Advanced Analytics For Real-Time Incident Response A REVIEW OF THREE KNOWN CASES AND THE IMPACT OF INVESTIGATIVE ANALYTICS

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1 Advanced Analytics For Real-Time Incident Response A REVIEW OF THREE KNOWN CASES AND THE IMPACT OF INVESTIGATIVE ANALYTICS

2 Introduction Every year, cyber criminals become stronger and more sophisticated in their attack methods, while the ability of enterprises to prevent, detect and respond to threats remains weak in comparison to their adversaries. We have seen a massive spike in demand for hiring of security professionals as a response to the growing threat landscape, and although it is evident to management that the ranks of cybersecurity professionals are saturated, hiring more bodies continues to be perceived as the solution to the problem. According to research by the Ponemon Institute, the average time to resolve a cyber attack is climbing to 45 days, up from 28 days in 2012, and the average annual cost of cybercrime climbed to $12.7 million for U.S. companies up from $11.6 million in With this reality at hand, 68% of information security officers have focused their budgets on increasing staff as part of the solution 2, even though research shows that not having the ability to collect the appropriate operational and security related data is one of the three greatest impediments to quickly follow up on attacks 3. The complexity and growth in cybercrime has left security teams unable to intelligently respond quickly to threats while an incident is happening. Instead, they are enabled with tools that allow them mainly to develop post incident forensic intelligence, produced after the damage is done. About the ebook Dr. James Jones is a 20-year cybersecurity practitioner and a strong proponent of the use of intelligence and analytics toward strengthening cyber security incident response teams. In this e-book Dr. Jones investigates three well-known breaches and takes us through the likely experiences of the security analysts at the time of each breach and how these breaches could have been handled, if the analysts had the power of investigative analytics that can easily leverage threat detection and insider threat capabilities supporting their Incident Response objectives. 1 Ponemon, Cost of Cybercrime Study, SANS Analytics Intelligence Survey, SANS Security Analytics Survey, 2013 About the Expert Jim Jones is an Associate Professor of Computer Forensics and Cybersecurity Engineering at George Mason University. Dr. Jones earned his Bachelor s degree from Georgia Tech (Industrial and Systems Engineering, 1989), Master s degree from Clemson University (Mathematical Sciences, 1995), and PhD from George Mason University (Computational Sciences and Informatics, 2008). He has been a cyber security practitioner, researcher, and educator for over 20 years. During that time, he has led and performed network and system vulnerability and penetration tests, led a cyber incident response team, conducted digital forensics investigations, and taught university courses in cyber security, penetration testing, digital forensics, and programming. Past and current funded research sponsors include DARPA, DHS, NSF, and DoD. His research interests are focused on digital artifact extraction, analysis, and manipulation, and on offensive cyber deception in adversarial environments.

3 CASE: Carbanak Carbanak, first discovered in 2014 and publicly documented in 2015, targeted mainly financial institutions with spear phishing campaigns and subsequent financial theft. One hundred banks in Russia, the U.S., Germany, China and Ukraine, fell prey and approximately $1 billion was lost. In Carbanak, attackers gained access to bank networks through a spear phishing campaign. The threat remained active on the networks for months, with the objective of monitoring banking functions. The attack was able to compromise additional systems and accounts, and then steal money in a short amount of time using multiple techniques. The criminals instructed ATMs to dispense cash remotely while the crime syndicate s money mules collected the cash. To avoid detection, they inflated bank balances and immediately transferred the inflated amounts. They also used financial transaction networks such as SWIFT to unsuspectingly move money between banks and accounts. There were a handful of spear phishing s and drive-by-download attacks, and most of these were likely recognized and blocked. The few s and attacks that were detected were not centrally reported, aggregated, or analyzed. The attacker s network traffic included the VNC and AMMYY Admin applications both remote administration tools that are commonly used for legitimate purposes and are often whitelisted. Similarly, the attackers also used the SSH protocol, frequently used for legitimate purposes and not easily recognized as malicious. If analysts performed antivirus scans of systems, they wouldn t have revealed any malware related to the attack; although initial versions of Carbanak were based on Carberp, later versions shared no source code with Carberp so they were not in any AV signature databases. One alarming action that would not have gone unnoticed was ATMs dispensing cash in the absence of local user action. Unfortunately, the next step by analysts running AV on the ATMs would not have revealed any issues. Upon deeper examination, analysts found the systems connected to the ATM network had early versions of the Carbanak malware. Additional searches were conducted based on the identified malware and this led to the discovery of other infected systems, and attacker activity. This eventually traced the initial infection to spear phishing messages and drive-bydownload victims. 2-4 MONTHS BANKS INVOLVED COST OF BREACH $1 BILLION DOLLAR LOSS 3

4 CASE: Carbanak Carbanak, first discovered in 2014 and publicly documented in 2015, There were a handful of spear phishing s and drive-by-download targeted mainly financial institutions with spear phishing campaigns and HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT subsequent financial theft. One hundred banks in Russia, the U.S., Germany, China In the and early Ukraine, stages fell of prey the attack, and approximately spear phishing $1 billion messages was lost. and drive-by-download attacks aggregated, or analyzed. The attacker s network traffic included the VNC and compromised internal systems. AMMYY Admin applications both remote administration tools that are In Carbanak, attackers gained access to bank networks through a spear commonly used for legitimate purposes and are often whitelisted. Similarly, phishing Carbanak campaign. then installed The threat novel remained malware active that on provides the networks remote for access months, for the attackers. At that point, the attackers also used the SSH protocol, frequently used for legitimate with the attackers the objective then of pivot, monitoring conduct banking reconnaissance functions. The and attack attempt was able to compromise other systems. purposes and not easily recognized as malicious. to compromise additional systems and accounts, and then steal money in a short amount of time using multiple techniques. The criminals instructed WHAT THE ANALYSTS COULD HAVE SEEN AND DONE attacks, and most of these were likely recognized and blocked. The few s and attacks that were detected were not centrally reported, If analysts performed antivirus scans of systems, they wouldn t have revealed ATMs to dispense cash remotely while the crime syndicate s money any malware related to the attack; although initial versions of Carbanak The spear phishing and drive-by-download attacks would have been correlated and aggregated in mules collected the cash. To avoid detection, they inflated bank balances were based on Carberp, later versions shared no source code with Carberp the analytical platform, augmented with HR data to identify individual users. The threat detection and immediately transferred the inflated amounts. They also used financial so they were not in any AV signature databases. capability would then generate alerts regarding novel malware on the compromised systems. transaction networks such as SWIFT to unsuspectingly move money between ACTION banks and accounts. One alarming action that would not have gone unnoticed was ATMs IDS sensors would trigger when compromised systems perform reconnaissance against internal dispensing cash in the absence The of analyst local user would action. immediately Unfortunately, see the the next network assets and failed remote access connections would also trigger IDS alerts. step by analysts running AV connection the ATMs would between suspicious not have activity revealed any issues. Upon deeper examination, (i.e., analysts reconnaissance, found the remote systems control) connected to These sources of data would then be aggregated, correlated, and presented to the analyst as a the link ATM network had early versions and the of spear the Carbanak phishing malware. and drive-by Additional analysis visualization. searches were conducted based downloads. on the identified Subsequently, malware the and analyst this led to the discovery of other infected could systems, quarantine and attacker the infected activity. systems, This eventually add traced the initial infection to spear rules phishing to Firewall, IDS, messages and AV systems, and drive-bydownload victims. eliminate the threat before critical systems and are compromised. 2-4 MONTHS BANKS INVOLVED COST OF BREACH $1 BILLION DOLLAR LOSS 4

5 CASE: Penn State The attack on Penn State started in 2012 and went undetected until November In the two years, reports state that 18,000 social security numbers were stolen. The school says it has spent $2.85 million in remediation costs. In November 2014, the FBI contacted Penn State to alert it of a cyber attack of unknown origin and scope perpetuated by an outside entity, possibly a nation-state, targeting the engineering school. The attack is believed to have been targeting the University s engineering school since at least September Although the university is underplaying the loss of data, it did warn 18,000 people that social security numbers were in a plain text file on one of the compromised machines. In addition, engineering faculty are being required to change passwords and VPN access will now require two-factor authentication. Initially, remote access from apparently authorized users wouldn t have raised any alerts because this is normal activity with standard UserID/password authentication. However, some of these accounts were compromised via other breaches, so the apparently legitimate access was really an attacker using a compromised account. Attacker activity consisted of internal file sharing, SSH traffic, and traffic to external web sites, but this would have also appeared to be normal. Following came the notification from the FBI of compromised accounts and systems; hence, the security team probably imaged memory and drives from compromised systems. The AV scans were clean but deeper forensic analysis revealed novel malware. This initiated network monitoring of compromised systems, which detected pivot and command and control (C&C) traffic of the attackers. Analysts then identified other compromised systems and accounts, imaged and rebuilt infected systems, reset user accounts, and initiated 2-factor authentication. The university has reported spending approximately $2.85 million in its attack response. DATA LOSS 2 YEARS 18,000 Social Security Numbers COST OF BREACH $2.85 MILLION 5

6 CASE: Penn State The attack on Penn State started in 2012 and went undetected until November In the two years, reports state that 18,000 social HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT security numbers were stolen. The school says it has spent $2.85 million in remediation In the early stages costs. of the breach, the attackers harvested user credentials from other breaches. They were then able to login remotely, masquerading as legitimate users. In November 2014, the FBI contacted Penn State to alert it of a cyber attack of The unknown attackers origin installed and scope novel malware perpetuated then by pivoted an outside to conduct entity, reconnaissance possibly a and compromise nation-state, additional systems. targeting the engineering school. The attack is believed to have been targeting the University s engineering school since at least September WHAT THE ANALYSTS COULD HAVE SEEN AND DONE The abnormally high number of failed login attempts (which happened because some breached Although the university is underplaying the loss of data, it did warn 18,000 users changed their credentials or used different passwords) would appear in VPN logs and people that social security numbers were in a plain text file on one of would have been reported. the compromised machines. In addition, engineering faculty are being required to change passwords and VPN access will now require two-factor An analyst could then have queried VPN logs to see unusual remote logins for other accounts. authentication The The university threat protection has reported capability spending would approximately have detected $2.85 suspected million in novel its malware and the pivot, attack reconnaissance, response. and exploit activity would have been detected by IDS sensors. These alerts would have been sent to the analytical platform where they would have been aggregated, correlated, and presented to an analyst. DATA LOSS 2 YEARS 18,000 Social Security Numbers Initially, remote access from apparently authorized users wouldn t have raised any alerts because this is normal activity with standard UserID/password authentication. However, some of these accounts were compromised via other breaches, so the apparently legitimate access was really an attacker using a compromised account. Attacker activity consisted of internal file sharing, SSH traffic, and traffic to external web sites, but this would have also appeared to be normal. Following came the notification from the FBI of compromised accounts and systems; hence, the security team probably imaged memory and drives from compromised systems. The AV scans were clean but deeper forensic analysis revealed novel malware. This initiated network monitoring of compromised systems, which detected pivot and command and control (C&C) traffic of the attackers. Analysts then identified ACTION other compromised systems and accounts, imaged and rebuilt infected systems, reset user accounts, and initiated 2-factor authentication. An analyst would immediately see the connection between unusual remote logins and insider threat activity. As a result, the analyst could quickly quarantine the compromised systems, disable accounts, add rules to Firewall, IDS, and AV systems, and eliminate the threat before additional systems are compromised or any sensitive data is exfiltrated. COST OF BREACH $2.85 MILLION 6

7 CASE: Stuxnet The Stuxnet computer worm, designed to attack industrial control systems, was first discovered in June 2010, but it is thought that its origins date back to The worm attacked Iran s nuclear facilities, damaging 1,000 centrifuges and infecting 60,000 computers. Industrial controllers in Iran s nuclear facilities managed a range of automated tasks including the operation of gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In this case, Stuxnet began its attack by first targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system and connected networks. Stuxnet then sought out the Siemens Step7 software, which it used to infect the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that control the equipment. In addition to manipulating the manufacturing plant, Stuxnet also spread through the supply chain, including contractors, business partners, and support staff to infect industrial control systems at the Natanz uranium processing facility. The worm not only collected information on the industrial control systems and facility operations, but subsequently disrupted uranium enrichment by altering valve positions and varying centrifuge speeds. When enriched uranium started emerging below expected quality levels, it must have puzzled the scientists. Then, when they saw cascade valves opening and closing at random, which negatively affected the quality of enriched uranium, it must have sprung them into action. Examined control system logs Results: Saw no explanatory log entries Ran antivirus (AV) scans on the control machines Results: Produced no hits Examined network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs Results: No red alerts After some head scratching, they probably ran AV on all the systems and examined all the logs. This would have produced nothing, therefore, the next step would have been to replace hardware and/or reload the Siemens software, Operating System, and PLC code. These initiatives would have made the problem disappear temporarily, unfortunately, the malware, still resident on other systems, would have re-infected the control systems and caused the problem to crop up again in hours or days. Due to this industrial control system malware s breadth of capabilities, the threat is not limited to the Iranian attack alone. Stuxnet can serve as a model for attacking controllers like the ones in Iran they re also found in automobile assembly plants and critical infrastructure that countries depend on for survival, like power plants in Europe, Japan and the U.S. As we review this case study, it s important to understand that the potential for a future disruption and damage due to similar attacks remains significant. 3 YEARS 60,000 Computers Infected As production resumes, things initially look normal, but then uranium quality degrades again and the analysts must return to step one to find the root of the problem. To compound the challenge, although centrifuge speeds were being varied by malware, that same malware modified the instrumentation and assumptions were made that speeds were in range. Near the end, a handful of systems started spontaneously crashing and rebooting. At this point, one of these systems was sent to forensic specialists who discovered previously unidentified malware. Leveraging this new sample, malware was then found on other still operational systems. In the end, all systems had to be rebuilt from clean hardware to ensure complete eradication. 1,000 Centrifuges Damaged 7

8 CASE: Stuxnet The Stuxnet computer worm, designed to attack industrial control systems, was When enriched uranium started emerging below expected quality levels, it must have puzzled the first discovered in June 2010, but it is thought that its origins date back to scientists. Then, when they saw cascade valves opening and closing at random, which negatively The HOW worm IT attacked COULD Iran s HAVE nuclear facilities, BEEN damaging DIFFERENT 1,000 centrifuges and affected the quality of enriched uranium, it must have sprung them into action. infecting In the early 60,000 stages computers. of the breach, the attackers harvested user credentials from other breaches. They were then able to login remotely, masquerading as legitimate users. Examined control system logs Industrial controllers in Iran s nuclear facilities managed a range of automated Results: Saw no explanatory log entries tasks including The attackers installed the operation novel malware of gas centrifuges then pivoted to enrich to conduct uranium reconnaissance for nuclear and compromise Ran antivirus (AV) scans on the control machines weapons. In this case, Stuxnet began its attack by first targeting the Microsoft Results: Produced no hits additional systems. Windows operating system and connected networks. Stuxnet then sought out Examined network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs the Siemens Step7 software, which it used to infect the programmable logic Results: No red alerts WHAT THE ANALYSTS COULD HAVE SEEN AND DONE controllers (PLCs) that control the equipment. In addition to manipulating the The abnormally high number of failed login attempts (which happened because some After breached some head scratching, they probably ran AV on all the systems and examined all the manufacturing plant, Stuxnet also spread through the supply chain, including users changed their credentials or used different passwords) would appear in VPN logs. This and would have produced nothing, therefore, the next step would have been to replace contractors, business partners, and support staff to infect industrial control would have been reported to the insider threat capability. hardware and/or reload the Siemens software, Operating System, and PLC code. These initiatives systems at the Natanz uranium processing facility. The worm not only collected ACTION would have made the problem disappear temporarily, unfortunately, the malware, still resident information on the industrial control systems and facility operations, but An analyst could then have the investigative analytics technology to query VPN logs on and other see systems, would have re-infected the subsequently disrupted uranium enrichment by altering valve positions and An control analyst systems would and immediately caused the see problem the to crop up varying unusual centrifuge remote logins speeds. for other accounts. again in hours or days. connection between unusual remote logins and insider threat activity. As a result, Due The threat to this industrial protection As production resumes, things initially look normal, but then uranium quality degrades again and control capability system would malware s have breadth detected of suspected capabilities, novel the malware and the pivot, the analyst could quickly quarantine the the analysts must return to step one to find the root of the problem. To compound the challenge, threat reconnaissance, not limited and to exploit the Iranian activity attack would alone. have Stuxnet been can detected serve as by a model IDS sensors. compromised systems, disable accounts, although centrifuge speeds were being varied by malware, that same malware modified the for attacking controllers like the ones in Iran they re also found in automobile add rules to Firewall, IDS, and AV systems, instrumentation and assumptions were made that speeds were in range. assembly These alerts plants would and critical have been infrastructure sent to theintelligence that countries depend platform on for where survival, they would have been and eliminate the threat before additional like aggregated, power plants correlated, in Europe, and Japan presented and the to U.S. an As analyst. we review this case study, it s systems are compromised or any sensitive Near the end, a handful of systems started spontaneously crashing and rebooting. At this point, important to understand that the potential for a future disruption and damage data is exfiltrated. one of these systems was sent to forensic specialists who discovered previously unidentified due to similar attacks remains significant. malware. Leveraging this new sample, malware was then found on other still operational 3 YEARS 60,000 Computers Infected systems. In the end, all systems had to be rebuilt from clean hardware to ensure complete eradication. 1,000 Centrifuges Damaged 8

9 How SureView Suite Makes a Difference Raytheon s SureView product family is a sophisticated suite of cybersecurity and analytics solutions that deliver unprecedented visibility across the enterprise with the express intent of managing enterprise risk, unearthing patterns in threat activity and profiling attacks to minimize disruption, contain exposure, and protect business critical assets. The products that make up the SureView suite were developed to operate independently or can be easily integrated to provide a full spectrum of enterprise security. The SureView family can protect your enterprise end-to-end and across all endpoints. Malware and advanced persistent threats can penetrate your network via multiple channels and attackers are becoming more adept at evading detection. Malicious insider behavior is often even more difficult to detect. But even if these types of threats are detected, security professionals need forensics and analytics tools to be able to assess the damage and remediate the attack. The SureView family includes the tools needed to effectively detect threats originating from both inside and outside the network and analyze threat movement so that they can be quickly controlled and contained. In this e-book we leveraged the combined capabilities of three of our cyber products listed below: SureView Analytics Leverages federated searching across the enterprise to connect disparate systems data. Coupled with automated data discovery tools and advanced investigative analytics, these capabilities result in a security program where analysts time is spent quickly developing and responding to actionable intelligence. SureView Threat Protection Detects zero-day attacks (advanced persistent threats) via an open architected platform covering web, and endpoints with unique integration capabilities. SureView Insider Threat Provides unprecedented visibility, rich data content and contextual awareness SureView of user activity Analytics via Overview a broad array of sensors. Web Pages System Unstructured Data Social Media System Health SIEM Hackers Malware s LINK ANALYSIS TEMPORAL IP Addresses Mobile GEOSPATIAL STATISTICAL Relational Databases 9

10 Conclusion Effective cyber security is not about preventing all possible attacks. Rather, it s about mitigating damage when attacks do occur. Simply put: What you don t know can hurt you, and the longer you don t know it, the more it hurts. Raytheon Websense s SureView product suite enables the access of data from multiple, disparate sources. It actively mines, correlates, and aggregates that data, then presents alerts, details, and actionable intelligence to an analyst in real time, while an attack is in its early stages. Analysts can quickly and effectively query for additional information using leads generated by the analytical platform to understand the scope and mechanisms of an attack, enabling the quick deployment of countermeasures before the attack progresses beyond the initial stages. Attackers need time in a network to inflict damage, and SureView Suite denies them that time. Learn more about SureView Suite Learn more about the SureView Suite and how powerful capabilities reduce the dwell time to eradication of threats. Contact Us Toll Free Follow us on 2015 Raytheon Websense. All Rights Reserved. 10

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