Improving policies by improving governance

Transcription

1 Improving policies by improving governance Rachel Glennerster Executive Director, J-PAL Department of Economics, MIT PSI June 6, 2013

2 Overview The problem Citizens as direct monitors Citizens as voters All impact results based on randomized evaluations

3 The problem Substantial increase in democracy but often very imperfect Very low levels of voter knowledge Persistence of corruption, vote buying Little debate about policies Increase in policies that benefit the majority E.g free primary education Still very poor services

4 High levels of provider absenteeism Absence Rates Uganda India Bangladesh Indonesia Uganda India Peru Bangladesh Indonesia Ecuador Peru 4

5 Direct monitoring by citizens Encouraging local monitoring has mixed results in Uganda for health, reduced absenteeism and infant mortality (Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) In Indian for education, no impact on effort or service (Banerjee et al, 2010) Existing beneficiary control systems were nonfunctional at project start Top down audits more effective than increased community monitoring to reduce corruption in Indonesian road projects (Olken, 2007)

6 School based management

7 Improving representative democracy Encouraging evidence that voting behavior is malleable to campaigns Reduced ethnic voting 9% (Banerjee et al, 2010) Increased female voting 12% (Gine and Mansuri, 2010) Reduced violence by 11% (Collier and Vicente, 2008) Mainly tested very specific information/messages Can this be applied to a spectrum of aspects of quality? Can it generate increase competition on economic/quality issues? Improvements in policies and services?

8 Info on corruption: Brazil Federal audits of municipal governments Randomized order of audits Some results released prior to election, some afterwards Allowed test of: whether voters punish corruption, how much do they punish corruption and in what circumstances

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11 Voting in urban India Scorecards on municipal candidates disseminated in random slums Legislative activity and committee attendance Discretionary expenditure Incumbent and challenger qualifications High performing incumbents benefit from transparency, low performing are hurt Respond to information that effects them Spending on their slum Banerjee et al, 2011.

12 MPs in Uganda Scorecards created for all MPs by AFLI Attendance, participation, initiative in parliament and committees, peer reviews Activity and accessibility in constituency Randomly announced in advance where there would be intense dissemination of the scorecards Change in short run self reported voting intentions No change in actual voting No change in politician behavior Humphreys and Weinstein, ongoing.

13 MP Debates in Sierra Leone Bidwell, Casey, and Glennerster, ongoing

14 Pre and post debate knowledge and stated preferences Pre Post % change stated party preference 13% change to undecided 0 Legislation as MP role Name APC candidate Identify Gender Equity Bill quota Name APC position on GEB Support Gender Equity Bill

15 Outstanding questions Can community monitoring/empowerment be made to work consistently and cost-effectively? What are the key design elements to make it effective? Is community monitoring only effective in certain environments? Can providing information up the chain of command improve governance? Can informed voters lead to better quality services? Can we bring together the community monitoring and informed voter work? For example, provide information on health worker absenteeism at district level in different districts prior to elections

16 SUAHASIL NAZARA Professor in Economics Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia Coordinator of Policy Working Group TNP2K Secretariat, Office of the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia

17 Democracy, less corruption, stronger civil society, able to implement public policy, competitive and efficient markets all improve poverty reduction efforts No doubt about that

18 Democracy may not be fully grown Corruption may still be out there Civil society may not be that strong Media may be strong but in love with bad news Markets and also public service-- may not be entirely competitive nor efficient

19 Initially is distributed as parts of Raskin program, the KPS is now being used for the poor and vulnerable to access other social assistance programs as compensation of 2013 fuel subsidy cut. The compensation programs include the unconditional cash transfer (Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat, or BLSM). Despite its Raskin origin, BLSM becomes the more important use of KPS. Revolutionary for Indonesia: (i) The first time an embryo for an integrated card (ii) Only a year after the single registry was up and running in 2012 (iii) Approval of several line ministries, including MoSA, MoHa who (by Law) also has another population database but is not capable of generating PMT, MoH who runs the largest program of Jamkesmas, etc.

20 Since 2013, for 15.5 million poor and vulnerable HHs Multiple programs: Raskin, BSM, BLSM and later for PKH and Jamkesmas Delivered directly to the beneficiaries by Post Office (PT Pos) 5

21 2 3 Post Office Prints and Sends KPS Names & addresses 8 Replacement Househoulds PT Pos Indonesia 9 Post Office prints and sends replacement KPS UNIFIED DATABASE (single registry) 1 Names & addresses Min. of Social Affairs (MoSA) 4 Undelivered cards cancelled & returned Number of returned cards given to Villages 7 Re-endorsed by MoSA Recap of Whole Replacement HHs 6 Recap of replacement households entered to the system by PT Pos Indonesia Households receive KPS 5 Village heads/lurah conducts Village Deliberations to households to replace and their replacement Village Deliberation 6

22 Democracy may not be fully grown Corruption may still be out there Civil society may not be that strong Media may be strong but in love with bad news Markets --hence public service-- may not be entirely competitive nor efficient

24 UNIFIED DATABASE (single registry) 1 Names & addresses Min. of Social Affairs (MoSA) The Unified Data Base (UDB) is managed by TNP2K Secretariat Governance! The UDB is based on 2010 Census and consultation with the poor On demand? Active search? UDB covers 40% of HHs in lowest distribution, KPS distributed to 25% lowest PMT developed for each of 497 kabupaten/kota in Indonesia sufficient? Secret or public model? MoSA assumes (APBN) budget responsibility receive data and send it immediately to PT Pos for cards production and delivery 9

26 2 Names & addresses 8 Replacement Househoulds PT Pos Indonesia Min. of Social Affairs (MoSA) MoSA PT Pos: Contractual agreement. Despite SOE status, PT Pos is a business entity (and calculations) MoSA needs to direct appoint PT Pos for cards printing & delivery. Direct Appointment typically unlawful special exempt needed Good corporate governance at PT Pos required 11

28 PT Pos Indonesia 3 9 Post Office Post Office prints and sends Prints and Sends replacement KPS KPS Cards delivery: PT Pos and Village apparatus Can Post Office brings the card down to houses? Some! Issues of jealousy, social/horizontal conflict may stop cards distribution Media: bad news is good news! Geography & transportation challenges Social mobility: migration Data may just be incorrect: governance in the data collection Households receive KPS 13

30 KPS is only for the poor. Those who feel ineligible, please return the cards Would that work? Social workers will coordinate with Village on the number of returned cards Village deliberation is the ultimate grievance handling. Participative? Accountable? Sensitive to the poor? PT Pos Indonesia Recap of the replacement HHs need to be endorsed by MoSA Not the most efficient, but is all about governance issue once again 4 Undelivered cards cancelled & returned Number of returned cards given to Villages 5 Village heads/lurah conducts Village Deliberations to households to replace and their replacement Recap of Whole Replacement HHs 6 Recap of replacement households entered to the system by PT Pos Indonesia Village Deliberation 15

31 Socialization materials Posters for village office Printed? Delivered? Posted? SOP Guidelines For Govt and Social Workers MATERIALS FOR THE REAL IMPLEMENTATION Socialization materials For beneficiaries / households Printed? Delivered? Understood?

32 Should we wait for better governance to be around before implementing reform? Could we expect better governance as we push for reform? No! Yes! Understand the bureaucracy and corporate governance (and sensitivity), and push for reform

33 and neither of hunch, instinct, nor anecdotal stories dominating the policy making process

34 What is it about? It is about triangulation of EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE) POLICY BROKER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION POLICY BROKER EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE) Universities, research institutes, think tanks, etc. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Line ministries, local gov ts

35 Photo: pontianak.tribunnews.com