EEB MEMORANDUM TO THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY. Prepared in cooperation with BirdLife Europe and Seas At Risk. Including the Ten Green Tests

Transcription

1 EEB MEMORANDUM TO THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY Prepared in cooperation with BirdLife Europe and Seas At Risk Including the Ten Green Tests photo: Alix Guillard

2 The European Environmental Bureau is the environmental voice of European citizens, standing for environmental justice, sustainable development and participatory democracy. We seek to ensure a healthy environment and rich biodiversity throughout the European Union and beyond. Boulevard de Waterloo 34 B-1000 Brussels, BELGIUM Tel Fax eeb@eeb.org Prepared in cooperation with: We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from our funder. Published in December 2015 by the EEB. The sole responsibility for the content lies with the EEB and does not commit the funders. 1

3 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 5. ENVIRONMENT COUNCIL DEFEND AND DEVELOP EU ENVIRONMENTAL TEN GREEN TESTS FOR THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY POLICIES/IIABLM GREENING THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY AND DEVELOPING A NEW EU SUSTAINABLE 1. EUROPEAN COUNCIL BETTER REGULATION AND UK REFERENDUM EU SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY CHALLENGE THE THREAT COMING FROM TTIP AND CETA 19 IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE 5.4 TOWARDS A STRONGER CLIMATE POLICY 20 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 5.5 CLEAN AIR VIA AN AMBITIOUS NEW 9 NATIONAL EMISSION CEILINGS DIRECTIVE EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE FOLLOW-UP ON THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS ENERGY AND TRANSPORT COUNCIL 5.7 GLOBAL MERCURY TREATY AND EU BIOENERGY CIRCULAR ECONOMY & WASTE POLICY EU BIODIVERSITY POLICY EU SOIL POLICY TOWARDS STRONGER CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICIES STRATEGY 5.11 FITNESS CHECK ON ENVIRONMENTAL 3. AGRICULTURE COUNCIL 16 REPORTING AND MONITORING APPLICATION OF THE AARHUS CONVENTION 4. FISHERIES COUNCIL FISHERIES DATA COLLECTION BALTIC MULTI-ANNUAL PLAN DEEP SEA FISHERIES ACCESS REGIME TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATION 18 TO THE EU INSTITUTIONS RE-LAUNCH DISCUSSIONS ON AN ACCESS TO JUSTICE DIRECTIVE IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 5.15 ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 31 2

4 INTRODUCTION THE NETHERLANDS takes over the Presidency of the European Union at a testing time with the UK referendum over EU membership hanging over the policy agenda, continuing political instability at Europe s borders meaning record numbers of refugees entering the EU and the need to deal with acts and threats of terror. At the same time, the EU has committed itself under two global landmark agreements to an unprecedented agenda of transformational change - namely through the adoption of a 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development including 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and a new climate deal in Paris. Although environmental degradation remains to a large extent a blindspot for the Juncker Commission, some positive signs emerged when the 2016 Work Programme was published including a follow up to the new Circular Economy Package and the announcement of an initiative to address the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This Memorandum reflects on the issues that the EEB would like to see advanced during the Dutch Presidency. It was prepared in consultation with the EEB Board, which has representatives from 30 countries and several European networks, and in cooperation with BirdLife Europe and Seas at Risk. The most important issues are highlighted in the Ten Green Tests, which at the end of 2015 will be used to evaluate the Presidency s performance over the next six months. While the Memorandum is directly addressed to the Presidency, we recognise that progress depends upon the cooperation of the European Commission, the European Parliament and other Member States. However, Presidencies can often make a difference if they invest their political and technical capacities in the right issues and if there is sufficient political will. We look forward to engaging in a constructive dialogue with the Dutch Government throughout the Presidency and beyond. On the other hand, major concerns remain about the Commission s Better Regulation agenda, and the paralysing effect it has on many badly needed new proposals, such as in the area of endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs), inspections and even straightforward implementation, as in the case of REACH. These concerns are compounded by a renewed drive by the UK government, supported by other member states, including the Netherlands, to adopt an EU-wide target to reduce regulatory costs. Jeremy Wates Secretary General Against this background, the Presidency will have to kick-start action on an effective and speedy follow up to the climate agreement that was reached in Paris. This will mean building on the existing momentum to put in place an ambitious and enforceable legal framework covering energy efficiency, renewables and GHG reductions. photo: Tom Sinon 3

5 TEN GREEN TESTS FOR THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY 1. DEFEND AND DEVELOP EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Reject proposals for an EU-wide target, either economy or sector wide, to reduce regulatory burdens, as such a target would undermine Europe s ability to develop effective new environmental policies. Use the Fitness Check on environmental reporting and monitoring to improve the quality and dissemination of information to make it more effective and user friendly. Call on the Commission to come forward with a new proposal for a Directive on Access to Justice, building on and strengthening the 2003 proposal; and once issued, swiftly convene Council working group meetings to make good progress on this directive. Seek to attempt to restore confidence in Europe s regulatory systems following the dieselgate scandal by calling on the Commission to come forward with new legislative proposals on environmental compliance assurance, aimed at strengthening inspection and enforcement capacities at EU and Member State level. 2. REFORM TRADE POLICIES IN PARTICULAR TTIP AND CETA If put to a vote, reject the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada that was finalised in May 2014 as it is understood to include a highly problematic and fundamentally undemocratic Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. fast-track ratification procedures that would circumvent democratic oversight; or other types of provisions that could restrict the present level of environmental and health protection or the freedom of the EU to legislate to protect public health and the environment. Oppose the inclusion under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) of: an ISDS mechanism; any type of regulatory cooperation provisions; 3. PRIORITISE CLEAN AIR Ensure that Council discussions on the revised National Emission Ceilings (NEC) Directive are aimed at delivering the objective of successive EU Environmental Action Programmes of levels of air quality that do not give rise to significant negative impacts on, and risks to, human health and the environment by More specifically, support ambitious emission reduction commitments (ERCs) for 2030 and legally binding ERCs for 2025 as well as limits for methane and mercury, while rejecting flexibilities that render the Directive unenforceable. Support the introduction of EU-wide source control measures to reduce air pollution, with particular attention to real driving emissions from cars, non-road mobile machinery, domestic heating, shipping, and the agriculture sector. Call on the Commission to ensure the EU minimum binding requirements of the Industrial Emissions Directive reflect technical progress achieved and ensure fast track publication of the revised Best Available Techniques conclusions for Large Combustion Plants. 4

6 4. FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE Take steps to ensure that the EU s climate policy commitments prior to Paris, having been based on the goal of limiting warming to 2 C, are now significantly and comprehensively strengthened in the light of the new commitment to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5 C and taking into account global equity and justice considerations. More specifically, push the EU to revise its climate and energy ambition upwards by committing to at least a 60% GHG reduction target, 40% energy savings target and 45% renewable energy target by And also by scaling up its 2020 ambition level accordingly with the level of ambition being confirmed by a transparent and reliable system enshrined in the new Effort-Sharing Decision and a separate pillar for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULCF). Take the structural reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) forward so as to make it fully effective with 100% auctioning of permits, cancelling of surplus allowances and a significant share of revenue channelled to investments in renewables and energy efficiency. 5. REFORM ENERGY POLICY Support the necessary initiatives to elaborate a more ambitious set of climate and energy targets. This demands a new push, building on the momentum created by the Paris agreement, to establish transparent and robust rules, including binding targets, for all Member States to put energy efficiency first and adopt an end-use energy savings target of at least 40%. Based on the November 2015 Council conclusions on the Energy Union, support the Commission in defining a governance structure for the 2030 objectives through revision of key legislative acts, including the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and related legislative and non-legislative proposals such as the Market Design Initiative and the Heating and Cooling strategy. Support an ambitious legislative proposal to strengthen the EU Energy Labelling Directive, coming back to a meaningful A to G scale for all labelled products within five years of adopting the new law, emphasising energy consumption beyond efficiency and supported by a searchable database and robust measurement standards. Ensure an effective follow up to the new Ecodesign and Energy Label Work Plan for the period published as part of the new Circular Economy package and help to finalise progressive ecodesign and energy label measures on displays, tap and shower heads and commercial cooling systems. Put pressure on the Commission to propose ambitious measures to limit the demand of bioenergy in line with sustainable supplies from the EU and ensure that only the use of biomass with low environmental risks and climate impacts are incentivised by EU policies as part of the renewable energy package of the 2030 climate and energy framework. 6. PROTECT BIODIVERSITY AND REFORM AGRICULTURE Initiate a debate on addressing the main causes of biodiversity loss in Europe in the context of upcoming reviews and reforms of the EU budget and sectoral policies, and based on recent data, reports and analysis published in the State of Nature report and as part of the Fitness Check of EU Nature legislation, as the most effective way to solve the implementation challenges of EU Nature legislation. Facilitate the emergence of a set of additional fast-track measures to help EU and Member States to plug key gaps and failures, which, if they remain unaddressed, will prevent the EU from meeting the Biodiversity Strategy s headline target. This means, for example, finalising Natura 2000 designation, protection and management planning, the enforcement of nature legislation and funding for Natura 2000 implementation. Draw particular attention to the urgent need to identify and reform incentives, including subsidies that are harmful to biodiversity, and contribute to progress in reducing the EU s global footprint on domestic and global biodiversity, for example, through the greening of supply chains and public procurement. In particular initiate a debate about the fitness of the EU s Common Agriculture Policy and its coherence to achieving the EU s agreed biodiversity objectives. 5

7 7. SUPPORT CIRCULAR ECONOMY & WASTE POLICY Prepare an ambitious position of the Council on both the re-tabled proposals for revised waste legislation and the new circular economy action plan, notably: Targets and incentives towards prevention of food waste and preparing products for re-use; A clearer obligation for separate collection of biowaste and re-instating the highest recycling targets for municipal and packaging waste; An extension of the scope towards commercial and industrial waste with associated targets and measures; A ban on landfilling and the incineration of all recyclable and compostable waste by 2020, with a staged target for the maximum amount of residual waste per capita per year to be landfilled or incinerated; Mandatory use of economic instruments for waste management with progressive increase of landfill and incineration taxes, and geographical coverage for pay-as-you-throw, as well as minimum requirements for producer responsibility schemes including EU-wide modulation of fees to reward those designing waste out of their products; Revision of the old-fashioned poorly enforceable essential requirements set in 1994 to enhance the prevention of over-packaging and incentivise reusable solutions. Ensure that hazardous materials are not re-injected in the economy through recycling practices, Call for a headline resource efficiency target for 2030 to be complemented by a more detailed resource efficiency dashboard at European, national and, where possible, at priority sector levels. Extend the scope of ecodesign and labelling policies towards non-energy-related products with a specific work plan and allocation of resources. 8. PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS INCLUDING MERCURY Encourage the Commission to step up its work towards achieving the 7EAP s goals in relation to chemicals by developing new EU tools to achieve a non-toxic environment. This means, inter alia, introducing an EU-wide register on nanomaterials and amending the REACH annexes to properly address nanomaterials; developing and publishing a progressive package on endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs); rejecting toxic recycling; and delivering concrete measures to promote the substitution of hazardous chemicals by safer solutions. Maintain EU leadership on activities related to the Minamata Convention on Mercury, including by taking action to accelerate the ratification of the Convention at EU and Member State level, and call on the Commission to swiftly come forward with a strong mercury legislative package going beyond the requirements of the Convention, including, but not limited to, a ban on the export of mercury-added products that are not allowed on the EU market and the phasing out of mercury in dental care since safe mercury-free alternatives are available. Call on the Commission, the European Chemicals Agency and Member States to address the obstacles in the implementation of the REACH authorisation process as set out in the recommendations in the recent EEB report A Roadmap to Revitalise REACH. 6

8 9. SAFEGUARD FISHERIES Improve the EU data collection regime to make relevant data publicly available for end-users in a harmonised and transparent way, to provide the basis for achieving good environmental status under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Ensure that the Baltic Multi Annual Plan supports the objectives of the reformed CFP and, in particular, that fishing rates are set below FMSY in order to provide at least a chance to restore and maintain fish stocks above levels capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield. Conclude negotiations on Deep Sea Fishing Regulations to ensure that deep sea fisheries are sustainably managed, in particular by effectively protecting vulnerable deep sea ecosystems through area closures, introducing a depth limit of at least 800m, but preferably 600m for the most destructive deep sea fishing gears, and submitting all operations to impact assessments. Ensure that the discussions on the proposal for a revision of the Technical Measures Regulation lead to a Council position that is based on a European framework of principles and requirements; support the objectives of the Natura 2000 network and other Marine Protected Areas; do not provide permission to conduct previously prohibited, destructive fisheries; leads to the avoidance or at least the minimisation of unwanted catches including through tactical selectivity measures; and minimise the ecosystem impact of fishing in general, including on seabirds. 10. PUSH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Call on the Commission to start to develop a) a new Sustainable Development Strategy based on the 17 SDGs and 169 targets, broken down for the European level, with a 2030 timeframe and serving as a guiding framework for the mid-term review of the Europe 2020 Strategy; and b) a plan of action for the short and medium term, where tasks and responsibilities are clearly divided and defined. Push for the institutionalising of appropriate (multisectoral) governance structures for Sustainable Development and the use of the right indicators for the implementation, follow up and review mechanisms. This should also include effective structures and processes for civil society participation at EU level with all relevant stakeholders to prepare the concrete implementation and review mechanism, with capacity building actions and funding possibilities. A strengthening of the environmental component of the European Semester by ensuring that input from the Environment Council is used in developing a Council response to the Commission s proposals for 2016 Country Specific Recommendations. 7

9 1. EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1.1 BETTER REGULATION AND UK REFERENDUM On 19 May 2015, the European Commission s First Vice-President Timmermans presented the Commission s plans for a new Better Regulation agenda. Most elements of this package apply directly to the Commission s internal procedures without further negotiations, but one crucial element, a new Inter Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking (IIABLM), has been subject to negotiations with the European Parliament and the Council and is generally expected to be concluded under the Luxembourgish Presidency. The Communication accompanying the IIABLM contains encouraging language about the body of EU law being one of Europe s strengths and an insistence that the agreement is not about deregulation or the lowering of existing environmental standards. However, all the proposals for new procedures and bodies both for the Commission and under the IIABLM create the risk that it will become more cumbersome to develop new and much-needed rules to support key environmental objectives. In relation to common commitments and objectives and joint work programming, the IIABL sought the endorsement by the Parliament and Council of Juncker s Political Guidelines with their focus on 10 priority areas as the basis for the preparation of EU policy and legislative initiatives. This was an audacious move. Juncker s Political Guidelines were presented to the Parliament on 15 July 2014 just 18 days after the approval of his candidacy by the Council. They were presented as the outcome of a dialogue between Juncker and the EP s political groups, but they were not subject to any formal negotiation or deal-making with the purpose of establishing a supporting majority. The Juncker priorities represent a narrowing of the environmental agenda to climate change and a downgrading of all other environmental issues. His proposals for a new Commission structure, mandate letters to his Commissioners coupled with the Guidelines constitute the most significant attack on environmental policy in decades. Although criticism by the EP led to the inclusion of sustainability in the mandate of the First Vice-President, not a single comma in the Political Guidelines, which remain the primary point of reference for filtering all new legislative initiatives, was changed. However, at that stage they were only guidelines for the Commission, not for the other institutions. Given their total failure to reflect the principle of sustainable development, which is supposed to provide the overarching framework for all EU policies, the Political Guidelines in their current form should under no circumstances be accepted as a basis for joint programming. They manifestly fail to provide a comprehensive sustainable development agenda and by completely ignoring the environmental dimension other than climate change, the Juncker priorities effectively sideline the Seventh Environmental Action Programme, which was developed by all three institutions. Although the inclusion of sustainable development in the mandate of First Vice-President Timmermans was a welcome first step in response to this criticism from the European Parliament this has not led to a re-adjustment of the President s Political Guidelines. If the EU is to be big on sustainable development, this should be reflected in Juncker s guidelines. At this point in time it remains to be seen what will be agreed in relation to the new IIA on BLM and the role which Jucker s political guidelines will play there. What is clear now is that the debate on how the EU should honour its commitment to a global agenda of transformational chance as set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals 17 and what to do with its Europe 2020 Strategy is creating a necessity and an obligation to ensure that Europe s main political strategy is equipped to deliver. It also remains to be seen how much of the deregulatory focus in the IIA has remained in a final deal, in particular whether or not proposals to reduce the regulatory burden are given priority treatment, impact assessments will be appropriately used, and whether leadership by Member States to go beyond minimum agreed standards is not negatively framed as gold-plating and primarily a source of burden, as opposed to a source of benefits. During the Dutch Presidency the main driver and risk for Europe s Better Regulation agenda becoming an overall liability comes from the negotiations leading up to the UK Referendum on EU membership. Presented under a heading of cutting red tape, the UK s approach to better regulation has far reaching implications for the way laws are developed and adopted. The UK s approach to Better Regulation has led to the creation of a large and unaccountable bureaucracy with a central role played by the Regulatory Policy Committee, a panel composed mainly of business representatives which validates departments estimates of the costs of new regulation, providing official opinions with the power to delay the introduction of new rules. It enforces a so called one in, two out rule that prevents government departments from implementing new laws that impose 1 of cost to business unless they also save 2 elsewhere, regardless of social or environmental benefits. It requires impact assessments to complete a detailed appraisal of proposed policy changes and, where possible, expresses all impacts in terms of monetary values. 8

10 The UK government also launched a Red Tape Challenge, a crowd-sourcing initiative in which the government invited the public to propose existing laws that should be scrapped1. Interestingly, an independent analysis found that [m]ost of the comments [from the RTC website generally indicated that more regulation was needed, rather than the hoped-for calls for eliminating red tape. Unfortunately, the same review found that the quality and quantity of crowdsourced comments proved to be of little importance to the actual deliberations. It seems that deregulation, in the abstract, is an attractive idea, but when confronted with specific protections, most people quickly recognise how important good regulation is to the quality of their lives2. During the Luxembourg Presidency an initiative by UK Chancellor George Osborne to call for an EU wide target to reduce regulatory burden was supported by a group of economy ministers and discussed over lunch during the 30 November Competitiveness Council meeting. The EEB would be extremely concerned if, in the course of negotiations over EU reform the UK approach to better regulation, and, in particular, a quantitative target to reduce the burden, were to be adopted by the EU. Setting a target to reduce the burden of regulation is the wrong approach for a number of reasons. Addressing global challenges such as climate change, ecosystem collapse, antimicrobial resistance, inequality, or resource depletion will require the EU to adopt new, effective and legally binding policies. A blanket requirement to offset any new regulatory cost arising from such new policies by slashing costs elsewhere irrespective of the benefits arising would seriously hamper these efforts. Secondly, the premise that the EU regulatory system is overly burdensome and a major barrier to economic development is a highly subjective one, underpinned by little, if any, evidence. In fact, the available evidence, in particular in the environmental field, shows that a competitive industry is easily able to absorb and adjust to the costs of new regulations. Further, a continuous focus on reducing regulatory costs would mean the subsidising of Europe s least competitive enterprises by allowing them to externalise part of their production costs. As a result, consumers and tax payers would foot the bill through, for example, increased health care costs, while efforts by leaders and frontrunners within industry would be undermined. We therefore urge the Dutch Presidency to take a more balanced approach to much needed efforts to improve the EU regulatory system. Most crucially, by not supporting the setting of a target to reduce regulatory burdens and by ensuring that public benefits of regulatory action are given sufficient weight and that rules, once in place, are effectively enforced irrespective of whether they address competition law, pollution or workers protection. 1 Extensive review of UK Better Regulation initiatives at: b.3cdn.net/ nefoundation/9c5f5f6281c949ddd9_uom6bvj9y.pdf 2 Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (2014). Crowdsourcing and regulatory reviews: A new way of challenging red tape in British government? Regulation and Governance, (November 2013). Retrieved from rego WE THEREFORE CALL ON THE COUNCIL TO: Not adopt the UK s current approach to Better Regulation in favour of a more balanced approach that ensures that the public benefits of regulatory action are given sufficient weight. Support more efforts to improve compliance and the enforcement of EU legislation through the adoption of legally binding minimum standards for inspections and by providing citizens with access to justice. 1.2 EU SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA The Dutch Presidency begins on the first day of the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. This should be a good incentive for it to keep the momentum high and set the scene for ambitious action plans. It is crucial that the EU has a clear view of its own role in this global and universal agenda. At the same time it is also important and timely to start to institutionalise adequate governance structures for the implementation and follow up of the strategies and activities in order to achieve all the 17 goals within all relevant sectors and DGs. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE AND THE MEMBER STATES: Europe s most prominent high-level political strategy, the Europe 2020 Strategy on competitiveness and growth, has some elements relating to environmental sustainability. In 2011 and 2012, the Strategy was given shape through a series of Flagship Initiatives, EU budget proposals, the Annual Growth Surveys, Semesters, National Reform Programmes and national budget consolidation plans. This work is ongoing and very relevant, but will not be enough to cover the whole scope of the Sustainable Development-agenda. However, rather than seeing signs of much needed extra effort, the current Commission is still dragging its feet over a much needed change in direction in line with this global agenda. First hopeful signs in the Commission s 2016 Work Programme are still to be followed up with a range of new policy initiatives and the impacts of the Commission s Better Regulation agenda seems to make it only more unlikely for this to happen. Notwithstanding the possibility, and indeed the necessity, to achieve more under the Europe 2020 Strategy, it can hardly be considered a Sustainable Development Strategy given its clear focus on competitiveness and growth and its lack of an external dimension. The fact that the growth is supposed to be smart, sustainable and inclusive does not make Europe 2020 a sustainable development strategy. The existing, but totally outdated, EU SDS has never enjoyed the same level of prominence or priority as the Europe 2020 Strategy. Adopted in 2001, the SDS was reviewed and renewed in 2006, with a further review carried out in The European 9

11 Council was expected to take a decision on it by the end of 2011, when a comprehensive review was due to be undertaken. In fact, it was October 2012 before the Council returned to the issue. The outcome of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), and especially the recently adopted 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, with the 17 SDGs, provided urgent reasons to think about a new updated EU SDS, based on the 17 Goals and 169 targets, broken down to the European level for implementation. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, Transforming the World is universal and there is no excuse for not starting right now in Transforming Europe. The 17 SDGs and targets are based in no small part on the recognition of and respect for planetary boundaries and the redistribution of wealth, opportunities, labour and a reduced use of natural resources. That means taking seriously the discussions about limiting the use of energy and natural resources for over-consumers in absolute amounts. We also need to break down the global targets to an EU level, taking into consideration common but differentiated responsibilities. Europe has a special responsibility here: firstly to take the initiative to set such targets for its own economies, but also to show leadership by demonstrating that achieving prosperity and well being is possible within the limits of a fair share of the planet s carrying capacity. Strong accountability and review mechanisms of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda are crucial for achieving the targets. A dashboard of indicators, focusing on several targets, has to guide policymaking, instead of solely focusing on growth in terms of GDP. The adoption of the universal 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda should bring new momentum to put sustainable development at the heart of EU policy making. But this Commission is continuing to miss the big picture: the 2016 Working Programme is quite weak on sustainability thinking, even if it offers some glimmers of hope on environmental issues, and the recently launched Circular Economy Package has weaker waste recycling targets than the withdrawn earlier version. The result of this is that at a time when global challenges are only becoming greater, the EU s role as a global leader is at risk of fading away. environmental organisations, youth and women, and based on the Rio principle of self-organising representation. The EEB welcomed the establishment of the HLPF and wants to underline the importance of it being given adequate authority and resources, with a board and a well funded secretariat and active participation modalities for the nine major groups and other stakeholders. We are concerned that as the HLPF is under the auspices of ECOSOC and the GA, civil society participation is being weakened as in current negotiations on modalities, there is a tendency to forget Resolution A/RES/67/290, 15 and 16 on stakeholder participation modalities. We note that neither ECOSOC nor GA are very familiar with the stakeholder modalities as defined and used during the Rio-process. Another concern is that since the HLPF is mainly under ECOSOC structures, trade and development ministers will be mostly present during the meetings, while ministers representing environmental and other relevant policy areas will be less actively involved. In the international area, two important meetings will take place in 2016 that are connected to the international Sustainable Development agenda and that need to be prepared during the Dutch Presidency. First, is the UNEA-2 meeting, to be held from May in Nairobi, with the overarching theme of The environmental dimension of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and addressing the topic of Healthy environment-healthy People and Mobilising resources for investing in Sustainable Development. In November 2015, a European civil society consultation was held in Brussels in preparation of UNEA-2, resulting in recommendations on these two topics. The second important meeting in 2016 will be the Environment for Europe, UNECE environment ministerial meeting to be held on 8-10 June in Batumi, Georgia. Here the two main topics will be greening the economy in the pan-european region and improving air quality for a better environment and human health. The Dutch Presidency should make a start as soon as possible in developing a new EU SDS, as mentioned above, based on the 17 goals and 169 targets, with a concrete and legally binding implementation plan. The Presidency should also press for bold review mechanisms for all goals, considering all existing policies, strategies and programmes in order to guarantee policy coherence. It should also follow up on how Vice-President Timmermans is approaching his sustainability mandate; we are waiting the results of his request to all Commissioners to carry out gap analyses to check where, and where not, the EU is implementing the SDGs. This information can be the basis for a coherent EU SDS and a plan of action, to be drafted soon, in active consultation with civil society organisations. Finally, an appropriate structure facilitating active and full multi stakeholder civil society participation needs to be set up. This can be a new structure, or a fundamental restructuring of the EESC, broadened to include more civil society groups such as 10

12 WE THEREFORE CALL UPON THE DUTCH Ensure that the Council expresses its concerns to the Commission about its Work Programme for 2016, underlining that it does not adequately reflect environmental and social considerations and thus flouts the principle of sustainable development in the Treaty and the commitments of the 7EAP. Further, policy coherence is defined in a much too limited way as only referring to external policies; it needs also to apply to internal policies. 1.3 EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE FOLLOW-UP ON THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT The outcome of the 2015 COP in Paris defines the mission for the climate and energy policies of the EU and the Dutch Presidency. Only if the EU and the Presidency successfully demonstrate how to deliver on the commitments and promises made, will Europe be able to hold international partners responsible for their commitments and promises. Urge the Commission to develop an EU Sustainable Development Strategy as the overarching strategic framework guiding Europe s future and to ensure effective regional implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets considering the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, therefore noting the need for the EU to make greater efforts than other countries. Initiate the institutionalisation of improved multi-sectoral governance structures for Sustainable Development, including all relevant Commissions, to fully guarantee the coverage, coherence and implementation of all 17 goals. Initiate a structure for (pro-active) civil society participation, with the inclusion of all major groups and other stakeholders (cf Agenda 21 and HLPF resolution A/RES/290/67), with the principle of self-organisation. Promote environmentally innovative national reform programmes, among other means, through the systematic application of the guidelines with regards to the removal of environmentally hazardous subsidies, environmental tax reform, green national accounting and green public procurement. Continue the plans for a fundamental review of the Europe 2020 strategy with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda as the core focus. EU POSITIONING IN THE UNECE ENVIRONMENT FOR EUROPE AND UNEA-2 PROCESSES: Start preparing, in consultation with civil society organisations, which have already submitted written input, the EU position for the UNEA-2 and UNECE Environment for Europe meetings. The pace of international action urgently needs to be significantly stepped up after the COP in Paris. While the temperature targets agreed were a step forward, the emission mitigation targets agreed in Paris - far weaker than those strongly advocated by the EU during the negotiations - are weak and vague and do not meet the temperature objectives. The Dutch Presidency has the opportunity to head a unified EU with a clear commitment to follow up on what will, following a hopefully swift ratification process, be a legally binding international agreement, inter alia by committing to temperature compatible emissions reduction targets that will not only enable the international community to keep global warming well below a 2 C rise but show that the EU is willing to play its full part in pursuing efforts to limit the rise to 1.5 C. This requires a comprehensive global transformation with deep emissions cuts enabling a zero carbon society by 2050, or shortly thereafter, in line with the Earth Statement. If the EU wants to be a global leader in this endeavour, EU emissions should be close to zero prior to this. In the coming months, the Dutch Presidency has the opportunity to maintain the momentum in various ways. It should push for a new EU climate and energy policy built on three sufficiently ambitious legally binding targets for GHG, energy savings and renewable energy; and prepare the path for an ambitious reform of the building blocks of the existing climate and energy policy, namely the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), the Renewable Energy Directive (RED), the Effort-Sharing Directive (ESD) and the Emissions Trading System (ETS). It should also initiate a debate on the need to reform the Energy Taxation Directive, implement earlier decisions on phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies, and develop mechanisms allowing like-minded Member States or the Union itself to carry out an environmental tax reform, including amending rules for state aid preventing implementation of the polluter pays principle. 11

13 WE THEREFORE CALL UPON THE DUTCH Recognise that the EU s climate policy commitments prior to Paris, being based on the goal of limiting warming to 2 C, now need significantly strengthening in the light of the new commitment to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5 C. Push for the strengthening of the 2020 and 2030 targets for greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency and renewable energy, both in quantitative terms and in respect of the extent to which they are binding at Member State level. In the case of the 2030 targets, the EU should now commit to targets of at least 60% GHG reductions, 40% energy savings and 45% renewables. Confirm the EU s level of ambition by a transparent and reliable system enshrined in a new Effort-Sharing Decision and a separate pillar for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). Implement the EU s commitments under the Paris agreement with a recurring review every five years and the objective of staying below a 1.5 C rise. Push forward the structural reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) based on evidence to make the EU ETS work and to make it fully effective with 100% auctioning of permits, the cancelling of surplus allowances and a significant share of revenue channelled to investments in renewables and energy efficiency. This will enable long-term solutions and match the EU ETS with the objectives of the 2050 decarbonisation roadmap. 1.4 REFORM TRADE POLICIES: TTIP AND CETA Amid regular calls from leaders such as UK Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to speed up negotiations on the one hand and ever growing public opposition on the other hand (illustrated by a self-organised European Citizens Initiative against TTIP and CETA which gathered over three million signatures), negotiations on a proposed Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), also referred to as a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), are progressing at a very slow pace. Unlike other trade negotiations, focus in these negotiations is on regulatory issues and non-tariff trade barriers, which is also the main reason why large sections of society are concerned about the negotiations. What is a trade irritant to a firm that operates in different markets can, at the same time, be a vital legal safeguard for consumers and offer environmental protection for citizens. Indeed, the purpose of these negotiations, namely to remove these trade irritants in order to facilitate trade, conflict with the democratic principle that those living with the results of regulatory standards (citizens of our countries) should be able to set standards through the democratic process, even if doing so results in divergent standards that businesses may find inconvenient. The EEB shares the widespread concerns about the possible inclusion of a number of mechanisms into this agreement which would drastically reduce the regulatory space of the EU to continue developing public interest policies including environmental policies. This means that a potential agreement between the US and EU must not include an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, neither in its current form as agreed under CETA or in form of an Investment Court System (ICS) as proposed by the EU under TTIP. Investors should not be empowered to directly challenge sovereign governments over public interest policies in off-shore private tribunals typically comprised of three private sector attorneys, skirting the well-functioning domestic court systems and robust property rights protections in the US and the EU. The inclusion of such provisions in prior trade and investment deals has enabled powerful interests, from tobacco companies to corporate polluters, to use investor-state dispute resolution to challenge and undermine consumer, public health and environmental protections. Investor-state tribunals have ordered taxpayers to compensate foreign corporations with billions of dollars for the domestic, non-discriminatory enforcement of such protections. The last 10 years, in particular, have seen the number of such cases increase significantly. If such an ISDS were to be included in the four major bilateral trade deals that are currently in the pipeline (TTIP, TPP, US-China, EU-China) 70% of global foreign direct investment would be covered by ISDS from 20% today. It would be hard to overstate the negative implications this would have for the ability of governments to continue to act in the public interest. To avoid such overreaching procedural and substantive investor privileges, greater than those afforded to domestic firms in either the US or the EU, any deal must exclude investor-state dispute resolution. It is noteworthy that an increasing number of countries, including Australia, Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa are seeking to end such provisions in bilateral treaties to which they are party. Another problematic element is a proposal for regulatory cooperation which foresees the development of a new system of governance and mechanisms that would give undue influence to industry on both sides of the Atlantic on how regulations are written. In addition to this, the Commission is considering this to be an open-ended agreement with the option to add new elements to the deal through a fast track procedure, for example on issues that were deemed too controversial to include in the first round with public concern being as high as it is today. Whereas the EU-US negotiations are at a relatively early stage, negotiations on a free trade agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) were concluded at the beginning of the Italian Presidency and published on the DG Trade website with confirmation that the agreement includes a provision on investor-state dispute resolution. The EEB believes it is therefore essential that this agreement is rejected by Member States and the European Parliament once it is send there for approval. 12

14 WE THEREFORE CALL UPON THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY TO REQUEST: EU negotiators to provide full public access to all negotiating documents including consolidated texts, and to ensure that a comprehensive Sustainability Impact Assessment is rapidly finalised and used as a basis for further negotiations, including a decision on whether to proceed with the negotiations at all. The European Parliament and EU Member States to firmly reject the recently agreed CETA deal with Canada, which includes an Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanism. The European Commission to work to ensure that any TTIP agreement excludes mechanisms for regulatory cooperation, investor state dispute settlement, fast track ratification as well as deeper forms of regulatory cooperation in the field of energy, climate, chemicals, agriculture and food, and other areas where environmental policy risks being weakened. The European Parliament and Member States to stand ready to reject a final TTIP deal should the Commission fail to exclude any of the above contentious issues. 13

15 2. ENERGY AND TRANSPORT COUNCIL 2.1 TOWARDS STRONGER CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICIES (See also section 1.3) With the first State of the European Energy Union by Vice President Šefčovič the European Commission has set the course for a comprehensive revision of EU energy legislation is the year of delivery on the promises of effective action to tackle the challenge of energy security, push ahead with the development of the internal energy market, become again a world leader in renewable energy and making efficiency first the abiding motto of the European Energy Union. These positive signals stand in contrast to the outcome of the 2015 November Council conclusions on the Energy Union governance that failed to address the lack of ambition and the non-binding nature of some of the most important targets of the 2030 framework for climate and energy. The Dutch Presidency now has the task of leading the Council debate that will result in a governance system for 2030 and beyond through revisions of the key legislative acts that include the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and related legislative and non-legislative proposals like the Market Design Initiative and the Heating and Cooling strategy. The level of ambition of the legislative proposals for 2030 should be based on sound evidence and comprehensive impact assessments. This must be done bearing in mind that the European Parliament has repeatedly called for binding climate and energy targets for 2030 and significantly increased ambition, demanding a 40% energy efficiency target to be implemented via individual national targets. The Parliament has also recognised the lack of ambition on energy efficiency shown by the European Council at its October 2014 summit. In the Communication on the European Energy Union of February 2015, the Juncker Commission pronounced a number of reviews, revisions and legal proposals for EU climate and energy policies for 2015 and beyond. While most files are still at an early stage, a legislative proposal to revise the EU Energy Labelling Directive and combine it with a strong Communication on the next Working Plan for regarding the further implementation of the Ecodesign Directive, would offer a unique opportunity for the Dutch Presidency to show its commitment to the efficiency first motto of the Energy Union. of confusing plusses beyond A in next five years, investigating an overall mechanism to re-scale, and update labels to adapt to market evolution once the shift to A to G has been done. Furthermore, the Presidency should make sure a robust, searchable database is set up to monitor the market and enhance market surveillance, including provisions for release on a yearly basis of anonymous aggregated sales data enabling the market penetration of appliances to be monitored. A mere estimate by the Commission of market penetration cannot provide the guarantee that we will have timely and accurate information about units sold in reality. And it seems there is no systematic correlation between models placed on the market and unit sold to draw conclusions about market penetration rates. Finally, further savings could be achieved by addressing absolute energy consumption beyond efficiency and requiring measurement and test standards that reflect better usage patterns. By supporting an ambitious new Ecodesign and Energy Label Work Plan for the period a weakening of the single market can be avoided and significant improvement potentials and further savings for Europe secured. The Presidency should notably consider: addressing the potential of building automation and control systems at a European level; setting an overall approach to grasp resource use optimisation opportunities and related climate change benefits; exploring the energy and resource aspects of internet and cloud technology devices, including smartphones; and at least investigate the possible labelling of domestic appliances, such as kettles and hairdryers. In addition, the Presidency should help to finalise expected ecodesign and energy label measures on displays, taps and shower heads and commercial cooling which have been stalled for too long within the Commission, depriving Europe and citizens from significant savings. These actions would ensure that energy savings and renewable energy are given the highest priority, and help to push back on expensive, obsolete and dangerous technologies like nuclear and avoid a scramble for unconventional domestic fossil reserves such as shale gas. The Presidency will guide discussions to ensure an ambitious revision of the Energy Labelling Framework Directive, getting rid 14