OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DELRAY BEACH FIRE- RESCUE DEPARTMENT AT HIGH-RISE FIRES STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

Transcription

1 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DELRAY BEACH FIRE- RESCUE DEPARTMENT AT HIGH-RISE FIRES STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE By: Russell Accardi Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department Delray Beach, Florida An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program September 2001 Page 1

2 ABSTRACT The Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department, like many small to medium sized departments, is challenged to provide fire and emergency medical services at a high level of efficiency and professionalism. Due to its limited local resources, the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department was at a disadvantage during the early stages of a high-rise fire. The purpose of this research was to determine the most appropriate use of limited resources within the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department when responding to a highrise fire. Once this had been determined, the information was used to develop a new Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) for high-rise fires. Historical research of high-rise fires that occurred around the world from the early 1900 s to the present was conducted. Published articles, technical reports, and textbooks were reviewed. Evaluative research was used to identify needed improvements in the water flow capabilities of hose and nozzles. Action research was used to develop an updated high-rise fire SOG, which can be found in Appendix C of this document. The following research questions were posed to address the issues: 1. What are the priorities of the first arriving companies? 2. What procedures should be established to move firefighters and equipment to the upper floors of a high-rise? 3. What building systems need to be addressed early in a high-rise fire? 4. What can be done to optimize the water flow capability at a high-rise fire utilizing our department s limited resources? The procedures used to complete this research included a literature review of fire service textbooks, personal observations during ride alongs, and reviews of National Fire Page 2

3 Protection Association (NFPA) standards. Videotapes were also obtained and viewed for a historical perspective on previous high-rise fires. A survey instrument was also used to obtain information from ten fire departments in southeast Florida who have the same high-rise fire potential. An evaluation was conducted by the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Training and Safety Division to analyze waterflow capabilities with hose and nozzles. The results of this research indicated the need for identifying pre-assignments and priorities of first arriving companies at a high-rise fire. It also determined the need to utilize comprehensive procedures when transporting firefighters in elevators during highrise operations. Research also indicated the need to gain control of building systems such as HVAC and the elevators with a lobby control group. Waterflow capabilities can be increased through the use of low pressure fixed gallon per minute (GPM) fog nozzles or low-pressure smooth bore nozzles. The capability to deploy 2 ½ inch and/or portable master stream devices may also be necessary for high-rise operations. Recommendations included clearly defined first arriving apparatus assignments, elevator use procedures, strong lobby control of building systems, coordinating movement of personnel, and switching from automatic fog nozzles to low-pressure smooth-bore nozzles in the high-rise packs. Page 3

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT...2 TABLE OF CONTENTS...4 INTRODUCTION...5 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE...7 LITERATURE REVIEW...10 PROCEDURES...29 RESULTS...36 DISCUSSION...41 RECOMMENDATIONS...46 REFERENCES...49 APPENDIX A...52 APPENDIX B...53 APPENDIX C...55 Page 4

5 INTRODUCTION The City of Delray Beach has a full service fire-rescue department providing fire, EMS (advanced life support) transport, hazardous materials technicians, technical/heavy rescue, dive rescue, fire prevention services, as well as other specialized services. The department has invested many resources, both financial and training/educational opportunities, for its personnel. The city prides itself in being customer service oriented. Delray Beach was a recipient of the All America City award in the years 1993 and Delray Beach is the only city in the state of Florida to receive this award twice. The city currently is assigned a Class 2 Public Protection Classification by the Insurance Services Office. The Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department is a customer service value driven organization under the direction of Fire Chief Kerry Koen. The department also realizes that the citizens expectations have to be met when it comes to providing some of the core services expected from a fire department. One of these services would be the capability to respond to a fire in any one of the city s 66 high-rise buildings in a professional, organized manner. In order for the department to be prepared to handle a high-rise fire, a considerable investment in preparation is required. One of the first elements in this preparation is an updated high-rise standard operating guideline (SOG). An effective SOG would not be one that is simply copied from a large metropolitan department and expected to be applicable for a local high-rise fire problem. An effective high-rise SOG would be written to reflect the local fire loading and typical high-rise buildings Page 5

6 encountered in the department s service area. It would take into account the types of apparatus and the staffing on such apparatus being utilized locally. Due to its limited local resources, the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department is at a disadvantage during the early stages of a high-rise fire. The purpose of this research is to determine the most appropriate uses of limited resources within the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department when responding to a highrise fire. Once this has been determined, the information will be used to develop a new SOG for high-rise fires. Historical research of high-rise fires from the early 1900 s to the present will be conducted. Published articles, technical reports, and textbooks will be reviewed. Evaluative research will be used to identify needed improvements in the water flow capabilities of hose and nozzles. Action research will be used to develop an updated high-rise fire SOG, which can be found in Appendix C of this document. The following research questions were posed to address the issues: 1. What are the priorities of the first arriving companies? 2. What procedures should be established to move firefighters and equipment to the upper floors of a high-rise? 3. What building systems need to be addressed early in a high-rise fire? 4. What can be done to optimize the water flow capability at a high-rise fire utilizing our department s limited resources? Once the new SOG is adopted it will be evaluated through practical high-rise drills in multi-company training evolutions. Its effectiveness will be measured and revised as warranted. Page 6

7 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE The Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department has 118 personnel currently assigned to the Operations Division. The department operates out of six fire stations with four engines, two ladder trucks (quints), six advanced life support transport rescues staffed with firefighter paramedics, a haz-mat heavy rescue, an EMS supervisor, and a battalion chief. The minimum daily staffing is 29 personnel. The city is approximately 16 square miles, and has a population of 60,060 people (Koen, personal communication, 2001). Last year the department responded to 10,435 calls, of which 8,472 were EMS, and 1,963 were fire related (Delray Beach Fire-Rescue, 2001). A first alarm structure assignment consists of two engines, two rescues, one ladder/truck, one EMS supervisor, and one battalion chief. There are no differences in the initial response assignment to a high-rise structure alarm. This allows for up to a second alarm and two extra transport rescues before all resources are depleted. Although the City of Delray Beach has mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions, Delray needs to plan how to maximize their available resources in the early stages of a high-rise fire. The city has 25 buildings that meet the definition of a high-rise (Delray Beach Fire-Rescue, 2001). The city also contracts with its neighboring Town of Highland Beach to provide fire and EMS services. The Town of Highland Beach is a coastal community that has a population of 3,775 people in approximately one square mile (Koen, personal communication, 2001). This community is primarily made up of highrise residential buildings, 41 in total, that are all concentrated along the ocean and the intracoastal waterway. Page 7

8 The Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department has handled some fires in these highrise buildings in the past, however, they have been relatively small room and contents fires, except for one that required a second alarm (Delray Beach Fire Rescue Department, 2001). The potential for fires in these high-rise buildings is increasing as many of them are getting older, and some are not equipped with automatic sprinklers or other modern fire detection features. Currently there are several new high-rise buildings being constructed in the Town of Highland Beach. The Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department has responded to two fires in one of the new buildings while under construction. One fire was on the sixth floor and the other on the 17 th floor. As more high-rises are built the probability of more fires in the future increases. The height of these buildings has also increased compared to those structures previously built. These factors make it necessary for the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department to become better prepared in order to make the best possible use of their limited resources until help from mutual aid departments arrives (Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department, 2001). Some early high-rise fires that show the consequences of fires on the upper floors of buildings and how deadly they could be included the 1911 Triangle Shirt Waist fire in New York City that killed 146 people. In 1946, both the Hotel LaSalle fire in Chicago and the Winecoff Hotel fire in Atlanta killed 61 and 119, respectively (Smith, October 1998). Even though many code changes resulted after these early fires, the high-rise fire problem was not eliminated completely. In the early 1970 s The Tae Kak Hotel fire in Seoul, Korea and the Joelma Building (Cresfisul Bank) in Sao Paulo, Brazil resulted in 163 and 179 deaths, respectively. In 1980 The MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas Page 8

9 killed 85, while the Dupont Plaza Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico killed 96 (Smith, October 1998). Firefighters were not immune to being killed by these deadly high-rise fires. Recent fatal fires include the One Meridian Plaza fire in Philadelphia where three firefighters were killed. In February of the following year, the Indianapolis Athletic Club fire claimed the lives of two firefighters. The next two years claimed the lives of 3 firefighters in two different high-rise fires (Smith, October 1998). The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) had several deadly fires that killed their members in 1998 and Three firefighters were killed in a high-rise fire at 77 Vandalia Avenue in Brooklyn, fighting a residential building fire that appeared to be a safe building (Norman, 1999). The results of this research will provide the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Department with important lessons learned from previous high-rise fires, recommendations on response, personnel assignments, command, control, logistics, water flow considerations, building systems, and overall strategies and tactics associated with fighting high-rise fires. The operational considerations for fighting fires in high-rise buildings are in the current Delray Beach Fire-Rescue Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual. These procedures were written in 1992 and have not been updated or revised since their adoption. Any recommendations to change or revise the high-rise procedures will require a method for successfully managing that change. The information in this research project will aid in comparing the existing highrise operational procedures to current recommended practices by leading fire service experts in high-rise firefighting. Results of this research may necessitate changes to the current high-rise procedures of other fire departments that have similar resources, and Page 9

10 have not reviewed their own operational procedures for high-rise fires since their initial adoption. This applied research paper was completed to meet the requirements of the Strategic Management of Change course at the National Fire Academy. This research relates to Module 1, Introduction To Change Management, by identifying the current issues and trends, as well as to recognize the need for change in fire and emergency services. Some of the issues and procedures identified by the research will also be utilized to influence a more comprehensive approach to high-rise firefighting by many fire agencies throughout Palm Beach County, Florida. LITERATURE REVIEW Priorities of the First Arriving Companies Deputy Chief James Smith of the Philadelphia Fire Department recommends that the high-rise operational procedure (OP) should spell out initial assignments. He further states the basis for success will depend upon a number of factors including organization, pre-planning, and applying experience and training to solve the many problems that undoubtedly will occur. He explains however, Nothing solves problems like an aggressive attack on the fire (Smith, October 1998, p.26). Retired Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn of the FDNY offers size-up factors that a first arriving officer should consider at a high-rise fire. They include: locate the fire, control and safe use of elevators, assignment of firefighters, divide stairs for fire attack and evacuation, water supply system, the vertical transportation system, and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. (Dunn, 1999a) Page 10

11 Deputy Chief Harold Meyers of the FDNY spoke at the High Rise Fire Safety Seminar held in October 1994 in New York City. He stated the high-rise strategic operational plan consists of five points: 1. Determine the fire floor. 4. Control building systems. 2. Verify the fire floor. 5. Confine and extinguish the fire. 3. Begin evacuation. Dunn and Meyers both agree one of the first priorities is locating the fire area as soon as possible. The Model Procedures Guide for High-Rise Fire Fighting, First Edition was prepared by the National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium Model Procedures Committee, as part of the National Fire Service Incident Management System. This document gives similar priorities suggesting basic strategic operating guidelines that may be used at a high-rise fire, and lists them in order of importance: 1. Locate the fire 2. Simultaneously, or as soon as possible, begin the process of controlling evacuation. 3. Gain control of the building systems. 4. Confine and extinguish the fire. 5. Deploy lines on the floor above the fire to control extension (NFSIMSC, 1996). This document also agrees with Dunn and Meyers on the importance of locating the fire, then starting evacuation and gaining control of building systems. Page 11

12 Retired Assistant Chief Jack Bennett of the Los Angeles City Fire Department wrote in the October 2000 issue of the American Fire Journal, if the building has a fire control room, fire crews should proceed there and check the annunciator panel for the location of fire or smoke. The next step is to obtain the keys to access stairways and elevators. He suggests checking the floor above the reported fire floor for signs of smoke and fire is essential. He further states one firefighter can go to the floor above, check the door and enter the floor to look for smoke and fire. If the floor above has signs of fire activity, report this immediately. At this point, it is very important for the officer to request additional fire attack companies to the fire floor and floor above. He further states to expect smoke in the stairways once a fire attack with hoselines begins. This cannot be avoided; however, it can be minimized by positive pressure ventilation in the stairway. Bennett (2000) wrote that if your companies are staffed with five, consider sending two firefighters and the officer in with the first attack line while two firefighters remain in the stairway as backup resources. This will make the available air supply for that company last longer than if the entire company went into fire attack mode. Another company must back up the first company on the fire floor as soon as possible. If a working fire is in progress, two additional companies will be needed initially to combat the fire. The stairway should be ventilated as soon as possible in order to provide a fairly safe environment for firefighters to access various floors. Bennett points out the need to use the fire control room if present to determine the fire floor. He also suggests the floor above the fire should be checked for fire and smoke extension. Most fire departments do not dispatch enough first-alarm resources to handle the full potential of a large-scale high-rise fire (NFA, 2000). Bennett makes similar Page 12

13 conclusions as the NFA regarding the need for additional resources when a working fire is in progress. Chief Dunn describes in the January 1999 issue of Firehouse Magazine a listing of priority assignment: 1. First and second arriving engines team-up to stretch the first attack line on the fire floor. 2. Third and fourth arriving engines team-up to stretch the second attack line, or stretch an attack line to the floor above. 3. First and second arriving ladder/trucks conduct search and rescue on the fire floor. 4. Third arriving ladder/truck checks for fire extension, and/or search and rescue on the floor above. 5. Fourth arriving ladder/truck checks for fire extension, and/or search and rescue on floors above, as well as the roof. 6. First arriving chief sets up command post in the lobby. 7. Second arriving chief proceeds up to command firefighting operations from floor below the fire. 8. Third arriving chief will coordinate search and rescue on floors above the fire. 9. Fourth arriving chief will coordinate the staging area three floors below the fire floor. The FDNY has determined it will require more than a single engine company to deploy Page 13

14 each attack line. The fire floor and floor above become the priorities for search and evacuation. Philadelphia s Fire Department assigns the first arriving battalion chief to ascend up to establish the operations command post one or more floors below the fire. The second arriving battalion chief, who will establish command on the ground floor of the building, follows this. Upon confirmation of a working fire the response includes a deputy chief and another battalion chief (Philadelphia F.D., 1993). FDNY sends four battalion chiefs on the initial alarm for a high-rise fire. The sector assignments for these four chiefs include lobby command, operations, search and evacuation (SAE), and logistics (Dunn, 1996b). These two departments have added several chief officers to the initial high-rise alarms, and have given them specific assignments prior to their arrival. According to the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department s standard operating procedures, an aggressive coordinated attack has proven to be the most effective tactical option in the majority of high-rise fire situations. The initial arriving units should be concerned with: 1. Identifying the fire floor. 2. Providing an attack on the fire floor with at least three (3) companies. 3. Providing for the life safety of persons in immediate danger. 4. Providing water supply for the initial attack. 5. Establishing lobby control. 6. Making a size-up of conditions on the fire floor, the floor above and ventilation needs (Phoenix Fire Department, 1996). Page 14

15 The Phoenix Fire Department indicates the same priority objectives of locating the fire, attacking the fire with multiple companies, and assisting civilians in immediate danger. Phoenix s SOPs state that the need for establishing command in the street is secondary to getting an officer and crew up to the fire area. Chicago s SOPs specify that a crew with a hoseline be put in place on the floor above the fire as quickly as possible to prevent any lapping or vertical extension (Bush, Routley, 1996). Both of these departments are stressing the importance of quickly establishing an attack on the fire. Once the crews have confirmation on the location of the fire room or apartment at a residential or hotel high-rise, a team would ascend to the room or apartment above the fire apartment. The crew would report conditions there, as well as effect ventilation of the fire room from that vantage point after assessing conditions and obtaining permission to do so (Tracy, March, 1998). According to Los Angeles City s SOPs the firefighters should try to initiate the attack from the stairwell containing a roof hatch, if possible, so that there is no ventilation problem or stack effect in the stairwell. Another consideration in these cases may be the required lengths of hose might involve the pairing of the first two engine companies, personnel and equipment (Tracy, 1998b). The procedures discussed here point out the need to address ventilation as a priority, as well as the need to pair companies up to place the first attack line in operation. Dunn (1999a) wrote that if a high-rise building has two or more stairways serving each floor, one stair should be designated an attack stair, and the second stairway must be designated the evacuation stair. Firefighters searching floors above the fire floor should use the evacuation stair. This procedure is used in many of the SOGs that were reviewed. Page 15

16 When the fire can be controlled quickly, some SOPs say that fire attack may be given priority over evacuation of occupants (Bush, Routley, 1996). Some departments discuss attacking the fire and simultaneously evacuating occupants. The Lobby Control Sector is one of the most important on the fireground. Philadelphia, for example, assigns lobby control on dispatch to the third due ladder truck. A battalion chief will assume command of this operation as soon as one can be assigned (Bush, Routley, 1996). The departments differ on exactly which arriving company has this assignment, but they agree it is a significant one and should be assigned early. Transporting Firefighters and Equipment to the Fire Floor Smith (1998a) wrote that the only practical method of movement in a high-rise building is by using elevators. A common rule is that the elevator should not be used by firefighters if the fire is located on the first seven floors. If a fire is located above the seventh floor, the use of elevators is at the discretion of the incident commander. If authorization is given to use elevators, the elevator should have fireman s service and the firefighters must be familiar with its emergency operation. An important factor to consider would be whether the elevator services the fire floor. If it does not service the fire floor, it would be much safer to use. The use of elevators is discussed in most SOGs, however some departments restrict their use entirely until a crew has reached the fire floor. Others give strict safety procedures for their safe use by initial arriving companies. Elevator Safety Smith (October,1998), wrote that the safety considerations of using elevators under emergency conditions requires members to have their self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) turned on and their masks ready. When ascending in an elevator, it should be stopped at random floors to check that the controls are operating properly. If Page 16

17 erratic operation occurs, the elevator should be abandoned and the stairway used. Firefighters should exit the elevator at least two floors below the fire floor and then climb the stairs to the fire floor. In 1996, Bush & Routley wrote that during the First Interstate Bank high-rise fire in the City of Los Angeles, a civilian security guard who took an elevator to the fire floor to investigate the alarm was the only fatality. Firefighters could not use elevators because fire department policy prohibited their use. This required them to carry over 300 air cylinders and other equipment up the stairs between the 12 th and 16 th floors of the 62- story office building to fight the fire. It took nearly 400 firefighters rotating through attack and support functions to control the fire. This is one of the departments that only allow elevator use after the first company has reached the fire floor and checks the fire condition. Dunn (January,1999) wrote that if an elevator has a firefighter service (Phase II) system, it should be used to take firefighters to the upper floor. If manpower permits, assign a firefighter to operate the elevator. The firefighter operating an elevator should do so continuously throughout the fire. During a high-rise fire, one firefighter should be assigned to do nothing but run an elevator (Dunn, January,1999, p.22). The firefighter operating the elevator must be equipped with a portable radio, and would transport firefighters and equipment up to staging (three floors below the fire floor). Dunn said that the elevator should not go to a floor above a fire when the blaze is not under control. If a fire is reported on the 14 th floor, instead of taking the elevator that serves 11 through 20, use the bank that serves 1 through 10, then walk up four flights from the tenth floor (Dunn, 1999b p. 130). If a building only has one elevator, Dunn said, Take the elevator two floors or more below the reported fire floor. One floor below is too close a call Page 17

18 (Dunn, 1996a, p.34). Dunn explains there are safety features to consider when and how the elevator should be operated to safely transport firefighters. In 2000, Bennett wrote that the decision to take the elevator to floors below the fire is a critical one. If the fire is reported to be above the low-rise elevators and there is no fire showing or reports of fire, using the elevator to access the fire area is an option. On the other hand, if fire is showing and there is a single elevator shaft, and information from the lobby indicates that a fire is burning, taking the elevators is a very dangerous proposition. Bennett wrote that if the fire was reportedly on the tenth floor, as firefighters reach the eighth floor they should open the door and check that floor as a possible staging area. On March 21, 1974 at 8:13 p.m. a security guard was dispatched to investigate smoke detector activation on the third floor of a 15-story office building in New York City. The fire department was notified immediately, and when they arrived, the badly burned guard was found in the stairway. He had used the elevator to investigate the alarm, and he was met on the third floor landing by a blast of heat when the elevator car door opened. Meanwhile the fire had swept throughout the elevator lobby and extended into the corridors surrounding the elevators (Mendes, 1975). These examples point to the importance of safety procedures for safe elevator use. Tracy (1998a) wrote that should a firefighter be on a lower floor (1-7), they should consider using the stairs to ensure their safety and guaranteed arrival to the fire floor. He suggests not using an elevator in a bank that services the fire floor if a lower bank of elevators reaches within five floors of the fire floor. Before leaving the lobby, and at the precautionary stops, direct a flashlight up between the elevator car and the hoistway shaft to determine if any smoke or water has accumulated in the elevator shaft. Page 18

19 It should be determined as soon as possible if the fire s location could affect the elevator s operation, and notify the incident commander of your findings. Tracy advised that if the elevator malfunctions, firefighters should notify the incident commander, abandon the elevator, and place it out of service. Firefighters should proceed to the fire floor via the stair shaft. Tracy warned that firefighters must maintain elevator discipline; they should not allow building service employees to operate the elevators. Tracy (1998b) wrote that when taking elevators firefighters should examine the you are here sign upon arrival at the target floor. This will give them an indication of the location of stairs on the floor in relation to the elevator shaft. This again emphasizes another safety consideration when using elevators to reach the fire floor. Clark (1999) wrote in the textbook, Firefighting Principles and Practices, that the New York City fire department s instructions require that no more than six members ride in one elevator, and they must carry forcible-entry tools. Bray (1993) also stated that elevators should not be overloaded and recommends an occupancy limit of five to six per elevator. Clark (1999) writes, the lobby command post should record which elevators are being used, by which units, and to which destinations. Before entering elevators, firefighters should note the direction of the stairway and the distance to it. He further stated that in manually operated elevators (fire service control), the hazard to firefighters during fires is minimal. On the other hand, elevators that are programmed and automatically controlled present considerable risk of the cars going to the fire floor accidentally, and staying there. These two individuals point out the importance of maintaining a safe elevator occupancy load. Clark also noted elevators that do not have fire service control present greater risk to firefighters. Page 19

20 In 1999 a 30-story apartment building in downtown Baltimore experienced a serious high-rise fire. One of the challenges for firefighters was that the elevators were not equipped for firefighter service and became inoperable as soon as some of the first residents used them to descend from upper floors. Firefighters battled the fire on the 15th, 16th, and 18th floors and had to move all the equipment and supplies using the stairwells (Lehr, 1999). Another problem with using elevators during high-rise fires is the possible loss of power to the building. Approximately 30 people were trapped in elevators in a 36-story office building in Bogota, Columbia in a 1973 high-rise fire due to such a loss of power. There were four fatalities and 100 injuries in the Avianca Building that burned for more than 12 hours (Peterson, C., 1974). In 1993, a terrorist truck bomb exploded in the underground garage of the 110-story World Trade Center that resulted in a complete loss of power causing many people to be trapped in elevators. This required the firefighters to have to walk up 110 stories searching floors and rescuing people stranded in elevators. (Bush & Routley, 1996). These three fires point out that elevator use may be lost for several reasons, and firefighters must be prepared to work without them. In 1977, McRae wrote that during fire tests conducted on hoistway doors, they warped at 400 degrees Fahrenheit, a temperature that can easily be reached in a building fire. This can prevent firefighters from escaping if they are inadvertently brought to the fire floor. Two security guards trapped in an elevator at a high-rise fire died because the doors opened only a few inches and would not close. These incidents again validate the need for strict personal protective gear use procedures. Addressing Building Systems in a High-Rise Page 20

21 In 1998, Smith wrote that communication systems are one of the key building systems that can be affected due to the large amount of concrete and steel in a high-rise building. This can hinder portable radio communications. He states that in order to counteract these problems fire departments can use the following alternative means of communication: 1. Stationary telephones 2. Cellular telephones 3. Hard-wire systems 4. Public address systems 5. Elevator intercoms 6. Built-in emergency telephone systems (both stationary and plug-in phones) One method of establishing a built-in telephone system is having the operations chief locate a phone in the vicinity of the staging area and assigning a firefighter to standby. This allows the firefighter to contact the lobby or command post and relay the phone number. Before ascending in the building, the operations chief would need to make note of the lobby telephone number. Cellular telephones can also be used which would allow more freedom in movement, as they are portable and not stationary. Before ascending in the building, the chief would need to leave his cellular number at the lobby (Smith, 1998b). These options have provided the firefighters with a back up plan should they need it. In 1976, Peige discussed radio relays, which is when firefighters who are not radio-equipped may use a telephone in the building to call their dispatch center and have a message relayed to their units via radio. This procedure can also be used to relay messages to other units if a firefighter cannot transmit effectively in areas of the building. This provides an alternative if there is not a two-way telephone capability in the building. Page 21

22 Built-in systems can sometimes be utilized in buildings such as hotels and hospitals that are equipped with house phones to allow communication throughout the building. Dunn (1999a) warned that since HVAC (heating ventilation and air conditioning) systems could kill people and spread fire and smoke during a high-rise blaze, they should be shut down. In the MGM Grand Hotel high-rise fire, the HVAC system pumped smoke throughout the building, which resulted in the deaths of 85 people. At the Los Angeles First Interstate Bank building, fire was allowed to spread from the 12 th to the 27 th floor through HVAC system. Some HVAC systems have smoke detectors that could shut down the system automatically. Many, however, do not have such smoke detectors, so at a high-rise fire the HVAC systems should be shut down manually. Bennett, in 1998, discussed that it is a good practice to shut down HVAC systems during a fire in buildings constructed before Once the fire is under control, HVAC systems may be able to be resumed. In post-1974 high-rise buildings, HVAC systems are very complex. These systems include smoke removal systems, positive pressurization of stair shafts, and smoke-proof enclosures (smoke towers). Smith (1998b) stated that the recirculation of air could spread smoke throughout a building. Control of the HVAC system during a fire is critical. Some systems can be utilized to purge smoke from a fire floor. Since each building is different, the on-site engineer s knowledge of the HVAC system may be necessary to assist the fire department. The common practice of the experienced fire departments appears to be shutting down the HVAC systems until the fire is out, then considering their use for smoke removal. Smith (1998b) described water supply as being another critical system for firefighters to consider in high-rise fires. He recommends utilizing 2 ½ inch hose with a straight tip to increase the reach and cooling effect of the hose stream. He further warns Page 22

23 of the problems associated with the use of automatic nozzles that require 100-pound nozzle pressure. These nozzles may be ineffective if reduced standpipe pressures are encountered. He discussed that fire departments should know the size and capacity of the building s standpipe systems, and the pumps providing these systems. The fire department should ensure an adequate and continuous water supply is delivered to the standpipe and sprinkler system. In 1996 Bush & Routley discussed that one of the greatest problems controlling major high-rise fires has been obtaining adequate pressure and flow to initiate an attack. These problems were usually due to the failure of pressure reducing valves for the building fire pump to operate properly. They recommended addressing these problems through inspection and testing of system components. That information prompted this researcher to conduct tests with the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue hose and nozzles. See the results section for details. Optimizing Water Flow Capabilities In 1996, Bush & Routley discussed that high-rise standard operating procedures (SOPs) should instruct firefighters to use hose and nozzles which can operate under low pressure conditions. High-rises can have static pressures at standpipe outlets as low as 65 pounds per square inch (psi). SOPs should address establishing 2 ½ inch hose as the choice hoseline for high-rise fire attack. Smooth bore nozzles should be carried in highrise hosepacks since they require about one-half the operating pressure of most fog nozzles. Prior to 1993, NFPA 14 (standard for the installation of standpipe and hose systems) required a minimum pressure of 65 psi as the required flow rate at the highest outlet in the system. NFPA anticipated the fire department would utilize 2 ½ inch hoses Page 23

24 with smooth bore tips, which require approximately 50-psi nozzle pressure to operate (65 psi minus 15 psi for friction loss). The maximum pressure allowed at an outlet was limited to 100 psi at the required flow rate. These pressure limitations were revised in 1993 after several fires where crews had difficulty achieving effective hose streams due to inadequate pressures. Many departments were found to be using fog nozzles, especially automatic nozzles, which require at least 100 psi at the nozzle to operate properly. In 1993 the pressure limit for all outlets greater than 1 ½ inch was increased to 100 psi minimum flow pressure and 175 psi maximum static pressure. Another recommendation to use smooth bore nozzles in standpipe operations came out in 1991 from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 14): It is very important that fire departments choose an appropriate nozzle type for their standpipe firefighting operations. Combination fog, constant pressure, and automatic type spray nozzles should not be used for standpipe operations because many of this type require a minimum of 100 psi of pressure at the nozzle inlet to produce a reasonable effective fire stream. In standpipe operations, hose friction loss might prevent the delivery of 100 psi to the nozzle. In high-rise standpipe systems with pressure-reducing hose valves, the fire department has little or no control over hose pressure. (NFPA 14). The amount of water needed for extinguishment was described by tests performed by the National Fire Protection Association, Factory Mutual, and others who have determined that flows of 10 gallons per minute (gpm) for each 100 square feet of fire area are sufficient to control fires in lightly fire loaded areas. Light fire loads include such areas as residential occupancies, classrooms, and offices. For ordinary hazard areas, such as most commercial occupancies, a flow of 20 gpm per 100 square feet is recommended Page 24

25 (Norman, 1991). These findings are proving why it is necessary to evaluate the different fire loads when determining required water flow needed. In 1997 Coffman wrote about tests that were conducted by members of the Fairfax County, Virginia Fire & Rescue Academy faculty. The purpose of the test was to observe the fire extinguishing capabilities of fog and straight streams in an area with limited or no ventilation; a common problem in high-rise firefighting. The first test used a nozzle on straight stream flowing 150 gpm. In this test, as in the second, the fire was allowed to develop to the steady state of burning with rollover out the top of the overhead door. During the first attack, the straight stream was aimed so as to play the water directly on to the burning fuel. The nozzle was only open for approximately four seconds and the fire was controlled. Visibility was maintained both before and after the nozzle was operated and the rollover simply burned away and the gases disappeared. (Coffman, 1997) A second attack was made using a fog pattern. The nozzle team started with a wide-angle fog and narrowed to about thirty degrees as they approached the threshold. This time, visibility was lost completely as soon as water was started into the involved area. The thermal balance was violently upset due to the air movement created by the fog pattern and could be observed quite easily by the smoke and fire behavior. At one point, when the nozzle was directed to the right, burning gases and smoke was forced out the left side of the overhead doorway and over the nozzle crew, which was still outside the threshold of the area. The nozzle was again flowing 150 gpm and was open for two minutes and ten seconds before the fire was controlled. All agreed that had they been in a hallway trying to make the attack, they could have been seriously injured during the second scenario (Coffman, 1997, p. 24). Page 25

26 This information indicates the need for straight stream or solid bore nozzles in non-ventilated areas such as high-rise fires. In 1997 Coffman wrote that a light fire load requires ten gpm per 100 square feet of involved area. A flow of gpm, which is a common flow from 1 ¾ inch hose, will handle only 1,500 to 2,000 square feet. In order to extinguish a floor area common in high-rise offices, which can exceed 10,000 square feet, seven to ten 1 ¾ inch lines may be needed on one floor. Use of 2 ½ inch hose may still be inadequate and multiple 2 ½ inch lines may be required. However, flows of 250 to 300 gpm can be expected from a single 2 ½ inch line. Departments need to ensure that the ability to flow large hose lines is available. It is recommended that the departments arrange high-rise hose packs to facilitate the deployment of both 1 ¾ inch and 2 ½ inch hose lines by the first crews who proceed to the fire floor. Experience has shown that use of a direct attack in poorly ventilated areas seems to have a greater chance of quick extinguishment. Since a direct attack is carried out using a straight stream, another option certainly would be to utilize a smooth bore nozzle (Coffman, 1997). This will require Delray Beach Fire-Rescue to arrange for additional large hose lengths being available for use at high-rise fires. Norman (1998) wrote the cornerstone of the fire attack, as well as the rescue effort, is the 2 ½ inch handline equipped with a solid-tip nozzle, preferably a 1 ¼ inch diameter. The majority of standpipe systems encountered in high-rise buildings were designed to operate at pressures as low as 50 psi. Many fire departments have never used anything but 1 ½ inch or 1 ¾ inch hose and a fog nozzle for a fire attack, and, falsely believe they can successfully use this line for their standpipe pack. It doesn t work! says Norman. Either your department uses the hose and nozzle that the standpipe was designed for or else you are destined to fight a losing battle. (Norman, 1998, p.20). Page 26

27 Using 2 ½ inch hose and solid tip nozzle hoselines can provide a large-volume (300-plus gpm) attack to be conducted at standpipe outlet pressures as low as 70 psi through 150 feet of attack hose (Norman, 1998). Recently, tests were conducted on the upper floors of a high-rise building under construction on the west side of Manhattan. Units of the FDNY s 9 th battalion, coordinated by Captain Jerry Tracy of Ladder Company 35, conducted tests of various portable monitors supplied by a pumper in the street more than 20 floors below. The tests were aimed at demonstrating the feasibility of supplying such devices from a single standpipe riser and to verify the flows and pressures available using a variety of hose lays. All of the tests began with three lengths of hose stretched from the standpipe outlet on the floor below the nozzle, following standard department policy. It was very evident that while a single 2 ½ inch line supplying a portable monitor delivers greater volume and reach than a 2 ½ inch hand-line or a master stream supplied by two 1 ¾ inch lines could, two 2 ½ inch or larger lines best supply these devices. That means the second line will likely have to be stretched from two floors below the fire; in this test that meant four lengths of hose. The advantage of using 2 ½ inch hose is quite clear; however little more it weighs, it permits flows of up to 750 gpm to be delivered off a single standpipe riser over 20 floors above grade without using any specialized highpressure pumpers, and utilizing hose and equipment available on the first-alarm units. (Norman, 1998, p ). Richter in 1995 wrote that the Bankers Trust fire in New York City as well as the One Meridian Plaza fire in Philadelphia both demonstrated the need for using 2 ½ inch hand-lines as well as master stream devices. These tests point to the need for preplanning the use of large flow lines. Page 27

28 Tracy wrote having a means to place a portable master stream in operation may make the difference between giving up the building to a fire or containing and controlling the beast in it s den. (Tracy, 1999, p. 107). The New York City Fire Department has learned from experience that fires above the reach of elevated exterior master streams will have to be fought using portable master streams on the interior of the building. Captain Tracy and the FDNY conducted tests that revealed with only one 2 ½ inch line supplying a portable master stream, a flow of almost 500 gpm was reached. When a second line augments the appliance, flows in excess of 600 gpm can be reached. Opening the standpipe outlets fully will allow flows in excess of 700 gpm. These flows are significant and provide the flow of an elevated master stream. Tracy in 1998 wrote, the objective is to deliver a larger volume of water with a smooth-bore nozzle to absorb a tremendous amount of British Thermal Units (BTUs) and push back the fire and heat so that you can advance on the fire (Tracy, 1998b, p.106). Several sources have recommended this same application of high flow water with either smooth-bore or straight stream nozzles. Smith in 1998 wrote fire departments should consider utilizing 2 ½ inch hose with a straight tip to increase the reach and cooling effect of the hose stream. The use of automatic nozzles that require 100 pound nozzle pressure may be ineffective if reduced standpipe pressures are encountered (Smith, 1998b, p. 17). Again it is stated the use of fog nozzles may not be adequate. It is very important that fire departments choose an appropriate nozzle type for their standpipe firefighting operations. Combination fog, constant pressure, and automatic type spray nozzles should not be used for standpipe operations because many of this type require a minimum of 100 psi of pressure at the nozzle inlet to produce a reasonably effective fire stream. In standpipe operations, hose friction Page 28

29 loss might prevent the delivery of 100 psi to the nozzle. In high-rise standpipe systems with pressure-reducing hose valves, the fire department has little or no control over hose pressure. (NFPA 14). The findings of this research, as well as observing firefighters responding to highrise fires during the preparation of updating high-rise fire SOGs was invaluable. The lessons learned from many fire departments and the officers in charge of past high-rise fires provided a new understanding of the complexities involved at these incidents. Battalion Chief Ed Geraghty of the FDNY allowed a first hand look at what would have been only read or explained by others. The interaction with Chief Geraghty had the most significant influence over this project. In 1999 Dunn discussed options available to the chief in charge of a high-rise fire in order to improve water pressure to the hose stream. One option is to order an increase in the pump pressure. Another is for the officer in command to have a second hoseline stretched from the pumper to the siamese supply inlet. PROCEDURES The research procedures used in preparing this paper were started with a literature review at the U.S. Fire Administration s Learning Resource Center (LRC) in February Definition of Terms High-Rise: A. A high-rise building is a structure that has a height of 75 feet or more above the ground. (NFA Incident Command For Highrise Operations definition) Page 29

30 B. Another common definition is any building beyond the reach of exterior fire streams or aerial ladder access. (Mendes, 1975) C. In south Florida, the building code defines a high-rise as any building with a height of 50 feet or more. HVAC: This is the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in a high-rise building. Base: This refers to the exterior staging area for the arriving apparatus, personnel, consolidation of equipment and logistical support. Lobby Control: A control point for firefighting resources located in the lobby of a highrise structure. Stairwell Support: Personnel assigned to and responsible for the transportation of portable equipment from the ground level to the staging floor of a high-rise structure. Ground Support Unit: Functional unit within the support branch of the logistics section. Responsible for fueling, maintaining, and repairing vehicles, and the transportation of personnel and supplies. Staging/Interior Staging: When used in a high-rise fire, these terms refer to the assembly area for personnel and equipment, usually two floors below the fire floor. SOPs/SOGs: Standard operating procedures or standard operating guidelines. For the purpose of this research project, they are considered to have the same meaning. Research Methodology The purpose of this research was to identify the important components that need to be addressed in order to revise the Delray Beach Fire-Rescue High-Rise SOGs. The methodology consisted of historical research of case studies from previous high-rise fires, as well as reviews of published articles and textbooks. Evaluative research was Page 30