APT A%ribu*on and DNS Profiling. Frankie Li
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1 APT A%ribu*on and DNS Profiling Frankie Li
2 Agenda APT A4ribu<on: Who wrote these codes? Tac<cs, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Behavior of APT adversary HUMINT extracted from DNS or Whois Gather intelligence from open source Dynamically monitoring of PassiveDNS è PassiveWhois Analysis by visualiza<on tool (Maltego) MalProfile Tools and demo
3 Who am I? From a place in China, but not so China ;) Sunday researcher in malware analysis and digital forensics Part <me lecturer A Lazy blogger (espionageware.blogspot.com) NOT associated with PLA or Mandiant NOT associated with PLA or CrowdStrike or Taia Global
4 APT ATTRIBUTION
5 APT A%ribu*on Disclaimer: Not going to provide any opinion on the latest indictment or Yoke Bun or Clock Tower Not a major concern for private sector, but for LE or intelligence agencies Not difficult, if you have source code Not hard, if you focus only on strings & human readable data within a malware program But, to a4ribute responsibility with Certainty is almost impossible, unless they make a mistake
6 Who wrote these codes? Source code a4ribu<on A4ributes of Windows binaries A4ribu<on malware A4ribu<on of APT by digital DNA
7 Source code a%ribu*on The term Stylometry refers the applica<on of a4ribute the authorship by coding style Kind of profiling by wri<ng style Comments and coding crumbs JStylo: By comparing unknown documents with a known candidate author s document* Not a solu<on because most APT samples collected are compiled binaries *Islam, A. (2013). Poster: Source Code Authorship A4ribu<on
8 A%ributes of Windows Malware PE headers are des- constructed and metadata (ar<facts) are categorized (Yonts, 2012) Extract the technical and contextual a4ributes or genes from different layers to group the malware (Xecure- Lab, 2012 and Pfeffer, 2012) By a proprietary reverse engineering and behavioral analysis technology (Digital DNA, 2014)
9 PE Deconstruc*on
10 A%ribu*on Using Gene*c Informa*on From: Xecure- Lab, 2012
11 TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTP)
12 Human is the key A4ribu<on: Tracking Cyber Spies & Digital Criminals (Hoglund, 2010) Forensics marks that could be extracted from raw data in three intelligence layers Net Recon Developer Fingerprints Tac<cs, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) Among these three layers, TTP should carry the highest intelligence value for iden<fying human a4ackers But, near impossibility of finding the human actors with defini<ve intelligence Social Cyberspace (i.e., DIGINT) Physical Surveillance (i.e., HUMINT) h4p:// watch?v=k4ry1trqhdk
13 Hoglund s malware intel life *me
14 TTP A military term? A term to describe the behavior of adversary? A modern term to replace modus operandi? the method of opera<on The habits of working TTP are human- influenced factors
15 Pyramid of Pain From David Bianco s Blog h4p://detect- respond.blogspot.hk/2013/03/ the- pyramid- of- pain.html
16 TTP OR BEHAVIOR OF APT ADVERSARY
17 APT life cycle
18 Extended APT life cycle
19 APT infrastructure tac*cs Domain registra<on Naming conven<on is not typo squarng, but follows a pa4ern of meaningful Chinese PingYing 拼音 Crea<on DNS- IP address pairs Engaging a friendly ISP to use a por<on of their C- class subnet of IP addresses situated at the domicile of the targeted vic<ms DNS names and IP addresses may be cycled for reuse (a.k.a. campaigns), which may provide indica<ons or links to the a4acker groups Embedding mul<ple DNS A- records in exploits Preparing spear- phishing content aser reconnaissance of the targeted vic<ms Launching malicious a4achments through spear- phishing s
20 APT infrastructure tac*cs- 2 The exploits drop binaries that extract the DNS records and begin communica<ng with the C2 by resolving the IP addresses from DNS servers. The C2 servers or C2 proxies register the infec<ons on the C2 database The intelligence analysts of the a4acker groups review the preliminary collected informa<on of the targeted vic<ms through C2 portals. The infected machines are further instructed to perform exfiltra<on of collect further intelligence from the infected machines. The infrastructure technical persons of the a4acker group apply changes (domain manipula<on) to the DNS- IP address pair, domain name registra<on informa<on (Whois informa<on), and the parked domains from <me to <me or when a specific incident occurs In contrast with the Fast- Flux Services Networks men<oned by the HoneyNet Project, the informa<on does not change with high frequency
21 HUMINT EXTRACTED FROM DNS
22 What is kept in DNS & Whois Domain names: A Record, Cname, NS record Whois records: valid address (once), name, street address, name servers Parked- domains: temporary IP address assigned crea<on of first DNS record on the name server (newly created domains are kept under 1 IP address for future use)
23 HUMINT intel collected Extract DNS from the malicious code (sandbox) Lookup the currently assigned IP address Retrieve all parked- domains from the iden<fied IP address Retrieve whois informa<on from the iden<fied domains Update iden<fied record to a rela<onal database for future analysis Repeat the process and record all changes in the database
24 Intel collec*on process
25 QUERIES FROM OPEN SOURCE
26 Open source Nslookup Whois Domain tools: reverse DNS and reverse whois h4p://bgp.he.net h4p://virustotal.com h4p://passivedns.mnemonic.no h4ps:// h4ps://
27 DomainTools Ouch!
28 h%p://bgp.he.net
29 PASSIVE DNS TO PASSIVE WHOIS
30 Passive DNS Passive DNS is a technology that constructs zone replicas without coopera<on from zone administrators, and is based on captured name server response Passive DNS is a highly scalable network design that stores and indexes both historical DNS data that can help answer ques<ons such as: where did this domain name point to in the past which domain name points to a given IP network VirusTotal kept passive DNS records collected from malicious samples Higher chance malicious historical DNS- IP records
31 VirusTotal - PassiveDNS
32 Passive Whois There are no open source keeping those whois changes, like VirusTotal Passive DNS project (or whois history at who.is) By stepping through the IP lookup, retrieval of parked- domains and whois lookup, any changes will then be updated to a rela<onal database
33 Passive Whois
34 ANALYSIS BY VISUALIZATION MALTEGO
35 Sample called OverProtect
36 CONCLUSION
37 Intui*ve views on the a%ribu*on of APT Con<nuously monitoring whois servers and DNS IP address pairs Intelligence may be lost if they change their TTP in the future, par<cularly aser the publica<on of this paper TTP are determined by the cultural background of the a4acker groups The intelligence collec<on process should thus be adjusted toward these changes and analysts should have the same cultural mindset
38 Is a%ribu*on with certainty possible? All discussed methods may generate some value to the a4ribu<on But, TTP should carry the highest intelligence value for iden<fying human a4ackers Any ar<facts that support the highest human link should be allocated with highest value to the a4ribu<on However, the increasing sharing of TTP and tools by various actors may reduce the reliability to associate with them. (I ve read a paper promo<ng a framework called OpenAPT) Another challenging factor is a4ribu<on intelligence are not shared enough and intelligence community are not fully understood
39 TOOLS
40 MalProfile Tools and MalProfile Local Transforms The tools consists of 2 parts: MalProfile script to grabbing intelligence from the Internet Maltego Local Transforms to help analysis process
41 MalProfile.py
42 Google Project Special thanks go to Kenneth Tse and Eric Yuen who is upgrading my messy code into a class You can find the code at: h4ps:// code.google.com/p/malicious- domain- profiling/ To allow more intelligence can be added when new TTP be iden<fied Any interested are welcome to contribute to this project. Please contact ran2@vxrl.org or kennetht@gmail.com
43 malicious- domain- profiling
44 DEMO
45 Sample called OverProtect and Insurance
46 Thank you! Q&A Frankie Li h4p://espionageware.blogspot.com
47 Please complete the Speaker Feedback Surveys Frankie Li h4p://espionageware.blogspot.com
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