1 1 PUBLIC SECTOR AUDITING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ENABLING LEGISLATION OF THE AUDITORS-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA # By Mr. Michael De Martinis* School of Accounting and Finance Victoria University of Technology P.O Box Melbourne, Australia and Professor Colin Clark Head, Public Sector Research Unit Victoria University of Technology P.O Box Melbourne, Australia April 2001 * Author for correspondence purposes. # The authors wish to thank Ruth Kiraka for her invaluable research assistance in collecting the data from the enabling legislation. This paper has also benefited from comments received on earlier drafts from Wayne Cameron, Auditor-General Victoria, John Parkinson (Convenor, Australasian Council of Auditors-General and Auditor-General, ACT), representatives from the other offices of the auditorsgeneral including: Ian Summers (Auditor-General, Northern Territory); Terry Hogan (the Audit Office of New South Wales); Barry Rowe (Office of the Auditor-General for Western Australia); Teresa Rafter (Queensland Audit Office); Janine McGuiness (Australian National Audit Office); Johann Jantz (Victorian Auditor-General s Office); Ian McGlen (South Australian Auditor-General s Department); and Dr. Arthur McHugh (Auditor-General, Tasmania). We acknowledge comments from Prof Haddon Storey, Public Sector Research Unit, Victoria University of Technology, Dr Bob Clift, participants at the European Accounting Association Conference Athens 2001, and also an anonymous reviewer. We are grateful for funding provided by the Public Sector Research Unit, Victoria University of Technology. Responsibility for any errors remains with the authors.
2 2 PUBLIC SECTOR AUDITING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ENABLING LEGISLATION OF THE AUDITORS-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA ABSTRACT Supreme audit institutions, such as the auditors-general, are considered a crucial link in the accountability chain between parliament and the executive arm of government. In this context, two landmark reports commissioned by the Parliament of Australia on the Office of the Commonwealth (Federal) Auditor-General provide an appropriate legislative framework on which to base the role, responsibility, and scope of auditors-general (Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA), 1989; 1996). The purpose of this study is to examine the enabling legislation of all nine auditors-general of Australia from a public sector accountability and independence perspective. Following on from JCPA (1989; 1996) and in particular English and Guthrie (2000), this study uses an accountability and independence framework to identify and compare the current legislation applicable to all nine auditors-general of Australia with regard to independence, autonomy, mandate, funding issues, and related parliamentary powers. This study finds that the enabling legislation of the Commonwealth and the Victorian auditors-general have markedly less differences from the suggested framework than the other seven auditors-general. Also, for all auditors-general examined, it highlights specific areas where provisions may be further strengthened through amendments to their enabling legislation. The framework and results of this study may be used to examine the extent to which the enabling legislation of supreme audit institutions in other jurisdictions adequately and appropriately deals with their powers, independence and autonomy, and parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
3 3 1. INTRODUCTION Supreme audit institutions, such as auditors-general, are considered a crucial link in the accountability chain between parliament and the executive arm of government (and its use of public monies). However, relatively little research has examined the extent to which auditorsgeneral fulfil such accountability enhancing roles. Further, nor has a formal theory or model been developed that integrates prior government and public sector accountability literature. Whilst such a model would prescribe how accountability agencies, such as the auditor-general, should best fulfil their role in ensuring government and public sector accountability to parliament, the development of such a fully integrated theoretical model of government and public sector accountability is beyond the scope of this study. However, this study makes a significant contribution by considering an important aspect of the literature as related to the powers and accountability of the auditor-general in ensuring such government and public sector accountability. In contributing to the future development of an integrated theoretical model of government and public sector accountability, the purpose of this study is to examine the enabling legislation of all nine auditors-general of Australia from a public sector accountability and independence perspective. The basis of this examination stems from English and Guthrie (2000) and Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA, 1989 and 1996), and involves identifying the extent to which the enabling legislation of each auditor-general contains provisions regarding a number of key suggested accountability and independence mechanisms. These relate to parliament s powers and oversight of the auditor-general, as well as on the extent to which the legislation addresses the auditor-general s powers, funding, mandate, and independence from direction by parliament. To help with the identification, English and Guthrie (2000) is adapted to provide a basis for further developing an accountability and independence framework that contains a number of key items relating to parliamentary accountability mechanisms and powers required by the auditor-general. The framework in this study extends English and Guthrie (2000) by presenting suggested legislative requirements that will provide for an appropriate level of parliamentary accountability and auditor-general power and independence. This framework allows for an identification of those issues not explicitly addressed in the enabling legislation of the auditors-general, as well as the extent of those items that are addressed in the enabling legislation. Further, the framework facilitates a comparison of the enabling legislation between all the auditors-general examined in this study. Overall, the closer the enabling legislative matches the framework, then the better the legislation in terms of the auditorgeneral having reasonably adequate and appropriate powers, mandate, funding, and independence from government. Whilst the focus of this study is to further develop an accountability and independence framework applicable to auditors-general that can be used to examine their enabling legislation with respect to the adequacy their powers, mandate, and independence, the framework can be applied in other accountability contexts. For example, the framework and results of this study may be used to examine the extent to which the enabling legislation of supreme audit institutions in other jurisdictions adequately deals with their powers, independence and autonomy, and parliamentary accountability mechanisms. Therefore, the framework has potential to make a significant contribution to the development of an overall theoretical model of government and public sector accountability.
4 4 Apart from this study s basic contribution towards the development of a formal theoretical model of government and public sector accountability, the study is further motivated by a recent parliamentary inquiry into a legislative framework for (its) officers of parliament. In April 2000, the Parliament of Victoria, Australia, through the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee (PAEC), requested submissions as part of its inquiry into a legislative framework for Victorian Statutory Officers of Parliament. The PAEC was to undertake an inquiry and report on: 1. An appropriate legislative framework for Victorian officers of Parliament such as the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and other statutory office-holders, that would recognise the special position of statutory officers of the Parliament in terms of their relationship with the Victorian Parliament but which also ensures that their greater autonomy is accompanied by very clear accountability requirements; and 2. Developments in this area in other jurisdictions. In order to determine an appropriate legislative framework for Victorian Officers of Parliament, including the Auditor-General, this study compares the enabling legislation of all auditors-general of Australia in terms of specific differences in their powers, mandate, funding, and independence. Also compared are the accountability mechanisms available to parliament in terms of their appointment, tenure, and oversight. The examination includes the Commonwealth Auditor-General (C/W), the six State auditors-general: Victoria (VIC), New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA), Queensland (QLD), Western Australia (WA), and Tasmania (TAS), and the two Territory auditors-general: Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Northern Territory (NT). The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant public sector auditing and accountability literature. In particular, focus is on prior reports and studies related to the Commonwealth Auditor-General (Barrett, 1996b; English and Guthrie, 2000; JCPA, 1989; 1996; Taylor 1996b). Whilst Mulgan (1997) represents a significant contribution towards the development of a model of government and public sector accountability, English and Guthrie (2000) provide the basis of an accountability and independence framework that highlights key accountability mechanisms required for ensuring of the relationship between parliament and government. Section 3 then proceeds to suggest the legislative requirements for each item within the framework. The suggested legislative requirements are derived from a review of relevant professional and scholarly literature. Section 4 then uses this extended framework to identify where differences exist between the framework s suggested legislative requirements (as identified in Section 3) and the enabling legislation of the nine auditors-general. The final section presents a summary and discussion of the results as presented in the previous section. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW Literature on public sector accounting, auditing, and accountability is extensive (see, for example, English and Guthrie, 1991; Funnel and Cooper, 1998; Mulgan, 1997; Taylor, 1992 and Zifcak, 1997). In recent times the literature has acknowledged a model of accountability that comprises a number of complementary agencies, processes, and channels of accountability between the public and public servants (Mulgan, 1997). Figure 1, which is
5 5 sourced from Mulgan (1997), depicts the agencies of accountability to include Freedom of Information legislation, courts, ministers, parliament, and committees and officers of parliament including the ombudsman and the auditor-general. The four main processes of accountability comprise reporting or accounting, information-seeking or investigation, assessment or verification, and direction and control. The agencies can ensure the accountability of governments or public servants through a number of channels. Insert Figure 1 about here However, the literature also acknowledges that the effectiveness of these accountability agencies, particularly in context of the role of public sector audit, is dependent upon their having independence, autonomy, funding, and a comprehensive mandate (Barrett, 1996a and 1996b; De Martinis, Clark, and Roberts, 1998; English and Guthrie, 1991 and 2000; Funnell, 1996 and 1997; Taylor 1996a and b). In the context of this model, three issues surface that serve as a back-drop to this study. First, there is no reason to expect any one agency, channel, or institution to fulfil all functions of public accountability. Second, whilst there may be a perception that any channel may be considered ineffective or lacking power if it does not direct and control, Mulgan (1997: page 34) points out that focus should be on whether their scrutinising and auditing activities lead eventually to appropriate responses from government, provoked if necessary by other channels of accountability. Third, public sector audit is a necessary but not a sufficient agent for achieving at least the first three processes of accountability. Therefore, Mulgan (1997) argues that the key is to improve the scrutinising and auditing function of the auditor-general, as well as the other complementary channels including parliament and other officers such as the ombudsman. With regard to the auditor-general, the extent to which this office can adequately scrutinise and audit is at the heart of the continuing debate on the role of public sector audit in public sector accountability. In fact, this debate represents a significant part of this literature (see, for example, De Martinis, Clark, and Roberts, 1998; English and Guthrie, 1991 and 2000; Funnell and Cooper, 1998; Mulgan, 1997; Taylor, 1992; Walsh, 1995). Therefore, this literature provides the framework for examining the appropriateness and adequacy of current legislative frameworks of all independent officers of parliament such as auditors-general with regard to mandate, independence, autonomy, and funding issues. In addition, it also provides the basis for reporting on an appropriate legislative framework for Victorian Officers of Parliament that: (i) recognises the special position of Statutory Officers of the Parliament in terms of their relationship with the Victorian Parliament; and (ii) ensures that their greater autonomy is accompanied by very clear accountability requirements. An Accountability and Independence Framework Whilst Mulgan (1997) represents a significant contribution towards the development of an integrated model of government and public sector accountability, the model lacks prescription in terms of how the accountability channels and agencies would best fulfil their public accountability function. English and Guthrie (2000) and JCPA s (1989; 1996) significant contribution towards such a model of public sector accountability is the detailing of key accountability factors or mechanisms required by the auditor-general in terms of appropriate and adequate powers, mandate, funding, and independence from parliament. Thus providing
6 6 the basis of a framework that can be used to examine the enabling legislation of auditorsgeneral with respect to these factors. It was noted above that auditors-general are considered a crucial link in the accountability chain between parliament and the executive arm of government (and its use of public monies). In this context, landmark reports by the JCPA on the Office of the Commonwealth (Federal) Auditor-General (now known as the Australian National Audit Office) such as Guarding the Independence of the Auditor-General (JCPA, 1996) and The Auditor-General: Ally of the People and Parliament (JCPA, 1989), have a common theme regarding the appropriate legislative framework on which to base the role, responsibility and scope of auditors-general. Recommendations therein focus on a legislative framework that ensures government accountability through auditors-general that are not only independent, but are seen to be independent. For example, JCPA (1996: page 7) states that the independence of the auditorgeneral is fundamental to public accountability, and that it is necessary to put beyond doubt the auditor-general s freedom from direction by the executive or the Parliament in the performance of audit functions. In the earlier inquiry, the JCPA (1989) noted the need to strengthen or at least maintain traditional accountability of federal government organisations and officials to parliament through public sector audits that emphasise compliance, probity, and financial processes. Of particular significance is JCPA (1989). The report details a framework that identifies four accountability mechanisms available to parliament related to audit mandate, independence, and funding. These are: scope of audit in the public sector; powers of parliament in relation to audit; funding as determined by parliament; and oversight. It also identifies the necessary powers required by auditors-general to conduct audits. These include wide mandate, independence from direction by the executive arm of government, and sufficient funding as recommended by parliament (not the executive). Table 1, sourced from English and Guthrie (2000), depicts this framework and is discussed in more detail in the next section. Insert Table 1 about here Based on JCPA (1989; 1996), English and Guthrie (2000) examine the role, powers, and autonomy of the Commonwealth Auditor-General in context of the accountability mechanisms available to parliament, as per Table 1. The two-part framework describes (i) the accountability mechanisms available to parliament related to audit scope, auditor-general appointment, tabling of reports, funding, and oversight, and (ii) the powers required by auditors-general to conduct audits related to independence, mandate and funding source. This framework also serves as the framework for this study s comparative analyses. In the first part of the framework, the four accountability mechanism available to parliament relate to: (i) scope of audit in the public sector; (ii) powers of parliament in relation to audit; (iii) funding determined by parliament; and (iv) oversight of the auditor-general. On the scope of audit, there should be no impediment to the auditor-general conducting financial statement and performance audits of all government entities. On the powers of parliament, it should have the power to request audits, have all audit reports tabled in the parliament, and have a parliamentary audit committee appoint and oversee the auditor-general and his/her office. On funding of the auditor-general, this should be determined by parliament via input from parliamentary audit committee. On oversight, an independent audit of the auditorgeneral s office should be conducted regularly.
7 7 In the second part of the framework, the powers or autonomy required by auditors-general to conduct audits relate to three issues: (i) the mandate to perform audits; (ii) independence from direction by the executive arm of government; and (iii) funding. On scope and mandate, auditors-general should perform financial statement and performance audits of all government agencies, authorities, companies, and individuals. On independence, specific issues that should be enshrined in law include: the auditor-general being: free of direction/control from the executive arm of government; reporting to parliament; having wide information gathering powers, appointed by the parliament, and appointed as an officer of parliament; and able to determine the terms and condition of employment of staff. On funding level, this should be sufficient to enable the auditor-general to exercise effective mandate, and be recommended by parliamentary audit committee (not treasury). To facilitate the comparison between each auditors -general enabling legislation, the framework as contained in Table 1 is restructured such that the main legislative requirements necessary for each accountability mechanism and power/autonomy issue are separated. That is, Table 2 details the suggested legislative requirements for each of the three main accountability mechanisms, while Table 3 details the suggested legislative requirements for the two main power/autonomy issues. Both these tables form the basis of the comparative analyses as discussed in Section 4 of this paper and appearing in the first row of Tables 4 to 8. In the next section, for each of the key items appearing in the Tables 2 and 3, prior literature is used to support the suggested legislative requirements. Insert Table 2 about here Insert Table 3 about here 3. SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS This section discusses the suggested legislative requirements in detail. The basis for the suggested legislative requirements stems from a review of the literature, in particular from recommendations contained in the landmark reports on the Australian National Audit Office (JCPA, 1989 and 1996) and from English and Guthrie (2000). For example, some recommendations resulted in the introduction of a legislative framework that promoted the Commonwealth Auditor-General s independence of the executive arm of government, and strengthened the role of the parliament in ensuring that audit functions are adequately resourced. They also lead to the Commonwealth Auditor-General being an Independent Officer of the Parliament. As such, most of the following discussion owes much to the prior work as contained in JCPA (1989 and 1996). Note, however that when the enabling legislation of the Commonwealth Auditor-General is compared with this study s suggested legislative requirements, differences do exist. Accountability Mechanisms Available to Parliament
8 8 A. Powers of Parliament in Relation to Audit Table 1 shows that a key accountability mechanism to parliament is its power over the appointment and oversight of the auditor-general and his or her office. Therefore, in the context of ensuring such powers, auditor-general independence (as distinct to independence of the public sector audit office (Funnell, 1996)), requires that the appointment, tenure, and removal be determined by parliament itself, and not by the executive arm of government. The same applies regarding the determination of remuneration. Further, parliament should have the power to request audits and have all audit reports tabled in the parliament. At the same time, the auditor-general should not be under any direction or control from, or be impeded by, the executive, nor lack discretion in determining the type of audit and auditee. Although JCPA (1996: page 59) states that auditor independence can be enshrined in legislation, both the professional standards (eg. AUP 32) and academic literature maintain that it should be enshrined in legislation (Barrett, 1996a and 1996b; English and Guthrie, 1991; Funnell, 1997; and Taylor, 1996a and 1996b). However, Funnell (1996) notes that given the importance accorded to independence for public sector auditors, relatively little discussion exists of how interpretations of public sector audit independence have been constructed and sustained. Further, he adds that no concerted attempt has been made to identify the groups which have played the greatest roles in the construction of meaning (Funnel, 1994). An interesting point made by Funnell (1996) relates to the apparent confusion encouraged by the executive between independence of the auditor-general as a person, with that of his or her office. Funnell (1996: page 110) states that to accomplish this the executive has stressed personal characteristics of the auditor-general (i.e. honesty, unbiased, objective) and relevant provisions of audit legislation as both indications and guarantees of the independence of public sector audit, as opposed to the independence of the auditor-general. Until recently, this approach has been effective in sustaining an image of an independent public sector audit function but without placing the auditor-general beyond the reach of the executive. In placing the auditor-general beyond executive reach, Barrett (1996a: page 138) states that one cannot effectively deal with the issue of independence unless one considers the framework that creates the Auditor-General s role as a whole. For example, the appointment and dismissal processes, term and conditions of appointment, the nature of the audit office and its relationship to the auditor-general and the audit mandate, incorporating power to access information including cabinet documents all impact on the extent of independence which exists in practice. In light of the above, and given that the governor or governor-incouncil act on recommendations of the executive government, it would be preferable to provide a more substantial role for the parliament, rather than the governor or governor-incouncil, with regard to the auditor-general s appointment, tenure, and remuneration. In summary, and as shown in Table 2, Column A, the suggested legislative requirements as related to enshrining adequate power to parliament in relation to audit are as follows. The auditor-general should be appointed by parliament or a parliamentary committee. The term of office of the auditor-general should be for a period of at least seven years and be eligible for re-appointment. An independent remuneration tribunal should determine remuneration of the auditor-general, and payment to the auditor-general should be from the Consolidated Fund. Removal of the auditor-general should only be by parliament. The process for appointment of an acting auditor-general should be the same as the process for appointing the auditor-general.
9 9 There should be no requirement to have an annual work plan prepared by the auditor-general and submitted to parliament or other officers and committees. Parliament, through the relevant committee, should have the power to request audits, and all audit reports of the auditor-general should be tabled in the parliament. B. Funding of the Office In the previous section, discussion centred on providing parliamentary power related to the auditor-general s independence, including powers to appoint, remove, and determine remuneration. In this section, focus shifts to addressing the separate but equally important issue of public sector audit office independence, or in other words on the issue of source and level of funding for the auditor-general s office (Funnell, 1996). Barrett (1996a: page 138) argues that dependence for funding does potentially, if not actually, impact on the independence issue. In this connection, there have been questions about control by the executive through the estimates process in negotiations with Finance or Treasury agencies. Funnell (1996: page 118) states that the greatest threat to the operation of an independent public sector audit office in Australia, which the executive has not sought to highlight, has been the auditor-general s dependence on the executive for the resources necessary to meet the audit mandate. Therefore, in order to achieve both an independent auditor-general and an independent public sector audit office, parliament, not the executive, should have the necessary powers to determine the auditor-general s employment conditions (for example, appointment, removal, and remuneration), and the level of funding. Table 2 Column B suggests that from both the accountability viewpoint and auditor-general power and autonomy requirements, funding (level) should be determined by parliament (via input from a parliamentary audit committee), and not Treasury. Further, the office of the auditor-general should have sufficient funds to enable the auditor-general to exercise effective mandate. This would enable the auditor-general to fulfil a comprehensive and extensive mandate. Further, the auditor-general should not need to recover costs from auditees for financial statement audits. C. Oversight of Auditors-General Figure 1 shows a model of accountability that comprises a number of complementary agencies, processes, and channels of accountability between the public and public servants (Mulgan, 1997). Public sector audit is a necessary but not a sufficient agent for ensuring public accountability. While agencies such as the auditor-general serve as vehicles of public accountability, the accountability debate also includes the extent to which the agencies themselves should be accountable to parliament. Phrases such as watching the watch-dog imply that the accountability agencies also should be accountable to parliament. Therefore, in a complete model of public accountability, parliament should have powers to appoint, remove and remunerate accountability agencies such as the auditor-general, as well as have powers of oversight. Further, parliament should have the power to appoint an independent auditor of the auditor-general, and that the independent auditor should report to a parliamentary audit committee (Table 1). In summary, and as shown in Table 2, Column C, the suggested legislative requirements as related to enshrining adequate oversight of the auditor-general are as follows. There should be an independent auditor appointed by parliament to conduct a financial statement audit of
10 10 the auditor-general, and report to parliament. An independent auditor should conduct a performance audit of the auditor-general s office at least once every three years. Powers required by Auditors-General to Conduct Audits D. Mandate of Auditors-General to Perform Audits It was previously mentioned that in order to ensure public sector audit office independence, parliament, not the executive, should have the necessary powers to determine the level of adequate funding. This is because funding has a bearing on the extent to which the office can carry out its mandate, whether comprehensive or not. Barrett (1996a: page 139) states that the nature and extent of the mandate have an important bearing on the office because it effectively determines the resource requirement including the professional and technical abilities likely to be demanded. Therefore, adequate funding of the auditor-general s office and achievement of a comprehensive mandate are not mutually exclusive. That is, without adequate funding, the latter cannot be effectively achieved, and similarly, a wide and comprehensive mandate necessitates adequate funding. Auditors-general should have powers to carry out a comprehensive audit mandate. This includes conducting financial statement, compliance/regularity, and performance (or valuefor-money ) audits of government agencies, authorities, companies, and individuals (Table 1). This power then allows the auditor-general and his office to effectively carry out an important accountability mechanism on behalf of parliament, such that he or she should have no impediment to conduct financial and performance audits of all government entities. In summary, and as shown in Table 3, Column A, the suggested legislative requirements as related to enshrining adequate mandate and scope of the auditor-general to perform audits are as follows. The auditor-general should have a comprehensive mandate to conduct financial statement and performance audits of authorities, agencies, departments, statutory bodies, companies, and individuals, and other bodies funded by government. E. Independence from Direction by Parliament or its Committees Table 1 lists a number of requirements related to ensuring that auditors-general have independence and autonomy from direction by the executive arm of government. Most of these issues have been previously discussed in context of the framework behind Table 1. For example, it was recommended that both the independence of the auditor-general and his or her office should be enshrined in law. That is, the appointment, removal, and remuneration of the auditor-general, as well as the funding of his or her office are determined by parliament, and that such funding be sufficient for effective conduct of a comprehensive mandate. Further, it was noted that parliamentary oversight of the auditor-general is necessary so that as an agency of accountability, he or she also is accountable to parliament (that is, the notion of watching the watch-dog ). In summary, Table 3, Column B, details the suggested legislative requirements as related to enshrining adequate independence from direction by parliament or its committees are as follows. The auditor-general should be independent from direction by parliament or its committees, free of direction or control from the executive of government, parliamentary committees, or individuals, and be an independent officer of the parliament. The auditorgeneral should have discretion to determine the type of audit and auditee, and have wide
11 11 information gathering powers. The auditor-general should determine the terms and conditions of staff in the office. As an alternative, the existing power to the exempt the auditor-general from employment provisions generally applicable to government agencies could be endorsed. Finally, the auditor-general should have the power to appoint contractors to conduct audits. 4. COMPARISON OF THE ENABLING LEGISLATION OF THE AUDITORS- GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA In this section, the study uses the two-part framework to describe and compare the accountability mechanisms available to parliament related to audit mandate, independence, autonomy, and funding across all auditors-general of Australia, as contained in their respective enabling legislation. The enabling legislation as at September 2000 of all auditorsgeneral were obtained. The legislation was examined to determine whether the accountability mechanisms (Table 2) and the required powers (Table 3) were or were not explicitly addressed. To validate our findings, detailed comments on the data as appearing in Tables 4 to 8 were received from representatives of the individual offices of the auditors-general via the auditors -general peak representative body, the Australasian Council of Auditors-General. Responses were received from all auditors-general. Consequently, where necessary and deemed appropriate, amendments were incorporated in the relevant parts of the paper and tables. Tables 4 to 8 provide a summary of the key features of the legislation applicable to each auditor-general of Australia under the separate accountability mechanisms, and required powers and autonomy. A total of 30 issues are contained within these tables. The highlighted cells within each table indicate a difference between the enabling legislation and this study s suggested legislative requirement as appearing in Tables 2 and 3. Table 9 provides descriptive results for each auditor-general based on the number of cells highlighted in Tables 4 to 8. Most of the deficiencies exist because the enabling legislation is silent. Therefore, such deficiencies would be addressed through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation that explicitly address the issues. Accountability Mechanisms Available to Parliament A. Powers of Parliament in Relation to Audit In a review of the enabling legislation on the powers of parliament specifically in relation to appointment, tenure, removal, and remuneration of auditors-general for each of the jurisdictions examined in this part of the study, Table 4 reveals a high degree of similarity. However, as discussed below, there are some significant differences in relation to mandate, independence, and funding. Insert Table 4 about here (a) Appointment The appointment of the Commonwealth Auditor-General is by the Governor-General (on the recommendation of the Minister, subject to the approval of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit). In the case of the States, appointment of the auditor-general is by the
12 12 Governor, with the exceptions being Victoria and Queensland where appointment is by the Governor-in-Council. In Victoria, the appointment is made on the recommendation of the PAEC. For the Territories, it is the executive who make the appointment for the ACT and the Administrator who makes the appointment for the Northern Territory. (b) Term of Office Generally the respective legislation provides for a fixed term of appointment for the auditorgeneral with these fixed terms ranging from more than five years through to 10 years. In the case of Western Australia and South Australia the appointment is until the age of 65. (c) Eligibility for re-appointment Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT provide for re-appointment of the auditor-general, however, in the case of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Northern Territory and Queensland the auditor-general is not eligible for re-appointment. (d) Remuneration The process for determining the remuneration of the auditor-general is removed from the direct determination of the parliament, with the exception of Tasmania where the remuneration of the auditor-general is stipulated in the Act. A form of remuneration tribunal is used to determine the remuneration of the auditor-general in the case of the Commonwealth, the ACT, and Western Australia. For Victoria and Queensland it is the Governor-in-Council which determines the remuneration of the auditor-general while for South Australia it is the Governor. For the Northern Territory it is the Administrator who determines the remuneration of the auditor-general. For New South Wales the legislation appears to be silent on the process for determining remuneration. (e) Payment The relevant legislation provides the auditor-general is to be paid from the Consolidated Fund in the case of each jurisdiction, with the exception of New South Wales, ACT and Northern Territory where the legislation appears to be silent on the matter. (f) Removal from office In each jurisdiction, the auditor-general may only be removed by the parliament. (g) Appointment of Acting Auditor-General In the case of Tasmania, South Australia, and Queensland, and for Victoria during any absence of the auditor-general, the deputy auditor-general is to act for the auditor-general. In the case of Victoria, the Governor-in-Council may appoint an acting auditor-general. In the case of New South Wales, the ACT, the Northern Territory, and Western Australia, the acting appointment is made by the same office which is given the authority to make the initial appointment. For example, in the case of New South Wales the Governor appoints the auditor-general and the acting auditor-general. However, in the case of the Commonwealth, whilst the Governor-General appoints the auditor-general, the minister may appoint an acting auditor-general in the absence of the auditor-general. (h) Approval of work plan Victoria is the only jurisdiction in which the auditor-general is to submit an annual plan to parliament (via the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee) for its consideration, with the subsequent requirement to report on actual performance against the work plan. In the case of
13 13 the Commonwealth, the auditor-general is to have regard for the audit priorities of the Parliament as determined by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. (i) Power to request audits The Commonwealth, Victoria and Queensland parliaments have the power to request audits. In Western Australia and South Australia the treasurer has a similar power, and in the Northern Territory the minister has a similar power. (j) Tabling of audit reports For each jurisdiction audit reports of the auditor-general are to be tabled in parliament. B. Funding of the Office Table 5 summarises the enabling legislation for the auditors-general examined in relation to the determination of their funding and payments for services provided, as well as cost recovery. The following provides a descriptive analysis of this and related issues as they appear in Table 5. Insert Table 5 about here (a) Determining funding of the Office Funding for the office of the auditor-general is explicitly from the parliament in the case of the Commonwealth, ACT and Queensland. The Victorian Audit Act 1994 provides that the PAEC have a consultative role when Parliament determines the Auditor-General s budget. In the case of New South Wales, Western Australia, Tasmania and South Australia the legislation appears to be silent on this matter. In the case of the Northern Territory, the Administrator determines funding for the auditor-general. (b) Amounts to be paid for financial statement audits The fees to be imposed on auditees are generally determined by the auditor-general (Commonwealth, Victoria, ACT, Western Australia, South Australia, and Queensland). In the case of South Australia and Queensland, the auditor-general determines these fees with the approval of the Treasurer, and in the case of Tasmania by the Treasurer in consultation with the auditor-general. For New South Wales, the Treasurer determines the fees with the legislation not providing a role for the auditor-general in determining fees. Thus New South Wales is the exception in this respect. (c) Cost recovery from auditees for financial statement audits Cost recovery from auditees is provided for the auditor-general in each of the jurisdictions with the exception of the Northern Territory where the legislation appears to be silent on this matter. In the case of the Commonwealth, Victoria, and Queensland, the reference to cost recovery from auditees is only in respect of financial audits. C. Oversight of Auditors-General Table 6 summarises the enabling legislation for the auditors-general examined in relation to parliamentary oversight through the appointment of, and reporting by an independent auditorgeneral. Apart from these issues, Table 6 also provides detail on whether an independent auditor conducts a performance audit of the auditors-general. The following provides a descriptive summary of the contents of Table 6.
14 14 Insert Table 6 about here (a) Independent audit of the Office For each jurisdiction there is provision for an independent audit of the office of the auditorgeneral. (b) Appointment of independent auditor There are, however, differences as to who appoints the independent auditor. In the case of the Commonwealth and Victoria, it is the parliament. However, in the case of New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia, it is the Governor, while in the case of Queensland it is the Governor-in-Council. In the case of the ACT and the Northern Territory it is the Minister and the Administrator respectively who make the appointment of the independent auditor to conduct the audit of the office of the auditor-general. (c) Reporting by independent auditor Generally, the reports prepared by the independent auditor are submitted to the parliament. However, the legislation is not explicit in this respect in the case of Western Australia. In the case of New South Wales, the legislation provides for the report to be submitted to the Treasurer, whilst in the case of the ACT the report is to be submitted to the Speaker. (d) Independent auditor conducting performance audits For the Commonwealth, Victoria, New South Wales, and the ACT, the legislation explicitly refers to the conduct of a performance audit as well as a financial audit. In the case of Tasmania, Western Australia, and South Australia, whilst there is reference to the appointment of an independent auditor, those provisions do not explicitly refer to either a financial statement audit or a performance audit. Within jurisdictions there are differences in the process with the appointment of the independent financial auditor and the performance auditor or reviewer of the office. In the case of New South Wales, whilst the Governor appoints the independent auditor, the reviewer is appointed by the Public Accounts Committee. In the case of the ACT, the independent auditor conducts performance audits of the Auditor-General s Office on the request of the Public Accounts Committee. In the cases of Northern Territory and Queensland, the legislation specifically provides for the appointment of an external reviewer to undertake a strategic review of the auditor-general s Office. For the Northern Territory, the Administrator, in consultation with the Public Accounts Committee and the auditor-general, appoints and determines the terms of reference of a strategic reviewer. For Queensland, the appointment and the terms of reference of the reviewer are to be determined by the Governor-in-Council in consultation with the parliamentary Committee. Powers required by Auditors-General to Conduct Audits D. Mandate of Auditors-General to Perform Audits Table 7 shows that the auditors-general in each of the jurisdictions under consideration have the mandate to undertake both financial statement audits and performance audits. What appears to differ between the jurisdictions is the range of entities subject to audit by the auditor-general. For example, in Western Australia the mandate includes financial statement audits of statutory authorities and their local and foreign subsidiaries, and also financial statement audits, where required by the Treasurer, of individuals granted or loaned money by
15 15 the Government. In the case of South Australia, financial statement audits are undertaken of publicly funded bodies. Insert Table 7 about here Similarly in each of the jurisdictions the authority to undertake performance audits generally covers the same range of bodies that are subject to financial statement audits. The exceptions are the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. E. Independence from Direction by Parliament or its Committees Table 8 shows that the enabling legislation for most auditors-general are not explicit with many of the independence issues listed. However, in the case of the Commonwealth and Victorian auditors-general, their legislation is explicit on all issues except on the determination of the terms and conditions of staff in the office. The following provides a descriptive summary of the contents of Table 8. Insert Table 8 about here (a) Independence enshrined in law The auditors-general of the Commonwealth, Victoria, and the ACT have their independence explicitly enshrined within their enabling legislation. (b) Direction/control In some cases the legislation refers to the auditor-general being free of direction or control from anyone (the Commonwealth, Victoria, ACT, South Australia, and Queensland). (c) Discretion in determining type of audit and auditee The legislation in some cases goes further to explicitly provide the auditor-general with discretion in determining the type of audit and the auditees for example the Commonwealth, Victoria, Northern Territory, and Tasmania. The Queensland legislation provides the auditorgeneral discretion as to the type of audit but does not make reference to discretion in respect of determining auditees. (d) Information gathering powers For all of the jurisdictions examined the legislation made reference to the information gathering powers of the auditor-general, with these powers being wide ranging. The Victorian auditor-general has wide powers to call for persons or documents. However, the auditor-general does not have the authority to access information held by private sector contractors that relate to services provided by such contractors to public sector agencies. (e) Officer of Parliament In the case of the Commonwealth and Victoria, the legislation explicitly describes the auditorgeneral as an Officer of the Parliament, unlike the other jurisdictions. (f) Determine terms and employment conditions of staff Legislation in the various jurisdictions typically refers to the staff being employed under the relevant public service act. In Victoria, the PAEC has the power to exempt the auditorgeneral of any legislative requirements applicable to government agencies in respect of employment conditions.
16 16 (g) Appointment of contractors to conduct audits In each of the jurisdictions the auditor-general is able to appoint other auditors to carry out audits. In summary, Table 9 analyses the cells highlighted with respect to each of the nine auditorsgeneral. Table 9 Column B shows the number of cells highlighted for each of the auditorsgeneral, and Table 9 Column C shows the percentage when dividing this number by the total number of cells highlighted for all auditors-general (that is, 105). Table 9 Column E shows the percentage of cells highlighted for each auditor-general when divided by the total number of items appearing in aggregate in Tables 4 to 8 (that is, 30). The most noteworthy observations are that 53.3% of the cells of both the New South Wales Auditor-General and the Northern Territory Auditor-General are highlighted, being greater than any other auditor-general. Next is the Tasmanian Auditor-General with 50% of cells highlighted, followed by the Western Australia Auditor-General with 46.7% of cells highlighted. The Commonwealth and Victorian auditors-general clearly have fewer cells highlighted than any other auditor-general. 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The purpose of this study was to examine the enabling legislation of all nine auditors-general of Australia from a public sector accountability and independence perspective. In this regard, the study involved identifying the extent to which the enabling legislation of each auditorgeneral contained provisions regarding a number of key suggested accountability and independence mechanisms. In summary, results for the accountability mechanisms available to parliament in respect of the auditor-general (Table 2) are as follows. Differences between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative requirements with regard to both the appointing of auditors-general and acting auditors-general differ markedly more than the other issues related to powers of parliament (Table 4, Panels A and B). Also, contrary to the suggested legislative framework, all auditors-general are required to recover costs from auditees for financial statement audits, with the exception of the Northern Territory legislation, which is silent on this issue (Table 5). Further, it is noted that determination of funding for the auditor-general s office, as well as who determines amounts to be paid for financial statement audits also show a considerable amount of differences between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative framework. On oversight of the auditors-general by parliament, most differences were found between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative framework for the body responsible for the appointment of the independent auditor to undertake the audit of the auditor-general s office, as well as whether or not there is a performance audit undertaken (Table 6). Results for the powers required by auditors-general to conduct audits (Table 3) are summarised as follows. On mandate of auditors-general to perform audits (Table 7), the items with most differences between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative framework is the power to conduct financial statement audits of individuals and bodies that are funded by government, and in the carrying out of performance audits of companies. On independence from direction by parliament or its committees, there were considerable differences between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative framework for independence being enshrined in law, being free of direction/control from anyone, and
17 17 discretion in determining type of audit and auditee (Table 8 Panel A). Further, Table 8 (Panel B) highlights that most auditors-general are not officers of parliament, nor do they determine the terms and conditions of staff in the office. As pointed out above, most of the differences between the enabling legislation and this study s suggested legislative requirement as appearing in Tables 2 and 3 exist because the enabling legislation is silent. Therefore, such deficiencies would be addressed through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation that explicitly address the issues. Using this study s suggested legislative requirements as a benchmark, the comparative analysis found an apparent difference between the enabling legislation of the Commonwealth and Victorian auditors-general, and the other auditors-general. That is, the number of differences between the enabling legislation and the suggested legislative requirements for both the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the Victorian Auditor-General is relatively fewer than the number of differences found with other auditors-general. On the Commonwealth Auditor-General, this can be directly attributed to the commissioning of the JCPA (1989; 1996) landmark reports by the Parliament of Australia, and the impact of the their findings and recommendations on the enabling legislation. On the Victorian Auditor- General, arguably the JCPA reports also have had an influence. However, other factors may have had a more significant part in the recent and continuing changes to the enabling legislative. In particular, those changes initially motivated by the implementation of national competition policy under the former Kennett Government (Craswell, 1997; Guthrie and English, 1997; Houghton and Jubb, 1998; Maddock et al 1997), as well as changes under the subsequent Bracks Government. In conclusion, this study extends public sector auditing literature in two ways. First, and in the context of prior literature on the role of public sector auditors, this study examined why independence of auditors-general should not be seen as an end in itself. Rather, independence should be seen as the main means by which parliament could be assisted to ensure accountability of the government (that is, the executive and bureaucracy) for the spending of public money. Therefore, in reviewing the auditor-general s role, amendments to the enabling legislation should be made if they ensure the independence, autonomy, power, and continued professionalism of the function. Second, and following on from JCPA (1989; 1996) and English and Guthrie (2000), this study used a two-part accountability and independence framework as a basis to examine the enabling legislation applicable to all auditors-general of Australia with regard to independence, autonomy, mandate, and funding issues. As a result, this comparative analysis was able to highlight areas where such provisions may be further strengthened through amendments in their enabling legislation. Finally, the framework and results of this study may be used to examine the extent to which the enabling legislation of supreme audit institutions in other jurisdictions adequately deals with their powers, independence and autonomy, and parliamentary accountability mechanisms. Also, the framework may be useful for examining other agencies, channels or institutions created to fulfil a public accountability function, for example (other) officers of parliament and ombudsmen. Further, future studies could consider the identification of other possible key accountability and independence issues not dealt with in this study, as well as the relative importance of such issues in terms of size and impact upon the performance of the functions of accountability agencies such as the auditors-general.
18 18 REFERENCES Legislation Australian Capital Territory Auditor-General Act 1996 reprinted as at 1 March 1999 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 updated as at 9 December 1998 Financial Management Act 1996 Commonwealth Audit Act 1901 Auditor-General Act 1997 New South Wales Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 No. 152 incorporating amendments as at 14 January 2000 Public Finance and Audit (Auditor-General) Amendment Act 1991 No. 88 incorporating amendments as at 29 July 1997 Northern Territory Audit Act incorporating amendments as at 2 June 1997 Financial Management Act incorporating amendments as at 26 January 2000 Queensland Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977 incorporating amendments up to Act No. 29 of 1999 South Australia Public Finance and Audit Act 1987 incorporating amendments as at 1 July 1999 Tasmania Financial Management and Audit Act 1990 consolidated at 11 July 2000 Victoria Audit Act 1994 incorporating amendments as at 19 th April 2000 Constitution Act 1975 incorporating amendments as at 1 July 2000 Financial Management Act 1994 incorporating amendments as at 19 th April 2000 Parliamentary Officers Act 1975 incorporating amendments as at 1 July 1998 Western Australia Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985 incorporating amendments as at 9 July 1999
19 19 Monographs and Articles Auditing Standards Board of Australia (AuSB), Statement of Auditing Practice AUP32 Audit Independence (AUP32), as contained in Parker, C & Soukseum, D, (2000), Auditing Handbook 2000, Prentice Hall, Melbourne. Barrett, P, (1996a), Some Thoughts about the Roles, Responsibilities and Future Scope of Auditors-General, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp , December. Barrett, P, (1996b), The Roles, Responsibilities and Future Scope of Auditors-General. Paper presented at the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants Annual Research Lecture, November 14, Canberra. Craswell, A, (1997), Competition in Public Sector Auditing, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp De Martinis, M, Clark, C, & Roberts, I, (1998), The Role of Public Sector Audits in Democratic Accountability: The Case of the Victorian Auditor-General, Accounting Forum, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp , December. English, L & Guthrie, J, (2000), Mandate, Independence and Funding: Resolution of a Protracted Struggle Between Parliament and the Executive Over the Powers of the Australian Auditor-General, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp.98-11, March. English, L & Guthrie, J, (1991), Public Sector Auditing: A Case of Contested Accountability Regimes, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp , September. Funnell, W & Cooper, K, (1998), Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia, University of New South Wales, Sydney. Funnell, W (1997), The Curse of Sisyphus: Public Sector Audit Independence in an Age of Economic Rationalism, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp , December. Funnell, W, (1996), Executive Encroachments on the Independence of the Commonwealth Auditor-General, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp , December. Funnell, W, (1994), Independence and the State Auditor: Constitutional Keystone or Refined Imagery, Abacus, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp , September. Guthrie, J, & English, L., (1997), Guarding the Independence of the Victorian Auditor- General and the Public Interest, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp Houghton, K, & Jubb, C, (1998), Public Sector Auditing: Victoria s Future Direction, Accountability and Performance, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp
20 20 Joint Committee of Public Accountants (JCPA), (1996), Guarding the Independence of the Auditor-General, Report 346, AGPS, Canberra. Joint Committee of Public Accountants (JCPA), (1989), The Auditor-General: Ally of the People and Parliament, Reform of the Australian Audit Office, Report 296, AGPS, Canberra. Maddock, R., Dahlsen, J., & Spencer, K., (1997), Audit Act 1994 Review, April. Mulgan, R, (1997), The Processes of Public Accountability, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp , March. Taylor, J, (1996a), The Role of the Auditor-General in Modern Government. Paper presented at the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants Annual Research Lecture, November 14, Canberra. Taylor, J, (1996b), What Should be the Role of the Auditor-General in the Context of Managerialist Government and New Public Management, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp , December. Taylor, J, (1992), Public Accountability Requirements, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp , December. Walsh, C, (1995), Creating a Competitive Culture in the Public Service: the Role of Audits and Other Reviews, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp , September. Zifcak, S, (1997), Managerialism, Accountability and Democracy: A Victorian Case Study, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp , September.
ASPG Conference, Perth Jonathan O'Dea - October 2013 "Financial Overseers and their Oversight A NSW Public Accounts Committee Perspective" OVERVIEW Statutory Officers play central roles as financial overseers
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY: KEEPING PACE WITH A CHANGING PUBLIC SERVICE LANDSCAPE 10th International Ombudsman Conference Wellington, New Zealand 16 October 2012 Marco Bini, Victorian Auditor-General
Administrator National Health Funding Pool Annual Report 2012-13 Design Voodoo Creative Printing Paragon Printers Australasia Paper-based publications Commonwealth of Australia 2013 This work is copyright.
Defence Housing Australia Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office Investigation No. 13 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 2008 ISBN 978 1 74037 251 0 This work is subject to copyright. Apart
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND ESTIMATES COMMITTEE SIXTY FOURTH REPORT TO THE PARLIAMENT Report on the review of the Auditor-General s report on Parliamentary control and management of appropriations SEPTEMBER 2005
FOREIGN LAWYERS AND THE PRACTISE OF FOREIGN LAW IN AUSTRALIA AN INFORMATION PAPER LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA Disclaimer This information paper has been prepared by the Law Council of Australia with the aim
Compliance Review Report Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the New South Wales Public Sector Background The Treasury issued TPP 09-05 Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the New South
Construction induction training - changes to regulations General information for industry The Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (1996) have changed to reflect the national approach to construction
august09 09-05 Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the NSW Public Sector OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Policy & Guidelines Paper Preface Corporate governance - which refers broadly to the processes
Bills Digest No. 91 2000 01 Remuneration Tribunal Amendment Bill 2000 ISSN 1328-8091 Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2001 Except to the extent of the uses permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no
All about the Controller and Auditor-General Office of the Auditor-General PO Box 3928, Wellington 6140 Telephone: (04) 917 1500 Facsimile: (04) 917 1549 Email: email@example.com Website: www.oag.govt.nz
Inquiry into Schedule 2 of the Veterans Affairs Legislation Amendment (2015 Budget Measures) Bill 2015 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 16 September 2015 GPO Box 1989, Canberra
2 March 2015 Mutual Recognition Schemes Study Productivity Commission Locked Bag 2 Collins Street East MELBOURNE VIC 8003 Sent via email to: firstname.lastname@example.org Dear Commissioner, Master Electricians
Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Report on WHISTLEBLOWERS LEGISLATION Report No. 26 December 2002 2. Recommendations 1. The Committee recommends that, if the Legislative Assembly of the Northern
QUEENSLAND COLLEGE OF TEACHERS SUBMISSION TO PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REVIEW OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION SCHEMES JANUARY 2015 BACKGROUND The Queensland College of Teachers ( the QCT ) was established in January
www.lawsociety.org.uk/international Guidance for English and Welsh lawyers on the practice of foreign law in Australia and admission as an Australian legal practitioner October 2015 Table of contents Introduction
Chapter 2 Key issues and committee view 2.1 The submissions received by the inquiry overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the ASBFE Ombudsman position, and its proposed role of supporting small
Feedback on the Inquiry into Serious Injury Presented to the Road Safety Committee of the Parliament of Victoria 08 May 2013 About the APA The Australian Physiotherapy Association (APA) is the peak body
Indemnity and Insurance Arrangements for Clinical Trials in the Public and Private Sectors in Australia Report to the National Health and Medical Research Council Prepared by Rallis Legal Index Definition
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND ESTIMATES COMMITTEE SEVENTY-SIXTH REPORT TO THE PARLIAMENT Report on trustee arrangements for governing the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Fund OCTOBER 2007 Ordered to be
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT ON E-HEALTH Council of Australian Governments An agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories, being: The State of New South Wales The State
Evolving Oversight The Australian Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit By Shane Armstrong, Department of the House of Representatives The Australian Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit,
1 Can Public Accounts Committees add value a case study approach Marco Bini, Director Policy and Coordination Victorian Auditor-General s Office Graduate Management Centre, Deakin University Thursday 9
October 2010 Practice Note 10 (Revised) AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF PUBLIC SECTOR BODIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM The Auditing Practices Board (APB) is one of the operating bodies of the Financial Reporting
ADRI Statement on the Application of Digital Rights Management Technology to Public Records ADRI-2008-001-v1.0 Version 1.0 6 August 2008 Statement on the Application of Digital Rights Management Technology
Avant Mutual Group Limited Submissions to the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission Inquiry into Aspects of the Wrongs Act 1958 1. Introduction Avant Mutual Group Limited ( Avant ) is Australia
COMMINSURE HOME INSURANCE PREMIUM, EXCESS AND DISCOUNT GUIDE. This document provides you with information to help you understand how your total premium has been calculated, discounts that are available
AITSL is funded by the Australian Government Teacher Performance and Development in Australia A mapping and analysis of current practice March 2012 Graham Marshall, Peter Cole and Vic Zbar Contents Background...
FMCF certification checklist 2014-15 (incorporating the detailed procedures) 2014-15 certification period Updated May 2015 The Secretary Department of Treasury and Finance 1 Treasury Place Melbourne Victoria
Review of PIRSA s Cost Recovery Policy and practices, including their application to the Fisheries and Aquaculture Industries Primary Industries and Regions SA 29 July 2015 Contents Executive Summary...
PUBLIC FINANCE AND AUDIT (PUBLIC ACCOUNTS) AMENDMENT ACT 1989 No. 57 NEW SOUTH WALES TABLE OF PROVISIONS 1. Short title 2. Commencement 3. Amendment of Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 No. 152 4. Amendment
Retail Operating Costs A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE ECONOMIC REGULATION AUTHORITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA March 2012 Frontier Economics Pty. Ltd., Australia. i Frontier Economics March 2012 Public Retail Operating
Office of the Small Business Commissioner 2 Office of the Small Business Commissioner Overview NSW has a relative advantage as the most populous Australian state and home to the largest concentration of
BULLETIN NO 25 JUNE 2000 OLD PASSBOOK & TERM DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS: REVISED APPROACH This office receives a large number of complaints from people who have: Found old passbooks showing credit balances; Presented
Office of the Auditor General Western Australia Audit Practice Statement Office of the Auditor General Western Australia 7th Floor Albert Facey House 469 Wellington Street Perth Mailing Address Perth BC
Department of the Premier and Cabinet Circular PC030 Protective Security Policy Framework February 2012 PROTECTIVE SECURITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 1. PURPOSE 3 2. SCOPE
APRA S FIT AND PROPER REQUIREMENTS Consultation Paper Australian Prudential Regulation Authority PREAMBLE APRA was created out of the Government s financial sector reforms that were implemented as a result
The Auditor-General Audit Report No.27 2001 2002 Assurance and Control Assessment Audit Agency Management of Software Licensing Australian National Audit Office Commonwealth of Australia 2001 ISSN 1036-7632
A GUIDE TO THE FIRST HOME OWNER GRANT 1. WHAT IS THE FIRST HOME OWNER GRANT? The First Home Owner Grant ( FHOG ) was established by the Federal Government to assist those purchasing their first owner occupied
FINAL REPORT 2014 Residential Electricity Price Trends To COAG Energy Council 5 December 2014 Reference: EPR0040 2014 Residential Price Trends Inquiries Australian Energy Market Commission PO Box A2449
Education and Early Childhood Development Legislation Reform Discussion Paper No 3 General Provisions for Education and Early Childhood Development Discussion Paper No 3 State of South Australia, 2008.
Review of parentage laws AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SUBMISSION TO THE FAMILY LAW COUNCIL 3 May 2013 ABN 47 996 232 602 Level 3, 175 Pitt Street, Sydney NSW 2000 GPO Box 5218, Sydney NSW 2001 General
A Guide to Aged Care and Retirement Villages in Australia FOR INVESTORS AND PROSPECTIVE OPERATORS PREPARED BY ARTHUR KOUMOUKELIS, PARTNER, GADENS 2014 Gadens providing straightforward, clear advice you
Attachment A Local Government and Planning Ministers Council First National Report on Development Assessment Performance 2008/09 Prepared by the South Australian Government Attachment A Table of Contents
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONSTITUTION 1. IDENTITY AND STANDING 1.1. This Constitution identifies and governs the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Australia, including any subordinate bodies, hereafter
THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Project No 45 Mortgage Brokers REPORT SEPTEMBER 1974 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia was established by the Law Reform Commission Act 1972.
About the Author is the owner of Argos Consulting, a private business which provides advice, recommendations and support for organisations and individuals requiring assistance in working with government
REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITIES AND OFFICE HOLDERS REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITIES AND OFFICE HOLDERS June 2003 Commonwealth of Australia 2003 ISBN
National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless National Economy (SNE NP) Report card prepared by the COAG Business Advisory Forum Taskforce - April 2013 - Overview In 2008, COAG agreed to implement
Essential Standards for Registration State and Territory Registering Bodies Australian Capital Territory New South Wales Northern Territory Queensland South Australia Tasmania Victoria Western Australia
Small business guide to trade practices compliance programs April 2006 Commonwealth of Australia 2006 ISBN 1 920702 93 8 This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968
The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing Medicare Benefits Schedule Allied Health Services 1 November 2007 PART 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPY SERVICES FOR PATIENTS WITH AN ASSESSED MENTAL DISORDER
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY Council of Australian Governments An agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories, being: The State of New South Wales
Client Skills: Skills required by Government as the Construction Industry Client APCC MEMBER AUTHORITIES AS AT JULY 2002 Department of Public Works and Services New South Wales Building Commission Victoria
V I C T O R I A Auditor-General of Victoria CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE AUDITS Payroll management and Administration of the goods and services tax March 2003 Ordered to be printed by Authority. Government Printer
June 2012 The State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury) June 2012 Except where otherwise noted you are free to copy, communicate and adapt this work, as long as you attribute the authors. This document
LIV Limitation of Liability Scheme Guide UPDATED AUGUST 2015 2 Professional benefits for LIV members The LIV is pleased to have in force a Limitation of Liability Scheme pursuant to the Professional Standards
Compiled Accounting Standard AASB 127 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements This compiled Standard applies to annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1 July 2007. Early application is permitted.
ISSUE 2 June 2015 Committee Chair, Dr Andrew Southcott MP Australasian Council of Public Accounts Committees In April, the Chair of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), Dr Andrew Southcott
Supporting Australia s Live Music Industry: Suggested principles for best practice 2010 2010 Commonwealth of Australia, in conjunction with the governments of the Australian Capital Territory, New South
POLICY FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDS INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES January 2003 CONTENTS Page 1. POLICY FRAMEWORK 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Policy Statement 1 1.3 Aims of the Policy 1 1.4 Principles
AMA NSW AND ASMOF NSW Submission on Health Practitioners Regulation National Law This submission is filed jointly on behalf of AMA NSW and ASMOF NSW. We note the submission of the Australian Medical Association
Guidance Note GGN 221.1 Managing Outsourcing Arrangements 1. This Guidance Note provides further detail on the requirements for managing material outsourcing arrangements (refer Prudential Standard GPS
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE (ENABLING AND VALIDATING) ACT. Act No. 18, 1927. An Act to authorise and enable the Colonial Treasurer to carry on the business of insurance of liability under the Workers' Compensation
Basis for Conclusions: ISA 600 (Revised and Redrafted), Special Considerations Audits of Group Financial Statements (Including the Work of Component Auditors) Prepared by the Staff of the International
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: Private Veterinarians engaged in an Emergency Animal Disease Response 1. Why was the Private Practitioner engagement working group established? The Department of Agriculture
Review of Self-Insurance Arrangements in Victoria Report of the Self-Insurance Review Team August 2005 2005 Victorian Workcover Authority About this Report This report presents the outcomes of the Victorian
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency Submission to the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Telecommunications Amendment (Mobile Phone Towers)
Government Owned Corporations Corporate Governance Guidelines for Government Owned Corporations Version 2.0 The State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury) The Queensland Government supports and encourages
Sex offenders registration Information paper Victorian Law Reform Commission GPO Box 4637 Melbourne Victoria 3001 Australia DX 144, Melbourne Level 3, 333 Queen Street Melbourne Victoria 3000 Australia
1 Guide to Home Warranty Insurance This Guide is to assist accountants and builders/contractors in the process of obtaining and maintaining Home Warranty Insurance. Home Warranty Insurance is a compulsory
Records Issues for Outsourcing including General Disposal Authority 25 A GUIDELINE FOR AGENCIES ABOUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RECORDKEEPING IN OUTSOURCING ARRANGEMENTS Commonwealth of Australia 1998
- Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them - A Guide to Exemptions in the Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) in Australia Chris Connolly 1 and Prashanti Ravindra 2 with assistance from Peter van Dijk 3 and
RTO Delegations Guidelines ISBN 0 7594 0389 9 Victorian Qualifications Authority 2004 Published by the Victorian Qualifications Authority This publication is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under
COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK AND REPORTING GUIDELINES DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION June 2015 38 Cavenagh Street DARWIN NT 0800 Postal Address GPO Box 915 DARWIN NT 0801 Email: email@example.com Website:
Please note that the following document was created by the former Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care. The former Council ceased its activities on 31 December 2005 and the Australian
Chapter 7: Workers Compensation CHAPTER CONTENTS 7.1 What is this chapter about? 149 7.2 What are the federal workers compensation schemes? 150 7.3 Do federal workers compensation schemes recognise same-sex
SECOND READING SPEECH Ambulance Service Amendment Bill 2013 Mr Speaker The purpose of this Bill is to amend the Ambulance Service Act 1982 to better reflect contemporary ambulance practice and to provide
NATIONAL PROTOCOLS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION APPROVAL PROCESSES The following National Protocols for Higher Education Approval Processes were recommended by the Joint Committee on Higher Education and approved
AEMC Electricity Price Trends report released AUSTRALIAN ENERGY MARKET COMMISSION LEVEL 5, 201 ELIZABETH STREET SYDNEY NSW 2000 T: 02 8296 7800 E: AEMC@AEMC.GOV.AU W: WWW.AEMC.GOV.AU The Australian Energy
National system for the accreditation of pre service teacher education programs Proposal for consultation Consultation Report October 2010 Contents Purpose 3 Background 3 Overview of the consultation process