growing pace of globalization and economic interdependence between the countries. Thus, if Russia and other countries in the east integrate themselves in social, cultural, political and economic spheres with the Western countries in Europe and beyond, where exactly are the boundaries between the East and the West? Consequently, is there a need for Ukraine to choose any civilization in the time of accelerating globalization? Another spatially-bound image, associated with the current geopolitical reasoning about Ukraine, is connected with the issue of Poland seen as a borderline of civilization. A promethean concept in the Polish eastern policy mirrors a mythological and at the same time messianic thinking about a special role and mission Poland needs to fulfill and carry out towards its eastern neighbor, Ukraine, in order to rescue her from Russia and oftentimes from herself. This messianism is strongly rooted in the Polish history and the idea of a Polish civilizing mission in her eastern borderlands ( kresy ). The promethean reasoning depicts 54 This sort of conviction was expressed by Zdzisław Najder in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny). 55 Dariusz Rosati, the former Polish Foreign Minister, in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny). 56 Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, Delusions and Dilemmas of Poland s Eastern Policy: In Praise of Minimalism, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol.1, no.1 (2001):

12 Poland as a borderline of western civilization 57, which is strongly connected with the history of the Polish Commonwealth, particularly with the seventeenth century. During that time, Poland was viewed by its noblemen (szlachta) as the Bulwark of Christianity against infidels (Turks). Today, Poland s civilizing mission, as a borderline country, is to bring Ukraine into the western civilization and protect her against the dominance coming from the uncivilized east (Russia). Promethean geopolitical reasoning: abolishing a myth of prometheanism in the Polish eastern policy The two linguistic terms realist and promethean establish specific meanings, which influence a perception about the two on-going debates. The adjective promethean produces the images associated with altruism, goodness, openness, sacrifice, optimism and a belief in change. In other words, the promethean concept relates to relatively soft and positive emotions and feelings. The term realist, on the other hand, conveys images of pragmatism, domination, power, inevitability and a belief that a given geopolitical reality cannot be changed hence one must accept it and adjust to it. In other words, the concept realist results in relatively hard and negative feelings. The Polish policy-makers, whose self-perception leads them to see Poles as a peaceful nation and Poland as a democratic country with benevolent and benign goals in international affairs, would unconsciously opt for and support a promethean position because its linguistic connotations of softness and altruism correspond with the image of Poland in the post cold war order. A promethean tag given to the Polish foreign policy towards her eastern neighbors is, however, very misleading simply because Poland s promethean eastern policy has never been altruistic or selflessness. On the contrary, the characteristic features of the current geopolitical reasoning in Poland is her selfish, egoist, inward-looking and interestoriented approach towards Ukraine. Gedroyć and Mieroszewski, the main representatives of Kultura, saw independence of Ukraine (and other eastern neighbors) as a safeguard against Russian imperialism and Poland s active political presence in the region as a fundamental advantage for our international position vis-à-vis the West 58. In other words, independence of Ukraine and Poland s involvement in this region was seen in a very instrumental way: to secure Poland s interests and to increase her international prestige/power. In other words, the Polish foreign policy towards Ukraine is the product of an instrumental thinking of the Polish political and intellectual leaders, which has little in common with a promethean behavior of giving up and sacrificing something for the well-being of others. As Sienkiewcz pointed out Poland perceived Ukrainian independence in terms of the Polish raison d etat 59, which implied that Poland knew better than the Ukrainian political class what Ukraine s raison d etat is 60. This led to the situation, in which Poland used the same standards and thinking about Ukraine as she used to determine her interests and security needs 61. At the end, the Ukrainian independence became an object (rather than a subject) of a self-centered discourse about the way Poland can ensure her security and a realization of the national interests. Thus, Ukraine and ordinary Ukrainians were relegated to an instrument serving Poland s own objectives. And this very fact meant that Poland s eastern policy, due to the prevailing geopolitical reasoning, was based more on politically-driven interests and self- 57 See Zdzisław Najder in Polska Polityka Wschodnia. Pełny zapis dyskusji zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję Tygodnika Powszechnego (Discussion on the Polish Eastern Policy organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation and the editorial board of Tygodnik Powszechny). 58 Sienkiewicz (2001): Dariusz Rosati in the discussion: Realism, Pragmatism, Idealism? A Debate Organized by Tygodnik Powszechny and the Stefan Batory Foundation, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol.1, no.1 (2001): Olszański (2001): Dariusz Rosati in the discussion: Realism, Pragmatism, Idealism? A Debate Organized by Tygodnik Powszechny and the Stefan Batory Foundation, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol.1, no.1 (2001):

13 oriented security considerations rather than any moral or ethical principles that could stem from a common spiritual, cultural and historical community of the former Polish Commonwealth states. Conclusions This study showed that the Polish eastern policy in the 1990s was formulated by and maintained on one dominant geopolitical reasoning, whose fundaments were established on certain promethean premises that stressed the significance of Ukraine for Poland s security and independence. This hegemonic geopolitical reasoning was the product of both Poland s geography and Polish history and produced a prevailing perception among the Polish political and intellectual elites about the necessity to build and maintain strategic relations with Ukraine since there is no independent Poland without independent Ukraine. This policy was, however, created via a top-down strategy involving a top level officials and intellectuals rather than through a more natural and organic bottom-up processes, which would involve ordinary people and civic communities on both side of the borders. The consequence of a specific geopolitical reasoning about Ukraine was securitization of this country to the degree that Ukraine became a guarantor of Poland s security. Zbigniew Brzeziński once even noted that if Poland had to choose between NATO or Ukraine, she should opt for the alliance with Ukraine 62. Thus, the rationale behind Ukraine s independence [was] to fit in the geopolitical jigsaw 63 of the Central and Eastern Europe. This was an exaggerated and very instrumental geopolitical construct, which brought about certain simplified assumptions and reductionism in understanding not only Ukraine s foreign policy objectives and her relations with Russia but also Poland s diplomatic abilities while performing the role of an Ukraine s advocate. Through geopolitical reasoning certain places, territories and states were reduced to security objects and this is exactly what happened to Ukraine. The result of it, is the Polish eastern policy that is instrumental and patronizing towards Ukraine. Self-centered foreign policy meant that Polish policy makers strived to bring Ukraine closer to the western civilization, taking for granted anti-russian and pro-western attitudes of the Ukrainian elites while remaining blind to the fact that Ukraine is neither ready nor willing to follow Poland. The terms such as western and eastern civilizations, borderline, the concepts of Poland as a bridge or a bulwark, which are often used in the discourse on the Polish eastern policy, have important geopolitical connotations and are part of geopolitical thinking about the role and place of Poland in the region. Finally, because of the existence of powerful geopolitical reasoning, the Polish foreign policy discourses resemble the old understanding of geopolitics based on fixed boundaries and territories. The idea of geopolitical vertigo 64, where informatization and globalization processes progress with a high pace, where the existing boundaries transcend each other simultaneously with a growing deterritorialization and reterritorialization of countries, where power and authority of sovereign states become decentered and deconcentrated, is missing from the picture, being overwhelmed by the promethean geopolitical reasoning. In this way, an intellectual and political confinement to history and geography makes the geopolitical discourse and practice about the Polish eastern policy looked as if nothing changed during the last four centuries. 62 Zbigniew Brzezinski cited by Jerzy Pomianowski, Koncert na jedną rękę, Rzeczpospolita, Michał Wawrzonek, The Dispute over Poland s Eastern Policy, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, vol.1, no.1 (2001): See Gearóid Ó Tuathail, At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the Century s End, Alternatives, vol. 22 (1997):

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