1 Empresas de Brasil e China na África: Parceria, Concorrência e Desenvolvimento New Multinationals from Brazil and China: The Case of Oil Andrea Goldstein OECD (in his personal capacity) CEBRI São Paulo 12 agosto 2010
2 Big questions indeed!! Quais setores e países se destacam na atração e atuação de empresas de Brasil e China na África? Como são financiados os projetos? Quais seriam os determinantes do investimento direto? Há uma distinção na forma de atuação entre empresas estrangeiras? É possível extrair um padrão da atuação destas empresas? Qual éa relação entre empresas privadas e os governos ao se lançarem para investir na África? Há alguma forma de coordenação ou apoio? Em que difere as operações africanas de empresas brasileiras e chinesas? Cooperam ou apenas concorrem? Como empresas brasileiras e chinesas compatibilizam normas existentes e regras locais (por exemplo, direitos trabalhistas e ambientais)? Seguem os padrões e critérios de boas práticas? Como os países africanos percebem a atuação das empresas de Brasil e China na África? Quais são as maiores dificuldades? Qual a percepção da sociedade local?
3 The relationship between the Asian Drivers and Angola has attracted an attention only paralleled by the one surrounding interactions with Sudan. Three closely related perspectives are important. First, the rapid expansion of the Chinese and Indian economies has sustained the world price for oil, of which Angola is the second-largest producer in sub-saharan Africa. In the process, China has also become Angola's third-largest trading partner, with a sizeable trade surplus favoring Angola. Second, from an international financing perspective, China's keen interest to diversify the portfolio of assets in which to invest its huge international reserves is only matched by Angola's need to find alternatives to normal and concessional sources of international financing, from which it is excluded due to the lack of progress in negotiating with the BWis. Third, all these issues must be understood in the broader and possibly more complex scenario of the political economy of the relationship between Angola and the world. Because of the country's size and control over huge oil resources, the growing presence of China in Angola has reverberations across the rest of Africa. Angola also joined OPEC in late 2006.
6 Why Study Oil Multinationals from Emerging Economies? understanding oil is essential for understanding contemporary political economy analyzing the growth and development of oil multinationals is crucial for analyzing changes in the geography of international business Emerging Asia and Brazil now host to some of the most dynamic NOCs. Petronas is the world s second largest TNC from developing countries (UNCTAD 2008) China and India have increased significantly their energy consumption as a share of total world energy use (IEA 2009)
7 Chinese OFDI in 2006: Industry Composition
8 Sectoral distribution of Brazilian OFDI stock as of 2007 (including tax havens) Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
9 Outline 1 Global Trends Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
10 The political economy of oil Paolo Scaroni s three North Stars Oil is not ours, it is theirs It is mostly consumed in the zones other than the producer zones. Approximately 60 percent of the yet to discover reserves are estimated to lie in countries where NOCs have privileged access to reserves (Energy Intelligence Agency, 2006) You don t find oil in Switzerland When prices go up, everyone wants to share the bonanza Oil producers are restricting investment opportunities (e.g., Russia, Venezuela) or delaying openings (Kuwait, Iran) The action is in new areas (Central Asia, West Africa, pré sal), non traditional oil (Canadian sands) and alternative energy sources
11 Production and Consumption by Region (million barrels per day in 2005) AFR ASIA ECA LAC MENA HI-non- OECD HI OECD Production Consumption Deficit/Surplus
12 Exploration and Development Costs by Region Source: IEA (2003)
13 Global Ownership of Proved Oil Reserves Exxon/Mobil, 1.00% Chevron, 0.90% Middle Eas t NOCs, 69.60% BP, 0.90% ConocoPhillips, 0.60% Shell, 0.50% Latin America NOCs, 9.80% Russia NOCs, 6.80% Europe NOCs, 1.00% Asia NOCs, 2.10% Africa NOCs, 6.60%
14 Drilling oil is a risky business Political risk index Political risk index
15 and so is trading
16 China s Oil Demand and Domestic Supply million barrels per day Demand Domestic Supply Net Imports Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy
17 Projections of China s Net Oil Imports million barrels per day Actual Reference Scenario Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007
18 Petrobras trade balance
19 Outline 1 Global Trends Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
20 Key corporate data financial Total assets Total revenues Total net income Capital and exploratory expenses 1999 a a b PetroChina ONGC n.a. Petronas n.a Petrobras ENI Shell
21 Key corporate data operational Oil production Natural gas production Oil reserves Natural gas reserves 1999 a a b b 2007 PetroChina ONGC 193 n.a. 665 n.a n.a n.a. Petronas Petrobras ENI Shell
22 Privatization Privatization policies differ depending on underlying motivation and political limitation Selling majority shares: Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Romania and Russia Partial privatization: Brazil and Thailand Sold non core state owned companies and assets while keeping their NOCs under control: Kazakhstan Most of the high income countries also privatized their national oil companies but their strategies differed: Such as BP (UK), Elf Aquitaine (France), ENI (Italy), and Repsol (Spain) in oil sector were initially founded as state owned companies, and gradually fully privatized. Norway only partially privatized its national oil company (StatOil) in mid 2001, while keeping its share of at least 33.4% to prevent a take over.
23 Petrobras shareholder base More than 100,000 investors in Brazil and abroad 60% of the economic value of Petrobras in private hands Government maintains control with 55% of voting shares
24 Key data on technological efforts R&D expenditures ($m, 2007/08) R&D expenditures (2005/08 average growth) R&D expenditures (% of sales, 2007/08) USPTO patents (since 1976) USbased a UKbased b EUbased c CNPC/ Petroc hina ONGC Petrob ras Petron as n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. 1.0 n.a
25 Petrobras competitive advantage Petrobras operates 22%of global deepwater production
26 Petrobras competitive advantage Petrobras operates 18% of all operating vessels
27 Outline 1 Global Trends Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
28 FDI Trends There have been significant changes in pricing mechanism of oil that caused significant price highs throughout years, which led to structural changes in the world oil industry. FDI increasing following high oil prices of the recent years and expectations for oil demand in the future. cross border North North M&A ( drilling in the canyons of Wall Street ) North South investments NOCs as MNCs in other oil producing developing countries (South South) and in the North to acquire existing assets (including refineries, retail networks and reserves) and reach customers.
29 FDI and M&A Flows (Upstream), 1990 to $ billion Global Developing countries M&A
30 Cross border M&A activities US billion Petroleum Petroleum Refining
31 International Oil Companies IOCs are concerned about increasing their upstream capacity and exploit exploration and development opportunities in countries with proven reserves as well as with oil reserve prospects. different business strategies. After the oil crisis of the 1970s, incentives from governments + high prices total investment reached $1.1 trillion (in 2003 dollars) (UNCTAD 2003). mid 1980 prices crashed and demand contracted IOCs were left with over capacity, non profitable investments diversification into non energy activities Late 190s into 1990s large mergers both domestic and cross border. Since second half 1990s new opportunities in Central Asia and Africa emerged.
32 Independent oil companies Smaller companies opportunities were at first limited to small, mature fields in marginal countries in 2000 the majors started shedding assets in established areas such as the North Sea and offshore West Africa skyrocketing oil and gas prices increasing importance of unconventional assets independent operators are paid for the right to use their infrastructure focus on applying specialized technology and squeezing out greater efficiency cast off fields provide a steady revenue stream Higher chance of making unexpected announcements that can dramatically move shares Cairn Energy in Rajasthan in 2004
33 Some Companies will Disappear: 46 of 79 Independents No Longer Exist Source: PFC Energy
34 Key corporate data internationalization Trans nation alizati on index Internationalizatio n index Foreign listing Foreign ownership in Directo rs Non-nationals in 2008 Manag ers CNPC n a. ONGC n. 16 n.a. 0 0/13 0/7 a. Petronas /7 0/15 Petrobras a 0/9 0/7 ENI /9 0/11 Shell /14 b
35 Geographical distribution of oil production activities USbased 2005 a UKbased 2005 b EUbased 2005 c CNPC 2007 ONGC 2007 Petrob ras 2008 Home country Europe North America South America Middle East and 2.2 North Africa Sub-Saharan 15.1 Africa Former Rest of and Rest of the World Petron as
36 Outward FDI by selected NOCs Corporation (home country) Total assets in 2004 ($ billion) CNPC (China) State Canada, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Myanmar, Sudan, Rep. Bol. de Venezuela Indian Oil Corp. State 10.9 Iran, Libya Lukoil (Russia) Private 29.8 Iraq, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Canada, Uzbekistan PDVSA (Venezuela) State 13.4 Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Paraguay, United States (Citgo) PEMEX (Mexico) State 84.1 Argentina Petrobras (Brazil) State 19.4 Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Tanzania Petronas (Malaysia) State 53.5 Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Turkmenistan Saudi Aramco State Canada, China, United States Petro China (China) State 58.8 Nigeria, Sudan, Rep. Bol. de Venezuela
37 Top twenty oil and gas deals since 2006 Value (US$m) Date Buyers Sellers 32, Aug-06 private investors Kinder Morgan North America 32, Dec-06 Statoil Norsk Hydro Europe 20, Jul-07 Basell Holdings Lyondell Chemical International 19, Jun-06 Anadarko Petroleum Kerr-McGee North America 17, Jul-07 Transocean GlobalSantaFe International 13, May-07 Rosneft Yukos Russia & CIS 9, Jul-07 Apollo Management LP Huntsman International 7, Dec-06 Gazprom Mitsui and others Russia & the CIS 7, May-07 Ssab Svenskt Stal IPSCO Inc North America 7, Oct-06 Royal Dutch Shell Shell Canada North America 6, Dec-07 National Oilwell Varco Grant Prideco International 6, Jul-07 Marathon Oil Western Oil Sands North America 5, Sep-08 ConocoPhillips Origin Energy Australia 5, Jul-08 Royal Dutch Shell Duvernay Oil North America 5, Oct-07 Penn West Energy Trust Canetic Resources Trust North America 5, Jun-06 Anadarko Petroleum Western Gas Resources North America 5, Dec-07 Institutional Investors Knight Inc North America 5, Oct-06 Sacyr Vallehermoso Institutional Investors International 5, Sep-07 TAQA PrimeWest Energy North America 5, Dec-06 CNOOC Government of Iran Asia Pacific
38 Outline 1 Global Trends Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
39 Why Africa? Because it is open for business access to reserves Full IOC access Reserves held by Russian cos. NOC oil reserves (equity access) African countries NOC oil reserves (no equity access) Source: PFC Energy, 2005
40 Why Africa? Because politicians extend a warm welcome to foreign visitors
41 Africa provides one third of China s crude oil imports Total = 3.3 million b/d b/d Source: General Administration of Customs of China
42 and Angola is where the real action takes place Source: General Administration of Customs of China
43 and Angola is where the real action takes place
44 China s NOCs are investing throughout Africa African countries where China s NOCs have contracts for equity participation Algeria Gabon Nigeria Angola Kenya Nigeria/São Chad Libya Tomé & P Joint DZ Cote Mauritania Sudan d Ivoire Eq. Guinea Niger Tunisia
45 but the value of Chinese oil assets in Africa lags behind that of other firms Figure 2: Commercial Value of Oil Investments in Africa US$ Million African NOCs IOCs Other Chinese NOCs Source: Wood Mackenzie, March 2007
46 China s NOCs: small producers in Africa Sources: Company reports, Wood Mackenzie
47 Most of the African oil production of China s NOCs is currently in Sudan Source: Wood Mackenzie and industry press
48 Chinese NOCs have a limited presence in Angola Block Production in 2008 (bbl/d) Operator Concessionaire Other partners Zero 340,000 Chevron (since 1955, 39%) Sonangol, Total and Eni 1 ENI (50%) Total, Petrogal, INA-Nafta 2 Chevron (20%) Petrobras, Total, Sonangol 3 (Canuku) Sonangol (100%) 4 (Kiabo) Sonangol (100%) BP, Norsk Hydro, Naphta- Israel 5 Sonangol (30%) 6 Petrobras (40%) ,000 Chevron (31%) Eni, Sonangol, Total and Petrogal ,000 ExxonMobil BP, Eni and StatoilHydro 15/06 Eni (35%) Sonangol Sonangol, Total Falcon, Statoil 16 Canada Natural Resources Odebrecht, Sonangol (50%) 17 (Perpétua, Hortensia, 250,000 Total Sonangol ExxonMobil, BP, and Zinia and Acacia) StatoilHydro ,000 BP (50%) Sonangol Sinopec 18/06 Petrobras (30) Sonangol 26 Petrobras (80%) 31 (Plutão, Saturno, Vênus 450,000 BP and Marte) ,000 Total 34 Sonangol (20%) Petrobras, Norsk Hydro, ConocoPhillips, Shell Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol) Sole concessionaire and partner in concession agreements and in some PSAs with iiocs
49 Petrobras in Africa Angola since 1979 E&P agreements, with shares in 6 offshore blocks (1 production) non operating partner in only two block through November 2006 since December 2006, operator of Blocks 6/06, 18/06 and 26 Nigeriasince 1998 operator in block OPL 315 since February non operating partner in 2 blocks Tanzania since % stakes in two offshore exploratory blocks (Blocks 5 and 6) Libya since 2005 exploratory oil and gas rights and shared production rights for area 18, operator of the consortium that explores the block Namibia since % of the exploration stakes for block 2714A
50 Direct PRC state financial support: less than meets the eye Minimal reliance by China s NOCs on Chinese bank loans balance sheet enough to finance most investments High profits from high oil prices Pre-tax Profits of Chinese Oil Companies US$ billion CNPC CNOOC LTD. SINOPEC CORP. Most deals are small no big loans needed
51 Indirect PRC State Support China Eximbank s lending priorities shaped by Chinese foreign policy priorities, including access to energy loans for large infrastructure projects in oil rich states But there are other motivations Gaining support of recipients in multilateral organisations Creating opportunities for other Chinese firms Preventing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan Oil for infrastructure deals have yielded mixed results for China Chinese loans to Luanda helped Sinopec gain some upstream assets in Angola but not everything it wants Efforts to link Chinese oil and non oil investments have not won China s NOCs attractive blocks in Nigeria
52 Santa Cruz Porto Alegre Project Financing Structure equity US$2.06 billion debt El Paso, US Enron, US Petrobras, Brazil Shell, Netherlands BHP, Australia US$143 million US$280 million BG, UK Transredes, Bolivia Petrobras, Brazil GTB(Bolivia) El Paso, US Enron, US Shell, Netherlands BHP, Australia BG, UK Transredes, Bolivia Petrobras, Brazil US$612million US847 million Petrobras, Brazil Multilaterals: CAF IBRD IDB EIB TBG(Brazil)
53 Why are China s NOCs small players in Africa? (views from China) Stiff competition for assets Latecomers to the region IOCs have a historical advantage Technology hurdles No deepwater capacity Insufficient use of diplomatic tools to help secure assets Source: Erica Downs, China energy fellow, Brookings Institution
54 Chinese NOCs and African Development The contribution of China s NOCs to develop host countries CNPC/Sudan: roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, training and education Sinopec/Angola: social welfare projects China s NOCs likely to continue good deeds to: Remain welcomed guests Reduce investment risk Improve global image
55 Company CSR Rankings Covalence Ethical Ranking Q (ranking among oil and gas companies) 2009 Global Reputation Pulse (ranking among oil and gas companies) EITI Principles and Criteria 2008 Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies a CNPC n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low ONGC n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low Petronas n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low Petrobras 3 1 Endorsed High ENI 20 6 Endorsed Middle Shell 25 n.a. Endorsed High
56 Organização Odebrecht in Angola Hidrelétrica de Capanda, Projeto Luzamba (mineração), Águas de Luanda, Vias de Luanda, Belas Business Park, etc. A Odebrecht tem 44 contratos e integrantes em Angola, dos quais apenas 11% são estrangeiros. Odebrecht + Damer + Sonangol JV Companhia de Bioenergia de Angola (BIOCOM) para produzir açúcar, etanol e bioeletricidade. O projeto, orçado inicialmente em US$ 258 milhões, prevê a construção de uma usina sucroenergética no município de Cacuso, na província de Malanje, até o início de 2012, com uma área equivalente a 30 mil hectares (ha) destinada ao plantio de cana. Segundo a BIOCOM, quando estiver em funcionamento, a usina terá capacidade de produção de 30 milhões de litros de etanol, 250 mil toneladas de açúcar e 160 mil megawatts hora (MWh) por ano de bioeletricidade
57 CSR at Organização Odebrecht in Angola Campanha de combate ao HIV/AIDS. Programa Sangue Seguro, em parceria com a Cruz Vermelha e com o Centro Nacional de Sangue do Ministério da Saúde. Programa Parto Seguro, para formação de parteiras tradicionais. Programa de esclarecimento para a prevenção da malária. Centro de Informação Móvel Programa Cadeia Produtiva da Mandioca na província de Malange. Programa de distribuição de merenda escolar e plantio de legumes e verduras. Construção de postos médicos em várias regiões do país.
58 Odebrecht Logística e Exportação (OLEx) in Angola Trading company of Odebrecht Organization Cerca de 40 obras para suprir em Angola rodovias, vias urbanas, condomínios, projetos agroindustriais, hidrelétrica, saneamento, rede de supermercados e outras. Projeto Nosso Super construção da única rede angolana de supermercados abastecimento de 31 lojas e dois centros de distribuição nas 18 províncias do país Para suprir a demanda por pescados, a OLEx havia selecionado um fornecedor na China, tradicional exportador de tilápia, mas ainda buscava melhorias para o cliente, tanto no produto quanto no atendimento. Negociações com a Coopemar Cooperativa Mista de Marisqueiros, Pescadores e Aqüicultores do Baixo Sul da Bahia primeira exportação em abril 2008 (quase 20 t de tilápia estuarina = dois meses de produção)
59 Presence in Worst Performing Voice and Accountability Oil Producing Countries Country Rank CNPC Petrobras ENI Shell Total Myanmar 1 3 Turkmenistan 2 4 Libya 3 3 Cuba 3= 4 Uzbekistan 5 1 Equatorial Guinea 6 1 Syria 7 2 Sudan 7= 3 Vietnam 9 3 Saudi Arabia 9= 2 Iran 11 5 Congo, Dem. Rep Chad 12= 3 Iraq 14 2 Tajikistan 15 0 Cote d Ivoire 15= 1 Egypt 17 4 Tunisia 18 2 Ethiopia 18= 1 Azerbaijan 20 1 Congo 20= 1 Angola 21 2 Brunei 22 1 Yemen 22= 0 Kazakhstan 24 3 Pakistan 25 2 Oman 25= 2 Algeria 27 3 Russia 27= 4 Total
60 Two views on governance and FDI Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig (2009) Chinese outward FDI is attracted to large markets, and to countries with a combination of large natural resources and poor institutions. Disaggregation shows that the former effect is related to OECD countries, whereas the latter interaction effect holds for non OECD countries Peter Drysdale (2009) Applying special conditions for these investments would reinforce the perception of the primacy of regulatory solutions over market solutions, and help sustain the dominance of the bureaucracy over the market in PRC and drive Chinese investment to other destinations in Africa or Latin America where there are less robust institutions to host it.
61 An adviser for various Governments in their petroleum organisations Governments award licenses and concessions to IOCs with inadequate care and investment on their part Petroleum offices are barely given enough money to pay their staff, let alone their utility bills or commercial costs of doing business with IOCs. Staff are treated like simple public servants rather than custodians of the national petroleum treasures. FDI in oil in a weak governance environments requires Government recognition of the large business risk they have entered sustainable institutional strength in all manner of disciplines in the Government petroleum organisation enormous and consistent donor support Improved capitalisation of petroleum organisations, good definition of business processes, generous operating costs and competitive staff remuneration discipline to avoid corruption and avert political intrusion
63 The HDP Launched in Heiligendamm 2007 Objectives Work together to meet the challenges of globalization Work towards a common view on outstanding global issues Develop common initiatives for resolving them Principles Topic driven policy dialogue, and not a negotiating process Openness, transparency and equal partnership Complement work in other multilateral or regional
64 OECD G8 & G5 LEADERS G8 & G5 SHERPAS (personal representatives of Heads of State and Government) HDP Support Unit DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA ENERGY, WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, INCLUDING IPRs CROSS BORDER INVESTMENT, INCLUDING CSR/RBC
65 DEVELOPMENT ENERGY INNOVATION INVESTMENT Role of aid and trade in development Quality of aid and its effectiveness in meeting the MDGs, Fragile states Capacity development particularly focusing on good governance and institution building; Role of triangular cooperation with equal partnership Retrofit of coal fired power plants Energy efficient and sustainable buildings Renewable energy Energy security The role of education and skills and the promotion of market and fiscal incentives to promote and facilitate the innovation process The international IP system and its socioeconomic impact on developed and developing countries Promoting, protecting and facilitating international investment Improving investment conditions Responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility
66 We commit to work together on global challenges and to improve international governance
67 Outline 1 Global Trends Brazil & PRC NOCs: History and Governance Brazil & PRC NOCs: Internationalization Brazil & PRC NOCs: Going to Africa Conclusions: Issues & Challenges
68 Main findings Size Growth Autonomy Technology Internationaliza tion Transpare ncy CNPC Large Medium Medium Low Very low Low ONGC Small Very high Medium Low Low Low Petronas Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Petrobras Large High High High Low High
69 Impact on Industry Dynamics Minimal on IOCs because competing for different projects China s NOCs have no deepwater capacity Many blocks offered in package deals of little interest to IOCs Larger impact on Asian NOCs Seoul and New Delhi competing to offer better package deals Competition encouraged by some host countries (Nigeria, Angola) Brazil and Petrobras lie somewhere in the middle Deepwater capacity South South solidarity Active diplomacy, including in support of business Towards Brazil Inc.?
70 Future Work Are (A)NOCs bidding more aggressively than IOCs and independent companies? (A)NOC investments and Investment Climate/Governance indicators Development impact of FDI in oil sector backward linkages Revenue generation Internationalization and inner dynamics of corporate organization