Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:2843

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1 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:2843 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION RIGHT FIELD ROOFTOPS, LLC, ) d/b/a SKYBOX ON SHEFFIELD; ) RIGHT FIELD PROPERTIES, LLC; ) 3633 ROOFTOP MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) d/b/a LAKEVIEW BASEBALL CLUB; and ) ROOFTOP ACQUISITION, LLC, ) Case No. 15cv551 ) Plaintiffs, ) Hon. Virginia M. Kendall ) v. ) Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason ) CHICAGO BASEBALL HOLDINGS, LLC; ) CHICAGO CUBS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC; ) WRIGLEY FIELD HOLDINGS, LLC; and ) THOMAS S. RICKETTS, ) ) Defendants. ) PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs Right Field Rooftops, LLC, d/b/a Skybox on Sheffield, Right Field Properties, LLC, 3633 Rooftop Management, LLC, d/b/a Lakeview Baseball Club, and Rooftop Acquisition, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs ), by their undersigned attorneys, submit the following Memorandum in support of their Motion to Amend Judgment and for Leave to File Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 15(a): INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs request that this Court reconsider its September 30, 2015 Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice, in particular with regard to the Count II antitrust claim, and seek leave to amend the Complaint to clarify the nature of the antitrust theory and the relevant market, as well as to include in the record the correct corporate identity of the party who has been seeking 1

2 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:2844 to monopolize that market. Plaintiffs bring this motion for two primary reasons. First, as explained below, Plaintiffs believe that the Court should allow an amendment to Count II because the problems identified by the Court concerning the Count II antitrust claim can be cured with the clarified allegations in the proposed First Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs now seek to file. (See Proposed First Amended Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion.) Second, Plaintiffs would like to correct and supplement the record to reflect information learned after the filing of the Complaint and briefing of the Motion to Dismiss regarding the sales of Rooftop Businesses, including information that Plaintiffs believe may affect this Court s antitrust analysis and cure the problems identified by the Court. Third, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend Count I to be consistent with the clarified and additional allegations relating to Count II, even though Plaintiffs recognize that this will not be sufficient to cure all of the reasons identified by the Court for its dismissal of Count I. 1 A. Plaintiffs Seek Leave to Amend and Ask the Court to Consider Newly- Discovered Information Regarding the Purchaser of the Rooftop Businesses and Additional Sales After the Filing of the Complaint and Briefing of the Motion to Dismiss. The Defendants in the original Complaint are Thomas Ricketts, one of the investors in the corporate entity that purchased the Chicago Cubs Baseball Club and Wrigley Field from the Tribune Company, as well as two of the corporate entities that own the rights and assets that constitute the Chicago Cubs Baseball Club (Defendants Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC and Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC) and also the corporate entity that owns and manages Wrigley Field (Defendant Wrigley Field Holdings, LLC). Although for the sake of brevity the four defendants were referred to as the Cubs Organization in the Complaint, Wrigley Field 1 Although new information is also available with respect to the other Counts, most significantly the contract counts, as Defendants threatened actions have now occurred and actual damages have now been suffered, Plaintiffs do not believe that amending those counts would affect the reasons given by the Court for the dismissal, although of course Plaintiffs respectfully disagree with those reasons. 2

3 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:2845 Holdings, LLC is not in the business of baseball, but instead constitutes a venue that has an agreement with a Major League Baseball team, as well as other providers of sporting events and entertainments. Defendant Ricketts is not only an investor in the Chicago Cubs businesses and Wrigley Field, along with other members of his family, but is also an investor in many other businesses that have nothing to do with baseball, just as the Tribune Company continued to be involved primarily in media businesses while it owned the Chicago Cubs. At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs did not know many of the details regarding the purchase of the Rooftop Businesses referred to as the Cubs Rooftop Businesses in the Complaint. That Plaintiffs lacked knowledge as to certain specifics of the sales was acknowledged in the Complaint and in argument before the Court, and was a matter that Plaintiffs had intended to address in discovery. See, e.g., 3/23/2015 Transcript [Dkt. # 68] at 15. However, for the reasons set forth in the Declaration of Marc Anguiano ( Anguiano Dec. ), attached as Exhibit 2 to the Motion, Plaintiffs believed at that time that the purchases were by a Cubs entity, such as Defendant Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, and that the Rooftop Businesses would subsequently be owned and controlled by the Chicago Cubs. See, e.g., Complaint [Dkt. # 1] 44-47, , ; Anguiano Dec This was because the sales were negotiated by employees and representatives of the Chicago Cubs, such as Crane Kenney, who is the president of Defendant Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, and Mike Lufrano, its general counsel. Anguiano Dec. 3, 5. As discussed below, Plaintiffs have now learned that the new owners of the Cubs Rooftop Businesses are not included among the current defendants and are not entities controlled by Defendant Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC or Defendant Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC, but instead that the indirect owner is Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC (indirectly, as the sole member in Greystone, LLC, which in turn 3

4 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:2846 is the sole member in LLCs created to own each of the individual Rooftop Businesses). Anguiano Dec. 8, Ex. A-C. Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC is not owned by Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, but instead is one of the investors in both Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC and Wrigley Field Holdings, LLC. The Ricketts family is, indirectly, the investor in Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC. Therefore, the Cubs Rooftop Businesses are not being acquired by the Chicago Cubs, but by the Ricketts family and Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC. Even if the Ricketts family were to sell the Chicago Cubs, or Wrigley Field, the Ricketts family would continue to own the Cubs Rooftop Businesses that it is now acquiring. Although the correct information about the ownership of the Rooftop Businesses in question were at all times known to Defendants and their counsel, 2 they did not provide this information to Plaintiffs or the Court. The briefing on the Motion to Dismiss was complete in March After that date, in May or June 2015, additional sales to the Cubs or a Ricketts-affiliated entity were reported, but again the specific details regarding the sale or the buyer were not immediately available. Rather than immediately seeking to amend the Complaint to include incomplete information regarding those sales, Plaintiffs believed that they would be able to obtain discovery, including information as to the ultimate buyer, and, if appropriate, seek to amend the Complaint to reflect any newly discovered facts. It also has been reported that the Ricketts family has sued to fully acquire yet another Rooftop Business, Down the Line, at N. Sheffield Avenue in Chicago, in which they were investors. This would bring the Ricketts family s ownership of Rooftop Businesses up to seven of the sixteen total, with 1,400 of the 3,000 total seats available to be sold by Rooftop 2 The law firm representing Defendants in this case also represented the purchasers of the Rooftop Businesses in connection with the purchases at issue. (See Anguiano Dec., Ex. A.) 4

5 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:2847 Businesses, within less than a year after the sales began. See Proposed First Amended Complaint, 112. In mid-august 2015, Plaintiffs discovered for the first time that the owner or interestholder in the Rooftop Businesses that they had believed to be Cubs-affiliated were not owned by any of the Cubs entities of which they were aware. Based on this information, Plaintiffs have done additional research, and although the ownership structure is complicated, it appears that at least six of the seven properties that the Cubs or Ricketts were believed to have acquired are indirectly owned by Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company owned by the Ricketts family. Thus, to reflect this information, Plaintiffs seek to amend the Complaint to include as a Defendant Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC, as well as the other entities involved in the purchases, if they are found to be necessary parties. B. Plaintiffs Seek Leave to Amend to Clarify Allegations that Plaintiffs Respectfully Believe the Court Has Misapprehended or Which Were Inadequately Alleged in the Original Complaint. As discussed in detail below, the amendments that Plaintiffs seek will not only add a new Defendant and clarify the ownership structure and relationship between the Cubs Rooftop Businesses and the current Defendants, but they will address certain matters on which the Court relied in dismissing Count II with prejudice. Specificially: The amendments will clarify that for the purposes of Count II, the market alleged is not based on the market for Chicago Cubs baseball tickets, but is a market for views into an arena from outside the arena. For the same reason, the Rooftop Businesses are not selling a brand but are selling views, food and drink, and an entertainment experience, involving not only Cubs games, but also other entertainments. (For the same reason, Plaintiffs do not believe that Count I s market is based on a single brand, and propose amendments to Count I to clarify this.) The amendments will clarify that the business in which the Rooftop Businesses are involved is not the business of baseball exempted by the Supreme Court from antitrust laws. 5

6 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:2848 The amendments will clarify that Plaintiffs do not concede that the Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC has any right to determine whether or not a local property owner may sell views into Wrigley Field, and that they consider the License Agreement entered into in settlement of the 2002 litigation to be a contract providing for payment (a share of profits) in return for an unobstructed view of the field. (This is similarly the case with respect to Count I, although Plaintiffs concede while respectfully disagreeing that the amendments would likely not change the Court s ruling with respect to Count I and the antitrust exemption.) A. Legal Standard ARGUMENT With respect to the motion for leave to amend, pursuant to Rule 15(a), the Seventh Circuit has held that ordinarily, when a plaintiff s original complaint is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff should be given at least one opportunity to amend before the entire action is dismissed. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago, 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). Under the liberal standard applied to requests to amend, a request should be granted unless it is certain that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted. Id. at This same liberal standard applies even where, as here, the request for leave to amend comes after final judgment is entered and is combined with a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id. at ; see also Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 441 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case, allowing Plaintiffs leave to amend is not futile, as it will clarify the record as to the relationship between the Chicago Cubs and the party who is attempting to monopolize the Rooftop Businesses, and it will clarify the issues as to the current relationship between the Chicago Cubs and the Rooftop Businesses. In particular, it will clarify the fact that Plaintiffs do not rely on the existence of a license from or permission of the Chicago Cubs to exist, and do not concede that they would violate any rights of the Chicago Cubs in the absence of the license agreements. 6

7 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:2849 With respect to the Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment other than for the purposes of amending the Complaint, such a motion may be based on new evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. Sosebee v. Astrue, 494 F.3d 583, (7th Cir. 2007); see also Childress, 787 F.3d at 442. In this case, as discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs are moving based on new facts, as well as on a belief that the Court erred in dismissing the Complaint with prejudice due to a misapprehension of their position, which they further seek to correct through amendment of the Complaint as would normally be permitted under the liberal standards of Rule 15. B. The Court Should Reconsider Its Ruling that Major League Baseball s Antitrust Exemption Applies to the Rooftop Business. In the September 30, 2015 Order and Opinion (the 9/30/15 Order ), the Court ruled that the Supreme Court s exemption of the business of baseball from the antitrust laws applies to the Chicago Cubs. 9/30/15 Order [Dkt. #74] at 4-5. With respect to Count II, however, the monopolization claim does not concern the business of the Chicago Cubs themselves. Instead, the market alleged in the original complaint was the market for the sale of views of live Cubs games from Rooftop Businesses outside of Wrigley Field, by independent competitors, who historically have had no involvement with the Chicago Cubs team or the putting on of the baseball games. Significantly, the Chicago Cubs themselves are not even alleged in Count II to be part of this market. In the proposed First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to further clarify this market as one for the Live Views of Wrigley Field Events, which do not consist solely of baseball games. Moreover, it is not a market for rooftop views of sporting arena events in general simply because, to Plaintiffs knowledge. there are no other Chicago-area venues of this sort, with local rooftop views of the events within. 7

8 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:2850 In ruling that the business of baseball subject to the antitrust exemption extends not only to activities of the Chicago Cubs themselves, but to others who profit from the existence and location of the Chicago Cubs, Plaintiffs submit that this Court has misapprehended the law as well as the relationship between the Chicago Cubs and the Cubs Rooftop Businesses. As discussed above, the owners of the Chicago Cubs (the Ricketts family) are seeking to monopolize the Rooftop Businesses. The mere fact that the Cubs and the Rooftop Businesses would then have a common investor does not thereby make the separate Rooftop Businesses part of the business of baseball (or the Cubs business) any more than the prior ownership of both the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Cubs by the Tribune Company turned the Tribune s newspaper publishing business into baseball. Nor does the fact that the Rooftop Businesses profit, in large part, from the popularity and presence of the Chicago Cubs in Wrigley Field transform the business of selling views of Wrigley Field, along with food and drink and an overall atmosphere and environment, into the business of baseball. If that were so, the sale of radio and television rights for baseball games would be covered by the antitrust exemption, and that has never been the case. See, e.g., Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass n, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263, 271 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that dispute arising out of broadcasting contract between Houston Astros and radio stations was not covered by the antitrust exemption); see also Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying antitrust laws to contract between baseball card manufacturer and players association); Nishimura v. Dolan, 599 F. Supp. 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying antitrust laws to contract between cable company and baseball teams). Indeed, it would seemingly transform the many other businesses who profit from the 8

9 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:2851 presence of Wrigley Field and the Cubs, including local sports bars like the Cubby Bear, into baseball businesses. The language of the Supreme Court s baseball holdings does not support such a broad extension. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 42 S.Ct. 465, 466 (1922), the business at issue was narrowly defined: the business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs. None of the Rooftop Businesses are themselves involved in giving exhibitions of baseball instead, they sell a view of a local landmark and various events within, including musical events, Big 10 football games, an All-America high school baseball game, and, of course, for a significant part of their history, Chicago Bears football games, none of which have anything to do with the business of baseball. Indeed, even the Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants that has been at issue in this case specifically makes clear that the subject matter is not limited to games played by the Chicago Cubs. Rather than paying only a percentage of gross reveue derived from rooftop views of Cubs games, Plaintiffs are to pay a percentage for tickets relating to any Major League baseball games, non-professional baseball games, National Football League games, non-professional football games, concerts or any other event taking place in Wrigley Field. (See Agreement (attached as Exhibit 1 hereto), 3.1(a) and Ex. C (Definition of Game and Gross Revenues ).) The later Supreme Court opinions did not expand the definition of the business at issue. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 74 S.Ct. 78 (1953) upheld Federal Baseball solely on stare decisis, defining the business at issue as the business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball players (emphasis added), and Flood v. Kuhn, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 2110 (1972), held that the reason for the exemption that baseball teams were not in interstate commerce was wrong under the current view of the law, but that too much hardship 9

10 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:2852 would result from undoing the exemption and subjecting the baseball leagues and clubs to retroactive litigation. That reasoning certainly does not apply to the Rooftop Businesses or the acquisition of them by investors who also happen to be investors in the Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field. Finally, the monopoly power that the Ricketts family and Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC are abusing in their attempt to monopolize the Rooftop Businesses does not result from their ownership of the Chicago Cubs or Defendants Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC and Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC. Instead, it comes from their ownership of Wrigley Field, which can be analogized to an essential facility for the various Rooftop Businesses that are in competition with each other. Through their control of Wrigley Field, the Ricketts family and Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC are able to favor the Rooftop Businesses that they own and damage the business of others in an effort to force a sale, as outlined in Count II of the original and proposed First Amended Complaint. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that defendant sports team s failure to fairly share essential facility it controlled, the sports arena, with competitors supported intent to monopolize). The business of a sports stadium is not equivalent to the business of a professional baseball team. See, e.g., Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing claim against provider of concessions in major league baseball stadiums without considering baseball exemption); City of San Jose v. Office of Commissioner of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that activities even of MLB and franchises themselves could be collateral to the business of baseball). Here, where Wrigley Field and the Chicago Cubs have common ownership but Defendant Wrigley Field Holdings, LLC 10

11 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:2853 enters into contracts with entertainment suppliers well beyond baseball teams, the business of owning and operating Wrigley Field certainly is not within the baseball exemption. C. The Court Should Reconsider Its Ruling that No Plausible Relevant Market Exists With Respect to the Rooftop Businesses. The Court also should reconsider its ruling and amend its judgment with respect to both Counts I and II because it is premature to determine that Plaintiffs cannot plead any plausible relevant market, given that the Plaintiffs were given no opportunity to amend the Complaint. As its basis for this finding, the Court ruled that a single brand cannot be a relevant market. Plaintiffs submit that they are not defining the relevant market based on a single brand and that, in any case, there is no rule precluding a market from being a single brand under appropriate circumstances, which could be proven to exist here. The market alleged in Count II of the proposed First Amended Complaint is the market for Live Views of Wrigley Field Events. Wrigley Field is a location, not a brand. Moreover, that the market is focused solely on Wrigley Field is not because the sale of rooftop views into other sporting arenas are asserted to be part of a separate market, but because Plaintiffs do not believe that there are any other such views for sale within the Chicago metropolitan area, which they assert to be the relevant geographical market. Therefore, this is not a case, like PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2010) or House of Brides, Inc. v. Alfred Angelo, Inc., 2014 WL 64657, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014), in which the market definition depended on proving that the product is not in the same market as other, otherwise competitive products, simply due to the significance of their brand name. Instead, it is analogous to Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held that a single brand can constitute a market if the facts are such that no other reasonably interchangeable competitors exist in the market as a matter of fact. Plaintiffs 11

12 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:2854 have alleged that this is the case for the Rooftop Businesses within the Chicago metropolitan area, and should be permitted to present evidence on that fact. See Hecht, 570 F.2d at 989 (holding Washington Redskins had monopoly over professional football in DC metropolitan area); Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Penn. 1982) (holding [t]here is no doubt that the NFL currently has a monopoly in the United States in major league football but rejecting claim for reasons other than a lack of monopoly power). D. The Court Should Reconsider Its Ruling that Monopolizing the Rooftop Businesses Is Nothing More than The Cubs Taking Over the Distribution of Their Own Product. The proposed First Amended Complaint also will clarify that Plaintiffs do not concede that the attempt to monopolize the Rooftop Businesses by the Ricketts family, through new Defendant Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC, constitutes the takeover of the distribution of Cubs baseball by the supplier, the Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC. First, as Plaintiffs now know, the Cubs entities are not the parties who are seeking to monopolize the Rooftop Businesses. Instead one of the Cubs s corporate investors is seeking to own the Rooftop Businesses as well as the Cubs. If the Cubs are sold, the Rooftop Businesses owned by Northside Entertainment Holdings, LLC would not be an assets of the Cubs (unless also bargained for and sold), and therefore the recent sales cannot be considered the Cubs taking over distribution. The sales also cannot be considered the Cubs taking over distribution, because the Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC does not own the exclusive rights to the live viewing of Cubs games or other entertainment in Wrigley Field and therefore has no authority to distribute it. While it is true that the Cubs and the Rooftop Businesses have entered into agreements that purport to be licensing agreements, they did so in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit in 12

13 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:2855 which the Rooftop Businesses specifically denied that the Cubs had any such rights. (See Agreement (Exhibit 1 hereto) at 1.) Instead, from the perspective of the Rooftop Businesses, the agreements provided for a payment of a percentage of profits in return for an unobstructed view. The fact that the Agreement covers not only Cubs games, but provides for a payment by Plaintiffs to Defendants for numerous other events the Chicago Cubs owners could have no right to license supports this view. (See Agreement (Exhibit 1 hereto) at 18.) While the original Complaint identified the nature of the agreements from the perspective of the Cubs to demonstrate that even under that view a violation of the antitrust laws would exist, the proposed First Amended Complaint clarifies that those facts are presented only in the alternative. Finally, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court misapprehended the law in ruling that Defendants could not be liable if they were in a vertical relationship with Plaintiffs, as well as a competitive one, for the reasons set forth in their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. However, that issue need not be reconsidered at this time, as the facts alleged in the proposed First Amended Complaint demonstrate that Count II states a claim even if vertical integration would not violate the antitrust laws. 13

14 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:2856 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs request that the this Court amend or alter the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), specifically the dismissal of Count II with prejudice, and grant them Leave to File an Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). Respectfully Submitted, Right Field Rooftops, LLC, d/b/a Skybox on Sheffield, Right Field Properties, LLC, 3633 Rooftop Management, LLC, d/b/a Lakeview Baseball Club, and Rooftop Acquisition, LLC /s/ Thomas M. Lombardo By: Thomas M. Lombardo One of their Attorneys Thomas M. Lombardo ( ) Abraham Brustein (327662) Di Monte & Lizak, LLC 216 Higgins Road Park Ridge, IL tel fax James R. Figliulo (# ) Stephanie D. Jones (# ) Figliulo & Silverman, P.C. 10 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3600 Chicago, IL T: (312) F: (312)

15 Case: 1:15-cv Document #: 80 Filed: 10/28/15 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:2857 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned counsel certify that a copy of the foregoing: PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT will be caused to be served upon counsel of record via electronic notification by the United States District Court's ECF System on October 28, _/s/ Thomas M. Lombardo. 15