FRANCHISING Research Results and Implications for Future Research

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "FRANCHISING Research Results and Implications for Future Research"

Transcription

1 FRANCHISING Research Results and Implications for Future Research Josef Windsperger Professor of Organization and Management University of Vienna I. Overview of major research results II. Research deficits and implications for future research

2 I. Overview of Research Results We discuss the different theoretical views regarding the explanation of the institutional structure of the franchising networks? - Royalties, initial fees, specific investments - Decision rights - Ownership structure (PCO, MUF) - Contract design (completeness, duration) - Informal governance (Trust, fairness) Property Rights View Resource-based View TC- Agency- Signalling- Screening- Search Cost-View

3

4 1 Resource-based View (1) Research question: How to explain the ownership structure of the franchising firm? (A) Resource Scarcity Theory (e.g. Oxenfelt, Kelley 1968/69; Dant et al. 1996; Dant, Kaufmann 2004) The franchisor has at least three resource constraints concerning the local outlets: - Information resources - Managerial resources - Financial resources (1) Ownership redirection effect during time: The proportion of company-owned outlets increases during the organizational life cycle. (2) MUF increases with the franchisor s financial constraints.

5 PCO time Discussion question: Which constraints are the most relevant?

6 Resource-based View (2) (B) Resource-based Theory (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Thompson 1994; Teece et al. 1997; Helfat et al. 2007) The franchisor has specific resources and capabilities resulting in a competitive advantage: - Coordination and control - Brand name development The higher these resources and capabilities of the franchisor, the higher is the rent-generating potential of these resources, and the higher is PCO (Combs et al. 2012).

7 Research questions: 2 Transaction Cost View (1) Explanation of the ownership structure Transaction-specific investments (initial fees, initial investments) Self-enforcing contract view (Klein 1995, 1996) Hostage model (2) Explanation of the allocation of decision rights between the franchisor and franchisees (Mumdziev, Windsperger 2013) (3) Explanation of MUF: Transaction-specific investments increase the self-enforcing range of contracts (Bercovitz 2003, Hussain et al. 2013). (4) Contract duration: Transaction-specific investments and uncertainty (e.g. Brickley et al. 2006, Garcia-Herrera, Llorca-Vivero 2010; CHAUDEY, FADAIRO, PERDREAU 2011)

8 Transaction Cost Theory TC Franchising Market Network Hierarchy S 1 S 2 S 3 Specifity, Uncertainty

9 Self-enforcing Contract View (Klein 1995, 2000) Franchisor A g BA g AB Franchisee B Licensor g BD D g AC C Licensee A s profit with B: g AB B s profit with A: gba A s quasi-rent: QR AB = (g AB g AC ) B s quasi-rent: QR BA = (g BA g BD ) Quasi-rent of B (QR BA ) = HOLD-UP Potential of A (H A ) Quasi-Rents of B (QR BA ) > H B - cooperative behavior

10 FEES and OWNERSHIP Results The higher the transaction specific investments and the initial fees of the franchisee, the lower is the tendency toward company-owned outlets. The higher the behavioral and market uncertainty, the higher is the tendency toward company-owned outlets (Mangolis et al. 1995). DECISION RIGHTS The higher behavioral and environmental uncertainty, and the higher transaction-specific investments of the franchisees, the more decision rights are transferred to the franchisees.

11 3 Information Economics: Agency, Signalling and Screening, and Search Cost Theory Research questions: 1. Explanation of the royalties and fees 2. Explanation of ownership 3. Explanation of initial investments 4. Explanation of MUF

12 3. 1 Agency Theory Research questions: 1. Explanation of the royalties initial fees 2. Explanation of the proportion of ownership? (e.g. Lafontaine 1992; Latontaine, Shaw 2005; Vazquez 2007; Penard et al. 2011) (I) Performance-based incentives Agency Costs: residual loss + incentive costs and monitoring costs Performance-based incentives for the agents (risk aversion): Remuneration = Fixum (a) + Performance-based pay (ß) ß commission rate Optimum: ß = 1/1 + 2rσ 2 (r > 0, agent is risk avers) Performance pay is negatively related to risk. Franchisee: Royality (R) = 1 ß Hence R is positively related with risk! (Lafontaine, Shaw 2001; Lafontaine, Slade 2005; Blair, Lafontaine 2005)

13 Empirical Results from Agency Theory - The more important the franchisee s (franchisor s) efforts, the lower (higher) is the royality rate. - The higher the uncertainty, the higher is the risk premium franchisees want to have, and the lower is performance dependent proportion of his income (1 R); hence the higher is R. Therefore, firms choose to integrate when facing more uncertainty. Empirical results do not confirm this relationship. - The higher the royalties, the lower the initial fees (as rents).

14 Empirical Results from Agency Theory (II) Proportion of Company-owned Outlets (PCO) - The higher the monitoring costs due to behavioral uncertainty, the higher is the tendency toward franchising. - The stronger the brand name value, the higher is the proportion of company-owned outlets. (III) MUF - The higher the opportunism risk due to moral hazard, free-riding and adverse selection, the higher the tendency toward MUF (Gomez et.al. 2010, Gillis et al. 2011)

15 3. 2 Screening Theory Research questions: Explanation of the royalties, fees and specific investments (Dnes 1992, 1993) Initial fees and specific investments have a screening function attracting competent franchisees The higher ther initial fees and specific investments, the more likely franchisees with high entrepreneural capabilities are attracted.

16 Research questions: 3. 3 Signaling Theory Explanation of royalties and company-owned outlets (Galini, Lutz 1992, Lafontaine 1993; Dant, Kaufmann 2003; Fadairo, Lanchimba 2013) Assumption: Franchisors have private information on the brand name value of the system that they intend to communicate to potential franchisees. Royalties and franchisor-owned outlets have a signaling function regarding the quality of the system to attract potential franchisees at the beginning of the organizational life cycle. The signaling effect of the PCO reduces during the organization life cycle.

17 PCO time

18 3. 4 Search Cost Theory Research questions: Explanation of company-owned outlets (Minkler 1990; 1992) Franchisors have a search cost advantage in the beginning of the organizational life cylce, if they use franchisees. The degree of information asymmetry diminishes during the life cycle because the franchisor acquires local market knowledge. Therefore, the porportion of franchisee outlet will be reduced during time.

19 Research question: 4 Synergistic View of Franchising How to explain the stable mix between franchisee-owned and company owned outlets? (Bradach 1997; Cliquet 2000, 2002; Cliquet, Penard, Saussier 2003; Cliquet, Penard 2012) Economic Reasons Different exploitation and exploration capabilities between the franchisor and the franchisees (Sorenson, Sorensen 2001). Franchisor: Higher exploitation capabilities (administrative capabilities, quality management) Franchisee: Higher exploration capabilities (innovation, local market knowledge) Synergy effects of the plural system - higher innovation capabilities (mutual learning, adaptation) - higher monitoring capabilities (performance benchmarks) - higher local responsiveness - stronger incentives (internal competition) - dual career path PRT as solution (Hendrikse, Jiang 2011)

20 5 Property Rights Approach Major contributions: Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2008, 2012) Research questions: 1. How to explain the structure of residual decision and ownership/residual income rights in franchising? (Windsperger 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2013; Mumdziev, Windsperger 2011; Hendrikse, Jiang 2011) 2. MUF (Hussain, Windsperger 2013) Property Rights: a. the right to use the good b. the right to change the good c. the right to capture the profit or to bear the loss d. the right to sell the good and to receive the liquidation value a + b = Residual decision rights c + d = Residual income or ownership rights

21 Property Rights-Explanation Contractible Know-how A: Franchisor Non-contractible Know-how Contractible Know-how B: Franchisee Market Contract Hierarchy Noncontractible Know-how A to B: Licensing Franchising Network Proposition: Contractibility (due to intangibility) of assets determines the structure of residual income, ownership and decision rights. Assets characteristics: Intangible system-specific and local market assets

22 Governance Structure of the Franchising Firm Intangible assets System-specific und local market knowledge H1 Residual decision rights How is the knowledge distrubuted between the franchisor and the franchisee? Proportion of company-owned Outlets (PCO) H2 Ownership rights (Residual income rights) H3 Royalties/ Initial Fees Who is the residual decision maker (whose decisions influence the residual income)? How are the ownership rights allocated? (Windsperger 2004; Windsperger, Dant 2006; Windsperger, Yurdakul 2007; Mumdziev, Windsperger 2011, 2013)

23 6 Comparison: Agency Theory (AT), Resource Scarcity Theory (RST), Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) and Property Rights Theory (PRT) (1) AT and PR-theory: Distinction between performance and ownership incentives is not possible under highly contractible assets (Hart 1995). (2) AT predicts a negative relationship between royalties and intitial fees and PRT predicts a positive relationship (Windsperger 2001). (3) TCT versus PRT: No distinction between intangible and tangible specific investments (Whinston 2003). (4) RST versus PRT: No distinction of the local resources (information, managerial and financial) according to the degree of contractibility (Windsperger, Dant 2006)!

24 II. Research Deficits and Implications for Future Research in Franchising (1) Governance structure: Relationship between decision and ownership rights and performance: Complementarity between DR and OR! (2) Performance of governance mechanisms: Impact of governance structure (decision and ownership rights) on performance! (3) Relationship between multi-unit franchising and the proportion of company-owned outlets: Decision management rights are divided between franchisor and MUfranchisees; franchisor s DR are diluted under MUF. Franchisor might get higher control rights by increasing PCO! (4) Governance structure of the international franchise firm: Wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, area developers and master franchising Organizational economics perspectives!

25 Future Research in Franchising (5) Relationship between firm strategy and governance structure: Chandler: Structure follows strategy! What is the impact of strategy on decision and ownership structure? (standardization versus adaptation strategies) (6) Relationship between uncertainty and incentives: AT: Royalties as performance-based incentives and risk is positively related! Empirical results do not support this view! According to James (2000), the relationship between risk and incentives depends on the underlying governance mechanism: (a) Employment contract with more contractible assets: NEGATIVE! (b) Franchise contract with less contractible local market assets: POSITIVE! (c) Empirical studies do not differentiate between these differences!

26 Future Research in Franchising (7) Relationship between DR and knowledge transfer mechanisms: Knowledge attributes (tacitness, noncontractible) determine DR-structure and the design of knowledge transfer mechanisms. (8) Relational and formal governance mechanisms in franchising: Trust (or fairness) as relational governance variables may influence the use of formal governance mechanisms, such as decision and ownership rights! Differentiation between general trust and knowledge-based trust! Research results show (Windsperger, Hussain 2013) that knowledgebased trust increases the tendency toward MUF and general trust decreases the tendency towards MUF! (9) Impact of alliance capabilities on ownership and DR: Higher alliance capabilities increase delegation and decrease ownership. (Kale et al. 2002; Ehrmann & Meiseberg 2013).

27 Franchising Research: An Interdisciplinary Focus? Integration of organizational economics (OE) and strategic management perspectives (in particular RBT)! March (1991): Organizations have two entrepreneurial functions: Exploitation of knowledge and exploration of knowledge! OE based on AT, TCT and PRT applications focuses on the first question (i.e. coordination function)! Given resources and capabilities of the firm, which governance modes reduce transaction and agency costs (TCT, ACT) or increase residual income (PRT), due to uncertainty/information asymmetry, transaction-specific noncontractible assets?

28 Organizational Economics versus Strategic Management Theories Core of Theory Core of Theory Set of Intended Applications TCT&PR&AT RBT&OCV TCT: Transaction Cost Theory PT: Property Rights Theory AT: Agency Theory OCT: Organizational Capability Theory RBT: Resource-based Theory

29 RBT (organizational capabilities and knowledge-based theory) focuses on the second question (i.e. innovation function)! FIRM is a bundle of resources and capabilities to generate competitive advantage (strategic rents - Rumelt 1984). Which governance modes increase competitive advantage through creation and transfer of resources and capabilities? FRANCHISING NETWORKS (as plural form) combine both functions and hence require a combined application of organizational economics and strategic management perspectives.

30 Determinants of Governance Structure RB&OCT Resources and OC Market Structure STRATEGY Strategic Rents Specificity, Contractibility, IA AC, TC GOVERNANCE Porter- View Strategic view Coordinative view OE: TCT, AT, PRT Thank you very much!

REFGOV. Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest. Institutional Frames for Markets. Economic Rents and Multi-Unit Franchising Strategy

REFGOV. Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest. Institutional Frames for Markets. Economic Rents and Multi-Unit Franchising Strategy REFGOV Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest Institutional Frames for Markets Economic Rents and Multi-Unit Franchising Strategy By & Susana López Bayón Begoña López Fernández Working paper series

More information

Master s Thesis. How complete are contracts in Franchising: Evidence from Greece

Master s Thesis. How complete are contracts in Franchising: Evidence from Greece Master s Thesis How complete are contracts in Franchising: Evidence from Greece Sofia Christina ZINELI-PRASTAKOU Student ID No: 10176659 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ferdinand A. von Siemens Faculty of Economics

More information

1042-2587 2011 Baylor University. James G. Combs David J. Ketchen, Jr Jeremy C. Short

1042-2587 2011 Baylor University. James G. Combs David J. Ketchen, Jr Jeremy C. Short etap_443 413..426 1042-2587 2011 Baylor University E T& P Franchising Research: Major Milestones, New Directions, and Its Future Within Entrepreneurship James G. Combs David J. Ketchen, Jr Jeremy C. Short

More information

Julho de 2010 ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN FRANCHISE CHAINS PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO

Julho de 2010 ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN FRANCHISE CHAINS PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO Textos para Discussão 262 Julho de 2010 ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN FRANCHISE CHAINS PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO Os artigos dos Textos para Discussão da Escola de Economia de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio

More information

CAN AGENCY THEORY EXPLAIN WHY INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISORS PREFER MULTIUNIT FRANCHISING?

CAN AGENCY THEORY EXPLAIN WHY INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISORS PREFER MULTIUNIT FRANCHISING? CAN AGENCY THEORY EXPLAIN WHY INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISORS PREFER MULTIUNIT FRANCHISING? Vinay K. Garg, Southwest Missouri State University Abdul A. Rasheed, The University of Texas at Arlington Abstract

More information

Entrepreneurship. Strategy. Competitive Advantage

Entrepreneurship. Strategy. Competitive Advantage Entrepreneurship 10 Strategy: Planning for Competitive Advantage In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable. --Dwight D. Eisenhower 10-2 Strategy

More information

How Firm Strategies Impact Size of Partner-Based Retail Networks: Evidence from Franchising

How Firm Strategies Impact Size of Partner-Based Retail Networks: Evidence from Franchising How Firm Strategies Impact Size of Partner-Based Retail Networks: Evidence from Franchising Manish Kacker 1 Associate Professor, Marketing Michael Lee-Chin & Family Professor in Strategic Business Studies

More information

Franchising: a literature review on management and control issues

Franchising: a literature review on management and control issues Franchising: a literature review on management and control issues Sofie Verbieren Lessius KU Leuven Research Assistant Accounting Lessius University College Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Department of

More information

Franchise Networking Theory

Franchise Networking Theory Contributions to Management Science For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/1505 . Mika Tuunanen l Josef Windsperger l Gérard Cliquet l George Hendrikse Editors New Developments in the Theory

More information

FRANCHISING: HYBRID ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FIRM GROWTH AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FRANCHISING: HYBRID ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FIRM GROWTH AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRANCHISING: HYBRID ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR FIRM GROWTH AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Olu Ojo Department Of Business Studies Covenant University P. M. B. 1023, OTA Ogun State Nigeria Abstract This paper

More information

Franchising in global markets: towards a conceptual framework

Franchising in global markets: towards a conceptual framework The research register for this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregisters The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0265-1335.htm

More information

Organizational Design Dr. Marco Weiß weiss@finance.uni-frankfurt.de Winter 2007/08

Organizational Design Dr. Marco Weiß weiss@finance.uni-frankfurt.de Winter 2007/08 Organizational Design Dr. Marco Weiß weiss@finance.uni-frankfurt.de Winter 2007/08 Content and structure of the course This course provides an overview of the theory and practice of organizational design.

More information

The Added Value of the Plural Form. Evidence from Dutch Pharmacy Chains

The Added Value of the Plural Form. Evidence from Dutch Pharmacy Chains The Added Value of the Plural Form Evidence from Dutch Pharmacy Chains TITLE CHAPTER NYENRODE BUSINESS UNIVERSITEIT The Added Value of the Plural Form Evidence from Dutch Pharmacy Chains Proefschrift ter

More information

Valuation of Intangibles under IFRS 3R, IAS 36 and IAS 38

Valuation of Intangibles under IFRS 3R, IAS 36 and IAS 38 Valuation of Intangibles under IFRS 3R, IAS 36 and IAS 38 Jim Eales Agenda Overview of Purchase Price Allocation under IFRS 3R Valuation of Intangibles - Approaches & Methodologies Impairment Testing (IAS

More information

Strategy is about organizational change.1 An action is strategic when it allows a

Strategy is about organizational change.1 An action is strategic when it allows a 0 0 0 I NTRODUCTION Different views of strategy Strategy is about organizational change. An action is strategic when it allows a firm to become better than its competitors, and when this competitive advantage

More information

Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm. George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard*

Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm. George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard* Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard* What determines the boundaries of the firm? Over the past twenty-five years,

More information

The Role of Technology Refresh on Asset Ownership in IT Outsourcing. Vidyanand Choudhary Vijay Gurbaxani Qiang Zeng

The Role of Technology Refresh on Asset Ownership in IT Outsourcing. Vidyanand Choudhary Vijay Gurbaxani Qiang Zeng The Role of Technology Refresh on Asset Ownership in IT Outsourcing idyanand houdhary ijay Gurbaxani Qiang Zeng veecee@uci.edu vgurbaxa@uci.edu qzeng@uci.edu The Paul Merage School of Business, University

More information

Challenges and Opportunities of Multi-unit Franchising in Fast-food Industry. Franchisee s Perspective

Challenges and Opportunities of Multi-unit Franchising in Fast-food Industry. Franchisee s Perspective Saimaa University of Applied Sciences Faculty of Business Administration, Lappeenranta Degree Programme in International Business Alexey Nabatov Challenges and Opportunities of Multi-unit Franchising in

More information

IP Valuation. WIPO Workshop on Innovation, Intellectual Asset Management and Successful Technology Licensing: Wealth Creation in the Arab Region

IP Valuation. WIPO Workshop on Innovation, Intellectual Asset Management and Successful Technology Licensing: Wealth Creation in the Arab Region IP Valuation WIPO Workshop on Innovation, Intellectual Asset Management and Successful Technology Licensing: Wealth Creation in the Arab Region Muscat, Oman, December 12 and 13, 2011 Topics Intangibles

More information

Consolidated Financial Statements

Consolidated Financial Statements AASB Standard AASB 10 August 2011 Consolidated Financial Statements Obtaining a Copy of this Accounting Standard This Standard is available on the AASB website: www.aasb.gov.au. Alternatively, printed

More information

FRANCHISING ROMANIA: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT DESIGN

FRANCHISING ROMANIA: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT DESIGN FRANCHISING ROMANIA: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT DESIGN CEBR Working Paper Series, 02-2008 May, 2008 Esteban Lafuente Centre for Entrepreneurship and Business Research (CEBR) Universitat Autònoma

More information

A Comparative Study of Transactional Cost Analysis in Franchising

A Comparative Study of Transactional Cost Analysis in Franchising A Comparative Study of Transactional Cost Analysis in Franchising Dr. Chen-I Huang, YuDa College of Business, Taiwan ABSTRACT Franchising is a kind of hybrid organizational form, which is different from

More information

Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries

Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access published January 30, 2013 JLEO 1 Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions Wouter Dessein* Columbia University, Graduate School

More information

Online EFFECTIVE AS OF JANUARY 2013

Online EFFECTIVE AS OF JANUARY 2013 2013 A and C Session Start Dates (A-B Quarter Sequence*) 2013 B and D Session Start Dates (B-A Quarter Sequence*) Quarter 5 2012 1205A&C Begins November 5, 2012 1205A Ends December 9, 2012 Session Break

More information

Bringing a Franchise Brand to the U.S.

Bringing a Franchise Brand to the U.S. Bringing a Franchise Brand to the U.S. LeClairRyan Thomas M. Pitegoff 885 Third Avenue Sixteenth Floor New York, New York 10022 Phone: 212.634.5032 tom.pitegoff@leclairryan.com WWW.LECLAIRRYAN.COM BRINGING

More information

WHAT DO ECONOMISTS TELL US ABOUT VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS?

WHAT DO ECONOMISTS TELL US ABOUT VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS? WHAT DO ECONOMISTS TELL US ABOUT VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS? Tereza Tykvová Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Abstract. Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems

More information

The Effects of Integration Strategies on Firm Performance

The Effects of Integration Strategies on Firm Performance MSc. in Finance and International Business Department of Business Administration Author: Selen Gül Advisor: Valerie Smeets An Empirical Study on Danish Manufacturing Firms Abstract: The firms diversification

More information

USE OF ICT IN SMES MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SECTOR OF SERVICES

USE OF ICT IN SMES MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SECTOR OF SERVICES USE OF ICT IN SMES MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SECTOR OF SERVICES Plumb Ion Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, Faculty of Management, 6 th Piata Romana RO 030173 Bucharest Romania, ionplumb@yahoo.com, +4021.319.19.00/287

More information

Consolidated Financial Statements

Consolidated Financial Statements STATUTORY BOARD FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARD SB-FRS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements This standard applies for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013. Earlier application is permitted

More information

Controlling Versus Enabling

Controlling Versus Enabling Controlling Versus Enabling Andrei Hagiu Julian Wright Working Paper 16-002 January 31, 2016 Copyright 2015, 2016 by Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright Working papers are in draft form. This working paper

More information

Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising

Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising Giorgio ZANARONE * Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising Forthcoming in Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 52, Fall 2009 This version, August 2008 Abstract This paper shows

More information

THE RESOURCE CREATION SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

THE RESOURCE CREATION SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THE RESOURCE CREATION SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE Jeffrey S. Harrison W. David Robbins Chair in Strategic Management Robins School of Business University of Richmond Richmond, VA 23173 USA (804) 287-1920

More information

FINDING THE RIGHT MIX: FRANCHISING, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND CHAIN PERFORMANCE *

FINDING THE RIGHT MIX: FRANCHISING, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND CHAIN PERFORMANCE * FINDING THE RIGHT MIX: FRANCHISING, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND CHAIN PERFORMANCE * Olav Sorenson Anderson Graduate School of Management University of California, Los Angeles 110 Westwood Plaza, Suite

More information

Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Moral Hazard Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Principal-Agent Problem Basic problem in corporate finance: separation of ownership and control: o The owners of the firm are typically

More information

HYBRID MODES OF ORGANIZATION Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and other strange animals

HYBRID MODES OF ORGANIZATION Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and other strange animals HYBRID MODES OF ORGANIZATION Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and other strange animals Claude Ménard, Claude Menard To cite this version: Claude Ménard, Claude Menard. HYBRID MODES OF ORGANIZATION

More information

Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations

Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations February 28, 2013 of Financial Condition and Results of Operations This ( MD&A ) was prepared as of February 28, 2013 and should be read in conjunction with the unaudited Condensed Consolidated Interim

More information

Pioneering Asian franchise brands: Pho24 in Vietnam

Pioneering Asian franchise brands: Pho24 in Vietnam Pioneering Asian franchise brands: Pho24 in Vietnam Lorelle Frazer Professor in Marketing Director, Asia-Pacific Centre for Franchising Excellence Griffith Business School Griffith University Australia

More information

Promote Cooperation. Job Market Paper

Promote Cooperation. Job Market Paper Divide and Conquer? Decentralized Firm Structure May Promote Cooperation Job Market Paper Michal Goldberg December 12, 2013 Abstract I consider a model in which an entrepreneur s objective is to maximize

More information

The gain from insurance (full information)

The gain from insurance (full information) The gain from insurance (full information) W 2 U U 1 E W W 2 W 45 W c E(W ) W 1 W 1 Figure 1: Demand for insurance Risk aversion: u (EW ) >Eu(W ), Risk averse individuals dislike uncertainty Assumptions:

More information

MANAGEMENT COURSES Student Learning Outcomes 1

MANAGEMENT COURSES Student Learning Outcomes 1 MANAGEMENT COURSES Student Learning Outcomes 1 MGT 202: Business Professions 1. Describe and use the elements of effective decision making research, assessment and consequence. 2. Apply elements of effective

More information

TOPIC 6: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

TOPIC 6: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL TOPIC 6: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1. Introduction 2. The free rider problem In a classical paper, Grossman and Hart (Bell J., 1980), show that there is a fundamental problem

More information

Rights and Incentives in Automobiles

Rights and Incentives in Automobiles JLEO, V17 N1 257 Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution Benito Arruñada Universitat Pompeu Fabra Luis Garicano University of Chicago Luis Vázquez

More information

Consolidated Financial Statements

Consolidated Financial Statements HKFRS 10 Revised October 2014January 2015 Effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013 Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standard 10 Consolidated Financial Statements COPYRIGHT Copyright

More information

Outsourcing of Information Systems as a Strategy for Organizational. Alignment and Transformation 1

Outsourcing of Information Systems as a Strategy for Organizational. Alignment and Transformation 1 Outsourcing of Information Systems as a Strategy for Organizational Alignment and Transformation 1 Ajit Kambil and Jon Turner Information Systems Department Stern School of Business, New York University

More information

Planning, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage

Planning, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage Planning, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage Chapter 6 website Mark Gosling Office: D404 Phone: 5417 Learning Objectives LO1 Identify the three main steps of the planning process and explain the relationship

More information

Canadian Tire: Value Under the Hood

Canadian Tire: Value Under the Hood Canadian Tire: Value Under the Hood May 2006 Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. Disclaimer Pershing Square Capital Management's ("Pershing") analysis and conclusions regarding Canadian Tire Corporation

More information

Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm. Discussion Paper No 02/540

Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm. Discussion Paper No 02/540 Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm Maija Halonen Augus t 20 02 -Revised July 2004 Discussion Paper No 02/540 Department of Economics University of Bristol 8 Woodland Road

More information

Franchising and the Impact of McDonald s

Franchising and the Impact of McDonald s Franchising and the Impact of McDonald s Gerhardt, Steve Tarleton State University Dudley, Dan Tarleton State University Hazen, Samuel Tarleton State University ABSTRACT As individuals decide to open or

More information

Access to Finance: Impacts of Publicly Supported Venture Capital and Loan Guarantees

Access to Finance: Impacts of Publicly Supported Venture Capital and Loan Guarantees Access to Finance: Impacts of Publicly Supported Venture Capital and Loan Guarantees Authors : Dr. Ronnie Ramlogan & Dr. John Rigby Presented by : Arslan Austin Innovation IV SS 2014 Introduction Innovation

More information

Chapter 4 Valuation Methods in Intellectual Asset-Based. Management Evaluation Finance

Chapter 4 Valuation Methods in Intellectual Asset-Based. Management Evaluation Finance Chapter 4 Valuation Methods in Intellectual Asset-Based Management Evaluation Finance (Supplemental Discussion) This chapter explains one way of thinking for valuation methods in intellectual asset-based

More information

Starting New Ventures -64-361.202 Chap 14. Strategies for Firm Growth

Starting New Ventures -64-361.202 Chap 14. Strategies for Firm Growth Starting New Ventures -64-361.202 Chap 14. Strategies for Firm Growth Dr. Jack M. Wilson Distinguished Professor of Higher Education, Emerging Technologies, and Innovation PhoneHalo Keychain Sensor alerts

More information

Common Denominator Relationships: Aligning the Franchisor and Franchisee Objectives.

Common Denominator Relationships: Aligning the Franchisor and Franchisee Objectives. Common Denominator Relationships: Aligning the Franchisor and Franchisee Objectives. Prepared by: Joe Fahey, CFA, Senior Director of Planning, Business Advisory Services, Wells Fargo Bank. In this white

More information

Introduction to franchise models in food retail

Introduction to franchise models in food retail Introduction to franchise models in food retail Retail franchising definition Franchising Franchising is a management model based on an agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee by which the latter

More information

The Impact of Information Technology on the Performance of Diversified Firms

The Impact of Information Technology on the Performance of Diversified Firms Abstract on the Performance of Diversified Firms Namchul Shin Pace University School of Computer Science and Information Systems Information Systems Department New York, NY 10038 Phone: 212-346-1067, Fax:

More information

PATENT BOX HOW TO MAXIMISE THE BENEFITS

PATENT BOX HOW TO MAXIMISE THE BENEFITS PATENT BOX HOW TO MAXIMISE THE BENEFITS On 1 April 2013 the government introduced a low tax regime applicable to a company s profits, derived from the commercial exploitation of inventions protected by

More information

Price Control In Franchised Chains: The Case Of McDonald's Dollar Menu

Price Control In Franchised Chains: The Case Of McDonald's Dollar Menu This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 06 22 Price Control In Franchised Chains: The Case Of McDonald's Dollar

More information

Marketing & Sales Competence Center

Marketing & Sales Competence Center Franchising The Roland Berger approach Marketing & Sales Competence Center July, 2009 1 Franchise systems attract growing interest and gain importance Roland Berger Strategy Consultants know how to succeed

More information

Organizational Design and Control Across Multiple Markets: The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry

Organizational Design and Control Across Multiple Markets: The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry Organizational Design and Control Across Multiple Markets: The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry Dennis Campbell a, Srikant Datar a, Tatiana Sandino b, a Harvard Business School, Harvard

More information

NAPCS Product List for NAICS 533: Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works)

NAPCS Product List for NAICS 533: Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works) NAPCS List for NAICS 533: Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works) 533 1 Licensing of rights to property protected as industrial property Granting permission to use industrial

More information

INTRODUCTION. By: Dianne H. B. Welsh; David E. Desplaces; Amy E. Davis

INTRODUCTION. By: Dianne H. B. Welsh; David E. Desplaces; Amy E. Davis A Comparison of Retail Franchises, Independent Businesses, and Purchased Existing Independent Business Startups: Lessons From the Kauffman Firm Survey By: Dianne H. B. Welsh; David E. Desplaces; Amy E.

More information

The Significance of Intangibles: why we need a deeper understanding

The Significance of Intangibles: why we need a deeper understanding The Significance of Intangibles: why we need a deeper understanding TEKES Intangible Assets Seminar. Hotel President, Helsinki Date: 04.12.14 Colin Hazley, PhD Visiting Academic at Manchester Institute

More information

SUBWAY AND THE CHALLENGES OF FRANCHISING IN CHINA. JaYoung Lee TaeSung Park Aschel Soza

SUBWAY AND THE CHALLENGES OF FRANCHISING IN CHINA. JaYoung Lee TaeSung Park Aschel Soza SUBWAY AND THE CHALLENGES OF FRANCHISING IN CHINA JaYoung Lee TaeSung Park Aschel Soza TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction of Subway What is Franchise? / China? Subway s challenges of Franchising in China.

More information

Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets

Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets Pol Antràs Mihir Desai C. Fritz Foley Harvard University and NBER Brown Economics December 2006 Motivation (1) Great interest in contracting

More information

TO LICENSE OR NOT TO LICENSE: THIS IS THE QUESTION

TO LICENSE OR NOT TO LICENSE: THIS IS THE QUESTION Studio Legale Bernase & Soci TO LICENSE OR NOT TO LICENSE: THIS IS THE QUESTION LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS Paola Sangiovanni, Partner SUMMARY LICENSE AGREEMENT Motivations Key issues ALTERNATIVE

More information

By: CECILIA M. FALBE and DIANNE H. B. WELSH *

By: CECILIA M. FALBE and DIANNE H. B. WELSH * NAFTA AND FRANCHISING: A COMPARISON OF FRANCHISOR PERCEPTIONS OF CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH FRANCHISEE SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES By: CECILIA M. FALBE and DIANNE

More information

C2W Music Ltd. Report To The Shareholders Financial Statements Ended September 30 th, 2015

C2W Music Ltd. Report To The Shareholders Financial Statements Ended September 30 th, 2015 C2W Music Ltd. Report To The Shareholders Financial Statements Ended September 30 th, The Board of Directors of C2W Music Limited (the Company ) is pleased to announce the financial results th for the

More information

CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS, BARGAINING POWER, AND GOVERNANCE INSEPARABILITY: INCORPORATING HISTORY INTO THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF THE FIRM

CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS, BARGAINING POWER, AND GOVERNANCE INSEPARABILITY: INCORPORATING HISTORY INTO THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF THE FIRM CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS, BARGAINING POWER, AND GOVERNANCE INSEPARABILITY: INCORPORATING HISTORY INTO THE TRANSACTION COST THEORY OF THE FIRM Nicholas S. Argyres* and Julia Porter Liebeskind Marshall School

More information

Seminar. Addressing Information Gaps in Business and Macro Economic Accounts to Better Explain Economic Performance

Seminar. Addressing Information Gaps in Business and Macro Economic Accounts to Better Explain Economic Performance IG/11 24 June 2008 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS STATISTICS DIVISION Seminar Addressing Information Gaps in Business and Macro Economic Accounts to Better Explain Economic Performance

More information

STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT

STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT Journal of Business Economics and Management 2008 9(1): 47 51 STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT Martin Schieg Technical University of Munich, Arcisstraße

More information

Bodey et al. Contrasting the Four Franchising Imperatives RESEARCH ARTICLE

Bodey et al. Contrasting the Four Franchising Imperatives RESEARCH ARTICLE RESEARCH ARTICLE across Hybridized Governance Models; a Preliminary Investigation Kelli L Bodey* Lecturer Department of Marketing Griffith Business School Gold Coast Campus, Griffith University Department

More information

A&W Food Services of Canada Inc. Consolidated Financial Statements December 30, 2012 and January 1, 2012 (in thousands of dollars)

A&W Food Services of Canada Inc. Consolidated Financial Statements December 30, 2012 and January 1, 2012 (in thousands of dollars) A&W Food Services of Canada Inc. Consolidated Financial Statements December 30, and January 1, (in thousands of dollars) February 12, 2013 Independent Auditor s Report To the Shareholders of A&W Food Services

More information

THE DISADVANTAGES OF FRANCHISING

THE DISADVANTAGES OF FRANCHISING 05_Shane_ch03.qxd 11/2/04 4:36 PM Page 43 3 THE DISADVANTAGES OF FRANCHISING There is no such thing as a free lunch not even at a franchised restaurant or fast food operation. The advantages of franchising

More information

Warwick Business School

Warwick Business School Introduction There are longstanding concerns that entrepreneurs experience binding financial constraints. A situation where increasing the amount of finance available to the entrepreneur would raise the

More information

THEME 9: GROWTH STRATEGIES

THEME 9: GROWTH STRATEGIES THEME 9: GROWTH STRATEGIES 1st Part: Vertical integration and Scope of the Firm 2nd Part: Internal and external growth 1st Part: Vertical Integration and The Scope of the Firm Vertical Integration and

More information

Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage

Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage EDITION 3 Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage CONCEPTS AND CASES Jay B. Barney The Ohio State University j William S.Hesterly The University of Utah Prentice Hall Boston Columbus Indianapolis

More information

Revenue. Compiled AASB Standard AASB 118

Revenue. Compiled AASB Standard AASB 118 Compiled AASB Standard AASB 118 Revenue This compiled Standard applies to annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2011 but before 1 January 2013. Early application is permitted. It incorporates

More information

Synergies and Sustainable Competitive Advantage

Synergies and Sustainable Competitive Advantage Synergies and Sustainable Competitive Advantage by Mikael Iversen Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy Copenhagen Business School Nansensgade 19, 6 DK-1366 Copenhagen K, Denmark E-mail: mi.ivs@cbs.dk

More information

Beregovskaya T.A. FRANCHANSING AS A MODERN CONCEPT OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

Beregovskaya T.A. FRANCHANSING AS A MODERN CONCEPT OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SUM, Moscow Most franchise networks do not begin with firm plans or any thought at all, relating to franchising. Without regard to whether the business operates from a single location or several outlets,

More information

Chapter 4 Franchises and Buyouts

Chapter 4 Franchises and Buyouts Chapter 4 Franchises and Buyouts TRUE/FALSE 1. One of the advantages of buying a franchise is that the purchaser has access to a proven business system. ANS: T PTS: 1 REF: p. 109 OBJ: 4-2 TYPE: C 2. A

More information

Monitoring and the acceptability of bank money

Monitoring and the acceptability of bank money Régis Breton Conference Bank liquidity, transparency and regulation Paris, 20/12/2013 The views expressed here are my own and should not necessarily be interpreted as those of the Banque de France or the

More information

Draft Registration Statement on Form S-1 Submitted March 27, 2015 CIK No. 1636222

Draft Registration Statement on Form S-1 Submitted March 27, 2015 CIK No. 1636222 Charles R. Morrison President and Chief Executive Officer 5501 LBJ Freeway, 5th Floor Dallas, TX 75240 Re: Draft Registration Statement on Form S-1 Submitted March 27, 2015 CIK No. 1636222 Dear Mr. Morrison:

More information

Corporate Investment and Cash Flow in the U.S. Restaurant Industry ABSTRACT. Keywords: restaurant, franchise, investment, cash flow, sensitivity.

Corporate Investment and Cash Flow in the U.S. Restaurant Industry ABSTRACT. Keywords: restaurant, franchise, investment, cash flow, sensitivity. Corporate Investment and Cash Flow in the U.S. Restaurant Industry Bo-Bae Min College of Hotel and Tourism Management Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Rep. of Korea and Yeo-Jin Shin College of Hotel and Tourism

More information

Is the franchising model attractive to independent small business operators?

Is the franchising model attractive to independent small business operators? Is the franchising model attractive to independent small business operators? Stephen Bennett PhD Candidate Asia-Pacific Centre for Franchising Excellence Griffith University Brisbane Australia Tel: +61

More information

How To Manage Area Revenue Management In A Franchised Network

How To Manage Area Revenue Management In A Franchised Network AGIFORS YIELD MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE Title: IMPLEMENTING AREA REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN A FRANCHISED NETWORK Authors: Jean Michel Chapuis * and Mathieu Paquerot ** University of La Rochelle, Management Institute,

More information

Going International for the First Time

Going International for the First Time Going International for the First Time Speakers: Rose Nichols Zinkel, Director of International Development, International Dairy Queen William Le Sante, CFE, CEO, Le Sante International Moderator: Robert

More information

a. Languages: English will be the primary language of the collection. b. Chronological Guidelines: Current and recent topics are of major interest.

a. Languages: English will be the primary language of the collection. b. Chronological Guidelines: Current and recent topics are of major interest. Georgia State University University Library Collection Development Policy Department of Marketing Purpose: To provide guidance in the selection of library materials to support the curriculum for the program

More information

Effects of Innovation Ability on International Entry Mode Choice and Firms' Performance

Effects of Innovation Ability on International Entry Mode Choice and Firms' Performance International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research (IJMSR) Volume 2, Issue 7, August 2014, PP 40-46 ISSN 2349-0330 (Print) & ISSN 2349-0349 (Online) www.arcjournals.org Effects of Innovation Ability

More information

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich. Working Paper Series ISSN 1424-0459. Working Paper No. 229

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich. Working Paper Series ISSN 1424-0459. Working Paper No. 229 Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich Working Paper Series ISSN 1424-0459 Working Paper No. 229 On the Notion of the First Best in Standard Hidden Action Problems Christian

More information

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 2249 Resource Allocation and Firm Scope Guido Friebel Michael Raith August 2006 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Resource Allocation

More information

VERTICAL INTEGRATION

VERTICAL INTEGRATION December 2, 2003 (Revised) Forthcoming, Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Kluwer VERTICAL INTEGRATION Paul L. Joskow 1 1. INTRODUCTION Understanding the factors that determine which types of transactions

More information

Franchising: A Pull Strategy to International Expansion. Megan Thompson, University of Western Sydney. Abstract

Franchising: A Pull Strategy to International Expansion. Megan Thompson, University of Western Sydney. Abstract Franchising: A Pull Strategy to International Expansion Megan Thompson, University of Western Sydney Abstract Business franchising is a mode of entry into international markets that seeks to replicate

More information

2013 Hay Group healthcare and health insurance pricing summary for pay

2013 Hay Group healthcare and health insurance pricing summary for pay 2013 Hay Group healthcare and health insurance pricing summary for pay Product Description Price* Publication Integrated healthcare system executives Integrated healthcare system prevalence and planning

More information

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS BBA 920: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS. Course Description

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS BBA 920: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS. Course Description DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BUSINESS BBA 920: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS Basic concepts and techniques of microeconomic analysis; Utility and demand; Theory of Production and costs; Market structures

More information

Towards a Functional Resource-based Theory of the Firm

Towards a Functional Resource-based Theory of the Firm Towards a Functional Resource-based Theory of the Firm Jeroen Kraaijenbrink & Aard Groen Paper presented at the SMS 28th Annual International Conference, Cologne, Germany The resource-based view (RBV)

More information

Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases 9e

Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases 9e Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases 9e Part II: Strategic Actions: Strategy Formulation Chapter 8: International Strategy 2011 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or

More information

ROMANIAN - AMERICAN UNIVERSITY School of Domestic and International Business, Banking and Finance

ROMANIAN - AMERICAN UNIVERSITY School of Domestic and International Business, Banking and Finance Invest in People! Project co-financed by European Social Fund through the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resource Development 2007 2013 Priority Axis: 1. Education and training in support for growth

More information

ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND PERFORMANCE IN SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES IN VIETNAM

ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND PERFORMANCE IN SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES IN VIETNAM Asian Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1 21, January 2010 ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND PERFORMANCE IN SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES IN VIETNAM Nham Phong Tuan 1* and Takahashi

More information

OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY I. Introduction 1. Simply put, technology transfer is the process by which a technology, expertise, knowhow or facilities developed by

More information

The Performance Implications and Success Factors of Channel Design and Channel Management on B2B Markets

The Performance Implications and Success Factors of Channel Design and Channel Management on B2B Markets Institute for Market-Oriented Management Competence in Research & Management Prof. Dr. Hans H. Bauer, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Christian Homburg, Prof. Dr. Sabine Kuester IMU Research Insights # 006 The

More information

GROWTH STRATEGIES: INCLUDING FRANCHISING, LICENSING, AND DISTRIBUTION

GROWTH STRATEGIES: INCLUDING FRANCHISING, LICENSING, AND DISTRIBUTION GROWTH STRATEGIES: INCLUDING FRANCHISING, LICENSING, AND DISTRIBUTION There are many ways in which a business can structure growth. Some examples include: (a) adding additional company-owned outlets; (b)

More information